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Alright, we are excited to be at the keynote address of our college of liberal arts research conference

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and I want to introduce somebody near and dear, provost Tom Sudkamp who is going to do a few remarks.

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And somebody has taken my little introduction so I'm going to have to go by memory here Tom.

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But Tom has been -- is it you? [laughing]. That's okay, I think I had it. but this will be good.

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00:00:31,840 --> 00:00:39,080

[laughing] I was going to wing it there. So Tom Sudkamp is the provost and vice president for curriculum and instruction

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and he has served here at Wright State University for 33 years as professor and Chair of Department of Computer Science.

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and as well as three terms as president of the faculty senate and we are really pleased to have Tom here to say a few remarks at our research conference.

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It's our second annual one and we're excited to be here.

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[applause]

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Well I am excited to be here and I thank Kristen for the invitation,

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because this is what we do as faculty, that we want to be talking about, we want our students to be talking about,

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we all want to be seeing the types of research we do, the types of scholarship, the working with our students as a primary objective of our goals here as faculty.

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So today's conference is a wonderful opportunity for a number of people.

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I looked through the list, across from multiple disciplines here, talking about things that interest them, that light a fire inside both the researcher and the students

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and bring new and exciting things to the classroom as you bring that back.

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I do regret that I wasn't here earlier, I just go here at the last point to hear about you know, the looking...

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I can't even say the right words, but the looking a the Greek Mycenaean pottery and artifacts.

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I'll just throw a kick-in to show how little I know about any of this: If you wanna watch a great TV series, The Story of England is terrific series on looking at artifacts and

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tracing from the pre-Roman to the modern day. I push that because I like that show so much.

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It has nothing to do with what we're talking about here today, but what we are talking about is all the things that you do.

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This is as Kristen said, the second research conference, the second in I hope a long line of such things, because it is the heart and soul of a faculty member.

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We have two key elements. One is working with our students and the second is love of our scholarship.

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So I always enjoy the areas that my research is in, although I confess these days I spend more time with bureaucracy than research.

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So that gives me a more exciting time to be able to hear the things that you're doing. That's what I'm looking forward to doing this afternoon.

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I did mention that one of the key things that's important across all of our disciplines is getting students involved in our research.

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When you have an opportunity to do that, it magnifies what you're doing. It's not just your learning, it's moving it on to the next generation

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and helping develop the research skills that you have, helping them move forward in their careers.

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So with that I am looking forward to today's keynote address by doctor Liam Anderson and I know that you are too.

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It's a wonderful day outside, but more importantly it's a great day in here so please join me in welcoming Liam to the stage and I'm looking forward to the talk.

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[applause]

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But first let me say some nice things about Liam Anderson, who is the recipient of the CoLA Outstanding Research Award.

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And there's a good reason for that. His research is amazing both in quality and range and so is his teaching, because as we all know research invigorates teaching and teaching invigorates research.

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I can give you a sense of the range of Liam's work by reading the titles of the five, yes five, five books he's written since coming to the Department of Political Science at Wright State in 2000,

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Economic Power in a Changing International System from 2000,

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The Future of Iraq: Democracy, Dictatorship, or Division 2004.

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An Atlas of Middle Eastern Affairs 2009 -- but now in the second edition,

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Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise 2009,

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and Federal Solutions to Ethnic Problems; Accommodating Diversity from 2013.

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Many of these works have been done with collaborators, which does not have the work load, but doubles the complexity of compromise as a number of you here know very well.

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And that's not all he's done, add to the list roughly ten book chapters, ten refereed articles, and multiple other scholarly accomplishments.

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He's a research machine.

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Liam came to Wright State 2000, right after finishing his PhD at the University of Georgia.

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He also has a Masters of Philosophy in International Relations from the University of Cambridge, the English one and a BA with honors in Politics from the University of Nottingham.

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His interest in the transformation of politics in the Middle East, specifically on Iraq and the Kurds, has made him a popular scholarly source for the media.

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He's given interviews on Bloomberg, CNN, and for multiple radio stations and print outlets.

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He was invited to speak at the United Nations International Peace Institute in 2012.

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The complex issues of global politics and peace, security in a multi-ethnic citizenry, and how to transition a state into a democracy are not issues for the weak of heart.

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It is Liam's gift to be able to translate these complicated topics and places into something we can all understand, without sacrificing nuance.

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This makes him a great teacher as well as our outstanding scholar, as we will see.

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His talk is titled Autonomy as a Solution to Ethnic Problems: Some Insights into the Case of Iraq. Liam.

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[applause]

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Well I barely recognize myself from that. I really don't have anything to add, thank you.

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00:07:23,260 --> 00:07:36,160
Yeah, let me just bring up my... There's no really good reason why there's a picture of a puppy on the first slide there.

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Really the only reason is like why not, right? If nothing else, puppy drinking cappuccino, you can't go wrong with that, right?

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What I'm going to try and do today -- I've got about a half an hour I think, to give you some sense of the journey I've been on with research and

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some idea of what political science is about. The political scientists love their jargon, so I'll try and keep that to a minimum.

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Basically we love jargon, because it makes us sound more intelligent than historians.

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Well, makes us think we sound more intelligent than historians, but...

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Essentially I cut my teeth within the broader sphere that's sometimes called institutional design or constitutional engineering,

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on electoral systems. The first past the post system you see there on the left,

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that's the system they use here in the United States, it's also used in Britain. There are different electoral systems in play

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and what you find is that in fact, if you change the electoral system, you change something quite fundamental about the political system in predictable ways.

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So in other words, the field of constitutional engineering or institutional design is about how you use political institutions

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to structure the incentives for political actors, be they voters, political leaders, candidates for election, in such a way that you can predict... the outcomes become predictable.

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Not in a sort of really hardcore scientific way, but within reason. For example, I've got my little pointer here and I...

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[inaudible] and essentially that's what the system they have here. You just choose the candidate you want, he represents a party, and the guy with the most votes wins.

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What provides is incentives in fact, for smaller groupings political interest to amalgamate into larger groups, because it's a winner-take-all process.

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So typically what you end up with is a two party system. That in turn has implications.

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In a two party system, politics tends to be a kind of zero sum game, because if the other side wins it means you don't win, it means you lose.

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If you go for a proportional representation system, the incentive structures are different for voters and political actors

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and you tend to end up with a multi-party system. That in turn tends to produce more consensual politics, compromise, this sort of thing.

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Trust me, I'm not necessarily a fan of proportional representation, but these are the kind of fairly predictable outcomes from this.

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I wrote my Phd dissertation on this stuff, looking at how changing electoral systems effects things like macro-economic outcomes and so on and so forth.

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And I guess it all got a little bit, I don't know, sort of First World problem

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when I was writing on paper on the fact that moving to PR would increase inflation rates by 1.5% and decrease unemployment by.. and this sort of stuff.

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I guess at that point I thought, well probably there may be a more pressing need for application for this sort of knowledge than the developed world.

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The alternative vote is an interesting electoral system, because you can see from it there, you actually express preferences at the ballot box.

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You choose your first guy, Jay Doe gets the first vote, Jones gets the second, Carter third, so on and so forth.

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They way this system works is if my first preference votes, so if Doe gets eliminated, so when the votes are counted according to first preferences,

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the one with the fewest first preferences gets eliminated, my vote then counts against my second preference. So it transfers

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if Doe is eliminated, my vote then counts for Jones and so on and so forth.

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And one of the arguments is that in ethnically divided societies for example, this is a good electoral system to have, because it tends to produce moderate political candidates.

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Candidates gain nothing out of demonizing ethnic minorities, because they may need second preference votes of ethnic minorities.

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And so, they have an incentive to put forth a moderate platform on ethnic issues and so on and so forth.

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So the argument would be that AV's a good electoral system to have when you're coming out of an ethnic civil war, something like that.

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So that was really what I've been working on for the last ten years or so.

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Along side that, I've done quite a lot of work on Iraq. How I got involved in this is a long story and too long to bore you all with, but...

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And here's a basic ethno-sectarian map of Iraq. It's a kind of obscene simplification, but it gets the point across.

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Iraq is kind of a divided place. In the Southern parts where it's the dark green, that's mainly Shia Arabs live down there.

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They are a majority of the population, about 65%. The orange on the left of the screen there is

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mainly Sunni Arab areas and the brown in the North are Kurds.

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So Sunnis are probably 20% of the population, Kurds somewhere between 15-20%. There's also other groups:

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Turkmens, Christians, Yazidis, all manor of other groups. It's kind of a complicated place.

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But the reason I in a sense, got interested in Iraq was in the build up to the war in 2003.

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One of the issues that I addressed in this book was... my colleague by the way, who should take some of the credit, he's the one who had all the connections in Iraq,

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so he got us interviews with the Kurdish leaders and so on. But one of the issues I was interested in was.. Okay...

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If you go into Iraq and you get rid of basically the Sunni Arab regime and you bring in democracy

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and if it's by straight majority vote, what you're going to end up doing is inverting the power structure that's been in place since the 1920's.

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Then you have to think about how you're going to accommodate the Kurds and what their demands are. Do you need to have some sort of elaborate power sharing mechanisms at the center?

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Do you need the Kurds to have their own autonomous region and various other things?

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And so the issue of ethnic autonomy and ethnic federalism and this sort of stuff, I sort of became interested in that from looking at the case of Iraq.

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You can see on the right hand side of the screen there, basically a unitary system, central government has all the power.

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It can choose to give power to regions or states or whatever sub-level units, but it can also just take it away.

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The central government possess all the power. In a federal system power is constitutionally divided between the center and the states.

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So in the U.S. system. Article 1, Section... help me out... 6
[laughing]

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gives all the powers of the federal government and the 10th Amendment of the Constitution says if the federal government doesn't have it, according to the constitution, the states have it.

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So the central government can't just arbitrarily remove power from the states.

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So a federal system essentially gives autonomy the sub-units I guess. Now in the context of Iraq,

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As I say, I really came at this from the Kurdish point of view. It was really obvious that if you're going to go in, you're going to have to deal with the Kurds at some point, because the Kurds have been autonomous

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on their own, basically for ten years prior to this, under UN control more or less, protected by the US and the UK. They hadn't been part of Iraq at all.

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If you want the Kurds to rejoin Iraq as it were, kind of the minimum requirement is going to be that Kurds have some autonomy,

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but then that raises a whole number of other questions. How do allow the Kurds to have their autonomy guaranteed?

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Do you need say, elaborate power sharing mechanisms based on ethnicity at the center and so on and so forth. It all gets kind of complicated.

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The conclusion of the book by the way, was that if we're going to do this, go in and remove the regime, then it's going to be complicated and we'd better be prepared to hang around for 50 years to do it.

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So we really need to do a Japan or Germany on Iraq. The only drawback is we thought the Iraq people wouldn't be okay with that

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and so it wasn't a very optimistic book let's say.

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The consensus among political scientists at this time was that giving the Kurds an autonomous region would be a really really bad idea.

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And there are a number of articles in quite influential journals, journals like Foreign Affairs and so on, talking about what to do with Iraq afterwards

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and the argument basically was: if you give the Kurds their own autonomous region, essentially what you do is you deepen and strengthen their ethnic identity.

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You harden the ethnic divisions between the Iraqs... the Kurds and the Arabs inside Iraq

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and you give them institutions, quite powerful institutions. So again, this is Masoud Barzani is the President of Kurdistan.

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There he is,, Masoud. This is the Kurdish Army. Kurd actually have kind of two armies, but the Peshmerga, they're very capable armed forces. They're they guys we are now basically funding weapons and things to to fight ISIS.

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They're the ones that actually fought ISIS rather than run away. Kurdish Parliament there and Kurdish flag. So essentially you invest the Kurds with

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a sense of their separateness from the rest of Iraq and in the end what you're doing is paving the way for the Kurds to leave Iraq, to secede from Iraq.

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So it's a really really bad idea to give them autonomy. That was conventional wisdom. The broader argument here is against the whole idea of ethnic autonomy

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and again, this is I would say the bulk of the literature in political science says this is not a good idea.

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The broader argument is about the balance between the center and ethnic regions as it were and how difficult it is to maintain that balance,

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because all the issues that arise naturally in a federal system between the center and the periphery, things like education.

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In an ethnic environment where you have an ethnic autonomous region, the contents of textbooks matter a whole lot; how you tell history in your schools.

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Things like that. All of these issues can be resolved where there are no ethnic divisions become magnified when you have ethnic autonomy

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So it's preserving a balance between the center and the units is kind of impossible.

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So I guess the again, the conventional wisdom is that this ethnic autonomy is a bad solution.

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It either ends up in the secession of the ethnic unit or else the central government, sort of re-centralizes the system and gets rid of the institutions of autonomy.

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SO it fails either one way or the other. The poster child for this sort of failure is the Soviet Union.

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A lot of these republics, I mean you could say some of them had a preexisting identity.

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Georgia, Georgians, the population of Georgia knew what it was to be Georgian. The three Baltic states: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia,

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they weren't absorbed until 1939, they had a sort of preexisting sense of identity.

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But some of these other ones, I mean Kazakhstan was kind of a creation of the Soviet Union.

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Basically the Soviet Union said "well there your borders... you are now land of the Kazakhs, go and be Kazakhs and so the Kazakhs have invented an identity for themselves

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essentially and I saw recently in the news that they now have a Kazakh version of Game of Thrones

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in order for them to track their own identity back to you know, a couple of a thousand years and things like that.

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And so in a sense in Moldova, Moldova's Romania or essentially a chunk of Romania that was chopped out by the Soviets.

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Now there is a Moldovan Identity. So in a sense, the Soviet Union created these identities

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and of course come 199, turns out that not all of these guys want to remain part of the Soviet Union and it falls apart along its lines of its ethnic units.

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Another good example is Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's six republics: Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Bosnia.

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And again, the idea essentially is you organize the system around ethnic autonomy,

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ultimately you reinforce ethnic identities and you make the emergence of some sort of transcendence Yugoslav identity, all but impossible.

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In fact the Yugoslavs used to keep track of this on a census. They used to ask the question: what's your primary source of identity? And the average was about 3% of the population would say Yugoslav.

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The rest would say "I'm primarily Croat" or I'm Serb" or whatever and so it never succeeded in generating an overarching identity that could hold it all together.

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So given that that's what the conventional wisdom among political scientists was, the question is well then it's still the problem what do you do with the Kurds, right?

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The argument that most political scientists put forward. This was the preferred solution, was this idea of territorial federalism

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where you actually draw boundary lines to chop up the ethnic group

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and the idea here is that -- and it would have worked in the case of the Kurds -- you divide up the Kurds into three separate units. Then each unit in a sense, acquires its own sort of separate identity

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and you kind of activate divisions within Kurdish community.

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You prevent the emergence of this unified Kurdish entity that can then challenge the central government.

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So essentially it's a divide and conquer logic through the drawing of boundary lines of federal sub-units.

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And in fact, on the right there is a map of -- they were the eighteen governorates in place in Iraq at the time the regime was overthrown.

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So you actually wouldn't have had to do anything. You could have left that map in place and you would have had the three northern governorates there would have been overwhelming Kurdish,

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but they would have had, they would have developed separate interests and so on and so forth. So that was the preferred solution of political scientists

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and it's a very I think, quite intellectually pleasing solution and it's been shown to work in some places.

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Nigeria is a good example. I don't want to get too deep into this, but that was what Nigeria looked like when it obtained independence from Britain

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in 1960. It was three units organized kind of roughly around ethnic groups.

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So the Western Yoruba, the Eastern region was Igbo, Northern region Hausa Fulani essentially.

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So each ethnic group got its own region. What ended up happening was you could see the Northern region's much bigger than the rest. It had a bigger population and it basically overpowered the other two regions.

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And because it was taken over by an ethnic group or captured by an ethnic group. This came to assume

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the feeling that it was an ethnic sort of imposition by the Hausa Fulani on the Igbo and Yoruba

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ends up civil war, the Igbo try to secede calling themselves the Republic of Biafra, ends up killing a million people, total disaster.

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The solution in Nigeria was chop it up.

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00:23:00,760 --> 00:23:09,240

That way you -- and the argument was you can activate sub-ethnic divisions among the Hausa Fulani and amongst the Yoruba and the Igbo.

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00:23:09,240 --> 00:23:15,020

So you avoid this sort of cataclysmic collision of ethnic identities at the center.

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00:23:15,020 --> 00:23:21,100

And in fact, the Nigerians just went haywire over this stuff and they just kept on dividing and dividing and dividing.

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00:23:21,100 --> 00:23:31,840

They're now 36 different units, but you know, Nigeria in some ways is not a raging success, but the fact that Nigeria is still together as a single country is in some ways...

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00:23:31,840 --> 00:23:40,900

most if you've read most experts on Nigeria, they say there's no way this could have happened unless these original boundary lines have been chopped up.

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00:23:40,900 --> 00:23:45,640

So that was kind of the idea, we do that in Iraq and everything will work out fine.

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00:23:45,640 --> 00:23:52,260

The real problem was that if you knew anything about the Kurds, the Kurds are never ever ever going to accept that,

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00:23:52,260 --> 00:23:58,200

because essentially this is a divide and conquer tactic, it's deliberately designed to divide them up.

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00:23:58,200 --> 00:24:05,100

And the Kurds were absolutely adamant "this isn't going to happen to us". So you then invent kind of an impasse.

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00:24:05,100 --> 00:24:13,200

If you listen to political scientists, political scientists will tell you: ethnic autonomy is a really bad idea.

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00:24:13,200 --> 00:24:23,420

So don't do that, instead do this, but this is not a politically feasible solution. It's not actually practical in the real world,

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00:24:23,420 --> 00:24:26,900

because the Kurds would never ever have accepted this.

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00:24:26,900 --> 00:24:35,300

So in the end then there's not much political science has to inform these poor guys on the ground who are thinking "how are we going to design the system?"

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00:24:35,300 --> 00:24:43,900

Because the solution they propose is politically unfeasible and the most logical solution, political scientists will tell you, doesn't work.

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00:24:43,900 --> 00:24:55,460

So okay, my thought at the time was look, we have an obligation I think, to be a bit more helpful and a bit more useful as political scientists.

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00:24:55,460 --> 00:25:02,000

And so one of the things that I worked on was trying to figure out in fact what is the current record of ethnic autonomy?

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00:25:02,000 --> 00:25:07,780

How many sort of ethnic federal arrangements have their been since 1945?

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00:25:07,780 --> 00:25:17,140

And then even look, how many have succeeded and how many have failed? So how many have resulted in either secession of the ethnic unit or the re-centralization of the center or whatever?

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00:25:17,140 --> 00:25:23,280

And if you look at it, you that there's some failures certainly, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and so on.

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00:25:23,280 --> 00:25:28,580

And obviously the Soviet Union is pretty substantively significant as a failure.

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00:25:28,580 --> 00:25:38,800

But there have also been quite a lot of successes. Belgium's still around. I mean again, it's not a model of political efficiency, but it hasn't suffered a succession yet. Flanders is still there.

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00:25:38,800 --> 00:25:49,600

Canada came close in 1995, but Canada's still around. Switzerland, India has a federal system based on language essentially.

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00:25:49,600 --> 00:25:58,260

So there are a whole bunch of successes as well. And so for me as a political scientist what I wanted to know is what explains...

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00:25:58,260 --> 00:26:03,460

Is there something systematic that explains the failures rather than the successes?

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00:26:03,460 --> 00:26:08,980

Because if we can explain why some are more likely to succeed than others,

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00:26:08,980 --> 00:26:14,360

maybe we can actually help guys on the ground who actually have to design these systems.

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00:26:14,360 --> 00:26:20,720

Maybe this can be something practical that can be used you know, it has a real world application.

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00:26:20,720 --> 00:26:27,800

And so ultimately what I looked at really was the internal structure, how are things structured?

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00:26:27,800 --> 00:26:37,280

And in fact, there are three different ways to structure ethnic autonomy. You can do the full ethno-federation thing, which is where all the units are essentially ethnically defined.

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00:26:37,280 --> 00:26:46,860

So every single of societies major ethnic groups gets its own homeland, Soviet Unions another example, Czechoslovakia, so on.

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00:26:46,860 --> 00:26:59,480

You can also do this, which is where a smaller ethnic group gets its autonomous area, but the rest of the country isn't a federal system, it's a unitary system.

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00:26:59,480 --> 00:27:06,020

So Moldova's a good example of this for Gagauzia is an autonomous ethnic region within Moldova.

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00:27:06,020 --> 00:27:12,140

It's a small part of the population, it's probably 4% of the Moldovan population.

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00:27:12,140 --> 00:27:25,140

It's survived today, it's don't reasonably well. So that's a different way to organize it. And they way that I thought was going to be the most effective was the way that the Canadian system is organized.

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00:27:25,140 --> 00:27:31,060

This... I'm sorry about the jargon, I said no jargon and then partial ethno-federation. Jargon, right?

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00:27:31,060 --> 00:27:40,040

But the way the Canadian system is structured, you have Quebec which is the ethnic unit, ethnolinguistic if you want to call it that.

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00:27:40,040 --> 00:27:50,860

But rather than have the rest of Canada as a sort of Anglo unit -- so you have a federation of two units, an Anglo unit and a French speaking unit,

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00:27:50,860 --> 00:27:56,620

the Anglo Unit is chopped up, it's divided up into multiple units, into multiple provinces.

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00:27:56,620 --> 00:28:04,580

And the interesting thing about Canada is what you see over time is if you look there at Alberta and Saskatchewan, they're...

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00:28:04,580 --> 00:28:08,880

I mean they were not part of the original federation, they were created in 1905.

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00:28:08,880 --> 00:28:18,260

And since 1905 what has emerged is a distinct Albertan Identity. These people feel attached to the land.

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00:28:18,260 --> 00:28:27,980

They feel attached to so... and in Alberta now you have textbooks that talk about the evolution of Albertan identity and this sort of thing.

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00:28:27,980 --> 00:28:36,000

And arguably, the Albertans are more likely secede from the union than Quebec was.

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00:28:36,000 --> 00:28:41,420

Saskatchewan again, there's quite a strong sense of regional identity in Saskatchewan

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00:28:41,420 --> 00:28:50,800

and it's an entirely kind of created, it's socially constructed identity. You construct it by drawing lines on a map and saying "you are now in Alberta."

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00:28:50,800 --> 00:28:56,520

You wait fifty years and then people start to think and believe like Albertans.

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00:28:56,520 --> 00:29:06,160

What this does is it creates a system that's more balanced, because when you have struggles between the provinces and the central government.

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00:29:06,160 --> 00:29:14,060

Quebec isn't going to be on its own. It's in alliance with other Anglo units like Alberta and Saskatchewan.

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00:29:14,060 --> 00:29:21,560

They all have a vested interest in protecting their autonomy. So it doesn't become ethno-fied in the same way

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00:29:21,560 --> 00:29:29,760

So the argument was India's like this as well, there's others, Switzerland's like this, Russia's like this, these are better balanced systems was the argument.

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00:29:29,760 --> 00:29:38,240

So essentially if we look at the probability of success and this is... I'm working on a paper right now with a colleague Dr. Koster.

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00:29:38,240 --> 00:29:42,940

He's my number cruncher so I'll shout out to him.

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00:29:42,940 --> 00:29:53,640

We argue that basically partial ethno-federations are going to have the highest probability of success. Ethnic federacies and full ethno-federations are going to have a lower probability of success.

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00:29:53,640 --> 00:30:04,440

So you then go out and get your caseload. So there's all out cases. You see, these are all the ethnic units of Russia, there are 21 ethnic units in Russia.

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00:30:04,440 --> 00:30:12,660

Spain, again there are three and we counted Andalusia as a separate ethnic unit, but Catalonia.

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00:30:12,660 --> 00:30:21,780

And so some of these succeeded and some of them failed over time. So this is everything, all of them in the the world that there have been since 1945.

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00:30:21,780 --> 00:30:26,780

So you can code these things according to the structure of the system within which they operate

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00:30:26,780 --> 00:30:33,400

and you can code for other things that may also effect probability of success or failure like level of democracy.

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00:30:33,400 --> 00:30:40,360

The more democratic the system, the more likely it is to succeed, the less likely you are to get secession and so on and so forth.

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00:30:40,360 --> 00:30:46,340

I'm going to show you numbers, because Dr. Koster would never forgive me for not showing numbers.

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00:30:46,340 --> 00:30:52,200

But there's basically, once you've coded it you can crunch the numbers and this is what you get, you get

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00:30:52,200 --> 00:31:03,920

and let me interperate it for you. Essentially what this tells us is partial ethno-federations have a higher probability of success than either full ethno-federations or ethnic federacies.

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00:31:03,920 --> 00:31:11,580

So partial ethno-federations are the way to go, essentially. But the interesting thing and this is thing that I found interesting,

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00:31:11,580 --> 00:31:26,400

is that this is -- trust me you can measure democracy though -- this is average democratic environment. So you go from -2 down here to 10 is actually the maximum the you get [inaudible]

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00:31:26,400 --> 00:31:35,160

that at really high levels of democracy -- so you get the 10 here --- it actually doesn't matter which of these three structures you have,

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00:31:35,160 --> 00:31:43,400

because once the system become fully democratic you notice norms of compromise are kind of embedded and so they can normally sort themselves out.

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00:31:43,400 --> 00:31:57,080

Same thing at the bottom end here, if we extended this a little bit longer the lines all converge and we're back to -3. So in other words, in really really undemocratic environments it doesn't matter which of these three you chose, they're all going to fail.

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00:31:57,080 --> 00:32:04,020

It matters most in the middle here. So in other words, if a democratic environment of 2,

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00:32:04,020 --> 00:32:20,780

which happens to be where most of the words ethnic conflict zones are, you've got almost zero chance if you adopt a full ethnic federation, little higher if you adopt an ethnic federacie, much higher if you adopt a partial ethno-federation.

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00:32:20,780 --> 00:32:29,820

So which of these three structures you choose, the importance of it varies according to how democratic the system.

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00:32:29,820 --> 00:32:39,300

And if you think about where awe are going to inevitably have ethnic autonomous regions, we're going to have them in Syria if Syria survives it's civil war.

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00:32:39,300 --> 00:32:48,920

We're going to have in Ukraine without a doubt. Georgia has two bits of it that are separatists, they operate as kind of independent things.

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00:32:48,920 --> 00:32:55,700

If they're ever going to come back to Georgia you know, it's going to be as autonomous units within a Georgian state.

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00:32:55,700 --> 00:33:06,800

So in the context of Iraq of course, what we have now is ISIS kind of rampaging throughout Syria and Northern Iraq.

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00:33:06,800 --> 00:33:14,140

A lot of the reason why ISIS was able to take root in Iraq was because of the prime minister down there, Nouri al-Maliki

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00:33:14,140 --> 00:33:27,360

who really targeted Sunni and particularly Sunni political leaders. So the Sunni's were participating in the political process and al-Maliki started traking them down; hunting them down and weeding them out basically.

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00:33:27,360 --> 00:33:35,740

Because from... he was kind of a paranoid leader and for him they were all basically terrorists and you know and Al-Qaeda sympathizers and the what.

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00:33:35,740 --> 00:33:46,580

So I mean he basically issued an arrest warrant for the Sunni Vice President of Iraq, Tariq al-Hashimi and sort of stage managed a kangaroo court to sentence him to death.

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00:33:46,580 --> 00:33:57,040

So al-Hashimi is I think, probably in Qatar right now. Same with the finance minister. So he was basically hunting down prominent Sunni Arab, popular Sunni Arab politicians.

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00:33:57,040 --> 00:34:06,720

This created a big protests in the Sunni Arab areas and that's how ISIS kind of got its talons into the Sunni Arab part of Iraq.

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00:34:06,720 --> 00:34:13,560

Once ISIS is gone the question of what we do with the Sunni Arab part of Iraq is going to rise once more and the question is:

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00:34:13,560 --> 00:34:20,260

do we need to protect Sunnis from leaders like al-Maliki?

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00:34:20,260 --> 00:34:24,780

There going to need probably their own autonomous area.

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00:34:24,780 --> 00:34:39,380

This is the most, I mean this is... Joe Biden [laughing]... I mean speaking intellectuals, Joe Biden, this is his favored solution and also several of the think tanks, they say "alright,

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00:34:39,380 --> 00:34:48,960

given that we've got three groups in Iraq, give them each their own unit so that Shiia can get there Shiistan, Sunnis get the middle bit, and Kurds get the Northern bit.

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00:34:48,960 --> 00:34:57,760

Well we can actually calculate what the likelihood of this surviving is relative to other structures

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00:34:57,760 --> 00:35:14,160

and that essentially is calculation. If you can see there, if you have... Can you read it or not? The ethnic federacie, so that's the Kurdistan region where the rest of Iraq stays unitary, the probability to survive is about 13%.

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00:35:14,160 --> 00:35:23,020

An ethnic federacie with a Kurdish regiona and a Sunni region, you can see increases a little bit. The worst of all options is the Joe Biden option:

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00:35:23,020 --> 00:35:29,900

three ethnic units. That has very low probability of success and the best is this,

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00:35:29,900 --> 00:35:37,560

partial ethno-federation with a Kurdish region and the rest of Iraq, Shiia Iraq stays chopped up, divided up.

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00:35:37,560 --> 00:35:48,500

So I hashed out using paint, the paint option on something. There you go. So you've got.. it's very rough.

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00:35:48,500 --> 00:35:55,800

The Kurdish region up here, Sunni region here and you retain these divisions within the Shiia South.

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00:35:55,800 --> 00:36:04,460

And again what this will do if you know anything about the Shiia South, you actually know that in fact there are different constituencies, Shiia are not a homogeneous block.

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00:36:04,460 --> 00:36:17,000

Basra has a sense of itself as being a cosmopolitan open city, the shrine cities Karbala and Najaf are much more socially conservative, they're very different economic interest and this sort of thing.

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00:36:17,000 --> 00:36:26,980

So you retain those divisions within the Shiia block. So in a sense, the Shiia would be dividing and conquering themselves.

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00:36:26,980 --> 00:36:31,760

But in the end that's the best chance of survival for Iraq.

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00:36:31,760 --> 00:36:40,320

Beyond that, you know, the same thing could be said, I mean Syria, the Kurds have already written their constitution for a post-war Syria

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00:36:40,320 --> 00:36:47,040

that basically has themselves as having an autonomous region in the North.

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00:36:47,040 --> 00:36:56,920

We have a choice. I mean we can either go to war against the Kurds to take that territory back or write a constitution for Syria post-war, I mean the let Syrians write it themselves

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00:36:56,920 --> 00:37:05,240

post-war, that acknowledges an autonomous Kurdish unit. The the question becomes how do you organize the rest of Syria?

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00:37:05,240 --> 00:37:16,560

So these, you know, these are sorts of questions that are going to be with us for a long period of time and I guess what I would try to do with research and particularly with Dr. Koster is

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00:37:16,560 --> 00:37:25,180

to figure out something useful to be able to present to people rather than just say don't do this, it doesn't work, here's the thing that works.

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00:37:25,180 --> 00:37:31,880

Where as in fact the thing that works is of course politically impossible to do. So I guess that's...

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00:37:31,880 --> 00:37:38,680

Am I done with my time? Yes, I am. So I shall stop and take any questions, except for Marin Levine

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00:37:38,680 --> 00:37:46,520

[applause]

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00:37:46,520 --> 00:37:52,780

Uhh [laughing]

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00:37:52,780 --> 00:38:11,400

I greatly appreciate your work from the inside [inaudible] the partial ethno whatever you call it [inaudible] the contribution.

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00:38:11,400 --> 00:38:21,000

You're well aware that nation building, however you define it is hard work and is impossible to do.

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00:38:21,000 --> 00:38:25,860

It's not impossible. It's hard work, I'll concede you that.

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00:38:25,860 --> 00:38:35,840

Okay, whatever. What I would just suggest here is to add to your work and your contribution [inaudible]

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00:38:35,840 --> 00:38:44,280

But in the regions that have the most severe and dangerous conflict in recent memory, killing,

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00:38:44,280 --> 00:39:00,760

that that isn't enough that it's a word [inaudible] ever since we've kind of been unifying it. [inaudible] sort of ethno-divisions [inaudible].

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00:39:00,760 --> 00:39:03,460

I think majority rules is a much better view.

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00:39:03,460 --> 00:39:10,800

Context makes a difference. But I think it's still a matter that we have to start thinking of in terms of historical [inaudible]

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00:39:10,800 --> 00:39:21,040

In terms of majority rules isn't going to work [Inaudible]

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00:39:21,040 --> 00:39:34,900

To restrain the government the majority [inaudible] basically formulating Liepot's associatioinal democracy for the divided society

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00:39:34,900 --> 00:39:42,060

Well except that Liepot's idea was much more to do with power sharing at the center. So.. Sorry?

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00:39:42,060 --> 00:39:44,300

His idea was to do what exactly?

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00:39:44,300 --> 00:39:51,380

He was much more focused on power sharing at the center so that the governments basically...

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00:39:51,380 --> 00:39:59,060

if it's Iraq you have the Kurds get one position: the president, the Sunni's get the vice president, the Shiia get the prime minister,

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00:39:59,060 --> 00:40:06,480

and all three have to agree anything, but that's much more his line rather than in terms of autonomy.

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00:40:06,480 --> 00:40:10,000

That was not really apart of what he did as it were,

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00:40:10,000 --> 00:40:17,700

but I guess his way of looking at the world was you use ethnic groups as the building blocks of the system

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00:40:17,700 --> 00:40:29,800

and I think what this does, if you think about Canada, that's not using ethnic blocks, it's allowing the French speakers in Canada to have an area of autonomy,

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00:40:29,800 --> 00:40:36,980

but it actually is chopping up the English block and relying on new identities emerging from that and so on and so forth.

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00:40:36,980 --> 00:40:42,520

So in some ways it's a theoretical contradiction to what Liepot believes.

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00:40:42,520 --> 00:40:47,840

He was a primordialist rather than a social constructivist.

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00:40:47,840 --> 00:40:50,040

[inaudible]

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00:40:50,040 --> 00:40:56,140

That's why I use him. Jargon is the last resort of the villain.
[laughing]

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00:40:56,140 --> 00:41:05,660

How would you cut up the Sunni section of Iraq and how do you just cut of the Shiia section? I understand [inaudible]

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00:41:05,660 --> 00:41:09,640

If you go by the Canada model [inaudible]

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00:41:09,640 --> 00:41:15,680

The key thing is cutting up the largest predominant population, right?

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00:41:15,680 --> 00:41:23,980

So that's Hindi speakers are in India for example and not a majority of the population. they're about 40%.

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00:41:23,980 --> 00:41:33,820

But they're chopped up into multiple federal sub-units along side linguistically homogeneous units like Tamil Nadu and Kerala and places like this.

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00:41:33,820 --> 00:41:48,180

It's chopping up the dominant... the bit that would otherwise dominate the whole thing and you chop them up and you hope that there's a sort of... that that activates intra- or sub-ethnic divisions within the majority ethnic group

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00:41:48,180 --> 00:41:54,880

and therefore diminishes the fear on the part of the ethnic minority groups, that they're going to be dominated by an ethnic majority.

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00:41:54,880 --> 00:42:00,380

You make it more difficult for an ethnic majority or dominant ethnic group to dominate everybody else.

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00:42:00,380 --> 00:42:03,960

[inaudible]

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00:42:03,960 --> 00:42:04,460

Yes.

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00:42:04,460 --> 00:42:07,540

[inaudible]

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00:42:07,540 --> 00:42:08,040

Yes.

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00:42:08,040 --> 00:42:10,040

[inaudible]

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00:42:10,040 --> 00:42:19,240

I mean if it's possible, I mean, again, the Sunni's are not homogeneous. You know Anbar's a very tribal region.

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00:42:19,240 --> 00:42:29,440

It may be that the Sunni's actually don't want one single unit. Nineveh and Mosul is much less tribal, it's very Arab nationalist,

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00:42:29,440 --> 00:42:37,360

a range of former Baathists, a lot of former Baathists there. Maybe they feel themselves to have separate identities, they may not want a single unit.

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00:42:37,360 --> 00:42:43,280

The Kurds in Syria actually have in their constitution to have three units not one.

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00:42:43,280 --> 00:42:53,340

Well if the ethnic minority wants multiple units, I think it's all the better. It's very difficult to do that if a minority group wants to preserve its unity,

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00:42:53,340 --> 00:43:05,780

because then if you want to impose divisions on it, you've got to go to war against it. We would have had to fight the Kurds in 2005 to impose the preferred solution of most political scientists

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00:43:05,780 --> 00:43:09,840

and I don't know who was willing to go to war with the Kurds to do this.

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00:43:09,840 --> 00:43:19,200

[inaudible]

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00:43:19,200 --> 00:43:24,400

Well some of it depends on what circumstance you find yourself in.

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00:43:24,400 --> 00:43:32,200

The Kurds you know, in 2005 arguably were the most coherent, powerful, single group in Iraq.

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00:43:32,200 --> 00:43:43,340

They had an army, Iraq itself didn't even have an army. So there were practical, really severe practical problems to try to impose something on the Kurds that they didn't want

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00:43:43,340 --> 00:43:53,320

and most ethnic minority groups who have been fighting twenty years, for either independence or autonomy against an ethnic majority group,

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00:43:53,320 --> 00:44:01,260

by the time they sit around a peace table the ethnic majority group says "okay here's what we're going to offer you, we're going to divide and conquer you by chopping you up".

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00:44:01,260 --> 00:44:08,140

It just doesn't.. it's not feasible. So when an ethnic minority group wants to preserve its coherence and unity.

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00:44:08,140 --> 00:44:13,140

Unless you're prepared to impose a solution on them, then yes that's what you have to do.

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00:44:13,140 --> 00:44:21,000

I think it was Nigeria was the example, where they kept dividing up into smaller and smaller groups.

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00:44:21,000 --> 00:44:21,500

Yeah.

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00:44:21,500 --> 00:44:26,140

Is there diminishing returns on that kind of a [inaudible]?

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00:44:26,140 --> 00:44:38,780

[laughing] Yeah there is. The way the Nigerians did it, I mean it was really the first round of this.. hold on, let me get a map. The first round of this...

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00:44:38,780 --> 00:44:46,240

Here, so you start with a three-fold division and I mean I've had to deal with this in a very short space of time, but

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00:44:46,240 --> 00:44:52,860

this was seen as a very unstable thing, because you associate each of these three regions with it's own ethnic group.

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00:44:52,860 --> 00:45:00,680

Where as the Hausa Fulani are only 30% of the Nigerian population, but they were the majority within the Northern region, therefore they captured the Northern region

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00:45:00,680 --> 00:45:06,700

and therefore the Northern region was seen as a vehicle for Hausa Fulani dominance over the whole of Nigeria.

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00:45:06,700 --> 00:45:15,360

So the first division, that was actually implemented by a military dictator, basically. Hausa Fulani didn't want this to happen.

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00:45:15,360 --> 00:45:23,060

The military dictator said "tough, it's happening". And so that was designed to break up the large concentrations of ethnic groups

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00:45:23,060 --> 00:45:27,580

and activate sub-ethnic divisions and this sort of thing and it was quite effective.

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00:45:27,580 --> 00:45:35,360

Subsequently what they did was actually incentivize smaller bits to declare the want to become their own states.

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00:45:35,360 --> 00:45:45,740

For example, some of the revenues from oil, a certain amount goes to you as a state and it's equally divided.

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00:45:45,740 --> 00:45:53,180

So in a sense, it encourages, you know if you're Yoruba you get more money if you're ten states rather than two.

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00:45:53,180 --> 00:46:03,300

You get positions in a cabinet allocated on a state basis. So again, if you're either Yoruba and you've got two states,

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00:46:03,300 --> 00:46:09,340

you only get two cabinet positions and you get two slices of the pie. You subdivide into ten states, you get cabinet positions...

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00:46:09,340 --> 00:46:21,520

So they incentivize you know, subdivisions as it were. At some point I think the problem with a place like Nigeria is -- an hour and thirty-six -- a lot of these states aren't really capable of governing themselves.

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00:46:21,520 --> 00:46:32,820

They lack the resources to do it. So that starts to become a problem. The smaller and smaller chunks you get, the more difficult is for these to govern themselves in any sort of efficient way.

344

00:46:32,820 --> 00:46:38,340

So there are drawbacks. December.

345

00:46:38,340 --> 00:46:47,480

In the second republic you didn't [inaudible]

346

00:46:47,480 --> 00:46:57,500

They went to a presidential system in 2001. And so it's all about [inaudible].

347

00:46:57,500 --> 00:47:06,100

Yeah I mean look, I thin I started with this quote. I started with a puppy, obviously. Yeah.

348

00:47:06,100 --> 00:47:15,520

"Good political institutions make political idiocy more difficult, but not impossible to achieve". There's a limit to what you can achieve by manipulating political institutions.

349

00:47:15,520 --> 00:47:26,920

I think if you read most of the literature. I mean I'm not an expert on Nigeria, I know a lot about the federal system of federalism

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00:47:26,920 --> 00:47:34,180

and the people who write about this say " look, if they hadn't done this Nigeria was toast. It would not have survived".

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00:47:34,180 --> 00:47:42,180

But the reforms to the federal system and the preservation of the federalist system at least, would have helped keep Nigeria together.

352

00:47:42,180 --> 00:47:48,440

[inaudible]

353

00:47:48,440 --> 00:47:55,000

Yeah I mean, How else would you govern it I guess would be another question.

354

00:47:55,000 --> 00:48:05,200

I mean there are so many other factors besides the ethnic division of [inaudible]

355

00:48:05,200 --> 00:48:11,620

Well I only picked... I mean I'm not arguing in favor of Nigeria -- I don't know where it's gone now -- I'm only arguing...

356

00:48:11,620 --> 00:48:21,280

I only brought it up, because this is the argument that political scientists put forward about what to do with Iraq, that this is an effective way to do it and whatever. So it's not...

357

00:48:21,280 --> 00:48:28,800

My argument doesn't depend on Nigeria being a thumping success. It's an illustration of a different approach to drawing lines.

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00:48:28,800 --> 00:48:38,320

So you draw them to divide up ethnic groups rather than around the ethnic group. So I'm quite happy to concede that you're absolutely right,

359

00:48:38,320 --> 00:48:45,720

because this isn't, it's not what I'm in favor of anyway, so not what I'm advocating.

360

00:48:45,720 --> 00:48:54,780

But it was a Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Horowitz who kind of looked at this, but feel free to disagree with him. Promod.

361

00:48:54,780 --> 00:48:57,320

Yeah, if you can go back to that table

362

00:48:57,320 --> 00:48:57,880

The Puppy?

363

00:48:57,880 --> 00:49:03,060

[inaudible]

364

00:49:03,060 --> 00:49:16,920

Yeah I should say that the success and failure, it's on terms... Success and failure are defined by those who have criticized ethnic autonomy arrangements.

365

00:49:16,920 --> 00:49:27,560

So in other words, it's a failure if the government re-centralized the system and eliminated the ethnic autonomy or if the ethnic unit seceded from the whole.

366

00:49:27,560 --> 00:49:32,180

It's a success if the thing's still together and it hasn't been re-centralized.

367

00:49:32,180 --> 00:49:44,160

[inaudible] What I'm seeing is a lot of or most of these [inaudible]. Well, not going to happen.

368

00:49:44,160 --> 00:49:54,800

And on the one hand for example, [inaudible]

369

00:49:54,800 --> 00:50:03,860

On another hand, the system was deeply simple and you can look at India for example,

370

00:50:03,860 --> 00:50:17,200
part of the reason why India succeeded was because at the same time
[inaudible]

371
00:50:17,200 --> 00:50:21,340
at the same time democracy [inaudible]

372
00:50:21,340 --> 00:50:21,840
Right.

373
00:50:21,840 --> 00:50:31,300
And that democracy actually made possible for the different groups,
differen kinds of [inaudible]

374
00:50:31,300 --> 00:50:32,160
Sure.

375
00:50:32,160 --> 00:50:35,900
And then also India had [inaudible]

376
00:50:35,900 --> 00:50:36,400
Right

377
00:50:36,400 --> 00:50:37,940
And that meant...

378
00:50:37,940 --> 00:50:38,440
[cough]

379
00:50:38,440 --> 00:50:47,320
So what I'm saying there is many democracies are transplants in a
system of the [inaudible]

380
00:50:47,320 --> 00:50:54,600
is a must for any [inaudible] the country [inaudible]

381
00:50:54,600 --> 00:50:55,260
Well...

382
00:50:55,260 --> 00:50:57,060

[inaudible]

383

00:50:57,060 --> 00:50:57,560

I.. I..

384

00:50:57,560 --> 00:51:04,040

Pakistan you have [inaudible]. On the one hand you have the Pakistan
[inaudible]

385

00:51:04,040 --> 00:51:04,540

Right.

386

00:51:04,540 --> 00:51:08,280

And then you also have the [inaudible]

387

00:51:08,280 --> 00:51:08,800

Right.

388

00:51:08,800 --> 00:51:17,140

[inaudible]

389

00:51:17,140 --> 00:51:27,380

[inaudible]

390

00:51:27,380 --> 00:51:35,000

[inaudible]

391

00:51:35,000 --> 00:51:43,560

[inaudible]

392

00:51:43,560 --> 00:51:49,900

So what I'm saying is that how can we think [inaudible] whether it is

393

00:51:49,900 --> 00:51:56,640

how you run the political system in terms of how [inaudible]

394

00:51:56,640 --> 00:52:02,980

Well what you do is you run a logistic regression and you control for
democracy.

395

00:52:03,000 --> 00:52:10,400

So that.. I mean, again, my stats guys isn't here, but you forced me back to the numbers.

396

00:52:10,400 --> 00:52:18,020

I mean you can look at this one way, which is essentially these differences in structure matter even after controlling for level of democracy.

397

00:52:18,020 --> 00:52:24,400

That's what the numbers tell you. So essentially this is one way of taking democracy out of it.

398

00:52:24,400 --> 00:52:28,760

So you control for democracy, it still matters what structure you have.

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00:52:28,760 --> 00:52:36,760

But I think it's more interesting in fact, to think about it in terms of what I said, which is that it matters more at certain levels of democracy.

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00:52:36,760 --> 00:52:44,800

So I mean again, Pakistan, it may have.. once you have really low levels of democracy, you're going to fail, right? Probably.

401

00:52:44,800 --> 00:52:50,380

That's what the numbers tell you anyway. Really high levels of democracy, you're going to succeed. It doesn't really matter how you organize it.

402

00:52:50,380 --> 00:52:56,860

You know Finland can adopt whatever system it wants for its Swedish speakers and it's probably going to succeed.

403

00:52:56,860 --> 00:53:07,860

Where it matters most is somewhere in the middle, which is where we happen to find most of the post-conflict environments in which you have to start constructing you know, these institutions.

404

00:53:07,860 --> 00:53:19,920

So I accept your point, but that numerically or statistically is kind of controlled for in this analysis.

405

00:53:19,920 --> 00:53:24,580
[inaudible]

406

00:53:24,580 --> 00:53:25,140
Where's the beer?

407

00:53:25,140 --> 00:53:35,240
This event you come with all this [inaudible]

408

00:53:35,240 --> 00:53:44,400
is going to be more stable. How do you do that without [inaudible] ?

409

00:53:44,400 --> 00:53:46,400
Well but...

410

00:53:46,400 --> 00:53:59,380
Who is going to do that? How are leaders going to accept that?
[inaudible]

411

00:53:59,380 --> 00:54:02,300
And then we'll have a [inaudible]

412

00:54:02,300 --> 00:54:11,520
Well I mean you've got a choice. If you're a Shiia politician like the current prime minister, fortunately Maliki is gone now, but Haider al-Abadi, right?

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00:54:11,580 --> 00:54:19,680
He comes into power, he's seen what happens if you are a sectarian leader like Nouri al-Maliki, right?

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00:54:19,680 --> 00:54:29,380
So if he has an interest in preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq, then he knows that in the end the Sunnis have to have some sort of autonomy,

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00:54:29,380 --> 00:54:39,440

some sort of defense against the central government. He also, if he understands that the best way for Iraq to hold together and preserve it's territorial integrity,

416

00:54:39,440 --> 00:54:46,360

is to leave the south divided up into multiple units, to have a Sunni region and a Kurdish region, then he's got a choice.

417

00:54:46,360 --> 00:54:56,220

You know, you can either do that and hope that Iraq hold s together or not do that and end up fighting against Sunnis and Kurds until the end of time. I mean

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00:54:56,220 --> 00:55:04,700

yeah, I can't force them to do it and all political institutions can do is make idiocy more difficult, you know?

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00:55:04,700 --> 00:55:12,680

At some point you know, the interests of the political leaders have to be towards keeping the thing together.

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00:55:12,680 --> 00:55:18,320

If they don't want to live together then nobody can make them and the institutions can't do that, so. I mean it's a fair point, but

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00:55:18,320 --> 00:55:27,720

my job stops short of that. I'm not going to go over to Iraq and convince guys to do it, but.

422

00:55:27,720 --> 00:55:29,420

Alright lets' give him a hand please

423

00:55:29,420 --> 00:55:33,940

[applause]

424

00:55:33,940 --> 00:55:41,340

Alright thank you everybody, this was an excellent second CoLA Research Conference. I learned a lot [laughing]

425

00:55:41,340 --> 00:55:48,080

from everybody and it was really nice seeing Janet's slides, because those are my kind of slides. I appreciate them a lot

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00:55:48,080 --> 00:55:53,740

So I just want to make sure, I want to thank Stephanie Dickie for organizing everything. Thank you so much Stephanie.

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00:55:53,740 --> 00:55:56,860

[applause]

428

00:55:56,860 --> 00:56:10,520

And we also have our reception over here, so make sure everybody comes over and has camaraderie and libations and food and thank you so much for coming.