1
00:00:03,040 --> 00:00:09,880
Alright, we are excited to be at the keynote address of our college of
liberal arts research conference

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00:00:09,880 --> 00:00:17,600
and I want to introduce somebody near and dear, provost Tom Sudkamp
who is going to do a few remarks.

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00:00:17,640 --> 00:00:22,160
And somebody has taken my little introduction so I'm going to have to
go by memory here Tom.

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00:00:22,160 --> 00:00:31,840
But Tom has been -- is it you? [laughing]. That's okay, I think I had
it. but this will be good.

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00:00:31,840 --> 00:00:39,080
[laughing] I was going to wing it there. So Tom Sudkamp is the provost
and vice president for curriculum and instruction

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00:00:39,080 --> 00:00:47,660
and he has served here at Wright State University for 33 years as
professor and Chair of Department of Computer Science.

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00:00:47,660 --> 00:00:57,320
and as well as three terms as president of the faculty senate and we
are really pleased to have Tom here to say a few remarks at our
research conference.

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00:00:57,360 --> 00:01:00,860
It's our second annual one and we're excited to be here.

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00:01:00,860 --> 00:01:05,820
[applause]

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00:01:05,820 --> 00:01:11,100
Well I am excited to be here and I thank Kristen for the invitation,

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00:01:11,100 --> 00:01:19,620
because this is what we do as faculty, that we want to be talking
about, we want our students to be talking about,

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00:01:19,620 --> 00:01:30,460
we all want to be seeing the types of research we do, the types of
scholarship, the working with our students as a primary objective of
our goals here as faculty.

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00:01:30,460 --> 00:01:35,180
So today's conference is a wonderful opportunity for a number of
people.

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00:01:35,180 --> 00:01:48,520
I looked through the list, across from multiple disciplines here,
talking about things that interest them, that light a fire inside both
the researcher and the students

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00:01:48,520 --> 00:01:53,880
and bring new and exciting things to the classroom as you bring that
back.

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00:01:53,880 --> 00:02:02,320
I do regret that I wasn't here earlier, I just go here at the last
point to hear about you know, the looking...

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00:02:02,320 --> 00:02:13,920
I can't even say the right words, but the looking a the Greek
Mycenaean pottery and artifacts.

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00:02:13,920 --> 00:02:27,420
I'll just throw a kick-in to show how little I know about any of this:
If you wanna watch a great TV series, The Story of England is terrific
series on looking at artifacts and

19
00:02:27,420 --> 00:02:35,220
tracing from the pre-Roman to the modern day. I push that because I
like that show so much.

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00:02:35,220 --> 00:02:41,160
It has nothing to do with what we're talking about here today, but
what we are talking about is all the things that you do.

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00:02:41,160 --> 00:02:52,240

This is as Kristen said, the second research conference, the second in I hope a long line of such things, because it is the heart and soul of a faculty member.

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00:02:52,240 --> 00:03:00,200
We have two key elements. One is working with our students and the second is love of our scholarship.

23
00:03:00,200 --> 00:03:09,980
So I always enjoy the areas that my research is in, although I confess these days I spend more time with bureaucracy than research.

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00:03:09,980 --> 00:03:18,680
So that gives me a more exciting time to be able to hear the things that you're doing. That's what I'm looking forward to doing this afternoon.

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00:03:18,680 --> 00:03:28,240
I did mention that one of the key things that's important across all of our disciplines is getting students involved in our research.

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00:03:28,280 --> 00:03:36,600
When you have an opportunity to do that, it magnifies what you're doing. It's not just your learning, it's moving it on to the next generation

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00:03:36,600 --> 00:03:41,760
and helping develop the research skills that you have, helping them move forward in their careers.

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00:03:41,760 --> 00:03:51,160
So with that I am looking forward to today's keynote address by doctor Liam Anderson and I know that you are too.

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00:03:51,160 --> 00:04:01,300
It's a wonderful day outside, but more importantly it's a great day in here so please join me in welcoming Liam to the stage and I'm looking forward to the talk.

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00:04:01,300 --> 00:04:06,960
[applause]

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00:04:06,960 --> 00:04:15,520
But first let me say some nice things about Liam Anderson, who is the recipient of the CoLA Outstanding Research Award.

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00:04:15,520 --> 00:04:30,280
And there's a good reason for that. His research is amazing both in quality and range and so is his teaching, because as we all know research invigorates teaching and teaching invigorates research.

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00:04:30,280 --> 00:04:45,900
I can give you a sense of the range of Liam's work by reading the titles of the five, yes five, five books he's written since coming to the Department of Political Science at Wright State in 2000,

34
00:04:45,900 --> 00:04:51,520
Economic Power in a Changing International System from 2000,

35
00:04:51,520 --> 00:04:58,280
The Future of Iraq: Democracy, Dictatorship, or Division 2004.

36
00:04:58,280 --> 00:05:04,740
An Atlas of Middle Eastern Affairs 2009 -- but now in the second edition,

37
00:05:04,740 --> 00:05:12,040
Crisis in Kirkuk: The Ethnopolitics of Conflict and Compromise 2009,

38
00:05:12,040 --> 00:05:19,720
and Federal Solutions to Ethnic Problems; Accommodating Diversity from 2013.

39
00:05:19,760 --> 00:05:32,520
Many of these works have been done with collaborators, which does not have the work load, but doubles the complexity of compromise as a number of you here know very well.

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00:05:32,520 --> 00:05:42,620
And that's not all he's done, add to the list roughly ten book chapters, ten refereed articles, and multiple other scholarly accomplishments.

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00:05:42,620 --> 00:05:45,620

He's a research machine.

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00:05:45,620 --> 00:05:52,160
Liam came to Wright State 2000, right after finishing his PhD at the
University of Georgia.

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00:05:52,160 --> 00:06:05,320
He also has a Masters of Philosophy in International Relations from
the University of Cambridge, the English one and a BA with honors in
Politics form the University of Nottingham.

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00:06:05,320 --> 00:06:16,260
His interest in the transformation of politics in the Middle East,
specifically on Iraq and the Kurds, has made him a popular scholarly
source for the media.

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00:06:16,260 --> 00:06:23,400
He's given interviews on Bloomberg, CNN, and for multiple radio
stations and print outlets.

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00:06:23,400 --> 00:06:30,400
He was invited to speak at the United Nations International Peace
Institute in 2012.

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00:06:30,400 --> 00:06:45,500
The complex issues of global politics and peace, security in a multi-
ethnic citizenry, and how to transition a state into a democracy are
not issues for the weak of heart.

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00:06:45,500 --> 00:06:55,960
It is Liam's gift to be able to translate these complicated topics and
places into something we can all understand, without sacrificing
nuance.

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00:06:55,960 --> 00:07:01,860
This makes him a great teacher as well as our outstanding scholar, as
we will see.

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00:07:01,860 --> 00:07:10,720
His talk is titled Autonomy as a Solution to Ethnic Problems: Some
Insights into the Case of Iraq. Liam.

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00:07:10,720 --> 00:07:16,380
[applause]

52
00:07:16,380 --> 00:07:23,260
Well I barely recognize myself from that. I really don't have anything
to add, thank you.

53
00:07:23,260 --> 00:07:36,160
Yeah, let me just bring up my... There's no really good reason why
there's a picture of a puppy on the first slide there.

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00:07:36,160 --> 00:07:45,100
Really the only reason is like why not, right? If nothing else, puppy
drinking cappuccino, you can't go wrong with that, right?

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00:07:45,100 --> 00:07:54,260
What I'm going to try and do today -- I've got about a half an hour I
think, to give you some sense of the journey I've been on with
research and

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00:07:54,260 --> 00:08:02,300
some idea of what political science is about. The political scientists
love their jargon, so I'll try and keep that to a minimum.

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00:08:02,300 --> 00:08:07,520
Basically we love jargon, because it makes us sound more intelligent
than historians.

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00:08:07,520 --> 00:08:13,240
Well, makes us think we sound more intelligent than historians, but...

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00:08:13,240 --> 00:08:22,580
Essentially I cut my teeth within the broader sphere that's sometimes
called institutional design or constitutional engineering,

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00:08:22,580 --> 00:08:29,000
on electoral systems. The first past the post system you see there on
the left,

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00:08:29,000 --> 00:08:37,100
that's the system they use here in the United States, it's also used
in Britain. There are different electoral systems in play

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00:08:37,100 --> 00:08:46,680
and what you find is that in fact, if you change the electoral system,
you change something quite fundamental about the political system in
predictable ways.

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00:08:46,680 --> 00:08:53,400
So in other words, the field of constitutional engineering or
institutional design is about how you use political institutions

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00:08:53,400 --> 00:09:04,600
to structure the incentives for political actors, be they voters,
political leaders, candidates for election, in such a way that you can
predict... the outcomes become predictable.

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00:09:04,600 --> 00:09:13,900
Not in a sort of really hardcore scientific way, but within reason.
For example, I've got my little pointer here and I...

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00:09:13,900 --> 00:09:22,920
[inaudible] and essentially that's what the system they have here. You
just choose the candidate you want, he represents a party, and the guy
with the most votes wins.

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00:09:22,920 --> 00:09:31,360
What provides is incentives in fact, for smaller groupings political
interest to amalgamate into larger groups, because it's a winner-take-
all process.

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00:09:31,360 --> 00:09:37,180
So typically what you end up with is a two party system. That in turn
has implications.

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00:09:37,180 --> 00:09:46,420
In a two party system, politics tends to be a kind of zero sum game,
because if the other side wins it means you don't win, it means you
lose.

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00:09:46,420 --> 00:09:53,380
If you go for a proportional representation system, the incentive
structures are different for voters and political actors

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00:09:53,380 --> 00:10:01,920
and you tend to end up with a multi-party system. That in turn tends
to produce more consensual politics, compromise, this sort of thing.

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00:10:01,920 --> 00:10:12,640
Trust me, I'm not necessarily a fan of proportional representation,
but these are the kind of fairly predictable outcomes from this.

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00:10:12,640 --> 00:10:22,080
I wrote my Phd dissertation on this stuff, looking at how changing
electoral systems effects things like macro-economic outcomes and so
on and so forth.

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00:10:22,080 --> 00:10:28,340
And I guess it all got a little bit, I don't know, sort of First World
problem

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00:10:28,340 --> 00:10:38,780
when I was writing on paper on the fact that moving to PR would
increase inflation rates by 1.5% and decrease unemployment by.. and
this sort of stuff.

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00:10:38,780 --> 00:10:48,380
I guess at that point I thought, well probably there may be a more
pressing need for application for this sort of knowledge than the
developed world.

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00:10:48,380 --> 00:10:56,080
The alternative vote is an interesting electoral system, because you
can see from it there, you actually express preferences at the ballot
box.

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00:10:56,080 --> 00:11:04,280
You choose your first guy, Jay Doe gets the first vote, Jones gets the
second, Carter third, so on and so forth.

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00:11:04,280 --> 00:11:14,520
They way this system works is if my first preference votes, so if Doe
gets eliminated, so when the votes are counted according to first
preferences,

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00:11:14,520 --> 00:11:22,440

the one with the fewest first preferences gets eliminated, my vote
then counts against my second preference. So it transfers

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00:11:22,440 --> 00:11:26,800
if Doe is eliminated, my vote then counts for Jones and so on and so
forth.

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00:11:26,800 --> 00:11:36,360
And on of the arguments is that in ethnically divided societies for
example, this is a good electoral system to have, because it tends to
produce moderate political candidates.

83
00:11:36,360 --> 00:11:44,100
Candidates gain nothing out of demonizing ethnic minorities, because
they may need second preference votes of ethnic minorities.

84
00:11:44,100 --> 00:11:50,760
And so, they have an incentive to put forth a moderate platform on
ethnic issues and so on and so forth.

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00:11:50,760 --> 00:11:58,300
So the argument would be that AV's a good electoral system to have
when you're coming out of an ethnic civil war, something like that.

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00:11:58,300 --> 00:12:05,580
So that was really what I've been working on for the last ten years or
so.

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00:12:05,580 --> 00:12:14,020
Along side that, I've done quite a lot of work on Iraq. How I got
involved in this is a long story and too long to bore you all with,
but...

88
00:12:14,020 --> 00:12:21,900
And here's a basic ethno-sectarian map of Iraq. It's a kind of obscene
simplification, but it gets the point across.

89
00:12:21,900 --> 00:12:29,560
Iraq is kind of a divided place. In the Southern parts where it's the
dark green, that's mainly Shia Arabs live down there.

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00:12:29,560 --> 00:12:36,760

They are a majority of the population, about 65%. The orange on the left of the screen there is

91
00:12:36,760 --> 00:12:42,120
mainly Sunni Arab areas and the brown in the North are Kurds.

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00:12:42,120 --> 00:12:49,280
So Sunnis are probably 20% of the population, Kurds somewhere between 15-20%. There's also other groups:

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00:12:49,280 --> 00:12:55,740
Turkmens, Christians, Yazidis, all manor of other groups. It's kind of a complicated place.

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00:12:55,740 --> 00:13:03,840
But the reason I in a sense, got interested in Iraq was in the build up to the war in 2003.

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00:13:03,840 --> 00:13:12,080
One of the issues that I addressed in this book was... my colleague by the way, who should take some of the credit, he's the one who had all the connections in Iraq,

96
00:13:12,080 --> 00:13:18,620
so he got us interviews with the Kurdish leaders and so on. But one of the issues I was interested in was.. Okay...

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00:13:18,620 --> 00:13:25,340
If you go into Iraq and you get rid of basically the Sunni Arab regime and you bring in democracy

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00:13:25,340 --> 00:13:33,640
and if it's by straight majority vote, what you're going to end up doing is inverting the power structure that's been in place since the 1920's.

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00:13:33,640 --> 00:13:42,700
Then you have to think about how you're going to accommodate the Kurds and what their demands are. Do you need to have some sort of elaborate power sharing mechanisms at the center?

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00:13:42,700 --> 00:13:47,560

Do you need the Kurds to have their own autonomous region and various
other things?

101
00:13:47,560 --> 00:13:58,540
And so the issue of ethnic autonomy and ethnic federalism and this
sort of stuff, I sort of became interested in that from looking at the
case of Iraq.

102
00:13:58,540 --> 00:14:05,380
You can see on the right hand side of the screen there, basically a
unitary system, central government has all the power.

103
00:14:05,380 --> 00:14:12,140
It can choose to give power to regions or states or whatever sub-level
units, but it can also just take it away.

104
00:14:12,140 --> 00:14:21,600
The central government possess all the power. In a federal system
power is constitutionally divided between the center and the states.

105
00:14:21,600 --> 00:14:28,840
So in the U.S. system. Article 1, Section... help me out... 6
[laughing]

106
00:14:28,840 --> 00:14:38,720
gives all the powers of the federal government and the 10th Amendment
of the Constitution says if the federal government doesn't have it,
according to the constitution, the states have it.

107
00:14:38,720 --> 00:14:44,040
So the central government can't just arbitrarily remove power from the
states.

108
00:14:44,040 --> 00:14:52,060
So a federal system essentially gives autonomy the sub-units I guess.
Now in the context of Iraq,

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00:14:52,060 --> 00:15:02,700
As I say, I really came at this from the Kurdish point of view. It was
really obvious that if you're going to go in, you're going to have to
deal with the Kurds at some point, because the Kurds have been
autonomous

110
00:15:02,700 --> 00:15:11,320
on their own, basically for ten years prior to this, under UN control
more or less, protected by the US and the UK. They hadn't been part of
Iraq at all.

111
00:15:11,320 --> 00:15:19,300
If you want the Kurds to rejoin Iraq as it were, kind of the minimum
requirement is going to be that Kurds have some autonomy,

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00:15:19,300 --> 00:15:29,160
but then that raises a whole number of other questions. How do allow
the Kurds to have their autonomy guaranteed?

113
00:15:29,160 --> 00:15:35,600
Do you need say, elaborate power sharing mechanisms based on ethnicity
at the center and so on and so forth. It all gets kind of complicated.

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00:15:35,600 --> 00:15:47,880
The conclusion of the book by the way, was that if we're going to do
this, go in and remove the regime, then it's going to be complicated
and we'd better be prepared to hang around for 50 years to do it.

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00:15:47,880 --> 00:15:55,960
So we really need to do a Japan or Germany on Iraq. The only drawback
is we thought the Iraq people wouldn't be okay with that

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00:15:55,960 --> 00:16:01,400
and so it wasn't a very optimistic book let's say.

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00:16:01,400 --> 00:16:09,280
The consensus among political scientists at this time was that giving
the Kurds an autonomous region would be a really really bad idea.

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00:16:09,280 --> 00:16:19,320
And there are a number of articles in quite influential journals,
journals like Foreign Affairs and so on, talking about what to do
with Iraq afterwards

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00:16:19,320 --> 00:16:28,840
and the argument basically was: if you give the Kurds their own
autonomous region, essentially what you do is you deepen and
strengthen their ethnic identity.

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00:16:28,840 --> 00:16:34,960
You harden the ethnic divisions between the Iraqs... the Kurds and the
Arabs inside Iraq

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00:16:34,960 --> 00:16:45,840
and you give them institutions, quite powerful institutions. So again,
this is Masoud Barzani is the President of Kurdistan.

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00:16:45,840 --> 00:16:59,160
There he is,, Masoud. This is the Kurdish Army. Kurd actually have
kind of two armies, but the Peshmerga, they're very capable armed
forced. They're they guys we are now basically funding weapons and
things to to fight ISIS.

123
00:16:59,160 --> 00:17:07,940
They're the ones that actually fought ISIS rather than run away.
Kurdish Parliament there and Kurdish flag. So essentially you invest
the Kurds with

124
00:17:07,940 --> 00:17:17,580
a sense of their separateness from the rest of Iraq and in the end
what you're doing is paving the way for the Kurds to leave Iraq, to
secede from Iraq.

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00:17:17,580 --> 00:17:26,540
So it's a really really bad idea to give them autonomy. That was
conventional wisdom. The broader argument here is against the whole
idea of ethnic autonomy

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00:17:26,540 --> 00:17:33,140
and again, this is I would say the bulk of the literature in political
science says this is not a good idea.

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00:17:33,140 --> 00:17:41,940
The broader argument is about the balance between the center and
ethnic regions as it were and how difficult it is to maintain that
balance,

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00:17:41,940 --> 00:17:51,180
because all the issues that arise naturally in a federal system
between the center and the periphery, things like education.

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00:17:51,180 --> 00:17:58,820
In an ethnic environment where you have an ethnic autonomous region,
the contents of textbooks matter a whole lot; how you tell history in
your schools.

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00:17:58,820 --> 00:18:06,340
Things like that. All of these issues can be resolved where there are
no ethnic divisions become magnified when you have ethnic autonomy

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00:18:06,340 --> 00:18:11,320
So it's preserving a balance between the center and the units is kind
of impossible.

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00:18:11,320 --> 00:18:17,480
So I guess the again, the conventional wisdom is that this ethnic
autonomy is a bad solution.

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00:18:17,480 --> 00:18:26,980
It either ends up in the secession of the ethnic unit or else the
central government, sort of re-centralizes the system and gets rid of
the institutions of autonomy.

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00:18:26,980 --> 00:18:33,560
SO it fails either one way or the other. The poster child for this
sort of failure is the Soviet Union.

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00:18:33,560 --> 00:18:40,860
A lot of these republics, I mean you could say some of them had a
preexisting identity.

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00:18:40,860 --> 00:18:49,420
Georgia, Georgians, the population of Georgia knew what it was to be
Georgian. The three Baltic states: Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia,

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00:18:49,420 --> 00:18:53,900
they weren't absorbed until 1939, they had a sort of preexisting sense
of identity.

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00:18:53,900 --> 00:18:59,960
But some of these other ones, I mean Kazakhstan was kind of a creation
of the Soviet Union.

139
00:18:59,960 --> 00:19:08,340
Basically the Soviet Union said "well there your borders... you are
now land of the Kazakhs, go and be Kazakhs and so the Kazakhs have
invented an identity for themselves

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00:19:08,340 --> 00:19:14,520
essentially and I saw recently in the news that they now have a Kazakh
version of Game of Thrones

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00:19:14,520 --> 00:19:21,940
in order for them to track their own identity back to you know, a
couple of a thousand years and things like that.

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00:19:21,940 --> 00:19:29,100
And so in a sense in Moldova, Maldova's Romania or essentially a chunk
of Romania that was chopped out by the Soviets.

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00:19:29,100 --> 00:19:35,160
Now there is a Moldovan Identity. So in a sense, the Soviet Union
created these identities

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00:19:35,160 --> 00:19:45,700
and of course come 199, turns out that not all of these guys want to
remain part of the Soviet Union and it falls apart along its lines of
its ethnic units.

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00:19:45,700 --> 00:19:57,840
Another good example is Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's six republics:
Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Bosnia.

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00:19:57,840 --> 00:20:05,900
And again, the idea essentially is you organize the system around
ethnic autonomy,

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00:20:05,900 --> 00:20:14,060
ultimately you reinforce ethnic identities and you make the emergence
of some sort of transcendence Yugoslav identity, all but impossible.

148
00:20:14,060 --> 00:20:25,560
In fact the Yugoslavs used to keep track of this on a census. They
used to ask the question: what's your primary source of identity? And
the average was about 3% of the population would say Yugoslav.

149
00:20:25,560 --> 00:20:36,320
The rest would say "I'm primarily Croat" or I'm Serb" or whatever and
so it never succeeded in generating an overarching identity that could
hold it all together.

150
00:20:36,320 --> 00:20:45,660
So given that that's what the conventional wisdom among political
scientists was, the question is well then it's still the problem what
do you do with the Kurds, right?

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00:20:45,660 --> 00:20:53,600
The argument that most political scientists put forward. This was the
preferred solution, was this idea of territorial federalism

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00:20:53,600 --> 00:20:59,020
where you actually draw boundary lines to chop up the ethnic group

153
00:20:59,020 --> 00:21:09,280
and the idea here is that -- and it would have worked int he case of
the Kurds -- you divide up the Kurds into three separate units. Then
each unit in a sense, acquires its own sort of separate identity

154
00:21:09,280 --> 00:21:14,300
and you kind of activate divisions within Kurdish community.

155
00:21:14,300 --> 00:21:19,720
You prevent the emergence of this unified Kurdish entity that can then
challenge the central government.

156
00:21:19,720 --> 00:21:26,400
So essentially its a divide and conquer logic through the drawing of
boundary lines of federal sub-units.

157
00:21:26,400 --> 00:21:34,520
And in fact, on the right there is a map of -- they were the eighteen
governorates in place in Iraq at the time the regime was overthrown.

158
00:21:34,520 --> 00:21:44,700
So you actually wouldn't have had to do anything. You could have left
that map in place and you would have had the three northern
governorates there would have been overwhelming Kurdish,

159
00:21:44,700 --> 00:21:51,960
but they would have had, they would have developed separate interests
and so on and so forth. So that was the prefers solution of political
scientists

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00:21:51,960 --> 00:21:59,020
and it's a very I think, quite intellectually pleasing solution and
it's been shown to work in some places.

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00:21:59,020 --> 00:22:08,180
Nigeria is a good a example. I don't want to get too deep into this,
but that was what Nigeria looked like when it obtained independence
form Britain

162
00:22:08,180 --> 00:22:13,500
in 1960. It was three units organized kind of roughly around ethnic
groups.

163
00:22:13,500 --> 00:22:20,800
So the Western Yoruba, the Eastern region was Igbo, Northern region
Hausa Fulani essentially.

164
00:22:20,800 --> 00:22:33,180
So each ethnic group got it's own region. What ended up happening was
you could see the Northern region's much bigger than the rest. It had
a bigger population and it basically overpowered the other two
regions.

165
00:22:33,180 --> 00:22:40,040
And because it was taken over by an ethnic group or captured by an
ethnic group. This came to assume

166
00:22:40,040 --> 00:22:47,060
the feeling that it was an ethnic sort of imposition by the Hausa
Fulani on the Igbo and Yoruba

167
00:22:47,060 --> 00:22:55,740
ends up civil war, the Igbo try to secede calling themselves the
Republic of Biafra, ends up killing a million people, total disaster.

168
00:22:55,740 --> 00:23:00,760

The solution in Nigeria was chop it up.

169
00:23:00,760 --> 00:23:09,240
That way you -- and the argument was you can activate sub-ethnic
divisions among the Hausa Fulani and amongst the Yoruba and the Igbo.

170
00:23:09,240 --> 00:23:15,020
So you avoid this sort of cataclysmic collision of ethnic identities
at the center.

171
00:23:15,020 --> 00:23:21,100
And in fact, the Nigerians just went haywire over this stuff and they
just kept on dividing and dividing and dividing.

172
00:23:21,100 --> 00:23:31,840
They're now 36 different units, but you know, Nigeria in someways is
not a raging success, but the fact that Nigeria is still together as a
single country is in some ways...

173
00:23:31,840 --> 00:23:40,900
most if you've read most experts on Nigeria, they say there's no way
this could have happened unless these original boundary lines have
been chopped up.

174
00:23:40,900 --> 00:23:45,640
So that was kind of the idea, we do that in Iraq and everything will
work out fine.

175
00:23:45,640 --> 00:23:52,260
The real problem was that if you knew anything about the Kurds, the
Kurds are never ever ever going to accept that,

176
00:23:52,260 --> 00:23:58,200
because essentially this is a divide and conquer tactic, it's
deliberately designed to divide them up.

177
00:23:58,200 --> 00:24:05,100
And the Kurds were absolutely adamant "this isn't going to happen to
us". So you then invent kind of an impasse.

178
00:24:05,100 --> 00:24:13,200

If you listen to political scientists, political scientists will tell
you: ethnic autonomy is a really bad idea.

179
00:24:13,200 --> 00:24:23,420
So don't do that, instead do this, but this is not a politically
feasible solution. It's not actually practical in the real world,

180
00:24:23,420 --> 00:24:26,900
because the Kurds would never ever have accepted this.

181
00:24:26,900 --> 00:24:35,300
So in the end then there's not much political science has to inform
these poor guys on the ground who are thinking "how are we going to
design the system?"

182
00:24:35,300 --> 00:24:43,900
Because the solution they propose is politically unfeasible and the
most logical solution, political scientists will tell you, doesn't
work.

183
00:24:43,900 --> 00:24:55,460
So okay, my thought at the time was look, we have an obligation I
think, to be a bit more helpful and a bit more useful as political
scientists.

184
00:24:55,460 --> 00:25:02,000
And so one of the things that I worked on was trying to figure out in
fact what is the current record of ethnic autonomy?

185
00:25:02,000 --> 00:25:07,780
How many sort of ethnic federal arrangements have their been since
1945?

186
00:25:07,780 --> 00:25:17,140
And then even look, how many have succeeded and how many have failed?
So how many have resulted in either secession of the ethnic unit or
the re-centralization of the center or whatever?

187
00:25:17,140 --> 00:25:23,280
And if you look at it, you that there's some failures certainly,
Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and so on.

188

00:25:23,280 --> 00:25:28,580
And obviously the Soviet Union is pretty substantively signification
as a failure.

189
00:25:28,580 --> 00:25:38,800
But there have also been quite a lot of successes. Belgium's still
around. I mean again, it's not a model of political efficiency, but it
hasn't suffered a succession yet. Flanders is still there.

190
00:25:38,800 --> 00:25:49,600
Canada came close in 1995, but Canada's still around. Switzerland,
India has a federal system base don language essentially.

191
00:25:49,600 --> 00:25:58,260
So there are a whole bunch of successes as well. And so for me as a
political scientist what I wanted to know is what explains...

192
00:25:58,260 --> 00:26:03,460
Is there something systematic that explains the failures rater than
the successes?

193
00:26:03,460 --> 00:26:08,980
Because if we can explain why some are more likely to succeed than
others,

194
00:26:08,980 --> 00:26:14,360
maybe we can actually help guys on the ground who actually have to
design these systems.

195
00:26:14,360 --> 00:26:20,720
Maybe this can be something practical that can be used you know, it
has a real word application.

196
00:26:20,720 --> 00:26:27,800
And so ultimately what I looked at really was the internal structure,
how are things structured?

197
00:26:27,800 --> 00:26:37,280
And in fact, there are three different ways to structure ethnic
autonomy. You can do the full ethno-federation thing, which is where
all the units are essentially ethnically defined.

198

00:26:37,280 --> 00:26:46,860
So every single of societies major ethnic groups gets its own
homeland, Soviet Unions another example, Czechoslovakia, so on.

199
00:26:46,860 --> 00:26:59,480
You can also do this, which is where a smaller ethnic group gets its
autonomous area, but the rest of the country isn't a federal system,
it's a unitary system.

200
00:26:59,480 --> 00:27:06,020
So Moldova's a good example of this for Gagauzia is an autonomous
ethnic region within Moldova.

201
00:27:06,020 --> 00:27:12,140
It's a small part of the population, it's probably 4% of the Moldovan
population.

202
00:27:12,140 --> 00:27:25,140
It's survived today, it's don't reasonably well. So that's a different
way to organize it. And they way that I thought was going to be the
most effective was the way that the Canadian system is organized.

203
00:27:25,140 --> 00:27:31,060
This... I'm sorry about the jargon, I said no jargon and then partial
ethno-federation. Jargon, right?

204
00:27:31,060 --> 00:27:40,040
But the way the Canadian system is structured, you have Quebec which
is the ethnic unit, ethnolingusitic if you want to call it that.

205
00:27:40,040 --> 00:27:50,860
But rather than have the rest of Canada as a sort of Anglo unit -- so
you have a federation of two units, an Anglo unit and a French
speaking unit,

206
00:27:50,860 --> 00:27:56,620
the Anglo Unit is chopped up, it's divided up into multiple units,
into multiple provinces.

207
00:27:56,620 --> 00:28:04,580
And the interesting thing about Canada is what you see over time is if
you look there at Alberta and Saskatchewan, they're...

208
00:28:04,580 --> 00:28:08,880
I mean they were not part of the original federation, they were
created in 1905.

209
00:28:08,880 --> 00:28:18,260
And since 1905 what has emerged is a distinct Albertan Identity. These
people feel attached to the land.

210
00:28:18,260 --> 00:28:27,980
They feel attached to so... and in Alberta now you have textbooks that
talk about the evolution of Albertan identity and this sort of thing.

211
00:28:27,980 --> 00:28:36,000
And arguably, the Albertans are more likely secede from the union than
Quebec was.

212
00:28:36,000 --> 00:28:41,420
Saskatchewan again, there's quite a strong sense of regional identity
in Saskatchewan

213
00:28:41,420 --> 00:28:50,800
and it's an entirely kind of created, it's socially constructed
identity. You construct it by drawing lines on a map and saying "you
are now in Alberta."

214
00:28:50,800 --> 00:28:56,520
You wait fifty years and then people start to think and believe like
Albertans.

215
00:28:56,520 --> 00:29:06,160
What this does is it creates a system that's more balanced, because
when you have struggles between the provinces and the central
government.

216
00:29:06,160 --> 00:29:14,060
Quebec isn't going to be on its own. It's in alliance with other Anglo
units like Alberta and Saskatchewan.

217
00:29:14,060 --> 00:29:21,560
They all have a vested interest in protecting their autonomy. So it
doesn't become ethno-fied in the same way

218
00:29:21,560 --> 00:29:29,760
So the argument was India's like this as well, there's others,
Switzerland's like this, Russia's like this, these are better balanced
systems was the argument.

219
00:29:29,760 --> 00:29:38,240
So essentially if we look at the probability of success and this is...
I'm working on a paper right now with a colleague Dr. Koster.

220
00:29:38,240 --> 00:29:42,940
He's my number cruncher so I'll shout out to him.

221
00:29:42,940 --> 00:29:53,640
We argue that basically partial ethno-federations are going to have
the highest probability of success. Ethnic federacies and full ethno-
federations are going to have a lower probability of success.

222
00:29:53,640 --> 00:30:04,440
So you then go out and get your caseload. So there's all out cases.
You see, these are all the ethnic units of Russia, there are 21 ethnic
units in Russia.

223
00:30:04,440 --> 00:30:12,660
Spain, again there are three and we counted Andalusia as a separate
ethnic unit, but Catalonia.

224
00:30:12,660 --> 00:30:21,780
And so some of these succeeded and some of them failed over time. So
this is everything, all of them in the the world that there have been
since 1945.

225
00:30:21,780 --> 00:30:26,780
So you can code these things according to the structure of the system
within which they operate

226
00:30:26,780 --> 00:30:33,400
and you can code for other things that may also effect probability of
success or failure like level of democracy.

227
00:30:33,400 --> 00:30:40,360
The more democratic the system, the more likely it is to succeed, the
less likely you are to get secession and so on and so forth.

228
00:30:40,360 --> 00:30:46,340
I'm going to show you numbers, because Dr. Koster would never forgive
me for not showing numbers.

229
00:30:46,340 --> 00:30:52,200
But there's basically, once you've coded it you can crunch the numbers
and this is what you get, you get

230
00:30:52,200 --> 00:31:03,920
and let me intemperate it for you. Essentially what this tells us is
partial ethno-federations have a higher probability of success than
either full ethno-federations or ethnic federacies.

231
00:31:03,920 --> 00:31:11,580
So partial ethno-federations are the way to go, essentially. But the
interesting thing and this is thing that I found interesting,

232
00:31:11,580 --> 00:31:26,400
is that this is -- trust me you can measure democracy though -- this
is average democratic environment. So you go from -2 down here to 10
is actually the maximum the you get [inaudible]

233
00:31:26,400 --> 00:31:35,160
that at really high levels of democracy -- so you get the 10 here ---
it actually doesn't matter which of these three structures you have,

234
00:31:35,160 --> 00:31:43,400
because once the system become fully democratic you notice norms of
compromise are kind of embedded and so they can normally sort
themselves out.

235
00:31:43,400 --> 00:31:57,080
Same thing at the bottom end here, if we extended this a little bit
longer the lines all converge and we're back to -3. So in other words,
in really really undemocratic environments it doesn't matter which of
these three you chose, they're all going to fail.

236
00:31:57,080 --> 00:32:04,020
It matters most in the middle here. So in other words, if a democratic
environment of 2,

237

00:32:04,020 --> 00:32:20,780
which happens to be where most of the words ethnic conflict zones are,
you've got almost zero chance if you adopt a full ethnic federation,
little higher if you adopt an ethnic federacie, much higher if you
adopt a partial ethno-federation.

238
00:32:20,780 --> 00:32:29,820
So which of these three structures you choose, the importance of it
varies according to how democratic the system.

239
00:32:29,820 --> 00:32:39,300
And if you think about where awe are going to inevitably have ethnic
autonomous regions, we're going to have them in Syria if Syria
survives it's civil war.

240
00:32:39,300 --> 00:32:48,920
We're going to have in Ukraine without a doubt. Georgia has two bits
of it that are separatists, they operate as kind of independent
things.

241
00:32:48,920 --> 00:32:55,700
If they're ever going to come back to Georgia you know, it's going to
be as autonomous units within a Georgian state.

242
00:32:55,700 --> 00:33:06,800
So in the context of Iraq of course, what we have now is ISIS kind of
rampaging throughout Syria and Northern Iraq.

243
00:33:06,800 --> 00:33:14,140
A lot of the reason why ISIS was able to take root in Iraq was because
of the prime minister down there, Nouri al-Maliki

244
00:33:14,140 --> 00:33:27,360
who really targeted Sunni and particularly Sunni political leaders. So
the Sunni's were participating in the political process and al-Maliki
started traking them down; hunting them down and weeding them out
basically.

245
00:33:27,360 --> 00:33:35,740
Because from... he was kind of a paranoid leader and for him they were
all basically terrorists and you know and Al-Qaeda sympathizers and
the what.

246

00:33:35,740 --> 00:33:46,580
So I mean he basically issued an arrest warrant for the Sunni Vice
President of Iraq, Tariq al-Hashimi and sort of stage managed a
kangaroo court to sentence him to death.

247
00:33:46,580 --> 00:33:57,040
So al-Hashimi is I think, probably in Qatar right now. Same with the
finance minister. So he was basically hunting down prominent Sunni
Arab, popular Sunni Arab politicians.

248
00:33:57,040 --> 00:34:06,720
This created a big protests in the Sunni Arab areas and that's how
ISIS kind of got its talons into the Sunni Arab part of Iraq.

249
00:34:06,720 --> 00:34:13,560
Once ISIS is gone the question of what we do with the Sunni Arab part
of Iraq is going to rise once more and the question is:

250
00:34:13,560 --> 00:34:20,260
do we need to protect Sunnis from leaders like al-Maliki?

251
00:34:20,260 --> 00:34:24,780
There going to need probably their own autonomous area.

252
00:34:24,780 --> 00:34:39,380
This is the most, I mean this is... Joe Biden [laughing]... I mean
speaking intellectuals, Joe Biden, this is his favored solution and
also several of the think tanks, they say "alright,

253
00:34:39,380 --> 00:34:48,960
given that we've got three groups in Iraq, give them each their own
unit so that Shiia can get there Shiiastan, Sunnis get the middle bit,
and Kurds get the Northern bit.

254
00:34:48,960 --> 00:34:57,760
Well we can actually calculate what the likelihood of this surviving
is relative to other structures

255
00:34:57,760 --> 00:35:14,160
and that essentially is calculation. If you can see there, if you
have... Can you read it or not? The ethnic federacie, so that's the
Kurdistan region where the rest of Iraq stays unitary, the probability
to survive is about 13%.

256
00:35:14,160 --> 00:35:23,020
An ethnic federacie with a Kurdish regiona and a Sunni region, you can
see increases a little bit. The worst of all options is the Joe Biden
option:

257
00:35:23,020 --> 00:35:29,900
three ethnic units. That has very low probability of success and the
best is this,

258
00:35:29,900 --> 00:35:37,560
partial ethno-federation with a Kurdish region and the rest of Iraq,
Shiia Iraq stays chopped up, divided up.

259
00:35:37,560 --> 00:35:48,500
So I hashed out using paint, the paint option on something. There you
go. So you've got.. it's very rough.

260
00:35:48,500 --> 00:35:55,800
The Kurdish region up here, Sunni region here and you retain these
divisions within the Shiia South.

261
00:35:55,800 --> 00:36:04,460
And again what this will do if you know anything about the Shiia
South, you actually know that in fact there are different
constituencies,Shiia are not a homogeneous block.

262
00:36:04,460 --> 00:36:17,000
Basra has a sense of itself as being a cosmopolitan open city, the
shrine cities Karbala and Najaf are much more socially conservative,
they're very different economic interest and this sort of thing.

263
00:36:17,000 --> 00:36:26,980
So you retain those divisions within the Shiia block. So in a sense,
the Shiia would be dividing and conquering themselves.

264
00:36:26,980 --> 00:36:31,760
But in the end that's the best chance of survival for Iraq.

265
00:36:31,760 --> 00:36:40,320
Beyond that, you know, the same thing could be said, I mean Syria, the
Kurds have already written their constitution for a post-war Syria

266
00:36:40,320 --> 00:36:47,040
that basically has themselves as having an autonomous region in the
North.

267
00:36:47,040 --> 00:36:56,920
We have a choice. I mean we can either go to war against the Kurds to
take that territory back or wright a constitution for Syria post-war,
I mean the let Syrians write it themselves

268
00:36:56,920 --> 00:37:05,240
post-war, that acknowledges an autonomous Kurdish unit. The the
question becomes how do you organize the rest of Syria?

269
00:37:05,240 --> 00:37:16,560
So these, you know, these are sorts of questions that are going to be
with us for a long period of time and I guess what I would try to do
with research and particularly with Dr. Koster is

270
00:37:16,560 --> 00:37:25,180
to figure out something useful to be able to present to people rather
than just say don't do this, it doesn't work, here's the thing that
works.

271
00:37:25,180 --> 00:37:31,880
Where as in fact the thing that works is of course politically
impossible to do. So I guess that's...

272
00:37:31,880 --> 00:37:38,680
Am I done with my time? Yes, I am. So I shall stop and take any
questions, except for Marin Levine

273
00:37:38,680 --> 00:37:46,520
[applause]

274
00:37:46,520 --> 00:37:52,780
Uhh [laughing]

275
00:37:52,780 --> 00:38:11,400
I greatly appreciate your work from the inside [inaudible] the partial
ethno whatever you call it [inaudible] the contribution.

276
00:38:11,400 --> 00:38:21,000
You're well aware that nation building, however you define it is hard
work and is impossible to do.

277
00:38:21,000 --> 00:38:25,860
It's not impossible. It's hard work, I'll concede you that.

278
00:38:25,860 --> 00:38:35,840
Okay, whatever. What I would just suggest here is to add to your work
and your contribution [inaudible]

279
00:38:35,840 --> 00:38:44,280
But in the regions that have the most severe and dangerous conflict in
recent memory, killing,

280
00:38:44,280 --> 00:39:00,760
that that isn't enough that it's a word [inaudible] ever since we've
kind of been unifying it. [inaudible] sort of ethno-divisions
[ainaudible].

281
00:39:00,760 --> 00:39:03,460
I think majority rules is a much better view.

282
00:39:03,460 --> 00:39:10,800
Context makes a difference. But I think it's still a matter that we
have to start thinking of in terms of historical [inaudible]

283
00:39:10,800 --> 00:39:21,040
In terms of majority rules isn't going to work [Inaudible]

284
00:39:21,040 --> 00:39:34,900
To restrain the government the majority [inaudible] basically
formulating Liepot's associatioinal democracy for the divided society

285
00:39:34,900 --> 00:39:42,060
Well except that Liepot's idea was much more to do with power sharing
at the center. So.. Sorry?

286
00:39:42,060 --> 00:39:44,300
His idea was to do what exactly?

287
00:39:44,300 --> 00:39:51,380
He was much more focused on power sharing at the center so that the
governments basically...

288
00:39:51,380 --> 00:39:59,060
if it's Iraq you have the Kurds get one position: the president, the
Sunni's get the vice president, the Shiia get the prime minister,

289
00:39:59,060 --> 00:40:06,480
and all three have to agree anything, but that's much more his line
rather than in terms of autonomy.

290
00:40:06,480 --> 00:40:10,000
That was not really apart of what he did as it were,

291
00:40:10,000 --> 00:40:17,700
but I guess his way of looking at the world was you use ethnic groups
as the building blocks of the system

292
00:40:17,700 --> 00:40:29,800
and I think what this does, if you think about Canada, that's not
using ethnic blocks, it's allowing the French speakers in Canada to
have an area of autonomy,

293
00:40:29,800 --> 00:40:36,980
but it actually is chopping up the English block and relying on new
identities emerging from that and so on and so forth.

294
00:40:36,980 --> 00:40:42,520
So in some ways it's a theoretical contradiction to what Liepot
believes.

295
00:40:42,520 --> 00:40:47,840
He was a primordialist rather than a social constructivist.

296
00:40:47,840 --> 00:40:50,040
[inaudible]

297
00:40:50,040 --> 00:40:56,140
That's why I use him. Jargon is the last resort of the villain.
[laughing]

298
00:40:56,140 --> 00:41:05,660
How would you cut up the Sunni section of Iraq and how do you just cut
of the Shiia section? I understand [inaudible]

299
00:41:05,660 --> 00:41:09,640
If you go by the Canada model [inaudible]

300
00:41:09,640 --> 00:41:15,680
The key thing is cutting up the largest predominant population, right?

301
00:41:15,680 --> 00:41:23,980
So that's Hindi speakers are in India for example and not a majority
of the population. they're about 40%.

302
00:41:23,980 --> 00:41:33,820
But they're chopped up into multiple federal sub-units along side
linguistically homogeneous units like Tamil Nadu and Kerala and places
like this.

303
00:41:33,820 --> 00:41:48,180
It's chopping up the dominant... the bit that would otherwise dominate
the whole thing and you chop them up and you hope that there's a sort
of... that that activates intra- or sub-ethnic divisions within the
majority ethnic group

304
00:41:48,180 --> 00:41:54,880
and therefore diminishes the fear on the part of the ethnic minority
groups, that they're going to be dominated by an ethnic majority.

305
00:41:54,880 --> 00:42:00,380
You make it more difficult for an ethnic majority or dominant ethnic
group to dominate everybody else.

306
00:42:00,380 --> 00:42:03,960
[inaudible]

307
00:42:03,960 --> 00:42:04,460
Yes.

308
00:42:04,460 --> 00:42:07,540

[inaudible]

309
00:42:07,540 --> 00:42:08,040
Yes.

310
00:42:08,040 --> 00:42:10,040
[inaudible]

311
00:42:10,040 --> 00:42:19,240
I mean if it's possible, I mean, again, the Sunni's are not
homogeneous. You know Anbar's a very tribal region.

312
00:42:19,240 --> 00:42:29,440
It may be that the Sunni's actually don't want one single unit.
Nineveh and Mosul is much less tribal, it's very Arab nationalist,

313
00:42:29,440 --> 00:42:37,360
a range of former Baathists, a lot of former Baathists there. Maybe
they feel themselves to have separate identities, they may not want a
single unit.

314
00:42:37,360 --> 00:42:43,280
The Kurds in Syria actually have in their constitution to have three
units not one.

315
00:42:43,280 --> 00:42:53,340
Well if the ethnic minority wants multiple units, I think it's all the
better. It's very difficult to do that if a minority group wants to
preserve its unity,

316
00:42:53,340 --> 00:43:05,780
because then if you want to impose divisions on it, you've got to go
to war against it. We would have had to fight the Kurds in 2005 to
impose the preferred solution of most political scientists

317
00:43:05,780 --> 00:43:09,840
and I don't know who was willing to go to war with the Kurds to do
this.

318
00:43:09,840 --> 00:43:19,200
[inaudible]

319
00:43:19,200 --> 00:43:24,400
Well some of it depends on what circumstance you find yourself in.

320
00:43:24,400 --> 00:43:32,200
The Kurds you know, in 2005 arguably were the most coherent, powerful,
single group in Iraq.

321
00:43:32,200 --> 00:43:43,340
They had an army, Iraq itself didn't even have an army. So there were
practical, really severe practical problems to try to impose something
on the Kurds that they didn't want

322
00:43:43,340 --> 00:43:53,320
and most ethnic minority groups who have been fighting twenty years,
for either independence or autonomy against an ethnic majority group,

323
00:43:53,320 --> 00:44:01,260
by the time they sit around a peace table the ethnic majority group
says "okay here's what we're going to offer you, we're going to divide
and conquer you by chopping you up".

324
00:44:01,260 --> 00:44:08,140
It just doesn't.. it's not feasible. So when an ethnic minority group
wants to preserve its coherence and unity.

325
00:44:08,140 --> 00:44:13,140
Unless you're prepared to impose a solution on them, then yes that's
what you have to do.

326
00:44:13,140 --> 00:44:21,000
I think it was Nigeria was the example, where they kept dividing up
into smaller and smaller groups.

327
00:44:21,000 --> 00:44:21,500
Yeah.

328
00:44:21,500 --> 00:44:26,140
Is there diminishing returns on that kind of a [inaudible]?

329
00:44:26,140 --> 00:44:38,780

[laughing] Yeah there is. The way the Nigerians did it, I mean it was really the first round of this.. hold on, let me get a map. The first round of this...

330
00:44:38,780 --> 00:44:46,240
Here, so you start with a three-fold division and I mean I've had to deal with this in a very short space of time, but

331
00:44:46,240 --> 00:44:52,860
this was seen as a very unstable thing, because you associate each of these three regions with it's own ethnic group.

332
00:44:52,860 --> 00:45:00,680
Where as the Hausa Fulani are only 30% of the Nigerian population, but they were the majority within the Northern region, therefore they captured the Northern region

333
00:45:00,680 --> 00:45:06,700
and therefore the Northern region was seen as a vehicle for Hausa Fulani dominance over the whole of Nigeria.

334
00:45:06,700 --> 00:45:15,360
So the first division, that was actually implemented by a military dictator, basically. Hausa Fulani didn't want this to happen.

335
00:45:15,360 --> 00:45:23,060
The military dictator said "tough, it's happening". And so that was designed to break up the large concentrations of ethnic groups

336
00:45:23,060 --> 00:45:27,580
and activate sub-ethnic divisions and this sort of thing and it was quite effective.

337
00:45:27,580 --> 00:45:35,360
Subsequently what they did was actually incentivize smaller bits to declare the want to become their own states.

338
00:45:35,360 --> 00:45:45,740
For example, some of the revenues from oil, a certain amount goes to you as a state and it's equally divided.

339
00:45:45,740 --> 00:45:53,180

So in a sense, it encourages, you know if you're Yoruba you get more
money if you're ten states rather than two.

340
00:45:53,180 --> 00:46:03,300
You get positions in a cabinet allocated on a state basis. So again,
if you're either Yoruba and you've got two states,

341
00:46:03,300 --> 00:46:09,340
you only get two cabinet positions and you get two slices of the pie.
You subdivide into ten states, you get cabinet positions...

342
00:46:09,340 --> 00:46:21,520
So they incentivize you know, subdivisions as it were. At some point I
think the problem with a place like Nigeria is -- an hour and thirty-
six -- a lot of these states aren't really capable of governing
themselves.

343
00:46:21,520 --> 00:46:32,820
They lack the resources to do it. So that starts to become a problem.
The smaller and smaller chinks you get, the more difficult is for
these to govern themselves in any sort of efficient way.

344
00:46:32,820 --> 00:46:38,340
So there are drawbacks. December.

345
00:46:38,340 --> 00:46:47,480
In the second republic you didn't [inaudible]

346
00:46:47,480 --> 00:46:57,500
They went to a presidential system in 2001. And so it's all about
[inaudible].

347
00:46:57,500 --> 00:47:06,100
Yeah I mean look, I thin I started with this quote. I started with a
puppy, obviously. Yeah.

348
00:47:06,100 --> 00:47:15,520
"Good political institutions make political idiocy more difficult, but
not impossible to achieve". There's a limit to what you can achieve by
manipulating political institutions.

349
00:47:15,520 --> 00:47:26,920

I think if you read most of the literature. I mean I'm not an expert
on Nigeria, I know a lot about the federal system of federalism

350
00:47:26,920 --> 00:47:34,180
and the people who write about this say " look, if they hadn't done
this Nigeria was toast. It would not have survived".

351
00:47:34,180 --> 00:47:42,180
But the reforms to the federal system and the preservation of the
federalist system at least, would have helped keep Nigeria together.

352
00:47:42,180 --> 00:47:48,440
[inaudible]

353
00:47:48,440 --> 00:47:55,000
Yeah I mean, How else would you govern it I guess would be another
question.

354
00:47:55,000 --> 00:48:05,200
I mean there are so many other factors besides the ethnic division of
[inaudible]

355
00:48:05,200 --> 00:48:11,620
Well I only picked... I mean I'm not arguing in favor of Nigeria -- I
don't know where it's gone now -- I'm only arguing...

356
00:48:11,620 --> 00:48:21,280
I only brought it up, because this is the argument that political
scientists put forward about what to do with Iraq, that this is an
effective way to do it and whatever. So it's not...

357
00:48:21,280 --> 00:48:28,800
My argument doesn't depend on Nigeria being a thumping success. It's
an illustration of a different approach to drawing lines.

358
00:48:28,800 --> 00:48:38,320
So you draw them to divide up ethnic groups rather than around the
ethnic group. So I'm quite happy to concede that you're absolutely
right,

359
00:48:38,320 --> 00:48:45,720

because this isn't, it's not what I'm in favor of anyway, so not what I'm advocating.

360
00:48:45,720 --> 00:48:54,780
But it was a Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Horowitz who kind of looked at this, but feel free to disagree with him. Promod.

361
00:48:54,780 --> 00:48:57,320
Yeah, if you can go back to that table

362
00:48:57,320 --> 00:48:57,880
The Puppy?

363
00:48:57,880 --> 00:49:03,060
[inaudible]

364
00:49:03,060 --> 00:49:16,920
Yeah I should say that the success and failure, it's on terms... Success and failure are defined by those who have criticized ethnic autonomy arrangements.

365
00:49:16,920 --> 00:49:27,560
So in other words, it's a failure if the government re-centralized the system and eliminated the ethnic autonomy or if the ethnic unit seceded from the whole.

366
00:49:27,560 --> 00:49:32,180
It's a success if the thing's still together and it hasn't been re-centralized.

367
00:49:32,180 --> 00:49:44,160
[inaudible] What I'm seeing is a lot of or most of these [inaudible]. Well, not going to happen.

368
00:49:44,160 --> 00:49:54,800
And on the one hand for example, [inaudible]

369
00:49:54,800 --> 00:50:03,860
On another hand, the system was deeply simple and you can look at India for example,

370

00:50:03,860 --> 00:50:17,200
part of the reason why India succeeded was because at the same time
[inaudible]

371
00:50:17,200 --> 00:50:21,340
at the same time democracy [inaudible]

372
00:50:21,340 --> 00:50:21,840
Right.

373
00:50:21,840 --> 00:50:31,300
And that democracy actually made possible for the different groups,
differen kinds of [inaudible]

374
00:50:31,300 --> 00:50:32,160
Sure.

375
00:50:32,160 --> 00:50:35,900
And then also India had [inaudible]

376
00:50:35,900 --> 00:50:36,400
Right

377
00:50:36,400 --> 00:50:37,940
And that meant...

378
00:50:37,940 --> 00:50:38,440
[cough]

379
00:50:38,440 --> 00:50:47,320
So what I'm saying there is many democracies are transplants in a
system of the [inaudible]

380
00:50:47,320 --> 00:50:54,600
is a must for any [inaudible] the country [inaudible]

381
00:50:54,600 --> 00:50:55,260
Well...

382
00:50:55,260 --> 00:50:57,060

[inaudible]

383
00:50:57,060 --> 00:50:57,560
I.. I..

384
00:50:57,560 --> 00:51:04,040
Pakistan you have [inaudible]. On the one hand you have the Pakistan
[inaudible]

385
00:51:04,040 --> 00:51:04,540
Right.

386
00:51:04,540 --> 00:51:08,280
And then you also have the [inaudible]

387
00:51:08,280 --> 00:51:08,800
Right.

388
00:51:08,800 --> 00:51:17,140
[inaudible]

389
00:51:17,140 --> 00:51:27,380
[inaudible]

390
00:51:27,380 --> 00:51:35,000
[inaudible]

391
00:51:35,000 --> 00:51:43,560
[inaudible]

392
00:51:43,560 --> 00:51:49,900
So what I'm saying is that how can we think [inaudible] whether it is

393
00:51:49,900 --> 00:51:56,640
how you run the political system in terms of how [inaudible]

394
00:51:56,640 --> 00:52:02,980
Well what you do is you run a logistic regression and you control for
democracy.

395
00:52:03,000 --> 00:52:10,400
So that.. I mean, again, my stats guys isn't here, but you forced me
back to the numbers.

396
00:52:10,400 --> 00:52:18,020
I mean you can look at this one way, which is essentially these
differences in structure matter even after controlling for level of
democracy.

397
00:52:18,020 --> 00:52:24,400
That's what the numbers tell you. So essentially this is one way of
taking democracy out of it.

398
00:52:24,400 --> 00:52:28,760
So you control for democracy, it still matters what structure you
have.

399
00:52:28,760 --> 00:52:36,760
But I think it's more interesting in fact, to think about it in terms
of what I said, which is that it matters more at certain levels of
democracy.

400
00:52:36,760 --> 00:52:44,800
So I mean again, Pakistan, it may have.. once you have really low
levels of democracy, you're going to fail, right? Probably.

401
00:52:44,800 --> 00:52:50,380
That's what the numbers tell you anyway. Really high levels of
democracy, you're going to succeed. It doesn't really matter how you
organize it.

402
00:52:50,380 --> 00:52:56,860
You know Finland can adopt whatever system it wants for its Swedish
speakers and it's probably going to succeed.

403
00:52:56,860 --> 00:53:07,860
Where it matters most is somewhere in the middle, which is where we
happen to find most of the post-conflict environments in which you
have to start constructing you know, these institutions.

404
00:53:07,860 --> 00:53:19,920

So I accept your point, but that numerically or statistically is kind of controlled for in this analysis.

405
00:53:19,920 --> 00:53:24,580
[inaudible]

406
00:53:24,580 --> 00:53:25,140
Where's the beer?

407
00:53:25,140 --> 00:53:35,240
This event you come with all this [inaudible]

408
00:53:35,240 --> 00:53:44,400
is going to be more stable. How do you do that without [inaudible] ?

409
00:53:44,400 --> 00:53:46,400
Well but...

410
00:53:46,400 --> 00:53:59,380
Who is going to do that? How are leaders going to accept that? [inaudible]

411
00:53:59,380 --> 00:54:02,300
And then we'll have a [inaudible]

412
00:54:02,300 --> 00:54:11,520
Well I mean you've got a choice. If you're a Shiia politician like the current prime minister, fortunately Maliki is gone now, but Haider al-Abadi, right?

413
00:54:11,580 --> 00:54:19,680
He comes into power, he's seen what happens if you are a sectarian leader like Nouri al-Maliki, right?

414
00:54:19,680 --> 00:54:29,380
So if he has an interest in preserving the territorial integrity of Iraq, then he knows that in the end the Sunnis have to have some sort autonomy,

415
00:54:29,380 --> 00:54:39,440

some sort of defense against the central government. He also, if he
understands that the best way for Iraq to hold together and preserve
it's territorial integrity,

416
00:54:39,440 --> 00:54:46,360
is to leave the south divided up into multiple units, to have a Sunni
region and a Kurdish region, then he's got a choice.

417
00:54:46,360 --> 00:54:56,220
You know, you can either do that and hope that Iraq hold s together or
not do that and end up fighting against Sunnis and Kurds until the end
of time. I mean

418
00:54:56,220 --> 00:55:04,700
yeah, I can't force them to do it and all political institutions can
do is make idiocy more difficult, you know?

419
00:55:04,700 --> 00:55:12,680
At some point you know, the interests of the political leaders have to
be towards keeping the thing together.

420
00:55:12,680 --> 00:55:18,320
If they don't want to live together then nobody can make them and the
institutions can't do that, so. I mean it's a fair point, but

421
00:55:18,320 --> 00:55:27,720
my job stops short of that. I'm not going to go over to Iraq and
convince guys to do it, but.

422
00:55:27,720 --> 00:55:29,420
Alright lets' give him a hand please

423
00:55:29,420 --> 00:55:33,940
[applause]

424
00:55:33,940 --> 00:55:41,340
Alright thank you everybody, this was an excellent second CoLA
Research Conference. I learned a lot [laughing]

425
00:55:41,340 --> 00:55:48,080
from everybody and it was really nice seeing Janet's slides, because
those are my kind of slides. I appreciate them a lot

426
00:55:48,080 --> 00:55:53,740
So I just want to make sure, I want to thank Stephanie Dickie for
organizing everything. Thank you so much Stephanie.

427
00:55:53,740 --> 00:55:56,860
[applause]

428
00:55:56,860 --> 00:56:10,520
And we also have our reception over here, so make sure everybody comes
over and has camaraderie and libations and food and thank you so much
for coming.