Readings in Affective Education

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PREFACE

Exploring, Deciding and Acting is a result of many, many hours of reading, studying and teaching. The editors have instructed courses and workshops which required a theoretical explanation of affective education. This text is our attempt to present some representative and excellent articles in the areas of affective education.

Many values clarification lessons are being published. These may take the form of strategy books to elaborate kits. As materials proliferate, more and more teachers will gain access. In one sense this overabundance of materials can serve a useful purpose. However, the editors are concerned that well-meaning teachers and administrators may do as much harm as good unless there is first some degree of comprehension of an approach to values analysis and moral education.

It is the writers' contentions that moral education and values clarification is not just another bandwagon. As educators we have a responsibility to keep abreast of current curriculum trends; today, we must know something about behavioral objectives, gaming and simulation, interaction analysis, role playing, inquiry, concepts, generalizations, and reflection. We should also know something of the theoretical constructs of values clarification and moral education.

We would maintain that moral education and values clarification are going to become much more important in all areas of the curriculum. As such these concepts have existed for several years. Perhaps John Dewey's writings in the 1890's did much to awaken the present generation to the need. During the past several years such writers as Hunt and Metcalf, Jewett, Simon, Kohlberg and Piaget, have contributed much to curriculum development. It is our contention that moral education and values analysis ought to be of central concern to the curriculum. Values education is the most important kind of education.

Nationwide we are witness to a growing trend of training educators in the skills of moral education. Many education method courses are beginning to deal with this complex issue. Many special workshops are being offered. Thus a need exists to provide a background for this new curriculum area. This book is one such attempt at filling this vacuum.

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Values are a part of the larger trend in education more commonly referred to as "humanistic," "affective," "confluent," or "psychological" education.

Humanistic education emphasized the non-academic aspects of a student's growth and development. The humanistic approach to education aims chiefly at promoting positive self-concepts, increasing achievement motivation, promoting creative thinking and behavior, fostering better human relations and clarifying values.

Our values are of utmost importance. It is our values that determine the choices we make and the direction we take in life.

In our highly complexed, individualized society, we are constantly bombarded by numerous decisions. Today people are confronted with more choices than ever before. In Future Shock Alvin Toffler warns that future generations may be faced with the dilemma of overchoice. A person who has no value system or a confused value system may not be able to cope with the dilemma of overchoice. Therefore, it appears imperative that each individual be assisted in establishing a set of values by which he can make rational decisions in unfamiliar situations.

We may feel that we have a well defined set of values, only to realize that when we are faced with a novel situation or a forced choice between two or more agreeable or disagreeable alternatives that we become thoroughly confused.

The concept of values education is not new. There have
always been parents and educators who have searched for ways to assist the youth in constructing a system of values. Numerous approaches may be used in constructing values. In their attempt to assist the younger generation in developing values, parents and educators have traditionally used such approaches as modeling, moralizing, laissez-faire and values clarification.

The adults who use the modeling approach, attempt to set a living example for youth to follow. This approach required the adult to set examples in words and in actions as well as in dress etc. The difficulty with this approach is that our youth of today are exposed to so many different adults that it is difficult for them to select an appropriate model.

Moralizing is an indoctrinational approach to teaching values. With the moralizing approach, the adults assume that they know the "right" set of values that everyone should have. The problem with this approach is that it has become ineffective. In our pluralistic society, the youth of today are introduced to many different philosophies. The youth become confused. In the final analysis, they are left alone to make their own decisions about whose advice to follow or values to adopt. The youth who are reared by adults who use the moralizing approach in teaching values are not equipped to make rational choices. They have not had the experiences of selecting what they think is best and refrain from the "less desirable" values which others are encouraging them to adopt.

The laissez-faire approach to values education requires everybody to refrain from teaching values. The adults who adopt this approach feel that everyone must develop their own values without any assistance. They feel that everyone will be allright in the end.

The fallacy of the laissez-faire approach is that everything usually does not come out allright in the end. Our youth of today do not need parents and teachers to run their lives, but they do need, and in most instances, want assistance in learning how to make value judgments.

Values clarification is a process approach to helping people
The process of values clarification attempts to assist people in developing their own system of values. This process allows a person to learn about himself, to become aware of his beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and what it is he values. Values clarification does not provide anyone with a set of values, but rather allows a person to discover his own values. The adults who use the process of values clarification are not concerned with the values a person holds, but rather the process by which a person develops his value system.

The questions that a person must ask to determine his own values stem from the areas of prizing, choosing and acting. By prizing, a person selects the beliefs, behavior and attitudes that he prizes and cherishes and is willing to publicly affirm when appropriate. In the process of choosing, the person must have a free choice to select from alternatives after the consideration of the consequences of each alternative. By acting, a person must decide if he is to act the way he believes. A person should form a pattern, be consistent and repetitious in his actions.

If a person cannot select what he prizes, make a choice between alternatives with a knowledge of the consequences and take action on his beliefs with consistency, he does not have a value system.

The goal of the process of values clarification is to assist people in applying the above processes of valuing in their everyday lives; to assist people in applying these processes to the beliefs and behavior patterns they now hold and to those they are now developing.

To achieve the goal of values clarification, educators must use techniques which will aid the youth of today in becoming aware of the beliefs they prize and would be willing to affirm publicly when appropriate. The educators must use materials and techniques which encourage students to consider the alternatives of thinking and acting. The learners must be encouraged to consider the pros-and-cons and the consequences of the different alternatives in reaching decisions. The teacher aids the learned in discovering
whether their beliefs correspond with their actions. If there is a gross discrepancy between the learner's stated beliefs and actions, the teacher attempts to assist the student in coordinating the two.

Through simulation exercises, the teacher provides the learners an opportunity to work their way through life-like situations. The learners are encouraged to use these processes in everyday life. People only learn what they are allowed to do. An individual does not really understand a problem until he/she has worked his/her way through it. It is only when people are allowed to make their own decisions and evaluate the consequences of the alternatives that they develop their own system of values.

WHAT IS VALUING?

by

Nicholas Rescher

(Reprinted by permission from Penny's Forum, Spring/Summer 1972, p. 3.)

Man is a creature that not only does things but thinks about what he does. Accordingly, we do things for reasons—because we regard them as leading to certain benefits for ourselves or others. Values represent the ultimate reasons people have for acting as they do—their basic aims, objectives, aspirations, ideals. They cover the whole domain or rational human action and range from our lowest to our most elevated concerns. The little things in life—the good manners and ordinary politeness of social interaction—manifest values no less sharply than the big crises.

Values are intangibles in the final analysis, they are things of the mind that have to do with the vision people have of "the good life" for themselves and their fellows. Each of a person's values—be it "loyalty" or "economic justice" or "self-aggrandizement"—plays a role in his concept of human well-being by providing a standard by which he assesses the extent of his
satisfactions in and with life. Abstract in character, these values manifest themselves concretely in the ways in which people talk and act, and especially in the pattern of their expenditure of time and effort, in their actions at work and leisure and in their choices in the marketplace. It is primarily through these concrete manifestations that values secure their importance and relevance in human affairs.

Values have to do with the rationalization of behavior—its justification and its explanation. Precisely because these two key factors of action and rationalization can get out of line, we come to the problem of the hypocrite; the person who verbally subscribes to a value but violates it in action. Since we tend to prize authenticity in our fellows nothing "turns us off" faster toward someone than this form of hypocrisy—talking a value up without implementing it in action.

Values are worth bothering with because they make a difference. When we know someone's values we are able to grasp "what makes him tick." We are better able to understand him and to deal with him. The possession of diverse values set people apart and shared values simplify their working together.

As biological organism all men share certain basic values relating to the maintenance of life, values enshrined in the rules of all civilized societies. But, of course, social and personal variation makes for a wide divergence in human values.

Values can change. When this happens—when changes in the conditions of life are such as to cast from the pedestal of the true and genuine some heretofore accepted value that once belonged there, there lies before us a (Nietzsche—reminiscent) "transvaluation" of values. But, of course, to say this is not to deny that it is unlikely to the point of inconceivability that many of our historic social or personal values—"justice," "intelligence," and "kindness," to give just three examples—could ever, under any realistically foreseeable circumstances, are likely ever to be dethroned.

Why bother to clarify our values? Knowing our own values is a crucial part of learning about ourselves. What sorts of
things are really meaningful to us? What are we striving for and working towards? What sort of a world do we want to see come into being? To the extent that we cannot answer such questions we have failed to come to terms with ourselves. The mark of an immature person lies exactly here, in that he still "has a great deal to learn about himself."

The single most important fact about values is that they themselves can be evaluated in turn. There are good values and bad values—curel or callous or self-aggrandizing values and those that are cooperative or kindly or humane.

It is especially important to equip children with a "sense of values." They must not only have values (that is pretty well inevitable) but should have an intelligent attitude towards them. Not only should they be taught good values, but they should learn to be critically aware of their own values and of the need to keep their actual life-style properly attuned to them.

The big values in our lives are called ideals. The importance of having them cannot be exaggerated. They are the basis of vision and aspiration in our lives. As the popular song put it, if you don'e have a dream you can't make a dream come true. In the kingdom of nature, man alone has a capacity for spiritual growth—for becoming bigger than life-size. All significant human achievement, great and small, is the product of intelligence guided by the vision of an ideal.

Whether we choose to confront it or not, all of us face the basic question: What really are my values? It is well worth reflecting about. For it is close to impossible to come away from such reflection without an enhanced understanding of ourselves and our relationship with our fellows.
TOWARD
A MODERN APPROACH TO VALUES:
THE VALUING PROCESS IN
THE MATURE PERSON

by

Carl R. Rogers

(Reprinted by permission from Paul Kurtz, ed.,
Moral Problems in Contemporary Society,
Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1969, pp. 77-95.)

There is a great deal of concern today with the problems of values. Youth, in almost every country, is deeply uncertain of its value orientation; the values associated with various religions have lost much of their influence; sophisticated individuals in every culture seem unsure and troubled as to the goals they hold in esteem. The reasons are not far to seek. The world culture, in all its aspects, seems increasingly scientific and relativistic, and the rigid, absolute views on values which come to us from the past appear anachronistic. Even more important, perhaps, is the fact that the modern individual is assailed from every angle by divergent and contradictory value claims. It is no longer possible, as it was in the not too distant historical past, to settle comfortably into the value system of one's community and live out one's life without ever examining the nature and the assumptions of that system.

In this situation it is not surprising that value orientations from the past appear to be in a state of disintegration or collapse. Men question whether there are, or can be, any universal values. It is often felt that we may have lost, in our modern world, all possibility of any general or cross-cultural basis for values. One natural result of this uncertainty and confusion is that there is an increasing concern about, interest in, and a searching for a sound or meaningful value approach which can hold its own in today's world.

I share this general concern. I have also experienced the more specific value issues which arise in my own field, psychotherapy. The client's feelings and convictions about values
frequently change during therapy. How can he or we know whether they have changed in a sound direction? Or does he simply, as some claim, take over the value system of his therapist? Is psychotherapy simply a device whereby the unacknowledged and unexamined values of the therapist are unknowingly transmitted to an unsuspecting client? Or should this transmission of values be the therapist's openly held purpose? Should he become the modern priest, upholding and imparting a value system suitable for today? And what would such a value system be? There has been much discussion of such issues, ranging from thoughtful and empirically based presentations such as that of Glad,¹ to more polemic statements. As is so often true, the general problem faced by the culture is painfully and specifically evident in the cultural microcosm which is called the therapeutic relationship.

I should like to attempt a modest approach to this whole problem. I have observed changes in the approach to values as the individual grows from infancy to adulthood. I observe further changes when, if he is fortunate, he continues to grow toward true psychological maturity. Many of these observations grow out of my experience as a therapist, where I have had the rich opportunity of seeing the ways in which individuals move toward a richer life. From these observations I believe I see some directional threads emerging which might offer a new concept of the valuing process, more tenable in the modern world. I have made a beginning by presenting some of these ideas partially in previous writings,² I would like now to voice them more clearly and more fully.

I would stress that my vantage point for making these observations is not that of the scholar or philosopher: I am speaking from my experience of the functioning human being, as I have lived with him in the intimate experience of therapy, and in other situations of growth, change, and development. To me these seem to express some core human values which a humanistic ethics can support with confidence.

Some Definitions

Before I present some of these observations, perhaps I
should try to clarify what I mean by values. There are many definitions which have been used, but I have found helpful some distinctions made by Charles Morris. He points out that value is a term we employ in different ways. We use it to refer to the tendency of any living beings to show preference, in their actions, for one kin of object or objective rather than another. This preferential behavior he calls "operative values." It need not involve any cognitive or conceptual thinking. It is simply the value choice which is indicated behaviorally when the organism selects one object, rejects another. When the earthworm, placed in a simple Y maze, chooses the smooth arm of the Y instead of the path which is paved with sandpaper, he is indicating an operative value.

A second use of the term might be called "conceived values." This is the preference of the individual for a symbolized object. Usually in such a preference there is anticipation or foresight of the outcome of behavior directed toward such a symbolized object. A choice such as "honesty is the best policy" is such a conceived value.

A final use of the term might be called "objective value." People use the word in this way when they wish to speak of what is objectively preferable, whether or not it is in fact sensed or conceived of as desirable. What I have to say involves this last definition scarcely at all. I will be concerned with operative values and conceptualized values.

The Infant's Way of Valuing

Let me first speak about the infant. The living human being has, at the outset, a clear approach to values. He prefers some things and experiences, and rejects others. We can infer from studying his behavior that he prefers those experiences which maintain, enhance, or actualize his organism, and rejects those which do not serve this end. Watch him for a bit:

Hunger is negatively valued. His expression of this often come through loud and clear.

Food is positively valued. But when he is satisfied, food is negatively valued, and the same milk he responded to so eagerly is now spit out, or the breast which seemed so satisfying is now rejected as he turns his head away from
the nipple with an amusing facial expression of disgust and revulsion.

He values security, and the holding and caressing which seem to communicate security.

He values new experience for its own sake, and we observe this in his obvious pleasure in discovering his toes, in his searching movements, in his endless curiosity.

He shows a clear negative valuing of pain, bitter tastes, sudden loud sounds.

All of this is commonplace, but let us look at these faces in terms of what they tell us about the infant's approach to values. It is first of all a flexible, changing, valuing process, not a fixed system. He likes food and dislikes the same food. He values security and rest, and rejects it for new experience. What is going on seems best described as an organismic valuing process, in which each element, each moment of what he is experiencing is somehow weighed, and selected or rejected, depending on whether, at that moment, it tends to actualize the organism or not. This complicated weighing of experience is clearly an organismic, not a conscious or symbolic function. These are operative, not conceived values. But this process can nonetheless deal with complex value problems. I would remind you of the experiment in which young infants had spread in front of them a score or more of dishes of natural (that is, unflavored) foods. Over a period of time they clearly tended to value the foods which enhanced their own survival, growth, and development. If for a time a child gorged himself on starches, this would soon be balanced by a protein "binge." If at times he chose a diet deficient in some vitamin, he would later seek out foods rich in this very vitamin. He was utilizing the wisdom of the body in his value choices, or perhaps more accurately, the physiological choices.

Another aspect of the infant's approach to value is that the source or locus of the evaluating process is clearly within himself. Unlike many of us, he knows what he likes and dislikes, and the origin of these value choices lies strictly within himself. He is the center of the valuing process, the evidence for
his choices being supplied by his own senses. He is not at this point influenced by what his parents think he should prefer, or by what the church says, or by the opinion of the latest "expert" in the field, or by the persuasive talents of an advertising firm. It is from within his own experiencing that his organism is saying in the nonverbal terms—"This is good for me," "That is bad for me," "I like this," "I strongly dislike that." He would laugh at our concern over values, if he could understand it. How could anyone fail to know what he liked and disliked, what was good for him and what was not?

The Change in the Valuing Process

What happens to this highly efficient, soundly based valuing process? By what sequence of events do we exchange it for the more rigid, uncertain, inefficient approach to values which characterizes most of us as adults? Let me try to state briefly one of the major ways in which I think this happens.

The infant needs love, wants it, tends to behave in ways which will bring a repetition of this wanted experience. But this brings complications. He pulls baby sister's hair, and finds it satisfying to hear her wails and protests. He then hears that he is "a naughty, bad boy," and this may be reinforced by a slap on the hand. He is cut off from affection. As this experience is repeated, and many, many others like it, he gradually learns that what "feels good" is often "bad" in the eyes of others. Then the next step occurs, in which he comes to take the same attitude toward himself which these others have taken. Now, as he pulls his sister's hair, he solemnly intones, "Bad, bad boy." He is introjecting the value judgment of another, taking it in as his own. To that degree he loses touch with his own organismic valuing process. He has deserted the wisdom of his organism, giving up the locus of evaluation, and is trying to behave in terms of values set by another, in order to hold love.

Or take another example at an older level. A boy senses, though perhaps not consciously, that he is more loved and prized by his parents when he thinks of being a doctor than when he
thinks of being an artist. Gradually he introjects the values attached to being a doctor. He comes to want, above all, to be a doctor. Then in college he is baffled by the fact that he repeatedly fails in chemistry, which is absolutely necessary to become a physician, in spite of the fact that the guidance counselor assures him he has the ability to pass the course. Only in counseling interviews does he begin to realize how completely he has lost touch with his organismic reactions, how out of touch he is with his own valuing process.

Let me give another instance from a class of mine, a group of prospective teachers. I asked them at the beginning of the course, "Please list for me the two or three values which you would most wish to pass on to the children with whom you will work." They turned in many value goals, but I was surprised by some of the items. Several listed such things as "to speak correctly," "to use good English, not to use words like ain't." Others mentioned neatness—"to do things according to instructions"; one explained her hope that "When I tell them to write their names in the upper right-hand corner with the date under it, I want them to do it that way, not in some other form".

I confess I was somewhat appalled that for some of these girls the most important values to be passed on to pupils were to avoid bad grammar, or meticulously to follow teacher's instructions. I felt baffled. Certainly these behaviors had not been experienced as the most satisfying and meaningful elements in their own lives. The listing of such values could only be accounted for by the fact that these behaviors had gained approval—and thus had been introjected as deeply important.

Perhaps these several illustrations will indicate that in an attempt to gain or hold love, approval, esteem, the individual relinquishes the locus of evaluation which was his in infancy, and places it in others. He learns to have a basic distrust for his own experiencing as a guide to his behavior. He learns from others a large number of conceived values, and adopts them as his own, even though they may be widely discrepant from what he is experiencing. Because these concepts are not based
on his own valuing, they tend to be fixed and rigid, rather than fluid and changing.

Some Introjected Patterns

It is in this fashion, I believe, that most of us accumulate the introjected value patterns by which we live. In this fantastically complex culture of today, the patterns we introject as desirable or undesirable come from a variety of sources and are often highly contradictory in their meanings. Let me list a few of the introjections which are common held.

Sexual desires and behaviors are mostly bad. The sources of this construct are many—parents, church, teachers.

Disobedience is bad. Here parents and teachers combine with the military to emphasize this concept. To obey is good. To obey without question is even better.

Making money is the highest good. The sources of this conceived value are too numerous to mention.

Learning an accumulation of scholarly facts is highly desirable.

Browsing and aimless exploratory reading for fun is undesirable.

The source of these last two concepts is apt to be the school, the educational system.

Abstract art is good. Here the people we regard as sophisticated are the originators of the value.

Communism is utterly bad. Here the government is a major source.

To love thy neighbor is the highest good. This concept comes from the church, perhaps from the parents.

Cooperation and teamwork are preferable to acting alone. Here companions are an important source.

Cheating is clever and desirable. The peer group again is the origin.

Coca-colas, chewing gum, electric refrigerators, and automobiles are all utterly desirable. This conception comes not only from advertisements, but is reinforced by people all over the world. From Jamaica to Japan, from Copenhagen to Kowloon, the "Coca-Cola culture" has come to be regarded as the acme of desirability.

This is a small and diversified sample of the myriads of conceived values which individuals often introject, and hold as their own, without ever having considered their inner organismic
reactions to these patterns and objects.

**Common Characteristics of Adult Valuing**

I believe it will be clear from the foregoing that the usual adult — I feel I am speaking for most of us — has an approach to values which has these characteristics:

The majority of his values are introjected from other individuals or groups significant to him, but are regarded by him as his own.

The source or locus of evaluation on most matters lies outside of himself.

The criterion by which his values are set is the degree to which they will cause him to be loved or accepted.

These conceived preferences are either not related at all, or not clearly related, to his own process of experiencing.

Often there is a wide and unrecognized discrepancy between the evidence supplied by his own experience and these conceived values.

Because these conceptions are not open to testing in experience, he must hold them in a rigid and unchanging fashion. The alternative would be a collapse of his values. Hence his values are "right" — like the law of the Medes and the Persians, which changeth not.

Because they are untestable, there is no ready way of solving contradictions. If he has taken in from the community the conception that money is the *summun bonum* and from the church the conception that love of one's neighbor is the highest value, he has no way of discovering which has more value for him. Hence a common aspect of modern life is living with absolutely contradictory values. We calmly discuss the possibility of dropping a hydrogen bomb on Russia, but then find tears in our eyes when we see headlines about the suffering of one small child.

Because he has relinquished the locus of evaluation to others, and has lost touch with his own valuing process, he feels profoundly insecure and easily threatened in his values. If some of these conceptions were destroyed, what would take their place? This threatening possibility makes him hold his value conceptions more rigidly or more confusedly, or both.
The Fundamental Discrepancy

I believe that this picture of the individual, with values mostly introjected held as fixed concepts, rarely examined or tested, is the picture of most of us. By taking over the conceptions of others as our own, we lose contact with the potential wisdom of our own functioning, and lost confidence in ourselves. Since these value constructs are often sharply at variance with what is going on in our own experiencing, we have in a very basic way divorced ourselves from ourselves, and this accounts for much of modern strain and insecurity. This fundamental discrepancy between the individual's concepts and what he is actually experiencing, between the intellectual structure of his values and the valuing process going on unrecognized within him—this is a part of the fundamental estrangement of modern man from himself. This is a major problem for the therapist.

Restoring Contact with Experience

Some individuals are fortunate in going beyond the picture I have just given, developing further in the direction of psychological maturity. We see this happen in psychotherapy where we endeavor to provide a climate favorable to the growth of a person. We also see it happen in life, whenever life provides a therapeutic climate for the individual. Let me concentrate on this further maturing of a value approach as I have seen it in therapy.

In the first place, let me say somewhat parenthetically that the therapeutic relationship is not devoid of values. Quite the contrary. When it is most effective, it seems to me, it is marked by one primary value; namely, that this person, this client, has worth. He as a person is valued in his separateness and uniqueness. It is when he senses and realizes that he is prized as a person that he can slowly begin to value the different aspects of himself. Most importantly, he can begin to value the different aspects of himself. Most importantly, he can begin, with much difficulty at first, to sense and to feel what is going on within him, what he is feeling, what he is experiencing, how he is reacting. He uses his experiencing as
a direct reference to which he can turn in forming accurate conceptualizations and as a guide to his behavior. Gendlin has elaborated the way in which this occurs. As his experiencing becomes more and more open to him, as he is able to live more freely in the process of his feelings, then significant changes begin to occur in his approach to values. It begins to assume many of the characteristics it had in infancy.

**Introjected Values in Relation to Experiencing**

Perhaps I can indicate this by reviewing a few of the brief examples of introjected values which I have given, and suggesting what happens to them as the individual comes closer to what is going on within him.

The individual in therapy looks back and realizes, "But I enjoyed pulling my sister's hair—and that doesn't make me a bad person."

The student failing chemistry realizes, as he gets close to his own experiencing—"I don't value being a doctor, even though my parents do; I don't like chemistry; I don't like taking steps toward being a doctor; and I am not a failure for having these feelings."

The adult recognizes that sexual desires and behavior may be richly satisfying and permanently enriching in their consequences, or shallow and temporary and less than satisfying. He goes by his own experiencing, which does not always coincide with the social norms.

He considers art from a new value approach. He says, "This picture moves me deeply, means a great deal to me. It also happens to be an abstraction, but that is not the basis for my valuing it."

He recognizes freely that this communist book or person has attitudes and goals which he shares as well as ideas and values which he does not share.

He realizes that at times he experiences cooperation as meaningful and valuable to him, and that at other times he wishes to be alone and act alone.

**Valuing in the Mature Person**

The valuing process which seems to develop in this more mature person is in some ways very much like that in the infant, and in some ways quite different. It is fluid, flexible, based on this particular moment, and the degree to which this moment is experienced as enhancing and actualizing. Values are not
held rigidly, but are continually changing. The painting which last year seemed meaningful now appears uninteresting, the way of working with individuals which was formerly experienced as good now seems inadequate, the belief which then seemed true is now experienced as only partly true, or perhaps false.

Another characteristic of the way this person values experience is that it is highly differentiated, or as the semanticists would say, extensional. As the members of my class of prospective teachers learned, general principles are not as useful as sensitively discriminating reactions. One says, "With this little boy, I just felt I should be very firm, and he seemed to welcome that, and I felt good that I had been. But I'm not that way at all with the other children most of the time." She was relying on her experiencing of the relationship with each child to guide her behavior. I have already indicated, in going through the examples how much more differentiated are the individual's reactions to what were previously rather solid monolithic introjected value.

In another way the mature individual's approach is like that of the infant. The locus of evaluation is again established firmly within the person. It is his own experience which provides the value information or feedback. This does not mean that he is not open to all the evidence he can obtain from other sources. But it means that this is taken for what it is—outside evidence—and is not as significant as his own reactions. Thus he may be told by a friend that a new book is very disappointing. He reads two unfavorable reviews of the book. Thus his tentative hypothesis is that he will not value the book. Yet if he reads the book his valuing will be based upon the reactions it stirs in him, not on what he has been told by others.

There is also involved in this valuing process a letting oneself down into the immediacy of what one is experiencing, endeavoring to sense and to clarify all its complex meanings. I think of a client who, toward the close of therapy, when puzzled about an issue, would put his head in his hands and say, "Now what is it that I'm feeling? I want to get next to it. I
want to learn what it is." Then he would wait, quietly and patiently, trying to listen to himself, until he could discern the exact flavor of the feelings he was experiencing. He, like others, was trying to get close to himself.

In getting close to what is going on within himself, the process is much more complex than it is in the infant. In the mature person it has much more scope and sweep, for there is involved in the present moment of experiencing the memory traces of all the relevant learnings from the past. This moment has not only its immediate sensory impact, but it has meaning growing out of similar experiences in the past. It has both the new and the old in it. So when I experience a painting of a person, my experiencing contains within it the learnings I have accumulated from past meetings with paintings or persons, as well as the new impact of this particular encounter. Likewise the moment of experiencing contains, for the mature adult, hypotheses about consequences. "I feel now that I would enjoy a third drink, but past learnings indicate that I may regret it in the morning." "It is not pleasant to express forthrightly my negative feelings to this person, but past experience indicates that in a continuing relationship it will be helpful in the long run." Past and future are both in this moment and enter into the valuing.

I find that in the person I am speaking of (and here again we see a similarity to the infant) the criterion of the valuing process is the degree to which the object of the experience actualizes the individual himself. Does it make him a richer, more complete, more fully developed person? This may sound as though it were a selfish or unsocial criterion, but it does not prove to be so, since deep and helpful relationships with others are experienced as actualizing.

Like the infant, too, the psychologically mature adult trusts and uses the wisdom of his organism, with the difference that he is able to do so knowingly. He realizes that if he can trust all of himself, his feelings and his intuitions may be wiser than his mind, that as a total person he can be more sensitive and accurate than his thoughts alone. Hence he is not
afraid to say—"I feel that this experience (or this thing, or
this direction) is good. Later I will probably know why I feel
it is good." He trusts the totality of himself.

It should be evident from what I have been saying that this
valuing process in the mature individual is not an easy or simple
thing. The process is complex, the choices often very perplexing
and difficult, and there is no guarantee that the choice which is
made will in fact prove to be self-actualizing. But because whatever
evidence exists is available to the individual, and because he is open to his experiencing, errors are correctable. If this
chosen course of action is not self-enhancing this will be sensed
and he can make an adjustment or revision. He thrives on a max­
imum feedback interchange, and thus, like the gyroscopic compass
on a ship, can continually correct his course toward his true
goal of self-fulfillment.

Some Propositions Regarding
the Valuing Process

Let me sharpen the meaning of what I have been saying by
stating two propositions which contain the essential elements of
this viewpoint. While it may not be possible to devise empiri­
cal testsof each proposition in its entirety, each is to some
degree capable of being tested through the methods of science.
I would also state that though the following propositions are
stated firmly in order to give them clarity, I am actually ad­
vancing them as decidedly tentative hypotheses.

1. There is an organismic base for an organized valuing
process within the human individual.

It is hypothesized that this base is something the human
being shares with the rest of the animate world. It is part of
the functioning life process of any healthy organism. It is the
capacity for receiving feedback information which enables the
organism continually to adjust its behavior and reactions so as
to achieve the maximum possible self-enhancement.

2. This valuing process in the human being is effective
in achieving self-enhancement to the degree that the
individual is open to the experiencing which is going
on within himself.
I have tried to give two examples of individuals who are close to their own experiencing: the tiny infant who has not yet learned to deny in his awareness the processes going on within; and the psychologically mature person who has relearned the advantages of this open state.

There is a corollary to this second proposition which might be put in the following terms. One way of assisting the individual to move toward openness to experience is through a relationship in which he is prized as a separate person, in which the experiencing going on within him is empathetically understood and valued, and in which he is given the freedom to experience his own feelings and those of others without being threatened in doing so.

This corollary obviously grows out of therapeutic experience. It is a brief statement of the essential qualities in the therapeutic relationship. There are already some empirical studies, of which the one by Barrett-Lennard is a good example, which gives support to such a statement.\(^5\)

**Propositions Regarding the Outcome of the Valuing Process**

I come now to the nub of any theory of values or valuing. What are its consequences? I should like to move into this new ground by stating bluntly two propositions as to the qualities of behavior which emerge from this valuing process. I shall then give some of the evidence from my own experience as a therapist in the support of these propositions.

3. In persons who are moving toward greater openness to their experiencing, there is an organismic commonality of value directions.

4. These common value directions are of such kinds as to enhance the development of the individual himself, of others in his community, and to make for the survival and evolution of his species.

It has been a striking fact of my experience that in therapy, where individuals are valued, where there is greater freedom to feel and to be, certain value directions seem to emerge. There are not chaotic directions but instead have a surprising commonality. This commonality is not dependent on the personality
of the therapist, for I have seen these trends emerge in the clients of therapists sharply different in personality. This commonality does not seem to be due to the influence of any one culture, for I have found evidence of these directions in cultures as divergent as those of the United States, Holland, France, and Japan. I like to think that this commonality of value directions is due to the fact that we all belong to the same species—that just as a human infant tends, individually, to select a diet similar to that selected by other human infants, so a client in therapy tends, individually, to choose value directions similar to those chosen by other clients. As a species there may be certain elements of experience which tend to make for inner development and which would be chosen by all individuals if they were genuinely free to choose.

Let me indicate a few of these value directions as I see them in my clients as they move in the direction of personal growth and maturity.

They tend to move away from facades. Pretense, defensiveness, putting up a front, tend to be negatively valued.

They tend to move away from "oughts." The compelling feeling of "I ought to do or be thus and so" is negatively valued. The client moves away from being what he "ought to be," no matter who has set that imperative.

They tend to move away from meeting the expectations of others. Pleasing others, as a goal in itself, is negatively valued.

Being real is positively valued. The client tends to move toward being himself, being his real feelings, being what he is. This seems to be a very deep preference.

Self-direction is positively valued. The client discovers an increasing pride and confidence in making his own choices, guiding his own life.

One's self, one's own feelings come to be positively valued. From a point where he looks upon himself with contempt and despair, the client comes to value himself and his reactions as being of worth.
Being a process is positively valued. From desiring some fixed goal, clients come to prefer the excitement of being a process of potentialities being born.

Perhaps more than all else, the client comes to value an openness to all of his inner and outer experience. To be open to and sensitive to his own inner reactions and feelings, the reactions and feelings of others, and the realities of the objective world—this is a direction which he clearly prefers. This openness becomes the client's most valued resource.

Sensitivity to others and acceptance of others is positively valued. The client comes to appreciate others for what they are, just as he has come to appreciate himself for what he is.

Finally, deep relationships are positively valued. To achieve a close, intimate, real, fully communicative relationship with another person seems to meet a deep need in every individual, and is very highly valued.

These then are some of the preferred directions which I have observed in individuals moving toward personality maturity. Though I am sure that the list I have given is inadequate and perhaps to some degree inaccurate, it holds for me exciting possibilities, let me try to explain why.

I find it significant that when individuals are prized as persons, the values they select do not run the full gamut of possibilities. I do not find, in such a climate of freedom, that one person comes to value fraud and murder and thievery, while another values a life of self-sacrifice, and another values only money. Instead there seems to be a deep and underlying thread of commonality. I dare to believe that when the human being is inwardly free to choose whatever he deeply values, he tends to value those objects, experiences, and goals which make for his own survival, growth, and development, and for the survival and development of others. I hypothesize that it is characteristic of the human organism to prefer such actualizing and socialized goals when he is exposed to a growth-promoting climate.

A corollary of what I have been saying is that in any culture, given a climate of respect and freedom in which he is
valued as a person, the mature individual would tend to choose and prefer these same value directions. This is a highly significant hypothesis which could be tested. It means that though the individual of whom I am speaking would not have a consistent or even a stable system of conceived values, the valuing process within him would lead to emerging value directions which would be constant across cultures and across time.

Another implication I see is that individuals who exhibit the fluid valuing process I have tried to describe, whose value directions are generally those I have listed, would be highly effective in the ongoing process of human evolution. If the human species is to survive at all on this globe, the human being must become more readily adaptive to new problems and situations, must be able to select that which is valuable for development and survival out of new and complex situations, must be accurate in his appreciation of reality if he is to make such selections. The psychologically mature person as I have described him has, I believe, the qualities which would cause him to value those experiences which would make for the survival and enhancement of the human race. He would be a worthy participant and guide in the process of human evolution.

Finally, it appears that we have returned to the issue of universality of values, but by a different route. Instead of universal values "out there," or a universal value system imposed by some group—philosophers, rulers, or priests—we have the possibility of universal human value directions emerging from the experiencing of the human organism. Evidence from therapy indicates that both personal and social values emerge as natural, and experienced, when the individual is close to his own organismic valuing process. The suggestion is that though modern man no longer trusts religion or science or philosophy nor any system of beliefs to give him his values, he may find an organismic valuing base within himself which, if he can learn again to be in touch with it, will prove to be an organized, adaptive and social approach to the perplexing value issues which face all of us.
Summary

I have tried to present some observations, growing out of experience in psycho-therapy, which are relevant to man's search for some satisfying basis for his approach to values.

I have described the human infant as he enters directly into an evaluating transaction with his world, appreciating or rejecting his experiences as they have meaning for his own actualization, utilizing all the wisdom of his tiny but complex organism.

I have said that we seem to lose this capacity for direct evaluation, and come to behave in those ways and to act in terms of those values which will bring us social approval, affection, esteem. To buy love we relinquish the valuing process. Because the center of our lives now lies in others, we are fearful and insecure, and must cling rigidly to the values we have introjected.

But if life or therapy gives us favorable conditions for continuing our psychological growth, we move on in something of a spiral, developing an approach to values which partakes of the infant's directness and fluidity but goes far beyond him in its richness. In our transactions with experience we are again the locus or source of valuing, we prefer those experiences which in the long run are enhancing, we utilize all the richness of our cognitive learning and functioning, but at the same time we trust the wisdom of our organism.

I have pointed out that these observations lead to certain basic statements. Man has within him an organismic bases for valuing. To the extent that he can be freely in touch with this valuing process in himself, he will behave in ways which are self-enhancing. We even know some of the conditions which enable him to be in touch with his own experiencing process.

In therapy, such openness to experience leads to emerging value directions which appear to be common across individuals and perhaps even across cultures. Stated in older terms, individuals who are thus in touch with their experiencing come to value such directions as sincerity, independence, self-direction, self-knowledge, social responsibility, and loving interpersonal
relationships.

I have concluded that a new kind of emergent universality of value directions becomes possible when individuals move in the direction of psychological maturity, or more accurately, move in the direction of becoming open to their experiencing. Such a value base appears to make for the enhancement of self and others, and to promote a positive evolutionary process.

NOTES


4 Gendlin, Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning.


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For a bibliography of materials and workshops available on Values Clarification and Humanistic Education write The National Humanistic Education Center, 110 Spring Street, Saratoga, New York 12866.
HELPING CHILDREN TO CLARIFY VALUES
by
Louis E. Raths and Sidney B. Simon
(Reprinted by permission from N.E.A. Journal, October 1967, pp. 12-15.)

Modern life in the United States is rich with choices and opportunities, but it is also very confusing. It is far more difficult for a child to develop clear values today than it was in the simpler, more austere life of the turn of the century.

One major reason for this is the change in the family, where many believe, values develop. In recent decades, Americans have seen dramatic, if not frightening, changes in the family - working mothers (one out of three), broken homes (estimated at one out of five), and geographic mobility (about one family in five moves every year). Family sharing has decreased. The consequence, we submit, has been a growing confusion in the life of children.

When the family defaulted, society passed the buck to the schools. To avoid controversy, many schools began to stand for nothing. Teachers turned toward "teaching the facts." Administrators tended to prefer teachers who did not raise issues. In communities consisting of strangers with many different backgrounds, it became easier to have schools which represented no moral consensus.

The question we must answer today, then, is: What can schools in a heterogeneous society do in the teaching of values? Before arriving at an answer, it is necessary to define the terms and say not only what values are but by what processes people acquire them.

Individuals have experiences. Out of these may come certain general guides to behavior - values - which tend to give direction to life. Values evolve and mature as experiences evolve and mature.

Because values are a part of living, they operate in very complex circumstances and usually involve more than simple
extremes of right and wrong, good and bad, true and false. The conditions in which values work typically involve conflicting demands, a weighing and balancing, and finally an action that reflects a multitude of forces. Since each person's experiences are different, we cannot be certain what values, what style of life, would be most suitable for any person. We do, however, have some ideas about what processes might be most effective for obtaining sound values.

We see values as based on three processes: choosing, prizing and acting. From these we derive seven criteria, all of which must be satisfied if something is to be called value. An adult who wants to help children develop values should, we believe:

- Encourage children to make choices, and allow them to choose freely
- Help them discover and examine available alternatives when faced with choices
- Help them weigh alternatives thoughtfully, reflecting on the consequences of each
- Encourage them to consider what it is that they prize and cherish
- Give them opportunities to make public affirmations of their choices
- Encourage them to act in accordance with their choices
- Help them to examine repeated behaviors or patterns in their life.

In this way the adult encourages the process of valuing. The intent of this process is to help children clarify for themselves what they value. This is very different from trying to persuade children to accept some predetermined set of values by limiting their choices, enforcing rules and regulations, or teaching cultural or religious dogma, as some of the traditional approaches do.

We have no doubt that such methods have in the past controlled behavior and even formed beliefs and attitudes, but we assert that they have not and cannot lead to values in the sense we are concerned with them—values that represent the free and
thoughtful choice of intelligent humans interacting with complex and changing environments.

The traditional approaches listed above would receive a low grade in terms of their effectiveness in promoting such values as honor, courage, self-control, and love. All have the air of indoctrination: free inquiry, thoughtfulness, and reason seem to be lost. The approach seems to be to persuade the child to adopt the "right" values rather than to help him develop a valuing process.

One reason for the continued use of the old methods is that no clear and testable alternative has been provided. We suggest an approach to clarifying values that rests on a specific method of responding to things a student says or does. The strategy, called clarifying response, is to respond to a student so that he considers what he has chosen, what he prizes, and/or what he is doing.

The clarifying response is usually aimed at one student at a time, often in brief, informal conversations held in class, in hallways, on the playground, or anyplace else where a student does or says something to trigger such a response from the teacher.

Especially ripe for clarifying responses are expressions by students of attitudes, aspirations, purposes, interests, activities, convictions, worries, and opinions. Typical keywords that signal a statement of attitudes include: I'm for, I'm against, I think, if you ask me, my choice is, my way of doing it is, I believe.

As a teacher listens to students, he may mentally plus and minus their statements—plus for what they are for and minus for what they are against. Students are not always aware when they have revealed what they are for or against and are quite surprised to see their inconsistencies.

Teachers must avoid making students feel they will lose face as they expose their feelings. It is essential to maintain an accepting atmosphere and to say sincerely over-and-over again, "All of us are inconsistent from time to time, and all of us tend
to be confused about certain things we are for and against. One of the things we hope to learn is how to think about our attitudes and clarify them."

The purpose of the clarifying response is to raise questions in the mind of the student, to prod him gently to examine his life, his actions, and his ideas. The responses lead the student to no specific value; he does not need to deliver a "right" answer to a clarifying response.

All of the exchanges will be brief, for an extended series of probes might give the student the feeling that he is being cross-examined and make him defensive. Also, a long exchange might give him too much to think about. The idea is to raise a few questions, leave them hanging in the air, and then move on without moralizing. The student to whom the questions are addressed, and others who might overhear, may well ponder them later. These gentle prods stimulate students, and our research indicates that a number of such exchanges add up and make large differences in some students' lives.

Many of the responses will be geared directly to one of the seven valuing processes. For example, when choosing freely is involved, the teacher may ask, "Where do you suppose you first got that idea?" or "Are you the only one in your crowd that feels this way?" If the student has chosen from alternatives, the teacher may say, "What else did you consider before you picked this?" or "What's really good about this choice?" To help the student in choosing thoughtfully, the teacher may ask, "What would be the consequences of each alternative available?" or "What assumptions are involved in your choice?"

If prizing and cherishing are involved, the teacher may ask, "How long have you wanted it?" or "In what way would life be different without it?" Another issue is whether the student is willing to affirm publicly his choice—"Would you tell the class the way you feel sometime?" In reference to acting upon a choice, a teacher may ask, "What are your first steps? Subsequent steps?" or "Have you examined the consequences of your act?" Questions a teacher might ask in relation to the repeating of an action
include, "Have you felt this way for some time?" "Has it been worth the time and money?" "How long do you think you will continue?"

The following brief exchange shows how a teacher may use clarifying responses:

MARY: Some day I'd like to join the Peace Corps.
TEACHER: What are some good things about that, Mary?
MARY: Oh, the chance to be of service excites me, and going to faraway places does too.
TEACHER: Of those two, which is first?
MARY: I guess the faraway places part.
TEACHER: Are you glad that that one is first?
MARY: No, I guess people would respect me more if the service part was first.
TEACHER: Well, it's been interesting talking to you, Mary, but I must get back to my papers. Perhaps we can talk about it another time.

Students are accustomed to having teachers ask questions, both academic—who founded Jamestown?—and behavioral—Didn't I tell you to be quiet? These questions however, have nothing to do with the interchange between Mary and the teacher, with the clarifying approach which respects the individual's rights to make decisions.

Because many questions teachers customarily ask are really statements of the teachers' decisions, students often assume that a question is actually a concealed directive. To combat this, the teacher begins to use clarifying questions at times when the student knows that the teacher is not trying to disapprove of what he is saying or doing.

The simplest guide in the beginning is for the teacher to use clarifying responses in situations of which he either approves or has no preferences. After students become familiar with the clarifying responses, they will begin to use them on one another and on other friends.

Before defining a clarifying response, it may be helpful to
say what it is not.

Clarifying is not therapy.

Clarifying is not used on students with serious emotional problems.

Clarifying is not a single one-shot effort: it depends on a program consistently applied over a period of time.

Clarifying avoids moralizing, preaching, indoctrinating, inculcating, or dogmatizing.

Clarifying is not an interview, nor is it done in a formal manner.

Clarifying is not meant to replace the teacher's other educational functions.

Clarifying is an honest attempt to help a student look at his life and to encourage him to think about it in an atmosphere in which positive acceptance exists. Students will probably not enter into the perplexing process of clarifying values for themselves if they perceive that the teacher does not respect their viewpoint. If trust is not communicated, the student may well play the game, pretending to clarify and think and choose and prize but being as unaffected by the exchange as by a tiresome morality lecture.

For many teachers, working with clarification of values will mean much less talking and a lot more listening. Teachers who are able to do this and to ask the right questions begin to have small miracles happening in their classrooms. They often see attendance go up, grades rise, and interest and excitement in learning crackle. They see encouraging changes in students who have been classified as apathetic, listless, and indifferent.

The teacher fits the clarifying response into the value clarifying method by doing the following: first, looking and listening for statements or actions which suggest a value issue may be involved (he notes especially children who seem to be very apathetic, indecisive, flighty, or inconsistent or who tend to overconform or drift from here to there without reason); second, keeping in mind the goal—youngsters who have clear, personal
values; third, responding to a value indicator with a clarifying question or comment designed to help the student use one or more of the seven valuing processes.

Though a number of students may overhear a student-teacher exchange and profit from it, the clarifying response focuses on one student. Some techniques for value clarification can be used with a whole group. For example, a teacher may give each member of the class a value sheet which, in its simplest form, consists of a provocative statement and a series of questions.

The purpose of the statement is to raise an issue that may have value implications. The purpose of the questions is to carry each student through the value clarifying process with that issue. Since valuing is an individual matter, each student completes the value sheet by himself. Later, his answers may be shared with the teacher or other students and/or used as a basis for large or small group discussions.

Some value sheets consist of nothing more than a series of probing questions that are keyed to a common reading or experience. The questions on the value sheet are in the style of the valuing theory. That is, the questions do not try subtly to convince a student to believe what the adult believes but to help him take the issue at hand through the value criteria.

Among the many other classroom methods which a teacher may use to help children escape from value confusion are role-playing, devil's advocate (presenting the unpopular side of an issue), and time diary (each student keeps a record of how he spends his time and analyzes the record).

How can a teacher begin to incorporate value clarifying into his teaching? We suggest that he start by working toward a classroom climate in which students feel they are respected and accepted and feel secure enough to think logically and speak honestly. At the same time, the teacher must work to eliminate his own tendencies to moralize.

With valuing processes of choosing, prizing, and acting ever in mind, the teacher experiments, slowly but steadily, to find which strategies fit him and work best with his students.
In a few months he will be able to see results in the way his students make and act upon their choices. He may also find he has clarified some of his own values.

VALUES EDUCATION: WHAT LIES BEHIND THE BALLYHOO?

by

William E. Collie

Certainly no topic has received more attention in elementary and secondary school circles in recent years than values education. For cynics who, over the years, have seen educational interests come and go, the focus may be viewed as only educational ballyhoo, merely "sound and fury signifying nothing" which will ride the crest of popularity but, like many fads, soon be replaced by another emphasis (back to basics?) having made little real impact on the actual conduct of the school. A closer examination, however, suggests that values education, while it may lose its primacy as the "in" topic, has the potential for significantly influencing school practice.

As evidence of the lively interest in values education, look at the educational literature of the last several years. Professional journals are running a continuing stream of articles and publishing special issues on values education/moral education and the various strategies and techniques developed including, most prominently, values clarification and moral development. Commercial publishers are spewing forth new curricular materials with a values emphasis (or discovering the values slant was there in the old stuff all along just needing to be publicized). Professional conferences from school in-service days to national conventions are offering innumerable section meetings on some aspect of values education. And to quench teachers' "how to do it" thirst, a number of paperbacks are appearing on educational bookshelves designed to help teachers develop instructional strategies for values education (e.g. Hawley, 1975; Hawley and

In fact, so much is being done under the label "values education" that it is becoming increasingly difficult to sort through and make sense of the bombardment of varied conceptual approaches and curriculum materials now available. Douglas Superka and others (1975) have developed a typology of values education approaches that enables one to make some sense of what we refer to as "values education." First of all, they define terms which we will utilize: values are regarded as "criteria for determining levels of goodness, worth, or beauty," valuing refers to "the process of developing or actualizing values," and values education involves "the explicit attempt to teach about values and/or valuing." Superka and associates identified five commonly used approaches in values education including inculcation, moral development, analysis, clarification, and action learning. Within the five categories, 84 sets of curriculum materials were analyzed. In addition, they suggested two other approaches for which no existing curriculum materials could be identified. The evocation approach would "help students express their values as personal moral emotions without thought or hesitation." The union approach would "help students perceive themselves and act not as separate egos but as parts of a larger, interrelated whole."

Utilizing Superka's categories, it appears that most of the discussion currently taking place about values and moral education refers to approaches which deal with moral development strategies; values analysis with emphasis on development of rational, analytical skills; or values clarification approaches which stress identification of person values seen in the context of feelings and behavior patterns. The discussion of how values education ought to take place within these mainstream emphases has led to a lively debate among proponents of the differing approaches. Perhaps the most spirited interchange has related to the adequacy of values clarification or moral development as singular strategies for values education.
Supporters of values clarification see values as based on the three processes of choosing, prizing, and acting which combined collectively define valuing. The results of the process they call "values" (Raths, Harmin, Simon 1966). Advocates have developed a number of classroom strategies to facilitate the process of valuing (Simon, Howe, Kirschenbaum 1972; Simon 1974). Sidney Simon, the most active spokesman for the approach, enthusiastically claims that values clarification helps people to be more purposeful and productive to sharpen their critical thinking, and to have better relations with each other (Simon and de Sherbinin, 1975).

Critics of the values clarification approach include Lawrence Kohlberg, who rejects the values clarification definition of the end of values education as self-awareness because of its derivation from a belief in ethical relativity (1975). John S. Stewart concurs, charging that values clarification is based on "a theory that is philosophically indefensible and psychologically inadequate" (1975).

Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of moral development posits that people think about moral issues in six identifiable stages. Morality is regarded as a natural product of a tendency toward empathy or role taking and is based on a universal concern for justice. Kohlberg's theory suggests the highest stage of moral reasoning is based on universal principles of justice (Kohlberg 1971, 1975; Fenton 1976, Beyer 1976). The moral development approach utilized with students incorporates peer discussion of value dilemmas to stimulate movement to the next stage of moral reasoning (Galbraith and Jones 1976; Hersh, Paolitto, Reimer 1979).

Critics like Richard S. Peters (1975) attack Kohlberg's emphasis on morality based on a theory of justice as simplistic when it is viewed as the only form of morality. He criticizes Kohlberg for being so wrapped up in the justification for his own theory that he is ignoring other aspects of morality and moral learning and development which has been identified by other scholars working in the field. Jack Fraenkel (1971) points
out the limited scope of the moral dilemma discussion strategy based only on examination of student-generated action options. Fraenkel (1976) further questions the adequacy of the rationale behind the moral reasoning approach for values education. Fraenkel suggests that intellectual development must be coupled with emotional development if individuals are to be fully functioning and psychologically whole persons.

While an overarching, comprehensive values education theory may be lacking, the debate between the specialists does not seem to have had serious impact on educational practitioners. Teachers at the elementary and secondary levels, and in teacher education as well, have adopted either or both approaches on pragmatic grounds -- the strategies are clearcut, easily mastered, adaptable to a variety of classroom settings, and enjoyed by the students.

Values clarification and moral development approaches provide the classroom teacher with immediate reward. The rationale behind the approaches sounds plausible, and the teacher can feel comfortable getting involved in these kinds of moral/values examination which do not operate from a religious base. Both approaches relate to individual concerns of the students or to concerns with which they can easily identify. Issues raised on the more personal level, even though they may be extended to more universal concerns, are much more satisfying than the values analysis approach, for example, which urges consideration of complex social issues that often appear to be too far removed from student life or to require too much knowledge for students to successfully use. In contrast to the inculcation approach, both values clarification and moral development approaches to values education remove the stigma of authoritarian values promulgator from the teacher role.

Stronger than any curricular approach to values education which may be implemented in the existing structure of the schools may be the revision of the moral environment of the school itself, Kohlberg (1976) among others has argued that the true "hidden curriculum" of the schools is the subtle,
unrecognized moral teaching of the school atmosphere, a curriculum so potent that its force can overwhelm and make meaningless any new moral education approach imposed on it.

Building on Kohlberg's premise that moral education grounded on a theory of justice is in actuality the proper basis for civic education, a number of pilot schools have been established to test his "just community concept." Wasserman (1976) describes the establishment of a Cluster School within Cambridge (Massachusetts) High and Latin School. The school is composed of faculty and ninth to twelfth grade student volunteers enrolled in a core curriculum of English and social studies. The curriculum centers on role taking, on moral discussions, and on relating the governance structure of the school to the wider community. The rules and procedures are established by the community. Preliminary progress reports indicate a developing sense of community and higher morale. Research regarding progress in moral reasoning in this learning environment has just begun.

Wasserman also reports two other school reorganization programs to fit the developmental model. In Brookline, Massachusetts, an existing school-within-a-school is establishing a democratic governance structure. In the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania area Carnegie-Mellon University is working with three school districts and a private academy to develop Civic Education Schools or classes within the schools. Danforth Foundation support for all three programs will enable cooperative planning and information exchange.

Attempts such as those described by Wasserman suggest that values education can have an impact far greater than any single approach. Returning to Superka's categories, these project schools appear to incorporate several approaches to values education -- moral development, values analysis, values clarification, and social action -- within a school structure in which the participants are able to more freely practice their moral and value choices. Such experiments can put the philosophical and developmental assumptions behind moral development theory to the ultimate test.
Values education seemingly has found an institutional home in the schools. However, it is now a melange of varied approaches based on differing goals and objectives and utilizing disparate strategies. For values education to have significant impact on the schools, the place of values education in the school setting will have to be radically reconceptualized beyond merely being regarded as a new approach to be tacked onto or integrated with the existing curriculum. Further, serious examination of the social structure and the interactive patterns of the schools will be necessary if an environment conducive to moral growth is to exist.

NOTES


8 R.C. Hawley and I.L. Hawley, Human Values in the Classroom. (New York: Hart, 1975.)


10 C.R. Kniker, You and Values Education. (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1977.)

DO VALUES CHANGE? YES! RE-EVALUATION OF OLD VALUES
by
Ronald Mazus
(Reprinted by permission from Penny's Forum,
Spring/Summer, 1972, p. 16.)

"Values" is an elusive concept. When used in a discussion
or a presentation of ideas, the term often conveys comfort to
the audience addressed, for, after all, we are all in favor of
everyone having values, preferably our own. But what is judged
to be significantly worthwhile in life varies from culture-to-
culture, society-to-society, person-to-person. The concept it-
self begs many questions and issues. One can tell more about a
person's values in any given situation by what the person does
rather than by what that person says. Yet, that statement it-
self begs a question: how can we always be sure of another's
motivations and meanings?

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It is one of my assumptions that all values are relative to at least three experienced facts: the sense of self (I-ness); the existence of others; the environment of Nature. These three given aspects of reality are not created by me, but my perception of them and their continuously changing and complex interrelationship shapes them in part. For I bring to those experiences my imagination, memory, wants, needs, attitudes, goals, knowledge, willing, beliefs, behavior, emotions, and biological inheritance. To some extent, each of us creates a personal and unique reality.

It is our search for values-as-common-good which prevents our private realities from random clashing and mutual destruction. It is possible, of course, to go to either extreme of values-as-common-good: Political oppression, war and fanaticism when it is overstressed; psychosis or character pathology when it is understressed. There will always be stress between individual freedom and social order, but this tension can be creative, especially in a society which allows and protects a pluralism of values. I am claiming then, that it is a social good—a value—for us to take seriously the pursuit of meaning-in-community in order to maximize both societal and individual well-being. Indeed, I recognize and accept for myself a long list of values, virtues or goods (versus evils). I expend an extraordinary amount of my time, emotional and intellectual resources, and psychic energy trying to actualize certain deeply held values which have to do with personal growth, group joy, and world community.

However, even if I did believe that there are unchanging values in life and the universe, such a philosophical conviction would provide small comfort and little direction for me. I do not believe that there are values outside of persons which are initiated from a Platonic realm, or divinely revealed, or which are applicable to all persons and that valuing is a complex process involving creation, risk and courage; values are not something you have but something you do. In other words, I hold values to be experiential and situational. We have a choice in
the worldview which we will choose as ours and act upon in spite of the awareness of the demonic potential of all ideologies. It is ours to evaluate, risk, decide and act. Every value is created the moment it is chosen, willed and expressed. Friendship, for example, is not a thing which exists between two people; it is a constantly changing relational dynamic which deepens or dies according to what each person brings to the other to share something of who they are at that time. And that identical constellation of evaluating, risking, deciding and acting may never again occur, leaving that particular moment of being and response unique. Though I may use past experiences, I nevertheless face "new occasions which teach new duties" and I am left in my aloneness to choose among my many value-concepts in order to contribute to any situation the most creative human response of which I am capable. Most of the time, of course, I am not confronted with such momentous decision-making; habit, conditioning, character and personality help me, for better or for worse, in the quiet survival of each day.

But the times certainly are numerous enough when I encounter experiences which require radical re-evaluation of old values. There are times to hold on to friends and times to let them go; times to endure suffering and times to fight it; times for passionate sex and times for gentle sensuality; times for disciplined reflection and times for controversial action; times for involvement and times for detachment; times to trust and times to withhold trust; times for privacy and times for openness-in-community. And so we could go on and on, not merely imitating the rhetoric of Ecclesiastes, but being painfully aware of the paradoxes, absurdities, ironies, inconsistencies, and unpredictabilities of living which make us vulnerable to hurt and which make it imperative that somehow we find the courage to be in spite of all insecurities and anxieties.

In our eagerness to hold on to old values in their old contexts we will find not security but cultural and personal stagnation. As the late Abraham Maslow expressed it (Easlen Papers, 1968), "the self-actualizing person, for the most part,
transcends the values of his culture." Religious and educational institutions which have responsibility for the nurture of youth and adults should embrace the potential of the future and prepare people to confront it not with shock but with confidence based on emerging values—values which individuals should have the dignity to discover within themselves and through their own experiencing.

The process of education is basically value-venturing, but institutions of education seem distrustful of the capacity and desire of learners to explore, discover, experiment, and create. Educators often seem more secure in the role of technicians of stereotyped truths and values rather than participating in an on-going valuing process. The quest for a hierarchy of values or a set of values is, I believe, misleading because it misses the more critical issue of developing the individual's ability to utilize value-making criteria in ever-changing contexts. Even a value framework at one maturational stage of a person will not be the same value framework of another maturational stage of that same individual. And, certainly, the values of the contemporary generation are not identical to those of its preceding generation, for new times bring new challenges which require new responses. The contemporary movements for world community, alternative lifestyles and people's liberation contain the promise of a higher order of human being. We can create that reality if we do not fear value-venturing.

DO VALUES CHANGE? NO! VALUES AS A CONSTANT

by

David R. Mace

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I find discussion of values as exasperating as discussions of love, and for the same reason—because the words have no
precise meaning, so that every speaker invests them with mean­ings of his own. I therefore propose in this article to present a conceptual framework that can be understood even by relatively young children. It may be philosophically vulnerable, but it is pedagogically serviceable.

In order to think clearly and communicate intelligibly about this subject, I find I need to consider my relationships to others at three levels—of values, of standards, and of behavior. At the top level, clouds in the sky represent values—they are ethereal and relatively formless. At the next level, boxes represent standards—they are rigid and clearly defined. At the lower level (down-to-earth) people interacting represent behavior.

These three concepts are normally inter-related. The values are the ultimate ideals and goals of mankind, which do not undergo basic change. The standards represent the attempts of human communities and groups to make rules which will ensure that the values are preserved and expressed. Behavior represents the manner in which individual men and women interact with each other, normally by conforming to the standards in order to preserve the values.

Now let us look at each of these three levels a little more closely. The values, in my view, do not undergo basic change. They are integrally associated with the goals of human life. I hold that man has evolved beyond the animal level at which first survival, then immediate gratification, are the only consciously sought goals. The development of the human imagination enables man to step out of the narrow confines of the immediate present and to contemplate the past and the future. Thus he sees his life moving onward and, hopefully, progressing upward. He dreams of preserving the goods he has and of gaining greater goods in the future. Thus he takes command of his destiny and plans ahead.

But I cannot plan my life on an individual basis. I am bound to others who travel with me. They and I stand or fall together. So I must work out with the members of my family,
tribe, or nation some agreement about our corporate goals. This is the process of defining our values.

In this process, we are not free to follow unfettered imagination. There are conditions that must be met for mutual survival. This is even true of the animal world, as Prince Kropotkin demonstrated in his Mutual Aid. Unless individuals cooperate in seeking group ends together, they create conditions in which their individual ends are finally defeated. The conditions that must be met represent the values. They can be described in different ways. Some would say the basic value is justice, others would say it was love. We often speak of beauty, truth and goodness as values; and though they may be associated with quality of life rather than with survival, they are valid, because man's goal is to do more than survive.

We can speak of these values in many words, and that doesn't matter. The clouds do not need fixed forms. But they are inherently immutable, because they represent the conditions which must be met if human communities are not to degenerate or perish. We see a good example in microcosm of a human community degenerating for lack of values in William Golding's book Lord of the Flies.

It would be theoretically possible to have a human community so dedicated to its values that behavior would not need to be prescribed or controlled, but could be left to individual responsibility. This is the policy prescribed by situation ethics, and it can be realized in a really good family and even for a time in a larger community. But up to now in human history, there have been too many immature and perverse individuals to make it practicable to give them total freedom and trust them to live by the community values. So it has been necessary to establish standards. These are the boxes in our diagram and they represent customs, rules, and codes that interpret the correct behavior which will lead to the preservation of the values. The boxes have rather different shapes in different communities, varying with the circumstances in which people have to live. The boxes have to be rigid in form so that all concerned can see clearly what the law is that they have to obey. But in spite of this rigidity,
standards are always having to be modified to meet special cases and changing circumstances. This is specially true in a time of cultural change like that through which we are now passing. Our standards today are in confusion. But it is inaccurate to say that this means we need no values. It is simply that we are in the process of re-interpreting how our immutable values can be most effectively reflected in behavior under the new conditions in which we are living.

The hope of many today is that we may be able, in a free and pluralistic society, to dispense with rigid standards and follow the situational mode of living in direct individual response to our ultimate values. This represents a novel and daring experiment. Theoretically, in a world of really mature people, there is no reason why this should not be possible. In practice, at this stage in human development, the difficulties are formidable.

DO WE NEED MORAL EDUCATION?

by

Ronald G. Helms

(Reprinted by permission from The Ohio Council for the Social Studies Review, Spring 1974.)

Today we often hear that people are behaving as they do because of a breakdown in moral values. Some people assume that a
lack of religious upbringing is central to the plight of our misguided society. Others reason that our value crisis stems from future shock, erosion of family life, cosmopolitan effects of mass media, revolution in science and technology, and the complexity of ecological problems.

While we are not certain about all the causes of increasing violence, drug use, and sexual promiscuity in contemporary American society, we are advised by leaders in the field of moral education that many people are beset with moral confusion. We are advised that many people, young and old, are unaware of their moral responsibilities to themselves and to other people.

But how did we reach this state of moral confusion? Let us review some historical origins of traditional value systems and see how the systems have broken down.

Throughout most of history the direction of cultural development was often determined by military power, by a church-state authoritarianism, or by some other type of entrenched body which defined institutions and interpreted the value system. The individualization, industrialization, and increasing population of the twentieth century have tended to diversify culture as well as value systems.

In the past Americans were largely concerned with the inculcation of the puritan ethic. In the past we accepted the dual tenets that "fear is the mother of morality" and that "morality is the rationalization of self-interest." In contrast, today we are attempting to eliminate fear from the life of the child; today we often insist that morality should not be limited to self-interest.

In a time in which morals were viewed as God-given, immutable, and absolute, the morality of children and adults could be assumed to be synonymous. In the past we were in relative agreement as to the content of these absolute morals, and the institutions of home, church, and school were much in agreement in the task of transmitting the culture values to the youth. Today we find that, although these institutions are still very much concerned with teaching morality, the teachings have become
more pluralistic. Each institution inculcates in children values which may be widely divergent from the values instilled by other institutions. This diversity in values training has resulted in a peoples harried by confusion and anomie.

Thus, we have eliminated the absolute aspect of morality, the three institutions are no longer in complete concurrence, and we have eliminated fear as the basis of morality. Yet, our society need not remain in this state of uncertainty.

Although this moral dilemma readily evidences negative implications for society, there exist positive implications as well. For example, people may be forced to reflect upon moral issues and thus discover and admit limitations in their own moral reasoning. After a number of people begin to realize that their framework of values is indeed unsteady, it is hoped that portion of these will determine that the value system should be bolstered.

Since we often look to youth for flexibility and to educators for guidance, perhaps a logical approach to a stable, rational system of morals is the development of moral education within the existing school curriculum. Educators must face this situation and accept their responsibility for providing a method of early moral development.

We should at the outset distinguish between moral education and moralistic education. Moralistic education refers to past and ongoing practices of instilling, inculcating, and indoctrinating a common set of values within children. Moral education as we will use the term refers to a process of state-to-stage development—a continual process which is learned rather than reached automatically. Moralistic education is based upon absolute answers and thus may involve passive acceptance; whereas the process of moral education can be stimulated and enriched by presenting children with moral dilemmas. Theoretically, through the latter process, the child can be assisted toward more mature moral reasoning and a better resolution of moral problems.

In times past the traditional school curriculum utilized fables and similar moralistic "lessons" to inculcate "right" conduct. The child was trained to recite righteous precepts in
the belief that recitation would lead to practice. The school, church, and family utilized sermonizing as a method of instilling morality. Although this moralization did seem to work, we might ask, was the instilling practice itself moral? Moralization might seem to guarantee a standard of behavior, but is standardization moral?

As some people recognize that moralistic education may indeed have a constraining effect upon the spirit of the individual, they propose that the school system abandon all training dealing with morals. However, we must recognize that so long as educators maintain that their role is one of guidance and leadership, valueless teaching will not be possible and therefore a morality-free school cannot exist.

If we conclude that values will permeate the curriculum, then surely values education should be based upon the twin concepts of individual moral autonomy and justice.

The over-riding goal of moral education is that each person will be able to independently define his own value structure. Moral educators would agree that this is the most important function of the curriculum. The new morality would emphasize the establishment of a system of justice which would promote the well-being of the person as an individual.

This stress on independence and autonomy should not be a focal point of confusion. We are not advocating the removal of fear in order to substitute the pleasure principle. While we would not advance a codification of values, we would agree that a new "planless code" or a libertine situation would not be any more beneficial.

It is not standardization which we seek, but justice. People must be able to, in their own frame of reference, differentiate between their values. Teachers must be prepared to recognize that children come to school with different focal points in regard to moral development. And so, in twelve years of schooling—even in a traditional curriculum—they will not graduate at the same level. Of course, teachers will also be at varying levels of moral development.
Justice, the second of our twin concepts in values education, has in the past been derived from arbitrary authority. Individuals have either been unwilling to define justice for themselves or else they have not been equipped to do so. For definition we have in the past turned to authority, to models, to special revelation, to faith, or to parental dictate rather than to rely upon our own moral reasoning. Teachers today must function to give students alternatives in the above ready references. Before educators can presume to institute a curriculum centering upon the concept of justice, we must recognize that justice cannot be taught in an unjust school. As educators we need to recognize the injustices of our system. The school is most certainly a legal institution; however, a legal system is not always a moral system. Our only claim to moral superiority is through our commitment to justice.

For the complicated task of assisting students in moral development, there must be some framework of approach. A school cannot hope to teach about values or morals simply by offering one elective in the senior year; the curriculum K-12 must reflect a commitment to moral development. Moral education must be integrated with reflection, inquiry, and citizenship skills. Teachers must develop additional cognitive skills. Administrators will need to value the systematic research efforts of scholars in the field. Finally, schools as social institutions must serve as microcosmic models of a just society.

In contrast, there are many forms of psychotherapy for the psychiatrically disturbed. What skilled counsel is there for the increasing millions whose problem is not psychiatric, but rather a problem of finding meaning in an age that has made the loss of purpose a veritable lifestyle? A theoretical ethics is not enough. Given our present moral knowledge and human needs, a new discipline of Life Values Education, and particularly of Life Values guidance and counseling, is both a possibility and a necessity. It is this human and social need which I believe humanistic ethicists must be prepared to serve. Life Values Education would enable people to examine more critically and expertly the
logic of their aimless or drifting lives. They would be enabled to see more clearly what must be abandoned in their life plans, if they are to realize their deeper values and more humanizing goals.

The same examination must extend to our social morality and to the questionable assumptions upon which our industrial and commercial systems operate—assumptions that have been newly exposed by the rebellion of youth and the necessity of living within the limits of our human and natural environments.

We need therefore, to develop a disciplined "value analysis"—or (to coin a term using the Greek prefix for value) an "axio-analysis"—of the ways we live and the values, including the low and false values which our existing social, psychological and economic patterns tend to impose. I do not believe, as many do, that our economic and social systems are impervious to change. Certainly we have no right to abandon the task of modifying the system to serve human need, when we have hardly begun to develop the sciences that could apply that we have already learned about how human beings acquire values and structure their personal and social goals. These are the practical arts that can help the recovery of morale and social vision.

Certainly a meaningful life-style is not reached by immersing ourselves in drugs, devoting our lives to the acquisition of more material wealth than we actually need, nursing the racial and ethnic prejudices that fragment human life, retreating behind locked doors while our cities decay and our culture degenerates, or waiting for the bomb to fall or revolutionaries to strike. These are the ways to ruin.

Even if our civilization should escape destruction, millions of people, by surrendering themselves to moral drift and purposeless existences, would see their lives withered and their hopes voided. None of this need be. Enough is known already about the requirements for human strength and growth for us to construct an applied science of Life Values Education and guidance. The present crisis is ecology, economy, race relations, and national goals should teach us that the victories and
accomplishments of the next half-century must be radically dif-
ferent from the last; they must be accomplishments of the human
spirit, fired by a passionate attachment to the future of our one
human race here on earth.
Moral dilemmas with which students can readily identify have been widely used to facilitate moral development. These dilemmas typically cast students in the central character role and present them with real conflicts that raise moral questions. Rarely, if ever, however, do dilemmas portray teachers facing moral issues. This latter type of dilemma is also appropriate as an educational strategy and serves additional purposes that the student-focused dilemma cannot.

Casting teachers as central characters can help students:

(1) recognize that teachers, as well as students, face problems in decision-making;

(2) understand that resolving inter-personal concerns are part of the teaching process;

(3) realize that fulfilling occupational/vocational roles involve moral decision-making; and

(4) realize that moral growth is a developmental, life-long process.

To facilitate student identification with this type of dilemma, the issue(s) should be student-oriented (e.g. breaking rules, cheating). An example of a student-oriented dilemma that portrays the teacher as the decision-maker follows.

Mrs. Kane teaches a senior course in which she utilizes small groups and group assignments. At the final, two students in group four separately told Mrs. Kane that the group had written Jake's name on the last group assignment at his insistence but that he actually had not contributed any work at all to the assignment. The two remaining members of the group (other than Jake) had left the room prior to the statements of the two students. Jake had taken the final prior to finals week in order to participate in an out-of-town speech tournament. Final semester
grades are due before Jake will return to town. Mrs. Kane knows she can give Jake an incomplete and contact him when he returns to school the following week to discuss the incident. She feels that giving him an incomplete, however, would indicate her acceptance of the statements of the two students with whom she talked, since her records show no incomplete work for Jake. On the other hand, if the accusation is true, Mrs. Kane has sympathy for Jake's group because she feels that only those students who actually do the group work should receive credit.

Should Mrs. Kane include the last group assignment grade in computing Jake's semester grade?

If additional information is needed to heighten the dilemma, the teacher may choose among the following complicating factors:

1. The group assignment counts 30% of the semester grade. If Jake receives a zero for the group assignment, he will fail the course.

2. Mrs. Kane knows that Jake, a last semester senior, must pass this course if he is to have enough credits to graduate.

3. On all other assignments Jake has done his work and has given no reason for Mrs. Kane to question his ability or his willingness to do the work.

4. Mrs. Kane knows that the two students who have reported that Jake did not do the assigned work also are in Jake's speech class. Unlike Jake, they were not chosen to participate in the speech tournament.

5. On an earlier class assignment, Jake copied material without giving proper credit for the source.

6. Even if the matter were settled later in Jake's favor, issuance now of an incomplete for Jake's grade would mean that his name would not appear in the graduation program because of printing deadlines.
In this article, I present an overview of the cognitive-develop­
mental approach to moral education and its research foundations,
compare it with other approaches, and report the experimental wor­
d my colleagues and I are doing to apply the approach.

1. Moral Stages

The cognitive-developmental approach was fully stated for
the first time by John Dewey. The approach is called cognitive
because it recognizes that moral education, like intellectual ed­
ucation, has its basis in stimulating the active thinking of the
child about moral issues and decisions. It is called develop­
mental because it sees the aims of moral education as movement
through moral stages. According to Dewey:

The aim of education is growth or development, both intel­
lectual and moral. Ethical and psychological principles can
aid the school in the greatest of all constructions—the building of
a free and powerful character. Only knowledge of the order and con­
nection of the stages in psychological development can insure this.
Education is the work of supplying the conditions which enable the
psychological functions to mature in the freest and fullest
manner.1

Dewey postulated three levels of moral development: 1) the pre-moral or preconventional level "of behavior motivated by bio­
logical and social impulses with results for morals," 2) the con­
ventional level of behavior "in which the individual accepts with
little critical reflection the standards of his group," and 3) the autonomous level of behavior in which "conduct is guided by the
individual thinking and judging for himself whether a purpose is
good, and does not accept the standard of his group without
Dewey's thinking about moral stages was theoretical. Building upon his prior studies of cognitive stages, Jean Piaget made the first effort to define stages of moral reasoning in children through actual interviews and through observations of children (in games with rules). Using this interview material, Piaget defined the pre-moral, the conventional, and the autonomous levels as follows: 1) the pre-moral stage, where there was no sense of obligation to rules; 2) the heteronomous stage, where the right was literal obedience to rules and an equation of obligation with submission to power and punishment (roughly ages 4-8); and 3) the autonomous stage, where the purpose and consequences of following rules are considered and obligation is based on reciprocity and exchange (roughly ages 8-12).

In 1955 I started to redefine and validate (through longitudinal and cross-cultural study) the Dewey-Piaget levels and stages. The resulting stages are presented in Table 1.

We claim to have validated the stages defined in Table 1. The notion that stages can be validated by longitudinal study implies that stages have definite empirical characteristics. The concept of stages (as used by Piaget and myself) implies the following characteristics:

1. Stages are "structured wholes," or organized systems of thought. Individuals are consistent in level of moral judgment.

2. Stages form an invariant sequence. Under all conditions except extreme trauma, movement is always forward, never backward. Individuals never skip stages; movement is always to the next stage up.

3. Stages are "hierarchical integrations." Thinking at a higher stage includes or comprehends within it lower-stage thinking.

*These levels correspond roughly to our three major levels: the preconventional, the conventional, and the principles. Similar levels were propounded by William McDougall, Leonard Hobhouse, and James Mark Baldwin.

**Piaget's stages correspond to our first three stages: Stage 0 (pre-moral), Stage 1 (heteronomous), and Stage 2 (instrumental reciprocity).
There is a tendency to function at or prefer the highest stage available.

Each of these characteristics has been demonstrated for moral stages. Stages are defined by responses to a set of verbal moral dilemmas classified according to an elaborate scoring scheme. Validating studies include:

1. A 20-year study of 50 Chicago-area boys, middle- and working-class. Initially interviewed at ages 10-16, they have been reinterviewed at three-year intervals thereafter.

2. A small, six-year longitudinal study of Turkish village and city boys of the same age.

3. A variety of other cross-sectional studies in Canada, Britain, Israel, Taiwan, Yucatan, Honduras, and India.

With regard to the structured whole or consistency criterion, we have found that more than 50% of an individual's thinking is always at one stage, with the remainder at the next adjacent stage (which he is leaving or which he is moving into).

With regard to invariant sequence, our longitudinal results have been presented in the *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry* (see footnote 8), and indicate that on every retest individuals were either at the same stage as three years earlier or had moved up. This was true in Turkey as well as in the United States.

With regard to the hierarchical integration criterion, it has been demonstrated that adolescents exposed to written statements at each of the six stages comprehend or correctly put in their own words all statements at or below their own stage but fail to comprehend any statements more than one stage above their own. Some individuals comprehend the next stage above their own; some do not. Adolescents prefer (or rank as best) the highest stage they can comprehend.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 1. Definition of Moral Stages</th>
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<td>1. Preconventional level</td>
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At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets these labels either in terms of the physical or the hedonistic consequences.
of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of
the physical power of those who enunciate the rules and labels.
The level is divided into the following two stages:

Stage 1: The punishment-and-obedience orientation. The physical
consequences of action determine its goodness or badness, regard­
less of the human meaning or value of these consequence. Avoid­
ance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued
in their own right, not in terms of respect for an underlying moral
order supported by punishment and authority (the latter being
Stage 4).

Stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation. Right action
consists of that which instrumentally satisfies one's own needs
and occasionally the needs of others. Human relations are viewed
in terms like those of the marketplace. Elements of fairness, of
reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always
interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter
of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty,
gratitude, or justice.

II. Conventional level

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the individ­
ual's family, group, or nation is perceived as valuable in its
own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. The
attitude is not only one of conformity to personal expectations
and social order, and of identifying with the persons or group in­
volved in it. At this level, there are the following two stages:

Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good-boy—nice girl"
orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases or helps others
and is approved by them. There is much conformity to stereotypi­
cal images of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior
is frequently judged by intention— "he means well" becomes im­
portant for the first time. One earns approval by being "nice."

Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There is orientation
toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social
order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing re­
spect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for
its own sake.

III. Postconventional, autonomous, or principled level

At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral
values and principles that have validity and application apart
from the authority of the groups or persons holding these princi­
ples and apart from the individual's own identification with these
groups. This level also has two stages:

Stage 5: The social-contract, legalistic orientation, generally
with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in
terms of general individual rights and standards which have been
critically examined and agreed upon by the whole society. There
is a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and
opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for
teaching consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and
democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal
"values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis upon the
"legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of Stage 4 "law and order" Outside the legal realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is the "official" morality of the American government and constitution.

Stage 6: The universal-ethical-principle orientation. Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons ("From is to Ought," pp. 164-165).


To understand moral stages, it is important to clarify their relations to stage of logic or intelligence, on the one hand, and to moral behavior on the other. Maturity of moral judgment is not highly correlated with IQ or verbal intelligence (correlations are only in the 30's, accounting for 10% of the variance). Cognitive development in the stage sense, however, is more important for moral development than such correlations suggest. Piaget has found that after the child learns to speak there are three major stages of reasoning: the intuitive, the concrete operational, and the formal operational. At around age 7, the child enters the stage of concrete logical thought: He can make logical inferences, classify, and handle quantitative relations about concrete things. In adolescence individuals usually enter the stage of formal operations. At this stage they can reason abstractly, i.e., consider all possibilities, form hypotheses, deduce implications from hypotheses, and test them against reality.*

Since moral reasoning clearly is reasoning, advanced moral reasoning depends upon advanced logical reasoning: a person's

*Many adolescents and adults only partially attain the stage of formal operations. They do consider all the actual relations of one thing to another at the same time, but they do not consider all possibilities and form abstract hypotheses. A few do not advance this far, remaining "concrete operational."
logical stage puts a certain ceiling on the moral stage he can attain. A person whose logical stage is only concrete operational is limited to the preconventional moral stages (Stages 1 and 2). A person whose logical stage is only partially formal operational is limited to the conventional moral stages (Stages 3 and 4). While logical development is necessary for moral development and sets limits to it, most individuals are higher in logical stage than they are in moral stage. As an example, over 50% of late adolescents and adults are capable of full formal reasoning, but only 10% of these adults (all formal operational) display principled (Stages 5 and 6) moral reasoning.

The moral stages are structures of moral judgment or moral reasoning. Structures of moral judgment must be distinguished from the content of moral judgment. As an example, we cite responses to a dilemma used in our various studies to identify moral stage. The dilemma raises the issue of stealing a drug to save a dying woman. The inventor of the drug is selling it for 10 times what it costs him to make it. The woman's husband cannot raise the money, and the seller refuses to lower the price or wait for payment. What should the husband do?

The choice endorsed by a subject (steal, don't steal) is called the content of his moral judgment in the situation. His reasoning about the choice defines the structure of his moral judgment. This reasoning centers on the following 10 universal moral values or issues of concern to persons in these moral dilemmas:

1. Punishment
2. Property
3. Roles and concerns of affection
4. Roles and concerns of authority
5. Law
6. Life
7. Liberty
8. Distributive justice
9. Truth
10. Sex

A moral choice involves choosing between two (or more) of these values as they conflict in concrete situations of choice. The stage or structure of a person's moral judgment defines:
1) what he finds valuable in each of these moral issues (life, law), i.e., how he defines the value, and 2) why he finds it valuable, i.e., the reasons he gives for valuing it. As an example, at Stage 1 life is valued in terms of the power or possessions of the person involved; at Stage 2, for its usefulness in satisfying the needs of the individual in question or others; at Stage 3, in terms of the individual's relations with others and their valuation of him; at Stage 4, in terms of social or religious law. Only at Stages 5 and 6 is each life seen as inherently worthwhile, aside from other considerations.

Moral Judgment Vs. Moral Action

Having clarified the nature of stages of moral judgment, we must consider the relation of moral judgment to moral action. If logical reasoning is a necessary but not sufficient condition for mature moral judgment, mature moral judgment is a necessary but not sufficient condition for mature moral action. One cannot follow moral principles if one does not understand (or believe in) moral principles. However, one can reason in terms of principles. As an example, Richard Krebs and I found that only 15% of students showing some principled thinking cheated as compared to 55% of conventional subjects and 70% of preconventional subjects. Nevertheless, 15% of the principled subjects did cheat, suggesting that factors additional to moral judgment are necessary for principled moral reasoning to be translated into "moral action." Partly, these factors include the situation and it pressures. Partly, what happens depends upon the individual's motives and emotions. Partly, what the individual does depends upon a general sense of will, purpose or "ego strength." As an example of the role of will or ego strength in moral behavior, we may cite the study by Krebs: Slightly more than half of his conventional subjects cheated. These subjects were also divided by a measure of attention/will. Only 26% of the "strong-willed" conventional subjects cheated; however, 74% of the "weak-willed" subjects cheated.

If maturity of moral reasoning is only one factor in moral
Why does the cognitive-developmental approach to moral education focus so heavily upon moral reasoning? For the following reasons:

1. Moral judgment, while only one factor in moral behavior, is the single most important or influential factor yet discovered in moral behavior.

2. While other factors influence moral behavior, moral judgment is the only distinctively moral factor in moral behavior. To illustrate, we noted that the Krebs study indicated that "strong-willed" conventional stage subjects resisted cheating more than "weak-willed" subjects. For those at a preconventional level of moral reasoning, however, "will" had an opposite effect. "Strong-willed" Stages 1 and 2 subjects cheated more, not less, than "weak-willed" subjects, i.e., they had the "courage of their (amoral) convictions" that it was worthwhile to cheat. "Will," then, is an important factor in moral behavior, but it is not distinctively moral; it becomes moral only when informed by mature moral judgment.

3. Moral judgment change is long-range or irreversible; a higher stage is never lost. Moral behavior as such is largely situational and reversible or "loseable" in new situations.

II. Aims of Moral and Civic Education

Moral psychology describes what moral development is, as studied empirically. Moral education must also consider moral philosophy, which strives to tell us what moral development ideally ought to be. Psychology finds an invariant sequence of moral stages; moral philosophy must be invoked to answer whether a later stage is a better stage. The "stage" of senescence and death follows the "stage" of adulthood, but that does not mean that senescence and death are better. Our claim that the latest or principled stages of moral reasoning are morally better stages, then, must rest on considerations of moral philosophy.

The tradition of moral philosophy to which we appeal is the liberal or rational tradition, in particular the "formalistic"
or "deontological" tradition running from Immanuel Kant to John Rawls. Central to this tradition is the claim that an adequate morality is principled, i.e., that it makes judgments in terms of universal principles applicable to all mankind. Principles are to be distinguished from rules, primarily "thou shalt nots" such as are represented by the Ten Commandments, prescriptions of kinds of actions. Principles are, rather, universal guides to making a moral decision. An example is Kant's "categorical imperative," formulated in two ways. The first is the maxim of respect for human personality, "Act always toward the other as an end, not as a means." The second is the maxim of universalization, "Choose only as you would be willing to have everyone choose in your situation." Principles like that of Kant's state the formal conditions of a moral choice or action. In the dilemma in which a woman is dying because a druggist refuses to release his drug for less than the stated price, the druggist is not acting morally, though he is not violating the ordinary moral rules (he is not actually stealing or murdering). But he is violating principles: He is treating the woman simply as a means to his ends of profit, and he is not choosing as he would wish anyone to choose (if the druggist were in the dying woman's place, he would not want a druggist to choose as he is choosing). Under most circumstances, choice in terms of conventional moral rules and choice in terms of principles coincide. Ordinarily principles dictate not stealing (avoiding stealing is implied by acting in terms of a regard for others as ends and in terms of what one would want everyone to do). In a situation where stealing is the only means to save a life, however, principles contradict the ordinary rules and would dictate stealing. Unlike rules which are supported by social authority, principles are freely chosen by the individual because of their intrinsic moral validity.*

The conception that a moral choice is a choice made in terms of moral principles is related to the claim of liberal moral

*Not all freely chosen values or rules are principles, however, Hitler chose the "rule," exterminate the enemies of the Aryan race," but such a rule is not a universalizable principle.
philosophy that moral principles are ultimately principles of justice. In essence, moral conflicts are conflicts between the claims of persons, and principles for resolving these claims are principles of justice, "for giving each his due." Central to justice are the demands of liberty, equality, and reciprocity. At every moral stage, there is a concern for justice. The most damning statement a school child can make about a teacher is that "he's not fair." At each higher stage, however, the conception of justice is reorganized. At Stage 1, justice is punishing the bad in terms of "an eye-for-an-eye and a tooth-for-a-tooth." At Stage 2, it is exchanging favors and goods in an equal manner. At Stages 3 and 4, it is treating people as they desire in terms of the conventional rules. At Stage 5, it is recognized that all rules and laws flow from justice, from a social contract between the governors and the governed designed to protect the equal rights of all. At Stage 6, personally chosen moral principles are also principles of justice, the principles any member of a society would choose for that society if he did not know what his position was to be in the society and in which he might be the least advantaged. Principles chosen from this point of view are, first, the maximum liberty compatible with the like liberty of others and, second, no inequalities of goods and respect which are not to the benefit of all, including the least advantaged.

As an example of stage progression in the orientation to justice, we may take judgments about capital punishment. Capital punishment is only firmly rejected at the two principled stages, when the notion of justice as vengeance or retribution is abandoned. At the sixth stage, capital punishment is not condoned even if it may have some useful deterrent effect in promoting law and order. This is because it is not a punishment we would choose for a society if we assumed we had as much chance of being born into the position of a criminal or murderer as being born into the position of a law abider.

We are decisions based on universal principles of justice better decisions? Because they are decisions on which all moral men could agree. When decisions are based on conventional moral
rules, men will disagree, since they adhere to conflicting systems of rules dependent on culture and social position. Throughout history men have killed one another in the name of conflicting moral rules and values, most recently in Vietnam and the Middle East. Truly moral or just resolutions of conflicts require principles which are, or can be, universalizable.

Alternative Approaches

We have given a philosophic rationale for stage advance as the aim of moral education. Given this rationale, the developmental approach to moral education can avoid the problems inherent in the other two major approaches to moral education. The first alternative approach is that of indoctrinative moral education, the preaching and imposition of the rules and values of the teacher and his culture on the child. In America, when this indoctrinative approach has been developed in a systematic manner, it has usually been termed "character education."

Moral values, in the character education approach, are preached or taught in terms of what may be called the "bag of virtues." In the classic studies of character by Hugh Hartshorne and Mark May, the virtues chosen were honesty, service, and self-control. It is easy to get superficial consensus on such a bag of virtues—until one examines in detail the list of virtues involved and the details of their definition. Is the Hartshorne and May bag more adequate than the Boy Scout bag (a Scout should be honest, loyal, reverent, clean, brave, etc.)? When one turns to the details of defining each virtue, one finds equal uncertainty or difficulty in reaching consensus. Does honesty mean one should not steal to save a life? Does it mean that a student should not help another student with his homework?

Character education and other forms of indoctrinative moral education have aimed at teaching universal values (it is assumed that honesty or service are desirable traits for all men in all societies), but the detailed definitions used are relative; they are defined by the opinions of the teacher and the conventional culture and rest on the authority of the teacher for their
justification. In this sense character education is close to the
unreflective valuings by teachers which constitute the hidden cur-
riculum of the school.* Because of the current unpopularity of
indoctrinative approaches to moral education, a family of ap-
proaches called "values clarification" has become appealing to
teachers. Values clarification takes the first step implied by a
rational approach to moral education: the eliciting of the child's
own judgment or opinion about issues or situations in which values
conflict, rather than imposing the teacher's opinion on him.
Values clarification, however, does not attempt to go further
than eliciting awareness of values; it is assumed that becoming
more self-aware about one's values is an end in itself. Funda-
mentally, the definition of the end of values education as self-
awareness derives from a belief in ethical relativity held by
many value-clarifiers. As stated by Peter Engel, "One must con-
trast value clarification and value inculcation. Value clarifi-
cation implies the principle that in the consideration of values
there is no single correct answer." Within these premises of
"no correct answer," children are to discuss moral dilemmas in
such a way as to reveal different values and discuss their value
differences with each other. The teacher is to stress that "our
values are different," not that one value is more adquate than
others. If this program is systematically followed, students will
themselves become relativists, elieving there is no "right" moral
answer. For instance, a student caught cheating might argue that
he did nothing wrong, since his own hierarchy of values, which
may be different from that of the teacher, made it right for him
to cheat.

Like values clarification, the cognitive developmental ap-
proach to moral education stresses open or Socratic peer dis-
cussion of value dilemmas. Such discussion, however, has an aim:

*As an example of the "hidden curriculum," we may cite a
second-grade classroom. My son came home from this classroom one
day saying he did not want to be "one of the bad boys." Asked
"Who are the bad boys?" he replied, "The ones who don't put their
books back and get yelled at."
stimulation of movement to the next stage of moral reasoning. Like values clarification, the developmental approach opposes indoctrination. Stimulation of movement to the next stage of reasoning is not indoctrinative, for the following reasons:

1. Change is in the way of reasoning rather than in the particular beliefs involved.

2. Students in a class are at different stages; the aim is to aid movement of each to the next stage, not convergence on a common pattern.

3. The teacher's own opinion is neither stressed nor invoked as authoritative. It enters in only as one of many opinions, hopefully one of those at a next higher stage.

4. The notion that some judgments are more adequate than others is communicated. Fundamentally, however, this means that the student is encouraged to articulate a position which seems most adequate to him and to judge the adequacy of the reasoning of others.

In addition to having more definite aims than values clarification, the moral development approach restricts value education to that which is moral or, more specifically, to justice. This is for two reasons. First, it is not clear that the whole realm of personal, political, and religious values is a realm which is nonrelative, i.e., in which there are universals and a direction of development. Second, it is not clear that the public school has a right or mandate to develop values in general.*

In our view, value education in the public schools should be restricted to that which the school has the right and mandate to

*Restriction of deliberate value education to the moral may be clarified by our example of the second-grade teacher who made tidying up of books a matter of moral indoctrination. Tidiness is a value, but it is not a moral value. Cheating is a moral issue, intrinsically one of fairness. It involves issues of violation of trust and taking advantage. Failing to tidy the room may under certain conditions be an issue of fairness, when it puts an undue burden on others. If it is handled by the teacher as a matter of cooperation among the group in this sense, it is a legitimate focus of deliberate moral education. If it is not, it simply represents the arbitrary imposition of the teacher's values on the child.
develop: an awareness of justice, or of the rights of others in our Constitutional system. While the Bill of Rights prohibits the teaching of religious beliefs, or of specific value systems, it does not prohibit the teaching of the awareness of rights and principles of justice fundamental to the Constitution itself.

When moral education is recognized as centered in justice and differentiated from value education or affective education, it becomes apparent that moral and civic education are much the same thing. This equation, taken for granted by the classic philosophers of education from Plato and Aristotle to Dewey, is basic to our claim that a concern for moral education is central to the educational objectives of social studies.

The term *civic education* is used to refer to social studies as more than the study of the facts and concepts of social science, history, and civics. It is education for the analytic understanding, value principles, and motivation necessary for a citizen in a democracy if democracy is to be an effective process. It is political education. Civic or political education means the stimulation of development of more advanced patterns of reasoning about political and social decisions and their implementation in action. These patterns are patterns of moral reasoning. Our studies show that reasoning and decision-making about political decisions are directly derivative of broader patterns of moral reasoning and decision making. We have interviewed high school and college students about concrete political situations involving laws to govern open housing, civil disobedience for peace in Vietnam, free press rights to publish what might disturb national order, and distribution of income through taxation. We find that reasoning on these political decisions can be classified according to moral stage and that an individual's stage on political dilemmas is at the same level as on nonpolitical moral dilemmas (euthanasia, violating authority to maintain trust in a family, stealing a drug to save one's dying wife).

Turning from reasoning to action, similar findings are obtained. In 1963 a study was made of those who sat in at the University of California, Berkeley, administration building and those who did not in the Free Speech Movement crisis. Of those at Stage 6, 80%
sat in, believing that principles of free speech were being compromised, and that all efforts to compromise and negotiate with the administration had failed. In contrast, only 15% of the conventional (Stage 3 or Stage 4) subjects sat in. (Stage 5 subjects were in between.)*

From a psychological side, then, political development is part of moral development. The same is true from the philosophic side. In the *Republic*, Plato sees political education as part of a broader education for moral justice and finds a rationale for such education in terms of universal philosophic principles rather than the demands of a particular society. More recently, Dewey claims the same.

In historical perspective, America was the first nation whose government was publicly founded on post-conventional principles of justice, rather than upon the authority central to conventional moral reasoning. At the time of our founding, post-conventional or principled moral and political reasoning was the possession of the minority, as it still is. Today, as in the time of our founding, the majority of our adults are at the conventional level, particularly the "law and order" (fourth) moral stage. (Every few years the Gallup Poll circulates the Bill of Rights unidentified, and every year it is turned down.) The Founding Fathers intuitively understood this without benefit of our elaborate social science research; they constructed a document designing a government which would maintain principles of justice and the rights of man even though principled men were not the men in power. The machinery included checks and balances, the independent judiciary, and freedom of the press. Most recently, this machinery found its use at Watergate. The tragedy of Richard Nixon, as Harry Truman said long ago, was that he never understood

*The differential action of the principled subjects was determined by two things: First, they were more likely to judge it right to violate authority by sitting in. But second, they were also in general more consistent in engaging in political action according to their judgment. Ninety percent of all Stage 6 subjects thought it right to sit in, and all 90% lived up to this belief. Among the Stage 4 subjects, 45% thought it right to sit in, but only 33% lived up to this belief by acting.
the Constitution (a Stage 5 document), but the Constitution understood Richard Nixon.*

Watergate, then, is not some sign of moral decay of the nation, but rather of the fact that understanding and action in support of justice principles are still the possession of a minority of our society. Insofar as there is moral decay, it represents the weakening of conventional morality in the face of social and value conflict today. This can lead the less fortunate adolescent to fixation at the preconventional level, the more fortunate to movement to principles. We find a larger proportion of youths at the principled level today than was the case in their fathers' day, but also a larger proportion at the preconventional level.

Given this state, moral and civic education in the schools becomes a more urgent task. In the high school today, one often hears both preconventional adolescents and those beginning to move beyond convention sounding the same note of disaffection for the school. While our political institutions are in principle Stage 5 (i.e., vehicles for maintaining universal rights through the democratic process), our schools have traditionally been Stage 4 institutions of convention and authority. Today more than ever, democratic schools systematically engaged in civic education are required.

Our approach to moral and civic education relates the study of law and government to the actual creation of a democratic school in which moral dilemmas are discussed and resolved in a manner which will stimulate moral development.

Planned Moral Education

For many years, moral development was held by psychologists to be primarily a result of family upbringing and family conditions. In particular, conditions of affection and authority in

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*No public or private word or deed of Nixon ever rose above Stage 4, the "law and order" stage. His last comments in the White House were of wonderment that the Republican Congress could turn on him after so many Stage 2 exchanges of favors in getting them elected.
the home were believed to be critical, some balance of warmth and firmness being optional for moral development. This view arises if morality is conceived as an internalization of the arbitrary rules of parents and culture, since such acceptance must be based on affection and respect for parents as authorities rather than on the rational nature of the rules involved.

Studies of family correlates of moral stage development do not support this internalization view of the conditions for moral development. Instead, they suggest that the conditions for moral development in homes and schools are similar and that the conditions are consistent with cognitive-developmental theory. In the cognitive-developmental view, morality is a natural product of a universal human tendency toward empathy or role taking, toward putting oneself in the shoes of other conscious beings. It is also a product of a universal human concern for justice, for reciprocity or equality in the relation of one person to another. As an example, when my son was 4, he became a morally principled vegetarian and refused to eat meat, resisting all parental persuasion to increase his protein intake. His reason was "It's bad to kill animals." His moral commitment to vegetarianism was not taught or acquired from parental authority: it was the result of the universal tendency of the young self to project its consciousness and values into other living things, other selves. My son's vegetarianism also involved a sense of justice, revealed when I read him a book about Eskimos in which a real hunting expedition was described. His response was to say, "Daddy, there is one kind of meat I would eat - Eskimo meat. It's all right to eat Eskimos because they eat animals." This natural sense of justice or reciprocity was Stage 1 - an eye-for-an-eye, a tooth-for-a-tooth. My son's sense of the value of life was also Stage 1 and involved no differentiation between human personality and physical life. His morality, though Stage 1, was, however, natural and internal. Moral development past Stage 1, then, is not an internalization but the reconstruction of role taking and conceptions of justice toward greater adequacy. These reconstructions occur in order to achieve a better match
between the child's own moral structures and the structures of the social and moral situations he confronts. We divide these conditions of match into two kinds: those dealing with moral discussions and communication and those dealing with the total moral environment or atmosphere in which the child lives.

In terms of moral discussion, the important conditions appear to be:

1. Exposure to the next higher stage of reasoning
2. Exposure to situations posing problems and contradictions for the child's current moral structure, leading to dissatisfaction with his current level
3. An atmosphere of interchange and dialogue combining the first two conditions, in which conflicting moral views are compared in an open manner.

Studies of families in India and America suggest that morally advanced children have parents at higher stages. Parents expose children to the next higher stage, raising moral issues and engaging in open dialogue or inter-change about such issues.  

Drawing on this notion of the discussion conditions stimulating advance, Moshe Blatt conducted classroom discussions of conflict-laden hypothetical moral dilemmas with four classes of junior high and high school students for a semester. In each of these classes, students were to be found at three stages. Since the children were not all responding at the same stage, the arguments they used with each other were at different levels. In the course of these discussions among the students, the teacher first supported and clarified those arguments that were one stage above the lowest stage among the children; for example, the teacher supported Stage 3 rather than Stage 2. When it seemed that these arguments were understood by the students, the teacher then challenged that stage, using new situations, and clarified the arguments one stage above the previous one: Stage 4 rather than Stage 3. At the end of the semester, all the students were retested; they showed significant upward change when compared to the controls, and they maintained the change one year later. In the experimental classrooms, from one-fourth to one-half of the
students moved up a stage, while there was essentially no change during the course of the experiment in the control group.

Given the Blatt studies showing that moral discussion could raise moral stage, we undertook the next step: to see if teachers could conduct moral discussions in the course of teaching high school social studies with the same results. This step we took in cooperation with Edwin Fenton, who introduced moral dilemmas in his ninth-and eleventh-grade social studies texts. Twenty-four teachers in the Boston and Pittsburgh areas were given some instruction in conducting moral discussions around the dilemmas in the text. About half of the teachers stimulated significant developmental change in their classroom — upward stage movement of one-quarter to one-half a stage. In control classes using the text but no moral dilemma discussions, the same teachers failed to stimulate any moral change in the students. Moral discussion, then, can be a usable and effective part of the curriculum at grade level. Working with filmstrip dilemmas produced in cooperation with Guidance Associates, second-grade teachers conducted moral discussions yielding a similar amount of moral stage movement.

Moral discussion and curriculum, however, constitute only one portion of the conditions stimulating moral growth. When we turn to analyzing the broader life environment, we turn to a consideration of the moral atmosphere of the home, the school, and the broader society. The first basic dimension of social atmosphere is the role-taking opportunities it provides, the extent to which it encourages the child to take the point of view of others. Role taking is related to the amount of social interaction and social communication in which the child engages, as well as to his sense of efficacy in influencing attitudes of others. The second dimension of social atmosphere, more strictly moral, is the level of justice of the environment or institution. The justice structure of an institution refers to the perceived rules or principles for distributing rewards, punishments, responsibilities, and privileges among institutional members. This structure may exist or be perceived at any of our moral stages.
As an example, a study of a traditional prison revealed that inmates perceived it as Stage 1, regardless of their own level. Obedience to arbitrary command by power figures and punishment for disobedience were seen as the governing justice norms of the prison. A behavior-modification prison using point rewards for conformity was perceived as a Stage 2 system of instrumental exchange. Inmates at Stage 3 or 4 perceived this institution as more fair than the traditional prison, but not as fair in their own terms.

These and other studies suggest that a higher level of institutional justice is a condition for individual development of a higher sense of justice. Working on these premises, Joseph Hickey, Peter Scharf, and I worked with guards and inmates in a women's prison to create a more just community. A social contract was set up in which guards and inmates each had a vote of one and in which rules were made and conflicts resolved through discussions of fairness and a democratic vote in a community meeting. The program has been operating four years and has stimulated moral stage advance in inmates, though it is still too early to draw conclusions as to its overall long-range effectiveness for rehabilitation.

One year ago, Fenton, Ralph Mosher, and I received a grant from the Danforth Foundation (with additional support from the Kennedy Foundation) to make moral education a living matter in two high schools in the Boston area (Cambridge and Brookline) and two in Pittsburgh. The plan was training counselors and social studies and English teachers in conducting moral discussions and making moral discussion an integral part of the curriculum. The second was establishing a just community school within a public high school.

We have stated the theory of the just community high school, postulating that discussing real-life moral situations and actions as issues of fairness and as matters for democratic decision would stimulate advance in both moral reasoning and moral action. A participatory democracy provides more extensive opportunities for role taking and a higher level of perceived
institutional justice than does any other social arrangement. Most alternative schools strive to establish a democratic governance, but none we have observed has achieved a vital or viable participatory democracy. Our theory suggested reasons why we might succeed where others failed. First, we felt that democracy had to be a central commitment of a school, rather than a humanitarian frill. Democracy as moral education provides that commitment. Second, democracy in alternative schools often fails because it bores the students. Students prefer to let teachers make decisions about staff, courses, and schedules, rather than to attend lengthy, complicated meetings. Our theory said that the issues a democracy should focus on are issues of morality and fairness. Real issues concerning drugs, stealing, disruptions, and grading are never boring if handled as issues of fairness.

Third, our theory told us that if large democratic community meetings were preceded by small-group moral discussion, higher-stage thinking by students would win out in later decisions, avoiding the disasters of mob rule.

Currently, we can report that the school based on our theory makes democracy work or function where other schools have failed. It is too early to make any claims for its effectiveness in causing moral development, however.

Our Cambridge just community school within the public high school was started after a small summer planning session of volunteer teachers, students, and parents. At the time the school opened in the fall, only a commitment to democracy and a skeleton program of English and Social Studies had been decided on. The school started with six teachers from the regular school and 60 students, 20 from academic professional homes and 20 from

*An example of the need for small-group discussion comes from an alternative school community meeting called because a pair of the students had stolen the school's video-recorder. The resulting majority decision was that the school should buy back the recorder from the culprits through a fence. The teachers could not accept this decision and returned to a more authoritative approach. I believe if the moral reasoning of students urging this solution had been confronted by students at a higher stage, a different decision would have emerged.
working-class homes. The other 20 were dropouts and troublemakers or petty delinquents in terms of previous record. The usual mistakes and usual chaos of a beginning alternative school ensued. Within a few weeks, however, a successful democratic community process had been established. Rules were made around pressing issues: disturbances, drugs, hooking. A student discipline committee or jury was formed. The resulting rules and enforcement have been relatively effective and reasonable. We do not see reasonable rules as ends in themselves, however, but as vehicles for moral discussion and an emerging sense of community. This sense of community and a resulting morale are perhaps the most immediate signs of success. This sense of community seems to lead to behavior change of a positive sort. An example is a 15-year-old student who started as one of the greatest combinations of humor, aggression, light-fingeredness, and hyperactivity I have ever know. From being the principal disturber of all community meetings, he has become an excellent community meeting participant and occasional chairman. He is still more ready to enforce rules for others than to observe them himself, yet his commitment to the school has led to a steady decrease in exotic behavior. In addition, he has become more involved in classes and projects and has begun to listen and ask questions in order to pursue a line of interest.

We attribute such behavior change not only to peer pressure and moral discussion but to the sense of community which has emerged from the democratic process in which angry conflicts are resolved through fairness and community decision. This sense of community is reflected in statements of the students to us that there are no cliques—that the blacks and the whites, the professors' sons and the project students, are friends. These statements are supported by observation. Such a sense of community is needed where students in a given classroom range in reading level from fifth-grade to college.

Fenton, Mosher, the Cambridge and Brookline teachers, and I are now planning a four-year curriculum in English and Social Studies centering on moral discussion, on role taking and
communication, and on relating the government, laws, and justice system of the school to that of the American society and other world societies. This will integrate an intellectual curriculum for a higher level of understanding of society with the experiential components of school democracy and moral decisions.

There is very little new in this—or in anything else we are doing. Dewey wanted democratic experimental schools for moral and intellectual development 70 years ago. Perhaps Dewey's time has come.

NOTES


7 Ibid.

Someone said of Bernard Shaw that he was like the Venus de Milo. What there was of him was excellent. The same, I think, needs to be said of Kohlberg. The trouble is, however, that Kohlberg remains quite impervious to criticisms of the limitations of his view of moral education. He has never answered, for instance, a series of very constructive criticisms leveled against him by myself and Bill Alston in the Binghampton conference of 1969. It is not that the stuff he continues to ladle out is not very good. It is, and I have made much use of it myself. It is simply that he remains oblivious of the many other important aspects of moral education, and there is a danger that the unwary will think that he has told the whole story. In a commentary of this length, I can only list the main omissions:

1. He suffers from the rather touching belief that a
Kantian type of morality, represented in modern times most notably by Hare and Rawls, is the only one.\(^3\) He fails to grasp that utilitarianism, in which the principle of justice is problematic, is an alternative type of morality and that people such as Winch have put forward a morality of integrity in which the principle of universalizability is problematic.\(^4\) I think this can be carried forward, actually. A morality of courage as exemplified by train robbers, the old "virtue" of Machiavelli's *Prince* is a defensible morality. So also is a more romantic type of morality such as that of D.H. Lawrence, in which trust must be placed in "the dark God within." It is either sheer legislation to say that Kohlberg's morality is the true one, or it is the worst from of the naturalistic fallacy which argues from how "morality" is ordinarily used to what morality is.

2. He does not take "good-boy" morality seriously enough either from a practical or from a theoretical point of view. Practically-speaking, since few are likely to emerge beyond Kohlberg's Stages 3 and 4, it is important that our fellow citizens should be well bedded down at one or the other of these stages. The policeman cannot always be present, and if I am lying in the gutter after being robbed it is somewhat otiose to speculate at what stage the mugger is. My regret must surely be that he had not at least got a conventional morality well instilled in him. Theoretically, too, the good-boy stage is crucial; for at this stage the child learns from the inside, as it were, what it is to follow a rule. Unless he has learned this well (whatever it means!), the notion of following his own rules at the autonomous stage is unintelligible. Kohlberg does not appreciate, either, that moral rules have to be learned in the face of counter-inclinations. Otherwise there would, in general, be no point to them. Hence the necessity at these stages for the type of reinforcement advocated by Skinner and others and for the modeling processes so stressed by Bronfenbrenner in his *Two Worlds of Childhood*.\(^5\) In particular, he ignores the masterly chapter on "The Unmaking of the American Child." He seems sublimely unaware, too, of the mass of evidence about other aspects of moral

3. As Bill Alston stresses in his article 7 and I stress elsewhere, Kohlberg, like Piaget, is particularly weak on the development of the affective side of morality, of moral emotions such as "guilt," "concern for others," "remorse," and so on.

4. Finally, Kohlberg, in his references to ego strength, sees the importance of will in morality, but offers no account of the type of habit training which encourages or discourages its growth. 8

I and others have written a great deal about these other aspects of morality and moral learning and development, it is a pity that Lawrence Kohlberg does not start doing some homework!

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