Non-State Actors and Asymmetric Warfare: A New Paradigm for International Relations

Matthew H. Wahlert
Wright State University

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NON-STATE ACTORS AND ASYMMETRIC WARFARE: A NEW PARADIGM FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, International and Comparative Politics

By

MATTHEW H. WAHLERT
B.A., University of Cincinnati, 1993
M.A. Northern Kentucky University, 2000

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Wright State University
WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

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I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Matthew H. Wahlert ENTITLED Non-State Actors and Asymmetric Warfare: A New Paradigm for International Relations, BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL-COMPARATIVE POLITICS.

Liam Anderson
Liam Anderson, Ph.D.
Thesis Director

Laura M. Luehrmann
Laura M. Luehrmann, Ph.D.
Director, Master of International-Comparative Politics Program

Committee on Final Examination:

Liam Anderson
Liam Anderson, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science

Donna Schlagheck
Donna Schlagheck, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science

Laura M. Luehrmann
Laura M. Luehrmann, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science

Joseph F. Thomas
Joseph F. Thomas, Ph.D.
Dean, School of Graduate Studies
ABStract


A billiard table metaphorically explains the conduct of states within the international system—sometimes clashing and other times tenuously co-existing. Yet, the international system ultimately remains a construct and pattern for the state actors. Spatially, the dimensions and context of the system fit the needs, requirements, and structure of the states. However, the system is one dimensional and does not account for the realities of the complexities inherent to the post Cold War Era. Currently, the state actor does not maintain an exclusive monopoly in the formation of the playing field. However, non-state actors usurp space and dimensions not defined by the state actor. In addition, the nature of the non-state actor allows for swift, fluid, and dynamic movement in order to capitalize on the emerging multidimensional nature of the international system. I intend to use a host of sources of current literature as well as qualitative processes, in the form of case study, and quantitative methods in order to show: (1) the nature and components of the international system changed after the fall of the Soviet Union and globalization, (2) the threat from non-state actors has increased with the fall of the Soviet Union, and (3) the failed state has become part and parcel of both the "new" international system and a significant factor in the emergence of non-state actors.
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Chapter One

Introduction

Admittedly, the study and discussion that follows poses a number of questions and only attempts to provide a starting point for research aimed at discovering what can best be described as the evolving nature of international politics in a multi-level and nested system – calling on both state level and international variables.

That said, the overall argument of this paper is that changes in the ordering of power in the international system along with reduced levels of state effectiveness and legitimacy have allowed non-state actors to more freely operate at both the state and system levels. This is not to say that non-state actors could not be a factor in times past – the discussion that follows on the Muslim Brotherhood illustrates the role of non-state actors dating back some eighty years. But, at the same time, the historical role of the non-state actor was typically restrained in a geographic sense. In addition, the impact of failed and inadequate states has been an historical concern – as seen in the examples dating back several hundred years in the discussion of failed states that follows. Changes in the international and state levels of political behavior, however, have elevated the failed and inadequate state to a more significant position in international politics. What has occurred, furthermore, is a number of changes in the international system and individual state systems that act as variables – and even, at times, enhanced variables – in order to
change the overall portrait of international politics. I have attempted to provide theoretical arguments and case studies that will demonstrate the evolving nature of international politics. Be that as it may, a certain key assumption was made in order to provide a starting point for the research that follows. Specifically, I have made the assumption that international politics is a nested game. Specifically, changes in system and state level variables often play a role in both levels of analysis. The concept of foreign policy as an expression of multiple levels of analysis appears in the literature of a number of comparative foreign policy researchers from the so-called second generation of foreign policy research. For the remainder of the conclusions, I have provided theoretical as well as case study evidence that is both quantitative and qualitative. Ultimately, my argument is that changes in the international system and state systems have altered the overall nature of international politics. Toward that end, I will be exploring such varied subjects as the end of the Cold War, the impetus for states to liberalize both economically and politically, failed and inadequate states, the nature of power, the way war has been fought and is being fought, trends in terrorism, and the perception individuals have concerning their own place in the international system. It is my contention that each of these variables acts as both a dependent and independent variable.
A series of equations summarizes the arguments within this paper:

Table 1 - Overall Depiction of Argument in Equation Form

\[
\begin{align*}
X &= \text{the international system} \\
Y &= \text{the state system} \\
Z &= \text{more powerful non-state actors} \\
\Delta &= \text{change}
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\Delta X + \Delta Y &= Z \\
\Delta X + Y &= Z \\
X + \Delta Y &= Z
\end{align*}
\]

All three equations represent the reality that changes in the international system, state system, or both have resulted in more powerful non-state actors.

And – conversely ....

\[
Z = \Delta X
\]

This equation represents the notion that stronger non-state actors have resulted in changes in the behavior of the international system.

In short, the purpose of my effort is multifaceted. I intend to use a host of sources of current literature as well as qualitative processes, in the form of case study, and quantitative methods in order to show: (1) the nature and components of the international system changed after the fall of the Soviet Union and globalization, (2) the threat from non-state actors has increased with the fall of the Soviet Union, and (3) the failed state has become part and parcel of both the "new" international system and a significant factor in the emergence of non-state actors, moreover, the elevated significance of the failed state comes as the result of changes within the international system as well as state level
pressures that have transformed the nature of the state making it less effective and less legitimate.

Toward that end, Chapter Two – *The International System* - offers a very brief history of the progression of the international system from the Treaty of Westphalia until contemporary times. In addition, I stress the evolving nature of the international system and offer an introduction into the advent of a "new" international political reality featuring the loss of supremacy on behalf of state actors. Chapter Three is devoted to a wide-ranging look at the changing nature of the state and its place in the international system. I place specific importance upon the dynamic nature of state actors, once again, in historical context. Next, Chapter Four includes a synopsis of the failed state, the emergence of the notion of a failed state and how it fits the overall emerging model of international relations and, also, the role a failed state plays in the growing relevancy of non-state actors. Chapter Five examines how warfare – like the state and international system – is ultimately a social construct and is subject to changing agreements by interested actors. Chapter Six includes a case study analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood and its contemporary relative – al-Qaeda – and how it evolved within the changing state and international systems. The foundation supplied by such an evaluation of literature utilizes an original case study of a non-state actor in the form of Political Islam and the International Muslim Brotherhood movement and its ultimate expression with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda organization. Finally, Chapter Seven offers concluding remarks designed to construct an overall paradigm from the varied inputs studied in the previous chapters for use in predicting outcomes and use in the broader typologies of systemic and terror studies. The inquiry concentrates on both grand level implications as well as
security ramifications for the United States. In this final chapter, I also discuss areas for further research and study limitations.
Chapter Two

The International System

In the equation provided in the introductory remarks, I set the variable “X” as the international system. Significantly, I argued that “X” represented both a dependent and independent variable. As a dependent variable, the international system has been changed by a number of developments within international politics. A number of independent variables – like the end of the Cold War, globalization, and the perception others have with regard to their place in the international system – alter the way in which the international system behaves. On the other hand, the international system and its composition play a large factor in the way states have organized themselves in the contemporary era. In this case, the international system is an independent variable that changes the way states behave. We can see this behavior through the emphasis on both political and economic efforts to liberalize states. In that model, the state becomes the dependent variable. The duality of this argument comes from the current emphasis on international politics as a two-level or nested game. In this chapter, I will discuss the theoretical arguments that consider the international system and the system level as both dependent and independent variables – or the changes in and changes because of the international system.

Intuitively, observations of the international political landscape would necessarily suggest that the composition of the international system has changed and, perhaps, the way in which that system behaves has changed, as well. The end of the Cold War offers a
clear illustration of the intuitive suggestion that international politics is somehow different. The dissolution of the Soviet Union was initially met by a large percentage of political analysts as an encouraging development in world security. The advantage of nearly two decades of world events, however, allows the student of international relations to view the fall of the Soviet Union in more of an historical perspective. Political analysts posited certain assumptions and beliefs that one can now view in suitable context. That is, initially, the rapid and multilateral expulsion of Saddam Hussein and Iraqi forces from Kuwait foreshadowed a promising advancement in world security and international governance. The United States quickly emerged as the player in international relations - an uncontested global hegemon in a world that had unquestionably evolved into a unipolar composition of power.

Be that as it may, world events surfaced to challenge the notion of a New World Order. Non-state actors in the form of terrorists molested the United States time after time. Obviously, the record confirms that the United States faced an emerging threat - whether the government realized it or not. The assault on the Central Intelligence Building, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the attacks on U.S. military installations in Saudi Arabia, the strike on the USS Cole in Yemen, the 1998 embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, and a series of foiled terror plots from New York to Los Angeles to Jordan all unfolded in the recently altered international system.¹

Indeed, the Cold War Era unquestionably highlighted times of conflict and even terror attacks but, ultimately, mechanisms specific to the system kept terror attacks, more or less, limited to those sponsored by states instead of the more contemporary stateless

face of terrorism. The bipolar configuration of the Cold War Era acted as a limiting
dynamic on all forms of conflict. In addition, the Cold War relationships assured
sovereignty of even the states on very unstable political ground and lacking legitimacy to
govern. In the end, the Cold War acted as a reducing factor in transnational conflict as
well as state failure. The threat of global nuclear war deterred theatre-wide warfare and
limited conflicts to wars by proxy.\(^2\) That is, engagements featuring superpower support
of rival factions within a system. As part of the larger picture, the United States and the
Soviet Union often guaranteed the existence of regimes and states that under different
circumstances would fall victim to the laws of natural selection and perhaps join the
ranks of failed states.\(^3\) Indeed, self-interest motivated the Soviet Union and the United
States however, the end result necessarily created a more stable system with less
likelihood of multiple numbers of state failures and constraining mechanisms from
Moscow and Washington.

The fall of the Soviet Union enhanced the probability of state failure. State
failure, I will argue, ultimately leads to an intrastate and interstate vacuum of power and
sovereignty. In addition, non-state actors can fill the vacuity created by a failed state. As
a result, sovereignty previously reserved for state actors now became available to non-
state actors. Political entrepreneurs emerged to take advantage of the lack of organized
political capital locally in failed states and began to claim space within the international

\(^2\) Theory developed from J. Herz, *The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics: Essays on
\(^3\) A good discussion of the forms and causes of state failure can be found in I. William Zartman ed.,
*Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne


A Historical Review of International Relations

Necessary to understanding the argument that the international system and its characteristics have changed, I believe, is a brief discussion of the history and genesis of the international system as it has been viewed for the last several hundred years. In reviewing the historical roots and foundations, I hope to demonstrate how politics within the international system are socially constructed and, as social constructs, susceptible to international system level changes resulting from social agreements. In other words, if social agreements define the international structure and its characteristics future social agreements can certainly redefine the same system.

In common practice, historians regard 1648 as the watershed for international relations. The year 1648 resulted in the Treaty of Westphalia - effectively ending what is generally identified as the Thirty Years War - but also fashioning the structure and fundamentals for what political scientists consider the "modern state." That is, the emergence of a "state" and state sovereignty supplanted the function of religious sovereignty in the realm of geopolitical affairs. The state included a definite geographical territory and assumed the role previously held by the Church as the ultimate authority in
the international system. Westphalia arranged the notion of sovereignty as one absolute to the state actor.

Needless to say, state leaders appreciated that Westphalia would never serve as an all-encompassing "magic wand" ensuring indefinite and open-ended sovereignty. As a result, the model of permanent militaries coupled to the state began to materialize. The permanent military could "encourage" - through its mere existence or behavior - other states and fringe actors to recognize the definitive sovereignty of the state. Ultimately, Westphalia created an international system of state actors. Moreover, the state actors of Austria, Russia, England, France, the Netherlands and Belgium managed the structure until the early nineteenth century.

Westphalia, however, would also exist as a covenant subjected to the whims of history. By 1815, Napoleon suffered defeat and the Congress of Vienna established a peace. The Vienna Treaty precipitated the emergence of the Concert of Europe and dominance by Austria, Britain, France, Prussia, and Russia in the international system. In order to assure peace, the dominant states of Europe committed to a series of alliances. The international system showcased coalitions calculated in order to realize a balance of power - fashioned so that one individual state or arrangement of states did not develop into too dominant of a geopolitical power. Great Britain, an incredibly dominant influence, symbolized the embodiment of the balance of power premise. Great Britain acted as a "balancer" and guaranteed that no other state or alliance emerged as too powerful within the international system.7

7 The theory of “offshore balancer” may be found in John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (W. W. Norton: New York 2002).
World War I, however, brought an end to the balance of power system. The scheme designed to ensure a peace, ironically, ended with a single shot from an assassin's gun that ultimately led to the deaths of over 10 million people. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand at the hands of Gavrilo Princip led to the world's first Great War. World War I prompted the end of the Russian empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. The states of Europe were defeated economically, politically, and socially. The settlement that ended World War I, the Treaty of Versailles, left Germany enraged and frustrated. While, on the other hand, the United States prospered economically as a result of the war. The lucrative trade resulting from World War I completed the transformation of the United States into a world economic power and, as a result, a latent world political actor.

World War II unmistakably plunged the United States into the global spotlight. The United States played the critical role in defeating the fascist axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan. Moreover, a new international relationship emerged at the end of World War II, the Cold War. The United States and the Soviet Union would fight proxy wars, contend for neutral states, and stare each other down from 1947 until the fall of the Soviet Union in the years of 1989 to 1991. During the Cold War Period, foreign policy issues were most often viewed through the perspective of realism. The realist school of thought would come to dominate much of the discourse surrounding international relations. Realists based the conduct of international relations on several key assumptions: the international system was anarchical, the state was the primary and rational actor, and states behave in a way that maximizes power. Adherents of the school of realism included such noted figures as Robert Gilpin, George Kennan, Henry Kissinger, Stephan
Krasner, Hans Morganthau, Susan Strange, and Kenneth Waltz.\(^8\) The theory and philosophy of Realism dominated the Cold War Era and filled textbooks on International Relations and strategic planning sessions of national security experts. In short, realists argue that the system is fixed and international relations a clear struggle for power within a system where power rules all. Ironically, the period of the Cold War Era - with nuclear war a computer keystroke and a turn of a key away - was, many argue, one of the most peaceful times in modern world history.

The fall of the Soviet Union created yet another new international order. The international order featured one exclusive hegemon - the United States. *The New World Order* appeared to be a most positive development for international relations when a broad coalition defeated Iraq after its August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Indeed, as Francis Fukuyama pointed out, many believed the "end of history" was upon the world.\(^9\) Be that as it may, a contending theory emerged illustrating the ideological underpinnings of what can best be termed as a "new model" for international relations - Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*.\(^10\) Huntington's argument examines the devolution of the international system but arrives a vastly different conclusions as applied in terms of a "new paradigm." Yet, Huntington's work is useful from an epistemic point of view in analyzing the context of an altered international system.

The Huntington thesis creates - as a vital variable in the progression of the international system - the role of culture. That said, Huntington reasons that the end of

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\(^8\) A summary of realism and individual theorists may be found in Martin Griffiths, *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations* (New York: Routledge, 1999).

\(^9\) Fukuyama believed liberal democracy was the last stage in historical development in Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1993).

the Cold War released the *Genie in a bottle* - culture - and "global politics began to be reconfigured along cultural lines."\(^{11}\) Furthermore, Huntington asserts, the role of culture is one that performs on a stage of conflict - in other words, "for peoples seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, enemies are essential…"\(^{12}\) As a result, the "new" model of international behavior is based upon the ideologies and realities of culture. In addition, the construction of a culturally based system has, by definition, led to an unstable and a conflict capable international reality. Within this context, Huntington outlines the sudden shift to a multipolar and multicivilizational world.\(^{13}\) Indeed, the end result of such a geopolitical structure is the increased likelihood of conflict based upon reinforced cultural cleavages. Although oft criticized by political scientists in the United States, the Huntington thesis offers an important hypothesis with regard to the behavior of the international system – it was no longer solely state driven but driven by culture at some level. Again, whether one agrees with the prominent position Huntington gives to culture or not, the key bit of discovery is the argument that the nature of the international system has changed because the nature of the actors had changed. Once again, referring to the equations introduced in chapter one, a change in the international system yields more powerful non-state actors (or: \(\Delta X + Y = Z\)). Previously, the argument concerning culture typically was a state-centered argument. For example, can a predominantly Catholic state form an effective democracy or are Asian values parallel with the values of a democracy. Using Huntington’s model culture now makes a difference in the international system. In the case study that follows, one can see how the Muslim Brotherhood effectively played

\(^{11}\) Ibid., p.19.
\(^{12}\) Ibid., p. 20.
\(^{13}\) Ibid., p.21.
the culture card in local areas of Egypt, Jordan, and other states. Yet, it is not until groups like al-Qaeda that culture matters within the larger domain of the international system.

The use of Huntington’s work is helpful in that he offers a series of alternative hypothesis for his argument that conduct within the international system has changed. A quick discussion of each of the alternative hypotheses reduces Huntington’s argument to the critical notion that observations of international politics after the fall of the Soviet Union clearly indicates that something is different. Although deemed problematic approaches by Huntington, the alternative suppositions are useful in following the development of Huntington's philosophy. Specifically, Huntington attempts to counter theories coined "one world euphoria and harmony," "two worlds us and them," "184 states, more or less," and "sheer chaos." Each alternative hypothesis offers logical explanations for the reality of global power politics after the fall of the Soviet Union. But, for the importance of this effort, each argument offers an hypothesis on why the international system is different than before.

With that in mind, I wish to explore the Huntington notion of the "sheer chaos" paradigm. Huntington uses "sheer chaos" in an effort to identify those that point to international conditions suggesting a "breakdown of government authority" and "the breakup of states." Ultimately, the resulting landscape permits "the intensification of tribal, ethnic, and religious conflict; the emergence of international criminal mafias" and the substantial complications of additional numbers of refugees, the increased accessibility of weapons of mass destruction, the "spread of terrorism," and further

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14 Ibid., p.32-36.
15 Ibid.
occasions of "massacres and ethnic cleansing." The definitional dilemma, as indicated by Huntington, with regards to chaos theory is the presence of substantial mechanisms remaining to ensure order. Thus, Huntington submits, sheer chaos does not precisely explicate existing world politics. With all due deference to Dr. Huntington, the notion of “sheer chaos” merely edited to “chaos” indicates a fairly realistic depiction of the international system. Indeed, mechanisms do, in fact, remain to ensure international order but those mechanisms more clearly belong within the domain of power politics. The Realist notion of an international system run by the exercise of actual and latent threats of power now includes emerging actors – non-state actors - somewhat immune to traditional manifestations of state power primarily due to their positioning within the international political system. Finally, one must necessarily view international power politics as a zero-sum endeavor. As non-state actors assume roles traditionally monopolies of state actors then the overall net power of state actors is reduced.

In an effort to set aside the realist claim of "184 states more or less" Huntington expresses the problematic methodology of merely relying on the state actor as the solitary dimension of geo-political relations. Albeit "…states remain the primary actors in world affairs, they are also suffering losses in sovereignty, function, and power." Thus, the state no longer occupies the lone place at the international table. Instead, "International institutions have assumed important functions previously performed by states…" Needless to say, the emerging non-state institutions play a significant factor in the evolving international system.

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16 Ibid., p.35.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
Huntington supposes that models of conduct, for a variety of explanations, will be based upon civilization fractures. Furthermore, Huntington reasons that civilization and population are actively involved in each other's formation. In other words, the basic idea of identifying oneself with a civilization is a functional attempt on the individual's part to identify a place in the geopolitical milieu - whether the individual realizes it or not. As a result, the effort to define relations in terms of civilizations appears, at some level, a strained relationship or, at the very least, an unnaturally occurring operation of the system but an active effort, on behalf of individuals, to redefine political realities. As a result, the difficulty in applying the theories of Huntington, in many ways, fails to recognize the deeper and more composite nature of the international system. With that in mind, the Huntington thesis is appropriate to examine as a lucid illustration of the disposition of the evolving international system.

Huntington's examination also allows for the employment of trends and statistics that pertain to the larger picture of international relations. For example, Huntington points to the increase of organized religions, in a global sense, in the late 20th century: "That resurgence has involved the intensification of religious consciousness and the rise of fundamentalist movement. It has thus reinforced the differences among religions."19 Significantly, if the basic percentages of adherents to each traditional religion are unable to adapt to the requirements of modernization, the potential exists for the spread of Western Christianity and Islam.20 In most cases, Islam wins a confrontation between Christianity and Islam - Huntington argues where Christianity converts Islam converts

19 Ibid., p.64.
20 Ibid., p.65.
and reproduces. 21 Thus, demographic data supports the conclusion that Muslim birthrates threaten the balance of population. In this context, Huntington argues the "clash of civilizations" and contends religion operates as a principal factor of what defines a civilization. Once again, however, the unstated result is a continued decay in the structure of the state and an increase in the power and influence of non-state actors often in the form of transnational ideologies. In this case, the international system has changed in that the state is no longer the unitary actor. Discussion, in a later chapter, will follow the notion of a decaying state and apply it to the state level of analysis. For the purposes of Huntington, however, the significance is at the system level. What this argument confirms is the initial equation and the argument that a change in the system has led to more powerful non-state actors.

Worthy of note to the Huntington thesis is the challenge of the liberal institutionalist precept that increased trade and contact between cultures or states likely will reduce conflict. Huntington calls the conclusions of such studies into doubt and, at the same time, uses the psychological themes of distinctiveness theory to suggest that increased interaction actually results in the likelihood of conflict. 22 Simply put, the more interaction peoples have the higher the likelihood of conflict of some variety - based on civilization variations and their predictable impact. In fact, people characterize themselves as to what they are not and, when applied in the context of international relations, the exclusive definitional act enhances the opportunities for reinforced cleavage as well as increasing the possibility for some form of difference of opinion. 23

21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p.67.
23 Ibid.
once again, the argument certainly does not limit conflict to state actors alone. In fact, Huntington cites Roland Robertson as to the impact of globalization in global relationships - "... in an increasingly globalized world - characterized by historically exceptional degrees of civilizational, societal, and other modes of interdependence and widespread consciousness thereof - there is an exacerbation of civilizational, societal, and ethnic self-consciousness" and that the reemergence of religion is a reaction to the forces that define the world as but a single concept. Ultimately, Huntington’s premise illustrates a dynamic global system with numerous allusions to the increasing significance of non-state actors. In addition, the Huntington system argues that occasions of conflict likely will increase. Again, the argument of increased conflicts as a result of increased levels of trade and globalization reflect an overall change in the international system which, as I have argued, leads to increased opportunities for the non-state actor to usurp additional power. In fact, such a conclusion resembles the focus of this paper – although many of the systemic arguments differ considerably. The familiar realist typology of actors in the international system as states behaving rationally in order to maximize power does not accurately reflect the reality of existing geopolitical exigencies.

In addition, the hierarchical study of levels of interaction - system, state, and individual inputs - falls short in reflecting the exigency of current global power interactions. This paper will attempt to introduce and operationalize a more appropriate précis of the modern international political system.

24 Ibid., p.68.
The Increased Role of the Non-State Actor

Part of the changing international system is the dynamic that the state is no longer the sole source of inputs into international politics. Indeed, non-state actors have significantly operated for many decades. For the most part, however, such organizations exerted power only within specific state areas – as will be clear with the Muslim Brotherhood – or were complimentary to the state actor and policy preferences of state actors. For example, efforts to restrict naval enlargement with the Washington Conference in the 1920s were virtually ignored by all signatories – including the United States. The international organization has come a long way since the Washington Naval Conferences even representing independent expressions of power in the form of an ability to punish defectors within international regimes. Be that as it may, the contemporary record is replete with other non-state actors exercising power in the international system. Multi-national corporations, terrorist groups, and a number of other non-governmental organizations all play significant roles within the contemporary international system.

Clearly, a key aspect of the evolution of the international system consists of the behavior of the individual state actor within that system. In short, the state actor no longer behaves in a unitary fashion. As argued, other units have the ability and freedom to act within the larger picture of the international system. The concept of states as the sole actor in the international system simply no longer applies.25 It is this change in the international system that allows for non-state actors to increase their power. Actors of all sorts behave in the same manner as states. For example, non-government organizations often flex a sufficient amount of influence to adjust policy at grand levels. Indeed, the

25 A great deal of literature traditionally has challenged the unitary behavior of the state actor within the international system. These perspectives, beyond the scope of this effort, include political scientists who examine behavior at the state level unit of analysis and the cognitive studies that offer an individual or leader level of analysis. With this effort, I advance or defend neither but, instead, provide a system level framework as a challenge to realism.
international attempt to ban landmines offers an outstanding example of a grassroots organization playing the game at the global plane.26 Certainly, corporations often carry the financial and political clout to engage in policy formulation at the international level and even boast their own security apparatus in order to protect corporate interests. "Dollar diplomacy" does not necessarily require the overt involvement of a government actor. Specifically, the non-state actor no longer is subjected to the limiting action of state actors upon their conduct. The system based upon states as unitary actors has given way to a system of numerous actors including emergence of the non-state actor.

Recent research documents the modification of the state-centered system in varied degrees. Laura Neack contends that "as the twentieth century gave way to the twenty-first, a distinct global society had become a permanent feature of the international System."27 As such, Neack compares the global society to the street life of Bangkok, Thailand.28 Interaction no longer merely exists in simple terms. Instead, different levels of social, economic, and political classes interact in different ways and for varied goals. Simply, the metaphor claims that life in the global system - much like life in Bangkok - exists on many levels of interaction. Clearly, Neack's comparison reveals that the primacy of states in the international system has yielded to altered arrangements featuring the interaction of various actors. In fact, Neack presents a fresh understanding of global society as “a many-layered superstructure” that includes “states, international lending institutions, multinational corporations, intergovernmental organizations of many types, nongovernment actors …, armies-for-hire and private security firms and just regular

28 Ibid., 342.
people…“29 Certainly, Neack concludes that the international system features infinitely more complexities than in times past.

In addition, the system is further evolving with the phenomenon of state actors as impotent and ineffective with regard to action in some of the varied responsibilities inherent to the definition of state. Neack argues "as the twentieth century started to close, it became clear that many over-extended states were not able to provide basic services like law and order…” and "the loss of exclusive territorial control to be a feature of all states in this era of globalization."30 Thus, the role of state in the domestic sense appears dynamic and changing.31 But also, states fail to operate with a unitary voice within the international system because they have difficulty achieving a monopoly of politics within their own territory.

The changing nature of the state threatens the domestic political arrangements within the state. Neack cites recent scholarship from Ronnie Lipschutz contending "that the growth of transnational forces and processes are rendering the nation-state increasingly permeable to all kinds of flows, ideas, and behaviors."32 That is, the very essence of the state within the international system is shifting and facing new challenges. In short, the state clearly is not the same unchallenged actor found in the substance of international politics of eras past. Furthermore, Lipschutz argues the altered system will have a long-term impact on the concepts of both "citizens" and "citizenship." Clearly, Lipschutz contends the relationship of citizen and citizenship applies only in the notion of statehood. As a result, an alteration in the primacy of states will create a vacuum in the

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29 Ibid., 343.
30 Ibid., 343-345.
32 Neack, 346.
concept of citizenship that may be filled by the emergence of other actors. In that context, Lipschutz argues one of three scenarios is most likely for the replacement of state roles in citizenship - "a global civil society, counter-hegemonic social movements, and partially deterritorialized political communities.”33 Or, simply, the failure of states to provide unitary national and international standing allows the emergence of non-state actors within the larger system. The non-state actor may then capitalize on functions of the state and the corresponding latent political capital.

In addition, the dynamic of the government - by definition - leads to a change in the substance of the governed. Neack notes "in the absence of alternative modes of citizenship and because of globalization's assault on traditional national identities, we might expect some recurrence to more fundamentalist identities and nationalism."34 Allaine Cerwonda's *Constructed Geographies: Redefining National Identity and Geography in a Shifting International Landscape*, according to Neack, argues the grassroots level of the development of such a new identity. Non-state actors have long played a role in the international system. That said, however, the application of the realist assumptions and paradigms largely explained interaction on a grand systemic level. The balance of power, struggle for gains in a zero-sum environment and the primacy of state actors all existed within the context of the realist model because non-state actors worked, primarily, as extensions of state actors. Thus, the non-state entity behaved in a manner often prescribed by their state sponsors. However, the emerging international paradigm allows for political entrepreneurs in the form of non-state organizations to construct political capital similar to that of a state actor. Lipschutz,

33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
Cerwonda, and Neack can all be reduced to one common denominator – changes in the makeup of the state. As argued in the introduction, it is the changes in the state that lead to a re-ordering of the international system. As the initial equation illustrates, changes in the state and/or international system have given the opportunities for non-state actors to increase their power at both the system and state levels.

Indeed, the international system has evolved into one where non-state actors potentially fit many of the roles primarily used by state actors. Clearly, the "new" form of non-state actor is able to behave in a manner that allows for the co-opting of a host of benefits heretofore reserved for states in the international system. Yet, at the same time, the non-state actor is becoming more characterized by its refusal to account for and recognize the cultural and legal norms of state actors. In addition, factors inherent to globalization have created security and political exigencies beneficial to the growth of transnational movements. Finally, the manner and structure of the contemporary non-state actor allows those committed at challenging the international system to act asymmetrically. From a security perspective, the asymmetric threat is one that can best be summarized as a "force multiplier." To wit, the very threat of a non-state actor engaging in asymmetric forms of warfare multiplies the actual and potential damage from such an attack. Indeed, all of this can be accomplished without many of the traditional financial and political costs inherent to governance at a central level. In simple terms, non-state actors have increased their power relative to the state and, quite often, perform state functions but do not face the same costs and limitations of the state.

Thus, the realist model, so commonly used during the Cold War Era to explain international relations, needs to be altered. A contemporary evolution of realism must
account for the "new" role of non-state actors. Indeed, the asymmetrical threat of such actors makes them a clear security concern toward the stability of the entire international system. Furthermore, the analysts of international security must account for non-state actors within the paradigm and precepts of power maximization - but through asymmetric means.

First, from the point of view of hierarchical structures inherent to the global political environment, states have been perceived as the central actor in the international system with some degree of limitations implemented from intrastate actors. That is, certain interest groups or political organizations may play a part in the inputs that lead to a state’s policy formation. However, the information age and globalization both have altered many of the fundamental systemic characteristics of political relationships. As a result, the heretofore-internal elements of policy input have essentially engaged in policy inputs at the international systemic level.

For example, organizations similar to Greenpeace and Amnesty International presently labor to effect modifications in the functions of the international system. Indeed, Greenpeace works for environmental change in the international system and not only adjustments in the policies of specific state actors. Hence, the international system now includes the functioning of transnational movements - like Greenpeace. Many of the transnational movements may, indeed, be devoted to noble ends. However, the danger of a normative view of such organizations is in minimizing their role as policy inputs in the international system. Greenpeace, once normative assumptions are abandoned, is nothing more than an actor in the international system attempting to maximize gains in order to achieve a predefined goal. Thus, organizations function toward "ends" much like state
actors. Whereas Greenpeace attempts to maximize gains in order to address the global environment, individual states act in a manner that maximizes power. The process in both cases is analogous - both organizations as well as state actors conduct themselves in such a way as to attempt to wield power in the structure of a zero-sum power relationship. The advantage of a non-state actor, however, lies in its ability to use the system itself as an ally. Thus, state actors are often constrained or limited while “working within the system.” On the other hand, non-state actors possess a unique ability and structure that allows for a “working of the system.” Ultimately, the notions of legitimacy and effectiveness affix boundaries for both actors. Clearly, the non-state actor possesses a clear advantage in that it may construct its own identity and, therefore, its own basis for legitimacy and effectiveness. Conversely, a state actor must amass effectiveness and legitimacy within the context of “state” dating back to the 17th Century. Furthermore, the non-state actor can behave and act on the basis of current – and even predicted – notions of effectiveness and legitimacy. Ultimately, however, non-state actors and state actors both utilize political power in order to achieve a goal of some sort.

The basic assumption of the state as a unitary actor within the realities of arrangements of international security faces a challenge from academics and researchers, as well. In fact, Adamson suggests that post Cold War international relations are very much outside of the defining characteristics of traditional assumptions. That is, Adamson suggests that recent conflicts such as Kosovo, East Timor, Bosnia, and Rwanda cannot be explained by the traditional models of international relations and, as a result, sentenced to
the growing list of "unexplainable" events in international discourse. In addition, Adamson suggests that local conflicts may not necessarily be strictly local conflicts but instead feature further spatial dimensions. As a result, the operational definition of local conflict must be exactingly outlined in order to account for the growing number of what heretofore can best be described as "local conflicts" that actually consist of multiple dimensions often in multiple systems. The advent of a globalized world theatre allows for a broadening of all conflicts. For example, an interested Palestinian living in New York City merely needs to log on the internet in order to find a multitude of ways in assisting in the *Intifada*. In addition, the presence of large diasporas makes a conflict stressing civilization-based cleavages international by definition. Clearly, the universe of previously held definitions of conflict - "internal conflicts," "civil wars," and "ethnic conflicts" need to be revisited and closely examined in order to reflect contemporary reality. Adamson argues - in many cases - the conflicts seen as "spatially bounded" are in fact transnational in scope. Thus, the idea of internal conflict or civil war or ethnic conflict is not universally reduced to a sub-international system activity. Instead, analysts must be prepared to view such conflicts through the prism of the international system in order to fully appreciate the context of such disputes. In the contemporary globalized international system very local conflicts threaten to morph into international disputes. Again, these observations return to the basic premise that the international system and behavior observed has fundamentally changed.

Indeed, Adamson effectively notes that many of the post Cold War conflicts that have been labeled as "internal" actually operate on the transnational level. The so-called

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"internal conflicts" operating in the transnational level - in addition - often features behavior by a non-state actor. Thus, Kosovo, East Timor, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, and Northern Ireland are simple more than "internal conflicts." Instead, many of the conflicts within state actors are mobilized transnationally - "Transnational mobilization is a strategy employed by relatively weak actors in the international system as a means of consolidating spatially diffuse resources for the purpose of converting them into a coherent projection of political power."36 Thus, transnational mobilization, according to Adamson, is completed by what can best be named "political entrepreneurs" - those that discover and take advantage of political realities in order to advance a specific end.

Once a "political entrepreneur" identifies an exploitable political reality a process of political mobilization commences. Adamson suggests that transnational mobilization is engaged in three different ways. That is, the non-state actor may first attempt to construct an "identity category," then pursue the "harnessing of dispersed material resources" available in the international system, and, finally, engage in a process of "international mobilization of political support."37 As a result, the sub-state actor, many times very weak at the state level, gains legitimacy in the international system. Moreover, a stronger international unit translates into increased domestic influence. A cycle of self-sustained growth allows for multi-dimensional expansion of political power. The mobilization of political power is accomplished not from an elitist perspective of top down but instead, from the bottom up grass roots level. As mobilization succeeds and political capital is gained, Adamson argues, the non-state actor becomes a player in the

36 Adamson 2003, 3.
37 Adamson 2003, 4-6.
security issues of "various levels" of the international system. As a result, the non-state actor may work at the local level, state level, or international level. All levels then become “penetrated” by the non-state actor. Also, the non-state actor emerges as a politically asymmetric threat. Indeed, the non-state actor may manipulate any level of interaction that is politically advantageous - it is fast and dynamic. The state actor remains burdensome and slow and can only react to the non-state actor. The speed and agility of the non-state actor clearly adds to its ability to build political capital and impinge on the sovereignty of states.

Clearly, the impact of a non-state actor varies in the strength and number of the actor's dimensions. To illustrate, the international jihadist movement - as a political entrepreneur - attempts to garner political capital through a variety of constructed "identity categories" that include anti-globalization feelings, anti-Israeli sentiment, anti-American feelings, pro-Islamic doctrine, levels of shared ethnic heritage, categories of economic inequality, as well as a host of basic psychological and emotional needs. The jihadist movement, in essence, has constructed a series of "shared beliefs" in order to build a very influential non-state actor. Building upon my initial hypothesis, I also maintain that the perceived view of oneself within the international system acts as a variable in altering the system – at both the system and state levels.

The development of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) provides an outstanding example of the evolution of power by non-state actors acting as political entrepreneurs. The KLA was formed in Switzerland in 1996 and used broadcasts throughout Europe in order to lead political campaigns. In essence, the fall of Albania allowed the KLA to arm by obtaining Albanian weapons and began a systematic program of military training.
Next, funds and recruits were collected throughout Diaspora communities of Europe in order to feed the KLA. At the same time, the KLA took advantage of existing international criminal organizations in order to fund activities. As Adamson argues, the non-state actor is able to operate across the political systems.

As the structure and actors of the international system change, “new” relationships and altered levels of interaction emerge. Muhittin Ataman argues the international system is one of three levels and defined by the "growth of so many kinds of non-state actors" that challenge and weaken "the state - centric concept of international politics” and result in the creation of a system more “transnational” in character. The model presented by Ataman holds transnational factors clearly become a “threat and a challenge to states, and hence influence foreign policy decision - making in almost all countries.” Furthermore, the traditional view of the international system as one of two levels of interaction - domestic and external - need to reflect the growth of a transnational third level. In fact, the "transnational ideologies emerged at the end of the socialist bloc (fundamentalist and radical movements) are considered as a significant issue for many states around the world.” In addition, the emerging ideologies have usurped the behavioral characteristics of the transnational movements. Once again, the modus operandi of the transnational movements suggests an evolving asymmetric quality. The usual method employed by non-state actors of targeting domestic instead of external goals is now anarchistic; the contemporary non-state structure is more concerned with ideology. As ideology emerged as the dominant model, the non-state actor could take

39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
advantage of the fixed dynamics of external versus domestic in the minds of politicians and policy makers. Ataman’s transnational ideology fits the overall argument concerning increased powers of non-state actors. The only difference is that Ataman constructs a new level – the transnational level – where I maintain that the transnational inputs are able to simply permeate the system and state. Moreover, the construction of the “transnational factors” are asymmetric social arrangements and do not strictly confine themselves to the traditional hierarchical view of international politics.

Given the theoretical advancement that non-state actors do operate within the global political system, one must analyze and adopt a grand level theory for the behavior of the non-state actor. To be sure, another key characteristic of the non-state actor intent on the adoption of the use of violence is the force multiplier advantage inherent to asymmetrical warfare - combat outside the domain of traditional conflict. As applied to the United States, the notion of asymmetric warfare is best defined as "unconventional approaches that avoid or undermine our strengths while exploiting our vulnerabilities."42 From an historical perspective, asymmetric warfare alludes to the Roman Consul Fabius Maximum who notable defended Rome from Hannibal and the Carthaginians. Fabius engaged a strategy of evasion - due to superior Carthaginian forces - and, at the same time, directed evasion as a technique to impact enemy morale. As a result, Fabius lengthened and "protracted the war" against Hannibal with the use of "military pin-pricks to wear down the invaders' endurance" in a form of classical asymmetric warfare.43

Accepting Carl von Clausewitz’s argument that war is politics by other means, one may

also extend the concept of asymmetric warfare to a broader theory of asymmetric geopolitical behavior. Conceptually, if war exists within political behavior it then follows that politics may be expressed by warfare. In turn, asymmetric warfare can be reduced to a more general notion of asymmetric global politics. Thus, a non-state actor engaged in asymmetric politics may resort to any political activity that “undermines our strengths while exploiting our vulnerabilities.” In modern terms, many of the newly empowered non-state actors are able to use coercion methods more potent than traditional capacities with the added element of asymmetry. Within this arrangement, globalization and the information age have acted to restrict the array of behaviors acceptable in warfare by state actors. Thus, non-state actors have a wider collection of options that traditional state actors are not prepared to either engage in or deter. That is, the pure aggregate number of options is limited by societal constraints placed upon state actors. Non-state actors involved in the struggle for geopolitical power are limited only by norms of behavior placed by member participants and any external sources of funding. That said, the norms that apply to non-state actors have broadened due to the evolution of the non-state structure within the context of globalization.

Assuming the position that non-state actors now behave in the same relative power paradigm as state actors, the pertinent question is how do such non-state actors behave - that is, do non-state actors in the international system behave as rational actors or in some other manner? Contemporary literature offers a variety of behavior models useful in the prediction of future outcomes based upon the behavior of non-state actors. One such useful alternative is the concept of prospect theory. In short, prospect theory suggests that actors are risk adverse in times of gains and risk seeking in the domain of
losses.\textsuperscript{44} So, in a generic sense, those sitting on top of the system tend to be more conservative while those in a disadvantageous position have a tendency to act more aggressively. As a result, the behavior of such non-state actors can be viewed through the useful prism of prospect theory. The non-state actors active in the "new" international paradigm gain popular legitimacy toward their movement by targeting the dispossessed and disaffected. Thus, the entity operates globally in a domain of losses. According to prospect theory, analysts can predict that behavior will be risk seeking. In a practical sense, the popular following of terror groups like HAMAS and Hezbollah can be reduced to the least common denominator - individuals feel that they have no other choice but to resort to asymmetric political behavior. An application of prospect theory maintains members of HAMAS, Hezbollah, and other radical movements behave aggressively due to their constituency’s subordinate position – imagined or real - within the international system.\textsuperscript{45}

The study of security and security enhancement fulfill a significant and important practical application in the field of International Relations and politics. Within this context, John Downey speaks of the changing of relationships in the international system.\textsuperscript{46} Indeed, Downey believes that the current wave of "international terrorism and our reactions could aggregate into a prolonged revolutionary epoch sustained by the under-privileged against the over-privileged in order to force the latter to face up to the

\textsuperscript{44} Prospect theory is often viewed as a cognitive approach to international relations and a competing theory with the realist assumptions of rational actor theory. For a detailed discussion please see Andrew Farkas, “Evolutionary Models in Foreign Policy Analysis,” \textit{International Studies Quarterly} 40 (1996): 343-361.


world's growing inequalities." As a result, Downey argues that behavior in the international system can no longer only be ruled by force and the threat of force. In fact, actors need to be "...politically inventive in removing the grounds for extremism." In other words, one may successfully argue that the nature of the threats facing the international system calls for asymmetric responses. Furthermore, the call for asymmetric strategies is revealing in that it recognizes the role of the non-state actor in the international system. Pure brute power politics, according to this argument, may not be enough to dominate the international system. In creating a strategy to deal with the non-state actor, powerful states recognize the presence of the non-state actor in the system and, as a result, define the system in that manner. For example, the United States countered the asymmetric nature of the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the war in Afghanistan through the use of large numbers of Special Forces in place of the conventional war envisioned by many in the military hierarchy. The Afghan model of fighting an entire war successfully on the backs of a small number of Special Forces units represented a dominant use of conflict assets against asymmetric threats. Theoretically, the asymmetric responses are the counter to the asymmetric threats that have developed. Furthermore, Downey argues that the conflicts and cleavages in the world society are mainly the domain of the "haves" versus the "have nots." Downey’s argument returns us to the initial supposition that a key difference in the international system is that people perceive their place in that system differently than before. Indeed, the new perceived position has added to the power of the non-state actor. In addition to the economic inequalities, the world of geopolitics is further complicated with the existence of ethnic and/or religious

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47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
cleavages. Within the geopolitical reality argued by Downey, the industrial states are under attack not by the developing states but by groups from the so-called developing states. That said, "there is no question of the South being able to sustain conventional warfare against the North, but the level and persistence of the terrorist threat depends a great deal, paradoxically, on the Northern response and the reaction in turn in the South, hence aggression." To complicate matters further, the growing number and scope of attacks toward the North will directly relate to increased pressure from Northern domestic groups for significant and escalated responses. Downey points out the fact that military analysts are coming full circle with security tactics. That is, the previous belief and reliance on deterrence has been clearly replaced with a belief in preemption – a crystal clear change in the international system. Hence, from an epistemic point of view, the change in defense tactics reflects an overall change in the realities of the international security system. In addition, Downey suggests that it really only is just a matter of time before terrorists acquire nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. Thus, he sketches a picture of a very active and very dangerous international system – in addition to a very different international system. The relative willingness of non-state actors from the South to engage the North in warfare will almost certainly lead to a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack which would violate nearly universal constraints of the Cold War international system concerning their use. That said, the use of troops and search and destroy alone will not eliminate the threat of terrorism. Instead, Downey suggests, the North must undergo a parallel strategy of economic reform with the military strategy. System level deterrence will give way, at least partially, to asymmetric strategies designed at facing the new actors within the system.

49 Ibid.
Political science and international systems analysis, much like any domain of epistemic knowledge, often features the presence of theories and phrases both overused and misused by academics and others eager to define the proper context of the newest "catch phrase." With that said, the notion of asymmetric warfare is one that has become a part of the everyday discourse of political analysts. However, part of the difficulty inherent to asymmetry is the effort to define what asymmetric warfare actually is - or in the parlance of analysts - a definitional model to explain the boundaries of asymmetric warfare. Such an effort, however, is a normative exercise. To explain, most military confrontations are of an asymmetric nature. Opponents attempt to exploit the weakness of their adversaries while at the same time taking advantage of their own strengths. Be that as it may, states typically operated within a defined international system - itself a limiting factor in the use of asymmetry. Yet, the point of my explanation is to reveal a shift toward an asymmetrical international system. Operationally, the theoretical hair I am splitting is that, in fact, the asymmetry inherent and characteristic of warfare among states is in the process of being preempted by a relationship that features a state actor versus a non-state actor. As a result, the state actor operates under the international system familiar to the world since the Westphalian era. The non-state actor, on the other hand, operates independent of many of the constraints facing the state actors. Asymmetry must not be limited to warfare but, instead, must expand in order to account for political behavior of all sorts. Thus, the realist model of states competing in a balance of power arrangement needs drastic alteration in order to depict the struggle between the familiar state system models versus the "new" reality that features what can best be described as a "clash of models." The fall of the Soviet Union replaced a predictable political model
with a dynamic and fluid series of models. Furthermore, the non-state actor utilizes asymmetric political strategies in order to realize political power and capital in the international system.

**Power in the International System**

An example of the evolving nature of the international system is the method and actors that are able to exercise power over others in the international system. Once again, we return to the initial set of equations were we find that the changes in the international system have led to more power for non-state actors. A very clear example of this is in the study of the exercise of power at the system level. Typically, an international use of hard power was a policy option for the state but that characteristic of the international system is changing.

In a garden-variety textbook sense, power can be characterized as the ability to compel another to act in a specific manner - persuasion.\(^50\) At the highest level, this struggle for power is played in an international geopolitical theatre. And, furthermore, the method of persuasion is one that may change from actor to ends to means. In purely classical terms, persuasion, according to Aristotle, assumed the form of both artistic and inartistic proofs.\(^51\) The artistic proof is persuasion using the tools of rhetoric while the inartistic proof is the use of force to compel. In more modern terms, Joseph Nye has cited both soft and hard power as key in the effort to influence within the international

\(^{50}\) A great deal of literature has been devoted to the creation of an appropriate definition for power. For the purposes of this effort, I have purposely limited power to the ability to control others and manipulate outcomes. Power may also be an ends and can refer to the control of resources. For a more detailed discussion please see John M. Rothgeb, *Defining Power: Influence and Force in the Contemporary International System*, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993).

\(^{51}\) For a broader discussion see Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herberg, eds. “Classical Rhetoric” a chapter in *The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the Present*, (Boston: Bedford Books, 1990).
That means of persuasion is much the same and simply boils down to convincing another to acquiesce via rhetorical discourse or the use of might and muscle. In the end, what segregates Greenpeace or Amnesty International from other actors is the lack of employing inartistic means or hard power (although even this is changing as NGO's are adopting more aggressive rhetorical strategies – for example, the Eco-terrorists in the U.S.). Surely, an organization may effect a conscious determination to not use such means of inducing action, or such a tactic may be a simple reality of organization’s structure. As a result, the international system has historically featured the monopoly of state actors - those with the ability to advocate through both artistic proofs and inartistic proofs. Hence, organizations - or movements - have existed outside of the power struggle inherent to international relations. That characteristic of the international system, however, is changing.

As the system of international relations and conduct has evolved, the role of non-state actors using hard power and inartistic proofs has emerged as an element of the zero-sum global struggle. Organizations using hard power methods in order to oblige a behavior are typically those of militant, criminal, or terrorist nature. The key variables in the promotion of such radical elements have been globalization and the information revolution. As such, the days of radical groups assembling in concealed locations in the middle of the night have been usurped by the internet and the processes of instant global communications in the form of satellite phones, blackberries, web pages, and fax machines. Thus, the non-state actor has made the transition from one of the many input elements involved in decision making at the state level to often becoming its own entity.

in the international system. Previously, most non-state actors flexed hard power muscle on merely a state or regional scale or were simply part and parcel of the inputs that determined policy. Terror groups were relatively geographically confined, and even cells of terrorist organizations felt pressures of geographical constraint. However, the global information age has made possible a more centralized command function for non-state actors while, at the same time, allowing a broader and more geographically disparate audience of followers.
Chapter Three

The State

The overall argument of this paper, outlined in chapter one, was that in addition to changes in the international system, changes in the dynamics of the state have led to opportunities for non-state actors to become more powerful. The original equations included $X + \Delta Y$ and $\Delta X + \Delta Y$ as yielding $Z$, more powerful non-state actors, when $X$ is the international system and $Y$ the state. As a result, an emphasis on the state and how the state acts offers explanatory power and rich description of the characteristics of the evolving international system.

The non-state actor has emerged as a clear competitor to the concept of state in many states across the world. For example, Max Manwaring's case study of the activity of non-state actors in Colombia analyzes the potential threats such organizations pose to the regional political and security system and also the threat non-state actors pose to the Colombian government. Manwaring views the growth of terrorism as an outgrowth of the engagement of non-state actors in contemporary security exigencies. In fact, terrorism emerges as a practical behavior for some non-state actors who are unable to otherwise compete with the state for sovereignty. It is terrorism that allows for the non-state actor to challenge the unitary position of the state and can be viewed as a response to that same unitary behavior of the state. Furthermore, non-state actors operate in an environment
allowing for organizational growth and “freedom of movement and action over time.”

Finally, as the instability and violence increases the so-called “freedom of movement and action” expands at the expense of the state’s power.

Non-state actors, once constrained by state sovereignty, can now behave without the scores of constraints encountered by states and in a manner that advances the sovereignty of their own organization at the expense of the sovereignty of the state. Reduced power, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the state allow for the non-state actor to usurp more power. A case study of Colombian insurgent and terror movements specifically details the evolutionary tract of organizations challenging the state’s authority. Within this emerging political system, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaries di Colombia (FARC) has advanced with "narco cosmetic patronage of the poor, creation of their own electoral machinery, participation openly in traditional political parties, and financing of election campaigns…” Thus, the end goal of FARC is "the intent to liberate and mobilize the 'disaffected and the dispossessed' population into an alternative society." Of course, the "alternative society" is one based upon the visions of FARC and not of the Colombian government. In essence, FARC has taken advantage of the political power inherent to a sovereign organization. The state of Colombia no longer can frame issues without competition from FARC. An international trend emerged of "…narco - insurgent paramilitary alliance [and] are straightforward. They are accumulation of wealth, control of territory and people, freedom of movement and action

54 Ibid., 69.
55 Ibid., 70.
56 Ibid., 71.
and legitimacy." In the end, the alliance of the narcotics and paramilitary merged and "together the alliance has the economic and military power equal to or better than most nation-states." Finally, although "many academicians are accustomed to thinking of non-state actors as bit players on a local stage" the "non-state criminal terrorist organizations … [have become] significant political actors with the ability to compromise the integrity and sovereignty of individual nation – states.” The power reserved for states – from arrangements of state sovereignty - revert to the non-state actor. In many ways, the centralization of power inherent to Westphalia no longer is a guarantee. Thus, the non-state actor fills the void in sovereignty and advances its own agenda with the assistance of new-found political capital.

The Historical Role of the State as a Unitary Actor

As with the international system, a quick examination of the historical role of the state as a unitary actor will provide an interesting and useful study on how the state emerged as an actor and how the status of the state has been increasingly challenged. The challenge states face offer additional variables in the general equation introduced in chapter one. In this case, the changes in the definition and social agreements that create what is known as a state work to increase the power of the non-state actor at the expense of the state.

Historically, a significant element of the international system since the Treaty of Westphalia has been the sovereignty of states. Sovereignty, more or less, defines the contextual borders of state power within the international system. Clearly, such power evolved in the political, economic, and social fallout from Westphalia. The 16th and 17th

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57 Ibid., 73.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid., 76.
centuries featured the consolidation of the state power and sovereignty at the expense of non-state actors—“sovereignty helped the state become a relatively more efficient economic and political organization, a condition necessary for defeating political rivals.” At this time, the state developed the necessary compunction to defeat threats to sovereignty. Interestingly enough, the system of state centered sovereignty created a political reality wherein threats to state actors most often were from other state actors. The construct of international politics was mainly limited to states. Thus, the international system featured numerous examples of state versus state conflicts. War and peace typically were decisions of states. On the other hand, within this context often, but not always, states assisted in the maintenance of sovereign power in other states in order to promote stability within the system as a whole. A threat to a neighboring state was seen as a direct threat to one’s own government. Accordingly, "the techniques that the state developed were sovereignty and its ability to harness military innovation.” In addition, the state utilized both sovereignty and military innovation in a mutually beneficial arrangement. Military innovation strengthened sovereignty and sovereignty encouraged military innovation at the state level. Hence, the state - as an actor - developed into a unitary force within the international system. Throughout this paper, I have made the point that this arrangement with regard to the state is changing. Moreover, the changes to the state result in both changes to the international system and increased power by non-state actors.

A critical element to understanding the shifting and altering Westphalian era international system is the historical basis of the system's development into state-centric

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61 Ibid, 77.
relationships. As individual states began to develop under the auspices of princes and other leaders, it became necessary to organize military functions in order to prevent adversaries from seizing power. Part of the necessary evolution to protect the foundation of power was the organization of resources into, what ultimately became the state system. The "centralized political institution(s) for organizing resources" became the foundations of the modern state.\textsuperscript{62} In addition, the necessity of facing all threats - internal and external - developed into a significant factor for states to address within the context of a dynamic international system. Thus, the political and economic institutions grew powerful enough in order to face both forms of threats.\textsuperscript{63} Clearly, the function of the state was centrally born on the economic, political, military, and social institutions required in maintaining the state monopoly over the exercise of power.

The development of the state system left many non-state actors disconnected from both state and global power arrangements. That is, states took action to eliminate threats of internal military, political, and economic hegemony. Threats within the international system – ones that by definition came from other states – were not necessarily always handled with force but strategies like deterrence and balancing of power – strategies that quite often respected sovereignty. The social context of the international system clearly elevated the state over other actors. The state responded to non-state threats with one of two options - the challengers to state legitimacy either had to be co-opted or defeated but, at the end of the day, destroyed. Serewicz holds that the state development of "superior military organization based upon greater economic resources" gave the state

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid., 79.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
Thus, threats that were not successfully co-opted politically were defeated militarily. The state sovereignty then served as a framework to "organize the political, economic, and social realms to create stability." The state system's approach to external and internal threats complemented each other in a way that the state sovereignty's strength began to increase. That is, sovereignty “helped to create a barrier against outside support for sub-state actors … and organize internal military resources against external threats." Indeed, the sovereignty of the state allowed for increased powers of the state both internally and externally. At that point, the conduct of military operations underwent a serious metamorphosis. Instead of the "small, short, and poorly funded campaigns based upon ad hoc organizational foundations, warfare became based upon increasingly larger, more professional armies equipped with the logistical capability to wage long campaigns." Serewicz also cites Spruyt in the argument that the development of the state actor was linked to the evolution of state sovereignty. In other words, according to Spruyt:

Sovereign boundaries allowed the state to create a zone of stability and security to foster economic growth. The internal zone of stability, in turn, contributed to the state's success against its organizational rivals by supporting and reinforcing the external identity. Sovereignty's internal and external aspects conferred economic and political advantages that allowed the state to emerge as a viable and successful political organization.

In more recent times and for a variety of reasons, non-state actors have adopted the mechanisms to organize politically, socially, and economically. Hence, the state faces new challenges. Serewicz also uses the research of Janice Thomson to advance the notion
that the development of the original Westphalian system and the evolving nature of military and political power in the sovereign state pushed the non-state actor to the fringes of the system.⁶⁹ Sovereignty evolved out of the political and security relationships founded on the development of states. Non-state violence was gradually reduced or eliminated as the sovereignty of the state strengthened. Soon, non-state violence was pushed to the edges of societal discourse where it remained relevant only as an afterthought in most relationships of power politics. Inherently, non-state actors gained credibility and power within the system through the use or potential use of violence but only as a limited way and relegated to the fringes of international politics because the societal agreements defined the non-state actor in that manner. Logically, as non-state violence moved to the fringes of the system then non-state actors followed - or, at the very most, became limited to one of many organizational inputs in foreign policy formulation.

Indeed, the advancement of state sovereignty led to a decline in the quantity and quality of non-state actors. Thus, logic follows, the more contemporary rise of non-state actors originates from a loss of state sovereignty - or at the very minimum - an alteration of previous global political and systemic exigencies.⁷⁰ In addition, non-state actors, due to the intervening variable of globalization, have access to many of the military assets previously enjoyed by only state actors. Moreover, an ever increasing trend for non-state actors, for instance - al Qaeda, is co-opting the sovereignty of so called "failed states" in order to also take advantage of certain elements of state sovereignty. As Serewicz explains, the state, as its power historically increased, developed a unique ability to

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⁶⁹ Ibid., 76.
⁷⁰ Ibid.
combine growing sovereignty with the "ability to harness military innovations." As such, the nature of sovereignty and military innovations "allowed the state to meet military and political threats from other political organizations." However, logic dictates, as states face increased difficulty in meeting "military and political threats" and as sovereignty decreases "military innovations" will no longer exist as a sole monopoly of the state. In essence, the non-state actor has usurped roles traditionally within the domain of the state.

To be sure, internal power politics also explain the loss of power by state actors and the corresponding gain by non-state actors. That is, van Creveld argues that the state has lost the ability to "adapt to organizations encroaching on areas where the state once dominated." The threats facing the state actor - van Creveld summarizes - is undermining state sovereignty and that the "state's effectiveness as a political unit is ending." In summary, the van Creveld thesis holds that the concepts of state sovereignty "…are already being undermined by organizations that refuse to recognize the state's monopoly over armed violence." Specifically, those challenging the idea of state's monopoly over violence wishes to replace state ownership of "coercive violence." In rhetorical terms, the societal agreements of the Westphalia system have fractured. The change in the international system has given the opportunity for non-state actors to gain more political power and more power outside of the “fringe” areas making them able to operate in domains traditionally viewed as belonging to the state. In addition, Serewicz argues that "the state faces a crisis of authority" due to the challenges in state sovereignty. Hence, the challenges are from "below, or within, by sub-state military actors and from above, or

71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Cited in Serewicz, 76.
without, by supra-state organizations.”\textsuperscript{74} Clearly, the power politics of Westphalia have entered a new phase.

Another significant theoretical perspective to keep in mind when discussing the advent of violence in the international system at the hands of non-state actors is the work by Mansfield and Snyder that calls into question the democratic peace theory. Mansfield and Snyder argue that the movement toward more liberalized political models results in increased cases of violence. The reason for more violence is the fact that institutions are not mature enough for a transition and the breakup of the previous political system results in a greater likelihood of violence. A change or evolution in the dynamics and substance of the state, I believe, lead to conditions that favor a change in behavior of that state – or an alteration of societal agreements. It is my hypothesis that, overall, as more states attempt a transition more non-state actors will emerge from states characterized by weakened institutions.

The data available for state capacity in terms of both effectiveness and legitimacy show that the levels of state power have fallen. Yet, on the other hand, civil liberties and political rights have increased. On the face of it, the inverse correlation provides difficulties in what one might expect. Increased civil liberties and political rights indicate more states are politically liberalizing. Yet, one would generally expect increased levels of effectiveness and legitimacy. The theoretical explanation for this phenomenon does, however, make intuitive sense. In short, the race to liberalize economically and politically after the fall of the Soviet Union has left states with weakened bureaucracies. The 1990s trend of less government intervention often translated into less government. The world is seeing the result of that expressed in terms of states having less capacity as defined by

\textsuperscript{74} Advanced by Serewicz, 76.
effectiveness and legitimacy. Referring to the initial equation of chapter one, the argument that the change in the state has allowed for more non-state actors has, I believe, taken another step. In this case, the weakened state allows for competitors to challenge its sovereignty. A quantitative analysis of state capacity and political and civil rights demonstrates this argument.

Much of the empirical evidence confirms the hypothesis the state is losing its capacity – especially in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy. For example, the capacity of state actors measured in quantitative terms illustrates the loss of power by the state. A measure of capacity using the variables of effectiveness and legitimacy confirms an overall loss of state capacity. Specifically, from 1990 to 1999 the mean levels of effectiveness dropped approximately 49% and the mean levels of state legitimacy fell about 56%.

Table 2 - State Capacity Measure\textsuperscript{75}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Effectiveness</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.037</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimacy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.031</td>
<td>0.0135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{75} State capacity measures used found in \textit{State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings} (2003): 201-204.
Figure 1 - Graphic Depiction of Mean Levels of State Capacity

The changes in capacity as expressed in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy are included side by side in 1990 and 1999. The light bar represents effectiveness in both 1990 and 1999 and the dark colored bar legitimacy in 1990 and 1999. The graph offers a visual depiction of the decrease in both over the nine year period.

A study of the values of political rights and civil liberties in the time before and after the end of the Cold War also suggest a weakening of the capacity of the state. Freedom House publishes annual values for both variables since 1972. A cursory examination shows that the mean values for both political rights and civil liberties have fallen consistently in the years since the end of the Cold War. The scale used by Freedom House labels values from lowest as most liberal to highest as least liberal – so that, a value of four indicates a more open system or more civil liberties than a value of three. In using the Freedom House data since 1972, one can see a clear increase in political rights and civil liberties – using current and historic mean levels.
Table 3 - Political Rights and Civil Liberties Values\textsuperscript{76}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mean Political Rights</th>
<th>Mean Civil Liberties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972-1989</td>
<td>4.3381</td>
<td>4.2493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-2003</td>
<td>3.5318</td>
<td>3.611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3.3700</td>
<td>3.302</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 - Period Depiction of Mean Levels - Political Rights and Civil Liberties\textsuperscript{77}

As the data illustrates, the average level of political rights has fallen 18.59% and the average level of civil liberties 15.02% in the period after the fall of the Soviet Union – indicating levels of political rights and civil liberties are becoming more liberalized. When compared with current data, the reduction is even more dramatic. That is, the average levels of political rights and civil liberties have fallen 22.32% and 22.29% respectively from their averages during the Cold War Era to their current levels. Once again, the data illustrates the movement toward more open state systems.

\textsuperscript{76} Data for analysis taken from Freedom House, \textit{Freedom in the World}, various years.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
At this point, it may be appropriate to offer a more extended discussion of Mansfield and Snyder in light of the date revealing expanded civil liberties and civil rights. The literature supports the notion of increased violence in cases of transition to more democratic governance. Mansfield and Snyder examine the age-old theory that democracies do not go to war with each other. Specifically, Mansfield and Snyder extend the debate to states transitioning – both to and from democracy – in order to quantitatively analyze the state’s likelihood of going to war. In short, the conclusion is that governments in transition are “more aggressive and war prone, not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states.” In fact, states undergoing democratization “were about two-thirds more likely to go to war than were states that did not experience a regime change.” Furthermore, states democratizing were “about 60 percent more likely to go to war than states that were not democratizing.” Mansfield and Snyder’s study comes from the four basic historical cases of violent transitioning states – (1) mid-Victorian Great Britain, (2) Napoleon III’s France, (3) Wilhelmine Germany, and (4) Japan’s “Tasho Democracy.” The four cases provide anecdotal evidence that something may be awry with the Democratic Peace argument. Intuitively, Mansfield and Snyder discuss the characteristics of a transition and why they may manifest into more violent behavior. More or less, “the problem lies in the nature of domestic political competition after the breakup of the autocratic regime.”

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79 Ibid., 13.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid., 6.
82 Ibid.
media are still immature and used by elites to “control political agendas” and, as a result, a promotion of “belligerent pressure-group lobbies or upwellings of militancy in the populace as a whole” results.\textsuperscript{83} In quantitative terms, Mansfield and Snyder utilize popularly accepted datasets in order to answer the research question. Gurr’s measure of governance in Polity II is used to determine regime type and the Correlates of War Dataset used in order to label a dispute as a war.\textsuperscript{84} That said, the one shortcoming of the study is that it concentrates on 1811 to 1980 – because the two studies share those years in common.\textsuperscript{85} Certainly, Huntington’s so-called third wave of democratization is notably absent – which may or may not have changed many of the findings. Also of interest in the findings was the conclusion that ANY change in form of government increased the chances of a war – autocracy to democracy 30-105\% of any war and 50-135\% of interstate war while anocracy to democracy increased the likelihood from 15-100\% in any war and 50-135\% in interstate war and, finally, even autocratizing states were more likely to go to war than a state not changing a regime.\textsuperscript{86} The bigger the leap – from closed to open regime – the more “disproportionately [the] increase [in] the likelihood that a country will engage in an \textit{interstate} war (emphasis by authors).”\textsuperscript{87} Again, the institutional structure of the democratizing state – weak and not yet developed – mixed with the nature of social groups makes the atmosphere more conducive for war.\textsuperscript{88} Other characteristics that play a role include the “widening of the political spectrum,” “inflexible interests and short time horizons,” “competitive mass mobilization,” “the

\textsuperscript{83} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid., 9-10.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 17-18.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 19.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 22.
weakening of central authority,” and various “prestige strategies” that build support at home through activities abroad. Mansfield and Snyder offer strategies for reducing the importance of the elites – especially former military commanders and leaders – in order to reduce the likelihood of war. That said, the long run is still best served by more stable democracies.

89 Ibid., 26-33.
90 Ibid., 34-37.
91 Ibid., 38.
Chapter Four

The Failed State

In addition to a quantitative weakening of the state, the occurrence of failed states has also become more common. The failed state fits the model and equation offered in chapter one in that the changing nature of the state allows for more powerful non-state actors (that is: \(X + \Delta Y = Z\)). While the system features a number of examples of transitioning regimes, a study of incidents of state failure reveals, at the very least, circumstantial evidence to support a trend toward overall lost state sovereignty.

In the thirty-five year period from 1955 to 1990, the world bore witness to only nine incidents of state failure while the eight year period of 1990 to 1998 claimed twelve cases of state failure. In raw terms, using 1990 as a baseline, the world averaged 0.257 state failures per year before 1990 and 1.5 failures per year after. Admittedly, such data alone would be insignificant. However, basic and unsophisticated data taken as part of the larger picture reveals a loss of state capacity by actors within the international system.
### Table 4 - State Failures, 1955-1998 92

(Includes “Near State Failures”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before Fall of USSR</th>
<th>After Fall of USSR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State</strong></td>
<td><strong>Years</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>1960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1974-75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>1975-76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ultimately, state capacity is being challenged at many levels. Zero-sum power equations suggest that power lost by certain actors must, in fact, be gained by others. Within this framework, I will contend that non-state actors are the emerging force in the international system. As states have lost power, non-state actors have been the benefactors.

Many political scientists and security analysts have turned to an examination of the failed state phenomenon in their research on counterterrorism. The notion of the failed state has been linked – in a number of studies – to terror actors and the non-state

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92 Instances of complete state failure and near state failures discussed in *State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings.*
actor. Furthermore, the Bush administration – in recognition of the serious nature of the problem - dealt with the issue in the *National Security Strategy of 2002* and the *National Security Strategy of 2006*, both of which pointed to the importance in addressing both failed and failing states as a part of national security.\(^\text{93}\) Failed states have become an important research agenda for academics as well as a topic of discussion for security specialists. This chapter will attempt to serve as an introduction to many of the issues concerning state failure as they relate to the broader effort to fight terrorism.

In common parlance and everyday usage, the idea of a state entails a government’s ability to maintain a monopoly of power over recognizable borders. As a result, a failed state would consist of a government unable to maintain the monopoly over force. That is, other actors – non-state actors – in the form of terrorists and criminal organizations enjoy the ability to project force in competition to the state. In short, the failed state argument maintains that the inability of a state to control its own territory creates a vacuum of power from which the non-state actor can usurp state power and enjoy a freedom of action within that state. Indeed, one may point to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda as a clear example of the role of failed states during an era of terrorism. Bin Laden utilized the freedom of activity inherent to Sudan and, later, Afghanistan in order to create a global terror organization. Despite efforts from many, including the United States, bin Laden remained unmolested in other sovereign states. Any attempt to kill or capture bin Laden would have (and did) involve a violation of Sudan’s sovereignty, in the case of a Saudi attempt to assassinate bin Laden, or Afghanistan’s sovereignty, as the United States did during the Clinton administration after the U.S. embassy bombings in Africa. More importantly, the ability of bin Laden to fade into the countryside and

continuously evade capture or elimination and move about without concern for government law enforcement officials points to the haven provided by failed states for terrorists and other criminals.

Historical Lessons

Although the failed state may have been a recent image of political scientists, the reality of failed states as important variables in a state’s security is really not a new development. In the United States, during the presidential administrations of William Howard Taft (1908-1912) and Woodrow Wilson (1912-1920), Mexico was a state in turmoil – and, perhaps, embodied many of the characteristics of a failing state. Mexico's erstwhile corrupt dictator Porfirio Diaz had been overthrown in 1910 by the populist Francisco Madero. Although Madero offered a policy with a number of democratic reforms, he soon wore out his welcome with American business interests. With the encouragement of the U.S., Madero was soon overthrown by Victoriano Huerta. Huerta represented a more pro-U.S. and pro-business perspective than Diaz. However, Huerta’s government murdered Madero and in doing so forced the U.S. to withhold recognition of the Huerta regime for image reasons – the United States did not want to be closely aligned with such a violent regime. A power struggle inside Mexico ensued, lasting for several years and, ultimately, impacting the national security of the United States. In 1914, a leading opposition figure, Venustiano Carranza seized control of Mexico. Wilson, upset over Carranza’s failure to accept American advice in the creation of the new Mexican government, considered supporting another potential leader – Pancho Villa. Villa was a former aide and lieutenant to Carranza who had created his own army. By
late 1915, Wilson finally decided on preliminary recognition for the Carranza regime. However, Villa now became angry at what he perceived as a betrayal by the United States and a series of attacks followed. In January 1916, Villa seized 16 American miners from a train in northern Mexico and murdered them. Two months later, Villa and his army raided Columbus, New Mexico and killed 17 more Americans. The United States, under General John J. Pershing and with the permission of Carranza, entered Mexico in pursuit of Villa. Villa, of course, was never captured. However, U.S. forces and Mexican forces loyal to Carranza clashed twice. The situation stood perilously close to war. Wilson’s withdraw of American troops and a formal recognition of Carranza eased tensions.

The story of Pancho Villa illustrates the importance of failed states. A failing state – or at least a chaotic state – on the immediate southern border certainly had broader national security implications. In the long term, the results may have been even more problematic. Indeed, Germany recognized the strain in Mexican-U.S. relations and, on the eve of World War I, attempted to push Mexico into a war with the United States with the promise of regaining territory lost during the Mexican-American War in an offer made in what is now simply called the Zimmerman telegram. Although it may be impossible to prove or disprove, one could argue that the experience of Pancho Villa and Carranza were part of the impetuous for the so-called Zimmerman Telegram and Germany’s attempt to widen World War I. In this case, the failing state had security implications well beyond the direct results of Villa’s attacks. But also, the story of Villa indicates the importance of maintaining states able to deal with challenges to its authority.
In fact, another lesson of state strength was learned even earlier in the history of the United States. After the War for Independence with Great Britain, the Articles of Confederation were established as a roadmap for governance, but they created a very weak and decentralized form of government. Subsequently, war veteran Daniel Shays (and others)– behaving as a non-state actor – challenged the government’s foreclosure and sale of farms during the summer of 1786, eventually taking up arms in what became known as Shays Rebellion. The lack of a strong central government and the inability of the Articles to create a counterforce to Shays eventually led to the hiring of a state militia by wealthy businessmen. The rebellion was defeated in January 1787, but at the same time, elites learned a valuable lesson about the ability of non-state actors to challenge the government’s monopoly on power. A direct result of the Shays Rebellion was the push for a stronger government. In fact, while a 1786 meeting in Annapolis to discuss the Articles drew only five delegations, after Shays Rebellion the 1787 Constitutional Convention boasted participation of 55 delegates from all states save Rhode Island.

While Shays Rebellion serves as an analogy for the weak and ineffective centralized government which resulted from the Articles of Confederation, the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794 illustrates how a more strong centralized government can deal effectively with threats to the state’s monopoly on the use of force. In 1794, farmers in western Pennsylvania refused to pay new excise taxes on whiskey – often used as a means of currency in the region. George Washington responded by calling on the militias of three states and personally marching an army of approximately 15,000 – a force larger than he had ever commanded in the Revolutionary War- in order to meet the threat. Needless to say, the Whiskey Rebellion was quickly quashed. Thus, both events
ultimately illustrate the importance of a state maintaining a monopoly over the use of force. Whether 1794 or 1914, the most important lessons from these examples is that a state’s national security relies on a considerable extent on its power to govern its people, as well as the power of its neighbors to govern their own people effectively.

In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt realized the importance of what we would later call failed and failing states when he issued the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine closed the Americas off from European colonization in 1823. Roosevelt reasoned that European aggression in the region of the Americas may come due to a state’s instability – very close to what we would currently define as a failing state. Hence, Roosevelt proclaimed that the United States could interfere with neighbors unable to maintain their own sovereignty. The only modern difference is that globalization has made all states virtual neighbors.

**Contemporary Challenges**

The discussion over failed states results in a number of theoretical and policy questions, however, that must be addressed in order to more fully understand the role of such states. The most obvious question is how do we measure a failed state? Certainly, every government has a section of territory where the state lacks a monopoly on power. Particular areas of the United States feature rival power centers in the form of gangs or other criminal organizations. In fact, police are often reluctant to enter such areas – does that make the United States a failed state? In addition, the United States clearly lacks control over its southern borders. Again, should we consider that lack of control as defining a failed state? The United States would not, under even the strictest measures, be
considered a failing or failed state. The point is, however, that the obvious examples of a failed state are somewhat easy to point out. At some level, moreover, the action becomes somewhat subjective and open to a great deal of discussion. Portions of Colombia are under the exclusive control of the narco-terrorist group FARC; large portions of Afghanistan – especially outside of Kabul – remain in the control of warlords; the Baluchistan region of Pakistan certainly lacks a government monopoly of power, and many other germane examples exist worldwide. So, we are left with the difficult question of appropriately defining a failed state. Another important question would be how exactly to handle the failed state. Does the danger of the failed state call for the United States to be a world guarantor of states? What can be done as part of the effort to fight terrorism in order to address the failed states of the world? Finally, how significant of a variable is the failed state when examining the roots of terrorism?

The international system has, for hundreds of years, consisted of states interacting as unitary actors in a way to maximize power within the international system. Although some may claim that the above realist interpretation is open to debate and offer alternative explanations of global politics, most would agree that the state was (and still remains) the primary actor within the international system. In times past, the paths of states may have never crossed. Hence, a failed or weak state in Asia may have very little impact in Europe. To borrow a phrase by the former Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill – “all politics is local.” So that the strength or ability of a state to govern – say El Salvador – mattered little to another – for example, Greece, the two states have little in common in terms of culture, history, and policy interaction and were not rivals within the international system. Globalization, however, has changed the distant relationship. For
example, a non-state actor dedicated to regime change in Greece may take refuge in El Salvador and direct both rhetorical and physical attacks toward Greek leadership. Greece would be forced to rely on El Salvador in order to enforce laws and, ultimately, protect the Greek regime from attacks emanating inside El Salvador. As the hypothetical narrative illustrates, the strength of one state - especially because of globalization – now matters to other states. Hence, states unable to even maintain a monopoly on power within its own borders are perceived to be less likely to address issues of poverty and to deal with threats from disease and, especially, terrorism.

**Definitions**

At this point, it is appropriate to make several comments with regard to definitions – in order to more clearly identify failed versus failing states. Specifically, a failed state is the end-point of failing states. Typically, a weak state may be failing – for example, Sri Lanka as it fights the Tamil Tigers for the third decade or Indonesia as unable to fully control areas of Aceh and Papua – but not pass the threshold to a collapsed state. A failed state is one unable to perform its duties on several levels – “… when violence cascades into an all-out internal war, when standards of living massively deteriorate, when the infrastructure of ordinary life decays, and when the greed of rulers overpowers their responsibilities to better their people and their surroundings.” In more direct terms, a recent State Failure Task Force defined state failure as “instances in which

95 Rotberg, 91-92.
96 Rotberg, 86.
central state authority collapses for several years.” The number of completely collapsed states is historically small, but the number of collapsing states somewhat more troublesome. As a result, the Task Force purposely extended its definition of state failure to include a more inclusive list of “civil conflicts, political crises, and massive human-rights violations that are typically associated with state breakdown.” From 1955 to 1998, the Task Force discovered 251 events and 136 cases of state failure.

Milliken and Krause studied the evolving definition of state failure and offer a thesis addressing the prescient issue of what exactly composes a “failed state.” They advance the argument that the state cannot be merely classified as a static entity but, instead, an ever changing work in progress. As such, part of the contemporary analysis of states necessarily must include the discussion of failed and/or collapsed states. Furthermore, state failure and its measurement utilize two distinct contexts - a state may "institutionally" fail or "functionally fail." As a result, state failure refers to "dashed expectations" of a state or of what the citizens expect the state to accomplish. In addition, the failure remains more subjective. Thus, the numbers of states in the midst or recently collapsed institutionally remain relatively low - the "former Yugoslavia, Georgia, Haiti, Colombia, and Afghanistan.”

98 Ibid.
99 State Failure Task Force, 4.
Policy Implications

Robert Cooper, former European Union diplomat and advisor to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, argues the threat posed by failed states is so great that it offers a clear rationalization for a new form of colonialism - aimed at interventions in failed or failing states.\textsuperscript{101} Francis Fukuyama noted, “weak or failed states are close to the root of many of the world’s most serious problems, from poverty and AIDS to drug trafficking and terrorism.”\textsuperscript{102} Chester Crocker, a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State has observed “state failure affects a broad range of U.S. interests … It contributes to regional insecurity, weapons proliferation, narcotics trafficking, and terrorism.”\textsuperscript{103} Within the context of new world geopolitics the balance of power system has become outdated and not useful in formulating policy and attention must be paid to the concept of failed states. Cooper contends that the system is best summarized as one consisting of interdependence among state actors. It is the interdependence factor that moves politics past the local level and to the system level. Hence, failed states do matter and impact other states throughout the international system.\textsuperscript{104}

Thus, the context of world politics and the careful stability inherent to an anarchical system become threatened very clearly with the phenomenon of "failed states." A failed state is representative of chaos - a chaos removing the state from the global political and/or economic community. Once removed from the economic benefits inherent to the interdependent structure of the contemporary global system, a "failed

\textsuperscript{103} Crocker, 34.
\textsuperscript{104} Cooper.
“state” turns to narcotics, terrorism, and other criminal activities in order to compensate for removal from the global community. In both failed and failing states, a number of non-state actors fill the void left by the state to provide products of government and prey on the state of chaos in order to increase their own power and wealth.

Why, then, does a state begin to fail? Can we see any warning signs or trace the failing or failed state to a moment when intervention would be helpful? A number of wide and varied explanations for the failing state offer somewhat of a glimpse into the complexity of the issues involved. Fukuyama suggests the end of the Cold War led to increased incidents of the failed state and left a number of both weak and failed states in areas like the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central and South Asia. At the same time, international organizations like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund pushed for less government involvement in the economy. Fukuyama notes that this “Washington consensus” was an effort to reform the economy but, ultimately, spilled over into the overall structure of the state. In addition, the reforms came at a critical time when many states were emerging from authoritarian rule. Hence, the Washington consensus placed very little emphasis on overall institutional development and state building. The already existing poor institutional framework – with the added pressure of the Washington consensus- resulted in an overall reduction of state strength.

Crocker takes a longer and more general view in defining the process of state failure. First, the process of state failure is one of a complex and lengthy process of state devolution. Furthermore, a variety of inputs result in the concept of a failed state - (1) rulers may corrupt the vehicles of governance, (2) corrupt elites may act with criminal

105 See Fukuyama “The Imperative of State Building.”
106 Ibid.
107 Crocker, 34-35.
networks in order to claim the material resources of a state, (3) specific regions may feature the general lack of governmental authority and, often, illegal trade results, (4) a transition from authoritarian government results in the state's loss of monopoly on power, and, finally, (5) large sections of the state feature the loss of power.\textsuperscript{108} Hence, a cycle of state failure is quite often easy to view. This raises at least three difficult questions: whether powerful states should intervene, when in the process should they intervene, and how such an intervention should be conducted.

Also of note in an examination of state failure is the impact of external support. That is, according to Crocker, "states with shallow domestic legitimacy tend to fail when they lose foreign support …"\textsuperscript{109} He notes that part of the equation of failed states, is the number of transitions to democracy in the 1990's. Specifically, a number of the transitions would simply fail. Some may result in the reemergence of an autocratic leader, some may simply become very weak, failing states, and others "will descend into chaotic warlord struggles."\textsuperscript{110} In fact, Crocker argues "In much of the transitional world - those at-risk societies concentrated in Africa, the Middle East, and southwestern Asia - there is a footrace underway between legitimate governmental institutions and legal business enterprises, on the one hand, and criminal networks, often linked to warlords or political factions associated with security agencies, on the other."

\textsuperscript{111} Milliken and Krause maintain legitimization is a process of function within a state - charged with providing "security, representation, and welfare."\textsuperscript{112} In the race toward legitimization versus state failure, the legitimate networks must outdistance and outperform the networks of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{108} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{109} Crocker, 35.
  \item \textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{111} Crocker, 36.
  \item \textsuperscript{112} Milliken and Krause, 756.
\end{itemize}
corruption. As Crocker observes, "Those who lead the cells and networks that hollow out failing states focus with a laser like intensity on exploiting opportunity and creating facts on the ground. Whether loosely arrayed in symbiotic relations or more closely coordinated by a central brain, they find space to operate in the vacuums left by a declining or transitional state - and they eat what they kill."\(^{113}\)

Susan Woodward has also examined the impact of failed states upon the international system. In short, a failed state represents the undermining of a key assumption in international politics - the primacy of the state actor. Furthermore, Woodward points to the fact that globalization is already challenging the power of the state. Yet, ironically, globalization "requires states that function - governments capable of giving sovereign guarantees, exercising sovereign power and responsibility, and controlling their sovereign borders."\(^{114}\) Milliken and Krause considered the concept of "economic globalization" a primary influence in the fall of the state. In fact, economic globalization tends to accentuate the societal cleavages in conjunction with inefficient and uneven distribution of government resources.\(^{115}\) Woodward suggests "there is a powerful association between internal disintegration, fragmentation, massive civil violence, and the rise of warlordism, on the one hand, and states' lack of strategic significance for major powers and the uncontrolled proliferation of conventional arms since the end of the cold war, on the other."\(^{116}\) Indeed, the lack of state power effectively eliminates a key limiting mechanism on internal politics.\(^{117}\) The non-state actor emerges from or makes a home in the remains of a state in order to operate unmolested from any

\(^{113}\) Crocker, 37.
\(^{115}\) Milliken and Krause, 761-762.
\(^{116}\) Woodward.
\(^{117}\) Ibid.
form of legal authority. Certainly, the model of drug trade in areas of Colombia, Afghanistan, and Myanmar in addition to relative lawlessness in Liberia, Southern Sudan, and most of Somalia illustrate the ability of non-state actors to freely operate in failed states or regions.

Crocker argues that the U.S.-led War on Terrorism is incomplete as it is only targeting the current manifestations of terror. Hence, the long-term terror implications are not addressed. Primary among the unaddressed concerns are the role of failed states. In addition, the rhetoric of the War on Terror is necessarily misleading because an enemy does not exist - enemies exist. Terrorism, according to Crocker, is merely a "tool."118 Indeed, the work in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the targeting of al-Qaeda are simply the "first steps" toward global security.119 In addition, Washington also must concentrate on "sustaining regional security, leading coalitions and institutions to help failing and threatened states, and winning the struggle after wars and regimes change."120 Furthermore, Crocker contends:

…state failure directly affects a broad range of U.S. interests, including the promotion of human rights, good governance, the rule of law, religious tolerance, environmental preservation, and opportunities for U.S. investors and exporters…unless the United States and its principal partners engage proactively to prevent and contain state failure, rogue regimes may seize power in additional failed or failing states, raising the specter of fresh adversaries that seek WMD and harbor terrorists. Moreover, the United States must learn to rebuild states after overthrowing their regimes, or the whole enterprise will backfire.121

In explaining what needs to be done in order to prevent the advent of "failed states," Crocker points to the fact that the number of sovereign states in 1945 was 51

118 Crocker, 32.
119 Ibid., 33.
120 Ibid., 33.
121 Ibid., 34.
while almost 200 exist today. In addition, although the failed state is typically a poor state, the economy does not provide a complete answer. A look at civilizations also comes up short in attacking "failed states.” That said, Crocker argues (with relevant empirical data) that "weak democracies" and "reforming autocracies" are states "highly prone to state failure.” In the end, national boundaries as well as ethnic cleavages are not the sole sources of the problem of "state failure.” Instead, Crocker looks to "ethnic imbalance between a dominant majority and a large minority" and "contested natural resources and separatist movements supported by well-heeled expatriate communities" as important antecedents to a failed state.

Be that as it may, Woodward provides several convincing arguments as to why the United States should be concerned over the existence of failed states. First, she notes, the constraints of the Cold War era - the threat of nuclear attack - are largely non-existent in the contemporary era of global politics. The Cold War's competition of superpowers acted as a limiting factor on worldwide behavior, yet no other natural limiting factor of behavior has arrived in order to replace the Cold War equilibrium. That is, should the Soviet Union or United States have gone to far with a foreign policy directive, both risked a war with the other and the corresponding threat of escalation to the point where the virtual existence of the planet would be threatened. In addition, the Cold War era led to the use of foreign aid in a manner to "purchase" friendship and loyalty. In contemporary global relationships, aid packages - which Woodward notes are essential for some states to maintain authority - are more often tied to neo-liberal "policies of

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122 Ibid., 37.
123 Ibid., 38.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid., 39.
liberalization, privatization, budgetary cuts and devolution, and overall fiscal conservatism."¹²⁶ Thus, the end result includes "increasing regional inequalities and grievances, social polarization and abandonment, and a power vacuum that open the door to movements for regional autonomy or secession, to alternative elites who aspire to total power through ethnic and nationalist appeals, and to vicious cycles of public protests, police repression by weak governments, communal violence, and local insurgencies."¹²⁷

A second argument Woodward provides as proof of the need to intervene in failing states is the end results of failed states. She argues that, "what seems to matter about failed states are the consequences" including political violence, refugee problems, and mass humanitarian emergencies. As a result, international actors contemplate action only when the state has failed. Thus, Woodward argues that the response is more humanitarian than political - which, by definition, suggests a quick end to emergency conditions and not the political negotiation required for long term solutions. She believes that "the violence [is] being caused by ethnic hatred [and] begin to treat such differences and presumed hatreds as essences rather than as contingencies produced by alterable conditions. This is especially the case if interveners organize in terms of 'enemies' and 'victims' and thus take sides; by doing so they harden lines of conflict rather than reinforce instances of cooperation and the capacity for it."¹²⁸

The breakdown of governance, which produces a power vacuum, is also a key difficulty in dealing with failing states. Instead of traditional forms of governing power, authority in such a state is claimed by others based upon their possession of some territory and some weapons by individuals who are taking advantage of fear in order to

¹²⁶ Woodward.
¹²⁷ Ibid.
¹²⁸ Ibid.
capitalize upon the insecurities inherent to such a breakdown of state power. Furthermore, such arrangements are reciprocal by nature – the “legitimacy” must be returned by some form of government services. In the failed state, the reciprocal service is often looting and/or criminal activity which leads to further state failure. Woodward posits the “ethnic, religious, linguistic, or clan differences” within a society are significantly exacerbated by the failure of the state’s governance and economic functions. These dividing lines often become magnified by the influx of resources internationally from groups or individuals sharing loyalties and offering sympathy to a particular cause.  

Furthermore, “the violence [is] being caused by ethnic hatred [and] begin to treat such differences and presumed hatreds as essences rather than as contingencies produced by alterable conditions. This is especially the case if interveners organize in terms of ‘enemies’ and ‘victims’ and thus take sides; by doing so they harden the lines of conflict rather than reinforce instances of cooperation and the capacity for it.”

How does the discussion of failed and failing states directly impact concerns over terrorism? Much has already been said and alluded to in this effort focusing on the ability of non-state actors, for the purposes of this chapter - terrorist groups - to usurp some of the space inherent to statehood in order to operate freely. Robert Rotberg characterizes globalization as the intervening variable between "failed states" and terrorism. That is, the past strategy of isolating failed states simply has become immaterial in the era of globalization. The realities of international relations demand effectual states and the continuation of failed states endanger security at a global level. Rotberg persists, furthermore, that failed states grow to be both "reservoirs" as well as "exporters of

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129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
terror."\textsuperscript{131} Essentially, the literature suggests a failed state is marked in levels of rising corruption at the hands of leaders using the rule of force to establish legitimacy. All the while, government services become benefits enjoyed only by a select few. Legitimacy is finally attacked by the masses within a final stage of state failure. At that point, reinforced societal cleavages - ethnic, religious, linguistic and more - become more pronounced. Finally, the inequities of history become fresh memories in the minds of mass society and historical grievances become part of the contemporary political agenda of settlement by force. A state, at that point, becomes perilously close to state failure - which becomes a threat to world security. Rotberg's solution is a fourfold approach: (1) improve economic conditions, (2) reintroduce a rule of law, (3) reestablish political institutions and (4) offer a new chance of civil society.\textsuperscript{132}

Rotberg's premise gains in expediency when seen through the perspective provided by Takeyh and Gvosdev. In their recent essay, these researchers speak both of the role of failed states as well as the smaller failures within states - cities, geographical areas, etc. The importance of investigating sovereign states and governments facing potential failure is paramount, as both are linked to the reality that a group like al-Qaeda is much different from the IRA or the PKK that have "limited, irredentist claims." Conversely, al-Qaeda is "not confined territorially or ideologically to a particular region." Al-Qaeda is more advanced and boasts its own "infrastructure" and is "self-sufficient."\textsuperscript{133} As a result, al-Qaeda, and the future organizations based similarly on global geographical realities look for failed states into which to move their organization. Indeed, the state's

\textsuperscript{131} Rotberg.
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
sovereignty becomes host of (and used by) non-state actors, terror organizations, to achieve their own goals.

The failed state theory is evident in many instances of terror organizations around the world. Key, too, are geographic areas or cities or villages that can be classified as "failed" because of the lack of coherent central government control. A good example is the Bosnian village of Bocinja Donja – a village which is widely described as lawless and a haven for radical Islamic movements. In addition, Italy (among other states) remains quite concerned of the security threat posed by Albania and its links to both criminal networks and Osama bin Laden. In fact, the port of Durres, Albania is noted for its role as a center of transit for smuggling and for Osama bin Laden's complicity in activities originating in the port.

In short, Takeyh and Gvosdev argue terror groups "have gained control over territory in a failed state through a Faustian bargain with authorities usually by offering its services to the failed state during time of conflict." Other factors also contribute to the usefulness of failed states as bases for terror groups. First, failed states lack the infrastructure of any semblance of law enforcement. In addition, a failed state also offers a population of ready-made recruits – as Takeyh and Gvosdev observe, “failed states create pools of recruits and supporters for terrorist groups who can use their resources and organizations to step into the vacuum left by the collapse of civil society.”

Finally, the levels of poverty and corruption typically associated with failed states makes the viability of bribes more compelling – again, allowing for terrorist or criminal organizations the freedom to behave in any manner it wishes.

134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
What has been offered in this chapter obviously does not offer a complete answer to the basic questions on how to define a failed versus failing state, the role of failed states in terrorism, the importance or the method for intervention, or any other of a number of relevant policy questions. These and other related questions are addressed amply throughout the political science and security studies literature. Instead, the chapter is meant to offer suggestions as to the current debate of the strength of the state and how it applies to concern of national security with regard to efforts to counter terrorism.

Obviously, not every failed state will produce an Osama bin Laden. What also should be clear, however, is that failed states do matter – not only for humanitarian reasons but also for basic issues of national security. The concept of a strong state is one as old as the republic itself and the concern over stability in other states has a historical precedent. What remains clear is that the shrinking of the world – through globalization – should offer pause for consideration on how to deal with the failing or failed state.
Chapter 5

Warfare in the Evolving International System

The argument of this paper has been that the international system and the composition of states are changing in such a way that non-state actors are more powerful. Typically, one of the most common attributes of a state has always been considered to be the ability to make war. Therefore, a change in the international system and a change in the state level should also bring different manifestations of war and violence. As a result, I believe that it is worthwhile to examine war and where the concept of war has been, where it is, and where it is going. In doing so, I hope to show that the international system and the behavior of states has evolved in such a way that the conventional methods of warfare have also changed. Again, this is due to any number of variables at both the system and state levels of analysis. Furthermore, the discussion of warfare and its evolution will show that the way war is fought is a social construct. Within that construct, variables from the system and state level guide the choices made in warfare. Since the state and system have both evolved then so should the characteristics of warfare.

Geoffrey Blainey commented in *The Causes of War*, “In human behavior few events are more difficult to predict than the course and duration of a war: that is one of the vital unlearned lessons of warfare.”136 Indeed, perhaps one of the most significant questions a social scientist can ask is how will warfare look in the future? Who will fight and what will motivate actors to use violence? Who will be the targets of warfare and

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how will society, in general, be impacted? This section is an attempt to begin a discussion
with regard to some of these questions. I will effort to place warfare within the broader
context of society and provide an analysis of the evolution of warfare – its past, present,
and future characteristics. Ultimately, I hope to illustrate the connections between both
warfare and society while, at the same time, making predictions with regard to the future
of warfare. Indeed, the evolving nature of warfare, I will argue, parallels the evolution of
the international system.

The progression of conflict and warfare over the past fifty years brings to light the
reality that the traditional Westphalian composition of unitary state actors no longer
dominate the international system. Although states still apply most of the power, non-
state groups such as al-Qaeda – in the form of extremist ideological organizations – have
expropriated space within the international system in order to employ expressions of
force independent from the state. Key to understanding contemporary, as well as future,
forms of conflict is an appreciation of the role of the non-state soldier and, more
generally, how the dynamic nature of warfare mirrors the evolution of society.

Warfare and the norms of society share a long and storied past. A study of the
development of international law and behavior in times of armed conflict reveals the
close connection between the evolution of society and of warfare. As the act of warfare
became more centralized to state actors, the norms and behavior of participants in acts of
war evolved. Concerns over treatment of those at war date as far back as the second
millennium B.C. when the wars between Egypt and Sumeria led to a construction of
codified behavior to follow during warfare. Much later, the originator of international law
– Hugo Grotius – in De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625) – argued that it was permissible to kill
all subjects found in captured territory. Many may take issue with the norms of Grotius, yet his work suggests an examination of codes of warfare did merit debate as early as the era preceding the advent of the Westphalian state centric system. Specifically, Grotius discussed norms of behavior within the context of natural law. That is, Grotius argued the source of all law was found in the needs of the society, as a whole, fused with the popular demand for justice. Hence, international law – and its subsidiary – the behavior of belligerents in warfare merely were a social construct. Ultimately, a desire would evolve to hold those engaged in armed conflict to some form of limitations. In fact, efforts were made as early as 1474 to hold belligerents accountable for actions during warfare with the trial of Peter von Hagenback. In one of the original examples of a war crime trial, Hagenback – the Burgundian governor of Breisach was charged for crimes committed by his forces against civilians while engaged in combat within the Holy Roman Empire. The Grotian school of international law, as a reflection of natural law, later evolved into the Doctrine of Positivism that drives contemporary international regimes. Positivists suggest law went beyond the needs of society and, instead, the people created international law. As a result, the norms and behaviors prescribed in international law clearly reflected societal agreements.

Discussion of behavior in warfare ultimately led to norm construction – suggested by the evolving attitudes toward warfare. Initially, the state’s concerns with norms were built upon a necessity for discipline within organized armies. A cessation of the looting frequently linked with victory and resulting collapse in obedience required

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138 A primer for Grotius and international law may be found in Scott, 87-115.
139 More on Positivism may be found in Scott, 87-115.
some form of solution. States called for norms of warfare in order to constrict rule over
the military. The military, furthermore, supported norm construction because they were
essentially a mobile populace. Conventions of behavior assured at least minimal
protection during warfare, theoretically, regardless of where a soldier called home. As
time progressed, a demand for institutional guidelines developed. Henri Dunant founded
the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1859 after watching the poor treatment
of soldiers on Italian battlefields. During the U.S. Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln
attempted to codify laws regarding behavior during warfare with the development of the
1863 Lieber Code. Gustave Moynier – after the Franco-Prussian War – called for an
international criminal court in 1870. A number of conferences in Hague, created to
address the treatment of belligerents, emerged at the turn of the 19th century – the most
notable in 1899 and 1907. Trials at Nurembourg called many of the Nazis to respond to
charges of the war crimes of World War II. In more current times, the effort to create an
International Criminal Court and the construction of International Criminal Tribunals for
both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda support the notion that norms of warfare are
social constructs.140 Each example typifies an evolving view of what is and is not
acceptable in the conduct of war. Taken a step further, global prohibition regimes on such
disparate subjects as piracy, slavery, drugs, and whaling all point to the epistemic role
society plays in the construction of what is and is not acceptable behavior.141 Clearly, the
norms and expected behavior during warfare are, at least at some levels, constructs of
society. As a result, analysts can point to warfare as a developing phenomenon beholden

140 For more on norm discussion see Evan Luard, Types of International Society (NY; The Free Press): 282-
311.
141 See Ethan A. Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International
to societal inputs. As behavior of belligerents is molded by society in the forms of norms, the ability to wage wars and the types of wars waged are also constructs of the agreements – tacit or explicit – of the actors within the international system.

Given the notion that the drama of warfare is one written within a cultural context, an examination of the major actors in warfare is necessary. Clausewitz – in the oft-cited On War - discusses the primary actor in warfare as the state.\footnote{Cited in Martin van Creveld, \textit{The Transformation of War}, (New York: Free Press, 1991): 33-44.} The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) shaped the necessary legal norms to effectively label warfare as a state versus state enterprise. Westphalia signaled the birth of the concept of state as a sovereign actor in place of the predominant international actor of the time - the Catholic Church. Before Westphalia, non-state players dominated the landscape of warfare and political, social, economic and religious motives all were completely matted. The pattern previous to Westphalia revealed warfare as an exercise common to many actors which included barbarian tribes, feudal barons, free cities, and even private armies hired or spurred on by religion. Pre-Westphalian arrangements represented a decentralized pendulum of power and the numerous actors engaged in warfare illustrated that reality. As a result, war as an expression of politics is a relatively new phenomenon in the international system. In fact, before the use of warfare in the form of the Clausewitzian dogma of politics through other means, motives of war were often of a non-political nature and included notions of justice, religion, and existence.\footnote{For extended detail on arguments provided please see van Creveld, 124-149.} Hence, warfare suggested a belligerent may either be “good” or “bad.” Thus, war may be used as a “stick” in order to accomplish some level of justice. The notion of justice in war led to theoretical discussions of what exactly makes a war just – and the actors good or bad.
Within this mindset, Augustine advanced the “just war” theory as an example of when war would be permissible under the laws of god. Cicero developed the theory of just/unjust war in an attempt to closely relate war to a legal remedy. In point of fact, Romans considered adversaries to be no more than “criminals.” Again, each example illustrates the constructive role society plays in guidelines for behavior during warfare.

In addition to justice, wars for religion also have a long historical legacy. So-called “holy wars” are part of the record of the Old Testament. Indeed, the Israelites spared nothing in efforts to fight wars over religion. Christianity was a target of the notion of religious warfare until Constantine converted. Westphalia and the state-centric structure it created somewhat reduced (but did not eliminate) the likelihood of religion as a source of warfare. In many ways the growth of the Christian community made possible larger wars for religion – but, typically, as a secondary motive. Indeed, the Spanish and Portuguese colonized “in the name of the cross” and often gave Native Americans the opportunity to convert (or die). Yet, economic motives and power politics ultimately spurred colonization. In addition, a long tradition of warfare exists between Catholics and Protestants. However, one of the most storied examples of Protestant versus Catholic violence, the “Troubles” of Northern Ireland, were more an expression of civil rights and a reaction to systemic deficiencies than a religious holy war. Yet, wars primarily for the sake of religious ends ceased after 1648. Instead, wars were molded in terms of power – in the style of Clausewitz and Machiavelli.

The timeline of history includes many instances of a belligerent simply fighting a war in order to maintain its existence. In fact, existence may be the single most important reason for warfare over the ages. Thus, warfare is not an extension of policy but is policy.
The French-Algerian War illustrates the warfare for existence model. Algeria framed the war into a fight for survival while France simply scrutinized the conflict from a more rational cost-benefit analysis. A complete list of Israeli versus Arab wars also fit the typology of war for existence – the existence of the state of Israel. The one notable exception, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June of 1982, ended in disaster for Israel. In fact, World War II evolved, for really every belligerent except the United States, into a war for existence. After Westphalia, the victorious monarchs began to build standing armies – a *militum perpetuum*. Many non-political motives existed for the conduct of warfare – religion, justice, and existence. However, the state monopoly on violence after Westphalia led to the majority of warfare as efforts to increase power through the acquisition of land or resources. Standing armies evolved into the tools of the state and politicians – often utilized for the expansion of the state or its treasury. Although some challenges from non-state actors confronted the Westphalian state, the depth and breadth of such attempts were quite minimal.

Warfare viewed through the lenses of Westphalia has become outdated. The arrangements of the 17th century treaty no longer accurately depict the nature of the international system in its entirety. Furthermore, the practice of identifying warfare with the state is a practice becoming anarchistic by the realities of globalization and deteriorating economic conditions. Specifically, the effort made by Clausewitz to tie warfare to the state leaves an interesting dilemma – if no state is involved, or only one state, then what is the nature of the conflict? Such a conflict – most familiar with modern

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students of warfare suggest – can best be labeled a “low intensity conflict.” As war for a political purpose represents a modern adoption of a more broad expression of organized violence, one may expect devolution in actors to necessarily include devolution – and return to the past – pertaining to motives of warfare.

**Generations of Warfare**

In general, analysts of conflict and military affairs refer to warfare as generational in nature. The generations of warfare typically correspond to developments in society. The first generation of warfare emerged with the development of gunpowder, the evolution of a system of states, and new transportation networks developed in order to satisfy the increased amount of trade. Warfare, during the first generation, was marked by the participation of the entire population. The first generation emerged from the organization of the nation-state after the Treaty of Westphalia along with the birth of professional armies subsidized by the various crowns of Europe. First generation governments measured wealth in terms of specie and increased both power and relative power with the acquisition of more and more hard wealth. Indeed, the colonization of the Americas played a large role in the cementing of state power. The system of mercantilism found power expressed in economic terms. Mercantilists contended power was best measured in terms of wealth in the form of a positive balance of trade and policy reflected those ends. In addition, the colonies added necessary mechanisms for trade and

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146 Argument advanced by Hammes and van Creveld but also see Ralph Peters, *Fighting the Future: Will America Triumph?* (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Books, 1999).
finance – again, building the power of the state. Close-order fighting of infantry and
cavalry dominated the first generation of warfare. As one might guess, the period was
marked by defensive dominance. Second generation warfare followed and was
characterized by an increase in state power in terms of the ability to tax. With the
increase in bureaucratic structures, the government usurped more power for use by the
state. The increase in tax receipts allowed a competitive growth in the purchase of arms.
Ultimately, the army with the most and best forms of fire power became victorious in the
second generation of warfare. War grew more and more defensive with advances like the
barbed wire, the machine gun, and the telegraph. In addition, warfare and expressions of
nationalism became more synonymous – as illustrated by the tremendous outpouring of
nationalistic fervor that accompanied the start of World War I. More or less, the
transformation to a second generation of warfare reflected changes in the battle order
between Waterloo and World War I. Industrialization clearly acted as a variable in the
shift to second generation warfare, as well. The grinding deadlock of World War I
symbolized second generation warfare. Efforts to break the deadlock of the trenches
utilized technology as a vehicle in order to transform warfare to a more offensive form.
The first western nation to experiment with the next generation of warfare was Nazi
Germany. Although many refer to the German victory over Poland as the advent of a new
form of warfare, it really reflected the World War I model. The invasion of Poland
included mostly foot soldiers and horse drawn artillery. A full twenty four of the thirty
four German divisions that invaded Poland were of the World War I style.\textsuperscript{147} Shortly
after Poland, Germany recognized the need to alter tactics and the May 10, 1940 invasion
of France unveiled the German blitzkrieg. Once again, infantry army divisions made up

\textsuperscript{147} Hammes, 23.
most of the invasion force. However, most of German military leaders organized the units into Panzer Corps. The fall of France in 1940 brought about a glimpse of the third generation of warfare. The blitzkrieg form of warfare utilized improved technology in order to make the expression of war more offensive. Furthermore, the Third Reich’s rapid movement around the infamous Maginot Line reflected the dominance of the third generation warfare over second. In short, the blitzkrieg strategy aimed at eliminating leadership and communications. Overall, the third generation of warfare consisted of decentralized attacks – like those witnessed in France in May of 1940 – followed by efforts to wear down the opponent. The attrition of World War I remained – but only after attempts to minimize the size and strength of opponents through attacks on command and control. Warfare evolved from the second generation of attrition to the more proactive model of the third generation.

The march of history continued with several key changes marking the geopolitical reality since WWII that impact the conduct of warfare – (1) more players – including those of a nonstate variety – exist on the world stage, (2) the number and diversity of nations has increased, and (3) the number of stateless actors has also increased.\textsuperscript{148} In addition, warfare is evolving to more closely resemble the corporate and financial bureaucratic model based upon the consequence of information.\textsuperscript{149} As a result, the hierarchy that characterized societies before WWII is less distinct and networks have emerged as important organizational forms. In many ways, the three phase model of guerilla warfare noted by Mao Tse Tung and its emphasis on political power reflects the use of a network-based approach. The increased political power allows networks to both

\textsuperscript{148} Hammes, 32-37.

\textsuperscript{149} More discussion on the impact of information found throughout Peters.
project power beyond borders and undermine the will of the adversary. The resulting paradigm allowed for a transformation in the conduct of war – networks replaced hierarchical organizations and an emphasis on political goals supplanted goals of territory and resources.\(^{150}\)

More recently, experts point to the current generation of warfare as the fourth. Whereas the previous generations were Trinitarian in nature – state versus state and army versus army, analysts characterize fourth generation warfare as low-intensity and often involving non-state actors. Since Westphalia, the effort of non-state actors to engage in warfare had typically been forbidden and the non-state soldier often treated as a criminal. However, the effort to defeat both Germany and Japan required the use of all available resources and insurgency – especially in the form of low-intensity conflict - became an attractive weapon for use against the Axis powers.\(^{151}\) Low-intensity conflicts also come at a cost to established norms – that is, legal norms break down with the low-intensity and non-Trinitarian forms of warfare. Before World War II, wars typically involved states and hierarchical organizations. The low-intensity form of conflict, on the other hand, more often utilizes networks of all sorts – political, economic, social, and religious. Fourth generation warfare represents a devolution of hierarchical systems. Hence, the state is no longer the only actor in expressions of warfare. Typical of the low-intensity and fourth generation of warfare is the Maoist paradigm outlined in his work *Guerrilla Warfare*. Mao broke insurgency into three distinct phases.\(^{152}\) Phase one involved the building of political networks. Military force was only used for assassinations and

\(^{150}\) Argument advanced in John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini in “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism.” Chapter found in Ian Lesser, et al. *Countering The New Terrorism* (Santa Monica, Ca.: RAND, 1999).

\(^{151}\) Van Creveld, 58.

\(^{152}\) Discussion of Mao’s phases of war found in Hammes, 44-56.
propaganda purposes. In the second phase, the movement gains strength and consolidates its political and military networks. Military assets are used for procurement of weapons and in order to wear down opponents. Mao’s final phase can best be termed the “final offensive.” Mao’s strategy relied heavily on the notions of networks within the low-intensity form of warfare. In addition, networks engaged the state not for territorial purposes but in order to accomplish political ends. In the effort to win political ends, warfare evolved into a contest of the actors’ will to win.

The Vietnam War clarifies how insurgency and low intensity warfare are best defined as a contest of wills. Ho Chi Minh utilized modified Maoist doctrine in order to control the ‘tempo and attrition’ of the conflict. Ho sensed the best strategy for victory in Vietnam involved a long war of attrition followed by an effort to weaken domestic support in the U.S. for the war effort. Hence, the North Vietnamese concentrated efforts on political ends. An additional case in point of politically aimed insurgency was the Nicaraguan insurgency of the 1980’s. The inability of the Sandinistas to apply Che Guevera’s *foco* theory in Nicaragua followed by the transformation of the movement to an urban-based political struggle reveals the ability of low-intensity warfare to quickly evolve in order to ultimately prevail. The *foco* strategy wagered that the creation of small groups of insurgents would ultimately lead to a spontaneous uprising. Guevera’s model did not transform well to Nicaragua. So, the movement adopted a more urban strategy and constructed coalitions of opposition to the Somoza regime. The Sandinistas made a point to minimize their leftist doctrine and capitalized on the alienated business class, acted to undermine the Somoza regime in international circles, and utilized liberal

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153 The Vietnam example can be found in more detail in Hammes, 56-75.
154 The discussion with regard to Nicaragua may be found in Hammes, 76-88.
elements of the Catholic Church (“liberation theologians”). The *Intifada* in the occupied territories of Gaza and, later, West Bank also spoke volumes about the ability of local guerrilla leaders to control the tempo and attrition while struggling for a political victory. Cameras of the international press corps and rocks thrown by children were able to accomplish more than conventional wars in the 1940’s, 1950’s, 1960’s, and 1970’s. Israel became framed as an aggressor and the Palestinians as underdogs pursuing ends of self-determination.

**Contemporary Warfare – Fourth Generation Warfare**

Low-intensity conflict, also known as fourth generation warfare and nontrinitarian warfare has emerged as the dominant form of warfare for the future. Expanded forms of violence in the form of low-intensity conflicts predict the future of warfare. Using the variable of state capacity, many political scientists contend the traditional power of the state has been reduced. Governments cannot provide the promised resource distribution due to rapid and massive population growth. This causes a polarization of wealth adding to the failure of many non-western cultures to compete in the post-modern age. The explosion of post-state organizations undermines the power of the Westphalian concept of the state. Violence often becomes the only outlet for frustration especially when all else fails. Hence, the international system likely will produce more violence in the form of small wars, while fewer wars of the classic larger type. In addition, the wars played out in the intrastate scale will often reduce the already low levels of legitimacy and effectiveness of the state.

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The prevalent modern expression of war is not limited to state displays of exercise of power. The resulting paradigm of warfare is best termed “fourth generation warfare.” Clearly, fourth generation warfare involves all networks – political, economic, social, and military. In short, all assets are engaged in order to change a political position of an adversary. While modern interstate war has rarely led to any change in the social tapestry of a society, fourth generation warfare often, even if not successful, has led to altered societal, economic, or political relations.

The evolution of warfare also illustrates the transformation from a modern to a post-modern society. In many cases, the transformation to post-modernism is trying and results in violent fissures within a society. Post state organizations factor in a “new” international system where even the primacy of the state is challenged. Media reports increase expectations of the state – expectations that often remain unfulfilled. The future of military and warfare is clear: “…by the middle of the next century, if not before, the overarching mission of our military will be the preservation of our quality of life.”

Generally, the template of conflict in the world has been an overall reduction in deaths from warfare. The end of the Cold War Era is no exception to the overall pattern – total war deaths in the four decades commencing with the 1960’s show a reduction from 3,161,337 in the 1960’s to a level of 1,993,554 in the 1990’s.

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156 Peters, 17.
The total number of wars, however, increased from twenty three in the 1980’s to thirty one in the 1990’s. Thus, a larger number of conflicts actually yielded a lower number of overall war deaths. That said, the number of total conflicts and wars per system member of the 1990’s are significantly lower than the pattern established during the Cold War Era which, certainly, were significantly lower than those in the previous era. In the end, wars among states appear to be in the midst of a multi-century decline.

\[\text{\footnotesize Data from Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer.}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize Data from Sarkees, Wayman, and Singer.}\]
Thus, the measures of traditional warfare after the Cold War Era shows a slight increase in the 1990’s but, at the same time, stands as part and parcel of overall reductions in wars per system member at the same time of declining net numbers of deaths as a result of conflicts.

The other side of the coin, however, is the number of terrorist attacks in measured during the same period. Ultimately, the raw numbers of terror attacks have steadily

\[159\] Ibid.
increased since the end of the Cold War. A graphical depiction of numbers of terror attacks from 1968 until 2003 reveals a troubling post Cold War trend.

**Table 5 - Average Number of Terror Attacks per Year**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Average Terror Attacks Per Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968-1989</td>
<td>234.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>436.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2003</td>
<td>1667.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The altered international system is allowing for a significant increase in terrorist activity – attacks by non-state actors. The 1968 to 1989 Cold War data shows an average of 234.32 incidents per year. Correspondingly, the post Cold War Era (1990-2003) shows an overall mean level of 788.43 attacks per year. In addition, the figure attests to the growing level of violent activity by terrorists.

Despite the reduced level of deaths as a result of warfare, terror attacks seem to be growing in their deadliness in the years after the Cold War. Once again, many of the constraints relative to state actors do not apply to many of the non-state actors.

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161 Data also from Rand-MIPT.
Table 6 - Average Number of Deaths per Terror Attack

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Average Deaths Per Terror Attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968-1989</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-1999</td>
<td>1.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2003</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Once again, using 1990 a breaking point, the data shows that terror attacks in the thirty years of Cold War Era led to an average of 1.05 deaths per attack. In the time of the post Cold War Era deaths per attack increased to 1.26 – an increase of approximately 20%.

Staten attempts to answer the "why" in the paradigm shift in warfare as an expression of geopolitical power. Toward these ends, Staten argues that previously:

Stable countries are experiencing religious, ethnic and other internal conflicts with increasing numbers of separatist movements … some of these conflicts are ancient and have been the cause of fighting for hundreds of years. Others are more recent and the result of demographic shifts, changing political regimes, or religious/ideological shifts.\(^{163}\)

In addition, the declining economies of South West Asia, Africa, South America, and the Far East have all contributed to an environment of social upheaval that adds a "combustible mix that is certain to fuel future conflicts in a number of parts of the globe for the foreseeable future."\(^{164}\) Germane to the argument provided by Staten concerning VNSA's and asymmetric warfare is a theory advanced by Marine Corp Colonel Gary Wilson that the future of warfare is asymmetric in nature due to the evolving nature of the terror organization. In short, the strategies used to combat an enemy are dynamic and

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\(^{162}\) Data found in Rand-MIPT.


\(^{164}\) Ibid.
"outside the box." Furthermore, the previously discussed evolution of non-state actors creates a possibility that non-state actors and state actors ultimately will collide. Then, the non-state actor, eager to survive, will resort to asymmetric actions. Wilson argues the structure of terror movements operates in a continual state of change and adaptation in order to ferment a successful terror program. Wilson compares the evolving terror structure to bacteria attacked by antibiotics - that is, sooner or later both have so changed their structure in order to become immune to the impact of the antibiotic. In short, terror structures "mutate, or change in form, in order to find new ways to survive and better project the strengths of the terrorists against the weaknesses of opposing civilizations."

James Denney, and ERRI Senior analyst, added the premise:

Global societies traditionally contain a myriad of subcultures that are based on strongly held ethnic, religious, cultural and ideological beliefs. In instances where many subcultures interact, new subcultures are generated in much the same way as a living cell generates another and another, until finally a new entity is created. Thus, the structural integrity of a given society becomes increasingly complex.\(^{165}\)

As a result, a clash or conflict of ideologies has increasingly characterized modern society. Certainly, the incumbent ideologies are holding to the status quo while, many times, the newly evolved ideologies challenge for hegemony within a system. As a result, Staten argues that the religious and ethnic cleavages have not been bridged and vertical integration has been replaced by "horizontal migration and factional polarization within these societies."\(^{166}\) Furthermore, the factional structures, all competing for power, migrate to polar ends within the community and have created a "breeding ground where fanatical ethnic and religious tribalism has emerged as fractal subcultures…"\(^{167}\) Thus, the

\(^{165}\) See Staten
\(^{166}\) Ibid.
\(^{167}\) Ibid.
birth of ideologies mixed with the positioning of non-state organizations as transnational actors creates a very volatile potential for violence.

As the global system evolves, state actors have realized the consequences of utilizing non-state actors for policy implementation. To be sure, the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan has certainly supported such a hypothesis. The Taliban - a clear overt supporter of al-Qaeda - received the full brunt of U.S. Special Forces and was summarily removed from power. However, the stress is on the "overt support." Many states still engage in "covert" support of terror groups. To be sure, Sudan allows the basing of terror groups, Syria supports many of the Middle Eastern groups, and Iran sponsors Hezbollah activity. Many, many examples of "covert" support of terrorists exist in open source intelligence. In fact, many may even question the level of covert support of terrorists by vaunted allies including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt. Furthermore, a very good case can be made that the U.S. covertly supported the Irish Republican Army (IRA) through the collection baskets at bars in Boston to the fundraising picnics in Philadelphia. Indeed, much of the IRA funding originated in the U.S. In addition, most terror groups, especially when gaining attention, often resort to tactics aimed at civilians that tend to undermine much of their support. Plainly, the model of McVeigh and the bombing of the Murrah building in Oklahoma City apply to many violent movements. To wit, the violence reaches a point where many of the moderate actors become disenchanted and leave the movement. In a scientific and calculating manner, the Murrah bombing did more to alienate Patriot and militia adherents due to its extreme nature than thousands of law enforcement and government agents would ever be able to do. Thus, a model is formulated that leads to the very radical elements of movements splintering and forming
their own organization. The moderates and radicals of the violent political movement no longer see eye to eye on the "means" even though they still may agree on the "ends." It is precisely at this point that the threat of asymmetrical warfare or, worse, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are often at their most likely stage. The radicals have already dismissed the external pressure by resorting to civilian attacks and have already undermined their legitimacy in some manner. As a result, the use of WMD, at this juncture, is less constrained. Interestingly enough, one of the most significant uses of chemical terrorism was the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway at the hands of Aum Shinri Kyo. Of note, the Aum Shinri Kyo is an apocalyptic terror movement - wanting to hasten the end of the world. In terms of movement typology, apocalyptic groups may be most dangerous because of their beliefs in the end of creation. In any working model of terrorism, those that want to die and hasten the end of the world clearly lack many of the internal constraints of other organizations. Staten claims the "devolution of terrorist organizations into smaller and more compartmentalized groups makes detection of these small cells increasingly more difficult…" 168 Thus, security responses become increasingly complex.

The Staten analysis leads to one conclusion with regard to the future of warfare - "By the advent of the 21st Century, not only is it likely that many of the conflicts facing the United States and her allies will be of an asymmetric and devolving nature, and it is also likely that the threats will come from diverse and differing vectors." 169 Another troubling trend in the changing nature of asymmetric warfare is an increased number of terror casualties. In short, terror organizations are becoming more violent and "… they

168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
can multiply fear in a civilian population by undertaking even more violent and deadly
tactics."\textsuperscript{170} The goal of many terror attacks quickly is becoming mass murder for the
sake of sending a political message. The travails of Ramzi Yousef - responsible for the
first World Trade Center attack, the Bojinca plots, and a host of other terror plans -
illustrate the shifting ideology. In short, the symbolic target has become the civilians
themselves. That is, many terrorists aim specifically at civilians in order to send their
message. At the same time, terror groups have become less likely to claim credit for their
attacks. In short, circumstances have been produced in order to introduce attacks of a
size and force heretofore unimagined.

The Staten report also points to the changing nature of WMD as a reason to
reconsider the previous norms of warfare. Citing Richard Betts - Staten argues the
significance of the shift of WMD from weapons of deterrence to offensive weapons of
choice for powers "formerly considered 'second-rate' military powers or even non-state
groups." In addition, Staten refers to Commander James Campbell and the development
of the "Post - Modern Terrorist" as one "free of constraints provided by sponsoring states,
who have discovered that the use of WMD's affords them the ability to wield a
disproportionate power to cause massive numbers of casualties, even within the
continental United States."\textsuperscript{171} Indeed, "non-state actors and post-modern terrorists, with
their apocalyptic visions and belief that they are acting on behalf of some higher power,
are likely to use WMD to maximize their kill ratios and send a larger and more fearsome
message to their perceived enemies."\textsuperscript{172} Clearly, Staten pointed to a changing of the

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid.
analysts who "want to continue to live in the comfortable past of a largely bi-polar, superpower - driven global situation may be in for a rude awakening as the nature of asymmetric conflict unfolds in the coming decade."\(^{173}\)

In fact, OBL is directly quoted with regard to the use of asymmetric warfare - "Nevertheless, it must be obvious to you that, due to the imbalance of power between our armed forces and the enemy forces, a suitable means of fighting must be adopted i.e. using fast moving light forces that work under complete secrecy."\(^{174}\) In addition, OBL's war against the United States best can be described as multi-dimensional in that its goals and objectives are political, economic, and religious. The war is aimed “… at the symbols and institutions of American political power.”\(^{175}\) Ultimately, the terror attacks of September 11 fit the archetype of political violence. As such, the attacks and the political effort belong in the domain of asymmetric behavior. Bin Laden, like any politician, strives to influence a particular policy and strategic outcome. Bin Laden, however, employs significantly violent inartistic proofs. The violence against the United States is no different in means and pursued ends than OBL’s flirtations, financing, and participation in violent political expressions in Chechnya, Algeria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kosovo, India, Indonesia, Palestine, Yemen, and the Philippines. In fact, many similarities exist between OBL and the revolutionary figures of past history - "whereas Lenin fought for a new social - economic communist state, bin Laden projected a vision of pure Islamic caliphate."\(^{176}\) In addition, the attacks of September 11 "were designed to encourage the 'good believers' and the 'strong believers' to support 'the greatest Jihad in

\(^{173}\) Ibid.
\(^{175}\) Ibid.
\(^{176}\) Ibid.
the history of Islam”. Such a message is political in nature and asymmetric in means. Many believed OBL different than the typical terrorist because of his de facto control of the Afghan government. However, it may be more relevant to view OBL under the auspices of the new form of terrorism as applied to contemporary geopolitical exigencies. That said, OBL’s Afghan operation clearly demonstrates the long held tenants of guerilla warfare. For example, upon finding that direct confrontation of U.S backed Northern Alliance forces simply was not advantageous, the al-Qaeda and Taliban remnants of al-Qaeda and the Taliban forces took the advice of Mao Zedong - the revered expert in guerilla warfare - and capitalized on "the ability to run away" and get "out of passivity and regain the initiative." Within the framework of OBL's campaign, Chipman derived a more contemporary and appropriate operational definition of terrorism reflecting the evolving nature of asymmetric warfare as "…warfare deliberately waged against civilians with the purpose of destroying their will to support either leaders or policies that the agents of such violence find objectionable." The March 11 terror attacks in Spain are a germane case in point. That is, the attacks in Madrid, Spain on the commuter lines were an asymmetric attempt to influence the parliamentary elections to be held several days later. The end goal was to ensure a socialist victory and the splintering of the coalition in Iraq. September 11, Chipman argues, was the beginning of round two. In short, the grand strategy of OBL was "to provoke a clash between West and Middle East cultures by initiating a guerilla war." As such, OBL fit the model of a

177 Ibid.
178 Ibid.
179 Ibid.
180 Ibid.
non-state actor utilizing asymmetric means in order to achieve a political goal at the international level.

An examination of asymmetric warfare and deterrence allows for an appreciation of the strategic advantages of asymmetric international conduct. Typically, deterrence is one of two broad forms - a "threat of retaliation" or "denial" in order to prevent an attack - and in order to project deterrence and avoid armed conflict an actor must have a requisite capability and strength of will.\(^{181}\) A lack of either capability or will makes the deterrent threat not credible. Simply put, an actor without power cannot use power as a deterrent. And, an actor holding power but not willing to use it makes for a poor deterrent as well. Needless to say, a state-actor must recall the words of the Romans - 

\[ si \text{ vis parem, para bellum } \text{(If you seek peace, prepare for war).} \] ^{182}\] 

That said, security expert Roger Barnett suggests deterrence irrelevant in a conflict featuring an irrational actor or one simply committed to inflict as much pain and disaster as possible. In addition, deterrence is also impacted by a series of other variables. That is, deterrence is undermined when specific assets are eliminated as potential targets.\(^{183}\) Indeed, an asymmetric response to U.S. military action has often been the hiding of munitions in mosques and the use of civilians as shields. Thus, the fact that those targets are off limits to U.S. forces reduces the deterrent. Furthermore, a series of variables impact the credibility of deterrence - deterrence is not credible if - (1) "defender's retaliatory capability was not credible," (2) deterrence involves a question of will, (3) credibility is undermined if the attacker believes the said attack will be successful, (4) "the attack was

\(^{182}\) Ibid, 4.  
\(^{183}\) Ibid.
irrational," (5) "the attack was not deterrable in the first place" in the form of attacks made merely to inflict casualties or motivated by revenge.¹⁸⁴

Clearly, asymmetric means by non-state actors minimizes and may even nullify the value of deterrence. A point by point examination alludes to the lack of utility in using deterrence versus non-state actors. First, the defender must possess the capability of retaliation. Such a capability previously was measured within the international system in terms of military and police strength and power. A current usage, however, is much more complex. A capability of retaliation often becomes difficult when the defender cannot clearly identify and locate the attacker. As argued, non-state actors thrive and exist in the fringes and “grey” areas of the international system. The option of an immediate counterstrike often does not pertain to deterrence of non-state actors. Thus, the capability of retaliation may be limited until the actor is located. Even then, retaliation must frequently be in conjunction or despite host states. Second, deterrence involves the question of “will.” That said, asymmetric non-state actors have a unique ability to wear down the will of governments and their constituents. Furthermore, the often radical ideology of violent non-state actors lends itself to an iron will not often encountered in pluralistic societies. Next, credibility of deterrence “is undermined if the attacker believes the said attack will be successful.”¹⁸⁵ The advantage of attacks by non-state actors is that, ultimately, many are ideologically based. In point of fact, strict ideologists believe in a macro-view and “larger picture” of ultimate ideological success. Thus, deterrence cannot be completely successful against ideological non-state actors. Finally, many of the attacks launched by violent non-state actors fit the very definition of “not deterrable” or

¹⁸⁴ Details of argument in Barnett, 4.
¹⁸⁵ Ibid., 4-6.
“irrational” by design. The frequent use of suicide bombings fairly illustrates such a concept. Hence, the asymmetric behavior of non-state actors often cannot be deterred.

Furthermore, an examination of deterrence also reveals that it "is wholly defensive."\(^\text{186}\) As a defensive measure deterrence must necessarily be specific. In fact, Barnett argues, "the nastier and less ambiguous the deterrent threat - backed up by requisite capability - presumably, the higher the level of deterrence."\(^\text{187}\) At the same time, policy makers must realize that deterrence should never be a policy objective. Surely a peaceful system may be an end objective. However, deterrence is merely a vehicle in order to achieve such an ends and not the ends itself. Barnett argues, conversely, that stability can really never be a policy objective. The system is in constant flux and a rigid status quo is not possible.\(^\text{188}\) In fact, Barnett defines stability as "a fool's quest" and the question facing policy makers are not if a system changes but how - violence or nonviolence - a system changes.\(^\text{189}\) In total, the operational definitions discussed are relevant in the much larger picture because "wars today can be irreversible in their consequence."\(^\text{190}\) With that in mind, the role of deterrence in such an international arena is of significant importance.

The United States is a clear example of a state vulnerable to "asymmetric strategies and tactics [which] undermine conventional and technological advantage."\(^\text{191}\) In short, the United States represents a power with superior military manpower facing threats from inferior powers - often in the form of a non-state actor. As a result, the

\(^{186}\) Ibid, 6.
\(^{187}\) Ibid, 7.
\(^{188}\) Ibid, 8.
\(^{189}\) Ibid.
\(^{190}\) Ibid, 12.
\(^{191}\) See Kolet.
future of warfare suggests that the U.S. will face asymmetric conflicts. In fact, the enemies of the U.S. are aimed at simultaneously reducing the power of the U.S. while increasing their own. In fact, the Defense Intelligence Agency defines the "emerging threat paradigm" as a “more complex [notion] than the bi-polar structure that the United States faced a decade ago; in this environment, the United States faces partners, competitors, adversaries, and renegades.”192 The asymmetric threats emanate from "economic volatility, the political and security implications of inequalities, and the growing threat from weapons of mass destruction …"the asymmetric approach of potential adversaries include the notion of the Western reluctance to take casualties and/or create collateral damage. In addition, asymmetric threats also recognize time, will, and the power of defense as potential vehicles of conflict.”193

As a global actor and hegemon with a significant profile, the United States is a target in all areas of the world. Yet, any attack on U.S. interests must also include a corresponding counterattack that will not be viewed as too “heavy handed.” Otherwise, the asymmetric threat wins the battle of public opinion and likely gains more political capital. At the same time, the asymmetric actor attempts to “affect the great power’s domestic cohesion, imposing a continual aggregation of costs on its adversaries.”194 That said, the costs envisioned are not merely limited to military assets and asymmetric attacks are bound by threats of mass casualties. As such, the strategic advantage of an “asymmetric attack designed to inflict both terror and unacceptable losses would be just

192 Ibid., 279.
193 Ibid.
as likely to target civilian targets at home as the military abroad.\textsuperscript{195} Furthermore, according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the threat of an asymmetric attack looms larger because globalization has led to “the ability of state and non-state actors to leap ahead and acquire means previously unattainable.”\textsuperscript{196} In addition, the asymmetric threat cannot be strictly limited to military targets. A comprehensive threat analysis of an asymmetric attack includes both means and ends.

Major Robert M. Cassidy also argues the likelihood of asymmetric warfare as "… the most probably form of conflict the United States may face."\textsuperscript{197} Cassidy argues four grand level reasons for the future of conflict tied to asymmetry - (1) Western powers stand unmatched in terms of military hardware, (2) The cultural and economic ties and globalization suggests Western states will not likely engage in warfare amongst themselves, (3) The Gulf War of 1991 showed the frustration with facing Western forces on the traditional battlefield and (4) The resulting analysis suggests that the "United States and its European allies will employ their firepower and technology in the less developed world against ostensibly inferior adversaries employing asymmetric approaches."\textsuperscript{198} According to Cassidy, the asymmetric approach suggests the bumper sticker mentality of "victory or death." Simply, the notion of losing is often not acceptable within the definition of asymmetric warfare.\textsuperscript{199}

A cursory examination of the attacks of September 11 frame the multiple outcomes of bin Laden’s attack with the domain of asymmetric warfare. In short, the 9/11 attack caused approximately $40 billion in economic damage in the area of the World

\textsuperscript{195} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{196} Kolet, 288.  
\textsuperscript{197} Cassidy, 42.  
\textsuperscript{198} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{199} Ibid.
Trade Center alone.\textsuperscript{200} Indirect results of the attack can be estimated as a net impact of $100 billion on the gross domestic product of the United States.\textsuperscript{201} In addition, the impact and “effects of a weak U.S. economy are quickly transmitted around the globe.”\textsuperscript{202} In addition, the attacks resulted in uncertainly that may have impacted the rate of domestic economic recovery.\textsuperscript{203} Ultimately, the attack essentially slowed the rates of global interaction and trade.\textsuperscript{204} In short, the attacks of 9/11 were deadly but also claimed multidimensions of asymmetric impact.

In many ways, the international geopolitical system has changed from the days of balance of power in the bi-polar Soviet - American relationship. Varied factors have led to the growth of non-state actors that behave much like a state actor in the power continuum. That said, the future of warfare lies in the asymmetric activities of the non-state actor. Indeed, the evolving arrangement of the international system calls for identifiable change in the methods used in power politics. Future warfare will consist of small scale operations in the form of “an increasing number of ‘brush fire’ wars, counter-insurgency campaigns, hostage rescue operations, ‘drug wars,’ and low intensity conflicts …” in addition to the “urban combat and ‘peacekeeping operations’” that have emerged as “the new paradigm of conflict … as more failed states emerge and peace enforcement and nation-building become staples of the senior military diet.”\textsuperscript{205} Instead, the future conflict will primarily be the engaging of non-state actors in an asymmetric theatre.


\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., 43.

\textsuperscript{202} Ibid., 44.

\textsuperscript{203} Ibid., 45.

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., 48-52.

\textsuperscript{205} See Cassidy.
Chapter 6

The Evolving Power of Non-State Actors: A Case Study of Political Islam

Throughout this effort, I have maintained that the changes in the international system and the evolving nature of the state have resulted in increased power for the non-state actor. In fact, the last chapter discussed the evolution of warfare within the international system and the increased role of non-state actors in the most significant of all state enterprises – the making of war. In this chapter, I will detail the emergence of al-Qaeda through its parent movement the Muslim Brotherhood. With this examination, I hope to show how the changes in the state and system had a significant impact on the Muslim Brotherhood and allowed a different development path for al-Qaeda than for the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result, an interesting historical case study of the Muslim Brotherhood and its transformation to an international actor in the ultimate form of al-Qaeda offers significant perspective into the emerging role of non-state actors. At the same time, the Muslim Brotherhood offers an examination of a contemporary problem in international security.

A great deal of insight into fourth generation warfare and its link with Maoist doctrine can be inferred from a discussion of the institutional growth of al-Qaeda. Bin Laden and Azzam, even in the founding of al-Qaeda, concentrated on the necessity of an Islamic rapid reaction force. Building on the successes of Afghan mujahadeen versus the Soviets, bin Laden and Azzam created the necessary framework to assist Muslims in Mao-like guerilla struggles globally. Ultimately, a schism between Azzam and bin Laden
left the future of the organization in the hands of bin Laden and his Egyptian proxy Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. The organizational development of religious schools, finance committees, and military committees harkened to Mao’s phases of insurgency. To wit, when faced with repression from Middle Eastern regimes, bin Laden recognized the value of attacking – both verbally and physically – the U.S. In a true fourth generation model, bin Laden exploited the political openings provided by repressive local regimes to allow a turning of bin Laden’s anger to the U.S. Bin Laden modified and manipulated the “diversionary war theory” in order to allow al-Qaeda to evolve.\textsuperscript{206} Finally, the presence of friendly nation-states as bases in the substance of Sudan and Afghanistan allowed for virtually unmolested growth.\textsuperscript{207}

In order to fully understand the attacks of September 11 and the role of al-Qaeda as a non-state actor, one must first analyze the movement's beginnings. Clearly, the historical record shows that the foundations of political Islam and the Brotherhood movement existed for a long time before widespread targeting of the United States and Western interests. The intervening variable, the sparks that lit the Islamic bomb, was the fall of the Soviet Union - and the change in the international system - as well as the rapid acceleration of globalization.

Many of the perceived injustices of the Islamic world are rooted in thousands of years of history. However, a key watershed in Islam was Kemal Ataturk's reign in

\textsuperscript{206} The “Diversionary War Theory” refers to the concept in international relations that governments may provoke a conflict with another state in order to shift attention from internal problems – poor resource distribution, economic problems, or the like – to the international conflict. Thus, the ruling government avoids negative publicity and may even gain in popularity.

modern Turkey that resulted in the secularization of the former Ottoman Empire. Since Ataturk, the movement of Political Islam has devoted much energy to the realization of a "new" caliphate - or new Islamic power. Such voices emerged in the 1920's as the foundations for the Muslim Brotherhood and a more broadly defined movement. In 1920, Maulana Maudoodi began to call for the emergence of a new caliphate centered in Afghanistan based upon the precepts of the Koran. Maudoodi argued that all Muslims in India should attend to the development of the Islamic caliphate.

By 1929, the early calls for an Islamic caliphate began to hit home with many Muslims. Hassan al-Banna created the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimoon) in Egypt. Al-Banna and six others pledged to work for Islam and launch jihad. Needless to say, the dream of the Muslim Brotherhood centered upon the reestablishment of an Islamic empire. Toward these ends, the West was considered an enemy of Islam and was the embodiment of a modern day crusader posing a serious threat to the Islamic way of life. Al-Banna contended the crusaders must be defeated and the mass Islamization of society was the appropriate strategy. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood worked extensively to educate the masses through a series of Brotherhood centers. In addition, the Brotherhood also acted as a sort of social safety net implementing programs of charity and welfare in Muslim communities. The strategy was to win the grassroots support of society before the launching of a jihad versus the crusaders.

Indeed, the message of the Muslim Brotherhood soon became ubiquitous in the Islamic society of Egypt.\textsuperscript{208} Within six years of the founding of the Brotherhood, some fifty branches were active in Egypt and within ten years more than two thousand

\textsuperscript{208} A pertinent discussion of Political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (and other states) can be found in Gilles Kepel, \textit{Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam} (Belknap Press: Cambridge, MA, 2003).
branches were active. In addition, branches of the Brotherhood were created in Syria, Sudan, Jordan, and other Islamic states worldwide. In fact, 1929 featured a rebellion of the Saudi Brotherhood which was defeated by 1930. By 1942, at the sixth Congress of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Banna called for the destruction of all political parties within Egypt so that the country could be ruled by Islamic law - *sharia*.

Clearly, the Brotherhood was growing both stronger and more aggressive. In 1945, the Brotherhood led xenophobic riots throughout Egypt. Anything foreign, but especially Western, was targeted. That same year, the Brotherhood began a policy of political assassinations of the enemies of Islam. Any politicians not sympathetic to the Brotherhood were marked for possible assassination. The Brotherhood also created a branch coined the "secret apparatus." Essentially, the "secret apparatus" was nothing more than a network of terrorist cells. They worked to buy weapons, train as fighters and assassins, and to infiltrate the Egyptian police and await the commencement of the jihad. Finally, threatened so much by the Brotherhood, Prime Minister Mahmud Nukrashi of Egypt would outlaw the Brotherhood in 1948. In 1949, Hassan al-Banna was assassinated and the Egyptian government was widely viewed as the culprit.

By the 1950's and 1960's the Muslim Brotherhood began to regroup and consolidate. The Brotherhood had become illegal in Egypt and was also not welcome in Syria and Iraq; so, many members fled to Saudi Arabia. The ideals of the Brotherhood quickly spread through the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Brotherhood members quickly blended into Saudi society and even began to fill important Kingdom positions. Soon, the Brotherhood members took up positions as imams, teachers, professors, and key posts
within the department of education. Within the ministry, the Brotherhood officials began to assume the role of selecting textbooks and programs of study.

In short order, the Brotherhood's radical forms of Islam became part of Saudi culture. The Wahhabi movement allied themselves with the Brotherhood members. In fact, the Brotherhood's involvement in Saudi education signaled a shift in the priorities of the Wahhabi movement. That is, until the arrival of the Brotherhood, the Wahhabi movement was less concerned with politics and more concerned with aesthetic appearances of devout morals and religious observations. The Wahhabis fought for strict interpretations of the Koran and for an implementation of Sharia within the context of staid and Puritanical beliefs. The Saudi government began using the vast proceeds of oil sales in order to facilitate the spread of Islam.

By 1951, Egypt had become very nervous with the state of government. In an effort to soothe political differences, the Muslim Brotherhood was no longer outlawed in terms of existence but was strictly permitted from becoming involved in political questions. Regional politics, however, would bear the heavy stamp of Brotherhood involvement in the 1950's. The "free officers" movement overthrew King Farouk of Egypt in 1952 with help from the Brotherhood. A host of regional events, however, revealed the long reach of the Brotherhood. In 1951 a former Prime Minister of Lebanon was assassinated in Amman, Jordan; King Abdullah of Jordan was assassinated in 1951; Islamic Liberation parties were founded - and outlawed - in Lebanon and Jordan; and, in 1954, the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nasser. Once again, Egypt outlawed the Brotherhood and Nasser overhauled the Egyptian Secret Service in an effort to eliminate any Brotherhood members.
After al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb emerged as the next voice of the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb's book, *Ma'alim Fi'l - Tareeq* (translated to "Signposts" or "Milestones") became a rallying point for many in the Brotherhood. Qutb argued for the imposition of a Muslim government and defined the steps necessary toward the implementation of such a plan. After spending time in the United States as a student, Qutb had arrived at the conclusion of a Muslim government as necessary, and he began to work closely with the Muslim Brotherhood. At that point, the Brotherhood aligned with the "free officers" movement evolving in Egypt - a movement that included Nasser and Sadat and advocated the overthrowing of the Egyptian monarchy. In fact, Sadat would refer to Qutb as "the ideologue" of the revolution. Qutb's participation would ultimately be minimized which would first create a rift between Qutb and Nasser and that would ultimately be resolved with the August 1966 assassination of Qutb.

In 1967, the Six Day War acted as a radicalizing factor in Arab opinion. The Saudi government began to provide funding for a host of political movements inside the kingdom - many of which were radical in nature and pushed for Political Islam. Interestingly, new non-state actors, financed by Saudi oil money, began to question the legitimacy of Saudi rule and of the Wahhabi bargain. The public opinion in Egypt, as well, was disappointed in the inability to defeat Israel. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood made clear advances in terms of public opinion throughout Egypt.

The 1970's brought further expansion of the Brotherhood. First, increased revenues in Saudi oil money gave the Brotherhood the necessary resources to expand. In addition, the disparity between the have's and have-not's allowed the Brotherhood to expand among poor and disaffected members of society. With the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979, wealthy Saudi financier Osama bin Laden began to emerge as a key actor in the international Brotherhood. Bin Laden arrived in Afghanistan and began recruiting Egyptians, Algerians, Lebanese, Kuwaitis, Turks, and Tunisians by, according to his own claims, the thousands. Bin Laden provided weapons and financial support. In addition, bin Laden would establish the Islamic National Front - a group of volunteers recruited to fight the Soviets and supported by U.S. funding. In the course of the war, over twenty five thousand Islamic guerillas from more than fifty nations would fight the Soviets. The war against the Soviets, through the prompting of the United States, would become Pan-Islam's first holy war in nearly 800 years. During the course of the war, the United States would provide $3 billion for the anti-Soviet jihad.

In addition, bin Laden quickly became a player in the war against the Soviets in an international sense. With his mentor, Sheikh Abdullah Assam, bin Laden worked for the Alkhifa movement. Within the context of an emerging international movement, the Alkhifa movement established offices in Brooklyn, New York - the Office of Services for the Mujahadeen - located at the Al-Farooq Mosque. The center also was responsible for shipping weapons to Hamas, providing forged identification documents, the counterfeiting of money, and also serving as a recruitment center for jihad in Bosnia, the Philippines, Egypt, Algeria, Kashmir, Palestine, and other areas of the world.

The international jihad movement, founded on the tenants of the Muslim Brotherhood, continued to be active in regional politics. In 1979, Juhayman al-Utaybi, a supporter of the Brotherhood, and two hundred followers seized Mecca - only to be defeated. Also, 1979 brought the Islamic Revolution in Iran. Although Shiite in nature, the revolution launched in Iran was partially based on the work of Muhammad Faraj
(Neglected Duty) and the argument that the Brotherhood was not active enough in jihad. Ironically, Neglected Duty served as an ideological underpinning for the views of Osama bin Laden - even to the point that much of the material found in the 1996 bin Laden call for jihad versus Saudi Arabia heavily borrowed from the work. In addition, Faraj would found the Egyptian Jihad based upon Neglected Duty. Ultimately, Imam Zawahari would be heavily influenced by Faraj's work and join Egyptian Jihad.

The 1980's would also bring a host of significant terror groups founded upon the ideals of Political Islam. The Jamaat ul-Fuqra, under the leadership of Pakistani Sheikh Mubarak Ali Gilani, emerged in Pakistan and the United States. Ul-Fuqra, ultimately, would boast a membership list that included American Clement Rodney Hampton-El, a participant in the World Trade Center attacks of 1993, who would be convicted for his part in a plot to destroy a series of New York landmarks. According to United States authorities, ul-Fuqra would be credited with seventeen homicides and thirteen fire bombings in the United States. Qibla emerged, under the leadership of Achmad Cassiem, devoted to the establishment of an Islamic state in South Africa. Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya, of Somalia, emerged as an Islamic movement. Syria destroyed the town of Hama, killing five to ten thousand, in an effort to control the Syrian Brotherhood. Egyptian Jihad assassinated Anwar Sadat in 1981 and major attacks sponsored by Iran under the auspices of Hezbollah were launched toward the United States. Finally, Osama bin Laden and Abdallah Azzam, a member of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, founded Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK) in order to funnel fighters and funds to Afghanistan through Peshawar, Pakistan. Analyst Steven Emerson suggested Azzam was the first to call for the so-called global jihad. As a result, a non-state actor with a transnational scope emerged.
In late 1987, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin founded HAMAS as a branch of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. HAMAS's formula was one devoted to the destruction of Israel and the creation of an Islamic fundamentalist government under the rule of sharia. HAMAS constructed a foundation of radicalism that had been maintained by the Muslim Brotherhood for six decades. In addition, the Islamic Congress had run the Brotherhood's social and educational institutions out of local mosques. Yassin, as leader of the Islamic Congress, quickly transferred the social network to HAMAS.

Yet another watershed in the International Muslim Brotherhood movement was the 1989 military coup in Sudan. As a result, the National Islamic Front, under the control of Dr. Hasan al-Turabi came to power. Turabi had been leader of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood movement as early as the 1960's. Turabi's vision was one of extending Islam to restore the former Caliphate. The Sudanese Brotherhood enacted a carefully planned strategy in order to take the reigns of Sudan's government. The Sudanese Brotherhood recruited from the educated classes and, at the same time, appealed to democratic ideals. As the lower rungs of society became more and more economically disenfranchised, Turabi worked to construct a social safety network founded upon the ideals of Islam. And, to help finance the expansion, Turabi developed an Islamic banking system. Political Islam - in Sudan - was constructed on well-considered economic, political, and social platforms. The masses began to view the Brotherhood as guardians of the values of antiquity and the gatekeepers to the future. The movement quickly mushroomed. In addition, the movement grew both vertically through social classes and horizontally through societies. Several factors allowed for both horizontal and vertical growth of Political Islam and the Brotherhood. These factors
included the changes in both the international system and characteristics of the state previously discussed in this effort.

Once in control of the leadership roles of government in Sudan, Turabi claimed a virtual monopoly - he controlled society from the position of leadership elite as well as from the grassroots with his Islamic charity network. Soon, however, Dr. Turabi discovered a kindred soul, of sorts, in Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden filled both the role of funding and providing a revered figurehead credited with the successful triumph over the "godless" Soviets. Certainly, bin Laden portrayed a man blessed by Allah. And, ironically enough, bin Laden possessed a battle tested and ready-trained military force. Recognizing the need to engage in force as a "means," Turabi and President Bashir excitedly welcomed bin Laden and his organization. Bin Laden's rhetoric, as well, was of a unified Islamic movement to purge the corrupt dictators of the Islamic world and return to the caliphate. Bin Laden, conversely, saw Sudan as the perfect place and opportunity to expand his own organization. The numbers of disenchanted increased polarization of the classes continued. Political Islam, however, intensified the legitimacy of the movement by appealing to the grinding Palestinian issue.

The relation between terrorism and state failure is a particularly important dimension of the current global security environment. Bin Laden’s use of Sudan as a base for militant Islam allowed for the necessary space and freedom to grow organizationally and provides an excellent illustration of the impact of a failed or failing states in a far away region on the rest of the world. Although not a failed state at the time, Sudan certainly fit many of the definitions for a failing state. Thus, bin Laden’s organization was able to expand in terms of scope and operations. Indeed, without Sudan as a base of
operations, bin Laden’s Afghani mujahadeen would have extended all over the Arab world – and made a less concentrated threat – “… over time, their [Afghani mujahadeen] strength would have waned and they would have had difficulty communicating and coordinating their efforts … without Sudan, bin Laden could have not incubated the networks that have caused such devastation.”

In 1991, bin Laden had arrived in Sudan, a group trained by Sudan launched the first attacks in a renewed Algerian conflict, and fighters were trained for use in Kashmir. Dr. Hassan al-Turabi – a Sudanese adherent of the militant Islamic movement, bin Laden, and Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri all constructed close relationships. Eventually, al-Zawahiri would manage the international finances of bin Laden and Turabi as they engaged in a series of terrorist attacks. In 1994 alone, Bin Laden trained 5000 mujahadeen in Sudan’s terror training camps. And, at the same time, bin Laden worked for organizational legitimacy by providing financial help and assistance in rebuilding Sudanese infrastructure: a highway from Khartoum to Port Sudan; a repaving of a 500 km highway from Sudan to Shendi and Atbara; construction on the Rusayris hydroelectric dam; a million dollar capitalization effort for the Shamali Bank; a 1993 loan of $8 million to finance imports; $1 million in contributions to the Pan Arab Islamic Conference (PAIC); a $2 million expense in resettling Afghan mujahadeen from Pakistan to Sudan, and the construction (“at his own expense”) of 23 terrorist camps.

The terror partnership of Turabi and bin Laden produced a litany of attacks. Agents were trained to assassinate Qaddafi; HAMAS operatives were trained that began – as early as 1995 – suicide bombings in Israel; Egyptian militants used Sudan as a base of operations to attack the Mubarak regime; the Sudanese counsel in Beirut was involved

with the assassination of a Lebanese politician as well as an attempted bombing of the
Egyptian embassy. The list also includes a 1993 attempted attack on U.S. troops in
Yemen en route to Somalia. The Sudanese government supplied weapons to Somali
warlord General Muhammad Aidid and bin Laden provided reinforcements with the
movement of 3,000 mujahadeen to assist Aidid – at a cost of $3 million. The PAIC,
through Turabi and bin Laden, agreed, in 1993, to supply fighters to Bosnia. In 1996, the
PAIC authorized a plan to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and at least five
attempts were made to fulfill the obligation. Mujahadeen were sent to fight in Chechnya
and Tajikistan while al-Qaeda operatives in Sudan trained members of the Filipino Moro
Front and a jihad office was opened in Baku, Azerbaijan.\textsuperscript{210} Only in 1996 did
cooperation between bin Laden and Sudan begin to wane. Bin Laden moved to
Afghanistan, the policy of a Sudanese “open door” immigration policy for all Arabs
ended, and Egyptian militants were ordered out of the country. Bin Laden’s network,
however, had grown to a point of self-sufficiency and stood primed to utilize its next host
state – Afghanistan.

Not only did bin Laden construct a network of terror, he also created the
necessary organizations to finance his efforts.\textsuperscript{211} In fact, bin Laden acquired a significant
business empire while in Sudan. Bin Laden organized an international trading company;
owned – with the government of Sudan – a construction company; held title to the Al-
Themar Agricultural Company, which employed 4,000 and harvested a one million acre
farm; gained exclusive monopoly over major Sudanese exports that included gum arabic,
corn, sunflower, and sesame; claimed a fruit and vegetable concern called Blessed Fruits,

\textsuperscript{210} See Peter Bergen. \textit{Holy War, Inc.} (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002).
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid.
Inc.; sold sweets and honeys through his Al-Ikhals enterprise; owned a trucking company named Al-Qudrut; and, also, owned both a leather tannery and furniture making company. Finally, bin Laden provided the $50 million funding for the Al-Shamad Islamic Bank.

In addition to the economic consolidation of the bin Laden network, Sudan also allowed for a political consolidation of al-Qaeda.\textsuperscript{212} Turabi organized the Islamic People’s Congress in 1995 and it was at this meeting that Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda aligned with Imad Mugniyeh and Hezbollah. As a result, the historic disagreement of Sunni versus Shiite Islam took a back seat to the more international struggle against Israel and the United States. Iran began to ship explosives to al-Qaeda and bin Laden’s “terrorist corporation” formed links with Egypt’s Islamic Group, Egyptian Jihad, the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria, the Libyan Fighting Group, the Yemeni Saif Islamic Jannubi, and the Syrian Jamaat e-Jihal al-Suri. Hassan al-Turabi and Osama bin Laden held many of the same beliefs at a time when Sudan was perilously close to being a failed state. President Bashir was ultimately forced to reign in both Turabi, who currently is in prison, and bin Laden, who moved his entourage to Afghanistan.

At the time of consolidation within the Mid-Eastern al-Qaeda organization, the Southeast Asian branches of al-Qaeda were busy as well. Al-Qaeda also began its expansion and conglomeration in Southeast Asia in 1991. A familiar pattern rang true. That is, al-Qaeda made an effort in “… co-opting individuals and groups, establishing independent cells, and finding cause with local militias.”\textsuperscript{213} In fact, the more localized Islamic movements of Aceh, Thailand, and Myanmar had very little interest in the

\textsuperscript{212} Ibid.
creation of an international movement. Al-Qaeda, however, utilized common historical
links and the Afghan experience as a shared identity.\(^{214}\) In the end, al-Qaeda took
advantage of the "economic dispossession", "failure of secular education", and "lack of
political freedom" in order to create a cadre of willing volunteers within the madrasah
system. Furthermore, the state of Southeast Asia fit the necessary prerequisites for al-
Qaeda organizational growth.\(^{215}\) That is, Southeast Asia were filled with "countries of
convenience" noted for the ability to obtain visas easily, "lax financial oversights,
"porous borders", "weak central government control", "endemic government corruption",
and "a vast supply of illicit arms."\(^{216}\) Notably, within Southeast Asia, "Every state, with
the exception of Laos and Brunei, produces small arms and ammunition. They are also
home to several leading arms brokers, who exploit legal loopholes in the sale of weapons
from legal sources (government owned or contracted firms)."\(^{217}\) In addition, the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Financial Task Force
characterizes the state of Thailand, Myanmar, and the Philippines all as "money
laundering states."\(^{218}\)

Ultimately, the al-Qaeda organizational plan was quite simple within the
Southeast Asian states. To wit, the al-Qaeda organizational strategy showed "in addition
to establishing independent cells, al-Qaeda was brilliant in its co-optation of other groups,
those with a narrow domestic agenda and in bringing them into al-Qaeda's structure."\(^{219}\)

Ironically, al-Qaeda utilized the madrasah system - mainly in Pakistan- in order to

\(^{214}\) Ibid.
\(^{215}\) Ibid.
\(^{216}\) Abuza, 429.
\(^{217}\) Abuza, 434.
\(^{218}\) Ibid.
\(^{219}\) Abuza, 431.
indoctrinate recruits, return them to their own country, and set up local madrasah to serve as recruiting centers.\textsuperscript{220} The system allowed the \textit{jihadist} ideology to quickly spread through Southeast Asia.

Al-Qaeda hierarchy remained on site and also worked to supplement the madrasah system. In fact, bin Laden's brother in law - Mohammed Jammal Khalifa - created the Islamic International Relief Organization (IIRO) in 1991 in order to serve Islamic dogma in the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Taiwan.\textsuperscript{221} Al-Qaeda operative Wali Khan made trips to the Philippines, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Thailand and senior al-Qaeda leader Omar al-Faruq worked to "establish links with Muslim militants in Thailand and Myanmar."\textsuperscript{222} A cursory look at a handful of al-Qaeda tied Southeast Asian organizations attests to the organization expertise of al-Qaeda.

The organizational structure of al-Qaeda that has widely been written about in regions of the Middle East and Central Asia is evident in a glance of its structure in Southeast Asia. Once again, the key variables that have allowed al-Qaeda influenced groups to become non-state actors in Southeast Asia appear to be much the same as in other parts of the world – globalization and the inability of the state to provide goods and services and maintain a monopoly over power.

The most commonly cited extension of al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia is Jemaah Islamiya (JI). JI’s goal is to create an Islamic state that includes Indonesia, Malaysia, parts of the Philippines, and southern Thailand. The JI is alleged to have carried out the October 2002 bombing in Bali and the August 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott hotel. Indeed, it is the freedom of movement inherent to Southeast Asia that allowed JI to

\textsuperscript{220} Abuza, 432.
\textsuperscript{221} Abuza, 436.
\textsuperscript{222} Abuza, 442-445.
operate in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and others. Key personnel in JI have been linked to bin Laden and include Hambali and Abu Bakar Bashir.

Yet, the story of JI is even more international in scope. In a study of Southeast Asian terrorism for the Monterey Institute for International Studies, Captain Wayne Turnbull developed a working list of many *jihadi* movements in the region. Significantly, all feature similar connections with al-Qaeda or JI and have been able to expand due to the changing international system and the freedom of movement associated with those changes. For example, the Arakan Rohingya National Organization is a group of Burmese living in Bangladesh that is committed to independence of the Arakan region of Myanmar. Other notable militant groups relating to Myanmar include the Ommat Liberation Front, Kawthoolei Muslim Liberation Front, and the Muslim Organization of Burma. Group 272 encompasses the 272 survivors from Indonesia that fought in Afghanistan. The Guragan Mujahidin Pattani is a Thai Muslim extremist group. A number of Indonesian groups were founded by or based upon the teachings of Abu Bakar Bashir – the Kumpulan Militan Malaysia, Laskar Jihad, Laskar Mujahidin, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, and Rabbatul Mujahidin. In the Philippines, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf group have been quite active. All share common cause with al-Qaeda’s vision.

Again, the discussion with regard to Southeast Asian elements of Al-Qaeda influenced groups is, admittedly, limited. The utility of such a discussion is in how the growth of these organizations has mirrored al-Qaeda in that it has been international in

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scope and taken advantage of opportunities and openings in the international system inherent to globalization. In fact, Barry Desker laments the lack of cooperation among state members of ASEAN and argues that radical Islam emerged during the expansion of ASEAN to include all ten states in Southeast Asia, the fall of Suharto in Indonesia, the financial crisis of the 1990s, and the advent of borders that are more open. In other words, the realities of the international system and the legitimacy issues of individual states were significant factors in the coming of age of radical Islam in Southeast Asia.

**Muslim Brotherhood Meets Al-Qaeda**

The preceding discussion has dealt with how the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Qaeda both utilized a particular ideology, one of Pan-Islam, in order to build certain levels of support. In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, however, one sees a limited expansion—organizational growth constrained by the state. In the discussion of the Brotherhood, the state intervenes and reduces the organization’s freedom to expand when the sovereignty of the state of Egypt - or other state like examples such as the Hama uprising in Syria or Jordan in its war against the Brotherhood – is sufficiently threatened. The state acted as a barrier to the evolution of an international Muslim Brotherhood movement and the Brotherhood stayed relatively local and confined. The power of the Brotherhood would vacillate based upon the state of relations with the central government.

That said, the same ideology and belief system of the Muslim Brotherhood are part of a contemporary global reality in the form of al-Qaeda. The al-Qaeda organization was able to internationalize the belief systems of the Brotherhood. In a study of al-Qaeda one can see many of the same key personnel and a continuity of ideas from the

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Brotherhood. Political scientists are left with the question of how the beliefs and organization of the Brotherhood evolved into an international non-state actor – al-Qaeda. Ultimately, the weakening of states and the ability for a non-state actor to exploit the global setting allowed the mostly territorially constrained elements of the Muslim Brotherhood to morph into the international and modern threat of al-Qaeda. A short discussion of leaders and belief systems of al-Qaeda and their sources helps illustrate the link between the two groups and, hence, shows how a local non-state actor became international in scope.

The key personnel that would transition the Muslim Brotherhood into al-Qaeda were active in Egypt as early as the 1960s. An Egyptian crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in the mid-1960s brought the execution of a key intellectual in the movement, Sayyid Qutb. After the repression of the mid-1960s, many lost faith in the Brotherhood. A “new generation” of activists, however, began to emerge. Key among the “new generation” was Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman. Rahman spoke on the necessity of creating an Islamic society even if by force. Eventually, Rahman developed contacts with an underground Egyptian organization called Gama’a Islamiyya. Rahman became the religious confirmation needed for Gama’a to carry out plots against the Egyptian government.

In a background of increased unrest, on October 6, 1981, members of the jihadi movement in Egypt assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. In the crackdown that followed, members of Gama’a and other jihadi organizations were summarily jailed. One such repressed organization was believed to be behind the assassination – the Islamic

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226 Ibid, 52.
Jihad. Islamic Jihad was the brainchild of Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Zawahiri spoke of the need for violent jihad in order to replace the corrupt government in Egypt. Zawahiri, however, was committed to local manifestations of Islamic rule.

The narrative continues in the early 1980s. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan resulted in the “great cause” for *jihadis* in the defeat of the atheist Soviet Union. The Palestinian question also continued as an issue for many in the Middle East. Revolutionary and militant groups of all sorts emerged. Yet, these groups were different from those in the past in the way they conducted themselves - “the operation of this growing secret world was everywhere facilitated by the trends and technology of globalization: inexpensive air flight, instant communications, migrant labor, the uniformity of popular culture.”

The so-called Egyptian *jihadi*, including Zawahiri, realized that more freedom of movement for the organization could be found elsewhere and began to move to friendlier environs like Afghanistan and Pakistan and, later, Sudan. What resulted was the development of an international and global underground movement. The forces of globalization, the inability of the Soviet Union to defeat the mujahadeen, and the emergence of a universal cause all contributed to the development of a truly global movement. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, Abdullah Azzam – who met and shared a similar world vision as Sheikh Rahman – became a significant leader in the mujahadeen struggle. Azzam was able to make the movement even more global in nature – he pushed his contacts in Palestine, Lebanon, Chad, Eritrea, Somalia, Burma, the Philippines, Yemen and elsewhere to join the cause in Afghanistan.

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227 Ibid, 75.
228 Ibid, 84-85.
In the meantime, Rahman traveled to Pakistan in order to experience the jihad. It is on that trip that Rahman and bin Laden met. Zawahiri also fled to Pakistan – in his case to build an Islamic Jihad in exile. Whereas Rahman and Zawahiri were focused on the specific issue of Egypt, Osama bin Laden looked at the jihadi struggle in a much broader worldview. In 1987, bin Laden toured the Gulf States raising money for his organization and in 1987 formally announced the creation of al-Qaeda. As a result, members of the jihadi movement began to shift their challenge from the corrupt Arab world to “the global system established by infidel power.” Ultimately, according to J. Boyer Bell, “globalization had encouraged global terror at the very time that the jihad, for ideological and practical reasons, had embarked on a global holy war.” And, the forces of jihad began to spread all over the world.

A study of al-Qaeda and its development as a non-state actor with a global reach must necessarily include a discussion of the Muslim Brotherhood. The ideas are similar, the strategies are related, and many of the key personnel are the same. Rahman and Zawahiri both played important roles in the development of Egyptian jihadi groups – which come from the Muslim Brotherhood. But also, the two are significant players in the bin Laden story. Indeed, quite a few variables all seemed to contribute to the transition of a, more or less local Muslim Brotherhood that was constrained by state boundaries, to a global movement in al-Qaeda. Many of the variables can be explicitly linked to changes in the international system. To be sure, the forces of globalization and the “shrinking of the world” is a significant factor. But also, the reduced power of the state – the reduced ability for a state to maintain a monopoly on power within its own

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229 Ibid, 86-87.
230 Ibid, 92.
231 Ibid, 192.
territory – allows al-Qaeda to operate virtually unmolested in many areas of the world. In addition, the continued failure of many states to provide goods and services for its population allows al-Qaeda the opening to sell its ideology to those willing to listen.
Chapter Seven

Implications on the Study of Terrorism

The previous chapters have attempted to show the changing nature and characteristics of both the international system and the state. The discussion, in chapter two, of the evolving international system offered a discussion of how the international system is socially constructed and how those constructs may change. Conversely, chapter three was an attempt to illustrate the role of the state and how it has changed over time. Toward that end, chapter four speaks to how the failed state has emerged as an important by-product of the variables that led to the alteration of the state’s roles. Both the state and system act as dependent and independent variables and interact in such a way that non-state actors have assumed more power. Chapter five attempted to illustrate that warfare, like the state and the international system, are social constructs. Finally, chapter six uses a case study of the Muslim Brotherhood and its contemporary relative, al-Qaeda, in order to generally apply the conclusions and hypotheses with regard to the international system and the state.

What follows is a discussion of how these changes at the state and system level can be applied to the study of terrorism. As alluded to in the previous chapters, the emerging power of the non-state actor offers evidence of the need for changes in the research agenda regarding the study of terrorism. A primary contemporary subset of the
non-state actor is the emerging violent non-state actors in the form of global terrorist
groups. Terrorists, among their many abilities, often co-opt indigenous violent political
movements in order to achieve certain ends. So, the terrorist actor uses the weakness of
the state and the changing nature of the international system in order to emerge as a
player in international politics in the form of a transnational actor. On point, Ataman
argues the two level model of international relations advanced by Putnam needs to be
altered in order to account for the role of transnational actors. Furthermore, Ataman
points out the problematic approach of studying transnational movements as one lacking
research "connecting transnational factors to either domestic or international settings." 232
Hence, the transnational movement in the form of a non-state actor operates within the
“grey” and undefined areas of the international system. Moreover, globalization has acted
as a key variable in the creation of transnational entities in the form of non-state actors as
well as elevating their importance in the international system. As a result, Ataman
suggests that the new international political exigency is one of three levels - national,
transnational, and international. For example, the indigenous Mexican Zapatista
movement survived many years in Mexico but only flourished with the information age
and globalization. Once faced with the advances of the communication age inherent to
globalization, the Zapatistas constructed a more powerful and influential movement. At
that point, the Zapatistas were able to advance their ideology in the international system.
Clearly, the attacks of September 11 provide ample illustration of a transnational and
non-state actor influencing not only world politics but also the internal politics of the
world's unchallenged hegemonic leader. 233 The attacks of nineteen individuals of a

232 Please see Muhittin Ataman.
233 Ibid.
transnational actor claiming allegiance to a non-state actor upon the United States set the
tone for an entire hegemon's foreign policy and strategic vision.

The transnational organization’s growth significantly benefits from a pattern of
self-sufficiency. Clearly, "the more transnational actors command power resources
(material resources) and the more they are institutionalized, the greater impact they have
on state preferences and policies." In fact, many point to the notion that some
transnational actors have greater resources than some state actors. Certainly, many
multinational corporations possess assets and income far superior to a number of states.
In addition, many NGO's enjoy political capital exceeding states. Indeed, the notion of
the all-powerful state first needs examination in through the lenses of the globalized
system of political, economic, and social realities. The evolving system clearly places the
non-state actor as a force in the international system. Ataman provides an outstanding
example of the impact of transnational movements upon the international political system
in examining the rivalry of Shiite Muslims versus Sunni Muslims. In 1979, the emerging
threat posed by Shiite Muslims were balanced by many states, including Turkey, the Gulf
States, and with, at the very minimum, an acquiescence on behalf of the United States,
through the use of Sunni Muslim doctrine as a transnational ideology. Interestingly
enough, the ideological threat posed by Shiite Muslims were balanced and countered with
another ideology – Sunni Islam. Thus, an ideology from an international movement was
countered by another ideology of a transnational movement and not merely by the actions
of state actors.

234 Ibid.
235 Ibid.
Non-state actors, do, indeed, play a significant role in international politics and theories toward that end should include an accounting for units besides the state. In addition, such a model is helpful in both predicting future behavior as well as enhancing security through the development and implementation of a security strategy aimed at the deterrence of the threats posed by violent non-state actors (VNSA). William Casebeer and Troy Thomas offered a systemic approach at the 2002 conference of the United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies. In their effort, Casebeer and Thomas operationalize the system of violent non-state actors as one "founded in an organic systems perspective, which looks at VSNA's as a dynamic biological system operating within an open environment." The sources of violent behavior of non-state actors are defined as a "subsystem." The violent non-state actors operate politically at levels below the state level. Specifically, the characteristics of state and institutionalized forms of state power are not inherent to the non-state actor. Furthermore, that is the point. The non-state actor need not develop identical functions and responsibilities of a state but only those necessary to exploit latent forms of political capital.

Casebeer and Thomas suggest that certain elements of the state dynamic are absent from the construction of violent non-state actors. Of significant note, the non-state actor and system fails in any effort to overcome the "non-rational dimensions of organizational behavior." In addition, however, to the formal structure, a more informal system also exists - "which deviates from the well-defined roles imposed by the rational

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Thus, the non-state actor, in essence, resembles the archetypal structure of terrorist organizations as advanced from Louis Beam to Carlos Marighella. The VNSA, according to their premise, should be examined in an "open system." Thus, Casebeer and Thomas advocate an organic and biological study of VNSA. The conclusions offered by Casebeer and Thomas are not significantly different from the conclusions in this paper. The use of an “open system” is very nearly the same as the initial discussion of the felt on the billiard table allowing for the “space” necessary for the non-state actor to flourish. The argument that the rational structure of the international system and state do not apply to the VNSA illustrates the point that the non-state actor and the VNSA are not constrained by either system.

The open-system analysis of Casebeer and Thomas can be seen with a case study of Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (AKA Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaries di Colombia) The organic process of violent behavior is described in terms of a cyclical model - (1) FARC imports "some form of energy from the environment" in the guise of recruits, weapons, tactical training, and the booty from criminal activities, (2) FARC then takes the environmental input and molds a guerilla fighter, (3) the FARC guerilla is then taken to Colombia to be used in insurgent activities, (4) "this pattern of activity is cyclic; the attacks generate new inputs - recruits, resources, government responses, etc." As a result, the "VNSA seeks negative entropy." In short, the VNSA wants to "import more energy than it expends."\(^{238}\)

Working from the assumptions or organic science, Casebeer and Thomas offered the examination of the life cycle of a VNSA. The gestation, or beginning of life, is the

\(^{237}\) Ibid.

\(^{238}\) Ibid.
mere "conception of an idea for collective violent action." The act of gestation then "occurs at the intersection of the roots of violence and state failure…" At that point, "identity entrepreneurs" (defined as anyone who "can exploit existing ethnic, racial, economic, or social - political differences by elevating someone who shares the same characteristics as the exploited class to a position of prestige or power") determine the viability of such a movement. Inherent to the actor, however, is the lack of "recruits, training, programs, facilities, or sustainable resources." That is, the VNSA must obtain necessary bodies to fill the ranks and the necessary stage on which to train recruits. The variables at the gestation period are the same that have been discussed throughout this paper as key changes in the international system and the state – specifically, state failure and how individuals perceive their position in the international system.

Next, the organization shifts to the growth phase. Within this phase, the ideological underpinnings of the movement begin to take shape. The organization, thus, is created and begins to assume behavior characteristic of organizations. At this point, deterrence may become a security option because the "VNSA remains heavily focused on recruitment, developing resources, and establishing an organizational model (hierarchical, network, cells, etc.) to eventually conduct a sustained campaign of violent action." Thus, security and political analysts must recognize the emergence of VNSA before they have created a hierarchy and organizational model - of some sort - replete with necessary foot soldiers to engage in violent political activities. That said, the structure of the globalized international system and weakened effectiveness of the state, often, allow for the VNSA to successfully complete the growth phase.

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239 Ibid.
240 Ibid.
The VNSA also benefits from multi-dimensional growth - growth at the state and system levels – while appealing to a number of perspectives on how individuals see themselves in the international system. Applications from other social and scientific fields attest to the tremendous impact of what can best be termed a multifaceted motivation of violent non-state actors. Serge Galam and Alain Mauger used the laws of physics in order to both explain and offer solutions in order to reduce the global terror threat.\footnote{Serge Galam and Mauger, Alain. “On Reducing Terrorism power: A Hint from Physics.” \textit{Physica A} 323 (2003): 695-704.} The Galam - Mauger thesis argues that classification of terror level - e.g. global versus local - is best determined in the examination of dimensions. To offer clarification, a Dayton, Ohio organization may be focused on ending medical testing on mice at an area University. The organization exists on a one - dimensional scale. If, however, the organization is devoted to saving laboratory animals from testing and also is against the serving of meat products in the cafeteria then a second dimension has been added to the movement. Perhaps the organization's stand is based upon religious beliefs - a third dimension has been added. An accurate analysis of the political movement is required in order to determine the dimensional nature of the movement. Then, according to Galam and Mauger, a "percolation threshold" exists at which point beliefs lead to the co-opting of "passive support." As a result, the dimension of an organization indirectly relates to the percolation threshold. That is, the larger the dimension then the lower the percolation threshold. The use of the physics of disorder is applied in order to suggest solutions in the war on terror.\footnote{Ibid.}

Galem and Mauger used the concepts of physics in order to present a solution in reducing the global terror movements. Using models from physics, Galam and Mauger
argue that the density of terrorism is very difficult to alter - "...even a few percent reduction of the world passive supporter density would require neutralizing millions of people, either physically or ideologically, making both options [unethical] and totally unpractical within reasonable action." Thus, an effort must be made in order to reduce the density of "passive support" for terrorism. As such, the "percolation threshold" moves higher. As a result, the best method for attacking the foundations of terrorism can be found in applying the concepts of classical mechanics. That is, a solution in reducing terrorism can be formed in addressing the concepts of space. In order to reduce the support for terrorists one must reduce the number of passive supporters found in the dimensions of the movement. In formula terms, Galam and Mauger concluded that where the value $Q$ is equal to the number of dimensions of a terror organization (e.g. ethnic, religious, geographic) and $D$ is equal to space then an increase of one dimension yields a two fold space increase, $Q=2D$. Thus, the success and "novelty of the current long-range terrorism has been its ability to generate several additional dimensions to its representative space. Among others, it embeds a religious dimension, a social dimension, a historical dimension, and a world bi-polarization dimension." In short, the effective counter then becomes a reduction in the number of dimensions. Indeed, such an effort is not military but, instead, the focus of economic, political, and social vehicles. Using the premise of Galam and Mauger, successful strategies in dealing with terrorism would necessarily reduce the operating space within the international system, address the weakened state, and deal with the perception individuals have about their position in the international system.

$^{243}$ Ibid.
$^{244}$ Ibid.
To further the explanation of how non-state actors exploit the multi-dimensional links of non-state actors, Thomas Land observed the apparent links between al-Qaeda and international criminal organizations. Land contends that al-Qaeda operates in conjunction with the Russian Mafia - especially in the newly independent states of Central Asia. As a point in fact, Land argues that it is not coincidental that "the conflict area that embraces the Caucuses and into Moldova and follows the traditional heroin smuggling route across Turkey to the Balkans." Land believes it points to the link between al-Qaeda and simple criminal elements. Also, Land points to a recent Russian report that Russian intelligence was able to "penetrate" a "diverse group of Islamic terrorist organizations held recently at the town of Travnik in Bosnia." Furthermore, according to Land, "...the conference forged a united front endorsing the deployment of any means and collaboration with any potential ally in pursuit of jihad." Vladimir Orlov, connected with the Centre for Policy Studies in Moscow, recently revealed an attempt by "foreign interests" in order to obtain weapons of mass destruction from elements of the Russian Mafia. Such a note is of great concern because of al-Qaeda's documented desire to obtain such weapons. Indeed, many documented instances of the seizure of radioactive materials exist in both Turkmenistan as well as Uzbekistan. Such reports draw concern when added to a Stanford University Institute for International Studies report that claims "88 pounds of weapons grade uranium and plutonium has been stolen so far from poorly guarded nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union alone." Furthermore, the case of

246 Ibid.
247 Ibid.
the former Soviet Union - according to the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center -
augments concern by claiming that "20 tons of `surplus` plutonium" and "500 tons of
surplus highly enriched uranium…" have simply vanished.249 Land cites other reports
that show that "Moldova is worried by Russian intelligence reports that high-level
representatives of al-Qaeda and Hamas as well as Iran and Chechnya have recently
passed through that country to establish operational bases there."250 Once again, a "weak
state" plays a significant role in the manufacturing of hard power by non-state actors.
Indeed, the ubiquitous interest by al-Qaeda in acquiring WMD is a significant red flag
when given the behavioral model and lack of systemic constraints with regard to non-
state actors in the geopolitical environment many politicians still view through the lenses
of realism. But also, the WMD example illustrates the issue of non-state actors as a multi-
dimensional organization.

Land's argument is bolstered by Roos who also cites examples of terror
organizations linking with criminal groups. Roos believes that the fall of the Soviet
Union, in fact, led to enhanced cooperation between terror groups and entities primarily
dedicated to criminal enterprises. As a result, the cooperation has created truly
transnational organizations in both scope and impact - "because narcotraffickers and
terrorist organizations often work hand-in-hand, their span of influence is truly
international. Together they have become the most powerful force in the criminal
world."251 Roos also points to the use of criminal groups as a source of terrorist financing
citing that "…drug money flowing to and from the Middle East and Eastern Europe is

249 Ibid.
250 See Land.
251 John G. Roos, “The Enemy Next Door: Good Reasons to Hammer South America’s Drug Cartels.”
Armed Forces Journal International 137 (March 2000).
now believed to fund organizations ranging from Hezbollah affiliates to the Kosovo Liberation Army.\textsuperscript{252} In essence, political entrepreneurs take advantage of political, economic, social, and ideological vacuums. Criminal activity is part and parcel of a larger universe of exploitable political opportunity.

The ideas of the post-Cold War international system, the behavior of non-state actors, terrorism, and state capacity and failure all diverge into a grand level theory that can be used in order to predict system-wide outcomes. The old paradigm of deterrence is dangerously anarchistic in the determination of security policy. Instead, state actors are faced with the problem of "denial." That is, the state actors must "deny" non-state actors the dimensions and space in order to operate within the international system. Otherwise, domestic policy inputs and localized conflicts run the risk of emerging in a transnational scope - especially those ideologically based. Contemporary history is one replete with struggles of ideology - World War I was based upon a nationalistic ideology, World War II featured the struggles of fascist ideology, and the Cold War was part of the struggle of communist and socialist ideology. Yet, common to the historical ideological confrontations was the behavior and motivation at the hands of state actors. Today, the system of ideological confrontations more prominently features non-state actors and terrorist groups.

M.G. Marshall compiled a helpful database in order to study the roots of terror actors. Marshall created a summary of "Actor Nationalities in Reported Terror

\textsuperscript{252} Please see Roos. In addition, a relevant discussion can also be found in Rachel Ehrenfeld, \textit{Funding Evil} (Chicago: Bonus Books, 2003).
Incidents.” Marshall coded the actor nationalities of all terror actors from 1991 to 2001 on a five point scale:

**Table 7 - Marshall’s Global Terror Base - Coding**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Greater than 1000 deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Greater than 200 but less than or equal to 1000 deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Greater than 100 but less than or equal to 200 deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Greater than 20 but less than or equal to 100 deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Greater than 0 but less than 20 deaths</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>No deaths</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Marshall’s coding allows for a breakdown and examination of terror incidents through a state analysis of the home of originating terrorists. From this information, it is possible to draw conclusions and make predictions with regard to the variables associated with states that produce terrorists.

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253 Found in Monty G. Marshall “Global Terrorism: An Overview and Analysis,” Center for Systemic Peace accessed online at members.aol.com/CSPmgm.
Table 8 – Marshall’s “Actor Nationalities in Reported Terror Incidents, 1991-2001”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2 Congo- Brazzaville</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>0 Estonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2 El Salvador</td>
<td>1 Lesotho</td>
<td>0 Finland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2 Guatemala</td>
<td>1 Madagascar</td>
<td>0 Gabon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republic</td>
<td>2 Guinea</td>
<td>1 Malaysia</td>
<td>0 Gambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2 Haiti</td>
<td>1 New Zealand</td>
<td>0 Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>2 Iran</td>
<td>1 Nicaragua</td>
<td>0 Guinea-Bissau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2 Macedonia</td>
<td>1 Niger</td>
<td>0 Iceland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2 Senegal</td>
<td>1 North Korea</td>
<td>0 Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>2 Somalia</td>
<td>1 Panama</td>
<td>0 Jamaica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2 Spain</td>
<td>1 Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>0 Jordan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>2 United Kingdom</td>
<td>1 Romania</td>
<td>0 Kyrgyzstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>2 Yemen</td>
<td>1 Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>0 Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Slovakia</td>
<td>0 Lithuania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1 Albania</td>
<td>1 Swaziland</td>
<td>0 Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>1 Argentina</td>
<td>1 Sweden</td>
<td>0 Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>1 Armenia</td>
<td>1 Switzerland</td>
<td>0 Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1 Australia</td>
<td>1 Syria</td>
<td>0 Mauritania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1 Austria</td>
<td>1 Taiwan</td>
<td>0 Mauritius</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1 Azerbaijan</td>
<td>1 Tajikistan</td>
<td>0 Moldova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1 Bahrain</td>
<td>1 Tanzania</td>
<td>0 Mongolia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1 Belarus</td>
<td>1 Thailand</td>
<td>0 Morocco</td>
</tr>
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<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1 Belgium</td>
<td>1 Tunisia</td>
<td>0 Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1 Bolivia</td>
<td>1 Ukraine</td>
<td>0 Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>1 Cameroon</td>
<td>1 Uzbekistan</td>
<td>0 Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1 Central African</td>
<td>1 Venezuela</td>
<td>0 Norway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Vietnam</td>
<td>0 Oman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1 Chile</td>
<td>1 Zambia</td>
<td>0 Paraguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1 Cuba</td>
<td>1 Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0 Portugal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>1 Cyprus</td>
<td></td>
<td>0 Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>1 Ecuador</td>
<td>0 Benin</td>
<td>0 Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1 Ethiopia</td>
<td>0 Bhutan</td>
<td>0 Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1 Fiji</td>
<td>0 Botswana</td>
<td>0 South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1 France</td>
<td>0 Bulgaria</td>
<td>0 Trinidad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>1 Germany</td>
<td>0 Burkina Faso</td>
<td>0 Turkmenistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>1 Greece</td>
<td>0 Comoros</td>
<td>0 United Arab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1 Guyana</td>
<td>0 Costa Rica</td>
<td>0 Uruguay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1 Honduras</td>
<td>0 Croatia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>1 Hungary</td>
<td>0 Czech Republic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>1 Italy</td>
<td>0 Denmark</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Japan</td>
<td>0 Djibouti</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>0 Dominican</td>
<td>Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1 Laos</td>
<td>0 Eritrea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A series of simple statistical tests reveals many commonalities with states that produce terrorists of assorted levels of violent behavior and those that do not. Using Marshall’s terror data and his classifications of regimes as “full democracy,” “partial democracy,” and “autocracy” reveals that partial democracies appear to be most likely to produce deadly terrorists.

**Table 9 – Terror Scores by Regime Type**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State Category</th>
<th>Mean Terror Score</th>
<th>Difference from Mean (All States)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full Democracy</td>
<td>1.031</td>
<td>-29.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partial Democracy</td>
<td>1.813</td>
<td>23.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy</td>
<td>1.754</td>
<td>19.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All States</td>
<td>1.464</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Obviously, the full democracy fairs best but, notably, partial democracies create slightly more deaths from terrorism than do even autocracies. A PRE test based upon a multiple number of variables indicates an assorted number of factors associated with the Marshall terror scale.

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Table 10 - Terrorism PRE Scores on State Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>PRE Score</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (thousands)</td>
<td>39.70%</td>
<td>.000 significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports and Export (% of GDP)</td>
<td>-39.6%</td>
<td>.000 significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-Linguistic Heter (3 category)</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>.018 significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Liberties</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>.001 significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy 1999</td>
<td>-23.0%</td>
<td>.011 significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Rights Score</td>
<td>-19.8%</td>
<td>.005 significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Labor Force Women</td>
<td>-18.4%</td>
<td>.027 significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Population largest ethnic group</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
<td>.014 significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Income by top 10%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>.032 significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Score (Hi = more)</td>
<td>-16.9%</td>
<td>.028 significance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A comparison of means between state capacity – in the form of legitimacy and effectiveness - and terror provides a bit more mixed results. Clearly, the states with mean levels of legitimacy and effectiveness above the overall mean fair quite well in a study of terrorism. In addition, negative expressions of legitimacy and effectiveness ultimately tend to result in more deadly terrorists produced.

255 Variables taken from Pollock.
Table 11 - Terrorism – Legitimacy and Effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terror Category</th>
<th>99 Legit Mean</th>
<th>99 Effect Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>0.2024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1183</td>
<td>0.0589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>-0.131</td>
<td>0.457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>-0.546</td>
<td>-0.272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>-0.337</td>
<td>-0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Mean</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.0188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The statistical implication is very clear – states that boast a higher capacity tend to produce fewer terrorists. Thus, the question becomes one of the ability of the state to serve its constituency. As discussed, the levels of both effectiveness and legitimacy have fallen since the end of the Cold War era. The number of failed states has increased in the time since the fall of the Soviet Union. At the same time, the levels of political rights and civil liberties have increased dramatically. In short, the end of the Cold War allowed “… relatively disciplined forces give way to decentralized, sporadic, and criminal problems of organized violence.”

So, the international system features less state versus state violence and more violent activity by non-state actors. In fact, many argue the fact that “… global warfare has been reduced by over sixty percent since 1991” as appropriate context for viewing the future of conflict and power politics.

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256 Marshall’s data tested with the State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III Findings, 201-204.
258 Ibid., 8.
The true state of the international system, however, is vastly different. The state’s level of aggregate power is less while non-state actors increase in terms of international power. Although state versus state conflicts are declining, many states face threats of a much different nature – “over one-third of the world’s countries (54 of 158) were directly affected by serious societal warfare at some time during the 1990’s and, of these states, nearly two-thirds (34) experienced armed conflicts for seven or more years during the decade.” Such conflict, surely, adds to the weakening nature of the state. Indeed, the ubiquitous presence of societal conflict demands that assets earmarked for state capacity functions to, instead, serve as protection for the ruling elite. As the state weakens “… conflict liabilities can move rather easily from strengthening societies to weaker societies and take advantage of new and future opportunities.” Thus, the cycle of state devolution continues.

Another significant input in the weakening of the state is the number of anocracies within the system. Marshall and Gurr define the anocracy as a state somewhere between democracy and autocracy. The end of the Cold War Era brought about an explosion in anocracies – from 16 in 1985 to 28 in 2002. The mere presence of increased numbers of anocracies makes the system more dangerous – over 50% experience “a major regime change within five years,” are “six times more likely than democracies” “and two and a half times as likely as autocracies to experience new outbreaks of societal wars” and, ultimately, the anocracy “… are less likely to repress or settle it [armed societal conflict].” As the state’s capacity weaken, the space for the

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259 Ibid., 13-14.
260 Ibid., 14-15.
261 Found in Marshall and Gurr.
262 Ibid., 16-25.
non-state actor within the system increases. As a result, security within the new international system is much different than the days of simple deterrence. Contemporary security is more proactive – involves preemption militarily and politically. The international system, as a whole, is weakened whenever a member state is weakened.

To be sure, what has been presented is only a small piece of the overall puzzle. The overall point to my discussion is that a system level analysis of international relations is more complex than ever before. Factors including non-state actors, failed states, transition regimes, and globalization have all reduced the unitary power of the state to act within that system. Ultimately, the terror attacks of 9/11 served notice that non-state actors would play a significant role in the international relations models of the future.

Further research should engage to identify the additional variables that impact the changes in the international and state levels of analysis. What has been provided in this paper has been an attempt to draw together a number of variables in order to demonstrate the complexity of a nested – or two level system – and the complications in readily illustrating the characteristics of the international system as they exist in contemporary international politics.
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