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Religious Pluralism in Mauritius and Turkey

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RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN MAURITIUS AND TURKEY

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

By

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2007
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I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY MORGAN J. O’BRIEN III ENTITLED RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN TURKEY AND MAURITIUS BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS.

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ABSTRACT


This thesis examines the treatment and facilitation of religious pluralism in Mauritius and Turkey. The thesis utilizes a most-different comparative case study, and argues for the existence of a tipping point that ultimately compels the elected leadership to act. The two states were chosen as most different cases due to their marked difference in religious diversity within each state, as Turkey is almost universally Muslim and Mauritius is very diverse, with large percentages of Christian, Muslim and Buddhist followers on the island state.
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I. Religious Pluralism and Democracy

"The example of the Colonies . . . which rejected religious establishments altogether, proved that all Sects might be safely & advantageously put on a footing of equal & entire freedom."

James Madison
Letter to Edward Livingston, July 10, 1822

“The development of pluralism as a significant dimension of democracy is closely related to the nature of the relationship between the State and religion.”

-Metin Heper
The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in Comparative Perspective (52)

I. Introduction and Purpose

During the American Revolution, a new idea emerged, disturbing the typical model of church-state relations. According to Feldman, this was the first time people and not just states were considered sovereign and entitled to self-determination. “To begin with, America was religiously diverse: how could the state establish the religion of the sovereign when the sovereign people in America belonged to many faiths” (Feldman 10)? With this in mind, the framers composed a constitution and for the first time in history, a Western government had no state religion. Up until this time, citizens were expected to follow the faith of their leader. “The experiment,” Feldman writes, “had begun” (11).

More than 225 years later the freedom of religion experiment continues, now expanding globally throughout the world’s democracies. The impetus of this thesis is to answer the following: What techniques are implemented to institutionalize and preserve religious pluralism in a modern democracy, and how do these measures differ state to state? The qualifications required for a state to be democratic are broad and the diverse
sets of characteristics among the world’s democracies help validate the research presented here. Theoretically, democracy allows for the freedom of assembly, public worship, the right to expression in public forums—including government and educational institutions—and honors customs and practices, all key components to the freedom of religion. This thesis examines some of those characteristics and analyzes the techniques and methods used by states in providing for religious freedom.

In studying how religions within a state interact, and this thesis also examines how the divisions within specific faiths impact the development of consensus and the growth of pluralism. Special attention is paid to Tocqueville and Mill’s concept of the “tyranny of the majority” and whether the faith with the most followers is empowered in ways that detract from the true potential of the pluralism. To fully uncover the questions researched, this thesis investigates the politics of consensus building between sects and how the composition of a state’s religious population impacts the strength and viability of plurality.

The growing importance of religion and religious expression in the modern world drives the research presented in this thesis, a comparative case study comparing the Republic of Mauritius and the Republic of Turkey. By comparing two democracies—one with more than 98 percent of the population following one religion and the other with a more diverse dispersal of faiths—this thesis shows that some measures may work for one democracy while completely different measures work in another. This thesis examines the domestic policy decisions implemented by democratic governments when institutionalizing religious pluralism.
Introductions to each state and the backgrounds of the histories and current political climates, successes and challenges are provided in chapters 2 and 3. A comparative case study, comparing and contrasting the laws implemented and measures implemented by the two states, follows in chapter 4. Chapter 5 contains conclusions and assumptions while also providing direction and recommendations for future research in the area studied.

The first operating assumption is that religious pluralism is an important, inalienable right to the citizens of a democracy. The importance of this right derives from the will of citizens seeking the freedom to practice their faiths. For instance, early in their educational experience, every American student learns that in 1620, a group of Puritans sailed in the *Mayflower* across the Atlantic to what was then known as the New World. This voyage, they are taught, occurred primarily because of the promise of religious freedom. Every Thanksgiving, Americans celebrate this group of Pilgrims and the hardships they overcame in their search of religious freedom. Religious pluralism in the U.S. has become a time-honored tradition deeply ingrained within the national consciousness. My own family came to America from Ireland at the turn of the 20th century because the marriage between my Protestant great-grandfather and Catholic great-grandmother was shunned by local customs and tradition. Thus, at the risk of sounding cliché, they like millions before and after them came to America for the promise of a better life, thanks to the freedom of religion offered by the grand democratic experiment begun by the United States.

The vaunted nature of religious freedom in America does not necessarily mean a total separation of church and state, in practice it is quite the opposite. The infamous
phrase calling for a separation between church and state is not located in any U.S. code, but in a letter written by Thomas Jefferson to the Baptist Association of Danbury, Connecticut.

Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man & his god, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, thus building a wall of separation between church and state (Jefferson, Letter to Danbury Baptists).

Jefferson’s comments emphasize the importance he placed on a state avoiding the recognition of one religion or the appearance of a first among equals. But this separation is not a sine qua non for a society that provides for religious pluralism.

The freedom of religion is not solely the providence of the American democracy; it is a global phenomenon. The Center for Religious Freedom, a division of Freedom House, posits the following: “Freedom of thought, conscience and religion is the prerequisite for the exercise of all other basic human rights. In theory and practice, free expression, freedom of press and freedom of association depend on the prior guarantee of a free conscience”.¹ Without the freedom of religion, other basic rights are not allowed to fully evolve or are improperly impeded. “The myth of complete separation not only neglects history, but it is also at odds with the continuing presence of legal privileges such as congressional and military chaplains paid from public funds…state officials swearing belief in God, prayers in the Supreme Court and U.S. Congress (and) ‘In God We Trust’ on U.S. currency” (Bader 604). Stepan recognizes that as recently as 1990, “five of the EU’s 15 member states—Denmark, Finland, Greece, Sweden and the United

Kingdom (in England, not Scotland)—had established churches” (Stepan 41). Stepan also states that the original intention of the nation’s founders has deviated from the original context and intent:

The separation of church and state originally mandated by the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment (‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’)…did not prohibit the 13 original states from having their own established religions. It merely prohibited the Congress from establishing one official religion for the United States as a whole. In fact, on the eve of the revolution, only three of the 13 colonies…had no provision for an established church (Stepan 56).

Today, many Western states also have religious-based political parties, for instance Christian Democratic parties have ruled in Germany, Austria, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands (Stepan 41). These examples emphasize the diversity employed by democracies handling religious pluralism from state to state and show that the issue continues to weigh heavily on modern domestic policies of states around the globe.

Freedom to practice religion is often tied to self-determination and self-identification, vital components of a successful democracy. Huntington writes, “People define themselves in terms of ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs, and institutions. They identify with cultural groups: tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities, nations, and, at the broadest level, civilizations” (2003: 21). Throughout the history of the world, the colorful interplay between religion and government has both spawned wars and brokered peace. Even more than artificially imposed national boundaries, religion today defines cultures and has attracted a tremendous amount of attention—as instances in the former Yugoslavia and the nascent post-Hussein Iraq prove. In his oft-cited, though often challenged work on world politics’ new era, Huntington writes, “The revitalization of religion throughout much of the world is
reinforcing …cultural differences” (2003: 29). Often, misunderstanding—both of the importance of the freedom of religion, and the proper implementation of pluralism—can lead to failures both domestically and on the global stage. The group dynamics formed by the notion of self-identity and inclusion are also important, as there is potential for an “us versus them” situation. Huntington writes, “Whatever universalist goals they may have, religions give people identity by positing a basic distinction between believers and nonbelievers, between a superior in-group and a different and inferior out-group” (Huntington 2003: 97). Because of this dynamic, religion and democracy have a delicate balance to maintain.

The waltz between religion and government has long been an important area of study. In 1938, Roger Straus published an article on the relation of religion to democracy. Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* is based on the interplay of religions both internationally while many passages are dedicated to the compatibility of specific religions to types of government. In the early stages of the 21st century, the importance of the study of religion continues a decades-long trend that has seen this study exponentially grow in importance. Huntington writes that the late 20th century, “has seen a global resurgence of religions… (realizing) the intensification of religious consciousness and the rise of fundamentalism movements. It has thus reinforced the differences among religious... (and) involved significant shifts in the proportions of the world’s population adhering to different religions” (Huntington 2003: 64). Zakaria’s book, *The Future of Freedom*, begins in 325 CE, covering Constantine’s decision to leave the pope in Rome as the rest of the empire moved east. ”This historic separation between church and state was to have fateful, and beneficial, consequences for humankind” (30).
Feldman takes the notion of the Roman Empire’s importance in establishing a state religion and caps this reign at the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia where it was decided that each region would practice the religion of the leader (10). In his 19th-century work, *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville marveled at the American freedom of religion and writes poetically of the relationship between liberty and the ability to practice religion unimpeded. In his work, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” Sen writes of the importance of democracy ensuring that sectarian leaders do not cause “massive consternation” by exploiting religious differences (6). Many of the questions surrounding this complex relationship continue to take on importance throughout a modernizing and democratizing world, and this topic clearly needs further study.

While this research is clearly important, in his work studying religiosity and tolerance in the United States and Poland, Vyacheslav Karpov writes that cross-cultural case studies examining religiosity and tolerance are relatively rare. “While religious determinants of political conflict in various societies is a much studied topic, it is infrequently explored at the level of mass attitudes and with attention to the interdenominational differences and the multifaceted manifestations of religiosity” (269). The author closes his article with a set of implications, the last of which was the necessity of broader cross-national explorations of religion-tolerance links, looking for a wider variety of religious traditions, cultural contexts and socioeconomic conditions (286). This call to action provides some of the motivation for this thesis. While Karpov’s research deals with the issue of tolerance from the point of view of practitioners of each religion—where this thesis analyzes the government’s treatment—the article provides a
strong foundation for this case study, providing definitions and techniques that used to bolster the arguments found herein.

Stepan highlights many examples of both state-led tolerance and intolerance that need study, becoming another impetus behind this thesis. He writes, “Another important area for further research is the role of the state in generating religious toleration” (56). This thesis is also heavily influenced by Alfred Stepan’s concept of the “twin tolerations”. In his work, Stepan defines the twin tolerations as the minimal boundaries of freedom of action “that must somehow be crafted for political institutions vis-à-vis religious authorities, and for religious individuals and groups vis-à-vis political institutions” (37).

II. Definitions

The major variables covered throughout this thesis and requiring formal definition are democracy, religion, pluralism, secularism, inclusion and tolerance. Additionally, the definitions of religion and pluralism are fused to form the definition of religious pluralism used herein.

Democracy

Democracy has a broad range of characteristics, and does not suffer from a lack of definitions from scholars. Both word and concept have long histories that have evolved over thousands of years. Dahl notes that the word itself derives from the Greek words demos, the people, and kratos, to rule (Dahl 1998 11). Since the ancient Greeks, popular government has meant different things to different civilizations including Rome and other parts of Italy. Eventually, the nascent United States government began to define itself,
and Madison employed the term, “republic” which established a level of government between the people and the state (Dahl 1982 17).

Stepan’s contemporary definition, based on Dahl’s concepts laid out in Polyarchy, defines democracy through a series of required guarantees: 1) freedom to form and join organizations; 2) freedom of expression; 3) the right to vote; 4) eligibility for public office; 5) the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes; 6) alternative sources of information; 7) free and fair elections; and 8) institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference (Stepan 39). Stepan also requires democratic governance to have a properly democratic constitution, respecting both fundamental liberties and protections for minority rights (39).

Zakaria defines democracy as “a government created by elections in which every adult citizen should vote” (13). He also points out that in 1900, not a single country fulfilled this definition, while 119 do today. In his paper, “Will More Countries Become Democratic,” Huntington writes that the correlation between the existence of democracy and individual liberty is extremely high, “Indeed, some measure of the latter is an essential component of the former” (2003: 194). Heper simply defines democracy as “the rule of all citizens” (38). Sen’s definition rolls over several pages, and encompasses universality of the adult vote, a free press and other civil rights, and a guarantee against the “factional exploitation of sectarianism” (3, 6, 7). The elected government should rule within the confines of this constitution and be accountable to other institutions. Straus calls democracy, “a community of people which sets up a ‘government of the people, by the people and for the people’ to maintain and develop the liberties and social obligations on which they agree through majority action” (37).
Within this thesis, the key elements to the definition of democracy are a freely elected government with universal adult suffrage; the guarantee of certain civil rights, specifically the freedom of religion as well as a free press, freedom of speech and right to assemble. It is also notable that universality stands a key component of a properly functioning democracy. While the term democracy in this thesis focuses on the will of the majority, certain protections must be constitutionally implemented to protect the rights of minority groups to exist. Ideally, disparate cultures should enjoy equal protection under the law and the right to observe practices unimpeded by the state. Additionally, the notion of liberty must stand at the forefront of any definition of democracy. Zakaria notes that “across the globe, democratically elected regimes, often ones that have been reelected…are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving citizens of basic rights” (17). The author also mentions that Hitler became chancellor through free elections, and goes on to describe these instances of democratically elected injustice “illiberal democracy” (17). Within this thesis, both Turkey and Mauritius are measured against a scale, devised by Freedom House, which accounts for any illiberalism.

**Religion and Religious Expression**

The relationship of religion to democracy always focuses on the freedom to form and join organizations and the freedom of expression. Durkheim suggests that associations are essential to basic human needs in addition to a variety of needs, which include faith and Tocqueville also asserts that associations are essential to freedom (Dahl 31). To further define religion, this thesis uses Roger Straus’ 1938 definition: “Man’s (sic) belief in a power upon which he depends, to which he is obligated, and with which
he may commune, together with the activities arising from the belief” (37). Huntington adds to the definition stating that people do not live by reason alone. “They cannot calculate and act rationally in pursuit of their self-interest until they define their self. Interest politics presupposes identity” (2003: 97). In a modern world, Huntington contends, this thirst for self-identification takes on extra importance.

In times of rapid social change established identities dissolve, the self must be redefined, and new identities created. For people facing the need to determining Who am I? Where do I belong? Religion provides compelling answers, and religious groups provide small social communities to replace those lost through urbanization’ All religions, as Hassan al-Turabi said, furnish ‘people with a sense of identity and a direction in life’ (Huntington 2003: 97).

While admitting that there is a disparate set of definitions to religion, Feldman ties faith to a belief in a higher power and a moral code. “Religious values also figure prominently in the debates about stem-cell research, abortion, euthanasia, and the death penalty.”

Feldman highlights an additional characteristic of religion: the fact that it often becomes a driving force in the middle of some of the most heated debates (6).

While his definition is nearly 70 years old, and despite the fact that Straus is not necessarily a major player in contemporary academic circles, his definition is valuable in that it provides a concise, worthwhile, valuable framework around which this thesis can be built. The key components of this definition are that there is no necessary tie to a “god,” however there is the recognition of a power. Second, there is an allocation for an undefined set of activities tied to the religion. Finally, emphasizing the point that there are no barriers to the execution of this free worship is important, so long as it does not impact those who do not wish to participate in any religious activities.

For most religions, some ritual or practice is typically required of its practitioners. Because of this, a state must go beyond simply recognizing a religion or allowing it to
exist to ensure complete religious pluralism. In defining *religious expression*, this thesis borrows Karpov’s variables used in defining religiosity, and adjusts them to fit the objectives presented above. They are: religious participation, religious commitment, theocratic orientations and religious affiliation (Karpov 273-274). Herein, religious participation refers to the freedom to attend religious services, which includes weekly services, holidays and prayer groups or public displays of religious commitment. The Center for Religious Expression also cites the two natures of religious expression:

> It belongs to individuals and also to religious groups. It includes a person’s right to walk down the street wearing a cross, a yarmulke or a headscarf, or not to do so, and to express and live out one’s beliefs in society. It also includes the rights of groups to worship God as they wish in community, to run schools, hospitals and other institutions, to publish and possess sacred literature, and order their internal affairs.²

In the following chapters, religious affiliation and the percentage of the population that self-identifies with the various faiths plays an important role in the each state’s various decision-making processes.

**Pluralism**

Dahl notes that independent organizations and groups exist in all democracies. “Consequently, the problem of democratic pluralism is a problem in all modern democracies” (Dahl 4). As mentioned above, both Stepan and Dahl formed their definitions of democracy beginning with the freedom of assembly and the freedom of expression.

> Pluralism stands as essential to a properly functioning democracy, but the potential for some groups to attain too much power is cause for concern by some academics. For instance, Dahl sees problems arising from pluralism in some

democracies. “If the consequences of organizational pluralism were entirely advantageous, there would be no problem,” he writes, “The problem of democratic pluralism is serious…precisely because independent organizations are highly desirable and at the same time their independence allows them to do harm” (Dahl 1982: 31). Dahl’s writings are critical of those groups that hold power in a democracy, an opinion expanded upon in his book, *Polyarchy*. Dahl also believes that in a democracy that allows for pluralism, political organizations should be controlled (Heper 39). In describing the transition of associational pluralism—autonomous groups not based on blood relationship or marriage—to more formal representative bodies, Huntington writes that social pluralism “gave rise to estates, parliaments and other institutions” (2003: 70-71). This transition lends credence to Dahl’s fears. However, Sen argues that democracies are the only regimes that can accommodate diversity, creating a system that is almost a conundrum—diversity can only thrive in a democracy, but too much group-think may hamper democracy. This sentiment plagues those democracies anticipating an attack whether from a violent enemy within the state or a group looking to topple an unstable government. This perception of pluralism is important to note, particularly in the sections concerning Turkish treatment of religious pluralism regarding Islam.

Heper also relates pluralism to polyarchy and defines both as “rule by many,” the many referring to groups, not individuals (38). Clearly defining religious pluralism—and separating pluralism from polyarchy in this thesis—is important because as Heper writes, “in this view, polyarchy stands in direct contrast to democracy” (38). To attain an appropriate definition, religious pluralism must be distanced from pluralism at large. The rights of individuals to freely choose their religion and appropriate practices are clearly
important. Ensuring that a tyranny of the majority does not arise is part of the state’s responsibility in maintaining a functioning democracy and proper balance among its citizens.

To quantify and analyze the degree of religious pluralism, this thesis focuses on two variables: *inclusion* and *toleration*. To operationalize these terms, this thesis draws upon data including: issues concerning the state and religious groups within the state; disputes concerning the state and international watchdog organizations; complaints made against a state impeding missionary efforts; known prisoners detained because of their religious beliefs; violence related to inter-religious feuds, to include acts of terror; weekly attendance of religious services; and official state observances of religious holidays and traditions.

**Inclusion**

The variable of *inclusion* is built upon Stepan’s questioning of the minimal boundaries of freedom of action that must somehow be crafted for religious individuals and groups vis-à-vis political institutions (37). This variable is first connected to the respective constitutions of each state; federal acknowledgement—such as federal holidays associated with religious holy days—and census-based statistics related to the presence of a diverse array of specific religions existing within the state. In quantifying *inclusion*, the literal “letter of the law” is culled from the state constitutions of the two democracies, focusing on key words surrounding the freedom of religious expression.
**Toleration**

The variable of *toleration* is based upon Stepan’s questioning of the “minimal boundaries of freedom of action that must somehow be crafted for political institutions vis-à-vis religious authorities” (37). A democracy must successfully implement tolerance of religious practices. Sartori writes, “Pluralism presupposes toleration, which is to say that an intolerant pluralism is a false pluralism. The difference is this: tolerance respects values, whereas pluralism posits values. For pluralism affirms the belief that diversity and dissent are values that enrich individuals as well as their polities and societies” (58). To measure this variable, this thesis examines the actual treatment of religious pluralism in a state, relying on the written, personal accounts and interviews conducted by scholars (as no first-hand interviews were conducted) and third-party analyses for examples of both pro- and anti-religious sentiment and treatments within Turkey and Mauritius.

Toleration encompasses the execution of the laws analyzed in the inclusion variable. This section analyzes any tangible existence of the infringement of religious pluralism, to include: forced conversion, limits to missionary efforts, state reaction to crimes motivated by religious issues, bans on public practice and assembly and any inter-religious violence. This section also includes any claims of prejudice—either state-sponsored or perceived by respective religious groups—formally captured in existing research.

**Secularism**

Secularism—an especially important within Turkey—receives much attention in the research surrounding the issues covered in this thesis. According to Davison,
“Secularism derivers from the Latin *saeculum*, meaning generation or age” (333, emphasis added). This meaning, the author points out, originally meant a generation “of the world” as opposed to a generation “of the church,” and implied distance between matters of religiosity and the state (Dawson 333-334). There is a clear need for separation between religious establishment and religious expression. Bader questions “whether religious freedom and equal treatment of all religions requires disestablishment and whether political equality requires a complete separation between state and (organized) religions or even the privatization of religion” (Bader 597). Davison writes that ideally, democratic secularism enables “more inclusive, tolerant polities and more varied forms of social and public experience—ensuring ‘freedom from religion as well as freedom of religion’” (335). This is an important distinction.

For a culture to properly segregate church and state, there need not be an overreaction and subversion of organized religion. In actuality, this too would overstep the relationship between church and state. The “freedom from” versus “freedom of” argument goes a long way towards capturing the essence of a secular society, one that recognizes and protects plural practices.

**What is the Definition of Religious Pluralism?**

Essentially, religious pluralism represents a confluence of the freedoms of assembly and speech, perhaps explaining why the framers of the U.S. Constitution chose to begin the Bill of Rights with a guarantee of no state religion and followed with the ability to speak freely and gather without fear of government interference or reprisal. However, the lack of a state religion is not a requirement of religious pluralism as
mentioned, a number of European countries have an established a state religion. What
works in one democracy does not necessarily work in all the world’s other democracies.
In fact, this thesis is partially built on the notion that democracies differ and examines the
similarities and differences between them.

Most important to the core of this thesis is the definition of religious pluralism, a
term that has a varying definition in states around the globe, but shares both a universal
set of values in addition to some more general characteristics. A society with true
religious pluralism allows its citizens to worship—and just as important, not worship—to
a degree they determine themselves. Again, the examples of both the freedom of religion
and freedom from religion are integral parts to properly implemented pluralism.

III. Methodology

This thesis employs a most-different comparative case study for analysis. To
analyze each state’s treatment of religion, this thesis examines official state policies laid
out in each country’s constitution and official policy documents. Additionally,
documents, surveys and analysis published the external and international organizations
that analyze religious toleration in both states were analyzed to draw conclusions from
those findings. The most-different case study—as opposed to a most-similar design—
was chosen because there is more to be found in exploring the differences between two
states than focusing on two similar cases. Therefore, the research is best served,
considering the nature of different religions, by comparing two democracies—both
ranked as comparably democratic while maintaining as much difference in the respective
composition of each state as possible.
Borrowing from Karpov’s study of tolerance in Poland and the U.S., it was important to choose two cases with, “contextual…similarities and differences that are essential for detecting cross-national patterns of religious influences on tolerance” (269). While there are different types of case studies, they should all accomplish three objectives: state the theory; state expectations about what to observe; explore the case looking for congruence or incongruity (Van Erva 56). Within the array of case studies, the format preferable for testing the theories and questions posed by this thesis is a controlled comparison, which Van Erva defines as a case study that uses comparative observations across cases to test theories (56).

In *How to Compare Nations*, Dogan and Pelassay write, “The comparativist searches for rules and tries to bring to light the general causes of social phenomena” (3). By contrasting the treatment of religions in Mauritius and Turkey, this thesis investigates the processes of religious toleration democracy and the variables that affect the treatment. Building upon their position that, “Comparison is the engine of knowledge,” Dogan and Pelassay write, “Only with exposure to other cultures does one become conscious of possible intellectual occlusion” (8-9). The differences between Turkey and Mauritius in respective religious makeup are the key aspects to uncovering the essential elements of a democracy establishing religious plurality, and recognizing the similarities and differences of each state.

To capture the realities of each state’s tolerance of religious expression, accounts from citizens of each state and reports filed by independent agencies covering the state’s compliance towards maintaining human rights are used. The data used comes from either state-run outlets (the U.S. Department of State) or from non-governmental agencies and
organizations (Freedom Watch) or sponsored by universities (University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research). Special attention is also given here to segmentation within a case study, because it “permits the researcher to ‘forget,’ to a certain degree, those contextual variables that make comparison so difficult” (Dogan and Pelassy 16).

Studying religion and democracy can be a challenging undertaking, so it is important to focus the research on the empirical expression of faith, and clearly define what that variable will mean within the case study. However, careful attention was paid so as not to ignore the overarching factors (for instance, why studying the treatment of religion by a democracy is important to research).

Case studies often face the challenge of too many variables, too few cases- that, considering the prominent role of religion in the world, may impact the research presented here. Considering the sheer number of religions in the world, and the factors governing successful democratization, there is no shortage of variables orbiting this case study. The research focuses on a few, well-defined, relevant variables. By focusing on Turkey’s overwhelming Muslim population, and comparing it to diversity of Mauritius, this thesis captures two excellent examples for a most-different comparative case study. Karpov notes that comparative studies that examine religious influences on tolerance—particularly those that study interdenominational differences and multifaceted manifestations of religiosity outside the U.S. are relatively rare, and make some data finding difficult (Karpov 269). One difficulty encountered in forming a proper methodology for this thesis came in the data surrounding Mauritius, and the overall ignorance of the world to the island-state. While the Institute for Social Research studied Turkish religious practices, it did not study Mauritian religious practices. Because of
that, this thesis does not have solid numbers for the weekly attendance at religious services by Mauritians. However, it remains important to include the Turkish numbers. On the Freedom Watch Web site, there is no Mauritius page, and articles on Mauritius are incorrectly located on the Mauritania page. This is tantamount to placing Uruguay’s articles on the U.S. page because both states start with “U” and are in the Eastern Hemisphere. Nonetheless, there was a surprising amount of research on the state, and enough to ensure the conduct of a proper case study between the two democracies.

Another limitation comes in the form of barriers both distance-related and language-related. I did not conduct any first-person interviews with subject-matter experts on either country in compiling this research. Thus, my research is subject to the filters of academics and researchers who have published their work. Their limitations—both known and unknown—become limitations to this thesis. Additionally, while English is pervasive in both states studied, the respective languages of each government are Turkish and French. As an anglophone, the research presented here, specifically the research surrounding official state documents, is limited to the quality of the officially sanctioned English translations used in this thesis.

IV. Hypotheses

The question used to form the basis of this research is a “nondirectional relational comparative question,” asking: What techniques are implemented to institutionalize and preserve religious pluralism in a modern democracy, and how do these measures differ from state to state (Ember 22-23)? By extension, this thesis analyzes the differences and determines if they cause each state to deviate. Considering the vast differences in the
histories and religious makeup of each state, I anticipate a number of state-specific decisions made by the respective governments that may deviate from the core definitions of democracy or religious pluralism as represented above. This thesis examines whether or not states make those decisions and why they choose specific courses of action.

“The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union, its severe modification in China and the failure of socialist economies to achieve sustained development have now created an ideological vacuum” (Huntington 2003: 100). Stepan begins his work, “Religion, Democracy, and the ‘Twin Tolerations’” by questioning whether all or only some of the world’s religious systems politically compatible with democracy (37). I anticipate that religions in a democracy adapt to the political system in most cases. In studying Turkey, I anticipate the relationship between Islam and the military will highlight the need for flexibility on both the part of a religion and the state and adaptation playing a key role in the success of religious pluralism. In Mauritius, the sheer number of faiths could force interesting scenarios of coalition building between faiths looking to push agendas.

If traditionally dominant religions do not meet emotional and social needs of uprooted peoples, other groups can, “move in to do so and the process greatly expand their memberships and the saliency of religion in social and political life” (Huntington 2003: 98). Over the past 50 years, shifts from Buddhism to Christianity in South Korea and from Catholicism to Protestantism in Latin America underscore this point but there is conflicting research regarding this notion. Voas, Crockett and Olson write that, “The question of whether religious diversity promotes or undermines commitment—and by implication how modernization affects traditional beliefs and practice—remains one of
the most interesting problems in the field” (Voas, et al 227). After all, as Zakaria notes, “Mohammed himself was a businessman” (153). Garry Wills writes that “Neither Jefferson nor Madison thought that separation would lessen the impact of religion…churches freed from the compromise of establishment would have greater moral force” (25). The more each state focuses on allowing the freedom to choose one’s own religion, the more I anticipate each state to focus on and value the will of the population to choose their own faith.

Rather than worrying about a plural society creating a polyarchy when concerned with allowing religious freedom, I anticipate that Zakaria is correct when he writes that, “Pluralism rests on competing centers of power,” and that these power bases push each other in both attracting followers and ensuring that rights are fairly balanced (95). James Madison observed that religious pluralism is good because “it reduces the likelihood that any one ‘faction’ will be able to take over”. In fact, Zakaria writes of the old maxim that “religious freedom is the product of two equally pernicious fanaticisms, each cancelling the other out” (40).

Transparency plays a major role here as well. Peripheral to the freedom of religion is the freedom of the press. In the information age, media sources now travel globally at the speed of the Internet. Organizations like Freedom Watch, Human Rights Watch and even the U.S. State Department can post online religious freedom reports using first-hand accounts from within a state—and as mentioned, comprise some of the research found here. Recognizing that this information is now seen globally, and that human rights abuses may bring bad publicity to a state’s worldwide reputation, each state

should be compelled to keep a clean ledger in terms of facilitating religious pluralism domestically.

Finally, I anticipate that politics plays a major role in how each state treats the freedom of religious expression. While parochialism draws meaning from the partitioning of Catholic parishes in a given region, there almost always exists parochialism within a democratically elected government where the balance of power fluctuates election to election. Anything that threatens the stability of a given government sounds alarms to elected leaders who, in the interest of keeping their jobs, are often compelled to act. This thesis pays special attention to major events that see religious groups coming together to threaten the balance of power within each state. The actions taken by the states during these events and in the post-event fallout are also examined.

Academics like Karpov and Stepan both called for continuing investigations into the issues and circumstances surrounding religious pluralism and tolerance in democracy. Karpov concludes his article on tolerance in the U.S. and Poland writing, “the (final) implication from this study is the necessity of broader cross-national explorations of religion-tolerance links…some of the detected patterns of the influence of religion on tolerance may be of broader, cross-national relevance” (286). In answering this call to research, this thesis focuses on addressing the questions surrounding the leadership responsibilities required by a democracy to ensure the facilitation of religious pluralism, and duly adding to the body of research in this important area of study.
II. The Power of Organization: Religion in Mauritius

“No person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of conscience, and for the purposes of this section, that freedom includes freedom of thought and of religion, freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and both in public and in private, to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”

-Mauritian Constitution, Section II, Ch. 11.1

“You gather the idea that Mauritius was made first and then heaven, and that heaven was copied after Mauritius.”

-Mark Twain, The Mauritius Enigma

“Sakrenn pe prie dan so fason.” (Each prays in his or her own way.)

-Mauritian Proverb

I. Introduction

A unique island state off Africa’s eastern coast promotes the freedom of religion both according to the letter of the law and within the day-to-day practices of the state, ingraining both tolerance and inclusion into the fabric of the island democracy’s citizenry. Mauritius is known globally for both its beautiful beaches and strong record of cultural coexistence (to say nothing of its beloved dodo, an indigenous but extinct bird). Considering Twain’s sentiments stated at the beginning of this chapter, it is important to recognize that deeming a state an earthly Utopia may establish some unrealistic expectations, nonetheless Mauritius is an island blessed with tremendous natural beauty as well as a strong promise of religious pluralism established in the constitution and affirmed with a hope-filled motto. But does the reality of life in Mauritius match the letter of the law and live up to the optimistic perspective surrounding the young state?
The freedom of religion is a cornerstone principle in both America and Mauritius contends Miles, who argues that it is not class but ethnicity that serves as the driving social force in Mauritian society (101). Within the population, religious affiliation is one major divide that separates the island’s ethnic groups (Cho 40). What experiences and factors drives Mauritius to institutionalize cultural respect, and in what ways does both state and society to foster this environment? The answer derives from the composition of the Mauritian population. The Mauritian treatment and perception of religion—and by extension, religious expression—connects to ethnicity for a number of reasons. Any case study of Mauritius cannot broach the issue of religious freedom without properly explaining the island’s rich tradition of and complex interplay between various ethnic groups.

Mauritius has no indigenous population and slowly developed through numerous waves of immigration. The foundation of the elected government is built upon ethnic diversity, with special provisions institutionalized within the framework that recognize each of the dominant cleavages. Table 2.1 shows how the state classifies major religions and ethnic groups. The Mauritian constitution divides the country into four main categories: Hindus and Muslims (religious-based), Sino-Mauritians (ethnic-based), and the General Population (a catch-all group consisting mostly of Franco-and Anglo-Mauritians as well as Creoles, descendents of African slaves) (Eriksen 15, Cho 35). The General Population typically practices Catholicism: as Franco-Mauritians, Creoles, Coloureds (sic) practice the faith although, as will be explained later, all of those groups do not necessarily practice together (Cho 40). Some of the Sino-Mauritians practice Buddhism, while most practice Christianity.
Before explaining the ethnic and religious composition of the island, it is important to note that the state’s reputation as a haven of successful diversity is well documented. “The population of Mauritius has been the subject of intensive examination as the problems of rapid population growth and limited opportunities for economic advancement became apparent after the Second World War” (Christopher 57). Researchers have long thought of the state as noteworthy because of its “extraordinary religious, ethnic, and cultural diversity” (Bowman 196), and been interested in understanding how “the concept of community has played a major role in the constitutional development of the country and the census…has been invoked in the electoral process” (Christopher 57). In addition to academics and researchers, many world leaders, diplomats and scholars cite Mauritius as a model of successful religious and cultural pluralism. Mark Erwin, a former U.S. ambassador to the island state, wrote to the people of Mauritius in his April, 2001 outgoing letter, “…one of Mauritius’ distinctive features is its marvelous blend of cultures and religions, the way in which it encourages diversity in unity.”

According to Mauritian ethnographer Thomas Hylland Eriksen, “Mauritius is often described as a quintessential plural society” (Eriksen 1997, 25077). Writing of his official visit to Mauritius, Pope John Paul II—in a 2001 letter to the new Mauritian ambassador to the Holy See—wrote:

I was able to observe for myself your nation’s rich ethnic, religious and cultural diversity, and learn about the efforts made to promote a civic life marked by tolerance, respect for others and the advancement of the common good… In the Indian Ocean, your nation has sought to be a model of harmony between diverse groups, and of fruitful cooperation in building a just and welcoming world. By continuing to accept one another in the diversity of their cultures, beliefs, races and languages, the people of Mauritius will become…the image of a society of

4 “An open letter to the people of Mauritius from outgoing U.S. Ambassador Mark Erwin” www.mauritiusnews.co.uk/Apr_01/2.htm
peaceful coexistence which can in some way prefigure an international community which would truly be a home for all peoples.\textsuperscript{5}

As both a global head of state and leader of the world’s largest faith traditions, the Pope’s opinions regarding the treatment of religion, the “peaceful coexistence” within Mauritius carries significance. Considering this impressive collection of international recognition, Mauritius represents a unique case study. How could a small island-state that few are familiar with, located in the middle of the Indian Ocean with a population just more than of 1 million draw such rave reviews from U.S. government, the Vatican and respected academics?

After stripping the international praise for Mauritius, this thesis examines if the island state deserves to receive praise as a model of cultural pluralism. While Mauritian civil society provides the building blocks of democracy, it does not necessarily supplant ethnic bases of group identity and organization (Miles 100). This chapter analyzes the intricate inter-religious relationships of Mauritius and studies the key components of Mauritian democracy connected to the implementation of and protections provided for religious pluralism. After establishing Mauritius as a democratic state, this chapter examines the notion and possibility of “peaceful coexistence” and explains when and where prejudices occur.

II. History

Prior to colonization, Mauritius—part of the Mascarene Islands along with Rodrigues and Reunion and located in the southwestern Indian Ocean—was uninhabited

and only began appearing on maps in 1502 (Young 12, Bowman 8). Vaughn notes, “Doubtless there was a time when the island of Mauritius was uninhabited, but those who landed on it either by design or misfortune from the late sixteenth century found a place full of traces—real or fantastical—of others who had trodden there before” (Vaughn 1).

At least one historian—Auguste Toussaint—argues that Swahili seamen from Comoros or Madagascar probably first visited the island although they made no effort to colonize (Bowman 8). Though Indian and Arab sailors may have reached the island, unlike Madagascar, Mauritius did not play a major role in the premodern history of the Indian Ocean (Vaughn 2). The Portuguese were among the first to reach the island, but never colonized it. The Dutch found the island after a violent storm pushed ships to the island while en route to the East Indies in 1598. The island was first colonized by the Dutch, subsequently claimed by the French and eventually captured by the British during the Napoleonic Wars.

The island’s name honors Dutch stadhouder Maurice of Nassau, and remained uninhabited until the Dutch East India Company began using the island for its resources and began importing slaves in 1638 (Bowman 9). As a result of trade routes and the Indian Ocean slave trade, numerous peoples and cultures, traditions and faiths arrived on the island. During French colonization, the economy was based upon plantations, requiring an influx of tens of thousands of African slaves (Lange 402). In 1835, after the British captured the island from the French in the Napoleonic Wars, the Colonial Office ended slavery, opening the doors to indentured servitude in the form of hundreds of thousands of workers from India and China. After a four-year apprenticeship, where freed slaves continued to work on plantations for a salary, about half of the slave
population continued working in agriculture, while the remainder began fishing or living in the cities.

Mauritius is unlike Australia, in that it is not a settler colony. “It is not a replica of the European ‘mother country’ beyond the seas, but rather a flotsam left behind by the wreck of the colonial world” (Houbert 75). In 1948, the state began implementing electoral and constitutional reforms, preparing for independence. Between 1948 and independence, the state saw a rise in political organizing and communal political appeals, focusing on, “religion and culture, not upon race” (Bowman 33). “The character and tempo of Mauritian political life changed markedly after 1948,” writes Bowman, “The political system became more open and far more people became involved” (33). These changes saw ethnic considerations begin to dominate Mauritian politics, and at the center of many state debates was the issue of Mauritian pluralism (Houbert 80, Bowman 33). This pre-independence period saw Franco-Mauritians, Creoles, Hindus and Muslims all begin to reach for power, privilege and security, prompting questions about representation, constituencies, style of voting with a focus on best serving group interests (Bowman 33). When Mauritius gained independence it had accomplished a remarkable odyssey, moving from an uninhabited island to a state with a population of 700,000 strong, originating from three continents, speaking a variety of languages, and practicing four of the world’s major religions (Lange 402). When this population of “flotsam” gained independence, Mauritius immediately became one of the world’s most diverse states. With heavy consideration to this cultural diversity, the state adopted a constitution at independence, March 12, 1968, and updated the law in 1992.
The government refers to itself as “a sovereign democratic state within the Commonwealth with a long tradition of parliamentary democracy.” The constitution begins, “Mauritius shall be a sovereign democratic State which shall be known as the Republic of Mauritius” (Mauritian Constitution). Accordingly, many experts consider Mauritius a democracy. Eriksen calls Mauritius, “a stable, multi-party democracy that has gone through several peaceful changes of government…since 1968” (1). Bowman writes that Mauritius emerged from colonialism as a genuine democracy, and recognized that this was no small feat: “That Mauritius has been able to sustain democracy places it within a small and esteemed handful of Third World countries” (Bowman 42). In the 2006 Freedom in the World report, Freedom House writes, “Since gaining independence from Britain in 1968, Mauritius has maintained one of the developing world's most successful democracies.” The report—which calls Mauritius one of the developing world’s most successful democracies—gives its highest ranking of 1 to the state’s political rights and civil liberties, and considers the state “Free”.

According to the definition of democracy established in Chapter 1, Mauritius satisfies the following requirements: First, the freedom of expression is explicitly stated in the constitution in Chapter 2 section 3.b “freedom of conscience, of expression, of assembly and association and freedom to establish schools” (Mauritian Constitution). Constitutional guarantees, sandwiched between provisions to secure the protection of law and the freedom of expression, outline the official stance on the freedom of conscience in no uncertain terms:

Protection from being compelled to take an oath contrary to one’s religion or belief (II.11.4)

6 www.gov.mu
Protection from the state creating laws that are inconsistent with the protection the rights and freedoms of religious practice or belief (II.11.5.b)

Freedom House reports that freedom of religion is respected in Mauritius. In Africa, only Mauritius and Botswana have experienced continuous democracy since independence. In fact, most of the nation-state’s peers are not African states. Lange writes that Mauritius’ “rate of economic growth, level of human development, and extent of state governance rival those of the three East Asian newly industrialized countries colonized by Great Britain, while its average democracy index has been significantly higher” (402-403). For 2006, Freedom House ranks Mauritius in the second tier of independent countries in their annual freedom ratings, ranking alongside Greece, Monaco and Poland.

The state’s isolated geography and history of varied colonialism are often cited as reasons for the success of Mauritian democracy, and the last half century has indicated the makings of a bright future for the island democracy (Miles 93-94). Miles writes, “Mauritius has been the darling of the World Bank and of other development and governance specialists” (92). Mauritius is a plural society according to Bunwaree, who writes that Mauritius has for a long time focused on “aggregate economic growth as the policy goal,” and that the economy has become a unifying principle among the state’s groups (1). Miles credits Mauritian success to the unique case of European oversight which he dubs “sequential colonialism,” factoring in that, “for Hindus and Muslims, British governance constituted a check on the Franco-Mauritian and upper-class Creole aristocracies; whereas for these latter groups, the French language provided a medium of resistance to British colonial usurpation” (Miles 96). No community ‘owns’ any single

7 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=7015
8 Ibid
language according to Miles; rather, individuals increase their political capital by speaking numerous languages (Miles 97). This “balance of languages,” Miles writes, “is a hallmark of compromise, negotiation, and proceduralism (sic)” (97). It should be noted that the effects of colonial rule by numerous European states are not universal. While Miles argues that two sets of colonial influences developed “unusually sophisticated political skills” in Mauritius, Cameroon has failed to reap these same benefits (96).

Mauritius stands out in terms of mutual respect and acceptance among the groups on the island. As Eriksen writes, “Mauritian society is, if anything, a plural one” (Eriksen 14). This pluralism is especially important in the tolerance and inclusion of religion, because the 1990 census showed nearly 90 different religions within a population of just over a million. This preponderance of faiths is perhaps the most practical example supporting the contention that Mauritius respects the rights of individuals to worship. Eriksen notes, “As in the case of language, differences that make a difference are much less than 90 in this respect” (90). Mauritius has no state religion, and is religiously heterogeneous but the largest and therefore most politically influential traditions are Catholicism, Hinduism and Islam. According to the CIA World Factbook, Mauritians today are divided among three main faiths, with the population identifying approximately 52% Hindu, 28.3% Christian, and 16.6% Muslim. The percentages of the faiths are virtually static as there is not much conversion on the island and religions are tied to ethnic groups.

The Creoles and Franco-Mauritians are typically Christian. About 85 percent of Mauritian Christians are Catholic, while the remaining 15 percent represent the Adventist, Assembly of God, Christian Tamil, Church of England, Pentecostal,
Presbyterian, Evangelical, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and Mormon churches (U.S. State Department Religious Freedom Report 2006). Muslim Mauritians hail predominantly from the Indian subcontinent. This group comprises one-sixth of the Mauritian population and typically resides in the southern part of the island. Sunni Muslims account for more than 90 percent of Mauritian Muslims, with the remainder comprising the island’s Shi’a sect (Srebrnik 9). Mauritian Muslims resemble Indian Muslims in that among other things that they worship Pir, Muslim “saints” of the Sufi sect who lived on the island.

Non-Muslims from the Indian sub-continent comprise one-half of the population. A total of 450,000 Indian indentured laborers came to Mauritius at various times, and most stayed (Houbert 78). While the group falls under the religious umbrella of Hinduism, there is a divide among language and region of descent. Some maintain ties to their castes, but Miles writes that this system has changed somewhat as well, “Mysteriously, untouchability seems to have disappeared during the passage across the Indian Ocean” (92). Sanathanists—the most prominent Hindu sect—worship a threefold deity, and the Arya Samajists, a smaller sect that worships a single god. “The major fault line that divides Indo-Mauritians separates ‘Hindus’ (of northern Indian origin) and ‘Tamils’ (from the Dravidian south). Color is also a factor here, in that the people from the north of India are generally lighter-skinned than those from the south” (Miles 92).

By virtue of their number, Hindus will govern, yet in light of the Hindu majority, the success of the population requires overcoming inter-ethnic conflict (Srebrnik 10). To ensure that no one group dominates the assembly and to achieve communal balance without disturbing political equilibrium established by election results, in addition to the
62 members elected, eight additional seats are allocated to “best losers”. “In Mauritius, a particularly ingenious system of electoral engineering has facilitated communal comity…imperfections in the communal balance are corrected by seating the eight ‘best losers’” (Young 15). The “best loser” system exemplifies how the government institutionalizes the importance of ethnic— which is often religious—toleration and diversity in the state. The best-loser system also supports the argument for Mauritius’ status as a liberal democracy as power transition in the government has been virtually seamless and adherent to the constitution, examples of which are covered further below. And while one scholar writes, “The multi-party system is characterized by a bewildering kaleidoscope of parties amazing in its complexity,” the system continues to work (Srebrnik 11). Today, the National Assembly comprises 70 members representing all groups. Over the last four decades, Mauritius has completed seven democratic elections, and the winning coalition has changed almost every time (Cho 2). By most accounts, the Mauritian democratic system has worked well.

III. Religion and Ethnicity on the Island

Miles compares the U.S. and Mauritius writing, “Mauritius is perhaps best understood as a miniature version of the U.S. model” (101). In addition to both being former British colonies, the author bases this opinion on parallels between both the immigration and slavery, which marked the early development of each state. Miles contends that Mauritius more closely ‘American’ than African or India in terms of democratic development (102). As explained above, diversity and the ability for groups to coexist for the benefit of Mauritius is the hallmark of the Mauritian state. Young states, “In Mauritius, Tanzania and the United States, the multiplicity of cultural groups is
arguably a facilitative factor for accommodative policy; different spheres of state action evoke different patterns of communal alignment and interest” (12). Regarding these differences and interactions between groups sharing common political borders,

The large-scale social significance of religion in Mauritius today, viewed as a single polyethnic system of action, consists in its capacity as an unofficial mechanism for the distribution of certain scarce commodities, and religious organizations as well as sentiments may be exploited politically, although national politics was not initially one of their dimensions. It is by no means the only criterion; it forms part of a social ‘package’ that we may label as ‘ethnicity’” (Eriksen 97).

The relationship between religion and ethnicity in modern Mauritius highlights the reality that successful coexistence in Mauritius comes with obstacles—there is some level of tension among its groups. Occasionally, inter-religious animus typically manifests in disputes between the recognized ethnic groups. Cho’s chart (Figure 2.1) indicates the tensions between groups may be more race-related than religion-oriented. These tensions are certainly understandable within such a young nation comprised of so many social identities. They have occurred with less frequency than might be anticipated and were typically spawned by external factors unrelated to ethnicity.

Interethnic tensions are not a recent phenomenon; they existed within the state prior to independence. In the decade before independence, the Franco-Mauritians, Creoles and Muslims all fought to prevent a Hindu-dominated country (Bowman 34). At perhaps the lowest point in modern Mauritius, these tensions manifested in violence on the eve of independence. “There was one last spasm of disruptive and destructive rioting, this time between Creole and Muslim gangs in Port Louis at the beginning of 1968. The causes appeared to be not so much politics as unemployment and economic uncertainty” (Bowman 41). The violence resulted in at least 25 people killed and more than 100
wounded, causing Mauritians to fear a “Hindu Peril” that would see Indo-Mauritian political domination (Cho 2). So tense were the riots, that the Creoles were forced to leave capitol city of Port Louis and migrate into the countryside (Miles 92). British troops—called in to monitor the state of emergency—were still on hand March 12, 1968, when Mauritius formally declared independence (Bowman 41).

In February, 1996, interethnic conflict manifest in communal attacks pitting Creoles against Muslims and Hindus. The interethnic violence resulted from a demonstration fighting to decriminalize a type of drug and the death of a popular singer, Kaya, apparently at the hands of Mauritian police. The state was brought to a standstill for about a week as some shops were looted and some homes were burnt. Some interpretations and readings of the riots indicated more frustration within the working class than true, interethnic disdain (Bunwaree 7). In spite of the tensions between groups, Eriksen finds that ethnic lines in Mauritius are blurring thanks to global mobility, cultural globalization and educational homogenization (186). Eriksen also discounts the perception that there is a real inter-religious rivalry, writing, “Since social relations in a society like Mauritius are pervaded by notions of ‘us versus them,’ religion tends to be subsumed under the more encompassing heading of ethnicity” (97). Instead of turning to violence, interethnic animus is now usually discounted through the evolution of Mauritians as a people, and scholars like Eriksen typically discount these feelings as typical of any population. As Cho notes, disenchantment with politics is certainly not unique to Mauritius (2).

Some Mauritians harbor beliefs that the government provides special treatment to the Hindu majority. Three of the first four Mauritian prime ministers: Sir Seewoosagur
Ramgoolam, Anerood Jugnauth, Navinchandra Ramgoolam, were from the same ethnic group (Indian), religion (Hindu) and caste (Vaish) (Miles 93). While this exclusivity reflected many Hindu voters’ belief that the public sector is “the rightful possession of the majority community,” Mauritian democracy was forever changed in September 2003, when the office of Prime Minister shifted from Sir Anerood Jugnauth of the Hindu Indian majority to Paul Berenger, a man with roots traceable to Marseilles, France (Cho 49).  

The perception of Indian—and by extension, Hindu—favoritism on the island has flaws. Internal divisions—in particular within the very diverse Hindu population—manifest, “in splits and the creation of new political formations and ‘groupuscules’” (Srebrnik 12). While Mauritians of Indian origin are ostensibly in the majority, Hindus themselves are divided by caste and community of origin and do not identify with Muslims of similar South Asian origin (Miles 100). Mauritius is so diverse, there exist divisions within divisions!

An additional source of consternation comes in the belief the Creoles are prejudiced against because of their skin color. “Most Creoles have remained at or near the bottom of the country’s socioeconomic ladder, but following a typical colonial pattern, those who have attained a measure of prosperity are almost invariably of mixed descent and lighter skin color” (Miles 92). Franco-Mauritians and the Creoles that typically worked for them throughout the history of the island are both predominantly Roman Catholic. However, the Franco-Mauritians have recently turned towards traditionalist forms of celebrating mass, such as performing mass in Latin, a practice “perceived as snobbish by the average Creole” (Eriksen 91). Conversely, the Creoles have recently seen a rise in liberation theology highlighted by a number of Creole priests.

9 Power has since shifted to Navinchandra Ramgoolam, a man of Indian descent.
moving towards politically charged labor movements (Eriksen 91). Liberation theology, according to Martin, is the nexus of Christian and Marxist beliefs targeting international capital and oppressive political and social structures as the main culprit in disparities between ethnic groups (69). This concept has attracted a large following within groups similar to Creoles in Central and South America.

When inter-religious tensions surface they tend to pit an Indo-Mauritian community against a Christian-Mauritian community (Cho 41). While the perception of favoritism undoubtedly exists, whether or not perception matches reality has had little bearing on the effectiveness of democracy. To avoid potentially explosive situations, “Mauritian nation-builders have followed two strategies: a multiculturalist one depicting the nation as identical with its cultural ‘mosaic’, and a universalist one depicting the nation as supra-ethnic” (Eriksen 144). Because of widespread diversity, compromise between religions, cultures and ethnicities impact virtually every aspect of Mauritian government, from daily interactions within the population to politics to future planning.

“In Mauritius, the meticulous care with which communal balance is maintained in the cultural action the state has served to foster…a profound commitment to tolerance shared by the citizenry at large” (Young 7). With the government leading the way, Mauritians overwhelmingly tend to embrace both the panoply of ethnicities on the island as well as their own. According to Eriksen, “The absence of a clear ethnic majority, aboriginal or not, calls for compromise or coercion; both options have been chosen in various situations in the colonial past” (14). Mauritians are both creative and clever in this compromise and coercion.
Village life was vital to the formation of Mauritian democracy and fosters common understanding, a tendency not uncommon in former British colonies with high Indian populations like Trinidad and Guyana. “One example of the richness of village life was the haitka, a Hindu village organization that held community meetings, educational classes, religious ceremonies and entertainment ‘one, two, or even ten’ of which were located in every rural village” (Lange 408). The success of haitkas underscores the adaptation, growth, development and—as every Mauritian can attest—celebration of Mauritian culture. The state makes a clear effort to recognize the many religions of Mauritian culture and institutionalize a culture that recognizes and respects the existence and practices of different faiths (Figure 2.2). According to Bowman, “This open and public sharing of religious holidays and symbols, combined with direct government financial support for all major religious groups, has done much to diffuse potential religious tensions” (50). In celebrating the unique nuances of so many cultures, virtually every group on the island and every individual receives due attention.

In September, people of all faiths flock to the shrine of Father Jacques Désiré Laval, a 19th century French missionary—recognized as a great Mauritian by Christians and non-Christians alike—in Sainte Croix, Port Louis. “One can almost catch a glimpse of Lourdes in the fervour of the crowd who attributes miraculous healing powers to this holy man” (Eriksen 144). Divali, considered the most jovial of all Hindu festivals, is celebrated in October or November and marks the victory of righteousness over evil in the Hindu mythology. Traditionally, clay oil lamps were placed in front of every home.

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10 Bowman writes, “Catholicism in Mauritius is associated with individuals who are honored by Mauritians of all religions” (48). In addition to the annual September Laval pilgrimage, Mauritian Catholics have seen some impressive displays of support and recognition from the Vatican including a Mauritian Cardinal—Jean Margeot—and an October, 1989 visit by John Paul II.
turning the island into a land of flickering lights; these have now been replaced mostly by
decorative electric lights.

Aside from highlighting the festive nature of the Mauritian people, the sheer
number of holidays shows two things. First, the breakdown of Mauritian religions within
the state’s population —lacking a clear majority— drives a need to recognize each
group’s holidays. Second, and more telling about the actual treatment of religious
expression, is the number of people who cross cultures to celebrate other holidays.
“There can be no doubt that the majority of Mauritians do not wish ethnic boundaries to
vanish altogether, although there are many views on what the relationship between
similarity and difference ought to be” (Eriksen 169). In his speech on the occasion of the
Ganesh Chaturthi Festival on 18 September 18, 2004, Motee Ramdass, the Minister of
Arts and Culture commended “the tireless efforts of socio-cultural organizations such as
the Mauritius Marathi Mandali Federation keeping alive our traditions and ancestral
values which not only enrich our cultural life but also strengthen our national unity.”

In attempting to capture the essence of Mauritian nationalism, Ramdass said, “On such
occasions we must also have a special thought for our forefathers who despite all their
difficulties and miseries during the dark period of indentured labour system made
immense sacrifice to preserve their traditional, cultural and spiritual values.”

In focusing these remarks on the importance of religious values and cultural traditions to the
state, Mauritian leadership begins to define the importance the state places on religious
and cultural pluralism and acceptance by the people of the country.

11 Speeches available at the Mauritian Ministry of Arts and Culture Web Page
http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/mac/menuitem.a1d95cf7ad12db80b6597adaa0208a0c/?content_id=
=fd7adb2467158010VgnVCM100000ca6a12acRCRD

12 Ibid
In practice, the government ensures that no one religion be given the opportunity to assert itself unfairly, and has emphasized this in the constitution’s handling of the state education system:

Protection from students being required to receive religious instruction or take part in or attend any religious ceremony or observance if that instruction, ceremony or observance that relates to a religion that he does not profess. (Mauritian Constitution II.11.2)

Protection for denominations to make provisions for giving religious instruction (Mauritian Constitution II.11.3)

Interestingly, both state and society foster pluralism through the Catholic school system. While most schools on the island are public, “The Catholic Church runs some of the most prestigious secondary schools in the country, but as a condition for receiving state funding, a minimum of 49 percent of the students have to be non-Catholics” (Eriksen 171). Here, the state accomplishes an impressive balance by recognizing the right of the church to run the schools, promoting quality education and ensuring no one group is overrun in the process. This balance has been challenged periodically, as was the case in a 1989 suit against a Catholic school by a non-Catholic desiring employment as a teacher was filed because the plaintiff suspected that her application had been passed over on religious grounds. “The principle of difference here was victorious over the principle of equality. Instead of a common denominator defending a principle of meritocracy, a common denominator defending ethnic segregation was sanctioned” (Eriksen 171-172). The school won, creating a precedent for differential treatment on religious grounds in a limited part of the labor market.

While diversity and acceptance are Mauritius’ calling cards, devotion is not. “How could it be possible for a person to maintain sincere belief in a particular religious
doctrine,” Eriksen asks, “Granted that the surroundings offered a multitude of alternatives, visibly proven cognitively viable to their adherents?” (91). Eriksen provides a host of examples including a large numbers of Tamils, and later Sino-Mauritians, who have converted to Christianity; increasing numbers of Creoles have participated actively in the annual Tamil Cavadee festival; many “nominally Christian” Sino-Mauritians celebrate both the Christian and Chinese New Year, performing most rituals in church; Hindu women observed at Mass claiming that they remained religious Hindus, and did not seem to understand the concept of contradicting religious practices; and an unknown, “but probably enormous” number of Mauritians turn to traditional healers and advisors for personal problems (Eriksen 92-93). From the examples of the tremendous cross-religion participation in a number of Mauritian holidays and even the intermingling of all faiths in Catholic schools, the conclusion can be drawn that the bevy of religions encourages both participation and celebration by any interested Mauritian.

IV. The Relationship between Religion and Democracy

Scholars like Miles argue Mauritian tolerance to religious pluralism as the platform the state’s diversity is built upon writing, “Religious tolerance is itself the bedrock for other liberties, including political freedom; constitutional protection for religious freedom merely formalizes an already entrenched ethos” (100). While there are clearly defined ethnic groups and religions on the island according to Freedom House, political parties are not divided along the lines of the country's diverse ethnicities and religions. Also, there are no state-mandated restrictions on public wear of religious garb, and since the 1990s, there has been an upsurge in popular interest in cultural origins. Mauritius’ strong tolerance for religious pluralism within the state includes the fact that non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) are permitted to operate in Mauritius and official figures classify NGOs in two ways, by “activity or function” and by “ethnic or religious provenance” (Miles 98). Missionaries are typically allowed to enter the island with little to no government oversight, although there have been some complaints about the process to renew visas. Mauritius does not have a ministry of religious affairs and the state manages religious affairs under the Ministry of Arts and Culture. The mission of the Ministry is to foster a balanced and harmonious Mauritian society through consolidation of existing pluralism, promotion of creativity and the celebration of cultural values.

“Mauritians of all faiths espouse toleration for the beliefs of others. No religious community claims precedence, either in temporal or in spiritual terms” (Miles 100). The example of Pere Henri Souchon supports this notion in that at the height of the legendary ‘race riots’ of 1968 Souchon, “admonished his congregation in central Port Louis to visit the nearby mosque in order to familiarize themselves with a Muslim way of thought and thereby mitigate the mutual suspicion between Christians and Muslims (Eriksen 170-171).” For his efforts, Souchon today is fondly remembered among Mauritians as “the human bridge” (Eriksen 170-171).

As mentioned previously, tensions between groups have evolved over time and have for the most part dissipated since independence. The growing acceptance towards intermarriage may be indicative of a sentiment of mutual respect that has manifested itself in other ways on the island. Typically, the one sticking point hampering intermarriage is generational disagreement. Intermarriage is legal in Mauritius and “there seems to have been a growth in the occurrence of interethnic marriages” (Eriksen 168).
Intermarriage trends seen on the island in recent years support the notion of growing acceptance between faiths.

While there is a strong case of institutionalized pluralism, Mauritius has also experienced scattered challenges concerning religions and religious groups since democracy. In 1986, the work permit and residence of *Pere* Diard, a Frenchman, expired and was not renewed by Mauritian authorities. The government maintained that the priest was instrumental in an illegal strike, although some took issue with the exact reasoning behind the deportation. “It is clear…that it had something to do with workers’ rights, and that he claimed these rights on behalf of all workers, not merely the Christian ones” (Eriksen 95). This situation is noteworthy in that it caused an alleged affront to a delicate balance in the state, thus compelling the elected leadership to speak out to the public.

“This was a threat to the stability of the country and could not be accepted. ‘If I had gone to France and done what Diard did here, I would have been evicted immediately,’” said Prime Minister Jugnauth, who made it a point to address concerns surrounding the Diard affair on television (Eriksen 95). Jugnauth also said the following on the Diard case, “No religious body should think that it is a state within a state” (Eriksen 170). This statement was important for a number of reasons, particularly because there was potential for this case to stoke the flames of religious conflict. In an attempt to shape the conflict, Jugnauth maintained “that the expulsion was not caused by religious animosities, for religious pluralism had to be deemed legitimate; rather it was the ‘meddling’ with the affairs of the state by the priest (who, like many Catholic clergymen in Mauritius was a French citizen) that was considered illegitimate.” (Eriksen 170).
In 1984, the entire staff of the Libyan Embassy in Port Louis were forced to leave Mauritius within 48 hours. While the exact circumstances surrounding the expulsion remain unclear, it is known that the Libyans initiated a certain missionary activity with Christians in eastern Port Louis. The Libyans subsidized “infrastructural expenses and improvements in the city, a Muslim stronghold in Mauritius (as a tangible result, the main square in eastern Port Louis was renamed Khaddaffi Square). It was also rumored that Christians were paid as much as Rs. 40,000 ($3,700) to convert to Islam (Eriksen 93). This event was also a clear indicator of the issue of religion’s potential as a powder keg threatening a delicate balance. “The government’s reasoning was that if a sufficiently large number of Christians converted to Islam, the precarious ethnic equilibrium of Port Louis (and of Mauritius as such) might have been upset, and the outcome would be unpredictable and possibly disastrous” (Eriksen 93-94). Again, there was special attention paid by the government in the interest of maintaining some sort of balance in the population.

V. Conclusion

Mauritian religious pluralism is not only institutionalized within the law, it has thrived in practice. While some liken Mauritian inter-religious rivalries to “walking on egg shells,” this can be attributed to the challenges that come with the imperfections that are often manifest in cultural differences (Eriksen 48). “Virtually every country in the world is torn, in some way, between homogenization and emphasis on shared values in culture on the one hand; and differentiation and ethnic or regional movements on the other. Mauritius is not unique in this” (Eriksen 169). In spite of infrequent challenges and an anticipated—but manageable—degree of interethnic tension religion in Mauritius
is built upon a foundation and history of flexibility and has experienced great success and reaped great rewards for the Mauritian people. The “best loser” system—established at the founding of the state—has worked well to ensure that the Hindu majority does not maintain a monopoly on Mauritian governance. The government takes a proactive stance in institutionalizing the tolerance and inclusion of religious pluralism within the state. For instance, when the government took action to address potentially inflammatory issues regarding religion, specifically in the Diard affair, leadership was quick to answer any questions or concerns with the press promoting an open dialogue with concerned citizens and groups and underscoring the importance the state focuses on maintaining a balance between potentially volatile groups.

The future success of Mauritian democracy and its treatment of religious pluralism revolves around both the balance and understanding that was established, maintained, and respected between the various groups on the island. The government works to ensure that the many different religions receive due diligence in support of the rights of practitioners to follow their faith freely. For instance, holidays receive federal recognition has worked well in conjunction with Mauritian citizens’ common sense of pride in both one’s ethnic background as well as the shared background with fellow Mauritian citizens. The simple act of shared celebration has fostered an environment that has nurtured mutual respect. This mutual respect has been a tremendous boon to the international perception of modern Mauritius.
III. Turkey: Cultural Bridge, Continental Divide

“Turkey is also an avowedly secular state, in which Islamic culture has opened to those forces of modernization, usually associated with the West, which have led to a distinction between religion and politics, the sacred and the secular, making Turkey what you yourself have referred to as a synthesis of East and West.”

-Address of Pope John Paul II to the new ambassador of Turkey to the Holy See, 7 Dec 01

“Unlike the U.S. model of secularism that rigidly separates church from state and requires the state to stay out of religious affairs entirely, Turkish secularism has promoted absolute domination and control of religion by the state at nearly all levels.”

- Graham E. Fuller, “Turkey’s Strategic Model: Myths and Realities” (52)

I. Introduction

For more than 1,000 years, the Anatolian peninsula served as the bridge between the Muslim Middle East and the Christian West, and the duality of Turkey has long been a hallmark of the state’s existence. For a country rooted in a rich cultural history, modern Turkish leadership walks a veritable tightrope in attempting to balance the tradition and social identity of the state while keeping an eye towards the future. In the decades leading to the early 21st century, the Turkish state has focused on moving its primary identity from the Middle East to Europe.

Much of Turkey’s formal hopes to “fit in” with the West kicked off in 1964, when the state began this process attaining associate member status of the European Community. Turkey submitted and initial application for full membership into the European Union in 1987—a move more than 80 years in the making. However, a number of international concerns stand in the way of Turkey and this ultimate goal of

Western acceptance. Over the past decade, the Turkish state has undertaken many reforms to strengthen both its democracy and economy. These changes focus on enabling the state to begin accession membership talks with the European Union tailoring Turkish law to make the best argument for the state’s quest for membership in the European Union.

While the Turkish government continues to lead with a focus on EU membership, it is noteworthy that conflicting interests has recently divided the population’s opinion on this focus. Turkish membership in the EU is still at least a decade away—European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso recently predicted a wait of 15 to 20 years. With France electing Nicolas Sarkozy—who stands categorically opposed to Turkish EU membership—to the presidency May 6, 2007, the path to Turkish EU membership has again encountered an estimable roadblock. Western influence in Turkey has diminished thanks to the war in Iraq, which has enflamed anti-American sentiment. As of 2006, only one in three Turks desire membership in the EU, dramatically lower than those interested as recently as 2004 (Gunter 119). Other issues causing Turkey’s interest in joining the EU to wane include Turkey’s strained relations with Cyprus (itself an EU member since 1994), EU demands for Kurdish rights, the French parliament seeking to embarrass Turkey by making it a crime to deny the Turkish genocide against Armenians during World War I, and the EU’s penchant to seek excuses to block or delay Turkish membership (Horsley).

Two concepts of life define the modern Turkish state: a secular lifestyle with its inherent freedoms and insecurities in addition to a religious way with its certainties and

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14 Unattributed, “The battle for Turkey’s soul” The Economist 5 May 2007: 11
15 Unattributed, “The battle for Turkey’s soul” The Economist 5 May 2007: 11
16 From BBC’s Web site, date 6 Nov 06: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6121106.stm.
strict controls (Howe 1-2). Equipped with a democratic constitution, Turkey is often referenced as the only democracy in the Islamic world, with much focus on Turkey’s unique status in the Middle East (Zakaria 2, Huntington 2003: 74). Domestically, Turkey faces issues surrounding the differences between two cultures and throughout the past three decades, the state has begun to experience something of an identity crisis. Freedom House cites the role of political Islam as one of the “defining questions of Turkish politics in the 1990s and early twenty-first century”. Howe evokes her experiences reporting from Turkey in the 1970s and 1980s in describing domestic issues within the Turkish state as “not a classic schism between East and West, rich and poor, or traditional and progressive. It is not even the kind of religious factionalism that wracks other countries, because about 98 percent...are Muslim” (1). A country of nearly 69 million people, the majority of Turks are Sunni Muslims, with most of the remaining 2 percent identifying as Christian and as Jew (Turkey, CIA World Factbook). These numbers are static, as conversion rarely occurs in Turkey.

Zakaria calls Turkey “the only predominantly Muslim society that has succeeded in sustaining an electoral parliamentary system of government for any length of time” (2). Huntington notes that, “Islam...has not been hospitable to democracy...The one Islamic country that sustained even intermittent democracy after World War II was Turkey, which had, under Mustapha (sic) Kemal, explicitly rejected its Islamic tradition and defined itself as a secular republic” (2003: 208). Stepan’s research

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17 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=7077
18 Because of the various spellings borne out of translation, I refer to people who practice Islam as ‘Muslims’, but use alternate spellings within direct quotes when appropriate.
19 Indonesia, with a population of more than 234 million, is 88% Muslim and conducted democratic elections in 2006 and has the same “Partly Free” rating as Turkey in the Freedom House report. India, with a population encompassing more than 130 million Muslims, is rated as “Free” by Freedom House.
shows that the divide is not necessarily driven by religion, noting that the world’s 16 Arab states are the most readily identifiable block that “underachieves” in terms of holding competitive elections (Stepan 30). While religious-based parties like the Justice and Development Party (known by its Turkish initials, AKP for Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) ruling in a secular democracy like Turkey raises eyebrows even within the state’s borders, religious-based Christian Democratic parties have been successful as ruling parties in many European countries, including Germany, Austria, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. In fact, Portugal is the sole EU member with a constitution prohibition on political parties from using religious affiliations or symbols (Huntington 1984: 207, Stepan 41). According to Stepan, “Our analysis of Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Turkey and even post-1997 Iran demonstrates the pitfalls of focusing only on the problems for democracy related to Islam, while neglecting the overall sociopolitical, military, ethnic, economic, and international contexts” (Stepan 52). Before assaulting any one religion—as Islam is much maligned—it is notable that there are numerous examples of virtually every religion competing with democratization.

For instance, the 31 Muslim non-Arab states “greatly overachieve” in holding competitive elections compared to their respective Gross Domestic Products per capita (GDPpc) (Stepan 30). Scholars tend to combine the notions of Arab and Islamic identities, in spite of the fact that 396 million non-Arab Muslim-majority states, which fall into Stepan’s “greatly overachieving” category (Stepan 143). Considering Turkey’s composition and aspirations, the state straddles two worlds—it is important here to note that Turks are not Arabs—and confounds scholars hoping to pigeonhole the state’s identity.
Geller writes, “Islam is unique among world religions, and Turkey is unique within the Muslim world…the exception within the exception” (Gulalp 2003: 382). In spite of this, scholars like Gulalp continue to claim that, “Unlike other religions, Islam is not conducive to secularization; consequently, Islam has always occupied a central place in the lives of Muslim societies, so much so that the hold of the religion over the society seems interestingly independent of other aspects of society” (2003: 381). Religions rarely operate with one voice and Turkey’s Islamic society is far from monolithic, coming complete with mystics who oppose involvement in politics to politicians focused on restoring Turkish governance to Islamic law, by violence if necessary (Howe 5).

The Muslim faith has many branches and diverse belief groups, with additional layers of varying degrees of devotion to the tenets of the faith. Within Turkey, there is a noteworthy Shi’a minority, of which an estimated 12 million are Alevi, “a distinct persuasion whose rituals include men and women worshipping together through speeches, poetry and dance” (U.S. Department of State 2006). The Alevi religious minority, which amounts to about one fourth of the country’s population, resent the Sunni bias in the curriculum, which fails to recognize their doctrines and beliefs in religious instruction classes (Kaplan 676).

This duality in the perception of Islam creates in numerous—often conflicting —arguments found in academic research, resulting in a veritable who’s who of scholars chiming in with their array of opinions. Stepan contends, “There is an extensive body of literature arguing that many key aspects of democracy are lacking in Islamic tradition” (47). Sen posits, “Due to the experience of contemporary political battles, especially in the Middle East, Islam is often portrayed as fundamentally intolerant of and hostile to

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20 Also known as Sharia.
individual freedom” (15). To this point Huntington argues, “Islamic culture explains in large part the failure of democracy to emerge in much of the Muslim world” (Huntington 2003: 29). However, in direct contrast to this sentiment Turkey has now truly become a model for the Muslim world in that it is one of the few Muslim states in which truly representative and democratic politics have emerged (Fuller 53). Rising above the fray and falling short of stereotyping a single religion, Stepan argues such broad generalizations must be carefully characterized, “We should beware of assuming that any religion’s doctrine is univocally prodemocratic or antidemocratic” (44). Stepan also highlights historical situations where states fostered inherent obstacles to democracy because of Catholicism, Lutheranism, or Calvinism and their “antidemocratic doctrines and nondemocratic practices” (44). There is no shortage of opinions concerning Islam’s relationship with democracy.²¹ By extension, Turkey serves as an interesting case study in examining this relationship. The Anatolian peninsula carries a rich history of war and empire over the millennia, divisiveness and diversity and a unique sense of nationalism that encompasses many of these historical aspects realized in Turkey today.

II. History

One political scientist describes the value of Turkey as a case study, by writing of “the fascinating uniqueness of Turkey, or the many uniquenesses (sic) of Turkey, and the interconnectedness of the various unique aspects of the Turkish political and social experience” (Gellner 128). These distinct qualities are found in at least four fields: in

religion, in state formation, in the pattern of nationalism, and in the diverse styles of modernity (Gellner 128). Because of the faiths involved and ethnic and cultural makeup of the state, there is perhaps no more important case study to examine for many of Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbor states. To properly understand both modern Turkish religious pluralism and the future of the state requires an understanding of the storied history of this intercontinental bridge.

*Age of Empire*

The Ottoman Empire—the longest-lived and most powerful Muslim polity the world has seen—is the bedrock foundation from which the modern Turkish state evolved (Silverstein 498). During the height of the Ottoman Empire—in the 16th and 17th centuries—the empire covered the Anatolian peninsula, the Middle East, parts of North African and southeastern Europe (namely present-day Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro). The Ottoman sultan went by the title “Caliph of all Muslims on Earth” and “Protector of the Two Holy Cities” [of Mecca and Medina] (Kaplan 666). In turn, the sultanate was imbued with sacredness, as befit its official name—“the well-protected [by God] domains” (*memalik-i mahrusa*) (Kaplan 666). Before adopting Islam—a process facilitated by the Abbasid victory at the 751 Battle of Talas—the Turkic peoples, who are the ancestors of most contemporary Turks, practiced non-Judeo-Christian religions. After this battle, many of the tribes along trade routes gradually converted to Islam and brought the faith with them to Anatolia beginning around the 1100’s (Oresman 422). Before this time, efficiency was placed above loyalty to any one faith. This mindset continued to exist at least in principle, in subsequent iterations of Anatolian peninsula civilization.
In terms of religious toleration, the rich Turkish history provides centuries worth
of perhaps one of the most tolerant societies in history.

Under the Ottoman Empire, nationalities were defined in terms of religious affiliation
rather than ethnicity. Turks were part of the Muslim ‘nation,’ and Turkishness was
not a political phenomenon. It was only in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries—when non-Muslims as well as non-Turkish Muslims began clamoring for
independence and the Ottoman Empire became a hotbed of nationalist uprisings—that
the notion of Turkishness assumed political salience: It may be said that Turks
learned about their Turkishness from other ethnic groups struggling for sovereignty
(Ergil 123).

The Ottomans adopted what can be described as a business model for running the empire,
focusing more on productivity over identity. Throughout the Empire, there was no
primary conversion to Islam. People of multiple ethnic and religious backgrounds served
in numerous military and bureaucratic roles within the vast empire. “The Ottoman
Empire ruled a society that evinced, among other things, a mosaic of religions as well as
sects. Consequently, it could not afford to subscribe to a particular version of Islam and
thus impose upon its subjects a uniform faith and practice” (Heper 157). The Ottoman
administrative system included tremendous social mobility regardless of ethnic or
religious background. Under the devshirme system, bright non-Muslim boys were
recruited and converted and received military or administrative training becoming either
janissary warriors or high-ranking vezir bureaucrats (Ahmad 19).

The Empire often served as a refuge for the persecuted and exiled Jews of Europe,
as for example following the expulsion of the Jews from Spain in 1492, when Sultan
Beyazid II allowed them entrance into the empire. “Even now, many Jews speak with
gratitude of how the Ottoman sultan welcomed their ancestors in 1492, when they were
forced to flee the Spanish Inquisition. From the sixteenth century, Jews attained
important positions in the sultans’ courts, in banking and trade, medicine, and the arts and
crafts” (Howe 93). As a result of this large-scale Jewish migration, many Jews rose to prominence in roles such as physicians (Heyd 154), and to this day, Jews pride themselves on “being the most integrated non-Muslim community in Turkey…Jews are full Turkish citizens, having waived minority status after Ataturk established the democratic secular republic in 1923” (Howe 93).

The invasion of Anatolia by Greek armies precipitated a popular national-liberation movement, led by General Mustafa Kemal—who later added the title Ataturk, meaning “father of the Turks”—and other officers of the dismantled Ottoman army (Ergil 123). After fighting on the losing side in World War I, the Ottoman government was compelled by the victors to accept the Treaty of Sevres, which divided its former empire, and ultimately led to its downfall. Under heavy pressure from the Allied powers, the treaty stands as a complex, significant pact that became the fount of many contemporary struggles, including issues that mar the region today concerning ethnic Kurds. In 1923, the Treaty of Sevres was superseded by the Treaty of Lausanne, which “legitimized the territorial integrity and unitary nature of the newly declared republic” (Ergil 124). An important aspect of the nascent republic came in that Ataturk did not make “Turkishness” the basis of the new state, which appealed to the Kurds and other minority groups that did not identify as Ottomans (Ergil 124). From the start, Ataturk pushed numerous sweeping changes into effect, making it clear that he was “seeking statehood for the multicultural entity of Anatolia” (Ergil 124). For a number of reasons, these multicultural efforts were discarded shortly thereafter, and the government instead pushed towards a policy of “uniformity and standardization” (Ergil 125).

*Modern Turkey*
With the overthrow of Sultan Mehmet VI Vahdettin by the new Republican Assembly of Turkey, the modern state came into being as the Republic of Turkey in 1922. Turkey today is best described as the Ataturk-spawned period that compelled the state and population of Turkey to balance pure secularism and the continual creeping of Islam into politics and education. As founder and visionary of guiding principles, Ataturk declared Muslim Turkey a secular state, and implemented the ideology known as Kemalism to affect changes. “Kemalist nationalism was simultaneously ‘anti-imperialist’ and ‘pro-western’. In Kemalist ideology, Turkey could only defeat western imperialism by adopting westernization” (Gulalp 2002: 28). Traditionally, the secular groups have “unswervingly pursued the Western-oriented project set down by Ataturk” (Howe 4). In analyzing the prospects for democracy in “non-Western, ‘non-Christian’ civilizations, analysts frequently assume that the separation of church and state and secularism are core features not only of Western democracy, but of democracy itself” (Stepan 40).

Following Ataturk’s lead, the country adopted a vast array of reforms—social, legal and political. The Turkish leader banned the wearing of the fez, which was headgear rooted in East Asia, but traditional clothing continues to remain a constant cause of consternation in the future of the Turkish state. Attaturk adopted both the Latin alphabet and Gregorian calendar, borrowed a penal code from Mussolini’s Italy and moved the language to vernacular Turkish from Ottoman (Smith 440). Although Ataturk died in 1938, the impacts of his reforms are still felt in contemporary Turkey. For instance, Orhan Pamuk, Turkey’s first Nobel laureate, was charged with violating a June, 2005 law, which requires Turkish citizens not insult the Republic or Turkish Grand National Assembly under penalty of imprisonment for a term of six months to three
years. Pamuk was charged after an interview with a Swiss newspaper in which Pamuk mentioned the Turkish killing of 30,000 Kurds and 1 million Armenians. The charges were dropped in January, 2006.

Smith notes, “The only explicit minority rights that exist in Turkey have their origins outside the Kemalist social contract; these are the protections accorded non-Muslims—traditionally Greeks, Armenians, and Jews—in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, which codified the status of modern Turkey in international law” (437). By contrast, the Kurds, cut off from the rest of the country by their remote location in the mountainous southeastern regions, divided along tribal lines, and economically dependent on local landed elites, remained largely unaffected (Ergil 125).

Since Ataturk, while parties have multiplied, periods of instability and intermittent military coups have challenged Turkish democracy. The coups all revolve around a similar topic: the influence of Islam on the government. “The Turkish military in particular has been the zealous and jealous guardian of this Ataturkist ideology and has led the struggle in suppressing any form of organized religious strength or the involvement of overtly religious people in politics” (Fuller 52). The Turkish army, long the vigilant watchdog for any sign of religion in government, has had to accede to the reality that the public overwhelmingly elected this party and that the AKP has, by and large, worked within the ideological confines of the established Turkish political order (Fuller 54). The army’s allowance of the AKP to operate with relatively little

22 This law includes Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which was included as a penal-law reform for negotiations to aid Turkish membership in the EU. “Since it has gone into effect, the vagueness of Article 301 has been used by extreme nationalists and statists to accuse writers, scholars, and intellectuals of treason and subversion” (Gunter 119). It is noteworthy that no one has been imprisoned by Article 301, but it has caused concern for the freedom of speech in Turkey (Gunter 119).
involvement should not be surprising in light of the fact that Islamic parties have been on the ascendency across the entire Muslim world for the past two decades or more. Events of early 2007, however, have shown that the military still wields power over the government, but the power has evolved and tempered over the past eighty years.

III. Turkish Democracy

Between the will of the people, the goals of the politicians and the power of the military, Turkish domestic politics are incredibly complex. The military has the power to intervene simply if it believes the government is moving in the wrong direction, and this power is the definitive aspect of Turkish government holding it back from true democracy. The army is treated as the “most trusted institution” and is considered “above politics” (Cizre 321). While a separation of church and state is often tied to freedom of thought and perhaps even enlightenment, the guiding hand of the military ensures that secularism has its place in Turkey. Because of the tensions that accompany the lurking potential of a military coup at the will of the commanders, there is credence in questioning whether Turkey is a legitimate democracy or just a puppet state forever on the brink of overthrow. Current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, “a reformed Islamist who was jailed for four months in 1999 for ‘inciting religious hatred,’” now governs under the eagle eye of the country’s military (Smith 436-437). In late 1997, while mayor of Istanbul, Erdogan recited a prayer of Turkish poet Ziya Gökalp, stating the following quatrain:

Minarets are bayonets
Domes are helmets
Mosques are barracks
Believers are soldiers (Heper 2003:170).
As a result of inciting religious hatred with this poetry, Erdogan was sentenced to 10 months in jail but served four months of his sentence. Initially, he was banned from political activity, but was reinstated in 2002, became a driving force within the AKP and became Prime Minister. According to Freedom House, the AKP has consistently sought to distance itself from a perception of promoting political Islamism, but by being lead by Erdogan, the long-term motivations of the AKP come under the scrutiny of the collective watchful eye of the military’s colonels. There are scholars who argue that the populist messages used by Islamic parties are fair game and subject to the whims of democratic politics. “When the day inevitably comes that the electorate feels this Islamic party has run out of steam, it will of course face defeat at the polls and another party will replace it, all as part of a normal alteration of political power that will make Islamic parties just like other parties” (Fuller 53). In short, successfully capitalizing on a popular message today does not guarantee support from the public if results are not there as well. Again, the argument for Turkey’s recognition as a true democracy will always shrink beneath the specter of military control, because Turkey’s history of military coups and intercessions with the democratic process runs deep.

According to the definition of democracy established in Chapter 1, Turkey satisfies the following requirements: First, the freedom of expression is explicitly stated in the constitution in Chapter VI, Article 24, which states, “Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction” (Turkish Constitution). Other key religion-related rights expressly guaranteed by the constitution in Chapter VI, Article 24 also include the protection of acts of worship, religious services, and ceremonies. Likewise, the constitution ensures that no one shall be compelled to worship, or to
participate in religious ceremonies and rites, to reveal religious beliefs and convictions, or be blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs and convictions. The constitution also ensures that religious and ethics education and instruction shall both be conducted under state supervision and control, and is compulsory in the curricula of primary and secondary schools. Additional religious education and instruction shall be subject to the individual’s own desire, and in the case of minors, to the request of their legal representatives (Turkish Constitution).

Freedom House lists Turkey as “Partly Free”, ranking it among the likes of Fiji and Indonesia. The organization rated Turkey with a 3 for political rights and a 3 for civil liberties. In the 2006 Freedom House ratings, Turkey's civil liberties rating improved from 4 to 3 due to the passage of another round of major reforms, including a complete overhaul of the penal code, greater civilian control of the military, the initiation of broadcasts in minority languages, and a decrease in the severest forms of torture (Freedom House 2006). For Turkey, Freedom House’s areas of recommended improvement include: limiting restrictions on public gatherings—similar to those mandated by the European Convention on Human Rights—and embracing multiculturalism, perhaps through constitutional amendment, to ensure that all religious, ethnic, and cultural groups are treated equally (Freedom House 2005).

In the interest of preserving liberal democracy Freedom House reports that citizens of Turkey can change their government democratically. “The 1982 constitution provides for a 550-member parliament, the Grand National Assembly, which is elected to five-year terms” (Freedom House 2006). To protect universality and minority groups, the constitution requires that a party win a minimum of 10 percent of the national vote for
parliamentary representation. Because of this, a large number and variety of parties
“participated in active campaigning in 2002, only two parties—the AKP and the
Republican People's Party (CHP)—won seats” (Freedom House 2006). Nevertheless,
both of these parties had been in the opposition, thus attesting to the ability of the
electorate to precipitate change (Freedom House 2006).

Article 15 in Section IV of the Turkish constitution, entitled, “Suspension of the
Exercise of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms,” reads as follows:

In times of war, mobilization, martial law, or state of emergency, the exercise of
fundamental rights and freedoms can be partially or entirely suspended, or measures
may be taken, to the extent required by the exigencies of the situation, which derogate
the guarantees embodied in the Constitution, provided that obligations under
international law are not violated (Turkish Constitution).

To protect pluralism, the constitution guarantees no one shall exploit or abuse religion or
religious feelings or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the
purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental,
social, economic, political, and legal order of the state on religious tenets. While these
rights are guaranteed, they come with a caveat. In recent years, the Islamic movement
has seen its political arm grow exponentially powerful. While the AKP has been very
careful to not pass any laws challenging the secular tenets of the constitution, millions of
Turks clearly worry about the influence of Islam in the state, and have protested the AKP
based on these vague concerns. When these fears of Islamic intervention are matched
with the outward display of the religion, the military has often felt compelled to act.

Spurred by the 1960 election, which Kaplan calls “the most divisive in its short
history as a Turkish Republic,” a military coup temporally arrested this religious shift in
the national educational system (Kaplan 666). When a member of parliament called a
press conference proposing that Turkey be called “a secular and democratic Islamic State,” the military moved in (Kaplan 665). “At the same time, from 1969 to the present, religiously oriented political cadres in Turkey have increasingly adapted themselves to the secular and democratic system” (Heper 159). A decade later, the military removed Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel from office during Operation Dev-Kur (Saving the State) in 1971. Technically not a coup, the 1971 event is referred to as a military intervention.

Demirel eventually returned to power, elected as Prime Minister three more times, and was removed again in 1980 (Karasapan 8). In 1980, the military intervened when it deemed that law and order was breaking down throughout the country and, in particular, in high schools and on university campuses (Kaplan 666). This military coup temporarily arrested this religious shift in the national educational system. One of the most important outcomes of the 1980 coup was the generals’ move towards the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, an intellectual movement advocating greater integration of Islamic values in the nation’s political culture, and they followed this path as part of their movement towards a more politically docile polity (Kaplan 666). The Turkish-Islamic synthesis allowed for the generation of Turks entering their twenties and thirties to learn in an environment that promoted Islam as a pillar of good citizenship and modern Turkish culture. At the core of the social and historical views of those involved in the movement “is positing that religion is the linchpin connecting an ever changing material culture with an invariant native spiritual essence” (Kaplan 666). Cizre and Cinar describe the shift as “elements of Islam were incorporated into public discourse to provide a moral basis, ideological unity, and some certainty in the face of global capitalism…” (resulting in) a
complete reversal from the republican pattern of state-Islam relations that, in the past, allowed for negotiation, compromise, and reconciliation between Turkey’s political Islamists and the establishment” (312). In principle, the Turkish government began to accept and gain a better understanding of the role of religion in a truly democratic state and began to work towards fostering this relationship.

A new Turkish Constitution was drafted in 1982 with the military’s looming presence clearly pressuring the government to return to the pre-1980 status quo. The updated constitution was drafted during a period of military rule by a committee vetted by the military and was approved by a plebiscite, although no one was permitted to campaign against ratification (Stepan 52). Key points of the new document were established in Article 2, stating that the Turkish Republic is secular, and Article 4 creates an interesting scenario in that Article 2 can never be changed, not even by Constitutional amendment. “Article 24 asserts that ‘education and instruction in religion and ethics shall be under state supervision and control,’ and adds, in a clause used to ban the Welfare party, that ‘No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religious systems’” (Stepan 52). As currently constituted, Turkey’s constitution is more restrictive both in the freedom of religious expression within society in addition to the freedom of organization within political society than any other longstanding Western democracy (Stepan 52). The compromise forged in 1982 secured a status quo lasted for just over a decade.

In 1995, the Islamic Welfare Party (Refah Partisi), won the general election but failed to reach a majority. From June 1996 to June 1997, Turkey had its first prime minister representing a de facto Islamic party when Necmettin Erkban—banned from
politics after the 1980 coup, but allowed to return after a ban was lifted—who became Prime Minister representing the Welfare Party’s coalition government in 1996. After taking power, Erkban was accused of violating Turkey’s secular constitution. Shortly after the party came to power in 1996, the military-dominated National Security Council (NSC) on February 28, 1997, issued the Welfare Party-lead Refahyol coalition government with a list of measures designed to nullify the supposed Islamization of Turkey and fortify the secular system (Cizre 309). Stepan writes, “When an Islamic-based government came to power in Turkey in 1996, there were frequent references to the threat that this presented to Western style secular democracy” (40). Two other parties formed a coalition instead, but a breakup of that coalition in 1997 forced the Democratic Party to form a coalition with Welfare. Convinced that Ataturk’s revolution was in danger, secularists united against the Islamic-led coalition and Turkish army colonels overthrew the civilian government, forced Erkban from power and enacted a new constitution—reaffirming the separation of church and state—and returned the People’s Republican Party to power (Howe 12, Kaplan 665). During this coup, the Islamic Welfare Party was disbanded by an order of a constitutional court. The coalition collapsed a few months later. “It was the fateful summer of 1997, when the secular elite, led by the military, drew the line against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. This event has since been labeled the ‘Post-modern coup’ because no troops were deployed to force the government from power” (Aydintasbas 32). The ousting of the Refahyol government highlighted the commencement of the military’s refashioning Turkey’s political landscape along Kemalist lines without directly taking over power (Cizre 309-310). “The architects behind the February 28 process grounded their actions in the need
to ensure the ‘continuity’ of the basic assumptions of the Kemalist model,” Cizre writes (310). “The Turkish military, former President Suleyman Demirel, the civil societal network of the secular establishment, media, and large sectors of the populace believe that Islamic reactionism constitutes the chronic, if at times, undetectable, malaise of the Turkish polity” (Cizre 310-312). The concept of the non-military, post-modern coup would evolve over the next decade along with technology when in 2007 the military would post a list of concerns on the Internet, addressing the governments moves and intentions and provide warning to maintain the secular nation of the state.

The threat and tensions of coup returned in April, 2007, Erdogan chose not to run for president instead hand-selecting foreign minister, Abdullah Gul—who is consistently described in the press as an Islamic politician—for the important post. While news reports also point out that Gul’s wife wears the headscarf, it is noteworthy that in his post as foreign minister Gul has labored hard to push Turkey’s membership in the EU and helped shepherd four years of “unprecedented economic growth” in the country.23 The military’s warning was labeled an “e-coup,” as the uniformed leadership wrote of possible intervention if religion and politics mixed and threatened secularism. The stern warning from the military as the general staff invoked its responsibility to defend the state’s legacy of secularism shortly before an inconclusive vote was cast in parliament—the Turkish parliament elects the president. After secular political parties boycotted the vote, it became impossible to attain a plurality. Gul withdrew his candidacy, but that

does not preclude the party from nominating him again when elections reopen in July.\textsuperscript{24}

The situation continues to develop in the face of these charges and of pressure from the military, Turkish elected government leadership is virtually compelled to lead and legislate out of fear of coup, a very undemocratic concept further examined in Chapter 4.

\textit{An Eye towards the West}

The EU has consistently maintained that improvements in Turkey’s human rights are key to membership, and the key issue standing in the way of Turkish acceptance by the West is Turkey’s inability to handle its Kurdish citizens’ demand for cultural recognition (Ergil 122). Through a concept of nation-building, Turkey has focused energy towards the Kurds calling for standardizing the citizenry to make them Turkish in language and nationality, secular in orientation, and obedient to the state. “Such a conception naturally leads to the denial of diversity and the repression of any other expression of group identity. The Turkish official mentality invariably confuses unity with uniformity” (Ergil 123). This mindset stands opposed to a core tenet of democracy—one clearly stated in the Turkish constitution—allowing for freedoms of conscience and expression, and freedom from discrimination. Turkey defines minority groups by religion, thus the Kurds are not officially recognized. “A traditional emphasis on Turkish identity over multiculturalism has left the Kurds facing restrictions on their language, culture, and freedom of expression” (Freedom House 2006). Here, the

practice of the Turkish government stands in contrast to the realities that exist within the state.

Chapter X, Article 10 of the constitution states, “All individuals are equal without any discrimination before the law, irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations” (Turkish Constitution). Additionally, the article clearly establishes that no privilege shall be granted to any individual, family, group or class. The issues surrounding the Kurds find its roots of intolerance in the very nature of the Turkish state. Although the mandatory indication of religious affiliation in personal documents such as ID-cards was abolished in April 2006, such documents still include information on religion, leaving open the potential for discriminatory practices, are cited as areas of concern by outside agencies evaluating Turkey, as was the case when the Commission of the European Communities evaluated Turkey’s status for EU membership in 2006 (Commission of the European Communities 16).

Non-Muslim religious communities were highlighted by the report for a lack of access to legal personality and continued to face restricted property rights. They encountered problems in the management of their foundations and in recovering property by judicial means. For instance, the fact that Alevis continued to face discriminatory practices—their Cem houses, places of worship, are not recognized and receive no funding from the state—receives attention in the report. The Greek Orthodox Halki (Heybeliada) seminary remains closed. The public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch remains banned in Turkey. Also, concern surrounded restrictions on the training of clergy and on foreign clergy to work in Turkey remain and Turkish
legislation was cited for not providing for private higher religious education for these communities.

Sermons and publications of the Religious Affairs Directorate (Diyanet) and of local religious authorities occasionally appear hostile towards proselytizing activities. Attacks against clergy and places of worship of non-Muslim religious communities have been reported, and it is noteworthy that the court case concerning the murder of the Catholic Priest Andrea Santoro in a church in the Black Sea region province of Trabzon in February 2006 resulted in a heavy penalty for the perpetrator. In spite of some of these shortcomings, the 2006 report affirms that the freedom of worship continues to be generally respected (Commission of the European Communities 16). The prospect of membership in the EU brings hope to minority groups believing that this is a strong impetus to ensure fair treatment under the rule of law (see Table 3.1, Turkish Minority Religions for breakdown by population). For instance, members of the Greek Orthodox Church express hope that Turkey gains admission into the European Union—even though it is public knowledge that Greece had opposed Turkey’s membership (Howe 97).

The issue of barring women from wearing headscarves in public universities and government offices, and observant men being dismissed from the military has garnered considerable attention. According to Howe, the unlikely alliance between the military and women activists sees the headscarf as a political issue, “a symbol of radical Islam, aimed at destroying the Republic and establishing a theocratic state like Iran” (103). It is noteworthy that 55% of Turkish women wear the headscarf. Generals have likened headscarves to “the uniform of Islamic extremism,” and demanded their abolition (Howe 103). Women who wear the headscarf typically cite either Islamic identity, self

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25 Unattributed, “Secularism v democracy” The Economist 5 May 2007 (63)
identity and respect for both themselves and their religion (Koker 316). There are periodic protests both for and against the headscarf ban, although it is important to note that the European Court of Human Rights ruled in June 2004 that the ban is legal and the Islam-based AK party dropped its attempt to introduce an easing of the ban in the 2004 penal code reforms. A much more vocal controversy erupted in spring 2004 over an AK proposal to allow graduates of vocational schools—including Islamic imam-*hatip* schools—to enroll in state universities.

In the annual Freedom House report, Turkey is described as follows: “While the constitution protects freedom of religion, the modern Turkish republic was set up on the premise of secularism in which state and religious affairs are separated. In practice, this has meant considerable government control of religion” (Freedom House 2006). Among the many issues currently involving both Islam and the state is government control over religious education. This issue splits Turks into those that think radical Muslims within the government will turn the state into a mirror of Saudi Arabia and those who think that religion has no place in government. The issue of the state’s relationship with religion presents a divisive challenge for Turkey’s future.

**IV. Turkish Secularism**

While the constitution protects freedom of religion, the Turkish republic was established on the premise of secularism in which state and religious affairs are separated. Secularism remains the state's official creed, and despite the AKP winning a large majority of seats in the November 2002 general election, pressure against the role of Islam and openly pious Muslims remains strong. The policies promoted by Ataturk were modeled on French secularism, unlike the U.S. model of secularism that rigidly separates
church from state and requires the state to stay out of religious affairs almost entirely; Turkish secularism has promoted absolute domination and control of religion by the state at nearly all levels (Fuller 52). Howe describes the secular establishment of the Turkish state as encompassing most big businesses, banking and tourism, academia, much of the media and arts, traditional political parties, new civic groups and the armed forces (4). While the military admits that Islam helped social solidarity, it is careful to ensure that religious influence was excluded from the training and education of its officer class (Dodd 321). Through the years, Turkey continues to remain in a near constant state of flux as it prepares for the future. Unfortunately for the democracy, military encroachments on the autonomy of the democratically elected government in Turkey have frequently been viewed as a necessary in protecting secular democracy—as was the case when Gul was nominated for the presidency, and there were frequent references to a vague threat that this presented to Western-style secular democracy (Stepan 40). As Turkish democracy developed, the state’s definition of secularism expanded and adapted, but the constant specter of coup has detracted from the quality of the democracy numerous times between 1960 and today.

Within the state, religious law and the Muslim caliphate was replaced by a Swiss code (Davison 337). To enforce these changes, “judges, teachers and other civil servants fanned out across Anatolia, intending to reshape traditional society” (Smith 440). From modern Turkey’s beginnings, religion was placed under the control of the state and not freed from the state as secularism would strictly require. While many reforms moved to secularize the state, the fact is that they did not remove religion from the state (Davison 337). The Diyanet, a central government organization established in 1924, oversees all
religious affairs for modern Turkey. Four years later, in 1928 the government removed a clause in the constitution declaring Islam the country’s religion (Kaplan 666). By separating the religion from its status as a political instrument, Ataturk sought to “raise and purify Islam” (Davison 340). Although Ataturk praised Islam as “the most reasonable and natural religion,” he believed that an Islamic state would never receive acceptance from the West (Davison 340). According to Stepan, “the Ataturk tradition has been directed toward controlling religious expression so that it conforms to state goals. If Turkey really had either a complete separation of church and state or complete secularism, it would not need 50,000 civil servants in its Directorate of Religious Affairs to manage religious schooling.” (52). Islam was not disestablished; it was differently established (Davison 341).

So important was the control and oversight of Islam to the state, the Diyanet’s Directorate General reports directly to the Prime Minister, focuses solely on Islam.26 After a 1998 law placed all mosques under government administration, the Diyanet today regulates the country’s more than 70,000 mosques and employs imams as civil servants. The Diyanet oversees “administration of all mosques…as well as the appointment and dismissal of all imams [preachers], hatibs [orators], vaizs [preachers], seyhs [leaders of dervish houses], muezzins [callers to prayer], kayyims [sextons], and all other employees of a religious character” (Davison 337). The stated function of the department is not to represent the interests of all religions within the country but to carry out tasks related to the beliefs, divine services and moral principles of Islam and to enlighten citizens on

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religious matters. A separate entity, the General Directorate for Foundations (GDF), oversees non-Muslim religious groups and their affiliated churches, monasteries, synagogues, and related religious property, encompassing 161 minority foundations including 70 Greek Orthodox sites, 50 Armenian Orthodox sites, and 20 Jewish sites. Additionally, the GDF oversees as well as Syriac, Chaldean, Bulgarian Orthodox, Georgian, and Maronite foundations and regulates historic Muslim charitable religious foundations, including schools, hospitals, and orphanages.

There are additional areas highlighting Turkish tolerance for religious pluralism within the state. Religious ritual is widely attended. According to the 2006 Institute for Social Research’s annual World Values Survey, 36.7% of Turks attended religious service at least one time a week, almost exactly the same result as the United States. In principle, missionaries are allowed in Turkey, but as mentioned in the EU progress report, proselytizing is looked down upon by the Turkish people. Intermarriage between faiths is permitted in Turkey, and about 30% of Turkish Jews marry Muslims (Howe 93). Turkey has numerous state-mandated restrictions on the wear of religious garb.

Political parties are divided along the lines of the country's diverse ethnicities and religions although there seems to be some sign of breaking this tradition. For example the AKP, holder more than 350 parliamentary seats, appears to have abandoned its former Islamic aspirations. However, much of its base remains very religious. Although the party has supported some loosening of restrictions on religious activity, it is important to recognize that the AKP has not made any attempt to undermine Turkey's secular underpinnings, while steadfastly pursuing continued EU negotiations.

27 www.maf.gov.tr/grupc/ca.cae.d3.htm
28 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=7077
V. Conclusion

In a variety of ways, Turkish democracy has deepened considerably over the past eight decades. Women received full civil rights in 1934 (Smith 437). Turkey became a multi-party state, expanding from the Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, or CHP) in 1946 (Smith 440). This transition was not flawless, and was reached after numerous challenges faced by the state, as witnessed in the numerous coups endured. This Turkish secular republic has seen numerous challenges and successes throughout its modern history, but has established itself as a government that has in many ways, beaten the odds.

The most intriguing facets of Turkish governance are the relationships between the will of the people and their elected government and the watchful eye of the Turkish military. The interplay between the institutions provides the focal point of the formation of the modern Turkish state and is the most important factor in any research of Turkish government. Turkey’s track record prompted one scholar to write, “Turkey has arguably solved, to the extent that any political problem can be considered permanently solved, the problem of political Islam by a combination of just the right degree of pressures and freedoms to allow a vibrant and healthy, Islamic-oriented political party to emerge and even flourish” (Fuller 53). These delicate balances of religion and the state within Turkish governance make it an exceptional case in supporting the goals of this thesis and may help alter common misperceptions concerning Islam.
IV. Case Study: Mauritius, Turkey and Defining Democracy’s Tipping Point

“The philosophical assumptions, underlying values, social relations, customs and overall outlooks on life differ significantly among civilizations. The revitalization of religion throughout much of the world is reinforcing these cultural differences.”

- Samuel P. Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations* (28-29)

“Look at the world around you. It may seem like an immovable, implacable place. It is not. With the slightest push—in just the right place—it can be tipped.”

-Malcolm Gladwell, *The Tipping Point* (259)

I. Introduction

For all the similarities and differences between Turkey and Mauritius examined within the preceding chapters, the most striking characteristic uncovered in researching each state is more a sociological phenomenon than a tenet of international relations. The research presented here shows, surprisingly, that in dealing with the multiplicity of issues surrounding religious pluralism, the elected leadership in both Turkey and Mauritius often govern out of a sense of fear, one that is not necessarily rational or irrational. Within this case study, the argument for the existence of a democratic tipping point—an ambiguous delineation where leaders tend to base their decisions upon the fear of what might happen rather than a conceiving a quantifiable rationale based upon experience, history or popular sentiment—is examined and used to define the decision-making processes of both states concerning the inclusion and tolerance of religious pluralism.

The art or science behind managing factions has challenged democracies since the Greeks, and Turkish and Mauritian leaders have faced the typical challenges that confront
the leadership of any elected government. This thesis focuses on decision making
regarding the management of religious accommodations at the highest levels of two states
with distinctly different religious populations. Politics in its most basic form is about
conflict and managing major conflicts—specifically in defining the boundaries of
tolerance and inclusion of religion—is one of the responsibilities of a democracy. “In
many countries that are now longstanding democracies, both Western and non-Western,
the major conflict for a long period of time was precisely over the place of religion in the
polity” (Stepan 45). This potential for and history of major conflict is cause for concern
for the two states with lofty 21st-century goals.

How Mauritius and Turkey manage religious rights and freedoms within their
states presents a number of challenges to state leadership. In examining each state, the
democratically elected leadership is pleased with the current direction, positioning and
status of their states, respective to state goals. Considering that each state has distinctly
different populations, the specific means to attain these ends differ between each state.
However, the leadership of each state follows surprisingly similar themes when making
decisions regarding religious groups. Elected officials typically enjoy the job security
that comes with state success and maintaining equilibrium within the state. Within this
equilibrium, the leadership of each state is cognizant of the importance of maintaining the
status quo in a number of political and social issues, to include the potentially explosive
arena of religious pluralism. Accordingly, both Turkey and Mauritius work hard to
maintain a pluralist balance. The leadership of each state has a fear of a tipping point,
and their actions often appear as preventative measures to avoid approaching a career-
threatening change in equilibrium. Neither group of leaders dare venture too close to the tipping point, for fear of throwing off this balance.

Sociologist Morton Grodzins, a University of Chicago professor who studied the concept of “white flight” in United States suburbs, coined the term tipping point when describing neighborhood change in 1957 (Steinnes 1043). Author Malcolm Gladwell’s bestselling 2000 book, The Tipping Point, expands upon the concept of social epidemics where something unique becomes something common, and seeks to explain where a situation undergoes sudden and chaotic changes from one state to another, similar to an outbreak of a disease. In this book, Gladwell focuses on fads—explaining why Hush Puppies shoes became a fashion statement—in addition to social phenomena—why crime in New York City declined in the 1990s (3-9). How can Hush Puppies and New York’s crime rates relate to Turkey and Mauritius and the ability of each state to implement religious pluralism? In describing the concepts laid out in his book, Gladwell writes on his Web site, “there is a little bit of sociology, a little of psychology and a little bit of history, all in aid of explaining a very common but mysterious phenomenon that we deal with every day.”

Within the context of this thesis, a tipping point is better viewed as more art than science. Because of the vagaries surrounding a tipping point, the notion of the “pre-tipping point,” or point where the leadership of each state is compelled to take action before a balance is threatened, is also a vaguely-defined scenario. This argument presented here contends that the leaders of the respective states would be hard pressed to define when they are compelled to act in a situation regarding religious pluralism. “Ideas and products and messages and behaviors spread just like viruses do” (Gladwell 7). For

29 http://www.gladwell.com/tippingpoint/index.html
all the challenges each state faces in their current iteration, the fear of what could happen if the perception of a delicate balance is upset. By popular mandate, elected leaders are at a minimum compelled to act in the best interests of the state while rallying a set amount of the electorate—typically at least 50 percent plus one in a plurality—to vote for them. In this domestic perspective, this explains the role of a tipping point in deciding the leadership of the state, especially when considering that both states are led by coalition governments that rely upon equilibrium, and therefore have a vested interest in not approaching the tipping point.

What makes this a real phenomenon is the fear of the potential outcomes. The leadership of each state must determine the measures implemented to foster and protect the free practice of religion. Accordingly, in the histories of both Turkey and Mauritius, the governments both paid close attention to various characters, individuals, and situations positioned to sway public opinion. Similarly, in fostering certain perceptions, each state worked to create environments where religious pluralism was properly recognized while establishing clear lines that citizens would hesitate to cross. If rioting or Balkanization becomes potential results of a decision, leaders are compelled to analyze cost-benefit ratios for each outcome.

These decisions are ultimately judged against the state’s accomplishment of their long-term goals and history becomes the final measurement of the effectiveness of avoiding the tipping point. For the two cases presented here, the continued growth and success of Mauritian economy and maintenance of a working democracy are the ultimate determinants of success. In Turkey, state goals focus on admission into the EU and lack of military intervention in political affairs will determine whether the constantly looming
presence of the military checking the elected government has eased and taken a more
democratic slant.

While both are notionally forward-thinking democracies, there are a number of
differences between the composition of Turkey and Mauritius that enrich this case study.
First and foremost, the religions of each state highlight a population mix, whether it is the
diversity of the Mauritian faiths or the factions found in Turkish Islam, or the acceptance
of several of minority faiths within Turkey. Defining religious pluralism’s tipping point
is dependent upon diversity in the religious composition of each individual state. The
faiths and particular sets of beliefs that comprise the religious composition of each state
are not as important as the percentages of each group, and the challenges in group
dynamics each state must manage. The interesting and confounding aspect of pluralism
in these states comes in that there is no orthodox answer or one way in how to tolerate or
include each religion. In researching Turkey and Mauritius and when considering that
importance of religion is important to cultures throughout the world, it becomes readily
apparent that the concept of a tipping point—whether real or perceived—plays a major
role in the decisions made by democratic leaders as they maneuver their countries to
modernization.

This chapter defines the operating perceptions of each state, and outlines the fears
shared by the two states that exist on separate ends of the democratic scale. This case
study also shows how pluralism manifests itself using the concepts of inclusion: how the
government institutionalizes pluralism within the law, and tolerance: how the public
accepts (or fails to accept) the unimpeded practice of separate faiths and the actual
treatment of other faiths practiced by fellow citizens and the government. The variables
of inclusion and tolerance, defined in Chapter 1, are represented in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, displaying some of the contextual similarities and differences concerning state treatment of religious pluralism found between Turkey and Mauritius.\(^{30}\)

**II. Similarities, Differences and the Comparative Case Study**

**Contextual Similarities**

Both states are relatively young, with Turkey becoming a democracy in 1928 and Mauritius celebrating independence in 1968. Both are modern societies with clearly established state goals to improve perceptions around the world. As such, both states can be described as being on the ascent, not having quite attained the position they desire on the world stage. Turkey began the application process to join the European Union in 1987, and has worked to implement the many reforms that it had passed in recent years as part of its EU membership efforts.\(^{31}\) Mauritius has earned a reputation as a tremendous success story, defying all expectations with a strong track record of economic growth and social prosperity. The Indian Ocean island state seeks to leverage itself into becoming a global hub for information technology.\(^{32}\)

Perhaps because of a recent push towards accomplishing these goals, both states show recent improvement in the annual *Freedom in the World* report released by

\(^{30}\) From Chapter 1: To quantify and analyze the degree of religious pluralism, this thesis focuses on two variables: *inclusion* and *toleration*. To operationalize these terms, this thesis draws upon data including: disputes concerning the state and religious groups within the state; disputes concerning the state and international watchdog organizations; complaints made against a state impeding missionary efforts; known prisoners detained because of their religious beliefs; violence related to inter-religious feuds, to include acts of terror; weekly attendance of religious services; and official state observances of religious holidays and traditions.

Freedom House in 2006. According to the organization, Mauritius' civil liberties rating improved from 2 in 2005 to 1 in 2006 due to the consolidation of associational rights and Turkey's civil liberties rating improved from a 2005 rating of 4 to 3 in 2006 due to the passage of another round of major reforms, including a complete overhaul of the penal code, greater civilian control of the military, the initiation of broadcasts in minority languages, and a decrease in the severest forms of torture.33 Both states provide for the freedom of religion, expression and assembly in their respective constitutions.

In Mauritius, there are a wide variety of religions with specific criterion set to define them. The groups receive a lump-sum payment every year from the Ministry of Finance based upon the number of adherents, "Newer religious organizations (which much have a minimum of 7 members) are registered by the Registrar of Associations and are recognized as a legal entities (sic) with tax-free privileges" (United States Department of State 2006). In addition to Turkey’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), the General Directorate of Foundations (Vakiflar Genel Mudurlugu) regulates the activities of non-Muslim religious minorities and at least 160 “minority foundations” including affiliated churches, monasteries, religious schools and related property (Kucukcan 504). In both Turkey and Mauritius, there were no reports of religious prisoners or detainees, nor were there any reports of religious conversion. However according to April 2007 news reports, three people’s throats were slit in an eastern Turkey publishing house that printed Bibles and other Christian literature, although the motive behind the killings

33 http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2006&country=7077
remains undetermined.34 The very presence of the Mauritian Registrar of Associations and the Turkish Office of Foundations institutionalizes state allowance of the existence of more than one religion.

The minorities of each state harbor notions of favoritism shown to the respective majorities. The favoritism shown by Mauritius towards Hindus—whether real or perceived—concerns many from the Muslim and Creole minorities. While tensions between the Mauritian Hindu majority and Christian, Creole, and Muslim minorities persist, only one violent confrontation manifest from these sentiments, and that situation was quickly addressed more than a decade ago. These tensions are more closely related to the institutionalized ethnic divisions within the state than specific religions. In Turkey, government employees are heavily vetted and some have lost their jobs because of their devotion to Islam, the typical example being the barring of the wear of the headscarf in public buildings (White 20-21). Additionally—and somewhat paradoxically—non-Muslims have the perception that only Muslims can get jobs in the government. This is paradoxical in that the Muslims getting the federal jobs are typically secular.

According to Nave, no act is as important for the maintenance of ethnic boundaries and traditions as marriage and child rearing, where parents can pass along cultural identity to their children (332). Intermarriage was rare in Mauritius but is growing—and therefore allowed by the state—according to the latest census. Nave adds that intermarriage in Mauritius does not necessarily weaken boundaries between groups because the results he observed was that one parent would take the lead in child rearing in

a mixed-group marriage (329). In Turkey, intermarriage is not outlawed, but exists at a much lower rate, which is not surprising considering that there exists a much smaller pool to intermarry as the state is less diverse. Hosgor and Smits write that while there still remains a tendency to marry within an ethnic group, since the 1960s, intermarriage in Turkey—particularly between Turks and Kurds—has risen (417). Further, Hosgor and Smits argue that the increase of intermarriage is an indicator of the weakening of social boundaries (417). This point carries weight in that the growing prevalence of intermarriage in both states is an indicator of common acceptance between groups and a strong step towards better inter-group (to include inter-religious) understanding.

**Contextual Differences (Rearranged paragraphs in this section)**

While a product of history rather than any state-based imitative, the religious diversity within each state is the major difference compared within this case study. The overwhelming majority of Muslims in Turkey comes in stark contrast to the diversity found in Mauritius. While there is a Hindu majority in Mauritius, in recent years that majority has slipped to less than 50 percent of the population, creating an environment that is ripe for coalition building within a government based on religious and ethnic-based political divisions. While an overwhelming majority of the Turkish population defines themselves as Muslim, there exist factions within the group, as about 50-55 million Turks are Sunni Muslims and 15-20 million Turks are Shi’a.

Because of the many unique and varied ways the island’s population arrived leading up to independence, Mauritius may be best viewed as a loosely supervised human experiment. “In fact, it is not correct to think of (Mauritius) as a self-contained entity, since important outside socio-economic and political forces penetrated into—and indeed
became a part of—the colonial body of Mauritius” (Houbert 77-78). An examination of Mauritius conjures images of the ABC television program *Lost*, in which plane crash survivors—with little in common, but bringing a multiplicity of skills and experiences with them—are marooned on a beautiful tropical island and are forced to establish a functioning society.

Miles focused on the lack of a sense of Mauritian national identity. “Only when they are overseas, goes the adage, do they think of themselves as ‘Mauritian.’ At home, they identify themselves primarily as members of their ethnic (or, in the case of Muslims, religious) communities” (92-93). While a common ethnicity isn’t necessarily adopted by Mauritians, they truly embrace each other’s faiths—particularly the celebratory aspect of faith. Eriksen cites medical anthropologist Linda Sussman who—in her study of diverse medical traditions on the island—concluded that Mauritian society promotes an environment where cultures can cross boundaries, interact and merge (93). What results is a free-flowing sense of tolerance within the country, reminiscent of diversity efforts in the U.S. that focus on the cross flow of ideas begotten when people of different backgrounds work together.

Through the reforms of Ataturk, the Turkish people were foisted into a loosely-supervised experiment of sorts, as well. Under Ataturk’s direction, the state moved towards the concept of a Western-style democracy. The Kemalist revolution attempted to force wholesale changes on a society with a proud and storied heritage of more than 1,000 years. The result saw the arrival of a new language, a new code of law and new customs forced upon the people of the Anatolian peninsula.
This difference in treatment is manifest in the lengths of their respective International Religious Freedom Reports compiled by the U.S. Department of State, which actually provides a tangible cue of the differences each state faces with the respective complexities found in dealing with the treatment of religious pluralism. Mauritius’ report comes in at just under two printed pages, while Turkey’s is more than twice as long, filling nearly four and one-half printed pages. While this report from the U.S. State Department might be used as a diplomatic tool by the U.S. to leverage Turkish internal affairs, the difference in length might also indicate a strong example supporting the case that the issue of religious pluralism is much more complex in Turkish democracy than it is in Mauritius.

While both states are recognized as democracies, another major difference derives from government oversight. The power of the military in Turkish democracy is well documented within this thesis. The ever-looming nature of the military most likely explains the disparity between Freedom House rankings of the two states. The Mauritian constitution differs from Turkey’s in that there are no provisions for military oversight of the government. In fact, Mauritius does not even have armed forces to intervene in government affairs, so therefore there exists absolutely no temptation to follow the lead of the Turkish military.

Religion-driven violence highlights one of the main areas of difference between the two states. While there are no recent recorded examples of religious-based violent attacks in Mauritius, 2006 was a terrible year in terms of number of attacks conducted by Islamic radicals affecting Turkish Christians. These attacks can be considered outliers, possibly spawned by remarks about Islam made by Pope Benedict XVI and the Pope’s
subsequent December, 2006 visit to Turkey. When coupled in a situation where the military already looms mightily over the state, poised to ensure that Islam does not gain too much power, the attacks lead by devout Muslims cause concern to the military. In all fairness, the Pope’s comments were inflammatory and perhaps instigated the attacks. The Pope made no such comments that would enrage the majority of the population in Mauritius.

The April 2007 killings of Christians in Turkey were tied to a nationalist fringe—which often boasts of a Muslim identity—however there is no clear determination whether the attacks were driven by a dedication to Islam or a promoting Turkishness.\textsuperscript{35}

Culturally it is important to note that violence is not a purely religious related issue in modern Turkey. In 2006, violence increased in the southeast as the separatist Kurdish Workers Party (\textit{Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan} PKK) fought Turkish security forces, slowing the pace of reform (Freedom House 2006). While non-violent, there have been times where tensions between religion and the Mauritian state have risen. Two of Mauritius’ most notable church-state confrontations—the Diard Affair and negotiations with Libya—came during the mid 1980s, and involved both Catholicism and Islam.

Both states classify citizens in groups that have some relation to religious affiliation. While ethnicity—and by extension, religion—are institutionalized in Mauritian government, the Turkish government focuses more on spiritual secularism. Mauritius’ official divisions are not strictly religious, and Turkey is selective in the religious classification on official documents. In Turkey, the Kurds are classified as

Muslims, thus not receiving any ethnic differentiation from the government. The classifications in Mauritius are tied to ethnic heritage as well as religious background so there is little room for argument—although as intermarriage begins to increase on the island the lines separating the ethnic groups may begin to blur and force a review of the island’s classifications.

Mauritius has a number of active foreign missionary groups active in the country—although not without some scandal, manifest in the aforementioned Diard Affair. No evidence was found showing that missionaries are barred from the country, and there are no known estimates of the number and religious affiliation of foreign missionaries in the country. Within Turkey, there are no laws prohibiting proselytizing or religious conversions; however, many prosecutors and police regard proselytizing and religious activism with suspicion, especially when such activities are deemed to have political overtones. “Police sometimes arrest proselytizers for disturbing the peace, ‘insulting Islam,’ conducting unauthorized educational courses or disturbing literature that has criminal or separatist elements. Courts usually dismiss such chargers. If the proselytizers are foreigners, they may be deported, but generally they are able to reenter the country,” and it deserves mention that police occasionally bar Christians. Insulting Islam is a surprising charge considering the relationship between Islam and the state. Additionally, zoning laws have been used to subvert prayer groups from certain Protestant and minority faiths, another action noted in the State Department report.

Although some of the charges in Turkey appear specious, there is clearly an allowance for freedom of practice and religion in principle.

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The display of religious attire is not currently an issue in Mauritius, but is the subject of major debate in Turkey. As discussed in chapter 3, traditional Islamic dress, notably the headscarf, has caused much consternation between Muslims and the state and has created a double standard. Within the AKP, those who wear headscarves are highly visible members, but only those who do not wear headscarves are allowed to serve in parliament. Merve Safa Kavakci, a female member of the Islamic Virtue Party, was forced out of the Turkish Parliament chamber by hecklers led by Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit after wearing a headscarf during her oath of office, as headscarves are banned in government offices, schools and universities.

The treatment of religious education also differs between the two states. As a condition for receiving state funding in Mauritius, a minimum of 49 percent of the students in Mauritian Catholic schools have to be non-Catholics (Eriksen 171). Catholic schools have tended to prefer Catholic applicants for teaching positions, although they have also occasionally hired Muslims and Hindus (Eriksen 171). While there is significant instruction on Islam in Turkish schools, by law, all religion textbooks must end with the chapter ‘Laicism and Islamism’ (“Laiklik ve İslamlık”). This chapter “distinguishes a priestless, personal Islam from a clerical, hierarchical Christianity all the while arguing for the Turkish state’s right to regulate and administer religious practices and institutions” (Kaplan 673). The religious lessons to which Turkish children are exposed during their years of schooling are designed to align their support for three longstanding government ideals: identification with the Turkish nation and its glorious history, economic and technological modernization, and obedience to state authorities (Kaplan 674). According to Freedom House, the government does not otherwise restrict
academic freedom, although self-censorship on sensitive topics like the role of Islam and issues surrounding the Kurds are common.³⁷

In Turkish national politics, the current religion curriculum constitutes a particular historical moment according to Kaplan, “considering the ways that the Turkish Islamists immerse their social and political ideals into the country’s school textbooks provides a unique perspective for gauging the ideological shifts in the national political culture” (668). The government does not restrict academic freedom, although self-censorship on sensitive topics like the role of Islam and the Kurdish problem are common (Freedom House 2006). This is yet another example of the difference between the letter of the law and actual practice within the state.

III. Inter-State Analysis

To achieve their 21st-century state goals and attain prominence on the international stage, the governments of Turkey and Mauritius have clear guidelines for success: successfully foster and promote freedom domestically while displaying a sense of control to those carefully observing from abroad. Just as any other state, the leaders of Turkey and Mauritius must carefully analyze carefully and anticipate potential outcomes before acting which virtually always leads to second thoughts before acting or making any sweeping reforms that would upset their complacency with status quo. If nothing else, a comparison of Turkey and Mauritius supports the notion that establishing and defining a status quo is an inexact science. Further, unexpected occurrences and unpredictable circumstances can marginalize the impact an elected leader or a government can affect on either state’s future.

Mauritian leaders preside over a state with, by most accounts, a strong record of managed diversity in addition to what appears to be a bright future. In effect, they have little choice but to adopt a pragmatic style of governance. This style is best manifest in the prime minister’s response to the Diard affair: “The general issue pertains to the limits of shared imperatives and common denominators and conversely, the scope of the cultural differences that are acceptable, seen from the state’s perspective” (Eriksen 170). These remarks reflect that in the view of the prime minister, perception was just as important—if not more so—than reality, and was quick to address the case in the public forum to diffuse any potential conflict.

Similarly, the most telling part of Mauritius’ Libyan situation was the government’s official rationale: equilibrium. In effect, the Mauritian government conceded that Madison and Zakaria were correct, that the success of pluralism relies upon a delicate balance. Eriksen quotes former Mauritian Prime Minister Sir Seewosagur Ramgoolam, who warned, “To the effect that religion ought not to be a topic of interethnic and public discourse seems to remain valid. Breach of this informal rule may have dramatic consequences” (93). Ramgoolam did not elaborate on what the potential consequences were. To their credit, Mauritian leaders do not take an ostrich-like approach to governance—rather than sticking their head in the sand, they are forced to maintain peace among groups to ensure that future goals can be achieved.

Conversely, Turkish leadership is tied to a situation where a major focus continues to revolve around membership in the European Union. Because of this, they’re tied to a style of leadership that revolves around a “don’t break it” style of governance. The Turkish case represents a strong relationship to Dahl’s fears of pluralism discussed in
Chapter 1. Islamic parties and the faith’s involvement in government has been one of the main defining issues of Turkish politics through the 1990s and into the first decade of the 21st century. Thanks to state tradition, a constitutional mandate, recent violence, and the Gul situation, the military has loomed large over contemporary Turkish politics.

The protests surrounding the visit of Benedict XVI and the violence that preceded his visit foisted internal Turkish politics into international headlines. In a state that has spent the past two decades formally campaigning for acceptance from the European Union and has battled negative stereotypes from member states, bad press—to say nothing of lengthy reports from the U.S. State Department—is the last thing Turkey needs. Therefore, the state has to manage the citizens in a way that best prepares it to reach its goal—not an easy task considering that they may have to compromise democratic ideals in doing so. There is clearly a delicate balance that must take into account the population, the government and the dominant faith in the country.

After Gul was nominated for the presidency, nearly a million secularists gathered in Istanbul to protest. “Chanting ‘no to coups’ and ‘no to sharia’, the demonstrators said their free-wheeling lifestyles were under threat.” 38 Interestingly, according to The Economist, none of the protestors could name a single law promoted by the AKP that directly challenged the constitution’s secular tenets. This is not surprising because, “there is none.” 39 In this case, fear of the unknown or what could be moved nearly a million people to protest a situation they may not fully understand. The events surrounding Gul’s nomination have set back some of the recent compromise seen between the AKP and the military. Erdogan was able to rise to Prime Minister after his

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38 Unattributed, “Secularism v democracy” The Economist, 5 May 2007 (63)
39 Ibid
release from jail, perhaps recognizing that moving towards a more moderate position would be the only way to operate in Turkish politics. Erdogan now casts himself as a “pro-West conservative,” but avoids the topic of headscarves, saying that he would not invite his wife (who wears the headscarf) to official functions. The fact that he was released from prison and allowed to return to politics may have been enough of a concession from the military to spur Erdogan’s move to the center.

Defining Tipping Points

Each government must manage a collection of balances to avoid an encounter with the tipping point. Whether the concept of a tipping point is actual or perceived, recent leadership actions in both states support the fact that this is in fact a real phenomenon—and that those in power are committed to avoiding an encounter. As the research here shows, defining the tipping point falls under the responsibility of either the elected leadership (who have a vested interest in preserving the status quo), or in the case of Turkey, a delicate cooperative that balances upon the feelings of the military and the reaction of the elected government.

The existence of tipping points begs a series of questions: Who determines the tipping point, and what issues shape their decision-making? Is there a way to quantify the tipping point or determine the right percentage mix for a specific state? What does a developing democracy sacrifice in the interest of maintaining a balance? Finally, is there a set of metrics to measure the effectiveness of leadership decisions?

Growth and economic success forms the crux of the Mauritian tipping point. As the leadership of Mauritius focuses on maintaining this continued economic growth,  

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40 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2270642.stm
maintaining the pluralistic balance between groups is seen as a way to continue the
growth. Mauritian leadership recognizes that the state’s success revolves around rave
reviews from leaders around the globe, and any threat to that reputation might adversely
affect the financial aid an support the state receives. Therefore, maintaining the
appearance of peaceful coexistence is as important as ensuring successful
accommodation of religious management.

The importance of maintaining complacency among religious groups within each
state is essential to bolstering that country’s perception by other global actors. For
instance, because transparency is essential to membership in the EU—as manifest in the
Commission of the European Communities 2006 Progress Report—external actors
formally evaluate Turkey’s fitness for membership. The importance of this tipping point
comes in that it encourages leadership to look beyond two, four or six-year election
cycles and towards the long-term stability of the state.

The major focus of EU membership underscores Turkey’s international focus, and
determination to become a major player on the global stage. The state’s strategic
importance is an important aspect in defining a tipping point, and on the global stage,
Turkish elected leadership has recently taken some calculated to avoid a tipping point and
establish itself. This came to fruition in 2003, when the AKP agreed to allow the U.S.
access to northern Iraq during the invasion. In March 2003, the parliament rejected the
measure and the military decided not to intervene. The calculated measure by the ruling
party worked, as the U.S. went to war without Turkey, and “Erdogan won praise at home
for standing up to the Bush administration's bullying after the parliamentary vote; and
when U.S. forces got bogged down by the insurgency, Erdogan was applauded for keeping Turkey out of the quagmire.41

In determining whether the quality of the democracy is sacrificed in the name of maintaining the status quo, there again is no definite answer. Turkish leadership is content in maintaining a “Partly Free” rating by Freedom House, and the military is unwilling to relinquish any control to improve that rating for fear of what might happen. Leaders can avoid disaster by ensuring a few things. First, they must remain cognizant of any indications of favoritism, when possible. One of the aspects of the definition of democracy established in chapter 1 required a state to ensure that minority groups receive equal protection under the law. In terms of the tipping point, protecting the rights of minority groups is also expedient in ensuring that established coalitions are maintained.

Second, there is an additional balance. Leaders must balance short-term actions with a long-term vision. Recognizing how cracking down on groups is perceived in a world where news travels around the globe almost instantaneously is important for any state with an eye towards interacting with other states. For instance, the U.S. Department of State, the EU Secretary General and Freedom House, among others, all have reports on Turkish religious freedom available in the public domain, accessible by anyone with unimpeded Internet access.

The religious groups of each state each have a set of responsibilities to maintain as part of a functioning democracy. Stepan writes that one of the major responsibilities of political and spiritual leaders who wish to revalue democratic norms in their own religious community in a state “where a significant portion of believers may be under the

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sway of a doctrinally based nondemocratic religious discourse,” have to be at the forefront with logical must always work to push and maintain a public dialogue between faiths (Stepan 45). Given the natures of democracy and religion, the free practice, viability and quality of a religion relies on how it fits in with other faiths. Part of the definition of plurality given in chapter 1 covers the importance of not only allowing individuals to practice their own faiths, but to ensure that others are allowed to practice (or not practice, as it were) their own faiths without impediment.

Part of the vague nature of the tipping point comes from the circumstances surrounding these points of action that require the state to act or not act, are by definition vague. Former Turkish Chief of General Staff General Huseyin Kivrikoglu expressed the following, “Radical Islam may appear gone one day to reemerge the next day…it is not possible to say the danger has vanished” (Cizre 310). In essence, the secular establishment’s natural reflex is to remain in a permanent state of alert (Cizre 312). Because of ambiguity, there are no etched-in-stone “triggers” in the constitution that dictate the times when these instances occur, the military intervenes more or less by a feel for when it is appropriate to protect its guiding vision of Kemalism.

The techniques that govern this ideology are difficult to define. Cizre claims that the governing ideologies of Turkey are modernizing, Westernizing, civilizing and promoting cultural homogeneity and territorial unity of the nation (310). The nature and definition of these ideologies has evolved over the eight decades of modern Turkey. The Turkish military—as is the case with many partially-free democracies—has no standard guidelines to define when an elected government has overstepped boundaries and when a coup serves the best interests of the state. Here, the Turkish military takes the seemingly
counterproductive action of nearly breaking their democracy in order to save their
democracy. According to Stepan, “Military encroachments on the autonomy of the
democratically elected government in Turkey have frequently been viewed as an
unfortunate necessity to protect secular democracy” (40). While these actions are most
likely carried out to assert the role of the military in the state, they may also occur
because the government feels compelled to act by some of the minority groups (albeit
few) within the state that feel overlooked in their status. These perceptions have pushed
the state to take a number of notable, democracy-circumventing actions in recent years.
Stepan contends that, “In Turkey (as in Pakistan and probably Indonesia as well) the
greatest obstacle to democracy is posed not by Islam but by military and intelligence
organizations unaccountable to democratic authority” (52). As long as the military looms
over Turkish democracy, the commitment to avoiding a date with the tipping point will
remain at the forefront of the government’s decision making and policy decisions.

**IV. Conclusion**

The avoidance of a tipping point highlights some of the major difficulties faced
by democratic leadership who must manage their state’s population and religious groups.
Clearly, there are more factors than a state’s treatment of religious expression when
defining the key components of democratic success and predicting the overall long-term
viability of a modern state. As Gladwell writes, “I think that The Tipping Point is a way
of making sense of the world, because I'm not sure that the world always makes as much
sense to us as we would hope.”[^42] In describing the peculiar and sometimes problematic
ways in which our brains process information, Gladwell writes, “Our intuitions, as

humans, aren't always very good. Changes that happen really suddenly…People who understand *The Tipping Point*, I think, have a way of decoding the world around them.⁴³

In many ways, the notion of a tipping point exists in the abstract and is subject to the whims of the democratically elected leaders in each state. The concept of a tipping point should probably be viewed as an important factor in solving two much larger equations: domestic stability and maintaining international stature and esteem.

⁴³ Ibid
V. Conclusions: Plurality, Power, Politics, Pressure, Perception

“Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

-Winston Churchill

Speech to House of Commons, November 11, 1947 (Keyes 46)

“How much control ought to be exercised by what actors, including the government, employing what means of control over what actors with respect to what actions?”

-Robert A. Dahl

Dilemmas of a Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control (1982: 2)

I. Introduction

A free, democratic state enables a multiplicity of freedoms typically encompassing the right to free assembly and free expression—rights required for the adequate tolerance and inclusion of religious pluralism in a democracy. These freedoms—as is the case with virtually all contemporary political theories and ideologies—are menaced by each state’s dilemma of organizational autonomy and control (Dahl 1998: 3). Dahl suggests that the freedom of religion comprises a vital component of a democracy but may ultimately spur groups that could potentially threaten the effectiveness of an electorate. The free market of expression eludes both theory and practice in all technologically advanced countries whether capitalist or socialist, writes Dahl who ominously notes that “pressures for organizational autonomy are like coiled springs precariously restrained by the counterforce of the state and ready to unwind whenever the system is jolted” (1998: 3). The differences in diversity in the democracies
of Turkey and Mauritius—and the measures taken by the state to successfully accommodate religious management—fully support this notion.

In many ways, trust is vital to the success of a state and properly addressing these “menaces” presents a slew of additional challenges, lending credence to Churchill’s quote at the open of this chapter. In a democratic pluralist political system, voluntary clubs and organizations—from trade unions to religious bodies and other structures with autonomous existence—are “beyond the political control of the state” (Srebnik 7). Democracies—particularly relatively young democracies—are presented with a conundrum in establishing and instituting religious pluralism while attempting to maintain control of the population and a focus on state goals. As was illustrated in both Turkey and Mauritius, complaining about the government is not the providence of any one specific culture. The individual liberties inherent in liberal democracy affirm the right to opinion and free expression. In fact, human nature almost invariably lends itself to complaining! This freedom of opinion helps explain the need for the freedom of religion—individuals have individual beliefs, and the freedom for these beliefs to thrive and manifest in the freedom of religious conscience is a responsibility of a democratic state.

Dahl highlights four defects in pluralist democracies: they stabilize political inequalities, deform civic consciousness, distort public agenda, and alienate final control over the agenda (1998: 41). Despite the roadblocks created by these issues, even Dahl fails to provide specific solutions to the problems he perceives in pluralist democracy, writing that even satisfactory solutions can, “be arrived at only in the context of the special characteristics and predicaments of a particular country” (Dahl 1998: 2). Taking
this ambiguity into account, a state not only must determine its tipping point—but
determine a “pre-tipping point” which the state carefully monitors and stands compelled
to act to maintain status quo. Because of the each state’s distinct identity, leadership
must react to issues concerning religious pluralism dependent upon the makeup and goals
of the population. A major factor in the governance of the two states studied in this thesis
surrounds this desire to maintain control and a direction in addition to a fear of the
unknown. This is clearly the case in Turkey where fear, a quest for power, or a concern
rooted in historical circumstance (or some combination of the three) are manifest in
military coups, hoping to prevent the takeover of Islamic rule from the secular republic.
The tension also exists in Mauritius, albeit to a lesser degree where an admittedly delicate
balance (“walking on eggshells”) exists between the various ethnic groups, resulting in
decades of successful transition among shifting coalitions.

“The idea of liberty of conscience is so commonsensical today that we hardly
imagine that it has a history at all,” Feldman writes of the First Amendment in America
(27). This freedom grew out of a notion by St. Jerome who studied the human faculty of
right and wrong. Centuries later, after distillation and additional thought by the likes of
Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther, John Locke interpreted the demand for liberty of
conscience into a systematic argument for distinguishing the realm of government from
the realm of religion (Feldman 29). Locke surmises that the state did not have authority
to regulate anything to its citizens that it lacked the authority to give while Madison
believes that no government had the right to take “any action in the religious sphere”
(Feldman 32, 21). True pluralism is more than a state that contains a number of groups
that coexist peacefully. While any complex society is “differentiated,” this does not
follow that all societies are differentiated “pluralistically” (Sartori 63). For example, Madison was not in favor of implementing the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. In reality, Madison believed that the different faiths would balance each other instead of tearing the country apart, arguing, “only national politics, not a parchment promise, could guaranteed religious liberty and nonestablishment” (Feldman 21). In the 1780’s, Madison recognized that religious pluralism was tied to the variables of tolerance and inclusions—while the Constitution could promise things in writing, ensuring society properly accepted the diversity of religious practice was another issue altogether. More than 225 years later, managing religious liberty and pluralism remains a hot-button issue not only in the U.S., but also in democracies around the world. While laws are institutionalized in democratic constitutions, this thesis shows that various decisions made by political leaders are critical to treating the issues and concerns of their constituent religious groups.

II. The Future of Religion, Mauritius and Turkey

As detailed in this thesis, Mauritius provides a number of lessons for other democratizing states. In Mauritius, where the intermingling of ethnicity, politics and religion is embedded in the foundation of the government, maintaining a proper balance of the population remains a priority as the state continues modernizing and maintaining a productive economy. Equal accommodation of all religions by the government melds well with Mauritians’ natural proclivity towards religious tolerance, writes Miles, begging the question, why does Mauritius have a natural proclivity towards religious tolerance (Miles 103)? The answer most likely comes in the diversity of Mauritius,
which not only allows for numerous religious groups to practice freely, but also allows religious groups to express displeasure when they feel slighted and know the state leadership is willing to address the concerns.

It is crucial that, in Mauritius where virtually all are believers, minority religions are reassured of their public legitimacy. In this way, democracy and religion have a mutually reinforcing and beneficial relationship which is important because any potential for the tyranny of the majority that might subvert Mauritian democracy and affect the viability of the state and may indicate a potentially serious problem with resource distribution (Miles 103). Mauritian governance has successfully addressed many of these potential concerns surrounding a poly-ethnic society via promotion of high levels of public integrity and accountability (Srebnik 15). This transparency between independence and dependence in modern Mauritius is important considering that Mauritius is inevitably dependent, and, “With that dependence there is growth, and since independence in 1968, the island has shown a limited but real capacity to adjust to changes in a capitalist world” (Houbert 105).

Many of Turkey’s issues and challenges revolve around perceptions of the state both on the global stage and within the population. The lack of military deployment during the 1997 coup and the subsequent return of Erdogan to power from exile were viewed as signs that that the relationship between the military and the state is evolving. The AKP has been unable to prove itself as a secular entity and the stern reaction of the military to the first round of presidential voting in 2007 caused observers around the world to question whether Turkey is truly a democracy, to say nothing of the various protests of Gul’s nominations. Like Mauritius, Turkey also seeks to establish itself as a
state that has the ability to perform as a powerhouse in a capitalist world. Unfortunately for Turkey, certain political factions may be disheartened by 20 years of rejection from the EU and the state may choose to reject these goals and either chart its own course in international affairs or align with Middle Eastern states.

As of January 1 2007, the European Union welcomed Romania and Bulgaria; the two newest members are also now the two poorest members of the EU. The former communist states applied for admission in 1995, eight years after Turkey first applied.\textsuperscript{44} Enlargement within the EU has become unpopular, and the plan for the foreseeable future is to maintain a size of 27 member states. In years past, Britain and Ireland have allowed open immigration to any EU citizen, but in 2007 they are limiting immigration of unskilled laborers into the country in 2007.\textsuperscript{45} However, all hope is not lost for Turkey. “At a recent meeting in Brussels, European leaders toughened their tone on enlargement but stopped short of setting new hurdles to expansion. They reaffirmed backing for the eventual membership of Turkey, Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia”.\textsuperscript{46} Perhaps the greatest insult to Turkey came as Bulgaria removed customs checkpoints into EU border states hours after midnight, January 1 and maneuvered resources in an effort to reinforce security at the Turkish border.\textsuperscript{47}

While some member states of the EU are hesitant to formalize Turkish membership, the Secretary General report established a number of recommendations to better prepare itself for membership. A lengthy passage on the treatments of religious

\textsuperscript{44} Hadjiyska, Nevyana. “EU Swells to 27 as Bulgaria, Romania Join,” \textit{Chicago Tribune}. 2 Jan 2007.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
freedom and religious minorities in the handling of virtually all freedoms and recommended courses of action were provided in the panel’s final report. To improve in these areas, the both the government and the military need to update, refine and reform Kemalism and provide a modern context for the theory. There are indications that Turkey is moving in this direction. “Even Ataturk has come under attack. Islamists, liberals, and Kurds criticize him for being an authoritarian leader who imposed his reforms from the top and tried to obliterate the people’s cultural identity” (Howe 12). The goals of the Turkish state have begun to change, both within the ranks of the population and the halls of the government, but as Westernization has been the main focus of Turkish politics for eight decades, simply scrapping the plan seems unlikely. If Turkey is able to satisfy the EU recommendations it will better position itself to question rejection from the EU and position itself to provide a meaningful appeal to the U.S. or United Nations to help the cause.

III. Implications for the 21st Century World?

As defined in chapter 1, democracy also has a mandate to protect minority interests, protecting from Mill and Tocqueville’s notion of a tyranny of the majority. Dahl’s critiques of pluralism revolve around the competing groups that develop within a free society. Huntington writes that the correlation between the existence of democracy and that of individual liberty is high, “some measure of the latter is an essential component of the former” (Huntington 1984: 194). Often despite the guarantee of individual liberty, this tyranny and competition may manifest in the misunderstanding or prejudiced views of another group. This is an important factor to note in any study
observing the relationship between religion and governance, and one religion’s relationship with democracy does receive extra attention, both justified and unfair.

Many modern perceptions of Islam—especially Middle Eastern Islam—portray Islam as intolerant of and hostile to individual freedom. While chapter 3 contains ample evidence to the contrary, the sentiment still pervades many common perceptions. Huntington based much of *Clash of Civilizations* upon this sentiment, writing, “Islam is exploding demographically with destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbors...at the local level fault line wars, largely between Muslims and non-Muslims, generate ‘kin-country rallying’” (2003: 20). A common fear contends that allowing free elections in Islamic countries would create governments that paradoxically use these democratic freedoms to destroy democracy itself (Stepan 48). And Turkey’s struggles with the military’s oversight of the government have been well documented throughout this thesis. Islam is not alone in that other faiths have also faced the mantle of failing to properly support and sustain democracy.

The Inquisition committed massive human rights violations in the name of Catholicism and that John Calvin’s Geneva was against inclusive citizenship or any form of representative democracy, writing, “numerous articles and books were written on the inherent obstacles that Catholicism, Lutheranism, or Calvinism place in the way of democracy because their antidemocratic doctrines and nondemocratic practices” (Stepan 44). In both Poland and the U.S., “Catholicism, which is frequently suspected to be an illiberal political influence, is found to have limited links to intolerance” (Karpov 268).

Despite the dismissal of the Libyan delegation—which occurred more than 20 years ago, in a Cold War world—the Mauritian government and population have done an
outstanding job in executing appropriate tolerance and inclusion of the Muslim minority. “For Mauritian Christians and Hindus alike, political Islam is more likely to bring to mind the figure of their distinguished president than the troubling portrait of a terrorist” (Miles 97-98). In fact, it is President Uteem who Mauritians think of when considering modern Islam. Muslims serving in Mauritian politics is personified by the universally esteemed president, Cassam Uteem. President Uteem’s 1992 selection by the parliament and highly visible and outspoken style, make him far more than a figurehead, according to Miles (Miles 97). That said, the fear of Islamic fundamentalism—although a much gentler form than commonly depicted—has begun in recent years to make inroads among the Mauritian Muslims (Miles 92). Additionally, there is also a Muslim organization called Hezbola, but it has functioned more as a social movement with some political ambitions than as a major Muslim force in national politics.

IV. Conclusion

Some questions posed within this thesis remained unanswered. For instance, to adequately surmise whether more faiths enable a society to better facilitate religious pluralism must encompass and evaluating far more states. This thesis only studies two cases, so this question is not answered here for lack of adequate sample size. The question of whether certain faiths are compatible with democracy (or vice-versa) also requires a more robust and targeted review.

Another shortcoming of this thesis is the unpredictability of the future; there are too many variables that may come into play. For instance, while it appears that if the respective economies of both states continue to grow, both states will continue to thrive.
But what happens in the event of a prolonged economic slump in either state? Does a blame game begin between factions within Mauritius? Would secularists (to include the military) blame the AKP in Turkey and result in a strong reaction? It is unlikely that this would become a rallying point for a diversity of faiths or diversity of ideas. Similarly, how will the Turks react if Turkey continues to improve its human rights rating and still does not attain membership—while other states that applied after them continue to jump ahead in line? The suspicion of a European anti-Islamic sentiment (coupled with what could be described as knowledge of overt anti-Turkish sentiment) continues to grow within Turkey, and the future of the state may turn on the strength of this sentiment. The 2007 summer presidential elections may be a major turning point for modern Turkey, and it will be interesting to see if Gul decides to run again or if a compromise is stuck and a candidate from another party gets the AKP support.

Finding an exact definition of pluralism or composing a universal set of pluralist bylaws for the world’s democracies is not only impractical, but also may represent more harm than good. Pluralism is not the same thing as structural complexity—that is to say that large-scale societies are not necessarily pluralistic, writes Sartori who argues, “Societal pluralism must be clearly distinguished from societal differentiation” (Sartori 63). This thesis helps show that pluralism is subject to the idiosyncrasies unique to each state. For instance, the guarantees and protections of pluralism are not necessarily as important as a showing of good faith by state leadership in their efforts to respect religious pluralism. Simply put, while tolerance is the law, the perception inclusion is equally as important.
When I began the research for this thesis I believed—somewhat naively—that the more heterogeneous state studied would have arrived at a natural balance and achieved a harmonious coexistence and that the more homogenous state studied would be torn by internal strife. In both states, I figured to find rigid rules supporting the notion and practice of religious pluralism. I found few certainties in each state’s treatment of religious pluralism. Also, I found that both states had leaders that were forced to maintain a status quo—and avoid a tipping point, finding a pre-tipping point—to keep their countries composed and focused on well-defined state objectives. To further sully the challenges of each state is that they are comprised of human beings, and therefore would inherit their shortcomings and imperfections. Of course, unexpected external variables also contributed additional unpredictability to these decisions.

In Karpov’s article, “Tolerance in the United States and Poland,” the author studies two states that bear uncanny similarities to the states covered in this thesis. Mauritius mirrors the United States in the preponderance of religions and religious diversity found within each respective state—accordingly, some Mauritian leaders refer to their country as a “mosaic” and even a “fruit salad” (Eriksen 169, 171). Turkey, a predominantly Muslim state, is religiously more monolithic, similar to the heavily Catholic Poland. The article—which focuses on the links between religion and tolerance towards other faiths within states—finds that in both countries, “religious commitment and religious participation, both essential components of religiosity, have very limited direct effect on political tolerance” (284). The examination of Turkey and Mauritius support Karpov’s argument, proving that there are specific, politically-based reasons

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48 Admittedly, there are differences in the case studies, for instance Poland and the United States are two Western, predominantly Christian nations.
driving state support for maintaining religious pluralism—namely, the specific goals of each state.

As Karpov issued a call to action in his article, this thesis also issues a call to action. With more research on this topic—most likely conducted by ethnographers—perhaps there can be a quantifiable measure of a state’s tipping point. This thesis works on the assumption that freedom of religious expression is an important tenet of a successful democracy. If more democracies are the desired end state on the international community (and that is a big ‘if’), understanding tolerance and inclusion of religious pluralism and the protection of freedoms and practice of self determination are important issues in the 21st-century world.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Devshirme- An Ottoman bureaucratic system, bright non-Muslim boys were recruited and converted and received military or administrative training becoming either Janissary warriors or high-ranking vezir bureaucrats

Diyanet- The religious affairs directorate of the Turkish government

Mauritian Registrar of Associations- Oversees religious issues in Mauritius

Sharia- Islamic Law
ACRONYMS

AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)- Turkey’s Justice and Development Party, lead by PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan

CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)- The Republican People’s Party,

EU- European Union.

GDF (Vakiflar Genel Mudurlugu)- The General Directorate of Foundations, the Turkish directorate dedicated to overseeing non-Muslim religious activity in Turkey.

GDPpc- Gross domestic product per capita

PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan)- Turkey’s Kurdish Worker’s Party.

RP (Refah Partisi)- Turkey’s Islamic Welfare Party, outlawed after the 1995 coup
Table 2.1 Relational Diagram of Mauritian Ethnic Politics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Elites</th>
<th>Creoles (informal sector, Catholic urban labor)</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural Indo-Mauritian</th>
<th>Rural laborers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elites</td>
<td>Franco-Mauritian &amp; Coulered Elites (private sector)</td>
<td>Muslim Elite (private sector)</td>
<td>Hindu Elite (public sector)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Cho 50

Table 2.2 Mauritian Nationally Recognized Religious Festivals

“Public holidays, representing the entire range of religious and ethnic variation on the island, are celebrated every year” (Eriksen 14).

“The profusion of public holidays…attests to the willingness of successive governments to give every religious community its due” (Miles 101).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Holiday</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Religious Affiliation</th>
<th>Public Holiday?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cavadee</td>
<td>Jan/Feb</td>
<td>Tamil (Hindu)</td>
<td>Public Holiday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maha Shivatree</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Public Holiday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ougadi</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Telegu (Hindu)</td>
<td>Public Holiday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holi</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easter</td>
<td>March/April</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>Public Holiday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eid-Ul-Fitur</td>
<td>Ramadan</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Public Holiday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ganesh Chaturthi</td>
<td>Aug/Sept</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Public Holiday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father Pere Laval</td>
<td>September 9</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divalee</td>
<td>Oct/Nov</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>Public Holiday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christmas</td>
<td>Dec 25</td>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>Public Holiday</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3.1 Turkish Minority Religions

The Government interpreted the 1923 Lausanne Treaty as granting special legal minority status exclusively to these three groups, although the treaty text refers broadly to "non-Muslim minorities" without listing specific groups. However, this recognition did not extend to the religious leadership organs; for example, the Ecumenical and Armenian Patriarchates continued to seek recognition of their legal status (Department of State 2006).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Turkish Minority Religions</th>
<th>Estimated Populations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Orthodox Christians</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>&gt; 2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baha’i</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Orthodox</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alevi (Shi’a Muslims)</td>
<td>15-20,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehovah’s Witnesses</td>
<td>3,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestants</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yezidi</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

49 In addition to the faiths listed, there are also undetermined numbers of Bulgarian, Chaldean, Nestorian, Georgian, and Maronite Christians. Most of these non-Muslim groups are located in big cities.
50 Exact figures not available, U.S. Department of State estimates, 2006
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table 4.1 Inclusion</strong></th>
<th><strong>Turkey</strong></th>
<th><strong>Mauritius</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Constitution**       | Allows for freedom of assembly and expression  
- Section VI, Art 24  
- Section X, Art 10 | Allows for freedom of assembly and expression  
- Section II, Ch. 11.1 |
| **Freedom House**       | Partly Free. Improved from 4 to 3 in 2006 rating. | Free. Improved from 2 to 1 in 2006 rating. |
| **Racially-recognized** | 2, both representing Islam. | 10, representing 3 major religions (6 to include separate sects). |
| **Religious holidays**  | Choice of religion protected by state  
- Muslim- (mostly Sunni) 99%,  
- 3 recognized minority faiths: (Jewish, Greek & Armenian Orthodox) 0.2%  
- Religion listed on id cards.  
Those religions not recognized are not listed on cards. | Choice of religion protected by state.  
- Hindu: 48%  
- Christian: 32.2%  
- Muslim: 16.6%  
- Other 3: .2%  
- Religions existing at independence receive annual stipend, a new group with 7 members can apply for recognition and benefits. No group has been turned down. |
| **Religious attendance** | 36.7% attend services at least once per week. | No reliable percentage available. |
| **Education**           | Compulsory religious and moral instruction in primary and secondary schools, religious minorities are exempted although certain Protestant groups can not get out of the classed (classes??) because id cards do not properly reflect religion.  
- recognized religious minorities may operate schools under the Ministry of Education. Such schools must appoint a Muslim reportedly, these deputies have more authority than their nominal supervisors | Most schools are public, Catholic Church runs some of the most prestigious secondary schools in the country, but as a condition for receiving state funding, a minimum of 49% students must be non-Catholic |
<p>| <strong>Religious prisoners</strong> | None reported. | None reported. |
| <strong>Protections</strong>         | There are legal restrictions against insulting any religion recognized by the government, interfering with that religion's services, or degrading its property | The freedom of religion is explicitly guaranteed in the constitution. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Table 4.2 Tolerance</strong></th>
<th><strong>Turkey</strong></th>
<th><strong>Mauritius</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forced conversion</strong></td>
<td>No forced conversions reported in 2006. Turks who convert from Islam have reported difficulty in changing their preference on ID cards, and sometimes complain of social harassment from friends and neighbors.</td>
<td>No forced conversions reported (Freedom House 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Limits to Missionary Efforts</strong></td>
<td>Some feel that police and prosecutors view proselytizing and religious activism with suspicion, but Christians handing out literature have been beaten and police have reported some of those who meet w/ missionaries to their families.</td>
<td>Missionaries allowed to stay in country for 5 years, some have complained about difficulties renewing visas or claim the state delays in providing visas for replacements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crimes tied to Religion</strong></td>
<td>2006: Judge Mustafa Yucel Ozbilgin killed, 4 other judges wounded by gunman upset with their ruling upholding headscarf ban. 2006: 5 assailants severely beat Protestant church leader Kamil Kiroglu in Adana. One attacker wielded a knife and threatened to kill Kiroglu unless he renounced Christianity 2006: Catholic priest Andrea Santaro shot and killed in a church in Trabzon. A witness said the gunman shouted &quot;God is great&quot;. 2006: Young men beat, threaten to kill a Catholic friar in Izmir, shouting anti-Christian slogans. 2006: Assailant enters Catholic church in Mersin, threatening church members and shouting anti-Christian statements. 2006: Young men entered the Syriac compound in Diyarbakir and shouted threats.</td>
<td>None reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bans on public practice and assembly</strong></td>
<td>Traditional garb banned for men &amp; women. Members of the secular establishment fear the influence of Islamism and reject the involvement of even moderate Islam in politics and practicing faith can cause dismissal from government jobs to include military.</td>
<td>None reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Claims of prejudice</strong></td>
<td>Religious minorities said they were effectively blocked from careers in state institutions</td>
<td>Creoles and Muslims complain of preponderance of Hindus in power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Recent Improvements</strong></td>
<td>April 2006, Roman Catholic authorities reopened the Bebekli Church in Adana for Sunday services. Catholic leaders had closed the church in September 2005 because local authorities had failed to enforce zoning regulations requiring a ten-meter offset around the church.</td>
<td>A committee consisting of religious leaders from each of the major religions met several times during 2005 to discuss inter-religious harmony</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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