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The Origins of Ethno/National Separatist Terrorism: A Cross-National Analysis of the Background Conditions of Terrorist Campaigns

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THE ORIGINS OF ETHNO/NATIONAL SEPARATIST TERRORISM: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE BACKGROUND CONDITIONS OF TERRORIST CAMPAIGNS

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (International-Comparative Politics)

By

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ABSTRACT

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The Origins of Ethno/National Separatist Terrorism: A Cross-National Analysis of the Background Conditions of Terrorist Campaigns

This study measures the influence that multiple social, political, and economic conditions have on the development of ethno/national separatist terrorist organizations. It begins by analyzing the nationalist theories of primordialism, modernism, and ethnosymbolism, and the terrorist theories of strategic logic and psychology. The nationalist theories consider cultural symbols a powerful component behind nationalist movements and populations with significant symbolic attachments especially prone to react aggressively against perceived threats to those symbols. Proponents of strategic logic and psychological theory also view terrorism as reactive but deviate on whether this response is conceived rationally. Examining the origins of Basque and Catalan terrorism and Roma passivity in Spain assists in identifying background conditions that are evaluated using a logit regression model. The logit model assesses two-hundred ninety-seven minority populations in one-hundred twenty-six states, primarily between 1945 and 2003. The results show cultural identity and sensitivity, violent encounters, political freedom, social unrest, underrepresentation, disproportionate economic privation, and stagnant educational systems and other factors of civil development correlating significantly with the formation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organizations. These findings imply an ability to detect populations and environments with increased potential for producing ethno/national separatist terrorism, and that by addressing those conditions facilitating its development, it may be possible to reduce the probability of additional campaigns developing.
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Introduction

This study analyzes the conditions surrounding the creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organizations. It begins by examining contemporary theories of nationalism and terrorism in order to identify common background conditions correlating with the development of these movements, and then uses a logit regression to test the significance of those correlations among various minority populations. The objective is to detect common triggers existing throughout the world that influence an aggressive response from specific populations that then leads to the initiation of terrorism for gaining national sovereignty. The intent of this paper is to advance the study of terrorism by understanding why some groups transition into a terrorist organization and attempt to solidify both the theoretical aspects and development of ideas applicable to future research in this field.

One of the first challenges in studying terrorism is defining the term. History shows a tendency of opposition movements and their sympathizers to resist the depiction of terroristic acts as terrorism to avoid its pejorative connotations, instead preferring to refer to themselves as rebels, freedom fighters, or liberators (Hoffman, 1998). The result of this difficulty with labeling is an inability to establish a universally acceptable definition of a terrorist organization. To provide a common description of these organizations, researchers produce ad hoc explanations that utilize common concepts and then periodically introduce subtle nuances to the term. Cooper (1997), for example, describes terrorism as opposition to normal society and its structures. Hoffman (1998) writes that terrorism is conclusively about power, involving “a planned, calculated, and . . . systematic act” of violence, or its threat, “designed to have far-reaching psychological effects” (pp. 15, 44). Laqueur (1999) adds to the definition of terrorism by describing its political components, and Rimanelli (1992) writes that terrorism is a tactic used by
revolutionists for maximizing “systematic and indiscriminate” attacks aimed “at provoking
generalized political instability and tensions to destroy the traditional psychological bonds
between state and society” (p. 127). For the purpose of this study, the definition of terrorism
broadly encapsulates illegitimate hostile acts by oppositionist groups to further their goals and
which manifest the aforementioned characteristics. In addition, the observations in this analysis
have previously been defined by other sources as terrorism, predominately by the *Global
Terrorism Database* (GTD).

Terrorism is a broad topic with episodes occurring in several forms that go beyond large-
scale, indiscriminate violence by clandestine groups. These acts range from civil disobedience to
cyberspace attacks, and a myriad of actions between. Often terrorism is seen as a weapon of the
weak and of last resort, committed in areas with higher degrees of civil freedom by organizations
that tend to emerge in authoritarian states with institutional weaknesses or political corruption
(Fox, 2003; Abadie, 2006; Feldmann & Perälä, 2004; Reinares & Jaime-Jeménez, 2000 Laqueur,
1999; Fleming, 1982). Moreover, terrorism occurs sporadically or cyclically, is a primary or one
of several tactics, and is unaided or sponsored, or connected to other movements (Feldmann &
Perälä, 2004; Fox, 2003; Cook, 1982). Walter Reich (1990), in his own quest to understand
terrorism, writes how this “subject is so confounded by problems of diversity, complexity, and
definition that any simplifying approach is bound to tempt one to use it beyond its valid limits”
(p. 2). This broad research by nature overlooks unique cultures, histories, and circumstances,
while the nearest to a universal description of terrorism is of a terrorist type as male and seldom
of a labor class, and for woman terrorists as emotionally driven (Laqueur, 1999). Beyond this,
concepts of terrorism become multidimensional and generally inapplicable to different cases.
The examples of Basque and Catalanian terrorism in Spain further illustrates how geographic
alignment, resource sharing, and similar hardships are indeterminate predictors of case specific aggression. This makes the task of uncovering the roots of terrorism especially difficult, although important, since common traits may exist within the various forms of terrorism. As Laqueur (1999) explains, there are no typical terrorists, only typical types of terrorism, and by narrowing research to these specific types, it may be possible to accumulate knowledge that assists in predicting conditions and environments that promote and facilitate its occurrence. Therefore, by examining the origins of ethno/national separatist (ENS) terrorist campaigns, this paper seeks to contribute to a more precise perspective on the ENS form of terrorism.

The aspects differentiating ENS terrorism from other forms of terrorism include moderate to intense levels of violence in the pursuit of national independence. Hoffman (1998) depicts this level of violence as between two extremes, which like Marxist-based terrorism is intrinsically revolutionary but more destructive and less discriminate, although less violent than religiously motivated groups. Crenshaw (1990) attributes these differences to ENS organizations appealing broadly along ethnic lines that helps compensate for indiscriminate aggression, whereas leftists relying solely on ideology have to calculate attacks carefully to avoid turning a populace against them. Rightwing terrorism, to the contrary, tends to be the least discriminate, which Hoffman (1998; 1995) argues operates outside dominant political or cultural paradigms and is uninterested in political or social change, striving only to annihilate a perceived ‘ungodly’ enemy. Therefore, religious-based terrorism appeals only to those sharing a narrow and extreme ideology, although in some cases ENS terrorists also integrate leftist or rightwing ideologies into their movement, and as a result exhibit the characteristics common to those beliefs. Furthermore, ENS terrorism includes organizations that tend to be the longest lasting and most successful. Most have roots in the post World War II anti-colonial movements and became commonplace in Europe during the
Cold War, where especially since the 1960s, Europe has remained among the hottest regions for terrorist activity (White, 2002; Hoffman, 1998).

Terrorism in its modern sense has plagued Europe for generations. Pluchinsky (1982) writes that since the 1970s, Europe has been “the most active terrorist environment in the world,” where Alexander and Myer (1982) note over 200 terrorist organizations have emerged (pp. 68-9). This neoteric concept of terrorism first arose from the ashes of the French Revolution when the *regime de la terreur* used brutal tactics for maintaining order in the early postwar era. In its beginning, the term terrorism had a positive connotation but quickly became synonymous as an instrument of torment (Hoffman, 1998). Its meaning later evolved into a method of rebellion in Italy during the 1870s as an early theory, propaganda by deed, linked it to anarchy, which Errico Malatesta and Carlo Cafiero developed by arguing how direct and aggressive action could bring awareness to a struggle. Malatesta and Cafiero promoted developing movements by educating masses, and advocated violence as the most effective and efficient mode of communication, ideal for affecting change. They subsequently brought their theory to fruition by inciting a riot in 1877 (Hoffman, 1998; Fleming, 1982). Terrorism again became prominent during the Russian Revolution, which redefined it as a tactic for waging violent resistance without open conflict. *Narodnaya Volya*, the People’s Will, was the first to implement Malatesta and Cafiero’s propagandist principles, showing that direct action by dispersing information could formulate a movement of rebellion (White, 2002; Hoffman, 1998; Fleming, 1982). From that period the meaning of terrorism gradually evolved. The assassinations of Tsar Alexander II in Russia and Cavendish and Thomas Burke in Ireland further connected terrorism to revolutionist ideology. Meanwhile, events over time shifted the perceptions of terrorists from anarchistic and expecting
severe repercussions to those of heroic protagonists forced to use violence, and for whom punishment would be viewed as unjust (Laqueur, 1999; Hoffman, 1998).

The origins of ENS terrorism are also considered to have begun in Europe and radiated outward through colonialism and, in its development, gained traction as a contemporary tactic of resistance. Several European groups including Armenians, Basques, Irish, Kurds, Macedonians, and Serbs have used terrorism to pursue national independence in regions where its origins stem back generations (Alexander & Meyer, 1982). The Armenians in Turkey and the Inner Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) in Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia were implementing these tactics as early as the 1880s, while parts of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) date back to 1789, following Wolfe Tone’s rebellion (Hoffman, 1998; Crenshaw, 1990). The surge of ENS terrorism ceased, however, during both World Wars, while terrorism in the late nineteenth century primarily espoused Marxism and after World War I, shifted to rightwing movements (Laqueur, 1999; Alexander & Meyer, 1982). Then, ENS terrorism began to resurge in the 1940s with anti-colonial revolts around the world that used radical tactics to gain independence and international awareness (Hoffman, 1998). Concepts of terrorism burgeoned amid marginalized ethnic populations worldwide who saw advantages in clandestine resistance. This momentum derived from technological advances and national events such as the birth of Israel in 1948 (Laqueur, 1999; Alexander & Meyer, 1982). Though many had Marxist roots, which provided an alternative belief system, these movements were not fundamentally grounded in communist ideology. Rather, terrorism involves the rejection of mainstream structures and ideology, and this was an era confronting Western dominance. Foremost, however, these movements structured themselves around ethnic identity and separatism, and eventually nationalism grew as their dominant ideology such that by the 1950s, these organizations were
almost entirely nationalist based. These movements emerged across the world with notorious organizations beginning in Israel, Algeria, and Spain in the 1950s, were revitalized in Ireland in the 1960s, erupted in Turkey in the 1970s, and since have continued to upsurge especially as Marxist terrorism has declined (Laqueur, 1999; Crenshaw, 1990; Pluchinsky, 1982; Alexander & Meyer, 1982).

In all, the subject of ENS terrorism presents an important topic. ENS terrorism occurs worldwide, and transpires under a variety of economic, political, and social systems. Although a universal explanation of terrorism may not exist, the task of studying the various forms of terrorism, and the conditions in which they occur, may lead to a better understanding of the background conditions common to these specific forms. The intent of this study is to strengthen the understanding of ENS terrorism by blending literature on nationalist and terrorist movements to identify theoretical concepts and measure their significance in relation to the development of these organizations. The first chapter provides a discussion of contemporary nationalist and terrorist theories. The second chapter discusses the case of ENS terrorism in Spain from an historical context, which the literature provides a framework for interpreting and understanding how to apply the theoretical concepts. The third chapter operationalizes these concepts in order to perform a logit regression assessing the relationship between the background conditions and development of ENS terrorist organizations. The final section discusses the overall significance of this study, identifies weaknesses, and provides suggestions for future research.
Chapter I
Literature Review

There are a variety of theories covering nationalism and terrorism, some note patterns that occur as reformist groups intensify in aggression, although few address the transitions to terrorism that occur within ENS movements. One theory, Gramsci’s war of positions, contends that opposition networks develop in areas with conflicting hegemonic beliefs and implacable self-interests, with terrorism occurring as contentious beliefs conflict with mainstream descriptions of reality. This conflict involves at least one sect feeling victimized while an opposition network exists that is able to offer those affected an alternative reality. When that network is unable to bring about alternative structures through peaceful measures, and perceives no alternative method for affecting change, it resorts to terrorism (Lustick, 1993). Laqueur (1999) finds this is especially true of ethno/nationalist groups. Pluchinsky (1982) also observes these groups flourishing in areas ripe with high levels of unemployment and inflation, stagnant educational sectors, weak judicial and legal systems, entrenched ethnic or religious divisions, or other factionalized partisanship, in which failed attempts at peaceful political solutions often contribute to radicalization. What is missing, however, is a description of how these conditions influence the conversions from nonviolence to terrorism, which the examination of literature on this topic provides an approach for analyzing.

Theories of Nationalism

Theories of nationalism are important to consider when studying ENS terrorism. Nationalist ideology is the foundation upon which ENS terrorist campaigns emerge. Though only a portion of nationalist movements transcend into terrorist organizations, theories of nationalism have identified several common characteristics regarding both the development of nationalist
movements and nationalist-based aggression. Those conditions influencing nationalist sentiment may also play decisive roles in the formation of ENS terrorist organizations or the decisions of nationalist movements to initiate terrorism. Therefore, nationalist theory may assist in identifying some of the stimuli encouraging the use of terrorism or assist in identifying which populations are most vulnerable to producing terrorist campaigns.

Several theories attempt to explain nationalist movements, which in their most basic form involve a social political force, nostalgia for returning to a golden age, and three themes: “autonomy, unity, [and] identity” (Muro, 2005; Beiner, 1999; Smith & Hutchinson, 1994, p. 5). Also inherent in nationalist theories are cultural symbols with the potential to elicit strong emotional responses. Most of these theories concur that manipulating these symbols can affect nationalist sentiment and therefore play a key role in nationalist movements. Another common aspect is that most of these theories rely on a constructivist or biological explanation, or a combination of both evolutionary and structural forces influencing nationalist movements, while differing over assumptions of the age of nationalism, and its internal ‘psychological’ and external ‘environmental’ triggers. Researchers often arrange these theories based on those paradigmatic variances, classifying them as either primordialist or modernist. Primordialism treats nationalism as enduring, with increasing trends to study its evolutionary and psychological components. Modernism instead limits the age of nationalism to the formation of nation-states, and relies on constructivist explanations that coincide with structural changes. A third method, ethnosymbolism, provides a theoretical bridge that combines aspects of both primordialist and modernist theories for explaining a long-existing phenomenon while rejecting notions of innate symbolic value.
**Primordialism**

Primordialists share the view that nationalism is an archaic human trait, but diverge over assumptions about internal behavioral mechanisms. Researchers in this field study the long-held values that individuals and groups place on kinship, collective identity, and other symbols of identity, to suggest that behaviors inherent to nationalism are a continuation of an enduring human practice. They consider nationalism a normative part of the human experience in which its common traits, such as preferred kinship and quick aversion for unfamiliar persons, have remained universal communal characteristics for innumerable generations, which makes it a worldwide-antiquated heritable phenomenon. Essentially, arguing that nationalism has existed since or before the dawn of man, while the creation of nation-states merely extended its context and application. The extent to which these perspectives fluctuate draws from diverging cultural or evolutionary views. Although each is anthropological, culturalists focus on socially inherited dimensions of behavior, whereas evolutionists try to determine which aspects of behavior are socially learned and which are genealogical. While each approach views perception as key to explaining social interaction, evolutionists attempt to extend the understanding beyond structural components to include the internal mechanisms that make perception vital.

Ozkirimli (2000) identifies Clifford Geertz and Pierre L. Van Den Berghe as influential scholars of primordialism. Geertz (1995), a culturalist, advocates studying behavior by focusing on intricate situational details, arguing how symbols of identity are not only multidimensional but vary among cultures and individuals within a culture. For that reason, analyses should involve thick descriptions that provide a holistic method for exposing deep roots of case specific stimuli, which facilitates retracing the perennial aspects of culture and behavior. Van Den Berghe (1987) in contrast, is a sociobiologist, who addresses the psychological mechanisms of
nationalism. Van Den Berghe (1987) relies on genetic, ecological, and cultural reasoning to argue that engineered behaviors for kin selection, reciprocity, and coercion contribute to all human interaction. From this view, organisms are vehicles for gene replication wherein evolutionary processes created survival instincts that influence interaction and reproduction with those perceived as genetic matches, with nationalism being coercion disguised as kinship.

**Modernism**

Modernism, in contrast, views nationalism as predominately induced by environment and a more recent human development. Ozkirimli (2000) writes that most scholars in this field follow one of three transformationist paradigms: economic, social-cultural, or political. Accordingly, the economic approach focuses on industrial changes, while social-culturalists view nationalism as a byproduct of maturing industrial societies, the latter viewing it as the result of evolving political structures. Each approach is highly constructivist with frameworks assuming that the creation of nation-states produced nationalism, with a consensus that its primary causes were the mass labor migrations during the Industrial Revolution and state consolidation. These factors contributed by establishing common identities within territories, from which recognizable symbols of national identity could elicit sentimental attachments to those regions. Statehood, in effect, produced preferred kinships through influencing a heightened sense of fear and antipathy for outsiders, wherein us-versus-them mentalities consolidate nationalist movements, making modernism a neoteric and outwardly produced response.

John Breuilly and Eric J. Hobsbawm are both proponents of political modernism who find economic and political changes to be the underlying causes of nationalist movements during the mid-twentieth century. Breuilly (1982) argues that prior to this period the general populace of Europe was neither political nor nationalist. Their issues were unimportant politically and
therefore many felt unattached to national frameworks within their homelands. Then, tremendous changes during the Industrial Revolution altered political landscapes. Rivalries over economic power and world primacy led nations to consolidate, worsening xenophobia. Breuilly (1982) finds national identity becoming more widespread as states became better established, and finally becoming a normal characteristic of nations and an exploitable political tool. In Europe, nationalism incessantly fueled aggression, and during the World War interim period, Hobsbawm (1994) argues how previously impotent nationalist groups ascended to power, filling the vacuum left by collapsed regimes by inciting fear against those who did not belong to a narrowly defined nationality. Subsequently, attributing the rise of Naziism to uniting a collective identity based on an aggravated mistrust of non-ethnic Germans and ethnic Germans perceived as different.

**Ethnosymbolism**

Ethnosymbolism observes multidimensional and evolving symbols playing essential roles in defining identity throughout history. Distinct from the other two paradigms, ethnosymbolism is in-and-of-itself a theory, which Hale (2004) and Ozkirimli (2000) describe as a fusion of primordialism and modernism. Like primordialism, this approach illustrates the importance of enduring symbolic values and studies their historical relevancies not limited to abrupt changes within a specific chronological domain. At the same time, it emphasizes how people must ascribe values to those symbols if they are to influence perception. Consequently, it emphasizes the importance of perennial symbols while acknowledging how their interpretations change (Hale, 2004). Therefore, Ozkirimli (2000) describes ethnosymbolism as a decidedly constructivist approach, which portrays culture as having ancient and enduring qualities, with symbols whose definitions constantly change and perpetually influence identity.
Hale (2004) and Ozkirimli (2004) credit Anthony D. Smith for developing the ethnosymbolist model. According to Smith (2003), national identity derives from the perpetual reinterpretation “of values, symbols, memories, myths, and traditions,” with nationalism being a collective phenomenon of those sharing these traits (pp. 24-5). In addition, Smith (2003) argues how cultural symbols, some from antiquity, pass down through generations and continue influencing perception. Using religion to illustrate an ancient perennial symbol that established frameworks for national identity, Smith (2003) describes how Christianity united ancient civilizations and laid the foundations for modern Armenia, Ethiopia, and Russia. Like statehood, Smith (2003) argues, religion has unifying qualities that gave historically religious societies the equivalence of a national identity pre-nation-state. In earlier work, Smith (1994) also argues how ethnic identity existed prior to the Industrial Revolution by illustrating how each period of enlightenment gave credence to cultural symbols, which spread a sense of racial identity and created symbolic heirlooms that continued reinforcing ethnicity throughout generations.

While observing a perpetual and reciprocal relationship between symbolism and cultural identity, ethnosymbolism also holds that the propensity of a symbol to influence identity depends on the interpretations of its value. As such, strong symbolic attachments might be less common in ethnically diverse populations having a vast assortment of insignificant symbols, while Smith (1991) considers ethnically exclusive groups, like the Basque, to be exceptionally sensitive to threats against their national identity. Smith (1991) argues how groups with notably close ethnic ties are more likely to share heritable traits, like gastronomy, language, and folklore. The close proximity of the population sharing culturally significant traits teaches and encourages members to place certain sentimental values in them, which shows how learning to recognize and appreciate values is necessary for symbols to have effective potential.
Theories of Terrorism

Contemporary views on terrorism vie between strategic and psychological explanations of its origins. Although each of these models focuses on several components of terrorism, and views these organizations as being, to a certain extent, homogenous to one another, they disagree on many of the underlying factors that lead an organization to commit violent acts. Much of this dispute derives from strategic logic’s emphasis on rational choice by organizations that behave as single entities. While psychological theory likewise considers these organizations as being in-and-of-themselves monolithic, it also focuses on individuals within each organization, especially the role they play during its development phase. The following offers a discussion about these methods for studying terrorism, and how they may contribute to understanding the forces behind nationalist/separatist-based campaigns.

Psychology

The psychological model views terrorism as the result of emotional responses. Terrorism, according to Sprinzak (1990), derives from a psycho-political process of delegitimation. One scholar commonly identified with this approach, Jerrold M. Post, argues that, “Individuals are drawn to . . . terrorism in order to commit acts of violence,” which is the effect of psychological factors (p. 25). This occurs when external forces affect the psychological frameworks of individuals that causes trauma and predisposes them to aggression. Terrorist organizations disproportionately attract these individuals, giving groups a high ratio of members with fractured identities who seek stimuli through action, are aggressive, and compelled to commit violence. By joining these organizations, such individuals gain a sense of belonging that helps to heal emotional damage, while their tendencies toward violence lead them to use groups for payback,
influencing groups to seek vengeance against those blamed for causing their psychosomatic trauma, and having an overpowering influence that increases the aggressive nature of the group.

Several authors have written about the psychological traits of terrorists, and how these traits may provide explanations for terrorism. The psychological model identifies similar behavioral and emotional traits that contribute to a predisposition to joining a terrorist group. According to Post (1990), terrorist organizations attract a disproportionately high number of individuals with troubled pasts, emotional disorders, or psychological damage. Implicitly, the potential terrorist lacks a well-developed sense of self and feels fundamentally detached from society. Gibson (1994) depicts many terrorists as perceiving themselves as rogue warriors who view terrorism as a necessity, while Ross (1999) portrays the terrorist type as being anxious, thrill seeking, culpable, depressed, antisocial, narcissistic, and lost, and argues that continual demonstration of such behavioral traits contributes towards the likelihood of becoming a terrorist. Likewise, Post (1990) describes many terrorists as victims of severe adolescent trauma, belonging to dysfunctional families, being educational or vocational failures, and social outcasts. To illustrate, Post (1990) highlights reports by members of the Red Army Faction (RAF) and 2 June Movement, showing how most of these members had divorced parents and unfavorable paternal relationships. Another example notes the high ratio of mixed Spanish/Basque ancestry among members of ETA, indicating individuals possibly having difficulty identifying with or being accepted by either culture, and thus lacking a strong sense of personal identity.

Vital to this theory is the effect that environment has on individual growth. Many cases point to social detachment facilitating radicalization. Post (1990) and Cook (1982) both illustrate several instances of individuals living outside mainstream culture for substantial periods before becoming terrorists. In essence, they believe that enmeshment in counterculturalism can diminish
normative values or foster new ones, facilitate unrealistic unidimensional views, and decrease inhibitions for using violence. For some, the cultures in which they were raised are in-and-of-themselves peripheral to society. For example, simply living under Francoism made Basque identity countercultural (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995). Subcultures might also emerge from shifting environmental conditions. Cook (1982) contends that living in a newly democratic post-fascist Germany prejudiced views of injustice and led to a countercultural subculture in the 1960s when German youth experienced a barrage of new concepts emphasizing rebellion that evolved from protest movements in the United States. These dynamics inspired a heightened sense of moral justice and aversion to Germany’s recent political past. Ultimately, however, financial security allowing excess in adolescent indulgence and political activism, along with inabilitys to cope with new social pressures or identify with their own political system, brought about adverse views of society and skewed perceptions of reality, eventually leading to the formation of the Red Army Faction (RAF).

Also important is that some who join terrorist organizations do so due to an emotional need. According to the psychological model, people seek out groups for healing psychological fragmentation caused by experiencing severe emotional trauma early in life and later emerging as a severe psychotic disorder. Post (1990) asserts that narcissism is a frequent terrorist trait, describing the commonly observed symptoms of splitting and externalization, which involve projecting inner weaknesses onto others, making them the targets of unsettled inadequacies. Cook (1982) adds that long held mistrust of society erodes standard reactions to stimuli, and that groups provide new normative guidance and identity. In Post’s (1990) view, groups are therapeutic; they offer a sense of belonging and a means for acting out aggression, while those who lack an adequate personal identity compensate by adopting a collective identity. The group
identity provides a platform for redressing grievances. Their enemies become the manifestation of the group’s inner emotional flaws. Groups also institute a sense of identity by establishing strict moral codes and enforcing homogeneity. They assume a sense of infallibility, and make it unacceptable to challenge beliefs. Pressure to conform compels submission to extreme views, while fears of isolation or retribution sustain cohesion.

Within groups, Post (1990) asserts that the already high proportion of psychologically damaged members have considerable influence over group dynamics. Such mentalities become the group mindset, and gradually move the collective group from a nonviolent phase of antisocialism to a phase conducive to terrorism. Sprinzak (1990) details how this process led the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), which committed itself to nonviolence, to become the Weathermen within a decade. Sprinzak (1990) describes the stages as moving from a crisis of confidence, to a conflict of legitimacy, to a crisis of legitimacy. In the initial stages, low-level nonviolent ideological struggles exist, but once passive tactics for effecting change prove ineffective, the struggle begins employing greater levels of violence. Justification derives from believing that existing systems are corrupt and repressive, and that the group is able to provide a superior alternative. Also included in this process are the unhealed fractured identities, which progressively turn into stronger shows of narcissism and violence. Ross (1990) claims that groups reinforce these negative traits and teach ways to increase violence, until eventually, these traits define the group’s identity. At which point, Post (1990) argues members develop a sense of invulnerability and superior morality, while viewing their enemies as unidimensional. Moreover, Post (1990) finds these characteristics pressuring conformity and the use of violence, while Sprinzak (1990) finds the process of delegitimizing social norms to produce, what he terms,
“antinomian weltanschauung[s],” meaning they discard conventional morality while holding a black and white worldview, which ultimately creates the pathway to terrorism (p. 83).

The psychological theory considers terrorism a group choice, typically following failed peaceful attempts to produce political or ideological reform, and where no conceivable substitute exists (Sprinzak, 1990). Consequently, the decision by groups to use terrorism derives from the perception that terrorism is their only option. Cooper (1997) calls this the doctrine of necessity in which groups share a belief that terrorism is the only effective means for pursuing their goals and therefore commit these acts believing they must. As Ross (1999) notes, many groups view it as the most effective and efficient means to pursue their interests. It justifies their existence while providing a sense of higher purpose, which Post (1990) discusses as the inevitable path to becoming irreversible monoliths. By illustrating ETA’s continued unwillingness to disarm after achieving substantial political gains, Post (1990) argues that the ultimate purpose of these groups is to commit terrorism. Violence gives the members of the organization self-worth and validates their continuation, while success threatens their survival. For this reason, Post (1990) believes that a terrorist organization will resist surrendering willingly or completely, essentially making terrorism a self-perpetuating necessity.

**Strategic Logic**

The strategic model describes terrorism as a calculated choice by organizations following a rational decision-making process. It focuses primarily on group logic instead of individual dynamics by viewing the organization as homogenously ideological and negating individualism. The scholars identified with this approach include Martha Crenshaw, Bruce Hoffman, and Walter Laqueur. Crenshaw (1990) argues that a terrorist organization collectively decides to commit terrorism and justifies its aggression by using an intra-group rationality. This is
demonstrated in deliberations that include a group’s ideology versus the proportion of the population sharing similar views, and the degree and potential effectiveness of attacks. However, while viewing these organizations as having a single identity, this model also considers them distinct, adept, logical, and deliberate. It applies a broad analysis that includes all forms of terrorism while providing a paradigm for identifying specific information about each case and integrating other theories into the analysis. In addition, because it offers a universal approach for studying terrorism, Crenshaw (1990) advocates this method as being the ideal framework for research in this field.

The strategic method observes a logical process in the lengthy and divisive development of a terrorist organization. This process typically begins with passive opposition movements that over time become more aggressive. According to Crenshaw (1990), the initial decision by a group to use terrorism tends to follow the protracted buildup of experiences. It entails learning from current circumstances and past failures. As Hoffman (1998) notes, people grow weary of ineffective nonviolent methods and turn to terrorism because of its potential to manifest quicker results. Clark (1984) illustrates this progression in describing ETA’s development, which began as Ekin, “To do,” having roots with remnants of Euzko Ikasle Alkartuna (EIA), the “Society of Basque Students, and along with members of Euzko Gaztedi del Interior (EGI), the “Basque Revolutionary Youth,” whom both parted from the Partido Nacionalisto Vasco (PNV), the “Basque Nationalist Party,” primarily over the dispute whether to use active resistance. As Crenshaw (1990) observes, the decision to use terrorism is a divisive issue capable of destabilizing groups or factionalizing members. Accordingly, some members might view it as an only option while others might worry about it being counterproductive or too elitist, as some theories contend that mass participation is necessary to keep people actively engaged. When
movements do become more violent, the strategic model views this as adjusting tactics from the standpoint that organizations are being altered while members vie to employ more efficient and effective strategies.

Therefore, strategic logic does not view terrorism as a precipitous act, but as a strategy for acquiring notoriety, gains, and resources that involves ideal moments and precise planning in order to limit the costs to the group while maximizing their results. These calculations for using terrorism are an important part of the strategic model. Terrorism, according to Crenshaw (1990), is often a “response to opportunity” where the decisions to commit terrorism involve not only previously failed strategies but also seizing opportune moments (p. 16). A key factor, Lustick (1993) claims, is whether a group feels an urgency to act under repressive conditions, especially if they sense regime vulnerability, which Crenshaw (1990) argues is important for several reasons. Chiefly, despotic conditions create time constraints to act. Groups need favorable moments where systems are vulnerable, making it possible to win quick support. Especially in authoritarian states, where accurate assessments of popular support are difficult to gauge, but latent underground support could exist; a group might act hoping to create revolutionary conditions and elicit a following. Furthermore, a group might act believing their actions will inspire future movements, an aspect that Crenshaw (1990) considers a long-term strategy of terrorism.

Another aspect of strategic logic underlies the dynamics involved in the initial decisions to initiate terrorism. According to Crenshaw (1990), the conditions under which terrorism tends to occur indicate a sense of logic, which Reinares and Jaime-Jeménez (2000) find to involve circumstances that open doors to unease and unrest, including economic crisis, liberalization, or frustration felt as one segment of society threatens another segment’s idealist expectations for
society and government. In these situations, Crenshaw (1990) argues that some want to act but lack capability. Laws might ban organizing politically, or extreme views lack broad support. Whichever the case, groups are more likely to use terrorism when they cannot realize their goals peacefully, and are unable to rally forces sufficient for open confrontation. The case of the Weathermen illustrates this point. Sprinzak (1990) writes that the Weathermen had wanted to create a revolution in the United States, but their extreme ideology made them highly selective over membership, and as a result, the group never had more than four hundred members, and eventually sought to deliver their campaign through terrorism. This decision Crenshaw (1990) describes as the last in a succession of options, and often a weapon of the weak for small groups to compensate for their lack of force. Meanwhile, the media magnified violence endows them with greater authority, forcing others to take them more seriously than they might have done otherwise.

The strategic model also holds that organizations consider the costs and benefits of using terrorism. Crenshaw (1990) argues that terrorist organizations use a logical process of gauging terrorism based on its potential effectiveness. One of the objectives is to provoke overreactions, which Laqueur (1999) calls a strategy of provocation where terrorists hope to further their cause and gain support by revealing governments as either ineffective or unjust. Several examples demonstrate terrorist organizations applying this logical analysis, which is especially common among ethno/nationalists and was ETA’s action-repression-spiral theory (Clark, 1984). Hoffman (1998) and Laqueur (1999) also describe the IRA as masters of using this logic to employ precise levels of aggression. According to Laqueur (1999), though the IRA was capable of massive violence, they routinely launched carefully directed and small-scale attacks to prevent estranging popular support. In addition, even acts foreseeable as destabilizing to terrorist organizations can
be a deliberate part of strategy. Sandler and Enders (2007) write how the September 11 attacks, which cost upwards of $100 billion, had the potential to cripple western market stability, which outweighed the potential damages to Al-Qaeda.

The strategic model also highlights the ability of terrorists to estimate responsive impacts. When it comes to terrorism, governments and terrorists alike must consider the outcomes of their actions. If governments respond inadequately to a terrorist attack, the lack of security puts people at risk and demonstrates an inability to respond to social threats. However, overreactions that institute repressive conditions risk eroding popular support and validating the terrorist’s position, giving the terrorist organization considerable power and influence. Even still, responding too severely can diminish the terrorist organization’s support base. Much of this, Crenshaw (1990) argues, involves a population’s ability to endure “insecurity and repression” (p. 19). Laqueur (1999) provides the examples of leftists in Venezuela and the M-19 in Columbia, who overestimated their support and acted too aggressively, turning public sentiment against them. Furthermore, Rimanelli (1992) describes how the Red Brigade (BR) in Italy not only miscalculated its support base and the effects of improved industrial conditions, but also lacked foresight of historical and ideological trends, while being naïve as to the role of the US and Italy’s geopolitical importance during the Cold War. These cases illustrate the awareness needed for a terrorist organization to survive. For organizations to endure, it is essential to recognize beforehand not only how attacks will directly affect their targets, but also how governments will respond and how those responses will affect their organization.

These calculations for ensuring longevity are a vital part of the strategic model. Although this model considers the adoption of terrorism initially based on its potential to foster immediate results, the majority of terrorist organizations do not achieve their primary goals right away.
Therefore, success rests not only on an ability to enact initial tactics, but also on the capacity to consolidate movements and develop long-term strategies for attaining incremental changes, which Rimanelli (1992) argues hinges on the ability to acquire communication outlets, new technologies, intra-group and transnational relationships, immunity abroad, and sponsorship. Crenshaw (1990) adds that organizations must also develop underground networks that can withstand nearly all repercussions. Fortifying movements, however, is a time consuming and difficult task. Crenshaw (1990) describes the Shining Path in Peru spending a decade developing itself clandestinely before its first attack. Meanwhile, Clark (1984) describes how the ferocity with which EIA was dismantled left an impression about the importance of covertness with the founders of ETA. As a result, ETA created a complex network, and took advantage of the Spanish/French border; where for years safe haven and immunity in France enabled ETA to survive against unrelenting Spanish persecution.

Analyzing the Literature

The following is an analysis of the theories for nationalism and terrorism that offers a critique for where they assist in explaining the causes of ENS terrorism or lack general applicability. While none of these theories exhaustively explains the causes of terrorism, each model provides a useful perspective for studying the origins of ENS terrorist movements. The nationalist approach indicates that populations with distinct histories are more culturally sensitive, and tend to react more strongly to threats against their cultural identity. Psychology, although failing to distinguish between terrorist organizations sufficiently based on their overall goals, recognizes an emotional component of terrorism, which provides a method for assessing areas unaddressed by strategic logic, such as emotional contributions to the decision to initiate terrorism, or factors influencing individuals to join terrorist organizations. Strategic logic, while predominately focusing on active
terrestrial organizations, also offers the perspective that group behavior is calculated and evolving. Although each of these theories approaches this subject with a unique perspective, several of their principles are compatible with one another and collectively create a paradigm for analyzing ENS movements.

*Analyzing Theories of Nationalism*

The theories for nationalism contribute to the study of ENS terrorism by observing precise components of nationalist-based violence. Because nationalist movements are precursors to nationalist-separatist terrorism, forces leading to nationalist movements conceivably also play causational roles in the creation of ENS terrorist campaigns. While many terrorist organizations share similar characteristics, including a high ratio of males and roots in nonviolent oppositionist movements, motivations for opposition can vary. For nationalists, territorial claims often lie at the heart of conflicts. Inherently, this involves nostalgia for returning to a golden age that represents a utopian era of national unity and territorial sovereignty. Though the Roma never had a golden age in Spain, the Basque and Catalan did. These were the Kingdom of Navarre and the Catalan-Aragón Empire. These historic territories are central in defining Basque and Catalan national identity, with members from both populations referencing those eras to describe a once proud and independent people. Because ancestral land provides a platform for rhetoric that gives solidity to nationalist movements and influences aggression, it may also play a fundamental role in ENS terrorism. In addition to the potential significance that territory may have regarding these campaigns, the approaches to studying nationalism also provide intimations about several other possible forces behind ENS terrorism.

Primordialism and psychology share the assumption that an emotional component links aggression to radicalism. Evolutionary psychology especially assumes that internal mechanisms
contribute to social attachments that manifest as collective identities deriving from evolutionary
processes engineering survivalism in the human psyche (McKinnon, & Silverman, 2005; Van Den Berghe, 1987). Evolutionary psychologists attribute nationalist movements to an insecurity exhibited as aggression anchored in these survival instincts. Evolutionary and psychological theorists agree that nationalist movements form as increasing levels of fear influence the formation of protective layers of familiarity. Hale (2004) describes, “deeply rooted psychological mechanisms” dictating this development, which function as social navigators, constantly altered and conditioned by the environment, and therefore they are easily manipulable and instrumental in proliferating fears that incite nationalism (p. 481). These assumptions seem compatible with observations of both nationalism and terrorism, and correlate with Post’s (1990) argument that environments affect individuals psychologically, leading them to seek out groups for emotional comfort. They also share the view that aggression is a behavioral proclivity that contributes to a nationalist movement’s collective hostility. The difference is the extent to which individuals are considered inclined to aggression. Primordialists consider nearly all prone to violence without a prerequisite of prior psychological damage. Frans De Waal (1989), for example, finds aggression to be a heritable and situationally induced reaction, common to all primates thus existing before man, while Post (1990) sets a specific parameter wherefore terrorism results from psychological fragmentation.

Modernism and ethnosymbolism emphasize the plasticity of perception, highlighting how changes in the industrial era influenced perception and drew together social collectives as nation-states, defining the context of modern ENS movements. In fact, many trace the origins of Basque nationalism to the nineteenth century and the Carlist Wars, an era which Kurlansky (1999) describes as Basque on Basque warfare (Muro, 2005; Muro & Quiroga, 2005; Garmendia, 1985;
Clark, 1979). Garmendia (1985) describes how Basque nationalism emerged as Carlists emphasized a Basque golden age, while promising a return to it. Shabad and Llera Ramo (1995) write how economic changes as early as the 1890s led to strong nationalism within traditional Basque society, while drastic population shifts, along with high unemployment rates, mostly among the youth, during the twentieth century strengthened its fervency and attracted segments to extremist movements. Conclusively, this period affected Basque nationalism in a way that directly influences movements today. It commenced a chain of events that sit at the core beliefs of modern Basque terrorism, but not necessarily marking the birth of Basque national identity.

The divergence of ethnosymbolism from modernism allows for observing nationalist roots beyond the corridors of the industrial age. This perspective helps to explain how historical progressions contributed to modern day movements. The conclusion that Christianity laid the foundation for Armenia, Ethiopia, and Russia, also applies to Spain, which united under Christianity during the Inquisition. Furthermore, Smith’s emphasis on symbolisms explains why Spaniards, united by Christianity, remained divided. Spain has an unusual terrain, and even within the Basque region, solitude gave rise to seven dialects of Euskera (Kurlansky, 1999). Basque ethnicity, defined by Euskera, the Basque language, is archaic, and ethnosymbolism implies that this symbol while not constantly uniting Basques, has consistently defined cultural exclusivity for innumerable generations. Catalan, however, is Latin-based, suggesting shared ancestral roots with other Spaniards, and in the case of the Roma, the Roma do not inscribe nor elicit the same symbolic values with Romani as the Basques are observed doing with Euskera. While notably distinct from Castilian, Romani is rare in Spain, with Caló, the Roma language in Spain, essentially being a form of improper Castilian. Euskera, to the contrary, delineates Basque identity. This distinction influences reluctance among Basques to recognize a shared ancestry
with other populations and explains why ETA views Euskera as key to uniting Euskadi as a decisively non-Spanish nation (Clark, 1984).

Analyzing Theories of Terrorism

Although psychology and strategic logic disagree about the general purposes for using terrorist violence, these theories share assumptions that can be applied to the development of terrorist movements. Post (1990) recognizes that terrorist organizations use a logical decision-making process to balance accomplishing levels of success in order to legitimize their existence, whereas Crenshaw (1990) and Hoffman (1998) agree that terrorism offers emotional benefits. Hoffman (1998) writes how “the desire for action can lead to an obsession with violence,” which along with notoriety becomes a necessary fix, encouraging self-aggrandizement and perpetuating desires for publicity (p. 175). According to Post (1990), the difference between these theories is the assumption that terrorism is a choice among alternatives. Strategic logic views terrorism as a decision based on its potential effectiveness, which Post (1990) refutes, arguing that the decision to use terrorism does not derive from a rational deliberation that weighs it against alternatives, since black and white world conceptions negate the ability for rational discernment. Instead, Post (1990) believes that terrorists view terrorism as their only choice, and an end in-and-of-itself, but not as a method for achieving political goals. However, despite these incompatible assumptions, it is possible to merge these theories in a way that contributes to this subject by describing an aspect of terrorism involving emotional reactions that influence rational calculations.

Analyzing Psychology

One weakness of the psychological model is its uniform view of terrorism. The argument that terrorist organizations exist solely to commit terrorism excludes consideration for the types of organizations committing it. In his article, Post (1990) frequently cites the Red Army Faction
RAF to illustrate terrorism’s psychological mechanisms, although Laqueur (1999) and Konrad (1990) portray this group as dysfunctional and atypical, describing its leadership as mentally unstable and the entire group as deeply troubled. The founders of the Baader-Meinhof Gang, the predecessor of RAF, Ulrike Meinhof and Andreas Baader, both had notable emotional damage. Meinhof, suffered a brain injury as a child, and Baader was a drug addict. Moreover, both committed suicide. While Konrad (1990) does agree that most terrorists “suffer from deep psychological trauma and act out what trauma whispers into their conscious minds,” he argues that, “the German case is unique” (pp. 43, 46). The history of Nazism had an unusual effect on the perceptions of German youth; an aspect unshared in many regions where terrorism occurs. Another commonly referenced group, the Weathermen, may also be an aberration. Laqueur (1999) depicts this group emerging from social unrest that radicalized naïve youth, who suffered an identity crisis and wanted excitement, but lacked a deep understanding of minority repression and economic hardship, or economics in general, and came to manifest the licentiousness that they condemned. Such examples, however, do not accurately depict every terrorist organization, and repeatedly referencing them demonstrates a selective analysis. As a result, the assumptions derived by Post may lack general applicability for all cases of terrorism.

Thus, Post’s (1990) assertion that ETA will not freely disarm because it failed to do so after achieving substantial political gains ignores that ETA has yet to realize its overall goal of Basque independence. Nor has Madrid ever completely given into ETA’s minimum requirements for a ceasefire and negotiations, which ETA-militar announced in 1978 with its five-point Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista (KAS) Alternative. This involved amnesty for all political prisoners; legitimating all political parties, even those supporting Basque independence; withdrawal of Spanish police and military forces from the Basque region; improved working and
living standards; and autonomy for Euskadi, with Euskera as the national language, law enforcement under the control of Basque authorities, and unconditional self-rule (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995; Clark, 1984). Some of these goals were less plausible, as granting sovereignty would require amending Article 2 of Spain’s Constitution, describing Spain as indissoluble (Cowans, 2003; Kurlansky, 1999). Other aspects were possible however, and in 1978, Madrid recognized both Euskal Iraultzale Alderdia (EIA), the “Basque Revolutionary Party,” which grew out of ETA-político-militar, and Herri Batasuna (HB), “Popular Unity,” which grew out of ETA-militar. Then in 1979, the Spanish Parliament approved Basque autonomy but not independence, while making Navarre a separate region, leading to contentiousness among Basque nationalists wanting to restore the entirety of the Navarrean Kingdom, including its French Provinces (Totoricaguena, 2004; Kurlansky, 1999).

Because Madrid has not entirely given in to these minimal requirements for a ceasefire, and because País Vasco remains under Spanish jurisdiction, claims that ETA will never willingly disarm are premature, especially when cases of similar successful movements indicate otherwise. Hoffman (1998) writes how many such movements fail to obtain their primary goal of national independence while small gains maintain campaigns of attrition. Konrad (1990) concludes that, “any such people, so long as they hold on to their convictions, cannot be appeased by anyone or anything; nor can they be satisfied by any change in conditions—they will fight until they are killed or caught” (p. 50). Thus, if the ultimate goal is national sovereignty, then assessing groups based on lesser gains is inadequate for concluding such definitive statements. Moreover, several examples exist of groups using terrorism in struggles of decolonization and secessionism, and disbanding after liberation. According to Hoffman (1998), when the Japanese attacked western colonies in World War II, western rule appeared vulnerable and liberation seemed possible,
leading to violent and successful uprisings throughout the colonized world. Cases from Algeria and Israel during this period illustrate effective separatist terrorist campaigns that ceased after gaining national independence. When Israel became a state in 1948, not only did Jewish terrorism diminish, but also did members of the Stern Gang legitimately enter the political process, with Menachem Begin, a Stern Gang leader, becoming Prime Minister of Israel in 1977 (Hoffman, 1998; Lustick, 1993). These cases expose the inaccuracy in claiming that all terrorist organizations are incapable of voluntarily disbanding, especially ENS movements where history shows terrorism being used as a means to an end.

The flaw in the psychological model, therefore, is that it fails to discriminate between organizations based on their overall purpose. ENS terrorists may not use terrorism for the same reasons as do other types of organizations, and while parts of psychology, such as ideological reinforcement appear significant in the case of ETA, other aspects appear irrelevant. Ferracuti (1990), for instance, agrees that “belonging to a group and remaining isolated from society reinforces” ideology and motivations (p. 61). This might explain why ETA-militar killed Eduardo Moreno Bergarche, Portell, ETA’s political strategist, in 1978 after Portell attempted to open dialogue with Madrid (Clark, 1990). However, it is not necessarily the case that Portell was killed to maintain a never-ending perpetuation of violence. The overall goals of terrorists vary drastically. Some of these goals, such as territorial sovereignty, are more rational than are others. They also likely represent an organization’s ideology and membership. Plausible goals with a history of being achieved illustrate ENS organizations having a greater comprehension of reality than organizations that pursue unrealistic objectives. Despite nationalist and leftist groups sharing a revolutionist ideology, leftists tend to establish short-term anarchist goals without comprehensive post-struggle views (Hoffman 1998; 1995). For example, RAF sought the
destruction of Germany’s democracy (Konrad, 1990). The Weathermen wanted a revolution in the US (Sprinzak, 1990). 17 November wanted to cripple capitalism and western alliances in Greece, and the Red Brigade espoused communism during a period when industrial conditions benefited the economy and living standards in Italy (Corsun, 1992; Rimanelli, 1992).

This narrow viewpoint of psychological theory weakens its potential to explain terrorism. For ENS terrorism, the only distinction offered by Post (1990) is a positive and loyal attachment to family. Although family loyalty is difficult to assess accurately, it seems improbable that all members of any organization share this trait, or the lack thereof. Laqueur (1999) more accurately argues that any terrorist profile at best depicts the members of a specific group, at a distinct place and time. Essentially, psychology appears too overreaching by setting such precise parameters for terrorist violence. Post (1990) assumes that anarchist, anticapitalist, nationalist, and religious campaigns each stem from individuals with violent proclivities caused by emotional disturbances in adolescence that draws them to groups for emotional security, while Porta’s (1995) research finds, as with most types of political participation, nearly everyone joining terrorist organizations has personal ties with others in the group. Therefore, the high proportion of etarras with Spanish-Basque heritage, which Post (1990) interprets as individuals radicalizing after facing adversity from a marginal social status, could also imply individuals well acquainted with one another due to familiar familial ties and a shared mixed-heritage. Even organizations commonly cited as having shared psychological components, might not. According to Ferracuti (1990), no study has been able to indentify common psychopathological traits among German or Italian terrorists. Furthermore, Konrad (1990) points to the flexibility within RAF, and its incoherent post-struggle view, to illustrate organizations as less rigid, single-minded, ideologues than generally believed,
altogether making the claims made by Post (1990) appear too generalized and unfitting for many cases of terrorism.

Analyzing Strategic Logic

The strategic model views terrorist organizations as a reactive, single entity, and although much of its focus is on active organizations, it contains concepts potentially applicable to the origins of movements. This approach views terrorism as reactive with traceable relationships between background conditions and episodes of terrorism. Strategic logic is also flexible for integrating a psychological component into this theory, which Crenshaw considers necessary for understanding several of the antecedent and individual intricacies relating to these movements. Therefore, the rational choice model offers a theoretical bridge for conceptualizing causes of terrorism, the motivations for launching movements, and how individual perceptions shape group-dynamics and influence the decision to initiate terrorism.

Strategic logic views terrorism as a decision largely based on its potential effectiveness, group circumstances, and surrounding conditions. These factors bypass the possible internal and psychological mechanisms also affecting these decisions. These presumptions are of intentional design for maintaining broad applicability and stem from observations of active organizations, particularly political terrorism, which requires a level of preciseness to be effective and endure. This involves competency in securing arms, planning and watching targets, executing missions, and acquiring funds that often requires financial backing through either state sponsorship or independent sources, which delves into an additional aspect of strategizing (Laqueur, 1999). These barriers are so immense that Hoffman (1998) argues cause the majority of groups to die out quickly. Those who do endure demonstrate considerable capacity to effectuate strategy. This leads to an assumption that terrorists logically calculate and evolve strategy, though another
approach may view attributes contributing to clandestine survival as leading to an entrenchment of organizations highly adept at devising strategy. Organizations that act rationally potentially endure and gain a level of notoriety that influences the concept of the terrorist type: middleclass, educated, and intelligent (Laqueur, 1999). However, in consequence strategic logic may fall short in linking the factors motivating the continuation of terrorist campaigns to those motivating the formation of terrorist organizations.

However, Crenshaw addresses these potential pitfalls by viewing terrorism as reactive and recognizing a need to increase comparative analyses of the background conditions where it occurs (1990). Extending studies to include these observations assists in conceptualizing its causes, but alone cannot adequately explain it. As was the case in Franco Spain, identifying with any non-Castilian heritage or leftist ideology could bring persecution, but only ETA and the *Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota* (FRAP), the “Patriotic Revolutionary Anti-Fascist Front” retaliated with terrorism (Clark, 1984). Because of examples like these, Crenshaw (1990) rejects the notion that environmental conditions alone produce terrorism but believes that tracing associations between background conditions and episodes of terrorism is vital for developing comprehensive theories, especially with ENS where history and heritage play a decisive role. A point shared by Laqueur (1999) who writes, the divergent Basque and Catalan response is only explicable by understanding the “perception[s] of historical, social, and cultural traditions, and of political calculus” (p. 36). To understand how these structural variations affect people differently, Crenshaw (1990) suggests utilizing psychology, pointing out that a thorough grasp of terrorism requires a psychological analysis of those involved, their objectives, and the emotional responses they receive. This highlights the benefits of using strategic logic. Its reactive approach
allows researchers to retrace the steps of terrorism for uncovering causational markers, while its broad design leaves room for interpreting case specific stimuli.

Explaining the causes of individual cases of terrorism requires understanding how a range of conditions influence perceptions and lead to violence. Crenshaw (1990) and Konrad (1990) agree that theories of terrorism need to be more specific, which Konrad (1990) explains, requires taking into account not only the individuals involved but also the political and intellectual forces. Accordingly, an accurate depiction of ENS terrorism requires understanding all its mechanics. Some of these characteristics, such as patterns in violence, are common to all forms of terrorism. Organizations are observed radicalizing as like-minds coalesce, forming a bottleneck effect and becoming detached from society. According to Sprinzak (1990), terrorism occurs after gradual experiences with increasing levels of aggression dissipate the mystique of using violence. Cook finds that organizations gradually become more willing to use violence as isolation, losses of reality, and peer-pressure move them “from sensitivity to hypersensitivity to hyposensitivity” (p. 177). According to Bandura (1990), the ability to use terrorism ultimately comes from a powerful and ongoing process of dehumanization, moral detachment, and justification, in which, Sprinzak (1990) adds, terrorism is the final stage. However, despite this similar process, it is important to recognize that not every opposition group radicalizes nor do all respond uniformly to the same experiences. Understanding the causes of terrorism therefore requires understanding why various groups respond to certain stimuli, for which Crenshaw (1990) believes “psychology is important in determining such behavior” (p. 7). Implicitly, therefore, merging strategic logic and psychological theory could assist in creating a comprehensive method for linking external and internal forces to examine and explain the transitions to ENS terrorism.
Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to study ENS terrorism by analyzing literature on nationalist and terrorist theory for developing a perspective on the transitions to terrorism that occur within nationalist movements. This focus on ENS terrorism highlights an important topic regarding conflict analyses that supersedes national boundaries and cultural identity. ENS terrorism transpires under various conditions throughout the world, and stems from organizations historically enduring far longer than other movements while also being the most successful. These organizations involve political revolutionists using unsanctioned, systematic, and intense violence for achieving national sovereignty while leaving an incessantly negative impact on life and infrastructure. However, despite the detriment caused by ENS terrorism, this subject is often glanced over as a minor facet as it relates to the general study of terrorism. The lack of coverage on this subject creates an opening to examine understudied elements associated with terrorist campaigns, and the regional, cultural, and circumstantial variations in which they occur.

The theories discussed in the first chapter offer a beneficial perspective into the subject of ENS terrorism. Primordialism and psychological theory highlight the importance of emotion in hostile movements, primordialism and ethnosymbolism recognize how ethnic symbols influence national identity and have the potential to elicit powerful and aggressive emotional responses, and modernism and ethnosymbolism stress the high malleability and potential manipulability of perception. Furthermore, the theories for nationalism and psychology view aggression as environmentally induced, thus sharing the view with strategic logic that collective hostility is a reactive phenomenon. Therefore, each of these theories offers mutually inclusive principles that are useful for tracing nationalist terrorism to nationalist movements to its root causes. Implicitly, nationalist aggression derives from aspects of culture that individuals learn to value, which
include background conditions priming certain responses to various triggers. Because nationalist-separatists in particular are observed using terrorism to achieve the same goals that they pursued as nonviolent oppositionists, and because these movements must exist before this form of terrorism can occur, one can draw the conclusion that symbols defining ENS movements also directly define dimensions of ENS terrorism. Together, these theories describe a paradigm for tracing the origins of ENS terrorism by looking for the antecedent conditions that lead to particular responses. This paradigm has the potential to assist in recognizing culturally sensitive populations, determining which conditions are likely to elicit an emotional response from those populations, and rationalizing why various individuals react differently.

This chapter widens the perspective on nationalist, separatist, and terrorist movements. The following chapter describes the history of the Basque, Catalan, and Roma in Spain, which the literature on nationalist and terrorist theory provides a lens for analyzing and identifying contributing factors of nationalism and terrorism that may also pertain to other cases of minority populations and the creation of ENS terrorist organizations elsewhere. The findings from this analysis are operationalized and measured in the third chapter using a logit regression that tests their significance regarding the initiation of these movements worldwide. The intent is to add to the understanding of this subject and terrorism in general, potentially contributing towards an ability to foresee populations and environments facilitative to the emergence of ENS terrorism.
Chapter II

Espainetan Abertzaletasuna eta Indarrikarako Edestia: the History of Nationalism and Terrorism in Spain

In the study of nationalism and ENS terrorism, the Spanish case is significant, not only for the contributions of studying Basque terrorism, but also for observing the mystery that typifies these movements. Cases of ENS emerge under various conditions, and although research identifying common factors has contributed to an increased understanding about these movements, these indicators neither appear exclusive nor guarantee that they will occur. Even populations sharing similar traits and experiencing similar circumstances are observed responding differently. This is the case in Spain, where the Basque, Catalan, and Roma have coexisted precariously at times due to their unique and non-Castilian heritages. Each of these populations has suffered systematic discrimination at various periods in Spanish history, and simultaneously faced discrimination during the Franco era, 1937-1975 (Minorities at Risk, 2004). Despite the parallels between these populations under Francoism, only the Basque created a sustained terrorist campaign against the state. This case is similar to other cases of ENS terrorism, with Basque terrorism contrasting sharply against the nonviolent Roma response and poorly organized and restrained Catalanian violence. Basque terrorism indicates a reaction to more than cultural persecution or structural conditions. To understand the forces behind Basque terrorism, this chapter follows the advice of Laqueur (1999) by examining historical properties. The following discussion places the Basque, Catalan, and Roma in the context of Spanish history to observe how cultural development led to distinct intra-group dynamics that influence their various reactions. The discussion attempts to refine the understanding of terrorism including ENS terrorism in Spain and elsewhere throughout the world.
Modern Spain is a coalescence of civilizations descending largely from Iberian natives, Celts, Greeks, Romans, Visigoths, Franks, Semites, and Mozarabes. Throughout their history, its diverse inhabitants were frequently isolated by a mountainous geography that augmented various realms which for most their duration lacked unity to one another (Stanton, 2002; Trend, 1944). Rome first united Iberia as Hispania in 200 BCE, colonizing the southern and western regions where terrain was less formidable to conquest. These surmountable geographic features spurred greater diversity and the south often became the front of occupation. The northern landscape in contrast was more inaccessible. Its steep terrain posed great difficulty for outside forces attempting to impose their rule over it. This led to Roman expansion loosely breaching the Pyrenees, and while Latinization spread through the peninsular interior, the north remained on the periphery of Rome’s influential sphere (Stanton, 2002; Collins, 1983).

Historically, the mountainous range of the north gave Pyreneans much autonomy where the Basque and Catalan developed in cultural isolation. The Basque are an ancient civilization of Iberian indigenes and their ancestral language, *Euskera*, predates Indo-Europeanism and is the oldest still functioning language in Europe (Kurlansky, 1999; Hooper, 1995). Euskera owes its survival to the modicum of Romanization in the north where even Lusitania maintained its indigenous language until the second century (Collins, 1983). For much of the duration of the Roman Empire, the Basques were independent from Roman subjugation and also Spanish law during Spain’s early development, instead ruling themselves through regional *fueros* (Totoricaguena, 2004; Kurlansky, 1999). Seclusion also led to physiological distinctions, giving the Basque a higher ratio of type O blood compared to other Spaniards or the French (Collins, 1983). While this historical detachment distinguishes Basque cultural identity, Catalanian culture is less antiquated. Cataluña originated as a Frankish outpost during the ninth century to protect
Charlemagne’s Empire from Moslems in the south (Lalaguna, 2001). Their culture developed from a mixture of civilizations that inhabited the peninsula, and they speak a Romance language, which identifies them more closely with other Spaniards (Hooper, 1995). Cataluña’s notable differences, however, includes an indelibly Frankish rather than Moslem lineage deriving from a terrain facilitative to spreading French influence (Collins, 1983).

During the Middle Ages, both Basque and Catalan kingdoms controlled the northern regions of Iberia. The Basque Kingdom of Pamplona arose in 818 under Íñigo Íñiguez, which developed out of sequential alliances defending against Visigoth and Moslem invaders, and later became the Kingdom of Navarre around 1087, and lasting until in 1512 at which time war divided the country (Totoricaguena, 2004; Kurlansky, 1999; Collins, 1983). The new Spanish-French border bisected the Basque region with France annexing Basse Navarre, Labourd, and Soule (Kurlansky, 1999). Cataluña also ascended from the ninth century, becoming sovereign under Wilfred the Hairy, and uniting with Aragón in 1162 to form the Kingdom of Aragón (Stanton, 2002; Collins, 1983). During its reign, the Catalan-Aragón Empire spread its influence throughout the Mediterranean. Although once a formidable power, the Catalan-Aragón Empire began to decline into the fifteenth century following the death of King Martin I in 1410, the last heir to the Catalonian throne. This led to a succession of rulers of Castilian descent. Then in 1453, Aragón lost its naval supremacy to the Turks, who retook Constantinople, and in 1469, the marriage between Ferdinand of Aragón to Isabella of Castile united these Kingdoms. Shortly after the kingdoms united, the revolt of the remensas in 1475 irreparably ruined crops and is attributed to the kingdom’s ultimate demise (Stanton, 2002; Trend, 1944).

The Roma, akin to the Basque, are a remarkably distinct civilization, having neither a far-reaching history in Spain nor an historic homeland elsewhere. Traditionally, they lived as
nomads who theoretically descended from the Rajputs, a people that fled northern India over a millennium ago to escape Moslem invaders (Lewy, 2000; Lyovin, 1997). This theory is partly based on their ancestral language, Romani, a form of Sanskrit, and similar to Sinhala, which is spoken in Sri Lanka (Lewy, 2000; Katzner, 1995). As the migration of the Roma spread throughout Eurasia, it rarely led to assimilation. In the fifteenth century, Germans believing them to be Egyptian travelers gave them the name Gypsy (Lewy, 2000). Furthermore, the Roma diaspora that spread across the continent gradually gained the reputation as thieves, savages, and witches. This reputation led to their excommunication and expulsion throughout Europe and influenced their mass migration into Spain during the fifteenth century (Kenrick, 1998; Quintana & Floyd, 1972). Traveling though Cataluña, the Roma arrived in Barcelona in 1447. While many continued traveling nomadically, others found refuge in colonies in Andalusia that were established years earlier by Roma migrating through northern Africa (Quintana & Floyd, 1972).

Persecution followed the Roma as they settled into Spain. Almost as soon as they arrived, and for centuries to follow, laws were established that targeted their culture. Spanish officials in 1499 banned nomadic lifestyles; in 1633 proclaimed that Roma was not an ethnicity; in 1695 prohibited the Roma from any vocations except farming; in 1746 restricted the Roma to living within seventy-five cities; and in 1749, Spaniards enslaved the Roma. These persecutive circumstances for the Roma did begin to improve in 1783, under Charles III who, wanting to promote integration, made the Roma equal citizens (Kenrick, 1998). However, centuries of discrimination had taken their toll and the Roma neither assimilated nor kept their historic identity but instead were left with a limited and vanishing culture that overshadowed its early identity. Several aspects of Roma tradition were forgotten, including their language, with most

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1 The remensas were a French style of serfdom, which attached peasants to the land (Lalaguna, 2001).
today speaking Caló, which is also a form of Castilian utilizing fragments of Romani (Lewy, 2000; Kenrick, 1998).

Hispania fractured in the fifth century following the collapse of the Roman Empire and remained apart until the eleventh century, when the Kingdom of Castile defeated Navarre and began advancing as a dominant force. By the thirteenth century, Castile was independent, and by the fifteenth century had reconstituted much of the region, which it developed from a defensive standpoint (Stanton, 2002; Trend, 1944). Prior to this period, Iberia had become vulnerable to unified powers, particularly along the French border, thus encouraging King Ferninand and Queen Isabella to fortify their strength by emulating the stability and power that was the model within France. This was done by creating a common identity by unifying Pyrenean and Cantabrian Christians in the Inquisition that sought to Christianize Spain (Stanton, 2002; Trend, 1944). This effort led to the conquering of southern Moslem territories that were resettled by Christians, runaway slaves, and Jewish and Moslem converts, overall helping to solidify Spain as a Christian nation (Stanton, 2002; Trend, 1944). However, years of isolation contributed to a pluralistic ethnic demography that could not be easily undone.

As Spain became a state, it embarked upon a tumultuous path. Despite forging statehood, its population never adopted a standard identity. Regions held onto their distinct characteristics that came to define their concept of nationalism. Particularly in the north, the enduring cultures laid the foundation for ethnic and national stateless identities. These divisions complicated efforts to homogenize Spanish identity and often led to violent conflicts over issues of identity, regional autonomy, irredentism, and secessionism. These pluralistic ethnic identities became especially prominent during the Industrial Revolution, which came to Spain through the Basque Country (Kurlansky, 1999). This period introduced avant-garde concepts and rapid development.
that hastily altered conventional lifestyles. Traditional Basque industries, like wooden shipbuilding, became obsolete, and while some adapted, many Spaniards were inundated as the country fell into an engrossing partition amid bucolic Catholicism verses urbanization, secularism, liberalism, and centralism; between traditional economies and capitalism; between absolutism and democracy (Pérez-Agote, 2006). The Catalan and Basque reacted differently to the changes occurring during this era. As industry grew in Cataluña, the bourgeoisie class was more effective at tempering the population and maintaining control over it (Bowen, 1999). Meanwhile, the polarization was ruinous in País Vasco where these positions bitterly divided Basques and soon culminated as an aggressive movement advocating traditional values and regional autonomy (Kurlansky, 1999).

The brewing tension ripened as revolution befell France, marking a turning point that ushered in a new period of liberalism. The violent overthrow of the French monarchy irreversibly transformed France into a republic, and within Spain worsened contentiousness and uncertainty about which looming transformations awaited it. The fusion of Basse Navarre, Labourd, and Soule in France further aggravated instability in the north where the seeds of Basque nationalism were already being planted. These territories were joined to form Béarn in an effort to homogenize French national identity. To make matters worse, Béarn was now forced to pay taxes to the new central government, something that Basques, along with mandatory military service, had been exempt from in Spain. This inflamed ideological tension among Spanish Basques who feared an analogous conversion of their own territory, and to which Napoleon’s invasion into Spain became the harbinger of inevitability (Kurlansky, 1999).

The Spanish mounted no resistance as Napoleon marched his army into Pamplona in 1808. Subsequently, King Charles IV abdicated to his son, Ferdinand VII who then relinquished
his throne to Joseph Bonaparte, the brother of Napoleon. This heralded a new era within Spain. Nearly without restraint, Bonaparte imposed policies meant to modernize Spanish society. The new ruler suppressed religion and attempted to abolish the Inquisition. This swift compulsion towards progressiveness ignited fuming traditionalists whose fears of change became reality. Consequently, it was not the crown, but Navarrean Basque traditionalists, who took it upon themselves to liberate Spain. With Navarre leading the charge, Spaniards rose in rebellion in what became the Spanish War of Independence, 1808 to 1813 (Kurlansky, 1999). By war’s end, the Spanish had expelled Napoleon’s forces and restored the monarchy. However, the reconstituted orthodoxy proved temporary as reformists continued undeterred to liberalize Spain.

Ultimately, these divisions led to a series of civil wars. When King Ferdinand VII died in 1833, he left his throne to his three-year-old daughter, Isabella. However, conservatives wanted to crown Ferdinand’s brother, Don Carlos, who stood for regionalism and monarchic absolutism. Theses proponents were known as Carlists, whose staunch support for Carlos led to what became the First Carlist War in 1833 (Bowen & Alvarez, 2007). This war pitched Catholic-rural-traditionalism against urban-progressive-capitalism, and was fought primarily in the País Vasco and Cataluña regions, which endured the bulk of the ensuing conflict (Pérez-Agote, 2006; Kurlansky, 1999). The fighting stopped in 1839 when Carlists put down their arms in a surrender lasting until 1846 (Kurlansky, 1999). Then, fighting resumed during the Guerra de los Madrugadores, “War of the Early Risers,” which began in Cataluña and spread to Galicia where it ended in 1849 when Carlists conceded and received amnesty (Bowen, 2007). While conflict tore through Spain, liberal reformation swept the nation. During the second year of the First Carlist War, Queen Isabella II officially abolished the Inquisition; and in 1869, Spain legitimated secular marriage and religious freedom. Also in the interim, industrialization swept through the
mineral rich Basque region, alarming and angering Carlist anticapitalists. Subsequently, the Spanish Revolution in 1868, and violent elections in 1872, contributed to political instability and yet another Carlist uprising (Bowen & Alvarez, 2007; Nation Master Encyclopedia, 2005; Kurlansky, 1999). Thus began the second Carlist War that lasted until 1876, when once more Carlism was defeated and dealt another blow with the abolition of foral law that same year, as fueros had been a requisite of Carlist doctrine (Bowen & Alvarez, 2007; Kurlansky, 1999).

These wars divided Spaniards along class lines but in so doing, embedded new concepts of regionalist national identity. Carlists built their following by stressing regional distinctions that transformed traditionalism into ethnic nationalism. In País Vasco, Carlists idealized a Basque golden age and promised a return to it (Garmendia, 1985). While less effective in Cataluña where fueros were never fully established, this nationalist propaganda spawned a new Basque movement, grounded in ethnic identity and led by Sabino Arana y Goiri (Bowen & Alvarez, 2007; Muro, 2005). Arana y Goiri came from a Carlist family made wealthy through shipbuilding, which had played a prominent role during the Carlist Wars (Kurlansky, 1999). However, the end of the Second Carlist War had rendered Carlism dead except for in the Basque region. This stalwartness was interpreted by Arana y Goiri as a distinguishing characteristic of a people inherently non-Spanish, which led to his advocation for Basque independence and founding of the Partido Nacionalista del Vasco (PNV), the “Basque Nationalist Party,” in 1895 (Lecours, 2007). Soon thereafter, Spain lost the Spanish-American War, leading to a heightened sense of Basque and Catalan secessionism, which inspired a 1900 law, proclaiming separatism a crime against the state, and another in 1906, placing secessionism under military jurisdiction. Although regional nationalism continued its rise, the status quo ante bellum to follow allowed Spain to democratize for the first time in 1931 (Bowen & Alvarez, 2007; Kurlansky, 1999).
Civil war again erupted in 1936, led by Generals Mola, Sanjurjo, and Franco against the nascent Republic of Spain (Clark, 1984). However, one of the significant factors that set this war apart from the previous wars was the ideological reversal of Basque nationalists. Previously, the republic had granted regional autonomy to the Basque and Catalan territories, which the rebellion sought to abolish while advocating Castilian nationalism. By this point, however, the spirit of País Vasco had altered nationalistic perception. Many Basques now considered themselves a separate people, and consequently, when war once more pitted liberal-capitalists against traditionalists, Vizcayan and Guipuzcoan nationalists, favoring self-rule and believing that an independent Basque state could benefit from their bourgeoisie industrial class, sided with the republic (Pérez-Agote, 2006).

The decision to side with the republic had a disastrous cost. In 1937, the conservatives overthrew the state and General Francisco Franco became dictator over Spain. The newly instilled regime executed two-thirds of its nearly 300,000 prisoners of war, along with 200,000 civilians between 1939 and 1950 (MacDonald, 1987). Upwards of 30,000 children from leftist families were taken from their parents and permanently placed in state custody (Expatica, 2009). Thousands of Spaniards also fled into exile, and during Word War II, the Nazis rounded up nearly 30,000 of those refugees in France, with a majority dying interned in concentration camps during the war. The era to follow continued to nourish repression with the empowerment of fascism creating a movement to homogenize Castilian identity (MacDonald, 1987). It began its reign by banning all non-Castilian culture, which it labeled unchristian. This prohibited regional languages and cultural symbols like the *lauburu* and *Ikurriña*. Moreover, registering babies

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2 *The Basque Cross*
3 *The Basque Flag, designed by Arana y Goiri*
without French or Spanish names was forbidden while all existing non-Castilian names had to be translated into Castellano (Kurlansky, 1999; Clark, 1979).

After the civil war, the regime continued to punish republican loyalty, with the Provinces of Cataluña, Guipuzcoa, and Vizcaya receiving extraordinary maltreatment for their resistance during the war. An estimated 21,780 Basque political prisoners received death sentences, while nearly 150,000 Basque men, women, and children went into exile (Totoricaguena, 2004; Kurlansky, 1999; Clark, 1984). These regions lost all autonomy and additionally became the financiers for their own repression, because most of Spain’s wealth had been concentrated in the north. Vizcaya since 1876, as an example, was 3.5 percent of Spain’s population but produced 15 percent of its energy, one-third of its shipyards, and two-thirds of its steel (Kurlansky, 1999; Clark, 1984). The northern industrialization remained the backbone of infrastructure, and by 1960, this region had the highest per capita incomes within Spain (Hooper, 1995; Payne, 1985). However, labor unions were illegal and the local population was forced to compete with migrants willing to work for lower wages. This caused a large number of foreign workers to migrate to the north and approximately 20,000 migrated to the Basque region yearly. From 1960 to 1975, the Basque provincial population increased by 45 percent and during the 1970s only 60 percent of the population remained indigenous (Reinares & Jaime-Jeménez, 2000; Kurlansky, 1999; Clark, 1984). This growth was even more dramatic in Cataluña, which absorbed close to one million migrants during the 1960s alone (Hooper, 1995).

The Cold War also contributed toward repression in Spain. For a short period during and shortly after the Second World War, the United States provided support for the PNV and other political exiles while opposing Franco, who was a noncombative ally with Hitler and Mussolini during the war. Although Spain never officially entered the conflict, both Germany and Italy had
given aid to the rebellion in Spain during its civil war. The Luftwaffe even carried out air raids against republican strongholds. However, the post World War II era reshaped policy, and by 1951, US strategy against the Soviet Union altered their relationship with Spain. The US saw an advantage in establishing a military base on Spanish soil and as a result began financing the dictatorship of Franco while rescinding support for its exiles (Kurlansky, 1999; Clark, 1984). During that same year, the Spanish regime clamped down on labor unions in a harsh response against a labor strike in the Basque region that put an end to all underground unions (Clark, 1984). These experiences contributed to a gradual shift of perception for many repressed Spaniards who came to view their country as heading down an irreversible course. As the change in US policy caused hope to fade regarding outside intervention, aggression by the state unsubtly vanquished optimism for unfettering its tyrannical chains. Those in opposition were now forced to look inward and rethink their strategy of resistance.

As Francoism stigmatized non-Castilians, Basque movements began focusing on cultural preservation. In 1945, the PNV established the Euzko Gaztedi del Interior (EGI), the “Basque Revolutionary Youth,” for clandestinely distributing its propaganda in northern Spain (Zulaïka, 1985; Clark, 1984). Then in 1947, students formed the Euzko Ikasle Alkartuna (EIA), the “Society of Basque Students.” Although headquartered in the Netherlands, EIA promoted Euskera and Basque culture inside Spain, but in 1950 Spanish authorities arrested, imprisoned, or expelled its leadership (Clark, 1984). Other associations appeared such as Gaztedi, the “Farm Youth,” created in the 1950s by Don Jose Maria, a Basque priest from Itziar, Guipuzcoa, for promoting religious and social ambitions although less rebellious than EGI and EIA (Zulaïka, 1985). Each of these movements demonstrated little success at impeding the systematic attempt to homogenize Castilian identity. The goals of these movements began to shift in 1952 when four
university students in Bilbao, Jose Manuel Aguirre, Jose Maria Benito Del Valle, Julen Madariage, and Jose Luis Alvarez Enparanza, a former member of EIA, founded Ekin, “To Do.” Initially, Ekin worked with EGI and the PNV but were critical of the PNV’s soft-line approach and perceivably racial subordination to the Spanish and eventually ousted by the PNV for their radical views. Ekin and dissenting members of EGI went on to revive the teachings of Sabino Arana y Goiri. Rejecting autonomy and passive resistance, they advocated the creation of a Euskera speaking independent Basque state of Euskadi, and in 1959 formed Euskadi ta Askatazuna (ETA), “Basque Homeland and Freedom,” to achieve this goal (Clark, 1984).

As ETA gained traction, so did secessionism within Cataluña. During the 1960s, Catalan separatists established the Front Nacional Català (FNC), “Catalan National Front.” Although the FNC began as a liberation movement, Marxism captured its focus by the end of the decade and in 1969, it factionalized (Birnir, 2007). That same year a breakaway element established the Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional (PSAN), the “Socialist Party of National Liberation.” PSAN organized around the principles of separatist militancy that then radiated into two additional movements: Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional-provisional (PSAN-p), the “Socialist Party of National Liberation Provisional,” and the Front d’Alliberament Català (FAC), the “Catalan Liberation Front.” These latter organizations also championed violent resistance for pursuing national independence and before long were followed by two additional ENS organizations. The third organization began to surface in 1978 and in 1980 became Terra Lliure (TL), “Free Land,” and the fourth began around 1987 known as Exèrcit Roja d'Alliberament Català (CRLA), the “Catalan Red Liberation Army” (Birnir, 2007).

Each movement professed aspiration for violent resistance and national liberation, though their actions exemplified disparity, with only the Basque demonstrating an immovable resolve.
ETA began with an action-repression strategy based on the theory of provocation. The objective was to invoke retaliation against País Vasco in an effort to ignite revolution (Clark, 1984). Their first attack was in 1961, attempting to derail a train transporting the backers of Franco. While failing in its goal of derailing the train, this action brought significant notoriety to the group followed by increased violence. Since that incident, ETA has claimed over eight-hundred lives, including those of Prime Minister Carrero Blanco, Police Commissioner Meliton Manzanas, and Supreme Court magistrate Jose Querol (BBC, 2006; Kurlansky, 1999; Clark, 1984). The proliferation of Basque terrorism did not correlate with the burgeoning in Cataluña of less aggressive and unsustainable movements. PSAN-p went largely unnoticed while FAC committed over a hundred nonfatal acts between 1969 and 1971 and claimed responsibility for two deaths in 1979 (Birnir, 2007; Schmid et al, 2005; Bowen & Petersen, 1999; Hooper, 1995). CRLA claimed responsibility for a bombing in 1987 that killed a Guardia Civil officer and injured others (Schmid et al, 2005). TL was the most violent, carrying out bombings and abductions during the 1980s but never developed a durable campaign, and ended operations in the early 1990s (Birnir, 2007; Bowen & Peterson, 1999). ETA, however, persisted despite the arrest, torture, and expulsion of nearly two-hundred members following its first attack and fractionalization throughout its first decade. Moreover, ETA survived a massive assault as retaliation for the assassination of Manzanas that led to more than six-hundred arrests in 1968, and almost two-thousand in 1969. At this time, José María Ezkubi was the only leader left in Spain that avoided arrest and eventually escaped to France (Clark, 1984). During this time of massive retaliation, and during additional attempts, ETA continued to reorganize, and has successfully defied all attempts to destroy it.
In an era that gave birth to violent nationalism and separatism in Spain, the Roma share no similarity in their reaction. Their case contrasts sharply against the paths of Basque and Catalan nationalists. Despite their comparable cultural disparity, no effort arose among the Spanish Roma to establish national independence. Instead, they avoided organized oppositional aggression. Even towards the end of the twentieth century as they became the most discriminated against group in Spain, the Roma neither protested with violence nor created any known militant organization (Minorities at Risk, 2004; Cowans, 2003).

Applying the Theories

The theoretical literature on nationalism and terrorism assists in developing an analytical framework for interpreting the Spanish case. Concerning theories of nationalism, this case does not offer insight into whether nationalist-based aggression is genealogical but does suggest that the traits associated with nationalist movements existed before the Industrial Revolution. Basque identity, for example, has always been defined by culture. Even the Euskera word for Basque, Euskal, means speaker of Euskera, which defines Basque identity in the context of cultural symbolization. Moreover, as the kingdoms in Iberia developed around their own distinct cultural identities, the peninsula shared a common Latin heritage that contributed to consolidating Spain as a state and a Christian nation. This common Catholic identity influenced aggression against both the Moslems and the Roma for centuries, and guided Spain into its modernity, while events linked to the Industrial Revolution merely shifted perceptions of national identity. This case illustrates a far-reaching history of nationalism in Spain that strengthens primordialism. This case also supports the shared assumptions of primordialism, modernism, and ethnosymbolism that describe the roles of cultural identity, symbolic attachments, and the plasticity of perception.
in nationalist movements. In addition, it provides answers for why Basque terrorism proved far more violent and durable than did the Catalanian movements.

The Basque and Catalan share a similar history. These populations developed culturally isolated by a mountainous terrain where their kingdoms maintained control though much of the Middle Ages, hosted the bulk of development during the Industrial Revolution, and continued consolidating growth in the subsequent era. Following the late civil war, these regions became targets of abuse for remaining loyal to the republic during the war. This led to an increased desire among Basque and Catalanian populations to secede from Spain. This period launched a phase of radicalization that initially began with nonviolent political dissidence for preserving cultural identity, which Madrid harshly curated by responding to these movements with arrests frequently correlating with torture. For nearly a decade following the formation of EIA and FNC, both Basque and Catalanian nationalists experienced severe hostility from the state. During this period, motivations and strategies for coping with the repression began to shift the members of oppositionist movements into new directions. In País Vasco and Cataluña, Marxism and ethnic nationalism competed against conservatism and often against each other. Because fascism was their foremost ideological rival, movements initially developed with a combination of Marxist-nationalist ideology. However, ideological competition was a destabilizing force and consistently led to factionalism and the reestablishment of organizations with greater intensity and narrower focus. Many new organizations developed and espoused increased militant ferocity, which also radiated into additional movements. This splitting predominately grew out of disputes within the organizations over strategic violence and their central philosophy. Meanwhile, the cultural differences between the Basque and Catalanian populations affected their ultimate methods of opposition.
Despite many linking the rise of Basque nationalism in Spain to the changes during the Industrial Revolution and Carlist Wars, symbols of Basque ethnicity have passed down through countless generations. Throughout Iberian history, symbols of Basque identity have influenced perceptions of cultural exclusion and the desire for regional autonomy. Meanwhile, the changes during the industrial age threatened those historic Basque symbols and led to a heightened sense of cultural sensitivity within traditional Basque society. Basque traditionalists became fearful of the potential changes to their traditional way of life, and they exhibited this insecurity as aggression expressed as nationalist sentiment. During this period, Pérez-Agote (2006) writes how a series of conflicts came to define the Basques. Shabad and Llera Ramo (1995) write that for generations, “numerous segments of Basque society perceived threats to their collective identity coming from both Madrid and from new groups within the Basque Country itself” (p. 418). Early on, liberal and conservative ideologies were defining and dividing the Basques, such as during the War of Convention, 1793-1795, when Basque liberals led a secessionist movement in Guipuzcoa (Pérez-Agote, 2006). However, even amid this ideological divide, the desire for regional autonomy was a foundation of Basque nationalism. Both Carlist and fascist doctrine promoted traditionalism, although Basque nationalists consistently fought against centralism. During the Carlist Wars, Basque nationalists supported Don Carlos, who promoted the continuation of traditional society and regional autonomy, while they sided with the progressives during the latter civil war because of the progressive’s support for decentralization. Each time, regional autonomy was the decisive issue, illustrating how ethnicity dominated Basque identity and ultimately trumped any shared economic, political, or religious philosophy.

In the period following Franco’s rise to power, avenues for addressing cultural grievances were lost although nationalism remained a strong part of Basque cultural identity. Subsequently,
Shabad and Llera Ramo (1995) describe an era where Basques emerged into an atmosphere of symbolic and physical hostility and oppression. During this period, identifying as Basque was considered traitorous and criminal, and therefore having Basque ancestral roots added additional hardships while Spain was already becoming developmentally stagnant and falling economically behind much of the rest of Europe. To add to this burden, País Vasco suffered disproportionate economic stress. The economic conditions were reducing the living standards for laborers within the region while the taxes on Basque industry financed the repression against them. Education in País Vasco was also being repressed. For example, provincial colleges could only offer scientific degrees to ensure its industrial base but prevent political enlightenment (Kurlansky, 1999). The regime made itself irreproachable to these hardships affecting País Vasco by preventing the use of conventional methods for redressing issues. The regime banned all labor unions and political parties, which reduced Basque nationalism to a disjoined and illegitimate struggle for preserving territory and culture (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995). This also left a political void that Ekin, and later ETA, would fill and gain popular support initially by providing an outlet for addressing cultural and political bereavement.

The adoption of terrorism by ETA appears to have been based on its potential to affect the relationship between Spain’s central government and Basque society. There is little doubt whether the founders of ETA were aware of nonviolent alternatives for pursuing their goals, but instead they chose to use terrorism hoping to create a revolution in País Vasco. These individuals had each previously belonged to a nonviolent oppositionist movement, and at some point interacted with the PNV. Their experience working with the PNV meant that many had taken part in nonviolent political opposition. Ekin, however, wanted to act more forcefully to promote controversial goals that the PNV considered too extreme, and they eventually divested ties over
these issues. Furthermore, their decision to use terrorism was not based on a perceived necessity for individual survival, as many of the original members of ETA were college students coming from middle-class families. Had they not adopted terrorism and continued with their education, the founders of ETA would have had the potential to live with a standard of living relative to that of other middle-class Spaniards. Instead, ETA’s decision to adopt terrorism grew out of a heightened sense of Basque nationalism, which may have been based on a perceived urgency for protecting Basque cultural identity. The underground promotion of Basque cultural heritage and imposition of Castilian assimilation may have reinforced a cultural hypersensitivity that led to perceptions of cultural victimization and contributed to radicalizing the struggle for preserving it.

In Spain, Basque terrorism thrived from an ability to spread nationalism while Catalonian movements failed largely over an inability to do so. Hooper (1995) writes how Cataluña in the 1960s could not integrate immigrant populations, and therefore lacked national unity. ETA, on the contrary, was ethnically inclusive. They redefined Basque identity, and grew largely as a labor movement. Before ETA emerged as the defining symbol of Basque nationalism, Basque ethnicity was ancestrally based. In the late-nineteenth century, Sabino Arana y Goiri wrote that to be Basque, all four grandparents must have been born in the Basque Country, having Basque surnames. ETA broadened this definition to include anyone who spoke *Euskera* or lived within the region (Kurlansky, 1999; Collins, 1987; Clark, 1984). Moreover, ETA espoused Marxism, and drew broad support from the labor class (Clark, 1984). Adopting Marxism was a common practice of nationalist-separatist movements during this period, and according to Laqueur (1999), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the IRA, and ETA all used leftist rhetoric at a time when liberation movements correlated with concepts of communist revolution. However, Laqueur (1999) considers ETA exceptionally gifted at developing itself in between
extreme nationalism and classism. Reinares and Jaime-Jeménez (2000) attribute ETA’s success in joining class struggle and nationalism to the unsteady economic conditions in País Vasco that made leftist ideology popular for integrating new classes and gaining broad support, such that by the 1970s, nearly sixty percent of ETA was of non-Basque heritage (Clark, 1984).

The different reactions of the Catalan and Roma to the repression under Francoism may also be because these populations lack several of the elements contributing to ENS terrorism. The historical context of Spain shows how Basque identity interacted with experiences during the Industrial Revolution, civil wars, and Franco era, influencing a totality of circumstances that gradually disintegrated the social fabric of Basque society (Shabad & Llera Ramo, 1995). Distinct Basque cultural symbols and identity continuously reinforced one another and led to strong symbolic attachments and an intense need for preserving them. Euskera and ancestral territory are two such archaic symbols that play a fundamental role in Basque nationalism, which advocates Euskera proliferation, secession from Spain and France, and irredenta of the historic Basque homeland. Conversely, Catalonian ethnicity is less discriminating and shares significant French and Spanish cultural roots, which Hooper (1995) and Stanton (2002) stress reduces secessionist sentiment, and, together with demographic shifts during the mid-twentieth century that racially diluted its population, kept Catalonian nationalism out of the mainstream. In the case of the Roma, conditions propagating nationalism are nonexistent. Alexander and Myer (1982) argue that territorial roots are an essential part of nationalist movements, and while remaining among the most discriminated against populations in Spain, the Roma diaspora are largely detached from one another and lack a territorial claim. These factors are considered vital antecedents for organizing separatist movements, because they center on the nostalgic drive to restore or preserve perceived cultural identity. As a result, Roma passivity derives from its lack
of what many consider essential for nationalist movements, a basis for demanding territorial autonomy, and because these movements are a prerequisite for ENS terrorism, it is unlikely that any area will ever manifest a Roma ENS terrorist campaign.

This research indicates that ENS terrorism stems from group dynamics and a shared perception of events. These organizations, like all activist organizations, integrate like-minded individuals who often share similar heritabilities that place them within a greater historical struggle. ENS organizations share a perceived history of colonial subjugation in which the drive for resistance derives from sensitivity over a putative privation imposed upon them by the illegitimate occupiers of the disputed territory. This brand of rhetoric grows movements for generations, as the philosophy of us-versus-them imbues the society’s ideological framework. Subsequently, nationalist rhetoric shapes generations until changes in structural mechanisms trigger reactions among the affected populace. Abrupt sociological changes lead to increased oppositionist sentiment by offsetting previous equilibriums that kept bereaved sectors from demanding substantial change. When this ideology has mainstream support, it is more likely to be influential thus burgeoning opposition. Freedom to assemble also assists group formation, while circumstances determine the means of resistance. When changes are not possible through legitimate channels, oppositionist movements tend to intensify as members tire from seemingly ineffective tactics for stimulating change, while the leap to terrorism occurs when organizations assume it will manifest quicker results and be the ideal method for their struggle.

This leads to the conclusion that conditions catalyzing the transitions to ENS terrorism involve a distinct national identity, territorial claims, distinct cultural markers, degrees of social agility, tumultuous social conditions, a desire to produce immediate change, an inability to influence changes peacefully, access to knowledge about revolution and clandestinity, and access
to resources. Nationalism is the core ideology of ENS terrorism. This involves a culture teaching its members to invest in and defend symbolic attachments of their national identity. An historic homeland is one such marker and a seemingly essential part of demanding territorial sovereignty. Other cultural markers are essential in delineating the minority and mainstream populations that show unambiguous differences to justify secession. The adoption of terrorism for achieving this goal seems to follow unsteady social, political, and economic conditions that contribute to social unrest and discontentment. At least in Spain, political conditions appeared to have allowed enough freedom for individuals to congregate but were insufficient for those individuals to affect change through legitimate political channels, which influenced their decision to circumnavigate direct channels by using violence. Cumulatively, this led to the development of several tactics that gradually became more violent, while the affluence in País Vasco helped to fund the continuation of mounting tactics against the state. In all, these variables appear to play a fundamental role in the conversion from nationalist movement to ENS terrorist campaign. The next step is to operationalize these findings and measure the relationship that they share with the formation of ENS terrorist organizations throughout the world.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>$\Delta$</th>
<th>Nationalist Theory</th>
<th>Strategic Logic</th>
<th>Psychological Theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distinct Culture</td>
<td>$\rightarrow$</td>
<td>Strengthens: Threats against cultural symbols &amp; identity</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthens: Violence integrated into cultural identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distinct Culture</td>
<td>$\leftarrow$</td>
<td>Weakens: Cultural identity less relevant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile Conditions</td>
<td>$\rightarrow$</td>
<td>Strengthens: Violence targeting ethny</td>
<td>Strengthens: Strategy to gain notoriety amid hostile conditions</td>
<td>Strengthens: Psychologically conditioned for violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostile Conditions</td>
<td>$\leftarrow$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Weakens: Less likely diminishing inhibitions against using violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Freedom</td>
<td>$\rightarrow$</td>
<td>Freedom of assembly &amp; strengthens if ethny is politically repressed</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthens: Detached from reality &amp; rejection of social norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Freedom</td>
<td>$\leftarrow$</td>
<td>Strengthens: Ethny politically repressed</td>
<td>Strengthens: A lack of alternatives to violence</td>
<td>Strengthens: Repressive conditions having a psychological effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternatives to Violence</td>
<td>$\rightarrow$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthens: Having alternative methods for pursuing interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternatives to Violence</td>
<td>$\leftarrow$</td>
<td>Strengthens: Ethnic identity is vulnerable</td>
<td>Strengthens: Lacking alternative methods for pursuing interests</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Unrest</td>
<td>$\rightarrow$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthens: Terrorism used to maximize results</td>
<td>Strengthens: Terrorism less likely used to maximize results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Resources</td>
<td>$\rightarrow$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthens: Able to fund the buildup of tactical resistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Resources</td>
<td>$\leftarrow$</td>
<td>Strengthens: Ethny economically repressed</td>
<td>Strengthens: Terrorism determined by available resources</td>
<td>Strengthens: Repressive conditions having a psychological effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Education</td>
<td>$\rightarrow$</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthens: Greater access to information for clandestinity &amp; rebellion</td>
<td>Strengthens: Social expectations leading to psychological damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to Education</td>
<td>$\leftarrow$</td>
<td>Strengthens: Ethny educationally repressed</td>
<td>Strengthens: Repressive conditions tactically influencing rebellion</td>
<td>Strengthens: Repressive conditions having a psychological effect</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Increasing units $\rightarrow$; decreasing units $\leftarrow$
Chapter III

Statistical Model: Method and Variables

This chapter uses a logit regression model to assess nationalist, strategic, and psychological theory in relation to the development of ENS terrorist campaigns by using the following formula:

\[ e^{\alpha + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \beta_3 x_3 + \beta_4 x_4 + \beta_5 x_5 + \beta_6 x_6 + \beta_7 x_7 + \beta_8 x_8} \]

The first chapter reviewed three paradigms for studying nationalism: primordialism, modernism, and ethnosymbolism, and two theories for terrorism: strategic logic and psychological theory. This study draws on the shared assumptions of the nationalist models that emphasize the role of collective identity, cultural symbolization, and plasticity of perception in nationalist movements, and highlights both shared and competing concepts between strategic and psychological theory. The second chapter discussed the case of terrorism in Spain from an historical context while applying the nationalist and terrorist theories as an analytical framework for identifying elements contributing to Basque and Catalan terrorism and cases of ENS terrorism elsewhere. From this case, the relevant factors appear to be an enduring and distinct ethno/national identity, threats against cultural symbols, volatile and hostile conditions, freedom to assemble, a desire to affect change without a legitimate method to pursue it, and access to information and financial sources.

Chapter 3 operationalizes these findings to perform a measurement of the background conditions that may play a fundamental role in the origins of ENS terrorism. The cases observe two-hundred ninety-seven minority populations in one-hundred twenty-six states, and span primarily from 1945 to 2003, with the exception of Ireland, which was observed from 1946 to 2003 and also in 1922. The independent variables assess cultural sensitivity, exposure to

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4 This paper treats the Soviet Union as a country
5 Some modifications occurred in MAR to adjust incorrect data due to interpolation and inaccurate data filing.
violence, political freedom, political transitions, economic conditions, representation/alternative options, educational stagnation, and developed educational systems. The data combines statistics from Minorities at Risk (MAR)\textsuperscript{6} World Bank (WB), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Polity IV, Global Terrorism Database (GTD), International Labor Organization (ILO), and United Nations (UN) along with several other sources to fill in missing data points.

This model evaluates nationalist theory by combining indicators for cultural differentials, group concentration, separatist beliefs, and ancestral territory. The nationalist approach argues that the presence of these indicators contributes to nationalist based aggression, which should also correlate with the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. The remaining variables are used to evaluate strategic logic and psychological theory. Strategic logic considers the initiation of terrorism to be a logistical decision influenced by financial and political restrictions, and transient conditions that open moments of opportunity. If the strategic model is accurate, ENS terrorist campaigns should develop in correlation with moderate levels of political freedom, underrepresentation, a lack of tactical alternatives, periods of instability, economic conditions limiting the scope of rebellion, and an educated population. Whereas these variables potentially influence a strategic response, the psychological model considers terrorism an irrational and emotional response driven by internal mechanisms shaped by traumatic experiences throughout life. From this view, structural conditions affect the decision to initiate terrorism when those conditions are psychologically damaging. If accurate, campaigns should develop in correlation with educational stagnation, an exposure to violence, and social instability relating to repressive and antagonistic conditions. These results should assist in determining whether it is possible to link nationalist theory to ENS terrorism and whether these campaigns develop in response to strategic or psychological forces.

\textsuperscript{6} See Appendix C for populations and countries
The data on minority populations comes from MAR, which it classifies as ethno/national, indigenous, ethno/class, communal contender, religious sect, or national minority, and does not use multiple classifications for the same group within a state. This definition of ethno/national excludes such populations as the Catalan in Spain, indigenous populations in multiple countries, and Russians within post-Soviet states. However, examples of ENS terrorism emerging from among each of these populations illustrates that violent ENS movements are able to transcend these various classifications. Therefore, this study uses all but those labeled as a religious sect, due to the drastic differences thought to exist between ENS and religious based terrorism.

This study excludes using populations labeled as a religious sect because some may lack the archaic ethnic traits that distinguish them from mainstream populations. As Hoffman (1998; 1995) explains, religiously motivated terrorists are nonpolitical, monolithic, indiscriminately violent, and exist only to harm those not belonging to a narrow interpretation of their faith, while ENS terrorist campaigns tend to embrace both political and nationalist ideologies, gain broad support through cultural associations, are revolutionary with post-struggle aims, and use violence more discriminately. Though religion is one of several elements of cultural identity, the variance between these forms of terrorism implies disparate antecedent conditions. The societies united primarily by religion may lack other cultural denominators that provide a basis for ENS and therefore be peripheral to this subject, although this study does not discount the role of religion in ENS terrorism entirely. This study neither excludes all for whom religion provides a common identity nor does it ignore the impact that religion might have on them. ENS terrorist campaigns often develop in populations that share a common religion, and this dataset incorporates several religious groups not coded as a religious sect, including Jews in several countries, Catholics in Ireland, Maronite Christians in Lebanon, Chechens in Russia, and Muslims in France, who as
collectives share multiple communal traits leading to a non-religious ethno-political status. The excluded populations include Shiite and Sunni Muslims, who, coded as a religious sect, may lack several distinguishing components of national identity.

The dependent variable is a dichotomous measurement for the formation of ENS terrorist organizations, primarily from GTD. Because this study focuses on the period that organizations establish themselves as terrorist networks, terrorist organizations that began as a nonviolent or non-terrorist movement are indicated in the year that they initiated their first attack, marking the transition from nationalist to terrorist organization. Meanwhile, organizations that developed in order to commit terrorism are indicated during the year that the group began. The organizations fitting this profile use terrorism to achieve national liberation, which does not include autonomy, a status where the parent state maintains its legal authority over the region. Secessionism, in contrast, involves gaining absolute sovereignty, an action that is potentially more consequential. In addition, while this study focuses on separatist movements, the lack of information on several organizations often impedes discerning between goals of liberation and separation. Although strictly speaking, separatism defines the emancipation of geographically connected territories, literature on this subject frequently references separation, liberation, and anti-colonialism as the same. Such movements view themselves in a struggle against territorial privation and illegal occupation, fighting to separate from dominant powers and gain national sovereignty regardless of the geographic proximity to the central base of opposition. Therefore, by defining separatism broadly it becomes analogous to national liberation and the parameter for this study.

The first variable assesses the general concepts of nationalist theory that consider national identity influenced by heritage, communal behavior, symbolisms, and the manipulation of those symbols while viewing condensed minority populations as particularly reactive against perceived
cultural threats. Smith (1991) describes these populations as sharing distinct ethnic ties and placing stronger value in cultural symbols and therefore more sensitive to perceived threats against those symbols. Cultural sensitivity is measured using a categorical variable that averages MAR’s indices for separatist ideology sepx, cultural differences culdfxx, group concentration groupcon, and historic homeland gc8. The separatist index (0-3) assesses whether secessionism had an historic role in group dynamics or exists latently, played an active role in movements between the 1940s and 1980s, or has a recent or active role in group-consciousness. The cultural index (0-4) measures the disparity between minority and mainstream populations based on ethnicity and nationality, language, historical origin, religion, social customs, and residence. The categories range from no differences, to minor, significant, major, and acute differentials. For example, in 1999, Basques in Spain had substantial cultural differentials because their nationality, language, and historical origin are substantially different from the mainstream population of Spain. The index for group concentration (0-3) categorizes the geographic dispersion of populations ranging from wide dispersion, such as the Roma, to mostly urbanized or marginally concentrated; a majority living within close proximity; and all concentrated to a single region. Lastly, the variable for historic homeland (0-4) indicates the existence of ancestral lands and the extent of which a group still inhabits that territory. The coding for ancestral lands is reordered to indicate respectively: the absence of ancestral lands; ancestral lands within another state; ancestral lands not exceeding the group’s provincial base; ancestral lands exceeding the group’s provincial base but not state; or ancestral lands exceeding both the group’s provincial base and the state.

The cultural variable attempts to encapsulate internal and external influences on cultural identity to assess whether nationalism is a response to threats against enduring cultural symbols.

7 See Appendix B for descriptions of terrorist organizations included in the dependent variable.
Smith (1991) argues that concentrated and unique populations tend to be more sensitive to and react more strongly against such threats. A common symbol, territory, is a central theme of liberation movements and when historically attached to a people, territory becomes a potent component of identity. Because Smith (1991) argues that nationalist based aggression derives from threats against cultural symbols, the existence and degree of control that a population is able to exercise over its historic homeland represents a cultural symbol and measures the threat against it. The expectation is that waning control over a fatherland jeopardizes the preservation of national identity, in which case a minority group living only within a fraction of its historic homeland should prove most volatile. Separatist ideology, cultural disparity, and geographic clustering are each considered contributory to cultural sensitivity and therefore their presence is expected to further the potential for volatility. For these reasons, high scores should indicate elevated cultural sensitivity and correlate strongly with the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. One of the drawbacks in using this variable however is that it does not provide a determinant between primordialism and modernism. It incorporates presumed factors that contribute to nationalist based aggression without assessing heritability for cases only occurring in the postindustrial era.

The second variable assesses psychological theory by measuring the relationship between violence and the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. Psychological theory argues that personality traits, anti-socialization, and violent experiences lead to terrorism. The expectation is that frequent aggression will lower inhibitions against using violence, leading to a radicalization process wherefore individuals in hostile regions are more willing to commit violence, thus increasing the probability that terrorist organizations will emerge. To assess this argument, this study measures the influence that an exposure to violence has on the development of terrorist
campaigns by combining each of the aggression indices in MAR. The rebellion indices, "Quinquennial Rebellion Scores, 1945-1999," \textit{reb} (0-8), and “Annual Rebellion Scores, 1985-2000,” \textit{reb} (0-8), record the most severe levels of violence occurring between minority groups and the central regime. And, the intercommunal indices, “Decennial Indicators of Intra-Communal Conflict, 1940s to 1990s,” \textit{comcon} (0-6), and “Annual Indices of Intercommunal Conflict, 1990-2000,” \textit{comco} (0-6), record the most severe levels of violence between minority groups and other antagonistic groups. This model utilizes the highest score from among each of these variables, lagged to avoid endogeneity, and indicating respectively: no conflict; individual nonfatal intergroup attacks or political banditry against the state; intergroup political agitation or terrorist campaigns directed against the state; periodic factional violence or local rebellions; large-scale anti-group protests or small-scale insurgency against the state; rioting and intergroup attacks or intermediate insurgency; prolonged communal warfare or extensive insurgency; and civil war. Consequently, high scores indicate severe levels of violence, and a positive statistically significant relationship between this variable and the formation of ENS terrorist organizations would support Post’s (1990) argument that an exposure to violence contributes to a radicalization process that then leads to terrorism.

The third variable assesses strategic logic by measuring the association between levels of democracy and the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. Democratic freedom is measured using \textit{Polity2} (-10-10); the data is constructed with Eugene (3.203), and assesses a state’s democratic freedom on a range from absolute autocracy to absolute democracy. Although strategic logic describes terrorism being used when no viable substitute exists, the literature on this subject frequently correlates terrorism with democracy attributed to social agility and less severe prosecution (Laqueur, 1999; Abadie, 2006; Feldmann & Perälä, 2004; Reinares & Jaime-
Jeménez, 2000; Fox, 2003; Fleming, 1982). However, endurance is one of the defining characteristics of ENS terrorism, and the forces influencing the continuation of violence potentially diverge from those motivating the initial reasons for developing an organization. ETA, for example, began under a fascist system with moderate freedom but survived over 50 years, becoming most violent during and after Spain’s democratization. The implication is that repression encouraged dissident Basques to organize covertly while liberalism emboldened them to act. If this case is similar to other cases of ENS, then organizations should develop most often in areas with restricted freedom. Therefore, interpreting the results of the democratic variable requires a different approach than with the other variables. A positive statistically significant relationship would strengthen the aspect of strategic logic that considers the freedom to assemble essential for formulating campaigns. However, these same results correlating with a negative relationship between the variable for nonmilitant organizations and the dependent variable would indicate the presence of legitimate political channels and weaken the argument that terrorism is a strategy used in areas void of legal alternatives.

The fourth variable uses the number of nonmilitant organizations for comparing the competing concepts between strategic logic, which considers terrorism a tactic when no viable substitute exists, and psychological theory, which attributes terrorism to irrational and emotional forces. Although the psychological model also describes the decision to use terrorism based on the perception that it is the only available option, its purpose is to achieve radical goals that develop during a period of social detachment. These goals are developed by antisocial and antinomian groups, and by their origin lack mainstream support, but are pursued regardless of public opinion or political conditions. The motivation behind this violence is to avenge those perceived as responsible for causing their psychological fragmentation, a view less supported by
strategic logic. The difference between these concepts is that strategic logic describes terrorist organizations as more politically versed, with goals, in this case national liberation, that are more rational. The expectation in strategic logic is that terrorists have a better grasp on reality than described by psychological theory, and, therefore, the formation of ENS terrorist organizations should correspond with measurable limits on political freedom, which this study determines by the number of nonmilitant organizations within the state that represent the interests of the minority population.

The variable for nonmilitant organizations measures both political representation and alternatives to terrorism and is built using the number of nonmilitant organizations recorded by MAR. This study quantifies these groups, reverses the results from positive to negative, and lags to the year following their formation in consideration of the time needed to consolidate and to become known. Nonmilitant organizations represent an aspect of political freedom different from what the variable for democratic freedom measures. The nonmilitant variable offers an analysis of the political circumstances directly affecting the minority population. It represents both associations directed at addressing several specific needs and advantageous freedoms decreasing the likelihood of repressive conditions. Despite the occasion of central regimes using proxy agencies claiming to represent the interests of the minority population to further their own interests, a greater number of organizations would decrease the probability of state puppeteering. Moreover, it would open channels for addressing cultural grievances and pursuing political aspirations. This offers insight into whether a minority population and terrorist organization shares similar goals while assessing the roles of logic and emotion. Although the strategic and psychological models agree that terrorism is conceived as a last resort, they diverge over the

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8 Reversing the variable for groups is for visual preference that has no effect on the results of the logit regression model.
underlining causes that motivate groups and influence their goals. Post (1990) argues that terrorist organizations result from grouping people with violent proclivities in which terrorism derives from an emotional necessity whereas for Crenshaw (1990) it is a strategic necessity due to the lack of tactical alternatives. Therefore, a statistically significant negative relationship with the dependent variable would indicate an emotional choice despite having alternatives, with a positive relationship implying tactical disadvantages that strengthens the strategic model.

The variable for political transitions compares strategic logic and psychological theory by noting changes that occur in a state’s political freedom to measure the relationship between social instability and the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. The transition variable is a dichotomous indicator that represents changes in political freedom determined by changes in Polity2 and includes instances of political transformation varying from democratization and autocratization to slight gains or losses of liberty. Though both strategic logic and psychological theory consider terrorism a response to accumulating events, they diverge on which factors ultimately lead to its initiation. Psychological theory argues that terrorism follows a failure of alternative peaceful attempts at reform, consequently making it prone to stagnant environments that continuously block change. Strategic logic, in contrast, considers shifting political and structural conditions more likely to encourage violence, as clandestine organizations have a tactical advantage during periods of unease and unrest. Consequently, while both paradigms view terrorism as a replacement for an absence of legitimate channels, the latter describes the leap to violence as a reaction to moments where terrorist organizations can maximize their results. These moments of opportunity involves rapid change that leads to social uncertainty and regime vulnerability, including not only periods of democratization but also illiberalization and other notable transitions. Therefore, a positive statistically significant relationship between
political transitions and the dependent variable would strengthen strategic theory, while the opposite results would support psychological theory.

The economic variable assesses strategic logic by measuring the relationship between economic conditions and the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. This categorical variable combines MAR’s economic differential index, ecdifxx, and state unemployment rates. Strategic logic considers terrorism a weapon of the weak compensating for a lack of resources and describes two factors that significantly influence the scope of rebellion. The first factor relates to organizations like the IRA, which are capable of committing attacks on a larger scale but deliberately limit their magnitude to prevent igniting adverse public sentiment. However, groups like the IRA are an exceptional case as Crenshaw (1990), Laqueur (1999), and Hoffman (1998) illustrate by describing the primary factor being a group’s financial capacity, while emphasizing the difficulty in funding clandestinity. Laqueur (1999) and Crenshaw (1990) describe this capacity involving a position between an ability to acquire funds sufficient for underground rebellions without enough for large-scale assaults. This generally requires access to affluent regions or state sponsorship. However, ENS movements typically develop around a regional identity unaffiliated with a global ideological network and are therefore limited in acquiring financial support internationally. Consequently, these movements are more likely dependent on domestic economies, implying that the dependent variable ought to occur infrequently in affluent regions among economically advantaged people who can choose between terrorism and open rebellion. Meanwhile, the least likely scenario involves indigent populations in impoverished states, while terrorist organizations are most likely to develop between these two extremes.

To measure the validity of this hypothesis, the economic index ecdifxx is combined with unemployment rates in order to analyze the economic status of the minority population. The
economic index, *ecdfxx* (-2-4), categorizes economic standing based on income, land and property, higher education, presence in commerce, presence in professions, and presence in official positions, scaling from economically advantaged to extreme disparity. It is recoded from one to seven to remove zero to permit the construction of interactive variables. This new value is multiplied with unemployment rates resulting in low scores that indicate the most economically affluent populations and regions, and high scores indicating the most impoverished. From this variable, there are two possible approaches for assessing whether economic conditions influence the decision to use terrorism. The first method is to perform a two-tailed test around the mean with spacing corresponding to the standard deviation. However, the mean is 54 percent and standard deviation is 63 percent, therefore using this method to test for economic affluence requires selecting values that could be interpreted as being selected for their results. Instead, this study divides the economic variable into five categories corresponding with the standard deviation. The first category consists of all values above the fourth standard deviation from zero, based on the assumption that extreme economic hardships substantially reduce the probability of the dependent variable. The second category comprises the first standard deviation from zero, based on the assumption that well-financed organizations are able to decide between large and small-scale confrontation, leaving terrorism as a choice among other tactics. The third, fourth, and fifth categories comprise the second, third, and fourth standard deviations from zero respectively, indicating gradations where wealth and economic opportunity become more limited wherein the final category is considered illustrative of hardships incapable of sustaining movements larger than clandestinity, leaving terrorism the only conceivable choice for those determined to rebel by using violence.

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9 See Appendix A for economic results using a 2-tailed test
The final indicators assess the relationship between education and terrorism. Strategic logic and psychological theory equally consider education to be a contributing factor of terrorism. From one aspect, Post (1990) describes the potential terrorist as being a social outcast, typically involving educational failure, although Laqueur (1999) refutes this notion by describing several campaign organizers as being middleclass and having an educated background. Though contradictory, both concepts are potentially valid. Evidence suggests that numerous elements of education contribute both directly and indirectly to terrorism. Traits differentiating terrorists from other criminal networks include the organizational use of violence guided by political ambition that requires moderate knowledge of underground structuralization and violent resistance. In the case of ETA, literature commonly depicts its founding members as more intellectual than later generations, but while intelligence and sophistication are attributably fundamental in developing durable networks and successful missions, equally characteristic of ETA, movements are also complex. Terrorist organizations potentially rely on variously skilled individuals for different aspects of logistics and violence, and whose educational experiences are potentially uniquely influential within the organization. Even educational restrictions under Franco are considered relevant where both education and its repression are seen as contributing to ETA’s formation.

The intimation is that both access to education and the lack thereof contribute in several important ways regarding terrorism. This leads to a bifurcated approach for analyzing the role of education in which the first variable comprises underdeveloped educational systems determined by literacy rates under ninety-eight percent and measures educational stagnation. The second variable measures the significance of highly developed systems by assessing states with literacy rates at and above ninety-eight percent. Despite the twentieth century being witness to growing
populations with decreasing illiteracy rates worldwide, few states have achieved full literacy. Literacy rates have a direct relationship with educational systems and are a strong indicant for human development used by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to track progress in developing states. These rates measure literacy among those aged fifteen years and older and therefore educational stagnation is measured by comparing the growth rate of the literate portion of the population to changes in its actual size. When the number of persons aged fifteen and over increases at a rate higher than the literate population, educational systems are considered more stagnant, but when literacy rates increase at a higher rate it indicates that educational systems are expanding and therefore less stagnant. A benefit of this approach is that it observes a direct correlation between education and demographics most prone to terrorism which tend to be young males slightly past the age of formal education and less affected by current educational structures. In addition, it compares systems with drastically disparate literacy rates, although it is ineffective for highly literate populations.

The measurement for educational stagnation is relevant for areas with suboptimal literacy rates but not for countries like Australia, Canada, Great Britain, France, Switzerland and the United States that report literacy rates in the 98th percentile or higher. These states provide full access to education with estimates representing a generally educated populace where illiteracy is no longer a common social barrier. Meanwhile, illiteracy remains an epidemic in several locations throughout the world. Nearly ninety percent of the cases in this analysis have literacy rates under ninety-eight percent and some lower than three percent. In order to incorporate each case, this study develops a dichotomous variable to test the significance of literacy rates at and above ninety-eight percent, which controls against inaccurately reporting stagnant educational
systems while measuring the significance that highly developed educational systems have on the development of terrorist organizations.

Literacy rates correlate with several components of societal development, and therefore the educational variables may produce several inferences. Although statistical significance would strengthen several theoretical concepts, insignificant correlations would weaken neither strategic logic nor psychological theory. While none of the variables in this study necessarily reflects the specific reality of the individuals forming a terrorist organization, this fact is especially important to consider when interpreting these latter variables. Accordingly, a positive statistically significant relationship with educational stagnation could indicate psychologically damaging conditions but would not retract from strategic logic, as it provides no indication about the educational attainment of those creating the terrorist organization. Moreover, stagnation could correlate with a multiplicity of factors that influence a strategy of resistance utilizing terrorist violence. Alternatively, a positive statistically significant relationship with literacy rates above 98 percent increases the probability that those individuals are educated and have access to information for learning about clandestine resistance. Furthermore, it could indicate education contributing to social expectations in which educational failure reduces social status and contributes to forces influencing antisocialism and aggression.

By integrating these eight variables into the logic model, the formula appears as follows:

\[
\alpha + \beta_1 \cdot \text{culture} + \beta_2 \cdot \text{violence} + \beta_3 \cdot \text{democracy} + \beta_4 \cdot \text{representation/alternatives} + \beta_5 \cdot \text{transitions} + \beta_6 \cdot \text{economy} + \beta_7 \cdot \text{education(stagnation)} + \beta_8 \cdot \text{literacy} > 98\% 
\]
Results of Logit Regression

TABLE II
Logit Analysis of Environmental Conditions during the Formation of Ethno/national Separatist Terrorist Organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ind. Variables</th>
<th>Creation of ENS Terrorist Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>1.245***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to Violence</td>
<td>.296***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Freedom</td>
<td>.134***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonmilitant Groups</td>
<td>.237***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Transitions</td>
<td>.485**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Conditions</td>
<td>.216**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Stagnation</td>
<td>-5.009**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.98+ Literacy Rates</td>
<td>.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constants</td>
<td>-3.422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-695.70947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo-r squared</td>
<td>0.196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>9321</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p<.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.00

TABLE III
Change in probability of ENS terrorist organization developing as a function of unit change in the independent variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prob. of ENS</th>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Violence</th>
<th>Democracy</th>
<th>Groups</th>
<th>Transition</th>
<th>Economy</th>
<th>Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(dy/dx)</td>
<td>.78%</td>
<td>.18%</td>
<td>.08%</td>
<td>.15%</td>
<td>.38%</td>
<td>.13%</td>
<td>-3.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 unit increase</td>
<td>.63%</td>
<td>1.41%</td>
<td>.81%</td>
<td>.71%</td>
<td>.78%</td>
<td>1.01%</td>
<td>.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total units</td>
<td>.63%</td>
<td>3.36%</td>
<td>2.07%</td>
<td>2.31%</td>
<td>1.83%</td>
<td>1.01%</td>
<td>1.15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dy/dx = proportional change in ENS formation per unit change in independent variable
Analysis of Logit Results

These findings offer important insights into the study of ENS terrorism. Table 1 describes the results of the logit model, which measures the relationship between possible contributors of nationalism and terrorism and the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. It includes 9321 observations of minority populations throughout the world with 174 cases of the dependent variable, indicating that ENS terrorist organizations have a 1.9 percent probability of forming within these populations. The independent variables represent cultural sensitivity, exposure to violence, political freedom, political representation/alternatives to violence, political transitions, economic conditions, educational stagnation, and developed educational systems, with all except developed educational systems showing a significant relationship with the dependent variable. Educational stagnation is the only variable showing a negative correlation, and Table 2 and the graphs illustrate the probability in relation between the dependent and independent variables.

GRAPH I
Correlation of cultural identity and creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organization

The association with cultural sensitivity in Table 1 supports concepts of nationalist theory and connects ENS terrorism to cultural symbolization and distinct ethnic identity. Table 2 shows this propensity increased by 0.78 percent per unit increase in the cultural indicant where the most
sensitive populations increase the probability of the dependent variable by approximately 3 percent. In addition, Graph 1 shows a nonlinear relationship with a sharp curvature in the dependent variable at 2.5 units. This signifies importance within each of the four cultural indices, which individually correlate considerably with the dependent variable. These four indices are illustrated in Table 3 (see below), which shows cases occurring most frequently among geographically clustered populations with 69 percent among the most concentrated and 21 percent where the majority lived within close proximity, and only 2.7 percent occurring among widely dispersed populations. Separatist ideology was present in 82 percent of the cases, and although only 44 percent occurred among the most culturally distinct, zero cases occurred when no notable differences existed between mainstream and minority populations. The results for historical homeland vary somewhat from the expectation that volatility would increase when minority populations have less control over ancestral lands. Although 41 percent of cases did occur where ancestral lands surpassed provincial and state boundaries, 40 percent also occurred where territory did not exceed the provincial base, though only 1.5 percent occurred when ancestral lands were inexistent. However, the symbols of cultural identity are innumerable and the cases where ancestral territory remained completely within a population’s domain do not imply that no other cultural symbols were under threat.

TABLE IV
Correlations between indices of cultural sensitivity and the formation of terrorist organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture</th>
<th>Sepx</th>
<th>Groupcon</th>
<th>Culdifxx</th>
<th>gc8 (recoded)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no. occur</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>no. occur</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X = no observations; sepx=separatist ideology; groupcon=group concentration; culdifxx=cultural differentials; gc8=historic homeland with reordered categories
Levels of violence between minority populations and the state or other antagonists are shown in Table 1 to have a positive relationship with the formation of ENS terrorist campaigns. Table 2 describes this relationship involving a unit probability of 0.2 percent indicating a 3.4 percent probability of the dependent variable in extreme conflict, such as civil war, although no cases in the data appear at this point. In addition, 15 percent of the cases occurred when no violence was reported whatsoever. The lack of violence in some cases indicates that hostility potentially contributes towards the decision to use terrorism but is not definitive that terrorism will occur and consequently provides inconclusive results regarding psychological theory. The role of increased frequencies of violence could be as much psychological as tactical. To validate the psychological argument that a radicalization process precedes the initiation of terrorism, the cases that show an absence of violence would require the presence of either undocumented violence or borderline and antisocial personalities, although equally possible, violence could factor in strategically if populations are conditioned to extreme violence and therefore less
responsive to moderate tactics. Just as violence could contribute to a psychological breakdown that encourages aggression, people living amid hostility might also be encouraged to employ aberrant violence in order to gain notoriety, in which case these findings support both strategic logic and psychological theory.

**GRAPH III**

Correlation between democracy and creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organization

Political environments appear to have a multidimensional relationship with the creation of ENS terrorist organizations. In accordance with the assumption that terrorism occurs most often in democracies, democratic freedom is shown in Table 1 to have a significant positive relationship with the dependent variable, with nearly every case occurring where some degree of political freedom, however sparse, was present. Graph 3 describes this relationship becoming its most pronounced in the positive range of Polity2, with a sharp increase in the dependent variable towards the highest levels of political freedom. Nearly 72 percent of the cases correlated with democratic scores of 8, 9, and 10, while only one case occurred where autocracy was valued at -10. Moreover, Table 2 shows political freedom having a unit probability of 0.08 percent thereby
leading to a 2.1 percent probability of the dependent variable in the democratically freest states. These findings support assumptions about the relationship between democracy and terrorism, primarily the need for the right to organize in order to integrate movements. However, despite this positive correlation, ENS movements do not appear to be a byproduct of endowed liberty.

GRAPH IV
Correlation between representation and creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organization

Movements often transpire in correlation with political freedom allowing social mobility but lacking sufficient milieus for addressing many social, political, or economic concerns. The analysis suggests that while these movements tend to emerge within liberal environments, the minority populations comprising them lack equal status or access to political society. Not a single case occurred among minority populations categorized by MAR as politically advantaged while nearly 85 percent occurred where at least moderate levels of political deprivation were present. Moreover, Table 1 shows nonmilitant organizations correlating significantly with the dependent variable. Nearly half the cases took place where no peaceful organizations were shown to represent the interests of the minority population, with nearly 93 percent of cases
occurring where fewer than three nonmilitant organizations were present. This suggests that the freer environments providing agility for organizing movements are not allocating freedoms equally, are potentially relegating members of the minority population to a lower sociopolitical status, and as a result supports the theory that terrorism is a tactic used when viable alternatives are unavailable for legitimately pursuing political goals.

Furthermore, Table 1 shows the variable for political transitions having a positive and significant relationship with the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. Although fewer than 14 percent of the observations contain these transitions, almost 18 percent of cases occurred during these periods, with nearly 80 percent occurring in areas where terrorist organizations had previously been established, 75 percent of which the minority population responsible had already produced a terrorist organization. Although this variable includes various changes in political freedom, its general presence increases the probability of the dependent variable by 3.7 percent, nearly doubling its probability. Therefore, political instability and social insecurity appear to play important roles in the development of terrorist organizations. Even among cases not occurring during these periods, less than a quarter took place in areas where the level of political freedom had remained constant for a decade or longer. These correlations support the assumption that social unrest contributes to terrorism although transitions primarily appear factoring in locations where terrorism is already a common practice. In this case, impoverished, unsafe, and unstable environments potentially function as an opportunistic backdrop for discontent persons who view terrorism as a normative tactic to mobilize and act by using terrorism to maximize their results. These findings point to both a logistical methodology and psychological forces facilitating the use of extreme violence, which supports psychological theory while reinforcing ideas of strategic
logic that consider terrorism a reaction to opportunity influencing not only acts of terrorism but also the initiation of campaigns.

However, the political environment may be less decisive in the development of ENS terrorist campaigns in comparison to the dynamics of the population itself. Several populations repeatedly create new terrorist organizations despite changes in political freedom. Albanians in Yugoslavia, Basques in Spain, Hill Tribes in Bangladesh, Malay-Muslims in Thailand, and Moros in the Philippines each share a protracted pattern of producing new terrorist campaigns long after gaining substantial levels of political freedom. These populations reflect the behavior of the Ijaw in Nigeria and Karens in Burma, who first created campaigns during liberal periods and then during autocracy, and Corsicans in France, Palestinians in Israel, Irish in Great Britain, and Kurds in Turkey, who continue producing new movements amid greater political stagnancy. This legacy of renewing terror campaigns possibly shows views on using terrorism developing as an integral part of a cultural identity. This association between culture and terrorism indicates a cultural inclination for using terrorism that surpasses several structural conditions, in which case nationalism, strategy, and psychological forces may each function in the initiation of terrorist organizations.

The model shows economic factors also play a significant role in the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. Table 1 shows the economic variable having a positive relationship that Table 2 reports as having unit probability of 0.13 percent, leading to a 1.2 percent probability of the dependent variable within the highest category. These findings support the assumption that financial resources influence levels of rebellion, which also appear important in considering which type of organization to develop. The analysis further provides insight into correlations between a country’s economic circumstances and a population’s position within that economy,
also indicating that factors of privation may contribute to a psychological component leading to terrorist violence. These results highlight an aspect of terrorism that unemployment rates alone cannot explain. The majority of cases in this study correlated with lower unemployment rates with nearly 70 percent of cases occurring when unemployment rates were at or below 10 percent, over half occurred below 5 percent, while only 13 percent occurred above 20 percent, the highest at 36.7 percent. However, only one percent of cases occurred amongst populations considered by MAR as economically advantaged whereas nearly 85 percent correlated with disadvantages, with nearly half occurring amid severe economic disparity. These results strengthen strategic logic by indicating that economic conditions do influence the scope of rebellion, and further show that an economic system can contribute to the initiation of terrorism based on a combination of national prosperity and economic repression within that system.

**GRAPH V**

Correlation between economy and creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organization

![Graph showing correlation between economic conditions and creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organization](image)

Table 1 shows stagnant educational systems having a significant negative relationship with the formation of ENS terrorist organizations, implying a strong relationship between factors...
relating to civil development and terrorism. Educational stagnation is shown in Table 2 to have a -3.13 percent unit probability, which shares a nonlinear correlation with the dependent variable. Illustrated in Graph 6 (see below), the probability of the dependent variable decreases substantially as the proportional variation in annual literacy growth rates nears those of the population aged fifteen and over. When literacy rates increase at 30 percent the rate of the population, the probability of the dependent variable is 7.4 percent, and as this variation approximates 90 percent, the probability of the dependent variable decreases to less than one percent and becomes virtually nonexistent as growth in literacy rates begins to surpass the demographic. Illustrated in Table 4 (see below), nearly 100 percent of the cases, not including those where literacy rates were above 98 percent, occurred before the variance between literacy and population growth rates reached 102 percent with no observations shown above 108 percent, and by the maximum variation, 224 percent, the probability of the dependent variable decreased by 5.4 percent.

GRAPH VI
Correlation between educational and creation of ethno/national separatist terrorist organization
Table 1 does not show developed educational systems having a significant relationship with the formation of ENS terrorist organizations. These results, along with those for nonmilitant organizations and educational stagnation point to a complex relationship between democracy and the dependent variable. Illustrated in Table 6 (see below), the majority of observations with literacy rates at and above 98 percent correlate with higher levels of democratic freedom. Implicitly, if liberalization alone led to an increase in the development of terrorist organizations, the expectation would be that high literacy rates also correlate with their development. However, the higher literacy rates are not shown to be a significant factor. Instead, the data shows ENS terrorist organizations developing most often in less-developed educational systems. Nearly 90 percent of the cases occurred in states with literacy rates below 98 percent, with more than half occurring where literacy rates were below 60 percent, the lowest being 11.6 percent. Because
numerous aspects of human development correlate with literacy rates, including infant mortality, the contributions to terrorism could develop from multiple stimuli associated with these findings, and in which case expanding educational systems likely indicate progressive policies aggressively addressing a variety of social needs and therefore reducing motivations to rebel. These findings show the roles of education and civil development as multidimensional, and while liberalization correlates with the dependent variable, the motivations behind ENS terrorism appear to originate from repressive conditions.

**TABLE VI**

Distribution of democratic freedom and observations of literacy rates at and above 98 percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dem.</th>
<th>-9</th>
<th>-8</th>
<th>-7</th>
<th>-6</th>
<th>-5</th>
<th>-4</th>
<th>-3</th>
<th>-2</th>
<th>-1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obs.</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>1730</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In conclusion, the purpose of this study is to learn more about the background conditions that influence the development of ENS terrorist organizations. Analyzing this aspect of terrorism requires understanding several elements of both nationalist and terrorist movements. Although theories of nationalism disagree about the age of nationalism and structural versus biological mechanisms, they share concepts about cultural identity, symbolisms, and the plasticity of perception. Other than viewing the case of terrorism in Spain from a historical context, this analysis did not attempt to compare the competing views of nationalist theory. Rather, it set out to determine whether the concepts of nationalist-based aggression also apply to terrorism, and can be used to explain cases of ENS terrorism, by measuring the relationship between cultural sensitivity and the formation of ENS terrorist campaigns. However, this study does compare two theories of terrorism: strategic logic and psychological theory. These two theories are evaluated
using variables that assess experiences with violence, levels of democracy, changes in political freedom, economic conditions, representation, and stagnant and developed educational systems.

The results of the logit model connect ideas of nationalist, strategic, and psychological theory to the origins of ENS terrorism. Except for developed educational systems, each variable is shown to have a significant relationship with the creation of ENS terrorist campaigns. The variable for cultural sensitivity strengthens theoretical assumptions about factors that lead to an aggressive response from some populations to threats against their cultural identity. These results bridge the theories of nationalism to ENS terrorism by showing an association between elements of cultural identity deriving from a manner in which a minority population perceives its status relative to the status of the mainstream population. The variables for an exposure to violence, nonmilitant organizations, and educational stagnation suggest that repressive and volatile conditions may contribute to a psychological breakdown facilitating an acceptance of violence as a means of resistance, although by organizations that have a logical grasp on reality somewhat in harmony with the consciousness of the majority of the minority population. The variables for political freedom, nonmilitant organizations, and economic conditions suggest that ENS terrorist campaigns tend to emerge in politically freer states from among minority populations who are more repressed than the mainstream population. The variables for political transitions and educational stagnation also support strategic logic and psychological theory. These variables show terrorism being initiated during periods of social unrest that are potentially psychologically damaging, but more important, provide an opportunity for terrorist organizations to maximize their results. Moreover, this suggests that violent conditions may strategically encourage the use of terrorism in order to gain notice.
The results of this project show that the theories of nationalism and terrorism each assists in explaining aspects of ENS terrorism. Anthony D. Smith thoroughly integrated concepts of primordialism and modernism to create an accurate depiction of several elements of nationalist-based aggression. Crenshaw (1990) accurately explained several forces motivating organizations to use terrorism as a strategic response, and appears correct in suggesting that psychology plays an important role in developing terrorist organizations, while the contributions of psychological
theory appear more subjective. This study suggests that psychological forces influencing the creation of terrorist organizations predominately contribute to an acceptance of violence as a method of resistance. However, while this study cannot assess whether ENS terrorist campaigns develop in response to long-term emotional damage, Post (1990) appears too overreaching in so precisely defining the role of psychology in terrorism. Although psychological forces may factor in as they relate to cultural identity, social instability, and repression, the conditions under which ENS terrorist organizations tend to develop demonstrates a strategic response driven by several factors. These findings put the formation of ENS terrorist organizations inside a strategic realm that shows a strong association between cultural identity and conditions influencing the scope of rebellion. Therefore, the ideas offered by nationalist and strategic theory seem to fit compatibly within the focus of this analysis, while the role of psychology appears more subtle. As a result, nationalist theory and strategic logic appear to offer the most valid explanations for the origins of ENS terrorist organizations.
Conclusion

This paper examines several social, political, and economic conditions that potentially influence the development of ethno/national separatist (ENS) terrorist organizations. Terrorism is a critical subject around the world, and concerns over this issue continue to grow as the cases of terrorism become more frequent while having a continuously devastating impact on society. The subject of terrorism covers a broad spectrum of aggression and ideology that limits the potential to develop a theory that can precisely explain every case of terrorism. While terrorist organizations typically share several common characteristics, such as using violence or the threat of violence to achieve recognition, many distinguishing traits exist between these organizations that primarily derive from the forces motivating their adoption of violence. The threats posed by terrorism increase the need to understand more about these specific forms of terrorism and the conditions that increase their potential to occur. To address this need, this study examines the ENS form of terrorism by focusing on the origins of ENS terrorist campaigns.

The approach taken for studying the ENS form of terrorism begins by analyzing literature on nationalist and terrorist theory. These theories describe a paradigm for studying the origins of ENS terrorism, which involves organizations that begin as ethno-political movements established around a goal of achieving national sovereignty. These movements tend to develop within certain populations that the theories for nationalism explain to result from an increased sense of cultural sensitivity based on perceived threats against their cultural identity. This heightened sensitivity tends to correlate with condensed populations who share a unique ethnic identity and cultural symbols that reinforce their distinctiveness. As it relates to ENS terrorism, an historic homeland is often seen as a powerful symbol of a cultural identity, and ENS campaigns tend to correlate with populations who share a strong attachment to their ancestral territory. Furthermore, the
approaches for studying terrorism portray this subject as a reactive phenomenon committed by organizations that behave as a single entity. The theories for terrorism describe several possible forces motivating oppositionist movements to transition from a phase of nonviolence to an active terrorist campaign, while sharing a view that assists in retracing episodes of terrorism to their root causes for identifying case specific stimuli.

The areas where the theories for nationalism and terrorism come into disagreement relate to the manner in which individuals are considered inclined towards aggression. Primordialism and psychological theory point to an emotional element linking individual aggression to hostile movements, and while some primordialists argue that the associations between aggression and nationalism are evolutionary inheritable traits, modernists and ethnosymbolists view nationalist-based aggression as stemming from populations being taught to interpret structural conditions. In addition, the theories for terrorism disagree on the underlying forces influencing an organization to adopt terrorism, deviating on whether this decision is conceived rationally. Strategic logic views the adoption of terrorism as a tactic for maximizing gains. However, psychological theory considers this an irrational decision by antisocial groups that have a unidimensional worldview. Moreover, while strategic logic considers psychology playing a central role in the development of a terrorist organization, psychological theory views these organizations as the manifestation of the personality disorders of emotionally damaged individuals within the groups.

After analyzing the theoretical literature, this study examines the examples of Basque and Catalanian terrorism and Roma passivity in Spain. This case illustrates how certain background conditions may have influenced the development of ENS terrorism in Spain. These conditions appear to involve an enduring and distinct ethno/national cultural identity, threats against cultural symbols, volatile and hostile conditions, levels of social agility, desires to affect change without
lawful methods to pursue it, and access to information about underground rebellion and financial resources. These conditions may also play a central role in the development of ENS terrorist organizations elsewhere, and this study operationalizes these findings and uses a logit model to evaluate their relationship with the development of ENS terrorist organizations throughout the world. The results of this study show that it is possible to identify populations and environments that have an increased potential for producing ENS terrorist organizations.

TABLE VII
Expected Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Nationalist Theory</th>
<th>Strategic Logic</th>
<th>Psychological Theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Sensitivity</td>
<td>Strengthens: threats to cultural symbols</td>
<td>Strengthens: a strategy to gain notoriety amid hostile conditions</td>
<td>Strengthens: violence integrated into cultural identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent Environment</td>
<td>Strengthens: violence targeting ethny</td>
<td>Freedom of assembly &amp; strengthens if ethny is politically repressed</td>
<td>Strengthens: psychologically conditioned for violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Freedom</td>
<td></td>
<td>Weakens: violence is used despite having alternatives</td>
<td>Strengthens: detached from reality &amp; rejection of social norms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternatives to Violence</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthens: terrorism used to maximize results</td>
<td>Weakens: terrorism used for tactical advantage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Unrest</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthens: terrorism is determined by available resources</td>
<td>Strengthens: repressive conditions having a psychological effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited Financial Resources</td>
<td>Strengthens: ethny is economically repressed</td>
<td>Strengthens: repressive conditions influencing rebellion</td>
<td>Strengthes: repressive conditions having a psychological effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Stagnation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthens: greater access to information for clandestinity &amp; rebellion</td>
<td>Strengthens: social expectations leading to psychological damage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access to education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The example of terrorism in Spain also shows the dispute in nationalist theory concerning the age of nationalism being a semantical debate. The behaviors that correlate with nationalist-based aggression are observed existing in Iberia long before Spain became a modern nation state.
Foremost, the Roman Empire introduced a common identity to the Peninsula that formulated a common Latin identity around which the Kingdom of Castile later reunited the region, and contributed to distinguishing Basque and Catalan identity. Furthermore, Castilian identity led to xenophobia against both Roma and Moslem populations for centuries before the industrial age. The changing perceptions of Basque national identity following the Industrial Revolution and civil wars merely illustrated the plasticity of perception, which strengthens the concepts of ethnosymbolism that highlight the enduring qualities of national identity and their continued alteration by perceptions of reality. Furthermore, strategic logic and psychological theory explain how a progression of increased propensities for violence ultimately resulted in the emergence of Euskadi ta Askatazuna and Terra Lliure. These terrorist organizations followed a process that moved Basque and Catalan oppositionist movements between Marxism and nationalism, and eventually led to jingoist struggles for achieving Basque and Catalan national independence.

The logit regression model offers an assessment of the nationalist and terrorist theories by measuring the relationship between the findings from the Spanish case and the origins of ENS terrorism throughout the world. The cases in this model observe two-hundred ninety-seven minority populations from one-hundred twenty-six states, including the Soviet Union, with observations spanning primarily between 1945 and 2003. The independent variables assess the role of cultural sensitivity, encounters with violence, political freedom, representation/alternative options, transitioning levels of political freedom, economic conditions, educational stagnation, and developed educational systems. The dependent variable is a dichotomous indicator for the development of ENS terrorist organizations among these populations. The analysis shows ENS terrorist organizations having a 1.9 percent probability of developing, with cultural identity, encounters with violence, political freedom, social unrest, underrepresentation, disproportionate
economic privation, and stagnant educational systems and other factors of civil development increasing this probability. This implies an ability to detect the conditions contributing to the development of ENS terrorism, including the populations and areas where organizations are likely to develop, the personality and background of those involved, their individual and collective goals, and other motivating forces, therefore implying the potential to improve policies for effectively confronting this issue.

The results of this study also show several concepts of national theory being compatible with strategic logic and psychological theory, suggesting that each of these theories may assist in explaining the origins of ENS terrorism. The cultural variable strengthens the general concepts of nationalist theory by measuring nationalist sentiment, distinct cultural markers, and the degree of threat against national identity. The remaining variables contribute to both strengthening and weakening the concepts of strategic logic and psychological theory. The variables for political freedom and nonmilitant organizations that measure the social agility and legitimate channels for pursuing political change show terrorism used to compensate for a lack of alternatives. The variables for violence, transitions, and education assess the effects of unstable social conditions, showing both strategic and psychological forces potentially influencing the use of terrorism. The variable for economic conditions shows economic privation influencing the scope of rebellion, indicating a strategic response while also implying conditions that are potential psychologically damaging. Finally, the variables for education assessing civil development and access to information indicate conditions that are potentially psychologically damaging but also contribute to a rational basis for employing clandestine rebellion. These findings show unstable conditions potentially contributing to a psychological breakdown of inhibitions against using violence. However, it appears that terrorist organizations, at least initially, maintain a logical grasp on
reality, and develop in populations that are more repressed than mainstream populations. These organizations tend to emerge in moderately liberal climates while the most fertile environments involve a history of terrorism and political instability; consequently, indicating a psychological conditioning for using terrorism when it is strategically beneficial for maximizing results.

There are weaknesses to this study however. The variables analyzed in this model lack specific indications about the individuals forming terrorist organizations. The absence of a direct observation of these individuals impedes the ability to assess accurately several psychological forces considered to contribute to the decisions to initiate terrorism. Psychology potentially plays a multidimensional and intrinsic role in the development of ENS terrorist organizations, but this study is limited in its ability to assess the full scope of those emotional components. The best conclusion that this study can offer regarding the role of psychology in the development of ENS terrorism is how similar background conditions correlate with the creation of campaigns, and the pattern among specific populations who continue developing additional terrorist movements, seems to imply a socially learned or situationally induced psychological state that facilitates an acceptance of violence. However, future research aimed at addressing the psychological aspects of terrorism may strengthen the understanding about the role of psychology with ENS terrorism.

This paper provides a starting point for new research. Currently, there may be more than two-hundred active ENS terrorist organizations around the world, although research in this field tends to focus disproportionately on notorious organizations such as the IRA, PKK, and ETA. Advancing knowledge in this field requires expanding beyond these already well-documented cases. There is a significant amount of untapped knowledge regarding this subject, and future studies should expand the range of observations to include several other populations and terrorist organizations. Furthermore, research should continue studying the biological components of
aggression while continuing to combine concepts of nationalist and terrorist theory. Additional analyses should observe concepts that this paper was unable to assess, such as organizational splitting or the intrinsic parts of nationalism. Studying specific organizations or innate individual characteristics, however, may require utilizing case studies or measuring a smaller number of observations, since precise details about many movements or the individuals involved are hard to obtain. Another important step would involve analyzing ENS organizations, such as Movimiento Estudiantil de Chicanos de Aztlán (MECHA), which have not initiated terrorism for furthering their goals. These suggestions illustrate the ample space for advancing the study of terrorism, especially ENS terrorism, which has the potential to become an increasingly common tactic for marginalized populations worldwide.

The threats from terrorism are likely to remain a growing concern around the world and a major security challenge for most states. As globalization brings the world closer together and transforms once rural areas into hubs of modernity, threats from terrorism are likely to increase. Concerns over this issue will continue expanding the need to develop policies that prevent or reduce its destructive results. These policies should focus on the underlying causes of terrorism, and to have the greatest impact, they should address those forces initially motivating individuals to become terrorists. This study has demonstrated that several social, political, and economic forces have a direct and significant correlation with the creation of ENS terrorist organizations. These results show that it is possible to detect, even predict, populations and environments with increased potential for producing terrorism. While psychology may assist in identifying those individuals within a population who are more prone to becoming terrorists, policy change offers the most effective approach for confronting this issue. Terrorism is a form of rebellion, and rebellion is a common human response; consequently the potential for terrorism may always
exist in the midst of desires to affect change. Nevertheless, steps can be taken that reduce the motivations for violent rebellion. Developing civil infrastructure and promoting social equality and human rights can significantly reduce its potential. Furthermore, such steps offer a variety of benefits, not only lessening the threats that terrorism poses on a population but also providing opportunity for improving lives. Most important, preventative measures can thwart the beginning of a movement that once active is nearly impossible to stop.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL TABLES

TABLE VIII

Logit results using the two-tailed test economic variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ind. Variables</th>
<th>Creation of ENS Terrorist Organization</th>
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<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure to Violence</td>
<td>.295***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Freedom</td>
<td>.133***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonmilitant Groups</td>
<td>.237***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Transitions</td>
<td>.491**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Conditions</td>
<td>.297**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Stagnation</td>
<td>-.961**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.98+ Literacy Rates</td>
<td>.33</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.233</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constants</td>
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<td>Pseudo-r squared</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
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*p<.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.00

This table shows the results when using a dichotomous economic variable. These results are similar to the results from using a categorical economic variable, which uses the same logic. The first standard deviation from zero is coded zero. The next three standard deviations are coded one, and the remaining values are coded zero. This slightly decreased the coefficients of the variables for violence, democracy, and educational stagnation, and decreased the pseudo r-squared. This also slightly raised the coefficients for transitions and economic conditions. The p-value for the economic variable rose from 0.029 to 0.1. Because the economic variable is two-tailed, however, its p-value is considered .005; therefore, remaining significant.
### TABLE IX

Relationship between cultural sensitivity and the development of ethno/national separatist terrorist campaigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culture Sensitivity</th>
<th>Total Cases</th>
<th>No. Occur</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>.5</td>
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<td>811</td>
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<td>764</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
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<td>1,514</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,091</strong></td>
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### TABLE X

Relationship between political representation and the development of ethno/national separatist terrorist campaigns

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nonmilitant Groups</th>
<th>Total Cases</th>
<th>No. Occur</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>844</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,154</strong></td>
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### TABLE XI
Distribution of violent encounters and development of ethno/national separatist terrorist campaigns

<table>
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<th>Exposure to Violence</th>
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<th>Total</th>
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<td>877</td>
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<td>10.3</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>586</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
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<td>628</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,960</strong></td>
<td><strong>194</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>13,154</strong></td>
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### TABLE XII
Distribution of economic and political differentials and development of ethno/national separatist terrorism campaigns

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<th>Terrorist Campaign</th>
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<th>Total</th>
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<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>advantaged</td>
<td>774</td>
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<td>6.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>some advantages</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>.5</td>
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<td>no major disparity</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>19.1</td>
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<td>extreme disparity</td>
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<td>36.1</td>
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<td><strong>193</strong></td>
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TABLE XIII
Distribution of literacy and unemployment rates and development of ethno/national separatist
terrorist campaigns

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<th>Literacy Rates</th>
<th>Unemployment Rates</th>
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<td></td>
<td>No. Occur</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 10%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 15%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 20%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 25%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 30%</td>
<td>3</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 35%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>-- 40%</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>-- 45%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 50%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 55%</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 60%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 65%</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 70%</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 75%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 80%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>-- 85%</td>
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</tr>
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<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-- 95%</td>
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<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--100%</td>
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<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(10.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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TABLE XIV
Distribution of political freedom, total observations, and development of ethno/national separatist terrorist organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Freedom</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Terrorist Group</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1,044</td>
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<td>8</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-8</td>
<td>529</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-7</td>
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<td>-6</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>5.08</td>
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</tr>
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<td>-5</td>
<td>369</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>.5</td>
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<td>603</td>
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<td>3.1</td>
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<td>3.10</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>395</td>
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<td>473</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>805</td>
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</tr>
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<td>193</td>
<td>100</td>
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TABLE XV
Descriptive Statistics

<table>
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<th>Variable</th>
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<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Culture</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
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<td>.015</td>
<td>.121</td>
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APPENDIX B: ENS terrorist organizations forming in the period of 1945 to 2003

Abu al-Rish Brigades: also known as Fatah Hawks, Abu al-Reesh Brigades, Ahmed Abu al-Rish Brigades, al-Reish Brigades; founded in 1993 as a militant faction of al-Fatah, active in Gaza, its goal is the liberation of Palestine.

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO): see Fatah al-Qiyadah al-Thawriyyah

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG): also known as Abu Sayyaj Moro, and al-Harakat al-Islamiyah, “Bearer of the Sword;” an Islamic Moro separatist organization founded in 1991 by dissenting members of MNLF, active in the Philippines and Malaysia, its goal is to establish an independent Islamic state in Mindanao in the southern Philippines.

Abu Sayyaj Moro: see Abu Sayyaf Group


Aceh Merdeka: see National Liberation Front of Aceh Sumatra

Adivasi Cobra Force (ACF): also known Adivasi Militant Force; formed in India in 1996 by Santhal nationalists and other tribal natives of Assam following violent incursions with Bodos. Its goals include seeking reparations for damages caused to Santhals during the conflict. The ACF is currently working towards becoming a legitimate political party.

Adivasi Militant Force: see Adivasi Cobra Force

Afwaj al Muqawama al Lubnaniya (AMAL): also known as Lebanese Resistance Detachments and Movement of Hope; founded by Imam Musa Sadr in Lebanon in 1975 as a Shiite protectionist organization, pursuing Shiite interests and supporting Palestinians during Israel’s 1978 invasion, it eventually fused with Hezbollah.

Ahmed Abu al-Rish Brigades: see Abu al-Rish Brigades

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades: founded by members of al-Fatah in the West Bank and Gaza in 2000, its goal is the liberation of Palestinians.

Al-Asifa: see Al-Fatah

Al-Badr: see Al-Badr

Al-Badhr Mujahidin: see Al-Badr

Al-Badr: also known as al-Badhr Mujahidin, and al-Badar; original established in 1971 by Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence, it was reestablished in 1998 under Kashmiri leadership, its goal is the establishment of an independent Islamic Kashmir.

Albanian National Army (ANA): founded in 2002 in Macedonia following incursions with Macedonian troops in 2001, its goal is to establish an ethnic Albanian state comprised of Albanian populations throughout the Balkans.

Al-Faran: formed in India in 1995, possibly by Kashmiri separatists from JeM and HuA, its goal is to establish an independent state of Kashmir but has been inactive since 1995.

Al-Fatah Intifada, “Fatah Uprising:” also known as Fatah Abu Musa; formed in 1983 by factionalized members of Fatah and PLO. It has links with Hezbollah and is committed to liberating Palestine.

Al-Fatah: also known as al-Asifa, Harek at-Tahrir al-Wataniyyeh al-Filastiniyyeh, and Fateh; founded by Faruk Qaddumi, Khalid al-Hasan, Salah Khalaf, Khalil El-Wazir, and Yassar Araft in the West Bank and Gaza in 1959. Originally, Fatah was a secularist organization seeking the violent removal of Israelis from Palestinian territory. Following the Oslo Accords in 1993, Fatah became a
legitimate political group, renouncing terrorism and recognizing Israel’s right to exist.

Al-Hadid: founded in 1994 in India as a Kashmiri separatist organization, although its purpose is questionable with suspicions of it being an Indian military scheme, it has been inactive since 1994.

Al-Harakat al-Islamiyah: see Abu Sayyaf Group

Al-Jabha al-Dimuqratiyya li-Tahrir Filastin: see Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Al-Jabha ash-Sha'abiya li-Tahrir Falastin, “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP):” founded by George Habash in 1967 following the Arab-Israeli War, its goal is the destruction of Israel and creation of a Marxist Palestinian state.

Al-Jabha al-Islamiyah litahrir Filastin, “Islamic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (IFLP):” formed by factionalized PLO members in Lebanon in 1986, its goal was to establish a sovereign Palestinian state. IFLP has been inactive since 1990.

All Tripura Bharat Suraksha Force (ATBSF): a Tripura separatist organization and splinter of NLFT, possibly founded during the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura, although rumored as having more to do with organized crime. ATBSF is no longer active.

All Tripura People’s Liberation Organization (ATPLO): founded in India in 1980 by Blinada Jamatia and other former members of the TNV, flowing Hrangkhawal’s orders for the TNV to disband, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura but was neutralized by 1983.

All Tripura Security Armed Force (ATSAF): a Tripura separatist organization and splinter of NLFT, possibly founded during the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura, although rumored as having more to do with organized crime. ATSAF is no longer active.

All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF): a Tripura separatist organization founded in India 1990 by Ranjit Debbarma and other dissenting members of TNV as the All Tripura Tribal Force, its goal is to liberate the tribal areas in northeastern India and establish a sovereign state of Tripura. ATTF is also anti-Bengali.

All Tripura Volunteer Association (ATVA): a Tripura separatist organization and splinter of NLFT, possibly founded during the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura, although rumored as having more to do with organized crime. ATVA is no longer active.

All Tripura Volunteer Force (ATVF): a Tripura separatist organization and splinter of NLFT, likely founded during the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura, although rumored as having more to do with organized crime. ATVF is no longer active.

Al-Madina Regiment: also known as al-Madinah; founded in 2002 as an Islamic Kashmiri separatist organization, its goal is to establish an Islamic state in Malaysia.

Al-Madinah: see Al-Madina Regiment

Al-Mansoorain: founded in 2003 as a branch of LeT, its goal is to liberate Kashmiris
from India and establish an independent state of Kashmir.

Al-Qassam: see Saraya al-Quds

Al-Quds Battalions: see Saraya al-Quds

Al-Quds Brigades: see Saraya al-Quds

Al-Reish Brigades: see Abu al-Rish Brigades

Al-Saiqa: founded by Syrian Ba'athists in 1966 as a Syrian branch of al-Fatah and PLO, its goal is the liberation of Palestine, mostly providing support beneficial to Syrian policies.

Apocu Genclik Intikam Mufrezeleri, “Apo's Youth Revenge Brigades;” founded in Turkey around 1999 by Kurd separatists in retaliation to the apprehension of Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the PKK, and has been inactive since 1999.

Apo'nun Intikam Sahinler, “Revenge Hawks of Apo;” a Kurdish separatist organization founded in Turkey around 1999 in retaliation to the apprehension of Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the PKK, and has been inactive since 1999.

Apo's Youth Revenge Brigades: see Apocu Genclik Intikam Mufrezeleri

Arab Liberation Front (ALF): also known as Jabhat al-Tahrir al-'Arabiyya; founded by Iraqi Ba'athists in 1969 as an Iraqi branch of al-Fatah and PLO, its goal is the destruction of Israel and liberation of Palestine.

Arab Organization: see May 15 Organization for the Liberation of Palestine

Arab Revolutionary Brigades: see Fatah al-Qiyadah al-Thawriyyah

Arab Revolutionary Council: see Fatah al-Qiyadah al-Thawriyyah

Arab Revolutionary Expansion Movement: see Harakat al-Madd al-Thawri al-Arabi

Arab Revolutionary Resurgence Movement (ARRM): see Harakat al-Madd al-Thawri al-Arabi

Arab Revolutionary Surge: see Harakat al-Madd al-Thawri al-Arabi

Armata Corsa, “Corsican Army;” founded by factionalized members of FLNC, Jean-Michel Rossi and Francois Santoni, in 1999, deterred by FLNC’s links to organized crime, but still shares the goal of establishing an independent Corsican state.

Armata di Liberazione Naziunale (ALN): formed by Corsican separatists in France around 2002 but has been inactive since although its existence is questionable.

Armed Commandos of Liberation: see Comandos Armados de Liberacion Nacional

 Armed Forces of National Liberation: see Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional

Armee Revolutionnaire Bretonne (ARB), “Breton Revolutionary Army;” also known as Emgann; formed in France in 1971 as the militant branch of the Front de Liberation Breton (FLB), which has links with ETA, and seeks to establish an independent state of Brittany.

Army of Mohammed: see Jaish-e-Mohammed

Army of the Prophet: see Jaish-e-Mohammed

Army of the Pure: see Lashkar-e-Toiba

Army of the Righteous: see Lashkar-e-Toiba

Arteshen Rizgariy a Gelli Kurdistan (ARGK), “People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan;” also known as Kurdistan National Liberty Army, and People's Defense Force; founded in 1984 as a militant branch of the PKK, its goal the liberation of Kurdistan from Turkey.

August 23 Movement: possibly arose in Lebanon in 1982 from Palestinian and Lebanese leftists, although its existence is questionable.

Babbar Khalsa International (BKI): a Sikh separatist organization founded in India around 1978, its goal is to establish an independent state of Khalistan in the Punjab Province of northern India.

Badr Force: see Quwat Badr
Baganda Youth Movement: founded in 1994 by Bagandans in Uganda, its goal is to achieve an independent Buganda state.
Baloch Liberation Army: see Baluchistan Liberation Army
Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA): also known as Baloch Liberation Army; founded between 2000 and 2003 by Baloch separatists in Pakistan. Its goal is to gain sovereignty for Baluchistan.
Barisan Nasional Pembe-Basan Pattani (BNPP), “National Liberation Front of Pattani:” founded first in 1947 and reorganized in 1960, its goal was the establishment of an independent Pattani state in southern Thailand. BNPP has been inactive since the 1980s.
Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Pattani (BRN), “National Revolutionary Front:” founded by Ustaz Karim Haji Hassan in 1963 as a breakaway sect of BNPP, active in Malaysia and Thailand, its goal was to create an independent Malay state, Pattani. Losing strength during the 1970s, BRN may have merged into Bersatu.
Basque Homeland Freedom: see Euskadi ta Askatasuna
Bayelsa Youths Federation of Nigeria (BAYOF): a militant Ijaw organization founded in Nigeria in 1960, the Ijaw are pursuing an independent state in the Niger-Delta of Ijawland.
BdSF: see National Democratic Front of Bodoland
Bearer of the Sword: see Abu Sayyaf Group
Belier Party: a Jura or Jurassian separatist organization operating in Switzerland, possibly formed prior to 1985, its status is currently unclear.
Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (BTFK): a Sikh separatist organization founded by Gurbachan Singh Manochal in India in 1984, its goal was the establishment of an independent Sikh state of Khalistan in the Punjab Province of northern India. Its status is currently unclear.
Birsa Commando Force (BCF): founded by Santhal separatists in India in 1996, its goal was the establishment of an independent Bodo state. The BCF has recognized a ceasefire since 2004.
Black Liberation Army (BLA): founded by former members of the Black Panther Party in the United States in 1971 for violently pursuing the self-determination of African-Americans. The BLA is no longer active.
Black Panthers (West Bank/Gaza): founded in Israel in 1988, funded by al-Fatah for violent resistance and Israel, it appears to have been inactive since 2005.
Black September Organization (BSO): founded in 1971 as a splinter of al-Fatah in retaliation of Jordan removing the PLO. BSO is no longer active.
Black Widows: see Chyornyye Vdovy
Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF): see Bodo Liberation Tigers
Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT): also known as Bodo Liberation Tiger Force (BLTF) and Terrorist Group of Assam: founded by Prem Singh Brahma in 1996 in Assam, India, its goal was to establish a sovereign Bodo state. In 2003, BLT negotiated a ceasefire and disbanded.
Bodo Security Force (BSF): see National Democratic Front of Bodoland
Borok National Council of Tripura (BNCT): a Tripura separatist organization founded in India in 2000 as a breakaway of the
NLFT due to tribal factionalism; its goal is the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura.

Bosnian Serb Armed Militia (BSA): established in 1991 as a splinter of the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA), comprising Bosnian Serbs, the BSA fought along side the JNA during the Bosnian–Kosovo conflict. As a loose collaboration of Chetnik militias, it launched a terror campaign pursuing an ethnic Serbian state of Srpska.

Boys of the Ijaw god of War: see Egbesu Boys

Breton Revolutionary Army: see Armee Revolutionnaire Bretonne

Catalan Liberation Front: see Front d'Alliberament Català

Catalan Red Liberation Army (CRLA), also known as Exèrcit Roja d’Alliberament Català: a Catalan separatist organization possibly founded during the late 1980s. Its status is unknown.

Catholic Reaction Force (CRF): founded in 1983 in Northern Ireland as a branch of the INLA. CRF shares INLA’s goal for establishing an independent Irish state.


Chin National Front: a Zomi (Chin) separatist organization founded in Burma in 1967, its purpose is to establish an independent Chin state.

Chittagong Hill Tracts United People’s Party: see Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity

Chyornyye Vdovy, “Black Widows:” began in 2000 in Russia with Chechen widows becoming suicide bombers after being taught that their husbands died in clashes against Russian forces as punishment for their sins, and subsequently becoming a burden on Chechen separatists.

Clandestini: see Clandestinu

Clandestinu: also known as Clandestini: founded in France by Corsican separatists around 1999, although inactive, elements Clandestinu may have merged with Clandestini Corsi.

Comandos Armados de Liberacion (CAL), “Armed Commandos of Liberation:” founded in 1968 by Puerto Rican separatists, its goal was to establish a sovereign state of Puerto Rico. CAL disbanded by 1972, with some members creating FALN in 1974.

Continuity Army Council: see Continuity Irish Republican Army

Continuity IRA: see Continuity Irish Republican Army

Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA): also known as Irish Continuity Army Council (ICAC), Continuity IRA, and Continuity Army Council: founded in Northern Ireland in 1968, its goal is to reunite north and south Ireland as a sovereign state.

Corsican Army: see Armata Corsa

Corsican Patriotic Front (FPC): formed in 1999 by Corsican nationalists and members the FLNC and other Corsican terrorist organizations, in 2002 it negotiated a ceasefire, remaining inactive since.

Corsican Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC): see Front Armi Revolutionnaire Corse

Dagestan Liberation Army: founded in 1999 by Dagestan separatists, its goal is to establish a sovereign Islamic Republic of Dagestan, but has not been a violent threat since 2004.

Dagestani Shari’ah Jamaat: also known as Islamic Jamaat of Dagestan and Dzhennet, “Paradise:” founded in 2002
in northeastern Russia by Chechen separatists. Its goal is to establish an independent Islamic state of Chechnya.

Darfur Liberation Front (DLF): founded in 2002 by members of the Fur tribe in Sudan, its goals was to liberate Darfur from Sudan and create an independent state. In 2003, DLF became the SLM.

Daughters of Faith: see Dhtaran-e-Millat

Daughters of the Nation: see Dhtaran-e-Millat

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP): also known as Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), and al-Jabha al-Dimuqratiyya li-Tahrir Filastin: founded by Nayaf Hawatmeh in 1969 based on Marxist philosophy, its goals are the destruction of Israel and creation of a socialist Palestinian state.

Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA): also known as Progressive Buddhist Karen National Organization, and Democratic Karen Buddhist Association; a Karen separatist organization, DKBA is the militant branch of the Democratic Karen Buddhist Association, a breakaway element of the KNU. Founded in 1995, it violently opposes the KNU and seeks to establish a sovereign Karen state known as Kayin in the northern regions of Burma.

Democratic Karen Buddhist Association: see Democratic Karen Buddhist Army

Dhtaran-e-Millat (DeM), “Daughters of the Nation:” also known as Daughters of Faith; founded by Asiya Andrabi in 1987 as a Kashmiri Islamic women’s organization, its goal is to liberate Kashmir from India although supporting annexation by Pakistan.

Dima Halam Daoga (DHD): founded by Jewel Garlossa in 1996 as a breakaway sect of the Dimasa National Security Force (DNSF). DHD aspires to carryon DNSF’s goal of gaining Assamese independence from India. Currently, DHD is recognizing a ceasefire.

Dogu Turkistan Kurtulush Orgutu: see Sharq azat Turkistan

Dzhennet: see Dagestani Shari’ah Jamaat

East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO): see Sharq azat Turkistan

Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF): founded by Sri Lankan separatists in 1980, EPRLF worked as a terrorist organization throughout the 1980s seeking to establish independence for Tamil Eelam, after which it began reestablishing itself and is now a political party.

Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS): also known Revolutionary Eelam Organization; founded in 1975 by Tamil separatists in Sri Lanka and was the first Tamil separatist terrorist organization, its goal was to establish an independent Tamil state known as Tamil Eelam, comprised of pre-colonial Tamil territory on the island of Ceylon (Sri Lanka).

Egbesu Boys, “Boys of the Ijaw god of War:” also known as Egbesu Cult, and Warring Ijaw Youths; possibly founded in 1999 in Nigeria as a militant branch for either the Ijaw National Congress or the Ijaw Youth Movement, used as a militant force, it supports the Ijaw movement pursuing self-determination and sovereignty over Ijawland the Niger-Delta.

Egbesu Cult: see Egbesu Boys

Ein Tyrol: a South Tyrolean separatist organization founded in Italy in 1960, its status is currently unclear.

Ejercito Popular de Boricua (EPB): also known as Macheteros: founded in 1978 by Puerto Rican separatists, its goal is to establish a sovereign state of Puerto Rico.

Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF): founded in Egypt in 1960 by Eritrean students, its
goal was to achieve Eritrean independence from Ethiopia. In 1970, ELF split and EPLF emerged as the dominant force. In 1991, Eritrea gained its independence.

Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF): founded in Ethiopia in 1970 by Isaias Afwerki following a split in ELF, its goal was to liberate Eritrea from Ethiopia, in 1991 defeated Ethiopian forces, and secured Eritrean sovereignty.

ETA militar: resulted from ETA factionalizing in 1974, and reclaimed ETA’s title following ETA p-m’s dissolution in 1982.

ETA politico-militar: resulted from ETA factionalizing in 1974, strongly influenced by communist ideology, it sought a sovereign socialist Basque state, Euskadi. In 1982, ETA p-m negotiated a ceasefire and disbanded.

ETA-V: formed in 1971, when ETA fractured over the dispute between Marxism versus ethnic struggle. Focused more on ethnicity, ETA-V united with Euzko Gaztedi del interior (EGI)-Batasuna, “United Basque Youth,” in 1972 to reemerge as ETA.

ETA-VI: formed in 1971, following a split in ETA over a Marxist versus ethnic dispute, more interested in Marxist struggle, ETA-VI merged with the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR) in 1973.

Euskadi ta Askatazuna (ETA), “Basque Homeland and Freedom:” founded in Spain in 1959 by Jose Manuel Aguirre, Jose Maria Benito del Valle, Julen Madariage, and Jose Luis Alvarez Enparanza, and is a breakaway group of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). Active in Spain and France, ETA is among the longest lasting and most destructive terrorist groups. Its goal is to establish an independent Basque, Euskadi, comprising the historic Basque lands in northern Spain and southern France.

Exèrcit Roja d’Alliberament Català: see Catalan Red Liberation Army

Falcon: see Shahin

Fatah Abu Musa: see Al-Fatah Intifada

Fatah al-Qiyadah al-Thawriyyah, “Abu Nidal Organization (ANO):” also known as Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims, Arab Revolutionary Council, Fatah Revolutionary Council, and Arab Revolutionary Brigades; founded in 1974 as breakaway group from the PLO, its goal is the liberation of Palestine but has been in decline since the 1980s.

Fatah Hawks: see Abu al-Rish Brigades

Fatah Revolutionary Council: see Fatah al-Qiyadah al-Thawriyyah

Fatah Uprising: see Al-Fatah Intifada

Fateh: see Al-Fatah

FLNC du Mai 1996: founded in 1996 by members of Corsica Viva, formerly belonging to FLNC-canal habituel, its goal was the establishment of an independent Corsican state. In 1999, it fused with canal historique, Fronte Ribellu, Resistenza, and Clandestinu to reestablish FLNC.

FLNC-canal habituel, “usual channel:” founded in France in 1990 after factionalism led to a split in FLNC, its goal was to establish a sovereign Corsican state. In 1996, canal habituel was disbanded by its public front, Movimentu pá l’Autodeterminazione (MPA). Many members joined the Rinnovu Naziunale Party (RN), others created Corsica Viva, which later became FLNC du 5 Mai 1996.

FLNC-canal historique, “historic channel:” founded in France in 1990 after factionalism led to a split in FLNC, its goal was to establish a sovereign Corsican state. Between 1998 and 1999, canal historique fused with FLNC du Mai.
1996, Fronte Ribellu, Resistenza, and Clandestinu to reestablish itself as the FLNC Union des combatants.

Free Aceh Movement: see National Liberation Front of Acheh Sumatra

Free Land: see Terra Lliure

Free Papua Movement: see Organisasi Papua Merdeka

Free People of Galilee: also known as the Galilee Liberators; founded by Israeli Arabs in 2003. It has no known terrorist links and no longer considered a violent threat.

Front Armi Revolutionnaire Corse (FR): also known as Corsican Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC): founded by Corsican separatists in France in 1992, its goal is to establish a sovereign Corsican state.

Front d’Alliberament Català (FAC), “Catalan Liberation Front:” a Catalan separatist organization founded in 1969 in Spain as a breakaway sect of the Catalan National Front (FNC). Its goal was to liberate Cataluña but dissolved in the mid 1970s.

Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse: see Fronte di Liberazione Nazionale di a Corsica

Front for Mauritanian Armed Resistance: see Front Uni pour la Resistance Armée en Mauritanie

Front for the Liberation of the French Somali Coast (FLCS): also known as Somali Coast Liberation Front; founded around 1962 in French colonized Djibouti, comprised of Issaq Somalis, it fought to liberate the French colonies. Successful in its struggle, Djibouti became independence in 1977.

Front Uni pour la Resistance Armée en Mauritanie (FURAM), “Front for Mauritanian Armed Resistance:” a Kewri resistance organization founded in Mauritania in 1990, although waging open rebellion, FURAM also used terrorism as a tertiary tactic; its status is currently unclear.

Front Unifié pour la Libération des Races Opprimées (FULRO): a Montagnard resistance movement founded in Vietnam around 1960 to resist the Vietcong and establish an independent state in the highlands of Vietnam.

Fronte di Liberazione Nazionale di a Corsica (FLNC), “National Liberation Front of Corsica:” also known as Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse; established in 1976 as fusion of GP and FPCL, its goal is to gain Corsican independence from France.

Fronte Paesanu Corsu di Liberazione (FPCL): founded in 1973 by Corsican separatists in France, its goal was to establish a sovereign state of Corsica. In 1976, FPCL fused with GP to form FLNC.

Fronte Ribellu: founded in 1996 by Corsican separatists in France and in 1999 fused with FLNC du Mai 1996, FLNC-canal historique, Resistenza, and Clandestinu to establish the FLNC Union des combatants

Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN), “Armed Forces of National Liberation:” also known as Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional Puertoriquena; founded by remnants of CAL in 1974, operating in the United States and Puerto Rico, its goal was to establish a sovereign state of Puerto Rico but has been inactive since the mid 1980s.

Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional Puertoriquena: see Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional

Fuerzas de Liberación Africanas de Mauritania (FLAM): a Kewri separatist organization founded in Mauritania in 1983, it fought for Kewri independence throughout the 1980s but suffered significant losses. Since the 1980s,
FLAM has worked through legitimate political channels.

Galilee Liberators: see Free People of Galilee

Gazteriak, “Youth:” founded in 1994 in France. Its goal is to reunite the historic Basque land in northern Spain and southern France as a sovereign Basque state.

Gerakan Aceh Merdika (GAM): see National Liberation Front of Aceh Sumatra


Ghjustizia Paolina (GP): founded in 1974 in France by Corsican separatists, its goal was to establish a sovereign state of Corsica. In 1976, GP fused with FPCL to form FLNC.

God’s Army of the Holy Mountain: a Karen separatist organization founded by Luther and Johnny Htoo in 1997 as a KNU splinter group, its goal was to establish a sovereign Karen state known as Kayin in the northern regions of Burma. God’s Army suffered significant losses during the early 2000s and now appears inactive.

Gora Euskadi Askatuta, “Long Live a Free Basque Homeland:” founded in 2002 by Basque nationalists in France. Its goal is to gain an independent Basque state of Euskadi, comprising the historic Basque lands in northern Spain and southern France. Currently, its members may be working with other Basque terrorist organizations.

Hamas: also known as Islamic Resistance Movement, and Harakat al-Muqawammah al-Islammiyya; formed in Israel in 1987 as a splinter of the Muslim Brotherhood. Its goal is to destroy Israel and establish a Palestinian Sunni state.

Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami Fi Filastin, “Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ):” formed around 1979 as a splinter organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, a fusion of Palestinian nationalism and Sunni Islam, small but active throughout the Middle East, PIJ seeks the destruction of Israel and liberation of Palestine.

Harakat al-Madd al-Thawri al-Arabi, “Arab Revolutionary Resurgence Movement (ARRM):” also known as Arab Revolutionary Surge, Revolutionary Outburst Movement, and Arab Revolutionary Expansion Movement; founded around 1993 in Lebanon as a pro-Palestinian organization. AARM has been inactive since 1993.

Harakat al-Muqawammah al-Islammiyya: see Hamas

Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM): founded in Pakistan in 1985, HUM is an Islamic terrorist organization linked to Al-Qaeda and al-Faran, of its goals include supporting Kashmiri separatism in India.

Harek at-Tahrir al-Wataniyyeh al-Filastiniyyeh: see Al-Fatah

Harkat ul-Ansar (HuA): founded in India in 1993 as a Kashmiri separatist organization, supported by Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and thought to be a militant branch of Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islami (JUI), a Pakistani Islamic political party, HuA has been inactive since 1996.

Hezbollah, “Party of God:” also known as Revolutionary Justice Organization, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, The Islamic Resistance, Islamic Jihad, and Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, founded by Shia clergyman in Lebanon in 1982, following the Israeli invasion. Its goals include the destruction of Israel, liberation of Palestine, eradication of Western
influence from the Middle East, and establishment of a Lebanese theocracy. Hizb ul-Mujahidin: see Hizbul Mujahideen Hizbul Mujahideen (HM): also known as HM of the Jamaat-e-Islami, and Hizb ul-Mujahidin; founded in 1995 as a militant branch of Jamaat-i-Islami, a Pakistani Islamic political party, HM is the biggest Kashmiri militant organization, supporting Kashmir liberation from India although favoring irredentism to Pakistan.

HM of the Jamaat-e-Islami: see Hizbul Mujahideen Holy War Warriors: see Laskar Jihad Iduwini Youths: see Ijaw Youth Movement Ijaw National Congress (INC): founded in 1992 as an amalgamation of multiple Ijaw groups in the Niger-Delta, its goals include the creation of a sovereign Ijaw state in southern Nigeria known as Ijawland.

Ijaw Youth Movement: also known as Iduwini Youths: possibly organized in 1999 in Nigeria as the militant branch of the Iduwini National Movement for Peace and Development (INMPD), its goal is to liberate Ijaw territory in Niger-Delta.

Ijaw Youths Council (IYC): founded in Nigeria in 1998, its goal is to unite the Ijaw and pursue self-determination in the Niger Delta.

Independent Armed Revolutionary Movement (MIRA): a Puerto Rican separatist organization founded Filiberto Ojeda Rios in 1967, its goal was to secede from the United States and establish an independent state of Puerto Rico. MIRA has been inactive since the 1970s.

International Islamic Battalion: see Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade

International Islamic Brigade: see Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade

Internet Black Tigers (IBT): founded around 1997 as a cyber militant branch of LTTE, its goal is to establish an independent Tamil state known as Tamil Eelam, comprised of pre-colonial Tamil territory on the island of Ceylon (Sri Lanka). Offensives by Sri Lankan forces in 2009 seriously crippled LTTE, and its ability to continue is in question.

Iparretarrek (IK), “Northerners:” founded in 1973 by Basque nationalists in France following an industrial dispute in Behe-Nafarroa. IK is a splinter organization of ETA, seeking to reunite the historic Basque lands in northern Spain and southern France as the sovereign Basque state of Euskadi.

Iraqi Liberation Army: see Jaish al-Tahrir al-Iraqi

Irish Continuity Army Council (ICAC): see Continuity Irish Republican Army

Irish National Liberation Army (INLA): also known as the People’s Republican Army (PRA) and People’s Liberation Army (PLA), formed by Seamus Costello in Northern Ireland in 1974 as a militant arm of the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP), its goal was to establish an independent Irish state. Although no longer a terrorist organization, INLA remains involved with organized crime.

Irish Republican Army (IRA), also known as Provos and Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA); founded in 1922 following the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Its goal was to establish a sovereign Irish state. In 2005, the IRA officially declared a ceasefire.

Islamic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (IFLP): see Al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah litahrir Filastin

Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB): also known as International Islamic Brigade and International Islamic Battalion: founded by Shamil Basayev Ibn al-Khattab in Chechnya in
1998, its goal is to create a Chechen theocracy, strictly prescribing to Sharia law.

Islamic Jamaat of Dagestan: see Dagestani Shari'ah Jamaat

Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine: see Hezbollah

Islamic Jihad: see Hezbollah

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU): also known as Islamic Party of Turkistan: an Islamic separatist organization founded in 1998 and connected to Osama bin Laden, it works with Uyghur separatists to establish an Islamic state across Central Asia.

Islamic Mujahidin Movement of Pattani: see Gerakan Mujahidin Islam Pattani

Islamic Party of Turkistan: see Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan

Islamic Resistance Movement: see Hamas

Jabhat al-Kifah al-Sha'bi, “Popular Struggle Front (PSF):” also known as Palestinian Popular Struggle Front; formed in 1967 as a splinter of al-Fatah. Its goal was the liberation of Palestine and since the 1990s evolved into a nonviolent political organization.

Jabhat al-Tahrir al-'Arabiyya: see Arab Liberation Front

Jaish al-Tahrir al-Iraqi (ILA), “Iraqi Liberation Army:” founded by Kurdish separatists in 1980, its goal was to liberate Kurds from Turkey and Iraq and establish a sovereign state of Kurdistan. ILA has been inactive since 1981.

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM): also known as Mohammed, Army of Mohammed, Tehrik Ul-Furqaan, Army of the Prophet, Mohammed's Army, National Movement for the Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty and Army of the Prophet, and Jaish-e-Muhammad Mujahideen E-Tanzeem: founded by Maulana Masood Azhar, a member of HuA, in 2000. Thought to have links with Al-Qaeda and Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), it seeks the liberation of Kashmir from India and favors irredentism with Pakistan.

Jaish-e-Muhammad Mujahideen E-Tanzeem: see Jaish-e-Mohammed

Jamiat ul-Mujahedeen (JuM): founded in 1990 in order to liberate Kashmir and Jammu from India, its goal is to annex these territories with Pakistan

Jammu and Kashmir Islamic Front (JKIF): founded by Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) in 1994 as a splinter of the JKLF, its goal was to liberate Jammu and Kashmir from India but is now inactive.

Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF): founded in India in 1976 by Kashmiri separatists, its goal was to liberate Jammu and Kashmir from India; originally, JKLF had a large following although decreasing as Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) recruited its member to form JKIF in 1994.

Javhadda Waddaniga Xoreynta Ogaddeenya, “Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF):” founded by Ogaden and Darood separatists in 1984, linked to OLF, it seeks to create an independent Somali state in the Horn of Africa.

Jenin Martyr's Brigade (JMB): founded by Mahmoud Nashbat in Israel in 2003, comprised of breakaway elements of several Palestinian terrorist groups, its purpose is to protect and liberate Palestinians.

Jerusalem Battalions: see Saraya al-Quds

Jerusalem Brigades: see Saraya al-Quds

Jordanian National Liberation Movement: founded in 1972, it has been inactive since failing to hijack a Jordanian flight that same year. Although little information about them is available, it likely consisted of Palestinians, motivated by Palestinian liberation and defiance against Israel and Jordan.
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM): founded on or after 2000 as Darfur separatist organization, led by Khalil Ibrahim and linked to SLM/SLA. In 2006, JEM fused with SLM to create the Alliance of Revolutionary Forces of West Sudan.

KADEK: see Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan

Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO): formed in 1995 by Rajbongshi students in northeastern India, its goal is to establish a sovereign Kamtapur, and receives support from ULFA.

Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP): a Karen separatist organization founded in 1959, it is Burma’s biggest and oldest insurgent group. Its goal is to establish a sovereign Karen state known as Kayin in the northern regions of Burma.

Khalistan Commando Force (KCF): a Sikh separatist organization founded by Sukhdev Singh in India around 1984, its goal was the establishment of an independent Sikh state of Khalistan in the Punjab Province of northern India. Active throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, it remains active but factionalized.

Khalistan Liberation Force (KLF): a Sikh separatist organization founded by Shaheed Aroor Singh in India in 1986; its goal was to establish an independent state of Khalistan in the Punjab Province of northern India. Its main activity occurred during the 1980s and early 1990s.

KHK: see Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan

Kongra Gele Kurdistan (PKK/KONGRA-GEL), “People’s Congress of Kurdistan:” established in 2003 as the title to replace the PKK in an effort to shed its communist origins but maintained its goals of Kurdish independence. PKK/KONGRA-GEL reassumed the name PKK in 2005.

Kongra-Gel (KGK): see Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan

Kongreya Azadi u Demokrasiya Kurdistan: see Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan

Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA); also known as Ushtria Clirimtare E Koseves (UCK); formed in 1992 in Macedonia for unifying segments of Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia as an ethnic Albanian nation. Since 1999, KLA has remained nonviolent.

Kurdish Democratic Party: see Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê

Kurdish Islamic Unity Party: founded in Turkey in 1995 as a Kurdish separatist organization, it has been inactive since 1995 although its existence is questionable.

Kurdish Patriotic Union (PUK): founded in 1994 as a splinter group of the PKK, its goals included Kurdish separation from Turkey. In 1997, PUK merged with the Kurdistan Allied National Forces.

Kurdistan Freedom Democracy Congress: see Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan

Kurdistan People's Conference: see Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan

Kurdistan Workers’ Party: see Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan

Lashkar-e-Taiba: see Lashkar-e-Toiba

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT): see Lashkar-e-Toiba

Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), “Army of the Righteous:” also known as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT), and Army of the Pure; founded in 1984 as a militant branch of MDI, linked to Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence
(ISI), MDI is a Kashmiri separatist organization in favor of irredentism with Pakistan.

Laskar Jihad: also known as Holy War Warriors; founded in 2000 based on Salafist Islam on Indonesia’s Maluku Islands. Its nationalist sentiment extends influence over Acehnese, Sulawesi, and West Papuans who share the goal of establishing an Asian Pacific pan-Islamic state.

Lebanese Resistance Detachments: see Afwaj al Muqawama al Lubnaniya

Liberation Front of Quebec (FLQ): also known as Quebec Liberation Front: founded by Québécois national socialists in Canada in 1963, its goal was to establish a sovereign Quebecker state. FLQ has been inactive since the 1970s.

Liberation of Tripura Tribal Force (LTTF): a Tripura separatist organization and splinter of NLFT, possibly founded during the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura, although rumored as having more to do with organized crime. LTTF is no longer active.

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): founded in 1976 by members of the Tamil New Tigers, it is Sri’ Lank most notorious terrorist group, fighting to establish an independent Tamil state, Tamil Eelam. Offensives by Sri Lankan forces in 2009 seriously crippled LTTE, and its ability to continue is in question.

Long Live a Free Basque Homeland: see Gora Euskadi Askatuta

Macheteros: see Ejercito Popular de Boricua

Markaz-ud-Dawawal-Irshad (MDI): founded in 1989 as an Islamic Kashmir separatist organization, linked to Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), it favors liberating Kashmiris from India and favors of irredentism with Pakistan.

Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Brigades: also known as Red Eagles; began in 2001 as a militant branch of the PFLP, its goal is the liberation of Palestine and creation of a Marxist Palestinian state.

May 15 Organization for the Liberation of Palestine: also known as Arab Organization of May 15: formed in 1979 as a breakaway element of the PFLP-Special Operations Group (SOG), operating from Iraq, its goal was the destruction of Israel but disbanded during the 1980s; several members joined Fatah.

Milliyetci Kurt Intikam Timleri, “Nationalist Kurdish Revenge Teams:” founded in Turkey around 1999 by Kurd separatists in retaliation to the apprehension of Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the PKK, and has been inactive since 1999.

MNLF Lost Command: founded in 1988, this group is likely a breakaway group of MNLF, which seeks to establish an independent Moro Islamic state in the southern Philippines.

Mohammed: see Jaish-e-Mohammed

Mohammed’s Army: see Jaish-e-Mohammed

Mong Tai Army (MTA): establish in 1963 as a Shan militant organization in Burma, although its primary purpose was drug trafficking, segments of MTA also pursued Shan independence. MTA is no longer active; some members refuse to surrender while others went onto form the Shan State Army (SSA) in 1983.

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF): a Moro separatist organization founded in 1978 as a breakaway of MNLF, its goal was to establish an independent Islamic state in the Philippines. Since 2005, MILF renounced terrorism, although it may still be active.
Moro Liberation Front (MLF): see Moro National Liberation Front
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF): also known as Moro Liberation Front (MLF); founded by Nur Misuari in the Philippines in 1968, its purpose was to establish an autonomous Islamic state in the Philippines. Throughout the 1970s, the MNLF had several breakaway organizations, and in the 1990s entered peace talks, although Nur Misuari remains a committed terrorist.
Movement of Hope: see Afwaj al Muqawama al Lubnaniya
Movsar Baryayev Gang: founded around 2002, is an amalgamation of SPIR and IIPB. Its goal is to establish an independent Chechen Islamic state
Mujahideen al-Mansooran: founded in 2002 in India as a Kashmiri separatist organization, it has been inactive since 2002.
Mujahideen Pattani Movement (BNP): founded in 1985 by Pattani separatists, based in Malaysia, BNP sought the liberation of Pattani territory and creation of an independent Pattani state. The BNP is no longer active in Thailand and works in Malaysia as a political party.
Naga National Council (NCC): founded in 1946 in India to represent Naga interests, since its formation, NCC has worked as both a political and terrorist organization.
National Democratic Alliance (NDA): founded in 1994 by Bagandans in Uganda, although little information on them is available, a prominent separatist ideology among Bagandans likely influences NDA ideology, which has been mostly inactive since 1995.
National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB): also known as Bodo Security Force (BSF) and (BdSF); founded by Ranjan Daimary in India in 1988, for achieving a sovereign Bodo state.
National Liberation Front of Aceh Sumatra (NLFAS): also known as Aceh Merdeka and Gerakan Aceh Merdika (GAM), “Free Aceh Movement;” formed in 1976 by Hasan di Tyro based on Suku Aceh ethnicity and Islam, active in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Sweden, its goal is to establish a sovereign theocracy in Indonesia’s Aceh Province of Sumatra.
National Liberation Front of Corsica: see Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale di a Corsica
National Liberation Front of Pattani: see Barisan Nasional Pembe-Basan Pattani
National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT): a Tripura separatist organization founded in India in 1989 by Dhananjoy Reang, a former leader of TNV; its goal is the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura.
National Movement for the Restoration of Pakistani Sovereignty Army of the Prophet: see Jaish-e-Mohammed
National Revolutionary Front: see Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Pattani
National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN): founded by Thuingaleng Muivah, Isak Chisi Swu, and S.S. Khaplang in India in 1980, its goal was to establish an independent Nagaland in northeastern India. In 1988, NSCN fractured into NSCN-IM and NSCN-K.
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM): founded by Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu following a split in NSCN in 1988, its goal is to establish an independent Nagaland in northeastern India.
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang (NSCN-K): established following a split in NSCN in 1988 by S.S. Khaplang, a cofounder of NSCN; its
goal is to establish an independent Nagaland in northeastern India.
Nationalist Kurdish Revenge Teams: see Milliyetci Kurt Intikam Timleri
New Pattani United Liberation Organization (New PULO): founded in Thailand in 1995 by factionalized members of PULO, active in northern Malaysia and southern Thailand, its goal is the creation of an independent Malay state, Pattani.
Northerners: see Iparretarrek
Odua People's Congress (OPC): also known as Yoruba O'odua Peoples' Congress; founded originally by Frederick Fasehun, founded in Nigeria in 1995 to advocate for Yoruba rights; however in 1999, Gani Adams led a breakaway militant faction to establish Yoruba independence.
Official IRA (OIRA): founded in 1969 in Northern Ireland, its goal was to establish a Marxist based independent Irish state. In 1972, OIRA declared a ceasefire, remaining inactive since.
Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF): see Javhadda Waddaniga Xoreynta
Oglaigh Na hEireann, “Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA):” also known as True IRA and Real IRA; founded in 1998 as a splinter group opposing a ceasefire and negotiations between IRA and British forces. RIRA remains active.
Omega-7: established in 1974 in the United States as a Cuban liberation movement, although unsuccessful in its endeavor Omega-7 turned to drug trafficking, and subsequently neutralized by the FBI in the early 1980s.
Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), “Free Papua Movement:” founded in 1963 as a liberation movement, it became an insurgent group in 1969. OPM operates in Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, its goal is to create a independent state in western New Guinea known as West Papua.
Organization of the Oppressed on Earth: see Hezbollah
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF): an Oromo separatist organization founded in 1973, linked ONLF, its goal is to secede the historic Oromo homeland from Ethiopia, comprising more than half Ethiopia’s territory. OLF has been inactive since 2002.
Our Kashmir: see Panun Kashmir
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): founded by Yassir Arafat during the Palestinian Congress in 1964, connected to al-Fatah, its goal was the liberation of Palestine. Following the Oslo Accords in 1993, many Arafat loyalists renounced terrorism and now pursue Palestinian sovereignty through legitimate political channels.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ): see Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami Fi Filastin
Palestinian Popular Struggle Front: see Jabhat al-Kifah al-Sha’bi
Palestinian Revolution Forces General Command: founded in 1985, possibly as a branch of the PLO, its goal was the liberation of Palestine but has been inactive since 1987.
Panun Kashmir, “Our Kashmir:” a Kashmiri separatist organization founded in India in 1990, its goal is to increase rights for Kashmiri Hindus and establish an independent Kashmir state.
Parbatya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS), “Chittagong Hill Tracts United People’s Party:” founded in Bangladesh in 1975 by Chittagong separatists, its goal is to gain independence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and expel the Bengali Muslims from the region.
Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional-provisional (PSAN-p), the “Socialist Party of National Liberation-Provisional:” a Catalanian separatist
organization founded in 1969 as a breakaway group from the Catalan National Front (FNC). PSAN-p is no longer active.

Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê (KDP), “Kurdish Democratic Party;” founded in Kurdistan in 1946 to pursue Kurdish autonomy from in Iraq. After the fall of the Saddam regime, KDP assumed a legitimate role in Iraqi politics.

Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK), “Kurdistan Workers’ Party;” also known as Kurdistan People's Conference, the People’s Congress of Kurdistan, Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress, KADEK, Kongreya Azadi u Demokrasiya Kurdistan, KHK, Kongra-Gel (KGK): founded by Turkish Kurds in 1974 based on Marxist ideology. Led by Abdullah Ocalan, it sought an independent Kurdish socialist state. The PKK has since denounced communism but continues pursuing Kurdish liberation.

Party of God: see Hezbollah

Patriotic Union of Kurd: see Yaketi Nishtimani Kurdistan

Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO): founded in 1968 by Pattani separatists, active in Thailand and Malaysia and more moderate or secularist than other Malay-Muslim separatist groups, active in northern Malaysia and southern Thailand, its goal is to separate from Thailand and create an independent Malay state of Pattani.

People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE): founded in 1979 by Uma Maheswaran, a former leader in the LTTE, and remnants of the People’s Liberation Front (JVP), a Sri Lankan communist resistance group founded in 1967, PLOTE sought independence for Tamil Eelam. PLOTE began declining during the 1980s from incursions with LTTE.

People’s Republican Army (PRA): see Irish National Liberation Army

People's Defense Forces (HPG): founded by Turkish Kurds in the 1990’s as the militant branch of the Kongra-Gel, its goal is the establishment of a sovereign Kurdish state.

People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan: see Arteshen Rizgariya Gelli Kurdistan

People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK): founded in 1977 by R.K. Tulachandra in India as a Manipur separatist organization, originally representing the Naga, Kuki, and Meitei, although evolving into a predominately Meitei organization, its goal is to create an independent state in northeastern India.

PFLP-General Command (GC): founded by Ahmed Jabril in 1968 as a splinter of the PFLP, its goal was the destruction of Israel and liberation of Palestine. During the 1970s, PFLP-GC became staunchly opposed to Arafat, Fatah, and the PLO. Based in Lebanon, PFLP-GC has links with Hamas and continues its attacks against Israel.

Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP): see Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP): see Al-Jabha ash-Sha’abiya li-Tahrir Falastin

Popular Resistance Committees (PRC): founded by Jamal Abu Samhdan in Gaza in 2000, comprising secularists and
religious Palestinians, PRC is committed to Israeli destruction and Palestinian liberation.

Popular Struggle Front (PSF): see Jabhat al-Kifah al-Sha'bi

Progressive Buddhist Karen National Organization: see Democratic Karen Buddhist Army

Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA): see Irish Republican Army

Provos: see Irish Republican Army

Puerto Rican Resistance Movement: founded in 1981 and considered to be a Puerto Rican separatist movement. Little is known about this movement, which has been inactive since 1981.

Quebec Liberation Front: see Liberation Front of Quebec

Quebec National Liberation Movement: founded in 1995 by Raymond Villeneuve, a former member of FLQ, its purpose is the continuation of FLQ’s goal of Québécois separatism.

Quwat Badr, “Badr Force:” founded around 2001 in the West Bank and Gaza, its goal is the liberation of Palestine but is no longer active and likely merged with a larger terrorist organization.

Real IRA: see Oglaih Na hEireann

Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA): see Oglaih Na hEireann

Red Eagles: see Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Brigades

Republic of New Africa (RNA): began following the Detroit Conference of Militant African-American Nationalists in 1968. Based on communist ideology, its goal was to gain Black sovereignty over Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Currently, the RNA works as a non-violent political organization.

Resistenza Corsa: see Accolta Nazinuale Corsa

Revenge Hawks of Apo: see Apo'nun Intikam Sahinler

Revolutionary Eelam Organization: see Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students

Revolutionary Justice Organization: see Hezbollah

Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims: see Fatah al-Qiyadah al-Thawriyyah

Revolutionary Outburst Movement: see Harakat al-Madd al-Thawri al-Arabi

Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade: also known as Riyadus-Salikhin

Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs and Riyadh-as-Saliheen; founded around 2002, its goal is to establish an independent Chechen Islamic state.

Riyadh-as-Saliheen: see Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade

Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance: see Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade

Russian Nat Bolshevik Party (NBP): a Russian nationalist organization founded by Eduard Limonov in 1993, NBP is anti-capitalist, anti-Semitist, anti-Western, and opposes Vladimir Putin. It is active throughout the former Soviet Union, aligning itself with multiple Russian causes.

Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs: see Riyad us-Saliheyn Martyrs' Brigade

Salah al-Din Battalions: also known as Salah al-Din Brigades; began in 2000 as the militant branch of the PRC, which is committed to the destruction of Israel and liberation of Palestine.

Salah al-Din Brigades: see Salah al-Din Battalions

Saraya al-Quds, “al-Quds Brigades:” also known as Jerusalem Battalions, al-Quds Battalions, Sayf al-Islam Brigades, Al-Qassam, and Jerusalem Brigades; founded around 1979 as a militant branch of PIJ, its goal is the liberation of Palestine.
Sardinian Autonomy Movement (MAS): a Sardinian separatist organization founded in Italy around 1971, its goal is to establish an independent Sardinia. MAS is suspected of being reestablished in 2002 and has been inactive since.

Save Kashmir Movement: founded in 2002 in India as a Kashmiri separatist organization but appears to have been inactive since 2002.

Sayf al-Islam Brigades: see Saraya al-Quds

SENRAK: the first of several Tripura resistance groups founded around 1965 in retaliation against migrants settling in reserved tribal areas. SENRAK was neutralized in 1968.

Shahin: also known as Falcon: founded in Iran around 1992 as a Kurdish separatist organization, Shahin has been inactive since 1992.

Shamil People’s Front: founded in 1990 by Avars in Russia, while little information of them is available, many Avars are active separatists possibly contributing to the pursuance of sovereignty from Russia and Chechnya.

Shanti Bahini: founded as the military branch of the Lamba faction following a split in the PCJSS in 1983, its goal is to gain independence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and expel the Bengali Muslims from the region.

Sharoq azat Turkistan, “East Turkistan Liberation Organization (ETLO):” also known as Dogu Turkistan Kurtulusu Orgutu; founded around 1998 by Uyghur separatists, its goal is to establish an Islamic East Turkistan in China’s Xinjiang province.

Sinh National Alliance (SNA): a Sindhi separatist organization founded in 1988, active in Pakistan and led by M. G. Syed, SNA has uses terrorism as a primary tactic in its quest for Sindhi Independence.

Social Democratic Front of Tripura (SDFT): a Tripura separatist organization and splinter of NLFT, possibly founded during the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura, although rumored as having more to do with organized crime. SDFT is no longer active.

Socialist Party of National Liberation-Provisional: see Partit Socialista d’Alliberament Nacional-provisional

Somali Coast Liberation Front: see Front for the Liberation of the French Somali Coast

Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM): founded by Riak Machar in 1991 as a breakaway faction of SPLA. Although it moved towards secession from Sudan, in 1996 SSIM signed the Sudanese Peace Pact, subsequently integrating with Sudanese forces to form the Southern Sudan Defense Force (SSDF).

Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR): founded by Arbi Barayev in Russia in 1996. Its goal is to establish an independent Chechen Islamic state.

Sri Nakharo: founded in 2001 as a splinter of Mujahideen Pattani, active in northern Malaysia and southern Thailand, its goal is to establish an independent Malay state of Pattani, but appears inactive since 2001.

Sudan Liberation Army (SLA): see Sudanese Liberation Movement

Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA): also known Sudan People's Liberation Movement; an ethnic-Dinka movement founded by John Garang in 1983, in opposition to Sudanese enforcement of Sharia law, waging a military campaign as well as committing terrorism, its goal was to unite and democratize Sudan. In 1991, a faction broke off to form SSIM,
and by 2005, SPLA recognized a peace agreement and now works as a political organization.

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement: see Sudan People’s Liberation Army

Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM): also known as Sudan Liberation Army (SLA): formed in the Sudan in 2003 as a continuation of the DLF and led by Mini Arkoi Minawi, SLM replaced DLF separatism in favor of democratization.

Sword of Islam: founded around 1998 by Chechen separatists, its goal was to liberate Chechnya and establish an Islamic state but has been inactive since 2001.

Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO): also known as Tamil Liberation Organization; founded Sri Lanka in 1974 by Selvarajah Yogachandran and Nadarajah Thangathurai, its goal was to establish an independent Tamil state. In the late 1980s, LTTE killed most of the TELO, leading to its disintegration.

Tamil Liberation Organization: see Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization

Tamil New Tigers: founded in 1972 by Sri Lankan separatists, its goal was to establish an independent Tamil state, Tamil Eelam. In 1976, it became the LTTE.

Tantra Jihad Islam (TJI): founded in Thailand in 1993 by factionalized members of BRN and PULO, little information about them is available, TJI likely shares BRN’s and PULO’s goal of establishing an independent Pattani state in southern Thailand and northern Malaysia.

Tanzim, “Organization:” founded in Israel in 1993 by Marwan Barghouti and other factionalized members opposed to the autocratic control of al-Fatah, it pursues Palestinian liberation while opposing the Palestinian Authority (PA).

Tehrik Ul-Furqaan: see Jaish-e-Mohammed

Terra Lliure (TL), “Free Land:” also known as Terra Uivre; founded during the 1970s in Spain by Catalan separatists. TL has been inactive since the 1990s.

Terra Uivre: see Terra Lliure

Terrorist Group of Assam: see Bodo Liberation Tigers

The Federated Niger Delta Izon Communities: an Ijaw separatist organization founded in Nigeria in 1998, the Ijaw movement is pursuing self-determination and sovereignty over Ijawland the Niger-Delta.

The Islamic Resistance: see Hezbollah

Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC): founded in 1970 by Sonam Topgyal, Tenzin Geyche Tethong, Tenzin N. Tethong, and Lodi G. Gyari, TYC is an international organization seeking Tibetan independence from China. TYC began using terrorism in 1977, although it is not their primary focus, and it is unclear whether they still use violence.

Tripura Humkurai Sepoy (THS): a Tripura separatist organization and splinter of NLFT, possibly founded during the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura, although rumored as having more to do with organized crime. THS is no longer active.

Tripura Liberation Organization (TLO): a Tripura separatist organization founded in India in 1992 as a splinter of ATTF, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura but is no longer active.

Tripura Lion Force (TLF): a Tripura separatist organization and splinter of ATTF, possibly founded during the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura, although rumored as having
more to do with organized crime. TLF no longer exists.

Tripura National Army (TNA): a Tripura separatist organization and splinter of ATTF, possibly founded during the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura, although rumored as having more to do with organized crime. TNA no longer exists.

Tripura National Liberation Front (TNLF): a Tripura separatist organization and splinter of NLFT, likely founded during the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura, although rumored as having more to do with organized crime. TNLF is no longer active.

Tripura National Sengkrak Force (TNSF): a Tripura separatist organization and splinter of NLFT, possibly founded during the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura, although rumored as having more to do with organized crime. TNSF is no longer active.

Tripura National Volunteer Force (TNV): see Tripura National Volunteers

Tripura National Volunteers (TNV): also known as Tripura National Volunteer Force (TNVF); a Tripura separatist organization originally founded in India by Amra Bengali in 1978, revived by Bijoy Harankhwal in 1982, and also thought to have been revitalized in 1999, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura.

Tripura National Volunteers (TNV): founded by B. K. Hrangkhawal in India in 1978, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura but disintegrated in the 1980s; many members joined other Tripura movements.

Tripura Regimental Force (TRF): a Tripura separatist organization and splinter of NLFT, possibly founded during the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura, although rumored as having more to do with organized crime. TRF is no longer active.

Tripura Resurrection Army (TRA): a Tripura separatist organization founded in India in 1994 by Dhananjay Reang, a former leader of TNV and NLFT, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura but surrendered to authorities in 1997.

Tripura Tribal Action Committee Force (TTACF): a Tripura separatist organization and splinter of NLFT, possibly founded during the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura, although rumored as having more to do with organized crime. TTACF is no longer active.

Tripura Tribal Democratic Force (TTDF): a Tripura separatist organization and splinter of NLFT, possibly founded during the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura, although rumored as having more to do with organized crime. TTDF is no longer active.

Tripura Tribal Volunteer Force (TTVF): a Tripura separatist organization and splinter of NLFT, founded around 1995, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura but disintegrated in the 1980s; many members joined other Tripura movements.
of an independent state of Tripura, although rumored as having more to do with organized crime. TTVF is no longer active.

Tripura Tribal Youth Force (TTYF): a Tripura separatist organization and splinter of ATTF, possibly founded during the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura, although rumored as having more to do with organized crime. TTYF no longer exists.

Tripura Young Rifle (TYR): a Tripura separatist organization and splinter of ATTF, possibly founded during the 1990s, its goal was the liberation of the tribal areas in northeastern India and creation of an independent state of Tripura, although involved with organized crime. TYR no longer exists.

True IRA: see Oglaih Na hEireann

United Front for the Independence of Pattani: see Barisan Bersatu Merdeka Pattani

United Liberation Front of Asom: see United Liberation Front of Assam

United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA): also known as United Liberation Front of Asom: formed in 1979 in Assam, India, its goal is to establish an independent communist state in northeastern India.

United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF): founded by Chittagong separatists in Bangladesh in 1998, comprising members of the Hill Women’s Federation, Hill People's Council, and Hill Student Council, and has links to PCJSS, its goal is to gain independence in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS): founded in 1999 by Assam separatists, primarily comprising the Karbi tribe, it seeks to establish a sovereign tribal state in northeastern India.

Ushtria Clirimtare E Koseves (UCK): see Kosovo Liberation Army

Warring Ijaw Youths: see Egbesu Boys

Yaketi Nishtimani Kurdistan (PUK), “Patriotic Union of Kurd:” formed in 1975 as a splinter group of the KDP, its goal was to establish a sovereign Kurdish state. PUK is now a legitimate political organization in Iraq.

Yoruba O'dua Peoples’ Congress: see Odua People's Congress

Young Liberators of Pattani: established around 2002 in Thailand, its goal is an independent Malay state of Pattani but appears inactive since 2002.

* Groups seeking autonomy are not included in the dependent variable; however, this glossary includes the descriptions of some autonomy seeking groups whose information pertains to movements included in the dependent variable.
## APPENDIX C: Countries and Minority Populations

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