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When Insurgents Go Terrorist: The Role of Foreign Support in the Adoption of Terrorism

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WHEN INSURGENTS GO TERRORIST: THE ROLE OF FOREIGN SUPPORT IN THE ADOPTION OF TERRORISM

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

By

JEFFREY F. FOURMAN
B. A., University of Dayton, 2004

2014
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I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Jeffrey F. Fourman ENTITLED When Insurgents Go Terrorist: The Role of Foreign Support in the Adoption of Terrorism BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

Fourman, Jeffrey F. M.A., International Comparative Politics Program, Wright State University, 2013. When Insurgents Go Terrorist: The Role of Foreign Support in the Adoption of Terrorism

What role does foreign support play when an insurgent group adopts terrorism? Utilizing both quantitative analysis and in-depth case studies, this thesis examines the effects of foreign support among other commonly cited explanations for an insurgency’s adoption of terrorism. In addition to observing the effects of foreign support on the adoption of terrorism, the effects of government regime type, insurgent group goal type, insurgent group strength, and foreign benefactor type are analyzed. After executing a multiple logistic regression analysis of 109 intrastate conflicts occurring from 1972 to 2007 and conducting detailed case studies for the Tamils in Sri Lanka and the Kurds in Iraq, this thesis concludes that specific types of foreign support from non-state actors not only make insurgent groups significantly stronger but also make them more likely to adopt terrorism thus calling into question the weapon of the weak argument.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I. WHEN INSURGENTS GO TERRORIST</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature Review</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conceptualizing Terrorism</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>III. MULTIPLE LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of Variables and Inferential Statistics</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis Testing</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion of Quantitative Analysis</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IV. THE SRI Lankan TAMILS: GOING TERRORIST IN A TROPICAL PARADISE</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Seeds of Insurgency:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Conflict and Self-Determination in Sri Lanka</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belligerents and Allies in a Paradise Lost</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Insurgency to Terrorism</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. THE KURDS IN IRAQ: DIVISION AND SELF-DETERMINATION

Introduction........................................................................................................................................122
The Seeds of Insurgency: An Oil-Soaked Powder Keg.................................................................123
Belligerents and Allies in the Struggle for Kurdish Autonomy....................................................128
From Insurgency to Terrorism........................................................................................................133
Conclusion........................................................................................................................................151

VI. CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF FOREIGN SUPPORT?

Introduction........................................................................................................................................155
Analysis of Results............................................................................................................................156
Areas for Additional Future Research............................................................................................163
Conclusion and Policy Implications..............................................................................................168

VII. BIBLIOGRAPHY.........................................................................................................................173

VIII. APPENDIX A

Insurgent Groups Participating in Intrastate Conflicts.................................................................185

IX. APPENDIX B

Cases Missing Valid Input for at Least One Independent Variable............................................189

X. APPENDIX C

Cases Missing Valid Input for Used Terrorism Dummy C Variable............................................190
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1 – First Terrorist Attacks Committed by Tamil Insurgent Groups against Military or Civilian Targets</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 – First Terrorist Attacks Committed by Tamil Insurgent Groups against Civilian Targets</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3 – Tamil Insurgency Troop Levels</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4 – Sri Lankan Troop Levels</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5 – Territorial Claims Made by the Tamil Insurgency</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 – First Terrorist Attacks Committed by Iraqi Kurd Insurgent Groups</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2 – Number of Terrorist Attacks Committed by Iraqi Kurd Insurgent Groups Compared to Iraq’s Polity IV Score</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3 – Territorial Claims Made by the Kurdish Insurgency</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

Table                                                                                       Page

3.1 – Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis Results for the
      Adoption of Terrorism by an Insurgent Group……………….57

3.2 – Comparison of Model Predictability.............................................................................58

4.1 – Causal Relationships between Independent Variables and
      the Adoption of Terrorism by the Tamil Insurgency..............116

5.1 – Causal Relationships between Independent Variables and
      the Adoption of Terrorism by the Iraqi Kurds.................152

A.1 – Insurgent Groups Participating in Conflicts that
      Start and End During the Cold War .........................185

A.2 – Insurgent Groups Participating in Conflicts that
      Start after the Cold War.................................186

A.3 – Insurgent Groups Participating in Conflicts that
      Start During the Cold War and End After the Cold War........188

B.1 – Cases Missing Valid Input for at Least One Independent Variable...............189

C.1 – Cases Missing Valid Input for
      Used Terrorism Dummy C Variable................................190
Chapter One
The Role of Foreign Support in the Adoption of Terrorism?

Introduction

Contrary to popular belief, terrorism is not a modern phenomenon, and unfortunately there is no shortage of cases to study throughout history where insurgent groups adopted terrorism. Likewise, insurgent groups throughout history have also received external support of differing levels from different types of actors. However, the role that foreign support plays in an insurgent group’s adoption of terrorism is largely understudied within the body of research concerning the causes of terrorism which focuses on the debate between the strategic logic of terrorism versus the social and psychological explanations of terrorism. This begs the question, why do some insurgents adopt terrorism and not others, and what role does foreign support play in that decision among the other factors more commonly considered?

The role of foreign support and its impact on the dynamics between local populations and insurgents is understudied. Drawing upon the assumptions of tripartite warfare laid forth by Richard Betts (2002), asymmetric conflict is as much a battle for the support of local populations as it is a military endeavor. Moreover, insurgents should be less likely to seek out or accept foreign support when they can achieve their goals with the level of local support afforded. Consequently, when insurgent groups receive foreign support, it is logical to assume they are less accountable to the local population and
possibly more likely to accept civilian casualties in pursuit of their goals. Therefore, this thesis hypothesizes that insurgent groups who enjoy foreign support are more likely to adopt terrorism compared to insurgent groups that do not receive foreign support.

Although terrorism may have roots in guerrilla warfare, there is a line that separates the two concepts that often gets blurry when insurgents deliberately attack civilian targets. This blurry line between terrorism and guerilla warfare is a large contributor to the contested nature of terrorism as a concept, and the research and conclusions of this thesis are subject to the limitations of one’s conception of terrorism. As more fully explained in chapter two, this thesis defines terrorism as violence or the threat of violence generally directed against civilian targets by a group or individual that is calculated to create fear and alarm and is intended to coerce a political outcome.

When an insurgent group adopts terrorism, there must be a point when they weigh the costs and benefits of attacking military versus civilian targets and decide that it is in their best interest to attack the latter. This decision is the pivotal point that transforms freedom fighters into terrorists. The purpose of this study is not to make an attempt at explaining all instances of terrorism, and it is not meant to develop an all-encompassing theory to explain why terrorism occurs. Rather, this study focuses on instances of terrorism that insurgent groups commit when involved in asymmetric conflicts against their domestic governments. Within the context of such asymmetric conflict, the purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of the role that foreign support plays when insurgent groups decide to adopt terrorism.

This introductory chapter proceeds with a literature review of the available scholarship concerning the causes of terrorism and the provision of foreign support for
insurgent groups. Chapter two outlines this study’s research design which takes advantage of both quantitative analysis and two qualitative in-depth case studies. Chapter three presents the results of the quantitative analysis, and chapters four and five present the research conducted on the case studies of the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka and the Kurds in Iraq respectively. Finally, chapter six compares the results of the quantitative and qualitative research and draws final conclusions in reference to the combined findings of this thesis and the prevailing theories on the causes of terrorism.

**Literature Review**

The literature on the causes of terrorism is split between those adhering to the strategic logic of terrorism and those arguing in favor of social-psychological theories to explain terrorism. Few, if any, pieces of literature address the presence of foreign support in asymmetric conflicts as it relates to constraining or encouraging influences on the adoption of terrorism. The strategic logic of terrorism, or the “Strategic Model” as termed by Robert Pape, looks at the outcomes of insurgent and terrorist campaigns as the dependent variable and assumes that the decision to adopt terrorism is based on evidence that doing so will help the group achieve their political goals. On the other hand, the social-psychological explanations focus more on the motivation of individuals to join the ranks of terrorist organizations. The following literature review first compares and contrasts the leading scholarship among the competing theories about the causes of terrorism, culls some basic themes concerning constraining influences on an insurgent group, and concludes by reviewing the literature on foreign support for insurgent groups.
While acknowledging that underlying social and political preconditions make terrorism a possibility, Martha Crenshaw (1981) believes that insurgent groups make the strategic decision to adopt terrorism based on a logical analysis of the perceived situation and available means. Crenshaw describes the transition from insurgency to terrorism as “an organization’s decision that it (terrorism) is a politically useful means to oppose a government” (Crenshaw 385). Crenshaw also cites the existence of concrete grievances among a sub-national group where the government is singled out for blame as a direct cause of terrorism as well as the lack of opportunity for political participation as motivation for terrorism (Crenshaw 383-384).

Crenshaw also describes the preconditions that lead to the adoption of terrorism as factors that “set the stage for terrorism over the long run” (Crenshaw 381). Crenshaw describes modernization and its sophisticated networks of transportation and communication as creating opportunities and providing a means for terrorist operations (Crenshaw 381). Closely related, she also cites urbanization as a permissive factor that “increases the number and accessibility of targets and methods” (Crenshaw 382). Moreover, Crenshaw claims that a government’s inability or unwillingness to prevent terrorism is “the most salient political factor in the category of permissive causes,” suggesting that only extremely repressive regimes can completely prevent terrorism (Crenshaw 382).

Among some of the remaining permissive factors that enable terrorism, Ted Gurr (1968) agrees with Crenshaw that “social facilitation” and the coerciveness of a government plays a very important role in the use of violence by groups who oppose the
government. While Gurr does not specifically refer to the use of violence against civilian targets, he does suggest that civil strife is more likely to turn violent when there are facilitating factors such as past civil strife to set precedence for the justification of violence (Gurr 1106). Crenshaw expands on social facilitation as a factor and claims that social myths, historical traditions, and habits permit the development of terrorism as an established political custom (Crenshaw 382). As for the coercive potential of a government to prevent violence, Gurr advances a curvilinear correlation between civil strife and the coercive potential of the government where moderate levels of coerciveness are most likely to produce civil strife and therefore more likely to result in the use of violence (Gurr 1105). Similar to Gurr, other scholars examine the relationship between regime type and the use of violence by dissenting groups as a curvilinear relationship where violent dissent (Moore, 2000) and terrorism (Findley and Young, 2011) is least likely to occur in the most authoritarian and the most democratic regimes.

Other scholars debate the relationship between terrorism and democracy. Robert Pape (2010) claims that “the strategic logic of terrorism is specifically designed to coerce modern democracies to make significant concessions to self-determination” (Pape 344). However, F. Gregory Gause (2005) dismisses the causal effect of regime type on the existence of terrorism where he claims,

> The data available do not show a strong relationship between democracy and an absence of or a reduction in terrorism. Terrorism appears to stem from factors much more specific than regime type. Nor is it likely that democratization (*in the Middle East*) would end the current campaign against the United States (Gause 62).
In addition, Sara Jackson Wade and Dan Reiter (2007) expand on Pape’s dichotomous analysis of regime type and discover that while there is no relationship between regime type and suicide terrorism for states without religiously distinct minorities at risk, there is “some statistical significance” between increased terrorist activity and states categorized as free (democracies) or partly free (mixed regimes) as they gain more religiously distinct minorities at risk (Wade and Reiter 344). Quan Li (2005) takes an even closer examination of the dynamics between regime type and terrorism by disaggregating the measurement of democracy into its individual institutional characteristics (constraints on the executive branch, voter participation, etc.), and he finds that the “distinct institutional characteristics of democratic polity produce different effects on transnational terrorism” (Li 280). In her recent research, Erica Chenoweth (2010) finds that political competition within democratic countries can motivate groups of various ideologies to commit terrorism in an effort to compete for limited political influence among a plethora of competing interests.

Numerous other scholars also cite the coercive power of terrorism and the strategic advantage that insurgents gain when they are in an asymmetric conflict regardless of regime type. In Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars (1975), Andrew Mack argues that the actors’ relative resolve of their interest in an asymmetric conflict determines the outcome of the conflict. This “interest asymmetry” theory assumes that insurgents can coerce a large state if the state’s resolve to win is not closely tied to their national interest (Mack 194). Likewise, Robert Cassidy (2003) also agrees with the interest asymmetry theory. Using the Russian experience in both Chechnya and Afghanistan as an example, Cassidy explains:
On the one hand, the qualitatively or quantitatively inferior opponent fights with limited means for unlimited strategic objectives—indeed. On the other hand, the qualitatively or quantitatively superior opponent fights with potentially unlimited means for limited ends—the maintenance of some peripheral imperial territory or outpost (Cassidy 4).

While Cassidy addresses the interaction of the objectives between asymmetric opponents and their likely outcomes, the cases that he highlights also begs the question of whether the type of goals that an insurgency has plays a role in the group’s decision to adopt terrorism. Additional research may help determine whether insurgents with separatist goals are more or less likely to adopt terrorism compared to insurgent groups who are fighting for control of the central government.

Ivan Arreguin-Toft (2001) also agrees with Mack where he claims that guerrilla warfare and terrorism hold coercive power and are adopted by insurgents for strategic purposes (Arreguin-Toft 100). However, he takes the analysis of adopted strategies and their resulting outcomes a step further. He classifies the possible strategies of the larger force as either a “direct attack” or as “barbarism” and classifies the strategies of the insurgents as either “direct defense” or “guerrilla warfare strategy” (Arreguin-Toft 100). By categorizing the strategy of both sides, he explains the outcome of asymmetric conflicts through the interaction between the opposing sides’ strategies. He claims that when a stronger state actor employs a strategy that is opposite from the strategy of the weaker insurgency, the stronger actor is more likely to lose the interaction (Arreguin-Toft 110).

Bruce Hoffman (2009) also agrees with Arreguin-Toft’s strategic interaction theory, and he offers the following three variables that determine the stronger side’s
ability to match the strategic method of the insurgency: the adaptability of the stronger force, the ability of the stronger power to counter the ideology of the weaker, and the intelligence that the stronger power has on the weaker (Hoffman 371). In reference to U.S. counterinsurgency and counterterrorism initiatives in recent decades, Hoffman concludes:

The effectiveness of U.S. strategy will be based on our capacity to think like a networked enemy, in anticipation of how they may act in a variety of situations, aided by different resources (Hoffman 372).

In very similar terms, John Arquilla (2001) explains the strategic advantage that insurgents gain when adopting terrorism. Arquilla claims that insurgents adopt terrorism because it provides the following three tactical advantages: surprise attack capability, small unit adaptive tactics, and intelligence-counterintelligence capability (Arquilla 382). The strategic interaction theory is clearly inherent to Arquilla’s discussion of tactical advantage.

Hy Rothstein (2007) offers the “inverse interest asymmetry theory” as an alternative to Mack’s interest asymmetry theory. While still within the Strategic Model framework, the inverse interest asymmetry theory argues that the more attention that the stronger side gives to an asymmetric conflict, the more restrained, less adaptable, and less likely they are to win (Rothstein 292). The basic premise of Rothstein’s theory is that smaller contingents of the more powerful force are less restrained, more adaptable, and more dedicated to defeating an insurgency when the full attention of their government, the media, and public are not present. This theory seems to also reinforce Arreguiun-Toft’s strategic interaction theory where less attention allows the larger force to adapt and
employ tactics similar to their smaller adversary and thus increasing the chances of success for the larger side.

In addition, Crenshaw describes how weaker and smaller groups are more likely to adopt terrorism compared to larger more powerful mass movements. Crenshaw explains:

Perhaps terrorism is most likely to occur precisely where mass passivity and elite dissatisfaction coincide. Discontent is not generalized or severe enough to provoke the majority of the populace to action against the regime, yet a small minority, without access to the bases of power that would permit over-throw of the government through coup d' tat or subversion, seeks radical change (Crenshaw 384).

While there are numerous variations, the underlying assumption of all of the Strategic Model arguments is that the weaker the insurgent group is, the more likely they are to adopt terrorism. Essentially, terrorism is the weapon of the weak according to adherents of the Strategic Model.

*Social and Psychological Motivation*

In opposition to the Strategic Model, many scholars downplay the utility of terrorism at the aggregate level and place more emphasis on the social and psychological motivation of foot soldiers to join the ranks of terrorist organizations. Although Marc Sagman (2004) loosely makes a connection between the strategic level and the psychological level, he provides much more support for a social-psychological explanation of terrorism, and he is often cited by other proponents who emphasize the social and psychological causes of terrorism. Usually, those who support these explanations believe that socially isolated individuals join terrorist organizations for the
benefit of in-group acceptance and to gain a better sense of identity among a group of peers. Social-psychological theories manifest in many studies that describe dependent variables at the individual and group levels of analysis such as radicalization, joining a terrorist group, or likelihood to become a terrorist.

Max Abrahms (2006) is perhaps the most ardent supporter of the social-psychological explanation, and he makes a statistical argument to refute the strategic value of terrorism and deduces that terrorism is an ineffective instrument of coercion given its very low success rate in achieving its political goals (Abrahms 42). Therefore, he concludes that terrorism cannot be a rational strategic choice to accomplish the goals of terrorist organizations (Abrahms 44). Abrahms (2004) directly challenges the Strategic Model and argues in support of a “natural systems model” where “individuals participate in terrorist organizations not to achieve their political platforms, but to develop affection with fellow terrorists” (Abrahms 96).

Reconciling the Strategic and Social-Psychological Theories

Other scholars place the social acceptance theories within the context of a larger more deliberate process that exploits preexisting political grievances to build primary group cohesion in order to transform potential terrorists into actual terrorists (Pape, 2010; Grossman, 1995). For both Pape and Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, primary group cohesion is the key to building an effective fighting force, and this concept applies to insurgent and terrorist organizations as much as it does to regular infantry (Pape 60; Grossman 160-161). Pape describes the process as “explaining the black swans,” or the rare instances of suicide attackers. According to Pape, the process starts with filtering where small groups of individuals come together around common interests such as
religious discussion, athletics, or other social programs. Next, the individuals discover that they share deep anger over specific political issues. Eventually, the anger over the political issues becomes the basis for continued social interaction, and their interactions with members outside the group are reduced to the point that they are cut away from mainstream society. Finally, an event such as another terrorist attack inspires the small group of radicals to commit their own act of terrorism (Pape 60). Grossman further explains the cutting off phase more specifically as one of isolation from members outside the primary group, instruction in the form of military training and conditioning, and indoctrination of radical grievances and ideology (Grossman 233). Of note, neither Pape nor Grossman indicate that the social acceptance process and the Strategic Model are mutually exclusive.

Some scholars reconcile the two schools of thought concerning the causes of terrorism by arguing the Strategic Model applies to the organizational level whereas the social-psychological theories apply to the individual level of analysis (Arquilla, 2001; Robinson, 2007; Chenoweth et al., 2009). Although Arquilla’s study focuses more on the strategic value of terrorism, he reconciles the competing theories by explaining the outcome of asymmetric conflict in terms of the strategic interaction theory while also placing emphasis on the need to dissuade potential terrorists from joining the cause in the first place. Arquilla’s following passage explains:

It seems clear to all that the Long War [The Global War on Terror] cannot be won by strictly military means. Even if the enemies of the terrorists 'transform' their field forces to improve the effectiveness of the hider-finder campaign—and this is worth doing—decisive victory will only come when potential terrorist
recruits are dissuaded from joining the cause, and persuaded that their own
sacrifices are likely to be for naught (Arquilla 384).

Glenn Robinson (2007) also blends the Strategic Model and the social-
psychological explanation with a case study on the Iraqi insurgency. He focuses on Islam
as the independent variable and suggests that an Islamic insurgent group exists for one of
the following three purposes: resistance, reform, or revolution (Robinson 271). Robinson
measures the violence and durability of different Islamic groups that fall into each
category and concludes that the level of nationalism within a group combined with the
observance of Muslim tradition determines the durability and success of the group when
they face an asymmetrically larger opponent (Robinson 272).

Local Support and Restraining Influence

Interestingly, a key theme among all of the social-psychological explanations is
the need to isolate recruits from mainstream society to make indoctrination possible.
This suggests that local populations hold a restraining influence over would be terrorists.
Furthermore, this also suggests that the mass majority of local populations do not support
the adoption of terrorism even when they have parallel political grievances.

Crenshaw (1981) touches on this dynamic of guerilla warfare in her conclusions
about terrorism as does Richard Betts (2002) in his explanation of “tripartite war” where
insurgent groups and the governments they oppose compete for the support of the local
population. Betts describes how insurgents use stealth and the cover of civilian society to
attack enemy targets, and how they “melt back into civilian society” after an attack (Betts
28). According to Betts, the cover of civilian society is central to the success of a guerilla
campaign, and he also suggests that guerilla warfare and terrorism “overlap a great deal
in their operational characteristics” and the “tactical logic of guerilla operations
resembles that in terrorist attacks” (Betts 28). Where Betts’ theory of tripartite warfare
assumes that insurgents are dependent on the continued support of local populations,
Crenshaw cites passivity among a civilian population as a requirement for terrorism to
occur (Crenshaw 384).

Although there appears to be little scholarly work examining the constraining
norms that a civilian population places on insurgents, the premise of tripartite warfare
assumes that passivity and local support of an insurgent group is contingent. If the level
of popular support for an insurgent group can change depending on circumstance, it
seems reasonable that insurgent groups will lose popular support if they commit terrorist
attacks that kill civilians within the population from which they derive their strength. In
this respect, local populations hold insurgent groups accountable for their actions, and
insurgents should be less likely to adopt terrorist tactics to achieve their goals when they
enjoy strong local support. It appears that further research is necessary to uncover factors
that might contribute to or diminish local support for insurgent groups.

The Role of Foreign Support

Much of the research on terrorism mentioned thus far examines the causes of
terrorism through a Strategic Model or a social-psychological lens, but very little is
mentioned about the impact of foreign support on an insurgent group’s decision to adopt
terrorism. This seems peculiar because asymmetric warfare seldom occurs in a vacuum,
and it is very possible that the level and type of foreign influence on an insurgency could
have a determining effect on the adoption of terrorism. Although not directly in
reference to a broader insurgency, Alex P. Schmid (2004) states:
Support for local terrorist groups has been utilised (sic) as a war-by-proxy device by states unwilling or unable to engage directly in armed conflict with another state (Schmid 199).

Several authors have also contributed to the conceptualization of foreign support. Hoffman describes foreign support as providing training, strategic advice, sanctuary, development of financial sources, and arms (Hoffman 364). Robinson focuses more on the individual contributions of foreign support and cites statistics on the presence of “foreign fighters” among Iraqi insurgents (Robinson 270). Abrahms refers to “jihadists” as using Chechen territory as a safe haven (Abrahms 64). Daniel Byman (2001) lists numerous types of foreign support including safe haven and transit, financial resources, political support and propaganda, direct military support, training, weapons, ammunition, food, fuel, provision of foreign fighters, intelligence, organizational aid, and inspiration (Byman et al.). Idean Salehyan, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David Cunningham (2011) also provide a typology for foreign support that labels each type of support as either tacit or explicit. They describe tacit support as “expressing sympathy or solidarity with the insurgents,” and they describe explicit support as direct “support of the insurgency through material resources, funding, supplies, supplying foreign fighters, and so on” (Salehyan et al. 724).

It is reasonably assumed that different types of foreign support impact an insurgency’s dependence on local populations at different levels. Therefore, to develop a more complete model for the impact of foreign support on the adoption of terrorism, it is required to also examine the type of foreign support that an insurgent group receives. Byman (2001) examines each type of support in light of the insurgents’ requirements that
it satisfies and categorizes it as critical, valuable, or minor. Although Byman does not provide specific definitions for each category of support beyond providing some examples for each, we can safely assume that critical support fulfills the most important requirements of the insurgency that could determine whether an insurgency ultimately achieves their goal or not. Byman places safe haven and transit, financial resources, political support, propaganda, and direct military support within the critical category.

Valuable support appears to fulfill the necessary requirements that sustain an insurgency including training, weapons, and other material such as ammunition, food, and fuel.

Finally, Byman places foreign fighters, intelligence, organizational aid, and inspiration into the minor support category (Byman et al.).

The existing body of research on insurgency and terrorism does not form a consensus on the impact of specific types of foreign support. For example, scholars hotly debate the role of foreign fighters in places like Iraq, Chechnya, and Afghanistan. Some point to the significance of the large number of foreign fighters captured in Iraq during the years after the collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime (Sagman, 2004; Simons and Tucker, 2007; Robinson, 2007). Robinson cites no less than seven different nationalities that were represented in the Iraqi insurgency (Robinson 270). However, Abrahms largely dismisses the significance of foreign influence on insurgencies as he describes its impact as “exaggerated” in the case of Chechnya (Abrahms 64). Byman’s categorization of foreign fighters as “minor support” appears to agree with Abrahms’ assessment.

Hoffman, on the other hand, cites interviews with U.S. Military officers at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan who describe foreign influence in that country as “actively fomenting, assisting, and participating in the (terrorist) attacks” and acting “primarily as a
force multiplier” (Hoffman 363). However, both Hoffman and Abrahms fall short of testing these assertions and only include them in their work as a means to highlight policy suggestions or to describe the nature of the operating environment.

Synthesizing the assessments on foreign support with the assumptions of tripartite warfare, I hypothesize that when foreign support comes in the form of indirect passive support such as moral support, diplomatic recognition, intelligence, or sanctions against the opposing regime, the insurgents retain their material dependency on the local populations and are less likely to adopt terrorism. However, when foreign support comes in the form of direct material support such as training, safe-havens, direct funding, weapons, and manpower, the insurgents become less dependent on the local population and more likely to commit acts of terrorism to achieve their goals.

Publicity for an insurgency’s cause is also a commonly cited goal for groups who cross the line into terrorism, and it is possible that the prospects of future foreign support could be a motivating factor for some insurgent groups to commit their first act of terrorism. This is important to note because this suggests that even the prospects of future foreign support could drive an insurgent group over the edge to commit terrorism, and the time series between the provision of foreign support and the act of terrorism may not be perfectly linear. Salehyan et al. (2011) propose that foreign actors are more likely to support insurgent groups that demonstrate competence in fighting the government. They explain, “Rebel organizations that have strong central leadership to coordinate action will be more attractive partners” (Salehyan et al. 7). Therefore, if insurgent groups are capable of demonstrating their ability to coordinate a media grabbing terror attack, they are more likely to demonstrate to foreign sympathizers that they are a capable
partner. This contradicts the linear logic of the “weapon of the weak” argument and also emphasizes the need to examine the specific components of insurgent strength such as central leadership in more detail.

Paul Staniland (2012) recently completed a study on how material resources influence the behavior of insurgent groups with different underlying social bases and leadership networks. He concludes that the pre-existing social network that an insurgent group is built upon determines whether the group degenerates into criminal behavior when they receive an influx of external support (Staniland 142). His theory claims that when insurgent groups are formed around overlapping social bases that integrate leaders and local communities, they are more assimilated and can manage their resource flows more effectively to improve their fighting power and internal control (Staniland 143). However, when overlapping social bases are not present and leadership is not integrated into local networks, an influx in resources can lead to criminal and “thuggish” behavior (Staniland 143).

Staniland’s study gives some insight into how organizations may be more or less successful in controlling resources, but he falls short of describing the specific nature of the insurgent’s criminality. He never specifies the adoption of terrorism by an insurgent group as an outcome, and it is not clear whether he would include terrorism within his description of what he calls “thuggish behavior.” Moreover, he cites Hezbollah among his list of highly effective and well controlled groups (as opposed to “thuggish” groups) who are “disciplined, politicized, and ruthlessly committed” (Staniland 146).

When local dependency constraints are lifted as a result of receiving foreign support, it is possible that those constraints are replaced by similar constraints imposed
by an external support base. Byman explains that excessive reliance on foreign assistance can undercut an insurgent group’s virtues and diminish the capabilities of a guerilla movement (Byman et al.). Therefore, foreign support alone is not likely to remove all constraints on an insurgent group’s freedom to adopt specific tactics, nor does it necessarily strengthen the insurgency.

A closer examination of the type of foreign benefactor should help predict what constraints are placed on an insurgent beneficiary. Whereas a state actor is more likely to constrain an insurgent group’s use of terrorism for fear of being labeled a state sponsor of terrorism, a non-state actor may not feel the same pressure to conform to international norms. Byman claims that accepting foreign support from non-state actors such as a diaspora or refugee population “carries few risks for insurgencies, even though the type of support these actors can provide is limited” (Byman et al.). In another study on suicide bombers in Iraq, Mohammed Hafez (2007) explains how the “strategic and tactical diffusion” of innovative tactics including terrorist tactics can occur between non-state actors.

Still, it is widely known that there are some state actors who buck the trend and knowingly sponsor terrorism. Scholars are nearly unanimous in agreement that one reason why states sponsor terrorism is for the strategic purpose of indirectly confronting a rival state (Hoffman, 1998; Byman, 2005; Carter, 2012). Byman also contends that states knowingly sponsor terrorism to promote ideology abroad or to strengthen a leader’s internal state control. Taken together, when assessing the impact of foreign support on an insurgent group’s decision to use terrorist tactics, it is necessary to consider the type of actor providing the support and their motivations for doing so. In general, one can expect
that insurgent groups who receive foreign support primarily from external non-state actors are less likely to be constrained and more likely to adopt terrorist tactics than when receiving support from state actors. Furthermore, one should also expect to find that there are some states that do not constrain insurgent groups and might actively encourage terrorism against rival states making it more likely for their beneficiaries to cross the line into terrorism.

In summary, the literature on the causes of terrorism is divided between explanations that emphasize a Strategic Model on one side and arguments that emphasize the social-psychological factors or the “natural systems model” on the other side. There are many passing references to foreign support for insurgents in the literature, and there are some scholars who have dedicated whole studies to the impact of foreign support on insurgent groups. However, there are very few studies, if any, that specifically examine the impact of foreign support on an insurgent group’s decision to adopt terrorism. Given the vast amount of foreign aid that crosses borders and the renewed emphasis on combatting terrorism over the past decade, it is worth a closer look to determine if any correlations or causal relationships exist, which gives way to the design for executing such a study.
Chapter Two
Research Design and Methodology

Conceptualizing Terrorism

Because terrorism is a contested concept, a discussion about the definition of terrorism in relation to this study is required. Leading scholars on terrorism often disagree on a definition of terrorism. Arquilla provides a simple definition of terrorism as “deliberate attacks on non-combatants as a means of influencing the attitudes and actions of nations, leaders and their mass publics” (Arquilla 370). Alex P. Schmid and Albert Jongman define terrorism as “the use of violence by an organization other than a national government to cause intimidation or fear among a target audience” (Schmid and Jongman 28). Pape also uses this same definition in “The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism” (Pape 4). Schmid has several publications that study the problems with conceptualizing terrorism, and he argues that researchers should vary the definition of terrorism depending on the framework of the research (Alex 197). Drawing on Alex’s conclusion, Leonard Weinberg et al. (2004) conducted a survey of scholars to develop a general consensus definition of terrorism. They defined terrorism as “a politically motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the pursuit of publicity plays a significant role” (Weinberg et al. 786).

Emphasizing the divide between terrorism and conventional or guerilla warfare, Schmid claims that the “traditional distinguishing characteristics of the terrorist were his
explicit refusal to accept the conventional moral limits that defined military and guerrilla action” (Schmid 205). Therefore, it is important to include the element of deliberate attacks on civilians in a working definition of terrorism. Arquilla includes this distinction in his definition as do many other leading terrorism experts. However, others do not clearly make the explicit distinction between civilian and military targets. Bruce Hoffman (2006, 41) defines terrorism as “the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change.” He continues:

All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instill fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider “target audience” that might include rival ethnic or religious groups, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general. Terrorism is designed to create power where there is none or to consolidate power where there is little. Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or international scale.

For the purpose of this study, I used Hoffman’s working definition of terrorism for two reasons. First, it includes the elements present among most of the other leading scholars’ definitions. Second, it is the definition that the RAND Corporation uses to qualify an act of terrorism for inclusion in the RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorist Incidents (RDWTI), which my research uses as a basis for data on the use of terrorist
tactics by an insurgent group. The RAND Corporation summarizes Hoffman’s definition in their criteria to qualify terrorist incidents as containing the following key elements:

- Violence or the threat of violence
- Calculated to create fear and alarm
- Intended to coerce certain actions
- Motive must include a political objective
- Generally directed against civilian targets
- Can be a group or an individual

**Alternative Hypotheses**

Several hypotheses are drawn from the literature discussing foreign support for insurgent groups and the adoption of terrorism. The first three hypotheses are all drawn from the core assumptions of the Strategic Model which assumes that goals and constraints matter, and they address the adoption of terrorism based on particular types of goals and constraints:

- **H₁** – *An insurgent group is more likely to adopt terrorism when the government they oppose is a democracy.*

- **H₂** – *An insurgent group with separatist goals are more likely to adopt terrorism compared to an insurgent group with the goal to gain control of the central government.*

- **H₃** – *The weaker the insurgent group is, the more likely they are to adopt terrorist tactics.*

The fourth and fifth hypotheses deal with the heart of this study’s purpose of evaluating the impact of foreign support on an insurgent group’s decision to adopt terrorism. They build upon the conclusions of previous research examining foreign
support that falls short of answering the question of whether there is a relationship between foreign support and terrorism. Assuming that foreign support strengthens an insurgent group, the results of testing H₄ and H₅ will have strong implications for disproving H₃ given all other variables remain constant.

H₄ – Insurgent groups with foreign support are more likely to adopt terrorist tactics than insurgent groups without foreign support.

H₅ – Insurgent groups that receive material and direct foreign support are more likely to adopt terrorism than insurgent groups that receive only passive and indirect foreign support.

The sixth hypothesis addresses the characteristics of the foreign actor that provides support to the insurgent group as a possible factor in the likelihood for a group to adopt terrorism:

H₆ – Insurgent groups that receive foreign support primarily from an external non-state actor are more likely to use terrorist tactics than a group that receives foreign support primarily from a state actor.

The seventh and eighth hypotheses address the potential interactions that could occur between the level of foreign support received and the type of benefactor providing the external support to an insurgent group. The combined results of testing these two hypotheses could have implications concerning the potential constraining or encouraging influence that different types of foreign support and different benefactor types have on an insurgent group’s adoption of terrorism.
H₇ – Insurgent groups that receive direct material foreign support from state actors are more likely to adopt terrorism than insurgent groups who receive only indirect passive support from state actors.

H₈ – Insurgent groups that receive direct material foreign support from non-state actors are more likely to adopt terrorism than insurgent groups who receive only indirect and passive support from non-state actors.

Datasets

The unit of analysis for this study is an insurgent group involved in an intra-state conflict from the years 1972 to 2007. This study uses the Correlates of War (COW) Intra-State War Data (version 4.1) to identify insurgent groups involved in intra-state conflicts during the chosen timeframe. The new expanded version of the COW Intra-state War data (version 4.0 and later) sets the minimum requirement for a state to be considered a war participant at either 1,000 troops committed to the conflict or 100 battle-related deaths (Sarkees, 2007). For non-state actors to be considered a war participant, the minimum requirement is set much lower. A non-state actor needs to commit a minimum of 100 armed personnel to the conflict or suffer at least 25 battle-related deaths (Sarkees, 2007). The COW Intra-state War data includes three general categories of conflicts based on the status of the combatants: civil wars between the state and a non-state actor, regional internal wars between the government of a regional subunit and a non-state actor, and intercommunal wars among two or more non-state actors (Sarkees, 2007). Because this study is primarily concerned with asymmetric warfare between a national government and an opposing domestic insurgent group, I excluded communal conflicts between two sub-state armed groups from the data prior to
analysis. Therefore, this study includes a total of 99 individually identified insurgent groups who participated in a total of 109 separate conflicts. Of the 99 insurgent groups, there were four groups that participated in more than one conflict. It is worth noting that the complete list of conflicts in the COW dataset includes insurgent groups involved in conflicts dating back to 1817, but this study selects only the insurgent groups participating in conflicts beginning in the years 1972 to 2007 for the following reasons:

- It is necessary to control for the impact of the Cold War by providing a relatively proportional number of Cold War insurgencies compared to post Cold War insurgencies. The sample included data for 47 intra-state conflicts that began and ended during the Cold War (1972 through December 25, 1991), 48 conflicts that began after the Cold War (December 26, 1991 through 2007), and 14 conflicts that began during the Cold War but ended after the Cold War.

- Data is more likely to be accurate for more recent intra-state conflicts, and it is assumed that the coders of the COW dataset had better quality information available for more recent conflicts. This is evident in the conflict coding changes between versions 4.0 and 4.1 of the COW dataset. Of the 30 conflicts that were recoded from extra-state conflicts to intra-state conflicts between the two versions, only five conflicts occurred after 1971 with the last instance occurring in 1978.

- Finally, the primary data source from the RAND Corporation that I used to identify instances of terrorism begins in 1968.

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1 See Appendix A for a list of insurgent groups categorized into the three time periods.
2 The conflict in Colombia between the recognized Colombian government and the FARC is the sole instance in the intra-state war data of a case that began during the Cold War that is still ongoing. For the purposes of this study it is included among the groups that participated in conflicts that began during the Cold War and ended after the Cold War.
This thesis will use the RDWTI to identify terrorist incidents for the quantitative analysis portion of the study. Compared to other datasets that track terrorist activity such as the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the RDWTI is preferable to determine if a terrorist attack occurred within a conflict for several reasons. First, the RDWTI was compiled using a more conservative and more definitive definition of terrorism compared to the GTD. The RDWTI requires the motive for an attack to be political whereas the GTD allows the motive to be political, economic, religious, or social. Second, the RDWTI also requires an incident to both create fear and alarm and to coerce certain actions. However, the GTD definition requires an incident to contain only one element of either coercion, intimidation, or to “convey of some message to a larger audience” other than the immediate victims. Finally, the RDWTI definition states that an incident must generally be directed against civilian targets whereas the GTD definition requires the violent act to be “outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law” which is open to interpretation itself. The result of the GTD’s definition appears to be a more liberal labelling of incidents as terrorism which could impact the validity of coding for the adoption of terrorist tactics among the sample population of insurgent groups in this study. On the other hand, the RDWTI attribution of a terrorist incident is less open to interpretation because its definition is more specific.

For a number of reasons, the GTD is still a valuable tool to conduct research on specific conflicts, and this thesis will use it in conjunction with the RDWTI when analyzing the in-depth case studies. The GTD includes a greater number of incidents with only military targets compared to the RDWTI which focuses primarily on civilian
targets that caused casualties. The GTD also includes more failed or thwarted incidents than the RDWTI. Moreover, the GTD contains terrorist incidents that targeted other terrorist organizations. All of these items, while not completely in the scope of this study will help gain a better understanding of terrorist activity within a specific conflict and will allow for a better examination of the point at which specific insurgent groups adopted terrorism.

**Operationalizing and Coding Variables**

*Dependent Variable: Used Terrorist Tactics*

Coding for this study began by cross referencing each of the insurgent groups within the RDWTI that includes over 40,000 instances of terrorism covering the entire timeframe under study. I took the following steps to determine whether an insurgent group used terrorist tactics:

1. Beginning with the first intra-state conflict within the scope of this study from the COW data, I compared the country name to the RDWTI to compile a list of all terrorist incidents that occurred in that country.

2. I compared the dates of the conflict that appeared in the COW data to the list of terrorist incidents that occurred in the country to narrow the list of terrorist incidents for that country to only include incidents that occurred during the time of the conflict as listed in the COW data.

3. I compared the perpetrator of each terrorist incident that appeared in the narrowed list of incidents to the insurgent group identified in the COW data for the conflict and completed one of the following actions:
• If a clear match was made between the perpetrator identified in the RDWTI data and the insurgent group identified in the COW data, that instance of terrorism was attributed to the insurgent group and was coded as having *used terrorist tactics*. \(^3\)

• If there were no terrorist incidents that occurred within the country of conflict between the conflict start and end dates, the insurgent group listed in the COW data for that conflict was coded as *did not use terrorist tactics*.

• If the perpetrators remained undetermined after examining both the perpetrator and description columns in the RDWTI, the insurgent groups listed in the COW data for that conflict were coded as *possibly used terrorist tactics*.

4. I repeated steps one through three for each intra-state conflict included in this study until all insurgent groups involved in a conflict were coded as either *used terrorist tactics*, *did not use terrorist tactics*, or *possibly used terrorist tactics*.

Next, I created three dummy variables for the attribution of terrorism to an insurgent group. Each dummy variable was the dependent variable included in one of three pairs of Multiple Logistic Regression models as described later in the Quantitative Analysis section of this chapter. I titled the first dummy variable as *used terrorism dummy A*, the second dummy variable as *used terrorism dummy B*, and the third dummy variable as *used terrorism dummy C*.

I coded *used terrorism dummy A* by assigning the value of 1 to all insurgent groups that were previously coded as either *used terrorist tactics* or *possibly used terrorist tactics*.

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\(^3\) If a perpetrator is identified in the RDWTI, it appears in either the “Perpetrator” or “Description” column.
terrorist tactics, and I assigned the value of 0 to all insurgent groups that were previously coded as did not use terrorist tactics.

I coded used terrorism dummy B by assigning the value of 1 to all insurgent groups that were previously coded as used terrorist tactics, and I assigned the value of 0 to all insurgent groups that were previously coded as either did not use terrorist tactics or possibly used terrorist tactics.

I coded used terrorism dummy C by assigning the value of 1 to all insurgent groups that were previously coded as used terrorist tactics, and I assigned the value of 0 to all insurgent groups that were previously coded as did not use terrorist tactics. I did not assign a value to any insurgent groups that were previously coded as possibly used terrorist tactics because I removed those insurgent groups from the third statistical model.

Independent Variable 1: Regime Type

Regime type is the independent variable in the first hypothesis (H1) in this study. Pape (2010) uses only Freedom House’s Freedom in the World (FIW) database to operationalize regime type whereas other scholars (Bogaards, 2007; Wade and Reiter, 2007) include the Polity IV database when categorizing regime type. Although Matthijs Bogaards uses both databases, he warns that the FIW database was “not developed out of a theoretical understanding of democracy,” but simply because data was available under the headings of political and civil rights (Bogaards 1214). For my study, I used only the Polity IV database to categorize regime type because it was specifically developed to measure the level of democracy in a given state. Because this study is concerned with controlling for the regime type in general and not its’ individual components, I did not
disaggregate the Polity IV measurement into its attributes, and I used the regime type labels (democracy, anocracy, autocratic) that Polity IV uses to maintain continuity.

Because some prior research (Moore 2000; Findley and Young 2011), on the relationship between regime type and the adoption of terrorism suggests a possible curvilinear relationship between the adoption of terrorism and regime type, I created dummy variables for autocratic regime type and democratic regime type as defined by Polity IV. By creating the dummy variables, more predictive conclusions can be drawn from the multiple logistic regression analysis in this thesis which can only detect linear relationships between a dependent and independent variable. I created the dichotomous dummy variables for regime type by taking the following steps:

1. To create the autocratic dummy variable, I assigned a value of 0 (not autocratic) to regimes with Polity scores ranging from -5 to +10, and I assigned a value of 1 (autocratic) to regimes with Polity scores ranging from -10 to -6.

3. To create the democratic dummy variable, I assigned a value of 0 (not democratic) to regimes with Polity scores ranging from -10 to +5, and I assigned a value of 1 to regimes with Polity scores ranging from +6 to +10.

Independent Variable 2: Insurgent Group Goals

The second hypothesis in the study addresses the need to control for the type of goal that an insurgent group has. The literature suggests that goals of national independence might cause insurgents to adopt different tactics compared to insurgents fighting for central control of a state wishing to overthrow the current regime in power. I used the following steps to code for the type of goals that each insurgent group has:
1. Beginning with the first intra-state conflict in the COW data, I located the corresponding insurgent group conflict in the Non-State Actor Data: Version 3.3 Case Descriptions.

2. I then took one of the following actions:
   - If the case description contained “Territory” in the Incompatibility Type field, I coded the insurgent group’s goals as separatist.
   - If the case description contained “Government” in the Incompatibility Type field, I coded the insurgent group’s goals as control of central government.

3. If the insurgent group did not appear in the case descriptions, I conducted additional research using primary and secondary media sources to determine the nature of the conflict and stated goals of the insurgent group.

*Independent Variable 3: Insurgent Group Strength*

The third hypothesis in this study examines the strength of an insurgency as the independent variable. Measuring the strength of an insurgent group is a very difficult task due to the secretive nature and the lack of available organizational data on insurgent groups. Very few scholars have attempted to develop a composite measurement for insurgent strength, but most research cites various factors that include troops levels (Wood, 2010), weaponry and training (Byman, 2001), organizational structure and leadership (Frisch, 2011; Arquilla, 2001; Staniland, 2012), and geography (Schutte, 2011). Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) are among the few scholars that provide a composite model for insurgent group strength defined as the “ability of a rebel group to target the government with military force” (Salehyan et al. 580). Their
composite combines the existence and strength of a central command, mobilization capacity, ability to procure arms, and fighting capacity (Salehyan et al. 580-581).

This study does not use Salehyan’s composite measure as it stands, but instead disaggregates it and adds the additional measure of territorial control as an indicator of insurgent strength. Because there is some disagreement on whether some components of insurgent strength are actually weaknesses, and because there is some question as to whether fighting capacity is a duplicative measure of insurgent strength as a whole, I did not use the aggregate measure but instead analyzed each indicator of insurgent group strength separately.

Scholars largely disagree on the whether a centralized hierarchical command and control apparatus is a source of strength or weakness for an insurgent group. While there are some obvious benefits from a central command in its ability to direct and execute a unified strategy, many scholars point to the advantages of a networked structure that makes an insurgency more durable and “impossible to decapitate” (Arquilla, 2001; Hoffman, 2006; Frisch, 2011).

The ability to mobilize militants is a key requirement to an effective insurgency. If nobody is willing to fight for the insurgency, then the insurgency does not exist in any true sense. The mobilization capacity is an estimate of an insurgent group’s ability to mobilize a fighting force relative to the national government’s ability to do the same. This is intended to be a measure of potential, rather than actual, active militants and accounts for reserve troops on both sides of the conflict that can readily replace active combatants (Salehyan et al. 580).
Weapons are often an arbiter of power, and as such, this study includes an insurgent group’s ability to procure arms relative to the national government they oppose as an independent variable.

The inclusion of fighting capacity in Salehyan’s composite definition appears to beget the composite measurement as a whole. Salehyan defines fighting capacity as “the ability of the rebels to effectively engage the army militarily and win major battles, posing a credible challenge to the state” (Salehyan et al. 580). This factor appears to simply be a duplicate indicator of Salehyan’s composite definition of rebel strength as “the ability of a rebel group to target the government with military force” (Salehyan et al. 580). Therefore, it seems appropriate to measure fighting capacity as a separate independent variable among other indicators of strength.

The element of territorial control which seems to be the most obvious and salient indicator of insurgent strength is missing from Salehyan’s composite measure of insurgent group strength. The control of a defined territory along with its people and resources could prove invaluable for the success of an insurgent group. Territorial control provides insurgents with a safe haven from which to train and launch operations, facilitates mobilization, and may provide resources to exploit in order to fund insurgent activities (Wood 6). On the other hand, it could be a curse as Carter (2012) argues by claiming that the provision of territory or safe haven can actually make an insurgent group more vulnerable because it provides the government forces with a clear target area upon which they can focus counterinsurgency efforts.

To summarize, this thesis analyzes the following five indicators of insurgent group strength relative to the national government they oppose:
- Central Command Strength
- Mobilization Capacity
- Ability to Procure Arms
- Fighting Capacity
- Territorial Control

I used the following steps to place each insurgent group within the proper category for each of the five indicators of insurgent group strength:

1. I took the name of the insurgent group as it appears in the intra-state conflict of the COW data and found that group name in the Non-State Actor (NSA) Data version 3.3.

2. I verified that the name and conflict was a match by taking the following actions:
   - Compare the dates referenced in the NSA data to the date range for the intra-state conflict in the COW.
   - Compare the country of conflict referenced in the NSA data to the country listed in the COW.
   - Use secondary sources and internet searches to define acronyms for groups for easier comparison.

3. I assigned the level of control that the insurgent group’s central command has over the entire group by taking one of the following actions:
   - If the strengthcent column for the insurgent group contained high, I coded the insurgent group’s central command as having high control.
   - If the strengthcent column for the insurgent group contained moderate, I coded the insurgent group’s central command as having moderate control.
• If the strengthcent column for the insurgent group contained low, I coded the insurgent group’s central command as having low control.

• If the strengthcent column for the insurgent group contained Unclear, I coded the insurgent group’s central command as having undetermined control.

• If the strengthcent column for the insurgent group contained NA, I coded the insurgent group’s central command as having no central command.

4. I assigned the level of mobilization capacity for the insurgent group by taking one of the following actions:

• If the mobcap column for the insurgent group contained high, I coded the insurgent group’s mobilization capacity as high.

• If the mobcap column for the insurgent group contained moderate, I coded the insurgent group’s mobilization capacity as moderate.

• If the mobcap column for the insurgent group contained low, I coded the insurgent group’s mobilization capacity as low.

• If the mobcap column for the insurgent group contained either NA, no, or unclear, I coded the insurgent group’s mobilization capacity as undetermined.

5. I assigned the level of the insurgent group’s ability to procure arms within the timeframe of the conflict by taking one of the following actions:

• If the armsproc column for the insurgent group contained high, I coded the insurgent group’s arms procurement capability as high.

• If the armsproc column for the insurgent group contained moderate, I coded the insurgent group’s arms procurement capability as moderate.
• If the `armsproc` column for the insurgent group contained `low`, I coded the insurgent group’s arms procurement capability as `low`.

• If the `armsproc` column for the insurgent group contained either `NA`, `no`, or `unclear`, I coded the insurgent group’s arms procurement capability as `undetermined`.

6. I assigned the level of the insurgent group’s fighting capacity within the timeframe of the conflict by taking one of the following actions:

• If the `fightcap` column for the insurgent group contained `high`, I coded the insurgent group’s fighting capacity as `high`.

• If the `fightcap` column for the insurgent group contained `moderate`, I coded the insurgent group’s fighting capacity as `moderate`.

• If the `fightcap` column for the insurgent group contained `low`, I coded the insurgent group’s fighting capacity as `low`.

• If the `fightcap` column for the insurgent group contained either `NA`, `no`, or `unclear`, I coded the insurgent group’s fighting capacity as `undetermined`.

7. I determined whether the insurgent group had territorial control within the timeframe of the conflict by taking one of the following actions:

• If the `terrcont` column for the insurgent group contained `yes`, I coded the insurgent group as having `territorial control`.

• If the `terrcont` column for the insurgent group contained `no`, I coded the insurgent group as having `no territorial control`.

• If the `terrcont` column for the insurgent group contained either `NA` or `unclear`, I coded the insurgent group as `territorial control undetermined`. 
8. I repeated steps one through five until each insurgent group in all of the 109 conflicts was coded for the indicators of insurgent group strength.

**Independent Variable 4: Type of Foreign Support**

The fourth and fifth hypotheses address the impact of foreign support on an insurgent group’s decision to adopt terrorism. They build upon the conclusions of prior research on foreign support that falls short of answering the question of whether there is a possible correlation between foreign support and terrorism.

This study uses Salehyan’s typology as a basis for an expanded definition of the different types of foreign support. This study divides foreign support into two categories. The first category is *indirect passive support* that is defined as important or valuable support provided to the insurgency that falls short of being critical to the success or continued existence of the group. Types of indirect passive support include international or diplomatic recognition, moral support and public statements of sympathy, intelligence sharing, withholding information that protects the insurgency, providing advice to insurgent leadership, facilitating and aiding the insurgency’s command and control apparatus, and the maintenance of laws or policies that enable insurgent operations.

The second category of foreign support is *direct material support* defined as support provided to the insurgency that is critical to the success of group. Types of direct

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4 Salehyan’s definitions are used as opposed to Byman’s because the level of importance that Salehyan gives to specific types of support are more congruent with other leading scholars who have studied insurgent and terrorist organizations. For example, Byman labels the provision of foreign fighters as minor support, and he places training, weapons, and ammunition in the middle category of “valuable” whereas most other scholars agree that these specific types of support are among the most critical forms of support provided.
material foreign support include finance, safe haven and transit, weapons, military training, and providing foreign militants to fight on behalf of the insurgents.

I used the following steps to compare each insurgent group with the NSA case descriptions to determine the presence and highest level of support provided to each insurgent group:

1. Beginning with the first intra-state conflict in the COW data, I compared the name of the insurgent group to the NSA case descriptions to locate the insurgent group.

2. If the NSA case description indicated that one of the following types of foreign support was present, I coded the insurgent group as received direct material support:  
   - finance
   - safe haven and transit
   - weapons
   - military training
   - foreign militants or soldiers provided to fight on behalf of the insurgents

3. If the NSA case description indicated that one of the following types of foreign support was present, I coded the insurgent group as received indirect passive support:  
   - international or diplomatic recognition
   - moral support and public statements of sympathy
   - intelligence sharing
   - withholding information and intelligence that protects the insurgency
   - providing advice to insurgent leadership

There were some cases that indicated alleged foreign support at a given level. For those cases, I assumed that foreign support was provided, but it was never officially acknowledged by either the benefactor or the beneficiary due to the often clandestine nature of the provision of foreign support for an insurgency.

If the insurgent group was already coded as received direct material support in step 2, I skipped step 3 and did not recode the insurgent group if they also received indirect passive support.
- facilitating and aiding the insurgency’s command and control apparatus
- maintaining laws or policies that enable insurgent operations

4. If the insurgent group did not appear in the NSA case description or if the references did not indicate that foreign support was provided, I coded the group as did not receive foreign support.

5. I repeated steps one through four until all insurgent groups within each conflict were coded for the presence and type of foreign support.

**Independent Variable 5: Benefactor Type**

The sixth hypothesis addresses the type of foreign actors providing support to an insurgent group. I used the following steps to code the foreign benefactors for the insurgent groups in this study:

1. Beginning with the first intra-state conflict in the COW data, I compared the name of the insurgent group to the NSA data to locate the row that corresponded to that insurgent group within the timeframe of the intra-state conflict.

2. I assigned a category for each insurgent group that received foreign support as follows:
   - If either the transconstsupp or the rebextpart columns contained either explicit, tacit, alleged, major, or minor and the rebel.support column contained either NA, no, or unclear, I coded the insurgent group’s benefactor as a non-state actor.
   - If both the transconstsupp and rebextpart columns contained either no, unclear, or NA and the rebel.support column contained either explicit, tacit, or alleged, I coded the insurgent group’s benefactor as a state actor.
• If either the *transconstsupp* or the *rebextpart* columns contained either explicit, tacit, alleged, major, or minor and the *rebel.support* column contained either explicit, tacit, or alleged, I coded the insurgent group’s benefactors as both non-state and state actors.

3. I repeated steps one and two until all insurgent groups within each conflict were coded for their foreign benefactor type.

4. I assigned dummy values to each case where *no benefactor* (no foreign support) equals 0, *non-state actor support only* equals 1, *state actor support only* equals 2, and *both non-state and state actor support* equals 3.

**Independent Variable 6: Type of Support by Benefactor Type**

To more closely examine the impact of foreign support on the adoption of terrorism by an insurgent group, this thesis used two dummy variables to measure the level of foreign support provided from each type of benefactor. I took the following steps to code the dummy variable for the level of foreign support provided by a state actor:

1. I assigned a value of 0 (*no support*) to all insurgent groups that did not receive any type of support from a foreign state actor.

2. I assigned a value of 1 (*indirect passive support*) to all insurgent groups that received only indirect passive support from foreign state actors.

3. I assigned a value of 2 (*direct material support*) to all insurgent groups that received direct material support from foreign state actors.

I then took the following steps to code the dummy variable for the level of support provided by a non-state actor:
1. I assigned a value of 0 (*no support*) to all insurgent groups that did not receive any type of support from a foreign non-state actor.

2. I assigned a value of 1 (*indirect passive support*) to all insurgent groups that received only indirect passive support from foreign non-state actors.

3. I assigned a value of 2 (*direct material support*) to all insurgent groups that received direct material support from foreign non-state actors.

**Methodology**

*Quantitative Analysis Models*

After the research data was coded as outlined in the previous section, I developed three Multiple Logistic Regression models to test the hypotheses in this study. I chose to use three separate models to better analyze for any possible statistical effects of including insurgent groups whose terrorist activity were not definitive. Model A includes *used terrorism dummy A* as the dependent variable, Model B includes the *used terrorism dummy B* as the dependent variable, and Model C includes *used terrorism dummy C* as the dependent variable. All three models include the following independent variables:

- autocratic regime type dummy variable
- anocracy regime type dummy variable
- democratic regime dummy variable
- type of insurgent group goals
- level of control by the insurgent group’s central command
- insurgent group mobilization capacity
- insurgent group’s arms procurement capability
- insurgent group’s fighting capacity
- whether the insurgent group controls any territory
- type of foreign support received by the insurgent group
- foreign benefactor type
- level of state actor support
- level of non-state actor support
- Cold War control variable

**Case Studies**

This study proceeds with a series of comparative case studies on two different insurgencies using a most similar systems design model to further test the hypotheses put forth. As Alexander George and Andrew Bennett point out, the completion of comparative case studies are particularly good at “assessing complex causal relations such as path dependence, tipping points, multiple interactions effects, disproportionate feedback loops, equifinality, and multifinality” (George and Bennett 10, 22). As such, the objectives of the following case studies are to test the theoretical foundations of the alternative hypotheses put forth and to evaluate the relevance of foreign support as an emerging indicator of an insurgent group’s decision to adopt terrorism within the context of the theory of tripartite warfare.

I chose to examine the two cases of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and the Kurds in Iraq. I selected these groups because both cases include an insurgency with various factions who have similar characteristics and similar primary goals allowing me to control for as many factors as possible. For example, many of the Sri Lankan insurgent groups received support from similar foreign actors and continued fighting the same opponent
while maintaining their primary separatist goal. Likewise, the various Iraqi Kurdish insurgent groups also received support from similar foreign actors, fought the same opponent (except when they battled each other), and maintained the primary separatist goal of carving out a Kurdish state from Northern Iraq. Also, these two cases contain insurgencies who participated in conflicts that occurred both during and after the Cold War allowing me to control for some systemic factors as well. Most importantly for my research design, there are factions within each group that appear to produce different outcomes with respect to their adoption of terrorist tactics.

I used the following list of research questions to guide my analysis of each case and to help extract information that will help test the hypotheses included in this study:

1. What are the goals of the insurgent group?
2. What is the nature of the regime that each insurgent group opposes?
3. How strong is the insurgent group compared to the government they oppose?
4. What was the source of any external support?
5. What types of support did each insurgent group receive?
6. When did the insurgent group receive foreign support?
7. How much foreign support did each insurgent group receive?
8. Who manages the flow and allocation of foreign support within the insurgent group?
9. What is the nature of the local support for the insurgent group?
10. What terrorist activity (if any) has the insurgent group been involved in?

First, I examined the goals of the insurgent group within each case. Analyzing the objectives of the group is meant to help frame the context for the insurgent group’s
purpose and explains how the interests of the group as a whole are shaped. Many of the decisions that insurgent groups and its members make are likely to be tied to the group’s purpose. Therefore, this question is a logical starting point from which to build a larger platform of factors that influence the group’s decision making process.

The second and third questions begin to explore the application of two of the alternative hypotheses on the causes of terrorism that focus on the strategic logic of a relatively weak insurgent group adopting terrorism to fight an asymmetrically more powerful democratic government. These questions look beyond just labeling an instance of terrorism as an attack by a weak actor meant to coerce a democracy. The expectation for these questions was to uncover more complex interactions between variables and to place the instances of terrorism in context that could potentially uncover causal mechanisms.

Research question four is important because it helps uncover the nature of the actor providing the support. It is possible that actors who have a reputation for sponsoring terrorism are less likely to hold the insurgent groups accountable for using terrorist tactics. In such cases it is possible that the insurgents may not believe the support they enjoy is contingent upon their restraint from using terrorist tactics. Likewise, it is possible that the provider of the support is more likely to turn a blind eye to terrorist tactics when they are supporting an insurgency within a country whose government is a major geopolitical rival. Some scholars have suggested that when external support comes from a state actor compared to a non-state actor, the interests of the state sponsor hold more influence over the insurgency—sometimes to the complete demise of the insurgency’s goals. Also, if there are multiple sources of external support,
there is likely an added dimension to the insurgent’s decision making process when
debating whether to use terrorist tactics. On one hand, it is possible that the insurgent
group will feel more restrained while trying to maintain good faith with their benefactors.
This could be especially relevant if the insurgent group is fighting for independence and
seeking diplomatic recognition. On the other hand, the insurgent group may feel less
restrained and might place less importance on meeting the expectations of any one
external supporter because they can always rely on alternative sources.

The fifth and sixth questions are important to answer because they address the
existence of specific types of support and help establish the existence of deliberate
support. It is important to uncover the type of support provided because there are likely
differing enabling effects for each type of support, and it may be possible to uncover the
existence of some specific types of support that would only be useful to enable terrorist
tactics. For example, if foreign support comes in the form of explosives training, it is
very possible that the training will be used to construct bombs for use in terrorist attacks.
Likewise, attempting to establish a timeline for the provision of support will help further
define the context under which support is provided.

Research question seven is important for fairly obvious reasons. If the amount of
support is nominal, its impact on the insurgent group could be inconsequential.
Moreover, foreign support that is categorized as direct and material may only have the
effect of being indirect and passive if the amount of direct support is so small that it
virtually has no material impact on the insurgent organization. For example, if an
insurgent group receives a dozen small caliber weapons from a foreign source and adds
them to their existing weapons cache of 100 similar small caliber weapons, it is hard to
see how that level of support could be seen as anything more than symbolic since it does not significantly change the capability of the insurgency.

Research question eight is significant because simply providing support, specifically direct material support, is likely to have little impact on the capabilities of the insurgent group if the leadership does not have the ability or is unwilling to distribute an influx of resources effectively. If the leadership is corrupt and uses the resources to line their own pockets rather than further the insurgency’s goals, the net effect on the insurgency as a whole should be minimal. Also, if a loosely organized insurgency receives resources and lacks an effective command and control center, decisions over the operational tactics are more likely to be made at a lower level which could lead to some factions committing acts of terrorism without the approval of the recognized leadership. In this sense, uncontrolled distribution channels could enable lower level lieutenants who are competing for leadership to commit high profile terrorist attacks with their new found resources in an effort to be seen as the leader who “gets things done.”

Question nine is meant to explore the possible causal link between the adoption of terrorist tactics and the provision of foreign support. This will test the assumption that foreign support has the potential to lift some constraining norms placed on the insurgent group by a local support base thus making terrorism more likely.

The final question directly examines the outcomes of each case with respect to the adoption of terrorism. This question is first meant to verify that terrorist activity was appropriately attributed to the groups under study. The question is also meant to look at the historical context in which significant events took place. Finally, this question is
meant to probe for information that originates from the insurgent group itself in reference to terrorism and any decision making processes surrounding its adoption.
III

Chapter Three
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis

Introduction

The purpose of the quantitative analysis in this chapter is to identify what factors are correlated with the use of terrorist tactics by an insurgent group involved in an intrastate war. By doing so I seek to gain a better understanding of the role that foreign support plays in an insurgent group’s decision to adopt terrorism. This chapter begins with a review of the variables under examination and summarizes the inferential statistics for the sample population of 109 intrastate wars involving 99 different insurgent groups during the years 1972 to 2007 (as defined by the COW Intrastate War Data version 4.1). This chapter will then review the hypotheses included in the quantitative analysis and provide an interpretation for each of the three multiple logistic regression models conducted. Finally, this chapter will synthesize the results of the hypothesis testing and draw some conclusions as it relates to the prevailing theories on the causes of terrorism and the provision of foreign support.

Review of Variables and Inferential Statistics

Due to the general chaos of warfare and the modest confidence in raw data associated with it, a review of the data used in this study is appropriate. Providing a description of the basic statistics from the sample population selected for study will help set expectations about the results of the more complex statistical models used in the later
sections of this chapter. Also, it will shape an image of what the typical insurgent group looks like and help describe the typical operational situation of an insurgent group.

**Battle-Related Deaths and Length of War**

Although the number of battle-related deaths suffered by each side is not an independent variable under examination in this study, it is still worth mentioning because an insurgent group is included in the study only if they are involved in an intrastate war as defined by the COW Intrastate War Data (version 4.1). To review, a state actor must commit at least 1,000 troops to the conflict or suffer at least 100 battle-related deaths to meet the minimum requirement of a “participant” in an intrastate war. Moreover, a non-state actor (insurgent group) must commit at least 100 armed personnel or suffer at least 25 battle related deaths to meet the minimum requirement for a “participant” (Sarkees, 2007).

44% (48) of the 109 insurgent groups that meet the COW’s criteria for inclusion in the study are missing data for battle-related deaths. Similarly, 46% (50) of the cases are also missing data for battle-related deaths on the state actor side of the conflict. This indicates that nearly half of all the cases in the sample had at least one side of the conflict that met the minimum participant requirement based on the number of armed personnel committed to the conflict rather than based on casualties.

A casual observation of the battle-related death data shows that the war participant criteria set by the COW for a non-state actor is much lower compared to the criteria for a state actor. However, the average number of deaths suffered by the 61 insurgent groups for which data is available is 3,000 battle-related deaths compared to an average of only 1,500 battle-related deaths suffered by the 59 state actors for which data
is available. While outside the scope of this study, additional research related to battle-related deaths in intrastate wars could help explain why the battle death criteria for a an insurgent group is so much lower than it is for a state actor when the typical insurgent group suffers twice the amount of battle-related deaths suffered by the typical state actor.

In addition to the number of deaths, the length of war is also worth noting in order to describe the typical situation in which an insurgent group operates. The COW data requires battle-related deaths to occur at a rate not less than 1,000 deaths combined for all sides per year in order to code the conflict as an intrastate war (Sarkees, 2007). In the sample of 109 intrastate wars, the average length of a war is 41 months, or about 3 ½ years.

Use of Terrorist Tactics in the Sample Population

In the sample population, a statistical examination of the dependent variable (adoption of terrorist tactics by an insurgent group) reveals that a plurality of insurgent groups adopted terrorist tactics. In the sample, 45% (49) of the insurgent groups used terrorist tactics, 36% (39) of the groups did not use terrorist tactics, and 19% (21) of the groups possibly used terrorist tactics. With nearly 20% of the insurgent groups coded as only possibly using terrorist tactics, the need for recoding the dependent variable into subsequent dummy variables for more powerful quantitative analysis is reinforced.

When recoding the dependent variable as used terrorism dummy A (where possibly used terrorist tactics is coded as yes), 64% (70) of the insurgent groups in the sample used terrorist tactics compared to 36% (39) of the insurgent groups who did not use terrorist tactics. Therefore, a clear majority of insurgent groups in the sample population adopted terrorism when observing the results of used terrorism dummy A.
However, when recoding the dependent variable as *used terrorism dummy B* (where *possibly used terrorist tactics* is coded as *no*), 45% (49) of the insurgent groups in the sample used terrorist tactics compared to 55% (60) of the insurgent groups who did not use terrorist tactics. Therefore, a slight majority of insurgent groups in the sample did not adopt terrorism when observing the results of *used terrorism dummy B*.

Because the statistical interpretation of the results for *used terrorism dummy A* and *used terrorism dummy B* are measurably different, dropping the cases that were coded as *possibly used terrorist tactics* from the sample becomes more important. When dropping the 21 insurgent groups that where initially coded as *possibly used terrorist tactics* as done for *used terrorism dummy C*, 56% (49) of the insurgent groups used terrorist tactics compared to 44% (39) of the insurgent groups who did not use terrorist tactics. Therefore, a slight majority of insurgent groups in the sample adopted terrorism when observing the results of *used terrorism dummy C*.

**Opposing Regime Types in the Sample Population**

The first independent variable examined within the quantitative results is the regime type of the government (Side A) that the insurgent group (Side B) opposes. In the sample, 35% (38) of the governments on Side A are autocracies, 48% (52) are anocracies, and 17% (19) are democracies. Therefore, the type of government that an insurgent group in the sample will most likely oppose is an anocracy, and the type of government that an insurgent group is least likely to oppose is a democracy.

The distribution of the cases across the democratic regime type dummy variable shows again that only 19 governments on Side A are democracies while 90 are not
democratic. Inversely, the autocratic regime type dummy variable shows that only 38 governments on Side A are autocratic while 71 are not autocratic.

*Insurgent Group Goal Types in the Sample Population*

The insurgent group goal type is the next independent variable observed in the sample population, and a clear majority of insurgent groups had the primary goal to control the central government. Of the insurgent groups in the sample, 64% (70) fought for control of the central government compared to only 36% (39) who held separatist goals.

*Strength of Insurgent Groups in the Sample Population*

The next five independent variables observed among the insurgent groups are all indicators of insurgent group strength relative to the government that they oppose. Beginning with the strength of the insurgent group’s central command for the sample population, 5% (5) of the insurgent groups had no central command, 11% (12) had only a weak central command, 49% (53) had a moderately strong central command, 31% (34) had a strong central command, and the strength of the central command for the remaining 5% (5) could not be determined. Therefore, insurgent groups in the sample are most likely to have a moderately strong central command compared to the government they oppose, but they are much more likely to have a strong central command than they are to have a weak central command. Moreover, insurgent groups in the sample are very unlikely to not have a central command at all.

Next, the insurgents group’s mobilization capacity was observed. In the sample, 39% (43) of the insurgent groups had a low mobilization capacity, 48% (52) had a moderate mobilization capacity, 12% (13) had a high mobilization capacity, and only 1%
had an undetermined mobilization capacity. Therefore, insurgent groups in the sample are most likely to have a moderate mobilization capacity, and they are much more likely to have a low mobilization capacity than they are to have a high mobilization capacity compared to the government they oppose.

The arms procurement capability was the third indicator of insurgent group strength that was observed among the sample population. The results for arms procurement capability in the sample are skewed toward the low end of the scale. In the sample, 52% (57) of the insurgent groups had a low arms procurement capability, 39% (43) had a moderate arms procurement capability, only 4% (5) had a high arms procurement capability, and 4% (4) of the groups had an undetermined arms procurement capability. The results show that a majority of insurgent groups in the sample are most likely to have a low arms procurement capability, and they are very unlikely to have a high arms procurement capability compared to the government they oppose.

Fighting capacity was also observed among the insurgent groups in the sample. In the sample, fighting capacity was also skewed toward the low end of the scale. 55% (60) of the insurgent groups in the sample had a low fighting capacity, 39% (43) had a moderate fighting capacity, only 5% (5) had a high fighting capacity, and 1% (1) had an undetermined fighting capacity.

The final indicator of insurgent group strength observed in the sample was whether the insurgent group exercised any territorial control. The results among the insurgent groups in the sample were evenly split with 50% (54) exercising territorial control and 50% (54) not exercising territorial control. There was only one group in the sample whose territorial control status could not be determined.
Foreign Support for Insurgent Groups in the Sample Population

The next four independent variables observed in the sample are all related to foreign support for an insurgent group. As for the overall level of foreign support, 73% (79) of the insurgent groups in the sample received direct material foreign support, only 13% (14) received indirect passive support, and only 15% (16) did not receive any foreign support. Therefore, if an insurgent group in the sample receives foreign support, it is very likely to be direct material support.

When looking at the type of group providing support, more insurgent groups in the sample population received foreign support from both state and non-state actors compared to the number of groups that received foreign support from just one benefactor type or compared to those that received no support. Moreover, it is also evident that insurgent groups in the sample are more likely to receive foreign support from state actors than they are to receive support from non-state actors. The evidence shows that 44% (48) of the insurgent groups in the sample received some type of support from both foreign state actors and non-state actors, 30% (33) received foreign support from state actors only, 11% (12) received support from non-state actors only, and 15% (16) received no foreign support.

When taking a closer look at the level of foreign support provided by each benefactor type, state actors are more likely to provide direct material support than they are to provide only indirect passive support. In the sample, 64% (70) of the insurgent groups received direct material support from foreign state actors compared to only 9% (10) whose support was limited to indirect passive support from state actors. The remaining 27% (29) did not receive any foreign support from state actors. Calculating
the proportion of each support type among just the insurgent groups who actually received support from a foreign state actor reveals that 88.5% (70) of the groups received direct material support and only 12.5% (10) of the groups received indirect passive support. This evidence indicates that when an insurgent group receives state actor support, it is much more likely to receive direct material support than indirect passive support.

As for the level of non-state actor foreign support provided to insurgent groups, 44% (48) of insurgent groups received no foreign support from non-state actors while 34% (37) received direct material support, and 22% (24) received only indirect passive support. Of the 61 insurgent groups who received some level of support from a non-state actor, 61% (37) received direct material support and only 39% (24) received indirect passive support. The above evidence shows that insurgent groups are slightly more likely to receive foreign support from non-state actors than they are to not receive foreign support from them. Similar to the nature of support from state actors, non-state actors are much more likely to provide direct material support than they are to provide only indirect passive support when they do sponsor an insurgent group.

Controlling for the End of the Cold War

As mentioned in chapter two, the time period in which the intrastate war occurs was also included in the study to control for the systemic effects of the Cold War’s conclusion. While none of the hypotheses directly address the time period variable, this analysis will still control for it in the regression models.
The “Typical” Insurgent Group

The inferential statistics presented thus far helps build a profile for a typical insurgent group involved in an intrastate war. To summarize, the typical insurgent group in the sample population was involved in an intrastate war that lasted about 3 ½ years, suffered an average of 3,000 battle-related deaths, inflicted about 1,500 battle-related deaths on their opponent, and are more likely to have used terrorism than not. In the sample, the typical insurgent group also opposes an anocratic government and has a primary goal to gain control of the central government. As for the relative strength of the typical insurgent group compared to the opposing government, the typical insurgent group in the sample has a moderately strong central command, a moderate mobilization capacity, a low arms procurement capability, a low relative fighting capacity, and may or may not control territory. With respect to the type and source of foreign support, the typical insurgent group in the sample received direct material support from both state and non-state actors.

Hypothesis Testing

Multiple Logistic Regression Models

This study utilized three multiple logistic regression models to analyze the variables. Each model includes all of the independent variables in the study. The results of the three models are combined into Table 3.1 below.

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7 See Appendix B for a table showing the results of the three multiple logistic regression models for this study.
### Table 3.1 - Multiple Logistical Regression Analysis Results for the Adoption of Terrorism by an Insurgent Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Valid n</th>
<th>Cox &amp; Snell Psuedo r-square</th>
<th>Democracy Log Odds (sig level)</th>
<th>Autocracy Log Odds (sig level)</th>
<th>Insurgent Goals Log Odds (sig level)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>5.254 (0.087)**</td>
<td>-0.377 (0.443)</td>
<td>0.124 (0.878)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>8.062 (0.013)**</td>
<td>-0.147 (0.752)</td>
<td>-0.440 (0.381)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>9.563 (0.041)**</td>
<td>-0.271 (0.639)</td>
<td>0.067 (0.939)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Valid n</th>
<th>Cox &amp; Snell Psuedo r-square</th>
<th>strengthcent Log Odds (sig level)</th>
<th>mobcap Log Odds (sig level)</th>
<th>armsproc Log Odds (sig level)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>2.243 (0.005)****</td>
<td>0.179 (0.688)</td>
<td>-0.535 (0.180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>0.907 (0.063)**</td>
<td>1.249 (0.038)**</td>
<td>-0.777 (0.015)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>2.046 (0.010)***</td>
<td>0.626 (0.270)</td>
<td>-0.711 (0.057)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Valid n</th>
<th>Cox &amp; Snell Psuedo r-square</th>
<th>fightcap Log Odds (sig level)</th>
<th>terrcont Log Odds (sig level)</th>
<th>foreign support Log Odds (sig level)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>0.546 (0.453)</td>
<td>1.395 (0.124)</td>
<td>1.364 (0.239)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>1.693 (0.099)**</td>
<td>1.286 (0.132)</td>
<td>-0.195 (0.738)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>1.374 (0.191)</td>
<td>1.624 (0.118)</td>
<td>0.488 (0.622)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Valid n</th>
<th>Cox &amp; Snell Psuedo r-square</th>
<th>benefactor type Log Odds (sig level)</th>
<th>state support Log Odds (sig level)</th>
<th>NSA support Log Odds (sig level)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>-0.558 (0.217)</td>
<td>0.184 (0.836)</td>
<td>1.705 (0.073)*</td>
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<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>-0.375 (0.452)</td>
<td>0.548 (0.551)</td>
<td>0.742 (0.257)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>-0.588 (0.221)</td>
<td>0.492 (0.650)</td>
<td>1.761 (0.086)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Valid n</th>
<th>Cox &amp; Snell Psuedo r-square</th>
<th>period Log Odds (sig level)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0.257</td>
<td>-0.430 (0.105)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>-0.231 (0.391)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>-0.359 (0.230)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Significant at an alpha of 0.1  
** Significant at an alpha of 0.05  
*** Significant at an alpha of 0.01  
**** Significant at an alpha of 0.005  

The first model (Model A) includes the *used terrorism dummy A* dependent variable where possibly used terrorist tactics is coded as *yes*. The second model (Model B) includes the *used terrorism dummy B* dependent variable where possibly used terrorist tactics is coded as *no*. The last model (Model C) includes the *used terrorism dummy C* dependent variable that drops the cases coded as *possibly used terrorism*.
In order to analyze all variables accurately, a multiple logistic regression model requires each case in the analysis to have valid entries for each variable included in the model. For Model A and Model B, there were eight insurgent groups that did not have data available for each variable included in the model.\(^8\) Therefore, data from 101 intrastate wars were included in the analysis for the first two regression models. In addition to the eight cases not included in the first two models based on missing data for at least one independent variable, there are an additional 17 insurgent groups that are not included in Model C because they were coded as possibly using terrorist tactics for the dependent variable.\(^9\) Therefore, there is valid data for all variables in only 84 intrastate wars for the final regression model.

Of the three regression models in this study, Table 3.2 shows that Model C had the best overall predictability of 76.2\%. Translated, this means that the model was able to determine the correct outcome with respect to the adoption of terrorism by an insurgent group in the sample population 76.2\% of the time. Models A and B had identical overall predictability of 72.3\%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Valid n</th>
<th>Model Predictability of &quot;No&quot; Cases</th>
<th>Model Predictability of &quot;Yes&quot; Cases</th>
<th>Overall Model Predictability</th>
<th>Cox &amp; Snell r-squared (% Explanation of variability)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
<td>72.3%</td>
<td>0.257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>77.4%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>72.3%</td>
<td>0.243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>72.2%</td>
<td>79.2%</td>
<td>76.2%</td>
<td>0.309</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^8\) See Appendix C for a list of cases that are not included in the regression analysis because they are missing valid input for at least one independent variable.

\(^9\) See Appendix D for a list of cases that are not included in Model C due to missing valid input for the used terrorism dummy C variable (coded as possibly used terrorist tactics).
However, when looking at the three models’ predictability of only the cases where terrorism was not adopted (No cases) or only the cases where terrorism was adopted (Yes cases), the Models A and C were better at predicting the Yes cases while Model B was better at predicting the No cases.

With a predictability of 80.0% for the Yes cases in Model A, it performed the best at predicting the Yes cases when compared to the other two models. However, Model A also performed the worst at correctly predicting the outcome for the No cases in the sample population with only 58.3% predictability for the No cases.

With a predictability of 66.7% for the Yes cases in Model B, it performed the worst among all three models at predicting the correct outcome for the Yes cases. However, Model B performed correctly predicted the outcome for 77.4% of the No cases in the sample.

Model C correctly predicted the outcome for the use of terrorist tactics in 79.2% of the Yes cases in the sample population. Model C also performed slightly worse at predicting the correct outcome for the No cases where it correctly predicted only 72.2% of the No cases.

Multiple logistic regression analysis does not produce a statistic that is an exact equivalent to an r-square value as in a binary regression analysis to describe precisely how well a particular model explains the proportion of variance accounted for in the outcomes of the dependent variable based on the predictive power of the independent variables. However, one can still compare the results of the Cox and Snell r-square value (pseudo r-square value) for each model to provide a heuristic comparison between models to determine which is relatively better at explaining the variance of the dependent
variable. For example, Table 3.2 shows that Model C has the highest pseudo $r$-square value (.309) among all of the regression models in this study and Model B has the lowest pseudo $r$-square value (.243) among all of the models. Although this cannot be perfectly interpreted to mean that the independent variables in Model C explains 41.2% ($309/75$) of the variation in the dependent variable or that the independent variables in Model B explain only 32.4% of the variation in the dependent variable, one can still correctly state that the independent variables in Model C better explain the variation of the dependent variable compared to Model B.\(^{10}\)

To summarize the statistical precision for the regression models shown in Table 3.2, all are fairly comparable with respect to their overall predictability of whether an insurgent group in the sample population adopts terrorism or not. However, Model A performs much better than any other model at predicting the outcome for cases in the sample where insurgent groups used terrorist tactics ($Yes$ cases). At the same time, Model A is also the worst model for predicting the outcome for cases where insurgent groups did not use terrorist tactics ($No$ cases). Also, all three models are fairly comparable with respect to their pseudo $r$-square values where no model varies more than .039 away from the .270 average pseudo $r$-square for all of the regression models. For the purpose of this study, the comparable precision among all three models allows for flexibility in citing statistically significant variables from any of the models with relatively equal importance. However, the conclusions drawn from the hypothesis testing in this chapter will favor the results of Model C when there is a discrepancy between the results of Models A and B.

\(^{10}\) Cox & Snell $r$-square values range from 0 to .75. Typically, a higher score is considered better.
Turning now to the actual hypothesis testing, the goal of this analysis is to
determine if the regression models reject the null of each hypothesis under examination.
Therefore, the null hypothesis is stated for each independent variable being tested, and
the log odds score from the regression models is compared to the null in an attempt to
reject it. Rejecting the null will indicate that the regression model does not falsify the
hypothesis under examination, and rules for rejecting the null of each alternate hypothesis
are provided below for each test.

Testing $H_1$: Is an insurgent group more likely to adopt terrorism when the government
they oppose is a democracy?

The first hypothesis ($H_1$) proposes a relationship between the adoption of
terrorism by an insurgent group and the regime type of the government they oppose.
Therefore, the null for $H_1$ is an insurgent group is no more likely to adopt terrorism when
the regime type of the government they oppose is a democracy compared to any other
type of government. In order to reject the null of $H_1$ two conditions must be met. First,
the log odds value for the regime type dummy variable must be positive and significant at
an alpha of at least 0.1. Second, the results for the autocratic regime type dummy
variable cannot show a positive log odds value that is statistically significant at an alpha
of 0.1 or less. The second testing criteria is required to reduce the probability of a Type I
error where an incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis (false positive with respect to $H_1$)
would occur due to a possible curvilinear relationship between regime type and the
adoption of terrorism by an insurgent group.

In the sample, all three regression models predict a very strong positive
correlation between the adoption of terrorism and a democratic regime type while
controlling for all other variables at an alpha of at least 0.1. Model A shows that the log odds of an insurgent group adopting terrorism in the sample increases by 5.25 times (525%) when they oppose democracies compared to non-democracies while controlling for all other variables. Model B shows that the log odds of an insurgent group adopting terrorism in the sample increases by 8.06 times (806%) when they oppose democracies compared to non-democracies while controlling for all other variables. Finally, in Model C the log odds of an insurgent group adopting terrorism in the sample increased by 9.56 times (956%) when they oppose democracies compared to non-democracies while controlling for all other variables. The slightly higher log odds score in Model B compared to Model A is somewhat surprising given the fact that the dependent variable in Model B (used terrorism dummy B) codes possible cases of terrorism as did not use terrorist tactics. This indicates that most of the cases where only possible use of terrorist tactics was present were cases where the insurgent group opposed either an autocracy or anocracy.

As for the second criteria for testing $H_1$, all three models fail to produce any statistically significant results for the Autocracy dummy variable which fails to provide evidence of a curvilinear relationship between the adoption of terrorism and regime type in the sample. Therefore, the analysis rejects the null of $H_1$, and this study cannot falsify $H_1$ which states an insurgent group is more likely to adopt terrorism when the regime type of the government they oppose is a democracy.
Testing $H_2$: Is an insurgent group with separatist goals more likely to adopt terrorism compared to an insurgent group with a goal to gain control of the central government?

The null of $H_2$ assumes that the insurgent group’s goals do not matter with respect to the likelihood for an insurgent group to adopt terrorism. That is, insurgent groups with separatist goals are just as likely to adopt terrorism compared to insurgent groups with goals related to gaining control of the central government. In order to reject the null of $H_2$ the log odds for the insurgent group goal type must be positive and significant at an alpha of at least 0.1.

The regression models produce mixed results for the strength and direction of the log odds statistic for the insurgent group goal type variable, but none of the models produced statistically significant results for the variable. Consequently, this test fails to reject the null of $H_2$ and suggests that the adoption of terrorism is explained by randomness as much as it is by the effects of an insurgent group’s goal type.

Testing $H_3$: Are weaker insurgent groups more likely to adopt terrorism compared to stronger insurgent groups?

The null of $H_3$ assumes that weak insurgent groups are just as likely to adopt terrorist tactics compared to relatively strong insurgent groups. The regression models produce mixed results concerning a correlation between the adoption of terrorism and the five indicators of relative insurgent group strength. Some indicators unanimously produce statistically significant results across the three models, some indicators are less consistently significant, some indicators produce results that consistently fall just short of significance, and some appear to only be explained by randomness. In order to reject the
null of $H_3$ for each indicator of insurgent group strength, the log odds must be negative and statistically significant at an alpha of at least 0.1.

*Central Command*

When examining the strength of the insurgent groups’ central command as an indicator of insurgent group strength, the hypothesis test rejects the null of $H_3$ because the log odds score is positive and statistically significant in all three models.

Model A has the highest increase in the log odds of an insurgent group to adopt terrorist tactics as the relative strength of the central command also increases. Model A shows that the log odds of adopting terrorist tactics in the sample increases by 2.24 times (243%) for each higher level of central command strength while controlling for all other variables at an alpha of 0.005.

Among the three models, Model B has the lowest increase in the log odds of an insurgent group to adopt terrorist tactics as the relative strength of the central command increases. Model B shows the log odds of adopting terrorism in the sample increases by 90% for each higher level of central command strength while controlling for all other variables at an alpha of 0.1.

Model C’s results fall in between the first two models for both the strength of correlation and significance level. Model C shows the log odds of adopting terrorist tactics in the sample increases by 2.04 times (204%) for each higher level of central command strength while controlling for all other variables at an alpha of .01.

Given the unanimous results among all three models showing a statistically significant correlation in the opposite direction of what $H_3$ proposes, this test can
reasonably falsify H₃ when using the strength of an insurgent group’s central command as a measure of insurgent group strength.

**Mobilization Capacity**

Only Model B produced a statistically significant result for the mobilization capacity variable within the sample, but the correlation is positive and is therefore in the opposite direction of what H₃ predicts. The log odds of adopting terrorism in Model B increased by 125% for each higher level of insurgent group mobilization capacity while controlling for all other variables at an alpha of .05.

In addition to a correlation in the opposite direction than the hypothesis predicts, two models, do not produce any statistically significant results for the sample population. Therefore, the hypothesis testing fails to reject the null of H₃ assuming that mobilization capacity is a valid indicator of insurgent group strength.

**Arms Procurement Capability**

All three regression models suggest a negative correlation between arms procurement capability and the likelihood for an insurgent group to adopt terrorism, but only Models B and C produce statistically significant results for the variable.

Model B had the highest log odds scores and the lowest significance level for the arms procurement indicator. In Model B the log odds of adopting terrorism in the sample decreases by 78.4% for each higher level of insurgent group arms procurement capability while controlling for all other variables at an alpha of 0.05.

Model C also produced statistically significant results for the variable, and it shows the log odds of adopting terrorism in the sample decreases by 71.1% for each
higher level of insurgent group arms procurement capability while controlling for all other variables at an alpha of 0.1.

Because two models, including the Model C with the highest r-squared value, reject the null of H$_3$ with statistically significant negative correlations between the adoption of terrorism and arms procurement capability, the hypothesis testing cannot confidently falsify H$_3$ assuming that arms procurement capability is a valid measure of insurgent group strength.

*Fighting Capacity*

Only Model B produced a statistically significant result for the fighting capacity variable within the sample, but the correlation is also positive and is therefore in the opposite direction of what H$_3$ predicts. The log odds of adopting terrorism in Model B increased by 90.7% for each higher level of insurgent group mobilization capacity while controlling for all other variables at an alpha of .1.

In addition to a correlation in the opposite direction than the hypothesis predicts two of the models do not produce any statistically significant results for the sample population. Therefore, the hypothesis testing for the fighting capacity variable also fails to reject the null of H$_3$ assuming that mobilization capacity is a valid indicator of insurgent group strength.

*Territorial Control*

All of the models fell just short of producing statistically significant log odds scores for the territorial control variable but in the opposite direction than what H$_3$
predicts. Therefore, the test rejects the null hypothesis and falsifies $H_3$ when considering territorial control as an indicator of insurgent group strength.

**Testing $H_4$: Are insurgent groups with foreign support more likely to adopt terrorist tactics than insurgent groups without foreign support?**

The null for $H_4$ states that insurgent groups with foreign support are just as likely to adopt terrorism than insurgent groups without foreign support. None of the models reached statistical significance for a correlation between foreign support in general and an insurgent group’s adoption of terrorism. Therefore, the results of the regression models do not provide any evidence to reject the null of $H_4$. In addition, this suggests that the adoption of terrorism in the sample population can be explained by randomness as much as it is by the mere presence of foreign support without considering the provider or level of foreign support.

**Testing $H_5$: Are insurgent groups who receive material and direct foreign support more likely to adopt terrorism compared to insurgent groups who receive only passive and indirect foreign support?**

In testing $H_5$, the type of support is examined without regard for the benefactor type (state actor or non-state actor). The null of $H_5$ states that insurgent groups who receive direct material support are no more likely to adopt terrorism than insurgent groups who receive only indirect passive support. In order to reject the null of $H_5$, the log odds for the specific variable under examination must be negative and statistically significant at an alpha of at least 0.1.
As already noted in the testing for H₄, there were no statistically significant results for the foreign support variable which also measured the type of foreign support for an insurgent group. Therefore this test also fails to reject the null of H₅, and falsifies H₅ when examining the effects of the level of foreign support without regard for the type of actor providing the foreign support.

Testing H₆: Are insurgent groups that receive foreign support primarily from an external non-state actor more likely to use terrorist tactics than a group that receives foreign support from a state actor?

The results of testing the previous hypothesis (H₅) were mixed when considering the levels of non-state actor state actor support. Therefore, the results of testing H₆ are ever more important. For the purposes of hypothesis testing, the null of H₆ is that there is no difference in the likelihood for an insurgent group to adopt terrorism based on the source of the foreign support they receive. In order to reject the null of H₆, the benefactor type variable must have a negative log odds value that is statistically significant at an alpha of at least 0.1.

None of the regression models produced a statistically significant result for the benefactor type variable. Moreover, all three models suggested a negative correlation that would have rejected the null if they reached the alpha threshold. Therefore, the results of the test fails to reject the null of H₆ and falsifies H₆ when only considering the benefactor type without regard for the level of foreign support.
Testing \( H_7 \): Are insurgent groups that receive direct material foreign support from state actors more likely to adopt terrorism than insurgent groups who receive only indirect passive support from state actors?

The null of \( H_7 \) is that insurgent groups who receive direct material support from state actors are no more likely to adopt terrorism than insurgent groups who receive only indirect passive support from state actors. In order to reject the null of \( H_7 \) the log odds for the level of state actor support variable must be positive and significant at an alpha of at least 0.1.

While all of the regression models produced a positive log odds score for the level of state actor support variable, none of the models came anywhere near close to being statistically significant. Consequently, this test fails to reject the null of \( H_7 \) and suggests that the adoption of terrorism and the level of state actor support is random in the sample population of insurgent groups.

Testing \( H_8 \): Are insurgent groups that receive direct material foreign support from non-state actors more likely to adopt terrorism than insurgent groups who receive only indirect passive support from non-state actors?

The null of \( H_8 \) is that insurgent groups who receive direct material support from non-state actors are no more likely to adopt terrorism than insurgent groups who receive only indirect passive support from non-state actors. In order to reject the null of \( H_8 \) the log odds for the level of non-state actor support variable must be positive and also significant at an alpha of at least 0.1.

All of the regression models produced a positive log odds score for the level of non-state actor support variable, and Models A and C both produced statistically
significant results at an alpha of 0.1. Model A’s log odds score showed that the adoption of terrorism in the sample was 1.71 times (171%) more likely to occur when insurgent groups received direct material foreign support from a non-state actor compared to when they only received indirect passive support from foreign non-state actors. Model C produced very similar results showing that insurgent groups in the sample that received direct material support from foreign non-state actors were 1.76 times (176%) more likely to adopt terrorism compared to insurgent groups who only received indirect passive support from foreign non-state actors. Consequently, this rejects the null of $H_8$ and provides evidence of a statistically significant correlation in the sample between the level of foreign non-state actor support provided to an insurgent group and the adoption of terrorism.

*Controlling for the End of the Cold War*

The last variable controlled for within the regression models was the end of the Cold War as measured by the time period in which the intrastate war occurred. The results for the time period variable varied slightly across the three regression models and one of the models actually produced statistically significant results.

Model A was the only model to show a positive correlation between the likelihood of adopting terrorism and the end of the Cold War. Model A was also the only model that produced statistically significant results for the variable. In Model A, the log odds of adopting terrorism in the sample population increased by 48.1% for each later time period at an alpha of 0.1 while controlling for all other variables. In Model B, the log odds of adopting terrorism decreased by 31.3% for each later time period while controlling for all other variables, but the significance levels was only 0.205. In Model
C, the log odds of adopting terrorism decreased by 43.1\% for each later time period while controlling for all other variables, and it was almost statistically significant with a significance level of 0.12.

Still, the statistically significant results for the time period variable shown in Model A indicate that its inclusion helped the regression model’s ability to predict the effects of the other variables in the model. Therefore, it is an important variable to control for in an analysis such as this one.

**Conclusion of Quantitative Analysis**

When looking at the entire set of results across all three regression models, the most obvious observation is that the models produced some important differences when comparing the results for specific variables. Comparing the difference in log odds scores among the models shows that in most instances the log odds varied by at least 10\% for the same variable. The differences were not confined to just the results that did not reach statistical significance either. Many of the variables that produced statistically significant results also showed some of the largest differences in log odds scores across the models. This indicates that the way in which the dependent variable is coded matters a great deal, and therefore, the use of multiple models to analyze the dependent variable was appropriate, even if it produce conflicting results.

The second observation that stands out is that the results across all three regression models were most consistent in producing statistically significant results for regime type, insurgent group central command strength, arms procurement capability, and for the level of non-state actor support. All four of these variables had at least two out of three models produce statistically significant results for them. Apart from these
four variables, only the mobilization capacity and fighting capacity variables produced statistically significant results from at least one regression model. However, both the mobilization and fighting capacity variables produced significant results from only Model B, the model with worst ability to predict the outcome for cases where the adoption of terrorism occurred (Yes cases). In general, the results for the indicators of insurgent group strength were more statistically significant than the results for the variables that addressed foreign support. Moreover, the regime type variable could be considered the most consistently significant across all of the models. To summarize, the following variables were found to be statistically significant in at least one regression model as shown in Table 3.1: democratic regime type, central command strength, mobilization capacity, arms procurement capability, fighting capacity, and level of non-state actor support.

However, there were several variables across all three models that fell just short of an alpha level to qualify for statistical significance. This leads one to conclude that the precision of the statistical analysis and its ability to produce even more meaningful results could be improved with future research that identifies and adds additional cases to the sample population.

Also, the pseudo r-squared values and the predictability levels discussed earlier and shown in Table 3.2 were fairly moderate for all of the models. In order to enhance the precision and predictability of the statistical model further, additional research is required to identify and add new independent variables to the model.

In summarizing the results of the hypothesis testing, it is first worth noting what the results do not tell us. First, the results for testing $H_2$ provided no evidence to suggest
that insurgent groups with separatist goals were any more likely to adopt terrorism than insurgent groups fighting for control of a central government. Also, there is not enough evidence to confidently support the proposition that the provision of foreign support in general without considering the type or source of support makes insurgent groups more likely to adopt terrorism.

Moreover, there are several variables related to insurgent group strength and foreign support that have results just shy of statistical significance. If the alpha level were moved to 0.25, only the autocracy regime type, insurgent group goal type, and level of state actor support variables would not produce a statistically significant result from at least one model. However, to maintain the integrity of the analysis, this study’s conclusion is left with less than overwhelming evidence in support of or in opposition to a few hypotheses. Again, additional cases identified and added to the models would likely produce some additional statistically significant results for some variables.

Still, the results of the hypothesis testing did accomplish some very important tasks. First, the study could not falsify \( H_1 \), and therefore the statistical evidence supports the proposition that insurgent groups are more likely to adopt terrorism when the government they oppose is a democracy.

Second, the results for testing \( H_3 \) provided some valuable insight into the nature of the relationship between insurgent group strength and the adoption of terrorism. Four of the five indicators of insurgent group strength falsified \( H_3 \), and only the arms procurement indicator produced statistically significant results that did not falsify \( H_3 \). Therefore, if insurgent group strength is measured solely by arms procurement capability, then an insurgent group is statistically more likely to adopt terrorism as their arms
procurement capability is diminished. However, the same is not true when measuring insurgent group strength by strength of central command, mobilization capacity, fighting capacity, or territorial control. Moreover, the indicators for strength of central command, mobilization capacity, and fighting capacity produced some statistically significant results suggesting exactly opposite of what H₃ predicts in that the adoption of terrorism is statistically more likely as insurgent groups improve in these three indicators of strength. At a minimum, the conflicting statistical results for testing H₃ advises that the simple weapon of the weak argument is in fact too simple, and the theory needs refined.

As for the nature of the relationship between the adoption of terrorism and foreign support, the results do provide some insight and help narrow the focus for potential future research. This is a significant accomplishment given the fact that there is no existing scholarship addressing the specific relationship between the two concepts. In this respect, the statistically significant results for the level of non-state actor support variable supports H₈. This is encouraging for the advancement of research on the topic because it can help focus future research on the differences between support provided by state versus non-state actors and specifically the level and type of foreign support provided by non-state actors.

Finally, this analysis also provides some evidence to suggest that the end of the Cold War may not have much of a determining factor for the adoption of terrorism, if at all. Therefore, future research should not shy away from identifying, researching, coding, and adding additional conflicts to the sample population even if they occur well before 1972.
In summary, the statistically significant correlations in this quantitative analysis show that the most likely insurgent groups to adopt terrorism in the sample are those who opposes a democratic government, have a strong central command, have a high mobilization capacity, have a low arms procurement capability, have a high fighting capacity, and have received direct material foreign support from a non-state actor. This conclusion takes a step closer to answering the question of when insurgents go terrorist, but statistical correlation still cannot prove causation. The next two chapters examine the hypotheses further using two in-depth case studies of insurgent groups involved in intrastate wars.
Chapter Four
The Sri Lankan Tamils: Going Terrorist in a Tropical Paradise

Introduction

Sri Lanka is an island nation located just off the Southeastern shore of India separated by only 18 miles of ocean at the narrowest point between the two countries. Sri Lanka has some of the most prized natural seaports with deep waters close to shore, and it is home to one of the only ports in the Indian Ocean capable of harboring large commercial and naval ships making it a geographically strategic island nation. As such the island’s inhabitants are no stranger to foreign influence, and foreign actors have played very important roles in shaping the country’s history and political landscape. This chapter examines the Sri Lankan conflict between the modern Sri Lankan government and the Tamil speaking ethnic groups. The goal of this case study is to determine the role of foreign support, among other factors, in the decision made by various Tamil groups to adopt terrorist tactics.

This case study proceeds by providing background information about the conflict in Sri Lanka including pertinent information about the parties involved and the island nation’s demographic and political profile. This chapter then examines the conflict through the lens of each competing hypothesis concerning the causes of terrorism while
demonstrating how the evidence either supports or dismisses a causal relationship between the variables. Finally, this chapter concludes by summarizing the causal links uncovered in the case study which will permit a determination about the level of influence that foreign support had on the Tamil insurgency’s use or constraint of terrorist tactics compared to the other factors commonly cited as causes of terrorism.

The Seeds of Insurgency: Ethnic Conflict and Self-Determination in Sri Lanka

Upon gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1948, Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) contained several ethnic groups who still cohabitate the island nation to this day. Of the roughly 20 million people who currently reside on Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese speaking people, referred to as the Sinhala, comprise about 75% of the population and are predominantly Buddhist. The second largest group is the Sri Lankan Tamils who comprise about 11% of the population and are predominantly Hindu. Moors of Arab descent make up another 9% of the population. Another 4% of the population is Indian Tamil, a distinct ethnic group from the Sri Lankan Tamils, who came to the island during British rule to provide manual labor for Tea, Rubber, and other types of plantations. The remaining 1% of the population is comprised mostly of Burghers of Eurasian descent and Sri Lankan Malays.11

Although they all share the same island which is only about 140 miles across at its widest and about 270 miles from the southern shores to the northern peninsula of Jaffna, the major ethnic groups in Sri Lanka are geographically separated to a large extent. Although Sinhalese are found all across Sri Lanka, they are an overwhelming majority in

the western, central, and southern districts of the country. The Sinhalese also maintain a large majority of the population in most of Sri Lanka’s major cities including the de facto capital city of Colombo. On the other hand, some pockets of Tamils are found in most major cities across the country, but they are largely concentrated in the northern and eastern districts including the strategically important Trincomalee seaport in the east and the easily defended Jaffna Peninsula in the north where they are a clear majority.12

While the island’s population has grown from about six million people at independence to about 20 million people today, the proportion of the population allocated to each ethnic group and the geographic dispersion of each group has remained relatively stable over time except for the repatriation of about half of the Indian Tamil population back to India shortly after independence.13 Although the proportion of the Sri Lanka population that each ethnic group represents has not changed much, the level of Sinhalese nationalism, the level of intensity in which the Tamils have sought independence, and the level of violence used by all parties in the conflict has dramatically changed over the same period as explained below.

Growing Ethnic Tension in Post-Colonial Sri Lanka

Tension among and between the various Sri Lankan ethnic groups has been present for much of the island’s modern history. Under British rule the Tamils excelled and were well represented among Sri Lanka’s educated and skilled workforce, and they were prevalent among the middle and upper classes of society. However, Sinhalese

citizens were underrepresented among these same classes compared to their share of the country’s population. Prior research indicates that feelings of disadvantage were strong among the Sinhala, and the Sinhala believed that the Tamils exploited British preference to their expense (Horowitz 1985:141-56; Peebles 1990, 32). Until independence in 1948, and the subsequent withdrawal of the British Royal Navy a few years later, these ethnic tensions were held mostly in check.

After the British withdrawal from Sri Lanka, Sinhalese political groups guided by Buddhist clergy began to use their super majority in government to push through ‘Sinhala Only’ policies which exacerbated ethnic divisions on the island. Almost immediately after independence, the Sinhalese set their targets on the Indian Tamils who enjoyed some limited franchise and voted in elections up until independence (Rupesinghe 1988, 343). The Indian Tamils were a natural and easy target for the Sinhala because they came to the island under British invitation to work plantations, were ethnically distinct from the Sri Lankan Tamils, and were a source of mobilization for Marxism on the island. Within three years the Sinhalese majority enacted a series of laws that disenfranchised the Indian Tamils rendering them “stateless,” and most were left to determine their fate with the Indian government (Rupesinghe 1988, 343).

During the first three decades of Sri Lankan independence, the Sinhala dominated the central government and continued to target minority groups with chauvinistic legislation, and Sinhalese factions actively incited riots against Tamils as they jockeyed for power. James Manor and Gerald Segal (1985) cited the rise of Sinhalese nationalism and the political exploitation of a perceived Tamil threat:

Sinhalese tend to regard Indians in general and Tamils in particular as both inferior and dangerously resourceful…Yet despite this scorn for Indians and
Tamils, Sinhalese also tend to fear their capacity for hard work and rather devious intelligence. The substantial achievements of Sri Lanka's Tamils in business and the professions have caused anxiety and resentment among many Sinhalese. These Sinhalese (mis)perceptions have contributed to all of the outbursts of anti-Tamil rioting since 1956 (Manor and Segal 1985).

As tensions grew and as the government established policies to increase the political, economic, and educational advantage of Sinhalese citizens, the Tamils began calling for greater autonomy and eventually for independence from Sri Lanka. With the Tamils forming small militias and the Sri Lankan security forces deploying to Tamil majority districts, both sides gradually militarized their struggle during the 1970s (Manor and Segal 1985, 1171). During the same period, both sides became more radical as moderates were shoved aside, or in too many instances, killed off. By 1983 Sri Lanka was primed for war between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil insurgency.

**Belligerents and Allies in a Paradise Lost**

On July 23, 1983 members of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ambushed a Sri Lankan Army patrol near Jaffna and killed 13 Sinhalese soldiers in the attack (Globe and Mail 1983). The Sri Lankan Army responded by taking out revenge on the Tamils in Jaffna, and 51 unarmed Tamil civilians were killed in the hours that followed the ambush (Hyndman, 2007: 364). Communal violence and ethnic riots across the country ensued for the next two weeks as Sinhalese citizens continued the path of revenge by attacking Tamil people, homes, businesses, and factories. Following the riots, official estimates cited 400 dead, but the actual number of Tamils killed was likely much higher according to other accounts (Manor and Segal, 1985: 1170). This marked the
official beginning of the armed conflict that would push the Tamil insurgency and Sri Lankan government to open warfare for the next 25 years.

The major participants in the Sri Lankan conflict include the Sinhala dominated Sri Lankan government, the Tamils, and the Indian government. Although each of the three major belligerents held mostly unified goals among their constituencies, there were still highly competitive factions within each group that also led to in-group violence that was just as brutal as the tactics used against their common enemies. The following conflict participant descriptions provide an overview of the major factions within each belligerent group.

*The Sinhala*

At first glance the Sinhalese majority in Sri Lanka seems like a unified nationalist movement, but there were factions and smaller political entities within the group. The driving force behind the “Sinhala Only” campaign was the Sangha, the community of Buddhists monks in Sri Lanka. The Sangha monks were highly revered in the Sinhala community and they exacerbated the notion that Sinhalese citizens were the “chosen people” of Buddhism and Sri Lanka was their spiritual homeland. They believed that any group other than the Sinhala, whether European colonial powers or Tamils, were simply temporary inhabitants of the island who were a threat to the purity of Buddhism and were expected to eventually go home. Given the Sangha’s elevated status with the majority Buddhist society, this relatively small group held influence over the population and its politics well beyond their numbers, and other Sinhalese political parties in the Sri Lankan government were often fearful of losing their support.

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Both of the two dominant Sinhalese political parties acquiesced to the Sangha to a large degree. The most closely aligned party was the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) who fully embraced Buddhist chauvinism and relied on the Sangha to carry their message of Sinhalese nationalism throughout Sri Lanka. While directly competing with the SLFP for Sinhalese leadership, the United National Party (UNP) also continually yielded to the Sangha and compromised with rising anti-Tamil sentiment. Sri Lankan politics has been dominated by coalitions built around the competition between the SLFP, UNP, and their offshoots since the island’s independence.

There were also some far-left Sinhalese communist groups in Sri Lanka, some of whom occasionally formed political coalitions with the dominant SLFP and UNP. However, the most extreme group was the revolutionary Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) whose goal was to overthrow the central government and replace it with a Politburo. Although the JVP did not play a direct role in the conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamils, they were implicated in some of the violence carried out against the Tamils during the 1983 riots (Tempest 1987). The JVP was also a consistent security threat forcing the Sri Lanka military to split its attention between the Tamils seeking autonomy in the north and east and the JVP launching attempted coups from the south and center of the island.

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17 Sri Lanka Department of Elections, Past Election Results: http://www.slelections.gov.lk/pastElection.html
The Tamils

During the height of fighting in the 1980s, there were over 30 individual Tamil groups fighting for an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka.\(^{18}\) Of the numerous Tamil groups, there were seven groups (one non-violent, and six militant organizations) who played significant roles over the course of the conflict.

The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) won 18 seats in parliament during its debut election in 1977, and since that time it has been largely recognized as the legitimate political wing of the Tamil independence movement in Sri Lanka.\(^{19}\) The TULF’s membership was often characterized as consisting of the older generation and more conservative Tamils who were committed to non-violence (Freudenheim and Giniger 1983). Despite being blamed for political violence by Sinhalese presidents, no terrorist incidents have been attributed to the TULF according to the RDWTI or the GTD. In fact, the TULF was often the target of terrorism rather than a perpetrator of it as evidenced by numerous TULF political leaders, both at the national and local levels who have been assassinated by competing Tamil extremist groups.\(^{20}\)

The People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) was originally a militant Tamil organization that eventually came to support the Sri Lankan government after the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) intervention. The PLOTE was well known for their mercenary role in the 1988 failed coup attempt to overthrow the government of Sri Lanka.

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\(^{19}\) Sri Lanka Department of Elections, Past Election Results: http://www.slelections.gov.lk/pastElection.html

\(^{20}\) Over 30 moderate Tamil politicians were assassinated during the Sri Lank a conflict, among them include the high profile public assassination of the former Jaffna Mayor by LTTE founder, V. Prabahakaran, the three Tamil moderates in September, 1985 (The New York Times 1985), the assassination of the top TULF politician, Appapillai Amirthalingam in July 1989 (The Guardian 1986), the assassination Sarojini Yogeswaran, the first woman elected as mayor of Jaffna in 1998 (QNP 1998), and the 1999 targeted suicide bomb attack that killed TULF leader, Neelam Tiruchelvam (Jayamaha 1999).
the Maldives (Aryasinha 1997), and they had a reputation for being able to form international partnerships. Only two terrorist incidents with civilian targets have been attributed to PLOTE, and both incidents resulted in no casualties. When the group was eclipsed by the ruthlessness of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) after the IPKF withdrawal, many of their cadre pragmatically turned to the Sri Lankan government side to save themselves from the LTTE’s brutality. By 1990 there was no denying that PLOTE was fully cooperating with Sri Lankan security forces and was mobilized against the LTTE. Effectively, the group merged out of existence and operated as a paramilitary organization on the Sri Lankan government’s behalf until the end of the conflict (Bosleigh 2009).

The Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS) was a Tamil revolutionary group formed in 1977 by members of the Tamil diaspora in London. It operated throughout the 1980s committing a limited number of terrorist acts before the group split. Most of the membership merged with the more militant LTTE by 1990 while others fled the island. The group’s leadership remained in London for most of the conflict and appeared to be more committed to non-violence than were its rank and file members in Sri Lanka (McLean 2005).

The Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) was a splinter group of EROS that broke off in 1980 with a more Marxist political outlook. The EPRLF enjoyed strong support from India in both arms and military training (Kantha 2006). The EPRLF and its members were viciously targeted by the rival LTTE after they challenged

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21 The GTD records a total of four suspected terrorist incidents attributed to the PLOTE. One incident was targeted an armed Sri Lankan military unit, and the other incidents targeted three leaders of the rival TELO but the attackers were never completely confirmed as members of the PLOTE.

22 The GTD attributed two terrorist incidents to EROS in the 1980s, one being the targeted assassination of an LTTE member and the other a kidnapping of a British journalist who was later released.
the group for political leadership of the Tamil movement. Up until November of 1986 the EPRLF was thought to be better armed and better trained than any of the other Tamil groups, but in a surprise action the LTTE swept EPRLF camps throughout Sri Lanka killing and taking prisoner a large number of militants and commandeering EPRLF weapons and supplies (Rettie 1986). Prior to the LTTE sweep, there were no terrorist incidents targeting civilians attributed to the EPRLF.23 However, in late 1989 there were three terrorist incidents attributed to the EPRLF that killed a total of four people.24

As a result of the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord, Tamil militant groups were required to give up their weapons in exchange for the presence of the IPKF on the island. The EPRLF complied with the request to disarm on the condition that the LTTE release 13 EPRLF prisoners and the IPKF guarantee security for the group. The EPRLF remained politically relevant among the Tamils, sweeping many of the regional elections, until the IPKF pulled out of Sri Lanka in March 1990. Left unarmed and defenseless to the LTTE who made only a token offer to disarm by turning in a mere 10 sub-machineguns (Rettie 1987), most of the EPRLF leadership left the island for Tamil Nadu in India while many of the rank and file EPRLF members ended up in refugee camps (De Silva 1990).

The Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) was another rival Tamil militant group formed around the leadership of two students in Jaffna who originally came from the fishing community of Velvettiturai, nicknamed “smuggler’s paradise”

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23 Prior to November 1986, the GTD attributed 4 terrorist incidents to the EPRLF that targeted Sri Lankan security forces. However, these four incidents did not appear in the RWDTI likely because they did not meet the criteria of deliberately targeting civilians. Also, there was a report in The Guardian Weekly (1985) that attributed the 1984 kidnapping of two suspected CIA officers to the EPRLF.

24 Two of the three terrorist incidents targeted the LTTE leadership for assassination in retaliation of the LTTE sweeps. The third incident targeted a police officer, but resulted in only injury.
(Richardson 2005, 350). The two leaders later became known by their aliases, ‘Thangadurai’ and ‘Kuttimani’ as TELO established itself as a leading Tamil militant organization in the early 1980s (Swamy 2002, 24-25). TELO gained the confidence of Tamil Nadu’s Chief Minister in neighboring India and reportedly received support from India’s clandestine Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) (J. Richardson 2005, 351). TELO’s two founders along with 28 other Tamil militants were later imprisoned outside Colombo where they were subsequently killed when the 1983 riots filtered into the Colombo prison where they were held.25 Some terrorist incidents and assassinations targeting both Sinhalese and the LTTE were attributed to TELO during the 1980s as the group fought for leadership of the Tamil movement. However, the LTTE eventually eliminated the TELO threat on April 30, 1986 when LTTE hit squads simultaneously attacked 24 different TELO camps killing the majority of their cadre while they slept (J. Richardson 2005, 531). Most of the TELO survivors were hunted down and killed in the following days with no quarter given to those who attempted surrender (J. Richardson 2005, 531).

The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) or simply the “Tigers” was founded in 1976 by a charismatic leader named Velupillai Prabhakaran (O’Ballance 1989, 13). The LTTE maintained an unwavering goal of complete independence throughout the three decades of armed conflict. While leading the group’s predecessor organization, the Tamil New Tigers (TNT), Prabhakaran committed his first act of political violence on July 27, 1975 when he personally assassinated Alfred Duraiappah, the former Tamil

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25 The deaths of political prisoners and “leaders of Tamil militants” inside the Colombo prison was first reported by the Associated Press on July 26, 1983. The prison riot continued for several more days, and later reports confirmed that both TELO leaders, Thangadurai and Kuttimani were among the prisoners who were literally butchered in their prison cells.
mayor of Jaffna, for cooperating with the Sinhalese led Sri Lanka government (O’Ballance 1989, 13). The LTTE was regarded as the most violent and ruthless Tamil insurgent group in the Sri Lankan conflict, and they dealt swiftly with moderate Tamils who sought non-violent political solutions with the Sinhalese government. Before the year 2000, the LTTE had assassinated 36 Tamil leaders who were labeled as traitors of the cause (Jayasinghe 1999). The RDWTI indicates that the LTTE conducted at least 250 separate terrorist attacks from 1983 to 2009 while the more liberal coding of terrorist incidents from the GTD indicates that the LTTE committed well over 1,000 separate attacks worldwide. After 1986 there was no real threat to the LTTE’s prominent position as the leading militant Tamil organization, and they remained in the top position until 2009 when Sri Lankan security forces militarily defeated and killed Prabhakaran.

In March of 2004, one of the LTTE’s senior leaders, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (a.k.a., Colonel Karuna), broke ranks with Prabhakaran and formed the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), commonly known as the Karuna Faction (Australian Foreign Press 2004, 14). The precise circumstances surrounding the split are murky, but Colonel Karuna openly complained about Prabhakaran’s preference for northern Tamils over those in the east where Karuna’s command was located, and Colonel Karuna questioned Prabhakaran’s strategy of using the ceasefire to rearm while outwardly negotiating a peaceful federal solution to the conflict (Buerk 2007). An estimated 6,000 former Tigers in the East along with the LTTE’s remaining arms procurement apparatus followed Colonel Karuna as his faction broke away (Ramesh

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26 The RDWTI uses Hoffman’s working definition of terrorism which considers other factors such as intent to harm or threaten civilians whereas the GTD’s criteria more loosely codes terrorist incidents to include unsuccessful attacks, attacks against other armed groups, and it includes a greater number of incidents that targeted property but resulted in no casualties.
Although there was little official documentation of the Karuna Faction defecting to the government side, it was highly suspected that Colonel Karuna was working in tandem with the government against the LTTE. There was virtually no confrontation between Karuna’s forces and the Sri Lankan Security forces in the east despite the two groups occupying immediately adjacent positions, and the events that led to the end of the conflict indicate that the Karuna Faction was closely cooperating with the Sri Lanka security forces in their pursuit of the LTTE.\textsuperscript{27} While there were no terrorist attacks attributed to the Karuna Faction that specifically targeted the Sri Lanka government, there were a total of 11 terrorist incidents attributed to the group and four of the attacks were against civilians in armed assaults or bombings resulting in at least 15 deaths.\textsuperscript{28}

Figures 4.1 and 4.2 provide a graphical representation of the point at which each major Tamil insurgent group adopted terrorism. Figure 4.1 shows the point at which each insurgent group adopted terrorism using the more conservative definition of terrorism that requires a deliberate attack on a civilian target. For comparison, Figure 4.2 shows the adoption of terrorism by each insurgent group when considering all types of targets including military targets that are included in the GTD. With the exception of the EPRLF, all of the Tamil insurgent groups’ first terrorist attack was against a civilian target. Therefore, the only difference between Figure 4.1 and 4.2 is the point at which the EPRLF adopted terrorism along the conflict timeline.

\textsuperscript{27} Near the end of the conflict in 2008, Colonel Karuna was commonly referred to in news media as an “ally of the government” (M. Richardson 2008).
\textsuperscript{28} The GTD records four terrorist incidents attributed to either the Karuna Faction or the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) that targeted “private citizens & property” resulting in 15 fatalities and 21 casualties.
Figure 4.1 – First Terrorist Attacks Committed by Tamil Insurgent Groups against Military or Civilian Targets

Figure 4.2 – First Terrorist Attacks Committed by Tamil Insurgent Groups against Civilian Targets
India and the IPKF

India had a continuous interest in and played a significant role in the Sri Lankan conflict. The level of Indian involvement over the course of the conflict was largely determined by India’s geopolitical interests as Edgar O’ballance explains:

When Mrs. Bandaranaike was Prime Minister of Ceylon (1960-65 and 1970-77) she had pursued a policy of non-alignment, which satisfied Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of India, who left the Island alone. When J. Jayawardene became Prime Minister of Ceylon in 1977 he began making contacts with foreign countries asking them for various forms of aid, which included the United States, Western European countries, China and Pakistan…Mrs. Gandhi decided to destabilize the Ceylonese government, and to give covert support to the Tamil insurgents (O’Ballance 1989, 14-15).

Indira Gandhi’s unofficial policy of destabilization did not seem to keep Sri Lanka from courting other foreign powers for assistance, and in a reversal, she began pressuring Tamil insurgent groups to seek a solution that did not demand complete independence. However, shortly after the suspected policy shift, the Prime Minister was assassinated by her own Sikh bodyguards.29

Mrs. Gandhi’s son and immediate successor Rajiv Gandhi was left to deal with the Sri Lanka problem. He continued to walk the line between showing support for the Tamil cause while not being seen as a sponsor of terrorism. While Rajiv Gandhi wanted the outward appearance of ratcheting down support for Tamil militancy, the Tamils still enjoyed refuge, training, and a steady supply of weapons from the Indian state of Tamil...

29 ABC News and other Associated Press Sources reported Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s assassination as being related to the communal conflict in India with the Sikhs and not as a result of her policy shift that began to cutoff support for the Tamils in Sri Lanka.
Nadu. While it is not clear if there was a true and sincere policy shift, the Indian authorities began seizing weapons en route to the island in an effort to show more interest in resolving the conflict through negotiations with the Sri Lankan government (O'Ballance 1989, 47-48).

Negotiations continued between India, the Sinhalese government, and some Tamil groups, and on July 29, 1987 the Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord was signed into effect with India as the guarantor of peace on the island (LaBelle 1987). Rioting and violence broke out immediately on both sides of the conflict among those who did not agree with the deal reached by their moderate representatives, and within 12 hours of signing the agreement the IPKF arrived in Sri Lanka (O'Ballance 1989, 93). The IPKF was never successful at disarming the LTTE despite spending over the equivalent of nearly $2.8 billion USD on the venture and losing the lives of 1,200 Indian soldiers in the process (Richardson 2005, 560-562). The IPKF began withdrawing from Sri Lanka in 1989 after the election of Prime Minister V. P. Singh and the last IPKF contingents left Sri Lanka in March of 1990. The IPKF involvement appeared to do very little to quell the violence on the island and had the net effect of disarming the more moderate Tamil groups leaving them defenseless to the LTTE after Indian withdrawal. Moreover, India paid a heavy price for their involvement when former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was killed by an LTTE suicide bomber while on his reelection campaign in Tamil Nadu.  

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30 There were no immediate claims of responsibility for the attack by a specific Tamil group, but an investigation revealed that the method and construction of the bomb matched those employed by the LTTE. LTTE conspirators and LTTE leadership was latter charged in absentia by the Indian government.
From Insurgency to Terrorism

With three decades of conflict in Sri Lanka, there is no shortage of events to examine when attempting to answer the question, when do insurgents go terrorist? For this reason, Sri Lanka is a critical case to test the competing hypotheses culled from the literature on the causes of terrorism. Evidence for or against the competing hypotheses is provided below by examining the events surrounding the adoption of terrorism by each of the major Tamil insurgent groups in reference to the independent variables cited in each hypothesis.

Insurgent Group Goals

All of the Tamil groups including the non-violent TULF and the ruthless LTTE unequivocally had separatist goals as evidenced by statements made by their leaders. In 1975, Tamil Member of Parliament and soon to be TULF leader S. J. V. Chelvanayakam (a.k.a., Chelva) asked:

Nations much smaller than the size and population claimed by the Tamils of Sri Lanka are governing and functioning as separate states. As such, why should the Tamils of Sri Lanka not agitate for a separate state whereby we can govern ourselves?  

Prabhakaran echoed the same separatist agenda when he maintained, “a separate state for minority Tamils is the only formula for lasting peace” (Reuters 1987).

Whereas the TULF stuck to their non-violent and democratic methods to achieve the goal, the LTTE devolved to terrorist tactics almost immediately to achieve the same goal when Prabhakaran assassinated the former Tamil Mayor of Jaffna in 1975. In

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31 The quote made by the TULF founder, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, was recorded by the journalist T. Sabaratnam in 1975 and later cited in a 2006 syndicated story in the Hindustan Times that commemorated moderate Tamils leaders.
addition, the GTD attributes this first act of terrorism and 10 other terrorist incidents to the LTTE prior to the 1983 riots that marked the beginning of the full-fledged insurgency in Sri Lanka. Therefore, it is clear that the LTTE adopted terrorism from the beginning of their struggle for independence.

Moreover, there were also other non-Tamil insurgent groups in Sri Lanka that adopted terrorism such as the JVP who did not have a separatist goal but instead had the goal of gaining control over the central government. Therefore, further inquiry beyond an insurgent group’s primary goal is required to explain the occurrence of terrorism in Sri Lanka, and the case of Sri Lanka does not support the hypothesis proposing that an insurgent group with a separatist goal is more likely to adopt terrorism compared to an insurgent group with the goal to gain control of the central government.

*Regime Type*

Since Sri Lanka’s independence from Britain, the regime type has gradually slid from democracy to anocracy. From 1948 to 1977 Sri Lanka had Polity scores well above the threshold to be coded as democratic. In fact, from 1970 to 1977, the years leading up to the establishment of many of the Tamil insurgent groups, Sri Lanka had its highest ever Polity score of 8 qualifying it as a democracy. During this same time period terrorist activity by Tamil groups was virtually non-existent with the exception of Prabhakaran’s assassination of Jaffna’s Mayor.33

32 The JVP made two major attempts to overthrow the Sri Lankan government, one in 1971 and another in 1987 while exploiting the uptick in violence between Sri Lankan security forces and the Tamils. Both the RDWTI and the GTD include terrorist attacks attributed to the JVP in a concerted effort to destabilize the Sri Lankan government.

33 The GDT qualified the assassination of Jaffna’s Mayor as a terrorist incident whereas the RDWTI did not.
In 1978 Sri Lanka’s Polity score slid to 6 following the election of the hard-nosed Sinhalese President Junius Richard Jayewardene who did more to encite anti-Tamil violence in the riots that followed his election than he did to quell them. In addition to not ordering security forces to quell the riots until three days after they began, Jayewardene also placed blame for the riots on the TULF when he warned them to “be careful of your words – such words can inflame people” (Associated Press Newswire - August 20, 1977 1977). In 1979, the LTTE began their terrorist campaign in earnest with two armed assaults and assassinations against government and civilian targets. However, the LTTE was still the only Tamil organization with verified terrorist attacks at that time.

Meanwhile, the TULF Members of Parliament continued to seek non-violent solutions, and in 1980 TULF leader A. Amirthalingam made a pact with President Jayewardene agreeing to a devolution of power to Tamil districts through a Federal system. In defense of his position to the more extreme militant Tamils, Amirthalingam explained, “the method of democracy is the ballot not the bullet” (Balachandran 2006).

In 1982 Sri Lanka’s Polity score fell to 5 and no longer qualified as democratic. The following year, LTTE insurgents ambushed Sri Lankan security forces near Jaffna, killing 13 Sinhalese soldiers. In retaliation, Sinhalese all across the country began rioting against the Tamil community. President Jayewardene outlawed any organization espousing separatism regardless of the tactics they employed. Effectively, the TULF vacated their seats in the Sri Lankan Parliament and they became a completely marginalized opposition party (Lammers 1983). With no democratic option left to achieve independence, numerous Tamil insurgent groups formed as the TULF leadership went underground.
The following year Tamil militancy turned to outright insurgency and terrorist activity surged. The TELO claimed responsibility for their first terrorist attack when they bombed a police station on the Jaffna Peninsula resulting in 29 deaths (Silver, Tamil Terror Attack 1984). By the end of 1984, there were a total of 94 separate terrorist incidents attributed to Tamil separatist groups to date. While many of the attacks were attributed to unnamed Tamil groups, both the EROS and the EPRLF joined the list of major insurgent groups who went terrorist by the end of 1986. Of the major insurgent groups in existence as Sri Lankan democracy broke down, only the PLOTE did not commit a terrorist attack.

The turn away from non-violent opposition coincided with the breakdown of the democratic process in Sri Lanka. Indicative of Sri Lanka’s Polity score, there were anti-democratic acts committed by the Sri Lankan government that all but eliminated a democratic option for attaining the Tamil’s separtist goals. Therefore, Sri Lanka provides little support for the hypothesis claiming that an insurgent group is more likely to adopt terrorism when the government they oppose is a democracy. Rather, Sri Lanka provides evidence showing the exact opposite.

Central Command Strength

When the LTTE adopted terrorism prior to the 1983 riots, Prabhakaran was still competing for leadership of both the Tamil insurgency as a whole and for the unquestioned leadership of the LTTE itself. As Tamil militancy began to grow in the

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early 1980s the younger more militant Tamils, or “the boys” as the TULF leadership referred to them, controlled the various independent insurgent groups (Hazarika 1984).

In the aftermath of the 1983 riots, TULF leadership took a backseat to “the boys” and leadership of the insurgency was starting to consolidate around the charismatic command of Prabhakaran. The death of TELO leaders that occurred during the Colombo prison riots and the marginalization of the TULF played to the favor of the LTTE, but the Tamil insurgency was still far from completely united around LTTE leadership. About 18 months after the 1983 riots, Paskal Cheret (1984) summarized the situation:

While the pogroms of July 1983 helped to unite the Tamil population in their rejection of the government's authority, the militant groups are having problems working together and hammering out a common programme. Various attempts at unification have so far all failed. It is hard to say which group has the broadest support, but the present success of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) stems from the fact that they are the best organised and most effective.

The Tamil leadership remained fragmented until after the IPKF withdrawal from Sri Lanka in 1990. By the end of the withdrawal, all of the major insurgent groups had committed at least one terrorist attack as shown above in Figure 4.1 at the beginning of this chapter.

In 2004 a faction of the LTTE became disillusioned with Prabhakaran and split away under the command of Colonel Karuna in the Eastern Province. The split effectively ended the LTTE’s unitary command and control of the Tamil insurgency, and the breakaway Karuna Faction began working with the Sri Lankan security forces to defeat Prabhakaran. The LTTE split also corresponded with a rise in terrorist activity,
and the new Karuna Faction recorded its first act of terrorism against a civilian target in March of 2005 killing six civilians and injuring three.\textsuperscript{35}

With respect to central command strength, it is plausible that a weak and fragmented command contributed to the adoption of terrorism in the early years of the conflict.

\textit{Mobilization Capacity}

Figure 4.3 shows the estimated troop levels of the Tamil insurgency during the course of the conflict. In comparison, Figure 4.4 shows the estimated troop levels of Sri Lankan forces during the same time. Keeping the definition of mobilization capacity as defined in Chapter 2, a comparison of the two tables reveals that Gleditsch et al. (2012) correctly classified the Tamil insurgency’s relative mobilization capacity as moderate in

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure43.png}
\caption{Tamil Insurgency Troop Levels}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{35} According to the GTD, the Karuna Faction’s first attack occurred on March 5, 2005 and was an armed assault against “private citizens & property.”
the Non-State Actor Dataset. The troop levels in the Tamil insurgency rose sharply during the 1980s, tapered off and decreased slightly during the 1990s, and then finally spiked in 2005 before sharply decreasing to zero in 2009. On the other hand, the Sri Lankan troop levels rose sharply in the late 1980s, remained steady during the 1990s, rose sharply again by 2000, and remained very high through the end of the conflict.

During the period before the 1983 riots, the Tamil insurgency’s mobilization capacity was at one of its lowest levels compared to the government, and only the LTTE was confirmed as having adopted terrorism. However, after the 1983 riots and the vacation of the TULF’s parliamentary seats, the recruitment pool among the Tamils swelled as anti-government sentiment rose and the mobilization capacity gap between the two sides was shrinking. By the end of 1985 the active insurgency was estimated to include between 6,000 and 10,000 militants (Wedel 1984; Jeyaraj 1985). At the same time, the Sri Lankan government had increased their active duty Army troop levels to

![Figure 4.4 – Sri Lanka Troop Levels](image)

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16,000, the Navy grew to about 4,000, and the Air Force grew to about 5,000 personnel for a total of 25,000 troops, but they still had to split their attention between the Tamils and the constant threat of the JVP so their superior numbers were never able to be fully concentrated against the Tamil insurgency.\(^{36}\)

Prior to the IPKF intervention, with the smallest mobilization capacity gap between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil insurgency, the TELO, EROS, and EPRLF all recorded their first terrorist attacks. However, during the IPKF intervention the Tamil insurgency’s comparative mobilization capacity was low compared to the government but, the PLOTE recorded their first terrorist attack. Therefore, the case of Sri Lanka reveals that the Tamil insurgency’s mobilization capacity appears to have no causal relationship to the adoption of terrorism in the conflict where some insurgent groups crossed the line into terrorism during periods of high mobilization capacity and some crossed the lined during periods of low relative mobilization capacity.

Arms Procurement Capability

After closely examining government documents, news articles, conflict data, and other first-hand accounts of the conflict, Gleditsch et al.’s (2012) summation of a low relative arms procurement capability is confirmed when looking at the conflict as a whole. However, the Tamil’s arms procurement capability was still quite impressive in its global reach and resilience to bounce back after suffering set-backs, and it was likely one of the most effective procurement systems compared to other insurgencies of its kind.

The Tamil insurgency took three primary approaches to procuring arms. The first was the Maoist approach that involved stealing and plundering weapons from a defeated

enemy. The second was the more traditional procurement method that required cash to purchase weapons through international black markets, and the third approach was the transformation of equipment and supplies meant for civilian use into military articles. The Tamils used all three procurement methods throughout the conflict while relying on some methods more than others.

In the years prior to the 1983 riots, the Tamil procurement network was not as robust, and the insurgent groups relied primarily on stealing weapons from bank guards and Sri Lankan security forces after successful ambushes. They also received some small amounts of weapons from the Tamils in Southern India as Sri Lankan Army Colonel Michael Silva admitted, “Many of the Tigers are armed with shotguns and .30-caliber hunting rifles, but some have automatic rifles and submachine guns taken from soldiers here or occasionally obtained in southern India (Claiborne 1983).” Prior to the 1983 riots, when the Tamil insurgency’s arms procurement capability was likely at its weakest, only the LTTE was verified to have adopted terrorism.

However after the 1983 riots, the Tamil insurgent groups ramped up their procurement capability by committing more bank robberies and procuring more weapons from external sources. In fact, during the mid-1980s many banks in Tamil controlled areas of Sri Lanka refused to open because their protection could not be guaranteed (Silver 1984). The Tamils also began to purchase arms on the black market financed by bank robberies and other international illicit activity such as drug trafficking, welfare fraud, and charitable giving schemes (Abel 1985; Heinrich 1986). There were also reports of Tamils smuggling weapons through Singapore (Nayar 1987) and actively targeting Australian munitions depots for theft. In 1986, 36 hand grenades and two
rounds of anti-tanks shells were stolen from an Australian Army base, and in a separate incident 1 million rounds of ammunition were stolen from an Australian munitions factory and shipped to Tamil insurgent groups in Sri Lanka (AAP 1986).

By 1985 shiploads of arms were being sent to the Tamil insurgency from across the Palk Straits in Tamil Nadu (Silver 1985). Testament to the Tamil’s arms procurement capability, the Indian Coast Guard seized two arms shipments en route to the EPRLF in March 1985 in what was later determined to be a token gesture by the Indian government while facilitating the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accords (Claude 1985). The first shipment contained an unspecified number of British-made hand grenades, machine guns and rifles, and the second shipment contained 1,400 automatic rifles, 300 sten guns (submachine guns), five Japanese-made field communications sets, three copy machines, and 40 million Francs (Claude 1985). At this time before the IPKF intervention, the Tamil insurgency likely enjoyed its highest level of arms procurement capability compared to the Sri Lankan government who announced a mere $20 to $26 million arms procurement appropriation to fight the Tamil separatists in 1984 followed by similar appropriations in the years to follow (Casinder 1984). During this period of moderate relative arms procurement capability, terrorist activity spiked for the Tamil insurgent groups who already adopted terrorism, and the TELO, EROS, and the EPRLF all committed their first act of terrorism.

After the IPKF intervention, the Indian government made a more proactive and sincere attempt to disrupt the Tamil insurgency’s procurement capability as the LTTE refused to disarm and began targeting the IPKF troops in Sri Lanka. Shipping arms directly from Tamil Nadu was more difficult after the intervention and the insurgency
had to develop longer logistical lines from other Southeast Asian countries (Ministry of Defence, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 2011). Additional evidence of a desperate arms procurement apparatus during the IPKF intervention was the discovery of make-shift Tamil munitions workshops to reload spent ammunition cartridges (Wigg 1987). The best that the Tamils could procure at the time where assault rifles, grenades, some mines, and other small arms (Brown 1987). In comparison, the Sri Lanka government freely received arms and ammunitions from Pakistan, South Africa, Israel, and Europe that included gunboats and helicopter gunships armed with rockets and 50mm cannons (Priestley 1987). However, terrorist activity by the LTTE spiked during IPKF intervention, and the reluctant PLOTE used terrorism against civilian targets for the first time in its history.

Looking at the conflict as a whole more groups adopted terrorism in Sri Lanka when the insurgency’s arms procurement capability was at an all-time high compared to the Sri Lankan government, but there were insurgent groups that crossed the line into terrorism during different periods of low arms procurement capability as well. Assuming that arms procurement capability is a valid measure of insurgent group strength, the case of Sri Lanka does not support the hypothesis that the weaker an insurgent group is, the more likely they are to adopt terrorist tactics.

_Fighting Capacity_

Prior to the 1983 riots the Tamil insurgency’s fighting capacity was on par with or stronger than the Sri Lankan security forces. The Sri Lankan Army lacked a counterinsurgent capability, and they were often ambushed on patrol, resulting in lopsided tactical victories for the insurgency. Summing up the relative fighting capacity
in the summer of 1982, the brigadier of Sri Lankan security forces in Jaffna said, “Conditions are trying, and the temptations to go berserk are great” (Selbourne 1982).

There were also some fairly lopsided victories for the Tamils in the years following the 1983 riots. For example, there was the successful multi-pronged attack on a national police complex in Chavakachcheri that involved 250 Tamil insurgents. After the attack the complex was razed and 130 police and Sri Lankan soldiers were dead while the Tamils suffered only 15 casualties in the fight (Athas, Curfew Ordered in Sri Lanka 1984).

According to Syed Rifaat Hussain, the Tamils and specifically the LTTE had superior dedication, organization, leadership, and tactical skills that allowed them to engage the Sri Lankan military decisively all the way up to the IPKF intervention (Hussain 2009, 9). It was during this period of near equal fighting capacity that all of the major insurgent groups in existence adopted terrorism except for the PLOTE who adopted terrorism during the IPKF intervention when the Tamil fighting capacity was diminished.

At the outset of the final phase of the conflict in March of 2004, the Karuna Faction broke away from the LTTE in the Eastern province and took a large portion of the LTTE’s fighting capacity with it. While it is difficult to verify the actual impact, Colonel Karuna himself said, “By our coming out of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, I mean by me leaving the LTTE, they have lost 70% of their fighting capacity” (Buerk 2007). Therefore, much of the LTTE’s former fighting capacity was bequeathed to the Karuna Faction, and they held no qualms about using terrorist tactics against their LTTE rival. The group also attacked a small number of civilian targets according to the
GTD and RDWTI, but it is difficult to find evidence linking their adoption of terrorism to the group’s fighting capacity.

In terms of fighting capacity, the Sri Lanka conflict does not provide enough evidence to support a direct causal relationship between a relatively weak fighting capacity and the adoption of terrorism where groups with comparable fighting capacities such as the LTTE and the PLOTE adopted terrorist tactics in different phases of the conflict and under very different circumstances.

**Territorial Control**

The territory in which the Tamils claimed as their nation included all of the Northern and Eastern provinces and the coastal region of the Northwestern province. Although two and a half of Sri Lanka’s nine provinces does not seem like much, these territorial claims encompass well over half of Sri Lanka’s coastline and most of the major port cities including the prized Trincomalee port. Figure 4.5 shows the areas in which the Tamils claim should be part of an independent Eelam. At no time during the conflict did the Tamil insurgency ever control the complete territorial claim. However, the insurgency did control sizable swaths of the Northern and Eastern provinces at various times throughout the conflict.
Tamil insurgent groups exercised very limited territorial control before the 1983 riots, and the LTTE was the only confirmed group to cross the line into terrorism at that time. However, as the armed insurgent groups grew after the marginalization of the TULF, Tamil insurgent groups become more authoritative and their territorial control grew. By January 1, 1987, the Sri Lankan Army was largely confined to their barracks inside an old fort in Jaffna City and the LTTE began implementing their plans for civil administration in the North including levying taxes, issuing postage stamps and motor vehicle registrations, operating three television stations, providing traffic police, and
providing some public transportation (Associated Press 1987). This period leading up to the IPKF intervention was the crest of Tamil territorial control, and the insurgency launched spectacular operations like the razing of the Northern province police station and the car bombing of the Central Bus Station in Colombo that killed 106 and injured 295 (Ministry of Defence, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 2011). During this period three of the major insurgent groups used terrorism for the first time.

In fulfilling a requirement of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, the Sri Lankan Security Forces withdrew from the Tamil populated areas and were replaced by the IPKF beginning in 1987. The IPKF were supposed to oversee the surrender of arms by the various insurgent groups, but the LTTE refused to turn in their weapons and opted instead to bury them in the ground and melt back into Tamil society for the moment (Landay 1987). The Tamils effectively ceded control of the major population centers to the IPKF, and the LTTE stopped providing basic traffic and law enforcement services in the cities they governed (Hamlyn 1987). During the ceding of territorial control to the IPKF, the PLOTE recorded their first verified act of terrorism against a civilian target according to the GTD.

In terms of strength gained from territorial control, the adoption of terrorism among the Tamil insurgent groups sometimes correlated with a lack of territorial control and other times correlated with it. If territorial control is indeed an indicator of insurgent group strength, the case of Sri Lanka does not support the hypothesis that a relatively weak insurgent group is more likely to adopt terrorism than a relatively strong insurgent group.
Foreign State-Actor Support

Due to the often clandestine nature of support provided to insurgent groups, it is not surprising that there is virtually no primary source documentation of official state actor support for the Tamil insurgency. However, there is near certainty among those involved and those familiar with the conflict that the Indian government did support the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka, including some direct material support during the early years of the conflict. Sandra Destradi’s (2012) prior research concluded:

“In the early 1980s, the state government of Tamil Nadu and the central government under Indira Gandhi supported Tamil rebel groups operating in Sri Lanka by providing them with military assistance and training, including on Indian territory. This support was related to Indira Gandhi’s desire not to alienate the potentially separatist Tamils in the state of Tamil Nadu and to punish the Sri Lankan government” (Destradi 2012, 600).

India of course steadfastly denied any level of official support for the Tamil insurgency throughout the conflict, but there is reason to seriously suspect that India’s hard stance against the Tamil insurgency was more of a hard stance against the LTTE rather than the Tamil insurgency as whole. Essentially, India’s opposition to the Tamil insurgency steadily hardened as the LTTE solidified its position as the sole embodiment of the insurgency.

In the years just before the IPKF intervention, the Indian Coast Guard began intercepting shipments of weapons and supplies en route to Tamil insurgent groups. When two large shipments of weapons were confiscated by the Indian Coast Guard in March of 1985, it was reported as a “turning point in India’s policy towards the Tamils of...
Sri Lanka” (Claude 1985). This suggests that the Indian Government was at least complicit up to that point.

Even with the observed change in policy, the sincerity of India’s policy change was still questionable. After India confiscated the token shipments of arms, they did little to ensure prosecution of those responsible for smuggling the weapons. The smugglers were arrested and turned over the Tamil Nadu state authorities who subsequently released them on bail to never be tried (Claude 1985). Later in November of 1986, the central government of India and the Tamil Nadu state government coordinated a mass arrest of known Tamil militants and confiscated arms and ammunition only to release all of those arrested and return their weapons on the same day (Rao 1988, 429-430). According to India, the purpose of the crackdown was to provide a better climate for discussions between Prime Minister Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Jayewardene ahead of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation summit to be held a week later. However, the immediate release of those arrested was a clear indication that India was concerned only with perception.

Other reports claim that India’s RAW began arming and training Tamil insurgent groups as early as 1977 (Barber 1989). Kumar Rupesinghe (1988) also cites, “speculations that Indian intelligence had been supplying arms to the militant movement.” Other sources cited Tamil insurgents being trained in Tamil Nadu by ex-Indian Army officers working as free-lance advisors (Manor and Segal 1985, Claiborne 1983). Evidence of a semi-official Indian support program certainly helps explain the Indian Coast Guard’s disinterest in arms trafficking across the Palk Strait in the early years of the conflict and also explains why most of the insurgent groups were so quick to
turn over their weapons when the IPKF intervened in 1987. This would also explain the apparent trust that the IPKF had in groups like the EPRLF and PLOTE when they rearmed them during the intervention in order to help fight the LTTE (Gupta 2013).

There is also reason to suspect that the rearming of the anti-LTTE insurgent groups during the IPKF resulted in massive criminal activity and terrorism against Sri Lankan civilians. After the IPKF rearmed the EPRLF, TELO, and PLOTE, they quickly turned to criminal activity and some committed acts of terrorism in pursuit of the LTTE. After the IPKF rearmed them, both the PLOTE and the EPRLF recorded their first verified terrorist attacks against purely civilian targets in 1988 and 1989 respectively.\footnote{37 The GTD indicates that the PLOTE committed their first attack against a civilian transportation target in 1988, and the ERPLF committed their first act of terrorism against a civilian police target in 1989. The EPRLF had previously used terrorist tactics prior to the IPKF intervention, but their only verified attacks were against military or police forces who were under the command of the Sri Lankan security forces.}

In addition, there was speculation that a massacre of 200 Buddhist Sinhalese that created 15,000 refugees from Trincomalee and Batticaloa was actually committed by IPKF armed Tamils rather than the LTTE who were ultimately blamed for the attacks (Johnson 1987). The LTTE never took responsibility for the massacre which occurred in a region where the IPKF troops had very little presence prior to the event. When the IPKF shifted troops southward into the region, they were seen walking side-by-side with anti-LTTE Tamil insurgent groups in the population centers vacated by the LTTE (Johnson 1987). Because of the apparent benefit given to the anti-LTTE insurgent groups coupled with the fact that the LTTE denied responsibility, there is good reason to believe the claims that the LTTE was not behind the massacre.

Although the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord also required India to expel all advocates of Tamil independence from India, an effective change in Indian policy toward the Tamil
insurgency did not occur until after the IPKF intervention ended and the LTTE became synonymous with the insurgency as a whole (Premdas and de A. Samarasinghe 1988, 685). In what many commentators described as “India’s Vietnam” (Kaufman 1996; Barber 1989), the Indian government finally decided to detach itself from the conflict shortly after Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi lost the 1989 election to V.P. Singh.

Shortly after the withdrawal from Sri Lanka, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a female LTTE suicide bomber while on reelection campaign in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu (Kaufman 1996). The assassination of the former Prime Minister solidified India’s official position against the LTTE which remained hardened through the end of the conflict. Just days after the assassination, Indian politicians were cited making anti-Tamil comments as the atmosphere among Indians turned very sour against Sri Lankan Tamils in South India. Vazhapadi Ramamurthy, the President of the Indian Congress Party in Tamil Nadu and Ms. Jayalalithaa Jayaram who was then running for Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu, both demanded the deportation of Sri Lankan Tamils claiming that the Tamil militants have ruined peace loving Tamil Nadu (Weintraub 1991). Shortly thereafter, the Indian government banned the LTTE, effectively making it a deportable offense for Sri Lankan refugees to associate with militant Tamil groups. After Jayalalithaa was elected as Tamil Nadu’s Chief Minister, she followed suit by banning public meetings and cracking down on Tamil militant movements (Housego 1991).

Although a seemingly odd relationship given Myanmar’s Buddhist tradition, the military regime in that country was also rumored to have provided support for the Tamil insurgency in the form of safe passage through the Malacca Straits (Mylvaganam 1998). Doing so would have facilitated weapons, ammunition, and drug trafficking to support
the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka. Despite claims of “considerable proof” of this relationship by Senthil Kumar Mylvaganam (1998), a thorough examination of the relationship uncovered no additional sources citing Myanmar support for the Tamil insurgency. Moreover, it is possible that any safe passage given to Tamil smugglers may have been the result of corrupt military personnel taking bribes in exchange for safe passage without considering the destination of any smuggled cargo.

The evidence may fall short of proving a law-like causal relationship between Indian support and the adoption of terrorism by Tamil insurgents, but the support was provided without apparent restrictions on how to employ it. Therefore, the various groups were free to adopt any tactics they choose with no apparent constraints or end-use monitoring of any assistance provided.

The Tamil Diaspora

All of the major Tamil insurgent groups received significant non-state actor support during their conflict with the Sri Lankan government. There were three primary types of non-state actors who supported the Tamil insurgency. They include the widespread global Tamil diaspora, other foreign terrorist organizations, and sub-national governments.

The Tamil diaspora was an obvious source of funding from which the Tamil insurgency could solicit support. By 2001 the Tamil diaspora numbered 800,000 people with the largest pockets located in Canada, the U.K., the U.S., Germany, Switzerland, France, Australia, and India (Asokan 2009, Human Rights Watch 2006). In addition, a large proportion of the diaspora were highly educated and held professions such as medical doctors, engineers, and successful business owners (Asokan 2009, Bedi 1994).
This provided a strong external financial base from which the Tamil insurgency could solicit and extort funds. While the exact amount of funding will likely never be known, it is estimated that up to 90% of the Tamil insurgency’s funding came from its diaspora by the mid-1990’s and included Cdn$1 to $12 million annually from Canada alone (Human Rights Watch 2006, Kaufman 1996).

With respect to the relationship between support from the Tamil diaspora and the adoption of terrorism by Tamil insurgent groups, process-tracing reveals that acts of terrorism by the Tamil insurgency were often designed to evoke a response by the Sri Lankan Security Forces against Tamil civilians which could in turn be used as propaganda to help lure sympathy and foreign support from the Tamil diaspora. Specifically, the LTTE’s earliest terrorist attacks confirm this causal relationship. In the years just prior to the 1983 riots, the LTTE committed a wave of guerilla attacks which included their first four verified terrorist incidents, excluding Prabhakaran’s public assignation of Jaffna’s former Mayor. The Jayewardene led Sri Lanka government repeatedly enacted states of emergency beginning in 1979 and Tamil civilians became increasingly the targets of harassment and violence at the hands of Sinhalese citizens and Sri Lankan security forces which was used as propaganda to gain sympathy from the growing Tamil diaspora (Globe and Mail 1979, Reuters 1981). Therefore, the case of Sri Lanka indicates that first use of terrorist tactics was at least partially caused by the lure of foreign support from the Tamil diaspora.
The Tamil Nadu Government

Prior to the IPKF intervention, the Tamil Nadu state government had a fairly cozy relationship with their Tamil cousins in Sri Lanka and provided significant foreign support to several Tamil insurgent groups. Support from Tamil Nadu waned as the LTTE consolidated its grip over the insurgency, and eventually support for the insurgency became politically unacceptable for the Tamil Nadu government. Indian Tamil support turned to scorn after the LTTE suicide bomber assassinated former Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi in Tamil Nadu. Marking the end of Tamil Nadu’s support, Ms. Jayalalitha won the election for chief minister of Tamil Nadu in a landslide victory because she campaigned on the promise to rid Tamil Nadu of the LTTE (Housego 1991).

However, the Tamil Nadu government openly provided aid to the insurgency during the early years of the conflict that amounted to direct material support. Cash payments from the Tamil Nadu government to various Tamil insurgent groups were reported including distributions of $2.4 million to the LTTE and $800,000 to the EROS in the Spring of 1987 (Indian Cash Aid to Sri Lanakan Tamil Militants Denounced 1987). In addition, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister M. G. Ramachandran, reportedly paid the LTTE $4 million in cash during July of 1987, and gave the insurgent group a $10 million merchant ship to facilitate arms transfers (Johnson 1988). There was also some evidence of Tamil Nadu complacency according to General Silva, the Sri Lankan Security Forces commander in Jaffna when he acknowledged that some training by retired Indian Army instructors was probably occurring in Tamil Nadu and that “wounded Tigers (sic) guerrillas are taken by outboard motorboat to India for treatment” (Claiborne 1983).
In addition, Tamil Nadu politicians had no real incentive to deny Sri Lankan Tamils refuge, and there was some political gain in supporting and showing sympathy for the Sri Lankan Tamils. For example, Tamil Nadu members of parliament spoke out against the Indian government’s confiscation of weapons en route to Sri Lanka (Claude 1985). Moreover, the Tamil Nadu government did very little to prosecute Sri Lankan Tamils caught smuggling weapons (Claude 1985). During the years leading up to the IPKF intervention, support from the Tamil Nadu government for the Tamil insurgency was at its highest point during the conflict, and during this period the TELO, EPRLF, and EROS adopted terrorism.

Palestinian Support

There is evidence suggesting the Tamil insurgency also received some support from Palestinian terrorist organizations in the early years of the conflict. While the specific dates, types, and amounts of support provided cannot be corroborated, there are multiple sources indicating a connection between Palestinian militants and Tamil insurgent groups as described below.

Some Tamil insurgent groups admitted they were trained in the Middle East in the early 1980s by George Habash’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The PLOTE openly acknowledge the connection, and it is suspected that both the LTTE and the TELO also had militants who were trained by the PFLP (Marxist Intellectuals Form Core of Tamil Separatist Leadership 1985). Similarly, there were reports of LTTE members who were captured by the Sri Lanka security forces in 1979 who admitted to receiving training by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and LTTE leader
Prabhakaran is said to have personally received guerilla training in Damascus by the PFLP (Claiborne 1983, Goodspeed 1994).

All three Tamil groups cited as having received training by the PFLP eventually adopted terrorism, but all at different times during the conflict. While the PLOTE did not commit their first terrorist attack until well after they were suspected as having received training from the Palestinians, the TELO and LTTE put their training to use much sooner. Moreover, some of the specific tactics employed by the Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka were very similar to those used by Palestinian groups in Israel and Lebanon. For example, suicide truck bombings like the one that targeted the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in 1983 were also commonly used against Sri Lanka security forces and government targets throughout Sri Lanka (Caplan 2006). Therefore, with respect to non-state actor support coming from other international terrorist organizations, there is a plausible link between the foreign support provided and the adoption of terrorism among the Tamil insurgent groups.

**Conclusion**

In summarizing the Sri Lankan conflict in terms of the variables under study, the Tamil insurgency had a separatist goal, opposed an increasingly repressive regime, had a relatively moderate strength compared to the Sri Lankan government, received a significant amount of foreign support from both state and non-state actors during the conflict, and carried out their struggle unabated during both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras. Most importantly, all of the major Tamil insurgent groups used terrorism at least once during the conflict, and the LTTE used terrorism as a primary tactic.
Table 4.1 below summarizes the results of the Sri Lanka case study in relation to the alternative hypotheses under examination.

**Table 4.1 – Causal Relationships between Independent Variables and the Adoption of Terrorism by the Tamil Insurgency**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Hypothesis False / Not False / Partly False</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H1</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H2</td>
<td>Separatist Goal</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H3</td>
<td>Weak Insurgent Group</td>
<td>Partly False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H4</td>
<td>Foreign Support (in general)</td>
<td>Partly False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H5</td>
<td>Direct Material Support</td>
<td>Partly False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H6</td>
<td>Non-State Actor Benefactor</td>
<td>Partly False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H7</td>
<td>Direct Support from State Actors</td>
<td>Partly False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H8</td>
<td>Direct Support from Non-state Acts</td>
<td>Not False</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The seeds of Tamil insurgency and the adoption of terrorism in Sri Lanka directly coincided with and were fueled by a breakdown in democracy. This finding directly falsifies the hypothesis that insurgent groups are more likely to adopt terrorism when the government they oppose is a democracy. Rather, it provides clear evidence for exactly the opposite, and Tamil insurgent groups became more militant and more likely to adopt terrorism as democratic options to achieve their goals were eliminated.

The case of Sri Lanka also did not provide evidence for a causal mechanism between an insurgent group’s separatist goals and the adoption of terrorism, and therefore the hypothesis stating that insurgent groups with separatist goals are more likely to adopt terrorism is not supported.

Examining Sri Lanka through the lens of the “weapon of the weak” argument, the case finds some evidence in support of the theory where the LTTE adopted terrorism
while all indicators of insurgent group strength suggested they were in a position of relative weakness. However, the adoption of terrorism by the other Tamil insurgent groups indicates just the opposite where the TELO, EPRLF, and EROS all adopted terrorism while most indicators of insurgent group strength were trending upward. Essentially, these three groups adopted terrorism as they became stronger in terms of mobilization capacity, arms procurement capability, territorial control, and fighting capacity. Moreover, a purely statistical examination of the Tamil insurgency’s position of weakness is somewhat misleading because they were not the only internal security threat facing the Sri Lanka government. The JVP was also a continuous threat, and therefore, the relative strength of the government could never be completely focused on the Tamil insurgency. This leads one to conclude that the case of Sri Lanka cannot confirm the hypothesis suggesting that weaker insurgent groups are more likely to adopt terrorism compared to stronger insurgent groups.

Foreign support from both non-state and state actors involved in the conflict helped explain the proliferation of terrorism among Tamil insurgent groups in the conflict, but it does not explain the first act of terrorism committed by the LTTE’s founder Prabhakaran who assassinated the former Tamil Mayor of Jaffna in 1975 with a revolver that he stole from an armed guard in a previous bank heist. While nothing surrounding this first act of terrorism was enabled by the provision of foreign support, there was a four year period following the assassination where no terrorist attacks occurred. However, a wave of terrorist attacks occurred in 1979 following the LTTE’s initial contact with the PFLP. In addition, the specific tactics that the LTTE and its rivals used in their first terrorist attacks were similar to those used by Palestinian groups.
Moreover, the provision of funding and the facilitation of arms procurement by the Tamil diaspora as well as the safe passage offered by the Indian state government of Tamil Nadu during the early years provided the major Tamil insurgent groups with the necessary means to execute terrorist tactics at all levels of sophistication.

State actor support for the Tamil insurgency by India also played a significant role in enabling terrorist activity during the conflict. India’s passivity and in some instances direct support of Tamil insurgents in the early years of the conflict certainly enabled terrorist operations and made it very easy to flood Sri Lanka with weapons and supplies for use in terrorist operations. With the amount of weapons entering Sri Lanka from India and the permissiveness of military training on Indian territory, it is reasonable to believe that many terrorist attacks would not have occurred otherwise.

However, the EPRLF and the PLOTE who received the largest amounts of direct support from India were the last of the initial five major insurgent groups to adopt terrorism and did so while direct material support from the Indian government was starting to diminish.

When considering the timing, level, and source of foreign support as summarized above, the case of Sri Lanka provides some evidence supporting the hypothesis that insurgent groups with foreign support are more likely to adopt terrorist tactics, but it does not provide enough evidence by itself to either support nor falsify the hypothesis that insurgent groups who receive direct material support are more likely to adopt terrorism compared to those who only receive passive indirect support. Unfortunately, the Tamil insurgent groups received a steady flow of all types of foreign support from various sources during the early years of the conflict when they adopted terrorism.
When considering all of the hypotheses concerning the effects of foreign support on an insurgent group’s decision to adopt terrorism, the case of Sri Lanka substantiates the hypothesis proposing that insurgent groups who receive foreign support from primarily external non-state actors are more likely to use terrorist tactics than groups that receive foreign support from a state actor. However, there is still not enough evidence to suggest that foreign support alone, regardless of type and benefactor, is a determining factor in the decision to adopt terrorism. Rather, in the case of Sri Lanka the adoption of terrorism is more fully explained by the interaction of multiple variables.

The adoption of terrorism by Tamil insurgent groups had its seeds in a determined separatist Tamil movement combined with an uncompromising and retaliatory regime that marginalized the Tamil population as a whole. When the democratic path to independence was eliminated, a large population of Tamils was left with the feeling that violence was the only option to escape their repressive government. As Jennifer Hyndman states, “Where marginalization, exclusion, and related vulnerability produce fear, violence is one response” (Hyndman 2007, 363). Therefore, it is not surprising that some groups like the LTTE adopted terrorism well before their competitors perceived no other option than violence after the 1983 riots.

What separated the LTTE’s adoption of terrorism from their rivals is how quickly and how strongly they gave up on the democratic option. Because the LTTE was essentially founded by a group of criminals who were experienced bank robbers, they were able to support their armed struggle in the beginning through cash and weapons they plundered whereas their competitors were mostly still looking at the TULF to find a non-
violent path to independence. Therefore, the LTTE had the enabling tools for them to become militant and adopt terrorism before their rivals.

When violence became more broadly perceived as the only option available to achieve Tamil independence after the 1983 riots, there was a greater support base available for additional groups wishing to take up arms. Possible sources of support and supplies also increased significantly leading up to and immediately following the 1983 riots with the growth of the Tamil diaspora and the increased interest in the conflict by both the Indian central government and the Tamil Nadu state government. Therefore, it was relatively easy for newer Tamil groups to procure arms, receive training, and secure safe havens which more widely enabled guerilla operations.

With all of the tools available to conduct a guerilla campaign and without defined limits on how the support was to be used, the groups were free to adopt whatever tactics they chose to accomplish their separatist goals, and therefore, foreign support in the form of weapons, cash, safe-haven, and training all increased the likelihood for Tamil insurgent groups to adopt terrorism. Most telling about the impact of foreign support is how all of the insurgent groups who disarmed at the beginning of the IPKF intervention ceased terrorist operations while the LTTE resumed terrorist attacks at new highs. Moreover, the rearming of some of the LTTE’s rival groups by the IPKF was also followed by those same groups committing terrorist attacks in their pursuit of the LTTE.

In conclusion, an increasingly repressive regime, the availability of weapons, cash, safe-haven, and military training without constraints all increased the likelihood for Tamil insurgent groups to commit terrorist attacks in the case of Sri Lanka. Therefore, it
is not surprising that all of the major Tamil insurgent groups eventually crossed the murky line from freedom fighter to terrorist.
Chapter Five
The Kurds in Iraq: Division and Self-Determination

Introduction

As with the previous case study, the independence of the modern Iraqi state began
under the auspices of the British who left a lasting legacy on the internal political
dynamics and ethnic tensions within the country. For geopolitical and strategic reasons,
the victors of World War I drew new borders on the map through the Zagros and Taurus
Mountains following the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire. In doing so, the Kurdish
people who inhabited the mountainous region were divided between what would
eventually become the independent states of Turkey, Syria, Iran, Azerbaijan, Armenia,
and Iraq. Being denied the opportunity to form a nation-state of their own, the desire for
independence among the Kurds in each country has been very much alive since the First
World War. The goal of this case study, like the previous one on Sri Lanka, is to
determine the role that foreign support played among other factors in the Iraqi Kurds’
decision to adopt or forego terrorist tactics.

This case study proceeds with background information about the conflict in
Northern Iraq between the Iraqi government and the Kurds to provide an overview of the
relevant demographic, political, geographic, and conflict participant information. This
chapter then examines how each of the factors cited in the competing hypotheses
concerning the adoption of terrorism appear in the case of the Iraqi Kurds. Finally, this chapter concludes by summarizing the causal links uncovered in the case study to determine the level of influence that foreign support had on the Kurds use or constraint of terrorist tactics compared to the other commonly cited causes of terrorism.

**The Seeds of Insurgency: An Oil-Soaked Powder Keg**

Much like the history of Iraq, and to a greater extent the Middle East, the story of the Iraqi Kurds is one of divide and conquer. The divisions between ethnic, tribal, cultural, and political differences have been continually manipulated in the Middle East to achieve political objectives and the Kurds were not immune to this dynamic. Unfortunately, the multiple levels of divisions both in Iraq and within the Iraqi Kurdish population itself has had a profound impact on the factors under examination in this study.

During the period after World War I up until 1958 when the Hashemite Monarchy was overthrown in a bloody coup, Shi’a Arabs accounted for between 55-60% of Iraq’s population, Sunni Arabs accounted for another 20-25%, and the Kurds accounted for the remaining 20% of the population (Anderson and Stansfield 2004, 20). At 1958 there were about 3.5 million Kurds living in Iraq (O’Ballance 1996, xxi). As of 2004, the Kurdish population in Iraq was estimated to be about 4.2 million (McDowall 2004, 3). The Kurds have maintained a rebellious tendency since they were denied the phased unification and recognition as an independent state as outlined in the Treaty of Sevres in 1920 (Anderson and Stansfield 2004, 15).  

\[38\] That treaty was replaced by the Treaty of  

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\[38\] The Treaty of Sevres outlined a phased approach to the unification of the Kurdish regions in Southeast Turkey and Mosul (present day Northern Iraq) which called for a referendum among Kurds followed by application for membership to the League of Nations.
Lausanne that officially ended the state of war between the Allies and the former Ottoman Empire in 1923, but it called for the attachment of Mosul to Mesopotamia to create the new state of Iraq and drew Turkey’s southern border where it currently is dividing the Kurdish people and their territory among multiple states. The British preferred that the combined Iraqi territories decide how to establish their national government together rather than permitting self-determination for the Kurds by themselves (McDowall 2004, 119). The British decision to draw the Northern border of Iraq where it is today was primarily a strategic decision that enabled the British to more easily defend a mountainous border with fewer troops rather than defending from Southern Mosul which ran through lower lying areas (McDowall 2004, 121). However, as Anderson and Stansfield (2004, 26) state, “The Kurds have a distinct historical, cultural, and linguistic identity that resolutely refuses to be assimilated into something broader.” Therefore, the British decision to include Kurdish dominated Mosul into the Arab dominated state ensured a persistent struggle between the minority Kurds who reside in Northern Iraq and the overwhelming majority of Arabs who dominated Iraqi politics throughout the rest of the country.

The first armed conflict between the central government of Iraq and the Kurds in Northern Iraq occurred after the Kurdish Sheikh Ahmed Barzani began coercing other Kurdish tribes to unite against Arab Iraqi troops who were occupying Northern Iraq on behalf of the British. In response to Ahmed Barzani’s armed action, Iraqi government forces pursued Barzani with the cover of British air support through Northern Iraq until Barzani was drove out of Iraq and surrendered to Turkish forces at the border (McDowall 2004, 180). This early campaign of fighting that included Kurdish in-group fighting and
indiscriminate bombing that leveled half of the buildings in 79 different Kurdish villages was the opening act of the violent Kurdish struggle in Northern Iraq and set the tone of the conflict for the rest of the 20th century (McDowall 2004, 180).

There were continuous skirmishes and some larger battles that took place from the time fighting first broke out in the 1920s until the rise of the Ba’ath regime in the 1960s, but this case study will focus on the period beginning with the March Manifesto of 1970 that marked the end of the Third Iraqi-Kurds War up until the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003. While there is some merit to being familiar with the pre-1970 conflict, focusing on the chosen period better aligns with the quantitative analysis completed in chapter three and provides a more valid case to study given the wider availability of terrorism data after 1970.

**Deadlock in Northern Iraq**

The March Manifesto was the result of a deadlock between the Iraqi military and the Iraqi Kurds. At the time, the Kurds were receiving assistance from the Soviet Union and “were receiving significant military assistance from Iran, and were essentially unbeatable fighting on their own terrain” (Anderson and Stansfield 2004, 45).

Meanwhile, the rising Iraqi leader and then vice president, Saddam Hussein failed to secure a Soviet commitment to curtail support of the Kurds which left him only with the option to negotiate peace with the Iraqi Kurds resulting in the 1970 March Manifesto (Anderson and Stansfield 2004, 52).

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39 There were three named wars in the COW dataset between the Kurds and the Iraqi central government prior to the period under examination including the First Iraqi Kurd War (1961-1963), the Second Iraqi Kurds War (1965-1966), and the Third Iraqi Kurds War (1969-1970) that ended with the March Manifesto.

40 There were four separate conflicts occurring from 1970-2003 between the Kurds and the Iraqi central government as defined by the COW Intrastate War Dataset. They include the Fourth Iraqi Kurds War (1974-1975), the Fifth Iraqi Kurds War (1985-1988), the “Shiite and Kurdish” war (1991), and the Sixth Iraqi Kurds War (1996).
In the March Manifesto, Saddam Hussein promised nearly everything that the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) leader, Mullah Mustafa Barzani demanded at the time. The agreement that Barzani negotiated included the adoption of both the Kurdish language (as well as Arabic) as the official language of Iraq, the full participation of Kurds in the government, the requirement for officials in Kurdish areas to be Kurds (or to speak Kurdish), the freedom for Kurds to form student, youth, women’s, and teacher associations, funds set aside for development in Kurdistan, pensions paid to families of Peshmerga killed in battle, agrarian land ownership reform, the requirement for a Kurd to be one of the vice presidents of Iraq, and the move toward unification of Kurdish majority areas as one self-governing unit (Yildiz 2004, 18). Finally, the March Manifesto required autonomy for the Kurds to be implemented in areas that contained a majority population of Kurds no later than March 11, 1974, and a census was to be taken in October 1970 to determine which areas would qualify for inclusion in the autonomous Kurdistan (Iraq and Kurdish Autonomy 1974, 26).

However, the Ba’ath regime proved to be insincere with the promise for Kurdish autonomy, and they were really seeking to only temporarily pacify the Kurds while the Ba’ath consolidated their power over the military and the rest of the government. The Ba’ath regime postponed the census, and by December 1970 they began sidestepping the March Manifesto by “Arabinizing” the territory they did not want included in a future autonomous Kurdistan by offering incentives for Arabs to relocate to the oil revenue producing Kirkuk region (McDowall 2004, 329). Therefore, when the postponed census...
was conducted, it would show that Kirkuk did not consist of a majority Kurdish population and therefore should not be included in the autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan.

By 1974, Arabs were a clear majority in Kirkuk, oil revenue from the region had increased over ten times what it was in 1970, and Kirkuk oil accounted for nearly 70% of all of Iraq’s oil output (McDowall 2004, 335). Understandably, the Kurds were no longer willing to implement the March Manifesto as it would now exclude Kirkuk from their autonomous region. The Ba’ath regime was undeterred however, and Saddam Hussein imposed his own Autonomy Law that did not cede Kirkuk and was based on census records from 1957 that would show a Turkoman majority population in Kirkuk (Yildiz 2004, 20). The imposition of the Autonomy Law left Kurdistan at nearly half the size that the Kurds expected when Mustafa Barzani signed the March Manifesto in 1970. The Kurds, now realizing that they would need to fight for their vision of an autonomous Kurdistan, that included Kirkuk, began seeking additional external support from Iran and the U.S. (Yildiz 2004, 22-23; The Kurds Trust a Bad Ally 1975, 25-26).

The struggle over Kirkuk and its oil revenue was, and still is, a central road block to lasting peace between the Kurds and the Iraqi central government. Mustafa Barzani wanted the resources in Kurdish areas to be controlled by the autonomous Kurdish government and demanded a division of national revenues, including those from oil revenues, along ethnic lines, but this was unacceptable to the central government (Iraq and Kurdish Autonomy 1974, 26). In fact, this was never acceptable to the Iraqi central government, and it put the two sides in a dead-locked disagreement for the remainder of

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42 At the time of the 1957 census records, Turks were a majority population in Kirkuk rather than Arabs or Kurds. Therefore, there was never an official census record offered that showed a majority Kurdish population in Kirkuk although they most certainly became a majority during the period between the 1957 census and the negotiation of the March Manifesto in 1970. During this same period large oil reserves were discovered in Kirkuk which coincided with the period of Kurdish majority in the region.
the conflict. Therefore, the unresolved question of Kirkuk is the seed of insurgency that put the Kurds on an uncompromising path toward war and the acceptance of large amounts of external support in pursuit of their secessionist goals.

**Belligerents and Allies in the Struggle for Kurdish Autonomy**

During the conflict between the Kurds and the Iraqi central government it was common for alliances to shift among the individual groups on either side due to the dynamics of individual group leadership and the changing priorities of the participants and their supporters. Within the confines of the period under examination after the March Manifesto, the conflict participants include the Kurds in Iraq, the Iraqi central government, and Iran.

*The Iraqi Kurds*

The only thing that is universal among all of the Kurds in the Middle East is that they share a connection to the mountains from which they come and to which they retreat when their existence is threatened. James Ciment (1996, 75) quoted of the Kurds:

> For all the variation of land and weather, one constant unifies the Kurdish landscape and, by implication, the Kurdish people as well: the mountains…and hence the Kurdish adage “we have no friends but the mountains.”

The Kurds are ethnically distinct from their Arab, Turk, and Persian neighbors, and they have occupied the Zagros and Taurus Mountains for over 4,000 years (Anderson and Stansfield 2004, 158; Yildiz 2004, 7). 75% of Kurds are Sunni Muslim (McDowall 2004, 10), but until very recently Kurdish society was ascribed to a tribal and kinship order that consisted of over 800 tribes throughout the Middle East (Yildiz 2004, 7). This order was highly susceptible to clientelism as evidenced by the Iraqi central government
successfully coopting thousands of Kurds from select tribes to serve as police and self-defense forces known as the *Jash* who actually fought against rebelling Kurds throughout the conflict.

Of those Kurds participating in the quest for Kurdish self-determination in Iraq, the KDP is the longest standing insurgent group. The KDP was founded in 1946 and has had a tradition of organizing around the leadership of the Barzani tribe with primary areas of control located in the Northern and Western territory of Iraqi Kurdistan. Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the brother of Sheikh Ahmed Barzani, was the KDP’s first President despite him remaining in exile in Iran and then the Soviet Union until 1958 (McDowall 2004, 296). On whole, the KDP was perceived to be the leading group for the Kurdish secessionist movement in Iraq until the 1975 Algiers Agreement that ended Iranian support of the Kurds in exchange for Iraq ceding their contested border claim of the Shatt al-Arab river to Iran (The Implications of the Iran-Iraq Agreement 1974, 2).

With respect to the adoption of terrorism, the KDP made a concerted effort to attack only military targets in their confrontations with the Iraqi government, and their leader, Mustafa Barzani explained the need for restraint in order to maintain their image of fighting for a repressed people who did not deserve the Iraqi military response against Kurdish civilians (McDowall 2004, 312). However, there were several verified terrorist attacks attributed to the KDP beginning with a wave of hostage takings from December 1976 to February 1977 (GTD, RWDTI). These early acts of terrorism ended with the release of the hostages with no fatalities despite the perpetrators’ demands for the release of Kurdish of political prisoners and to stop the army’s massacre of Kurds not being met.

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43 According to scholars (Anderson and Stansfield, 2004; McDowall, 2004) the KDP was originally named the Kurdish Democratic Party, but was later renamed to the Kurdistan Democratic Party after a brief hiatus following a defeat and division of leadership that led some to be exiled.
Mustafa Barzani died in 1979 and left the regrouping of the KDP to his sons Massoud and Idris Barzani who led the group together until Idris’ death in 1987 (Korn 1994). Massoud continued to lead the KDP for the remainder of the conflict.

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) was officially founded in 1975 and began operations in 1976. It was formed around the core leadership of Jalal Talabani, who was in exile in Syria at the time. The PUK’s primary areas of control were in the southern and eastern areas of Iraqi Kurdistan. The PUK was an umbrella group that included not only the followers of Jalal Talabani, but the Marxist-Leninist Komola group, the Kurdistan Socialist Movement (KSM), and other fringe groups who joined in an attempt to fill the vacuum left in the wake of the KDP’s 1975 failure (McDowall 2004, 343).

Prior to the formation of the PUK, the Barzanis repeatedly clashed with Talabani over the leadership of the Kurdish movement. In fact at the 6th Party Congress for the KDP in July 1964, Mustafa Barzani attempted to lure Talabani to attend with the hope of arresting him upon arrival. When Talabani suspected Barzani and did not attend, Barzani sent a force of 4,000 led by his son to attack Talabani’s positions and drive them into Iran (McDowall 2004, 304). Throughout the conflict, the PUK continued to challenge the KDP for leadership of the Kurds in Iraq and competed with them for support of tribes willing to shift alliances.

Like the KDP, the PUK initially refrained from overt terrorist attacks, but they too were credited for adopting terrorist tactics beginning in 1980. The PUK began to walk the thin line between freedom fighter and terrorist when they abducted two Yugoslav engineers working in Iraq in protest of Yugoslavia-Iraqi military cooperation (RDWTI).
In addition to the two primary umbrella Kurdish groups mentioned above, there were also some lone actors and unaligned Kurdish militants who confronted the Iraqi central government from time to time. These unaligned Kurdish actors were responsible for the first act of terrorism committed by Kurdish militants against a civilian target on March 1, 1975, when three Kurds hijacked an Iraqi Airlines Boeing 737 on a domestic flight. A gun battle between the hijackers and two Iraqi security officers on board the plane resulted in the deaths of one hijacker, both Iraqi security officers, and caused injury to 90 people. The flight was diverted to Tehran where it landed, and the hijackers eventually turned themselves into Iranian authorities who subsequently tried them in a military court and executed them by firing squad (RDWTI).

The Iraqi Central Government

From the first British installment of the Hashemite King Faisal I in 1921, the promise made to permit Kurdish self-determination in Iraq was denied for the sake of Iraqi state interests. King Faisal and every authoritarian leader of Iraq since has been of Sunni descent and needed the Kurds to remain part of Iraq to balance against the large Shia population in the South. In addition, the fear of a separate Kurdish entity in Iraq would give cause for Kurds in Turkey, Iran, and Syria to follow suit thus creating a permanent threat along Iraq’s border (McDowall 2004, 168). Therefore, Kurdish autonomy or independence was seen as contrary to Iraqi state interests even before Iraq’s official independence from Britain in 1932. Coupled with the growth in hostilities during the 20th century between Iraq and Iran, and later the United States, the Kurds were often caught in the crossfire and viewed by the Sunni-Arab dominated Iraqi government as a “Trojan Horse” for external influence in Iraq’s internal affairs (McDowall 2004, 168).
In addition to fears and reservations held of the Kurds by the Iraqi central government, the existence of large oil reserves around Kirkuk added an additional incentive for the Iraqi government to use military action to prevent an independent Kurdistan in Iraq. To this end, the Iraqi government has been exceedingly brutal in their repression of Kurdish self-determination. Using one of the largest and most advanced land armies to ever exist in the Middle East, the Iraqi government destroyed Kurdish villages and killed thousands of civilians using all manners at its disposal including the use of chemical weapons.

**Iran**

Iran has played an on-again-off-again role in the conflict, and they are considered a direct participant because they actually committed armed troops to the conflict at different times. Iran committed troops and took military action on the same side as the Kurds both during the reign of Iran’s last Shah and during the Iran-Iraq War under the leadership of the Ayatollah. In addition, the actions taken by Iran in the conflict had determining effects as to its result.

However, Iran’s goals for assisting the Kurds were very much self-interested and their level of support was highly contingent. Indeed Iran saw an opportunity with the Kurds to destabilize their long-time foe by fomenting and arming an insurgency within Iraqi borders. During the conflict, Iran was able to use their support of, or withdrawal of support, as a bargaining chip to gain important territorial concessions from Iraq as evidenced by 1975 Algiers Agreement which benefited both Iran and Iraq to the complete detriment of the Kurdish secessionist goal (The Implications of the Iran-Iraq Agreement 1974, 2-3).
From Insurgency to Terrorism

The case of the Iraq Kurds appeared to be one of restraint on whole with increasingly questionable tactics used to achieve Kurdish autonomy. Although, the Kurdish quest for independence was a very violent one, there were relatively few instances of terrorism given the length and brutality of their foe. Figure 5.1 shows the point at which each of the primary Kurdish insurgent groups adopted terrorism in relation to the other.

**Figure 5.1 – First Terrorist Attacks Committed by Iraqi Kurdish Insurgent Groups**

Evidence for or against each of the competing hypotheses is provided below by examining the events surrounding the adoption of terrorism by the Kurdish insurgent groups in Iraq.

**Insurgent Group Goals**

The desire for independence grew with the awakening of Kurdish identity during the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. After Russia occupied Koi and Urumiya in 1909 in
order to evict Ottoman seizure of Iranian territory, Abd al Razzaq Badr Khan, a Kurdish leader who was previously exiled to Persia (present day Iran), traveled to Tabriz and began circulating the idea of Kurdish autonomy under Russian protection (McDowall 2004, 98). By 1914 the Russians and British were attempting to generate discontent among some of the major Kurdish tribes and foment open revolt against the Eastern Ottoman rulers in Kurdistan, but a coordinated and united front was lacking then just as it still is today (McDowall 2004, 100-101). McDowall (2004) describes the early Kurdish efforts to gain independence:

The problem for would-be Kurdish rebels was one of co-ordination. As the British vice-counsel in Bitlis reported, ‘Could the Kurds combine against the Government in one province, the Turkish troops in their eastern part of Asia Minor would find it difficult to crush the revolt.’ Lack of co-ordination remained the Kurds’ Achilles heel.

Kurdish goals in Iraq remained primarily separatist throughout the entire conflict, but leading up to the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in 2003 Kosrat Rasul, a former PUK prime minister, quipped about having “an agenda for all possibilities” and wanting a “share in Baghdad” (Kutschera 2002, 16). Likewise, Barzani’s military advisor stated, “If we want federalism, we must be strong in the central government in Baghdad” (Kutschera 2002, 16). Statements such as these seemed to call into question whether the Kurds wanted more than just to be free from Iraqi. At a minimum these statements indicate that Kurdish goals may not be entirely unanimous, and they blur the line between their goals and the methods in which they seek to attain them. Moreover, a draft version of an new Iraqi constitution offered by the Kurds prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion first committed them to a federal system with the reserved right to declare independence should the Iraqi
Arabs not follow the constitutional outline for power sharing (Kutschera 2002, 21). These statements may be more indicative of the Kurds’ pragmatic approach to achieving autonomy, but they are nonetheless interesting in that some viewed a possible path to autonomy through gaining control of the central government.

An examination of the Iraqi Kurds’ case does not reveal any direct causal links between the adoption of terrorism and the virtue of holding a separatist goal as opposed to a goal of gaining control of the central government. When both of the primary Kurdish groups began adopting terrorist tactics, there was no recognizable change in their desire to pursue an independent Kurdistan, and the Kurds showed they would topple the central government and replace it with a friendly government that would permit Kurdish autonomy if they could. Therefore, the case of the Iraqi Kurds does not support the hypothesis that an insurgent group with a separatist goal is more likely to adopt terrorism compared to an insurgent group with the goal to gain control of the central government.

Regime Type

Throughout the period under examination, the Iraqi central government was unequivocally authoritarian, and there were virtually no limits on the ruthlessness of Saddam Hussein’s approach to dealing with any group who opposed him especially the rebellious Kurds. Not only did Saddam Hussein and his Ba’ath party systematically prevent any political opposition, he was extremely repressive against any perceived threat to his complete control of the country. For example, fearing an Iranian-Kurdish alliance against his regime in 1983, Saddam’s forces rounded up 8,000 Kurdish males, paraded them through the streets of Baghdad, and executed them in public (McDowall 2004, 349).
Also, using the full might of the Iraqi military against Kurdish civilians during the al-Anfal campaign, Iraq’s military destroyed Kurdish villages, summarily executed Kurds, and committed the grave atrocity of using chemical weapons on Halabja and its civilian population, killing up to 5,000 people and injuring between 7,000 to 10,000 more, most of whom were civilians (Akins 1991, 22).

As shown in Figure 5.2, the Polity scores of Iraq showed a steady decline during the period under examination corresponding with the increasingly tighter grip that Saddam Hussein had on the Iraqi state. Contrary to the hypothesis claiming that
terrorism is more likely to be adopted when an insurgent group’s foe is democratic rather than authoritarian, Figure 5.2 shows an increase in terrorist activity used by Iraqi Kurdish insurgent groups as the Iraqi regime became more authoritarian.

*Central Command Strength*

McDowall (2004, 177) summarizes that the failure of the Kurds was “in unity of leadership and of purpose.” The *Peshmerga* were not unified under a single command, and from the formation of the Iraqi state in the 1920s, Ahmed Barzani recognized the need to unite the Kurdish tribes. He took about conquering neighboring Kurdish tribes in Iraq who were not aligned under the Barzani tribe’s command, and this violent form of in-fighting among Kurdish tribes continued throughout the conflict with brief periods of near unanimous military cooperation against the Iraqi regime. By the time the March Manifesto was signed in 1970, the KDP and their prized leader, Mustafa Barzani, had risen to the top of the Kurdish leadership in Iraq while the smaller groups led by Jalal Talabani from Damascus were attempting to form coalitions of other fringe groups who did not wish to bow to the Barzani tribe.

When the March Manifesto proved fruitless for the Kurds and fighting erupted again between the KDP and the Iraqi government, Mustafa Barzani was initially successful in rallying the support of the *Peshmerga* who were being supplied from Iran. In doing so, they were able to hold off the onslaught of the Iraqi military until the Algiers Agreement ended Iranian aid. Foreseeing an unwinnable situation in directly confronting the Iraqi military on the battlefield with sealed borders to the North, West, South, and now the East, Mustafa Barzani made the decision to resign his command over the *Peshmerga* in March 1975 (Korn 1994). Barzani, who was suffering from lung cancer,
knew he was too old to lead a mountainous guerrilla campaign as he did in earlier years (Korn 1994).

With an ailing Mustafa Barzani, and no clear leadership over the *Peshmerga*, the KDP struggled to retain the tribal loyalties during the late 1970s. Meanwhile, Jalal Talabani and his PUK organization rose in significance among the Kurdish movement and rallied the support of leftist Kurdish groups. During the late 1970s, the Kurdish central command was divided into two fairly equal competing camps that lasted almost until the al-Anfal campaign in 1987. Still, until the KDP, PUK, and the Communist party in Iraq signed a non-aggression pact in 1987, the groups continued to settle in-group disputes violently.

In February 1987 a joint statement issued by the KDP and PUK announced their intention to form a Kurdistan National Front and to merge their *Peshmerga* forces. In May, the Kurdistan Front including the KDP, PUK, KSP, KPDP, Pasok, The Toilers’ Party, the ICP, and the Assyrian Democratic Movement was formed with a joint command to oversee political and military activities (McDowall 2004, 352). However, the level of military coordination of each group’s *Peshmerga* was limited primarily to safe passage through rival group’s territory, and the KDP and the PUK still maintained separate commands at the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War (al-Khafaji 1988, 37).

Tribal allegiance to either the KDP or the PUK remained tentative throughout the conflict. For example, in December 1994 a section of the Karki tribe shifted loyalties from the KDP to the PUK in return for a concession on territorial claim (McDowall 2004, 16). Moreover, the KDP and PUK were not only competing with each other for the allegiance of Kurdish tribes. Saddam was also able to recruit Kurdish tribes such as the

Division among the Kurds continued throughout the 1990s. The feud between Talabani and Barzani finally came to a head during the Kurdish civil war from 1994 to 1998 when the PUK and KDP battled each other with support from external actors including the KDP’s coordination with Iraqi troops in pursuit of the PUK. At the same time the growing Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK) around Halabja began to challenge the secular Kurdish groups, and in December 1993 they began attacking PUK forces as well (McDowall 2004, 386-387).

As far as the command discipline among the rank and file Peshmerga, the core supporters of Barzani and Talabani were generally loyal and willing to fight and die in support of their leaders. David Korn (1994) notes how Israeli generals who visited Kudistan “marvelled at the endurance of the Kurdish soldier, at his uncomplaining acceptance of hardship and his unquestioning obedience to orders.” However, the allegiance of militants among the smaller tribes who attached themselves to the PUK and KDP was more questionable as McDowall (2004, 388) explains:

In addition to the personal animosity between Barzani and Talabani, the peshmerga forces were characterized by mercurial and undisciplined behavior particularly among the surrogate armed groups that had attached themselves to one side or the other.

In reference to the adoption of terrorism, there is evidence in the case of the Iraqi Kurds to support the notion that a strong central command of the main
groups, while separate, prevented the widespread adoption of terrorist tactics in northern Iraq. All of the Kurdish insurgent groups who adopted terrorism during the conflict did so during periods of weakened central command. The militants aligned with the KDP first started kidnapping civilians while the KDP leadership was regrouping after the Algiers Agreement and while the ailing Mustafa Barzani was battling lung cancer that eventually took his life in 1979 (Korn 1994).

Likewise, the PUK never reached the level of battlefield command that the KDP had over their Peshmerga troops, and militants aligned with the PUK began committing terrorist attacks during the early 1980s before they consolidated with other opposition groups at the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Moreover, the first terrorist attack committed by the insurgency that involved the hijacking of the Iraqi Airlines flight in 1975 was committed by Kurdish militants who were outside the command of Talabani or Barzani, and it is most likely that neither leader would have sanctioned the attack.

*Mobilization Capacity*

Kurdish mobilization capacity as a whole was moderate compared to the Iraqi central government during the conflict. In the years following the March Manifesto, the trained Kurdish Peshmerga under the command of Barzani numbered about 50,000 with about another 50,000 reserves who could be mobilized as irregulars (McDowall 2004, 337). At the same time the Iraqi Army had about 100,000 troops committed to the conflict, and the CIA estimated that the Iraqis could easily replenish any casualties suffered as a result of fighting the Kurds (The Implications of the Iran-Iraq Agreement 1974, 8). While there were some brief periods of lower mobilization capacity, the
Kurdish forces always rebounded to troop levels between 75,000 and 100,000 making them a serious threat to the stability of the Iraqi state.

The Kurdish mobilization capacity was primarily enabled by foreign support and by maintaining the moral high ground in their struggle against a repressive regime. External support in the form of training bases in Iran with Israeli advisors ensured a disciplined core force in the early years of the conflict. In addition, the KDP leadership’s conscious effort to constrain terrorism even when faced with the brutal oppression of Kurdish civilians resulted in a constant supply of young Kurdish males willing to fight for a righteous cause. Barzani clearly understood the dynamics of tripartite warfare by being very careful to attack only military targets knowing that the Iraqi government reprisal would be against Kurdish civilians and thus enhancing the Kurd’s mobilization capacity (McDowall 2004, 312).

However, the regime’s increasingly heavy tactics used throughout the Iran-Iraq wars culminating in the al-Anfal campaign did serve to scare many Kurds from opposing Saddam. Faced with the perception of certain death for joining the Pesmerga, many Kurdish leaders and their tribes submitted to Saddam in order to avoid his wrath, hence the existence of the Jash who patrolled Kurdish populated areas on behalf of the Iraqi government (al-Khafaji 1988). Therefore, the repressiveness of the regime actually contributed to a more fragmented insurgency that limited the insurgency’s ability to fully mobilize the Kurds.

According to the KDP leadership, the case of the Kurds in Iraq indicates that the causal arrow between the adoption of terrorism and mobilization capacity actually runs in the opposite direction as assumed in the weapon of the weak argument. Rather than a
weak insurgency leading to the adoption of terrorism, it was actually the adoption of terrorism that would hinder mobilization capacity in Iraqi Kurdistan and thus making the insurgency weaker.

Arms Procurement Capability

Due to the land-locked position of the Kurdish insurgency, they were heavily reliant on third-party support to procure weapons, and the primary channel for arms procurement was through Iran. Even though the Kurds received funding from several state actors like Syria, the United States, Iran, and Israel, they still could not use their funds to any effect without the cooperation of either Turkey or Iran as the Iraqi central government tightly controlled the central and western areas of Iraq (Quil 2008, 15). Turkey’s willingness to allow arms trickle through their border was very fickle, and they were reluctant to arm Kurds in Iraq who were often perceived as aiding and abetting the Turkish Kurds who were a constant nuisance inside their own borders. This left only Iran as a realistic lifeline for the flow of weapons into Iraqi Kurdistan.

This reliance on an open border with Iran repeatedly proved to be the determining factor in the Kurds’ fight against the Iraqi government. This was never more so apparent than when the Algiers Agreement resulted in the Shah sealing the Iranian border and cutting off all flows of supplies to the Iraqi Kurds (The Implications of the Iran-Iraq Agreement 1974, 8). After the arms were cutoff in 1975, the Kurds, and specifically the KDP who were in direct contact with the Shah, were left with the decision to either give up completely or retreat to the mountains and continue the struggle purely as a guerrilla campaign (Korn 1994). Without an open supply route and without heavy artillery to hold back the Iraqi force of 92,000 infantry, 1,200 tanks, and about 200 supporting aircraft, the
decision to melt back into the mountains was simple (McDowall 2004, 337). A guerrilla campaign was the only viable option if the Kurds wanted to continue to fight.

The slow adoption of terrorism that occurred during the disbandment of the regular Peshmerga forces was not directly caused by a decreased arms procurement capability. Throughout the conflict the Kurds maintained an irregular contingent of guerillas even when their arms procurement capability was at its highest. What the Algiers Agreement did was eliminate the arms procurement capability that supplied the conventional Peshmerga forces, but it had less of an effect on existing Kurdish guerrilla forces. The adoption of terrorism by the Kurdish insurgents that began with non-fatal kidnappings was more a reflection of the lack of discipline rather than a lack of arms procurement capability.

_Fighting Capacity_

When fully supplied and supported by heavy artillery from Iran, the Kurdish insurgency was a very effective fighting force and was able to hold back the Iraqi military. However, when denied the critical support that the land-locked Kurds relied upon, their fighting capacity was not strong enough to take and hold strategic positions. The Iraqi military exercised control over the major population centers with relative ease while the Kurds were not directly supported by the Iranian military. Moreover, by the end of the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi military was able to supplement their fighting capacity with a cocktail of chemical weapon attacks on population centers like Halabja that were jointly held by the Kurds and Iranians.

The periods following the Algiers Agreement in 1975 and the al-Anfal campaign that concluded the Iran-Iraq war were salient reminders that the Kurdish rebels’ fighting
capacity was no match for the Iraqi military as the Peshmerga were unable to defend Kurdish civilians in both instances. Like in previous periods, the only thing that denied the complete destruction of the Kurdish fighting force during the al-Anfal campaign, was a retreat to the more easily defended mountains.

The period immediately after the al-Anfal campaign was arguably the low point for the Kurdish insurgency’s fighting capacity. The result of the al-Anfal campaign left 4,500 Kurdish villages destroyed, as many as 182,000 killed, and up to 1 million Kurds displaced (Sinan 2007). As McDowall describes the al-Anfal campaign:

Saddam unleashed a scorched earth policy against the Kurds and defeated them militarily and committed mass atrocities and genocide in the al-Anfal campaign that was reminiscent of Nazi Germany (McDowall 2004, 362).

If the weapon of the weak argument concerning the adoption of terrorism were valid, one would expect a broad based terrorist campaign to have occurred after the al-Anfal campaign when the Kurds fighting capacity was at its weakest. There was one rather spectacular armed assault on an Iraqi military base in November 1988 that killed 40 and injured 100 (GTD). However, this attack does not adhere to RAND’s definition of terrorism because it was committed against a military target. Because the Kurds hardened their resolve and showed even greater restraint in their focus on non-civilian targets following the low point in their fighting capacity, the November 1988 attack suggests the exact opposite than what the weapon of the weak argument predicts. Moreover, the Kurds’ level of terrorist activity aside from the military base attack remained much the same as it was prior to the al-Anfal campaign consisting mainly of bloodless kidnappings with an occasional armed assault resulting in minimal casualties.
Territorial Control

As with most insurgencies, the Iraqi Kurds never controlled the entire territory to which they made a claim. The territorial claims made by the Iraqi Kurds include a large area of northern Iraq with a perceived border that begins about 100 miles northwest of Baghdad at the Iranian border and then snakes in a northwest direction across northern Iraq for about 300 miles to the point where the Tigris River crosses the Turkish border.

Figure 5.3 – Territorial Claims Made by the Kurdish
The area as shown in Figure 5.3 includes the strategically important and highly contested city of Kirkuk which most Kurds commonly recognize as their homeland’s capital city (McDowall 2004, 3).

Iraqi Kurdistan is strategic for two reasons. First the large oil reserves contained within the Kurds territorial claim has made the Kurds a sought after partner for foreign actors looking to topple the Ba’ath regime following the nationalization of Iraq’s oil industry on June 1, 1972 (McDowall 2004, 331). The second strategic resource that flowed from Iraqi Kurdistan was the water that ran off of the Zagros Mountains and fed into the Tigris River making Iraqi Kurdistan agriculturally viable.

The exercise of territorial control over the contested areas of Iraqi Kurdistan was highly contingent on foreign support and the unification of the Kurdish insurgency. The Kurds were able to keep the Iraqi military at bay with the provision of heavy artillery support from Iran in the period between the March Manifesto and the signing of the Algiers Agreement. The Kurds were also able to control a large portion of their territorial claim after the KDP-PUK unification against Saddam in 1986-1987. During the unification, the KDP was able to gain considerable territory from the Iraqi Army in the North while the PUK controlled all of the mountains in the southern part of Kurdistan and were able to fight pitched battles with the Iraqi Army around Sulaymaniya. McDowall cites the limits of the Iraqi Army as only able to control the countryside during daylight hours (McDowall 2004, 351).

However, the Kurds never relinquished control of the mountains to which they retreated during periods of greater asymmetry compared to the Iraqi military. The Kurds used the mountainous territory to their maximum advantage. For example, prior to the
Algiers Agreement they were able to cache large quantities of weapons and munitions enabling a subsequent guerrilla campaign against the Iraq military (The Implications of the Iran-Iraq Agreement 1974, 6).

Kurdish control over their lower lying territory was enabled by external support during the periods between the March Manifesto and the Algiers Agreement, during the Iran-Iraq War, and after the 1991 Gulf War. The Iranians were welcomed into Kurdish territory on multiple occasions when they fought Iraq. The CIA also sought Kurdish bases to launch an operation to topple Saddam during a 1995 aborted attempt that ultimately left the PUK to fight alone (Anderson and Stansfield 2004, 95-96). The PUK was sure to fail in 1995, but the fact that they were even capable of launching an attack is testament to the importance of having a territorial base of operations. Later in the lead up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the U.S. was able to once again launch one prong of their attack from Kurdish controlled territory.

There is some evidence within this case showing that the territory in which the insurgency controlled facilitated some limited terrorist activities. As McDowall (2004, 351) points out, “the territory the PUK controlled in the countryside during the fighting in 1986 allowed them to kidnap and take hostages along the major roads.”

**Foreign State-Actor Support**

There were a multitude of foreign state actors who supported the Iraqi Kurds over the course of the conflict, and as Anderson and Stansfield (2004, 80) explain:

The Kurds demonstrated repeatedly over the period that they were willing to side with anyone, regardless of nationality or ethnicity, to continue their struggle against the Iraqi state.
State actors who supported the Iraqi Kurds during the period under examination include Iran, the United States, Israel, Syria, Jordan, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom (Quil 2008, 15). Most notably among the state actors who provided support that had a direct impact on the Kurds’ quest for self-determination was Iran, the U.S., Israel and, to a lesser extent the Soviets, whose support forced Saddam to offer the March Manifesto.

Although Saddam was unable to convince the Soviets to withdrawal support for the Iraqi Kurds in 1970, he was finally able to secure an agreement with the Soviets in April 1972. The so-called Friendship Treaty between the Soviets and the Ba’ath regime ended Soviet aid to the Kurds and moved the onus of maintaining a destabilizing Kurdish insurgency in Iraq to the Shah in Iran (McDowall 2004, 331). At the same time the U.S. was incentivized to curb Soviet influence in the Middle East, and they pledged their support for the Kurds as “guarantor that the insurgent group would not be summarily dropped” by the Shah (McDowall 2004, 331).

By the time Saddam imposed his Kurdish Autonomy Law in March 1974, the Kurdish insurgency was prepared for battle. Israel was providing military assistance in the form of intelligence and training from bases within Iraqi Kurdistan, Iran, and possibly even from Israel’s territory itself (The Implications of the Iran-Iraq Agreement 1974, 8). Israel was also providing financial support to the Kurds including a $50,000 stipend for Mustafa Barzani (McDowall 2004, 331).

Not only was Iran offering safe passage for training Kurdish Peshmerga and maintaining an open supply route into northern Iraq, they also committed large numbers of their own troops to fight alongside the Peshmerga. During the 1974-1975 fighting, Iran provided two divisions of infantry who often dressed in Kurdish garb to prevent
them from being easily identified as Iranians on Iraqi soil (Abdulaghani 1984, 142). Iran also provided 75mm light and 130mm medium field guns directly to the Kurds, and they provided long-range heavy artillery support fired from 175mm guns located within Iranian borders to help keep Iraqi infantry and armored units from advancing on Kurdish positions (McDowall 2004, 338). In addition, Iran used their U.S. supplied Hawk missiles to shoot down the Iraqi’s Soviet supplied MiG-23 jet fighters which provided a level of air defense enjoyed by the Kurds that was not rivaled until the U.S. established the No-Fly Zone above the 36th parallel in northern Iraq following the 1991 Gulf War (McDowall 2004, 338; Kutschera 2002, 15).

As evidenced above, the level of state actor support enjoyed by the Iraqi Kurds up until the signing of the Algiers Agreement was very impressive and permitted the Kurds to directly confront and win battles against the attacking Iraqi military. However, when Iran’s support was eliminated in 1975 and the Iranian border sealed, the Iraqi Kurds were left with virtually no prospects of receiving future weapons, supplies, or training from not only Iran, but also from Israel and the U.S. who relied on Iranian logistical support. The Kurdish resistance led by Mustafa Barzani and his KDP was forced to retreat to the mountains and draw on cached supplies of weapons and ammunition if they wanted to continue fighting, and they no longer had the capability to fight a conventional war augmented by guerrilla tactics.

At first glance, the near complete elimination of state actor support following the signing of the Algiers Agreement on March 15, 1975, appears to have triggered the slow adoption of terrorism by the remnants of the KDP and PUK in the years that followed. However, the most undeniable act of terrorism committed by unaligned Kurdish militants
took place on March 1, 1975 when an Iraqi Airlines passenger plane was hijacked in midair. At the time of the hijacking, the Shah had not yet announced his intention to withdrawal Iranian support which came on March 5, 1975 following the meeting between Saddam and the Shah in Algiers (Korn 1994). Therefore, the most irrefutable act of terrorism committed by Kurdish insurgents occurred at a time when the Kurds were fully supplied and enjoying the highest levels of external support from state actors to that time.

However, because there is no evidence found to suggest that the lone actors were directly impacted by the level of support enjoyed by the dominant KDP, it is difficult to report a causal link between the level of state actor support and the adoption of terrorism by rogue actors.

Non-State Actor Support

The majority of external non-state actor support came from the Kurdish diaspora in the neighboring countries of Turkey, Syria, and Iran. Post-Gulf War estimates show the largest concentrations of Kurdish diaspora appearing in Turkey with 12-15 million Kurds, Iran with 6.5 million Kurds, Syria with 800,000 – 1 million, Germany with 330,000, the U.S. with 300,000, Azerbaijan with 200,000, Armenia with 75,000, Lebanon with 60,000, and another 400,000 spread across Europe and the former Soviet Union (McDowall 2004, 4; O'Ballance 1996, xxi; Yildiz 2004, 9).

The Kurdish diaspora in Turkey has had the greatest incentive to support Kurdish autonomy in Iraq. Many Turkish Kurds see a potential benefit for their own struggle with Turkey if Iraqi Kurdistan were independent. Marcie Patton (2003) explains how an oil rich Kurdish entity in northern Iraq could be a viable source of financing for militant operations in southeastern Turkey (Patton 2003, 44).
The Kurds in Iran were also supportive of their brethren in Iraq. They too joined the fighting on the side of the Iraqi Kurds during the 1974-1975 War along with the two divisions of Iranians that crossed into Northern Iraq. However, direct support from the Iranian Kurds in the form of foreign fighters was also all but eliminated when the Shah sealed the Iranian border following his agreement with Saddam Hussein in Algiers.

The level of support provided to the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq from their diaspora was not nearly as impactful as the huge amounts of support provided by state actors, but it did at least show a symbolic solidarity even if it was only contingent on tribal allegiance and subject to clientelism.

With respect to the adoption of terrorism, this case study found no evidence linking the non-state actor support provided by the Kurdish diaspora to the first acts of terrorism that were committed by Kurdish insurgents in Iraq.

**Conclusion**

A full examination of the variables cited among the competing hypotheses concerning the adoption of terrorism in the case of the Iraqi Kurds reveals that there are some plausible causal links as well as evidence to debunk some assumptions concerning the adoption of terrorism. Table 5.1 summarizes the results of the Iraqi Kurds case study in relation to the alternative hypotheses under examination.
Table 5.1 – Causal Relationships between Independent Variables and the Adoption of Terrorism by the Iraqi Kurds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Hypothesis False / Not False / Partly False</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H₁</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H₂</td>
<td>Separatist Goal</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H₃</td>
<td>Weak Insurgent Group</td>
<td>Partly False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H₄</td>
<td>Foreign Support (in general)</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H₅</td>
<td>Direct Material Support</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H₆</td>
<td>Non-State Actor Benefactor</td>
<td>Not False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H₇</td>
<td>Direct Support from State Actors</td>
<td>False</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H₈</td>
<td>Direct Support from Non-state Actors</td>
<td>Not False</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, the case of the Iraq Kurds does not provide enough evidence to suggest that insurgent groups with secessionist goals are more likely to adopt terrorism than insurgent groups with the goal to overthrow the central government. Moreover, the case of the Iraqi Kurds show that sometimes the goal of overthrowing or gaining control of the central government may not be a goal in and of itself, but rather can be a means to achieving the real goal of autonomy as evidenced by the Kurds’ pragmatic approach to include demands for greater governmental participation in all of the agreements they made or proposed with the Iraqi central government.

Next, the case of the Iraqi Kurds does not provide sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis that an insurgent group who opposes an authoritarian regime is less likely to adopt terrorism compared to an insurgent group who opposes a democratic government. Both of the major Kurdish insurgent groups in Iraq adopted terrorism when Iraq’s polity scores were -7 or lower. In addition, as Iraq’s Polity score continued to decline, the frequency and lethality of terrorist incidents rose.
Among all the indicators of insurgent group strength, the existence and strength of a central command rose to the top as a variable having the most impact on whether the Kurdish insurgency adopted terrorism. The first recorded act of terrorism on March 1, 1975 was committed by three Kurds who had no known affiliation to either the PUK or the dominant KDP, and it appeared that the hijackers were lone actors. Moreover, as the insurgency became more fragmented insurgents from within both the KDP and the PUK began kidnapping Iraqi civilians and foreign workers in Iraq.

The insurgency’s mobilization capacity also showed a correlation with the adoption of terrorism, but a close examination of the case reveals that the causal arrow ran in the opposite direction than what the weapon of the weak argument suggests. Mustafa Barzani’s understanding of tripartite warfare gave him the wisdom to maintain the support of the general Kurdish population as their leader by holding the moral high ground and not giving into the temptation to attack Iraqi civilians. Therefore, in the case of the Kurds the foregoing of terrorist tactics increased the insurgency’s mobilization capacity, and a decreased mobilization capacity did not lead to the adoption of terrorism.

However, there was no further evidence showing a causal link between the adoption of terrorism and the remaining indicators of insurgent group strength. The Kurdish insurgency as a whole maintained the strength to hold the Iraqi military at bay in direct confrontation on the battlefield while rogue Kurdish militants hijacked an airliner during the same period. Therefore, there is not enough evidence to support the weapon of the weak argument.

To summarize foreign support for the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq, non-state actor support had a negligible impact on the course of the conflict and amounted to primarily
indirect passive support, but the state actor support that the Kurdish insurgency relied
upon had an immediate and salient impact on the Kurds’ ability to put up an effect
defense against the Iraqi military and to protect Kurdish civilians. However, there were
no causal links found between state actor support and the adoption of terrorism despite
the first act of terrorism occurring during a time of unprecedented levels of foreign
support provided by Iran, the U.S. and Israel. Therefore, the case of the Iraqi Kurds does
not support the hypothesis claiming that insurgent groups with foreign support are more
likely to adopt terrorism.

Of note in the case of the Iraqi Kurds, there were relatively few instances of
terrorism committed by the Kurdish insurgency given the length of the conflict.
Moreover, the lethality of the terrorist incidents that did occur was low, and many of the
attacks coded as using terrorist tactics targeted only the Iraqi military. These facts lend
themselves to falsify the hypothesis (H4) that insurgent groups who receive foreign
support in general are more likely to adopt terrorism. Moreover, there is also little
evidence to support the hypothesis that insurgent groups who receive direct material
support compared to indirect passive support are more likely to adopt terrorism.

In conclusion, the case of the Iraqi Kurds is a testament to the impact that strong
leadership and unity of central command can have on the tactics employed by an
insurgency. The leadership of Mustafa Barzani in setting a doctrine against attacking
civilian targets was strong enough to override any erosion of local constraints that could
have resulted from the insurgency’s reliance on foreign support. Therefore, the role of
foreign support in this case was secondary to the effect of the central command.
Chapter Six
Conclusion: What is Foreign Support’s Role?

Introduction

So what is the role of foreign support among the other factors that impact an insurgent group’s decision to adopt terrorism? A purely quantitative analysis of the factors suggests that foreign support only plays a significant role in the decision when it comes in the form of material and direct support provided by another non-state actor. The case studies also support this finding, but there are other variables that help explain the adoption of terrorism by insurgent groups.

In addition to direct material support coming from a foreign non-state actor, the quantitative analysis in this thesis also suggests that regime type, strength of central command, mobilization capacity, arms procurement capability, and fighting capacity help explain the adoption of terrorism by insurgent groups to some degree. However, by tracing the events surrounding the adoption of terrorism in both case studies, this thesis was able to further test the effects of the variables to identify some causal mechanisms that either support or refute the correlations revealed in the quantitative analysis.

This chapter proceeds by comparing the quantitative analysis results from chapter three to the case study results for the Tamils in Sri Lanka and the Kurds in Iraq as found in chapters four and five, respectively. In doing so, this chapter also compares the two
case studies to one another to identify common causal mechanisms present in both cases and to highlight unique causal mechanisms in each. This chapter will then provide recommendations for conducting future research based on the inductive findings of the thesis. Finally, this will summarize the significance of this thesis’ results specifically focusing on potential theoretical and policy implications arising from the findings concerning the role of foreign support among the other causes of terrorism.

**Analysis of Results**

According to the deductions from chapter three based on statistically significant correlations, the mostly likely insurgent group to adopt terrorism would be one who opposes a democratic government, has a strong central command, has a high mobilization capacity, has a low arms procurement capability, and receives direct material foreign support from a non-state actor.

**Democratic Regime Type**

Just as Wade and Reiter (2007) and Pape (2010) would predict, Chapter three showed a correlation suggesting that the more democratic a regime type is, the more likely an insurgent group who opposes that regime is to adopt terrorism. However, the combined results of the case studies fail to falsify the predictions of a curvilinear relationship between regime type and terrorism as Moore (2000) or Findley and Young (2011) would predict. In the case of Sri Lanka, the causal mechanism that triggered a widespread armed insurgency and the eventual adoption of terrorism was actually the breakdown of democracy that left only armed action as viable means to achieving the Tamils’ goals. Combined with the lack of widespread terrorism committed by Kurds in
Iraq’s authoritarian environment, the case studies hint at a possible curvilinear correlation when taken together.

However, the results of this thesis’ case studies also cannot falsify the assertions made by scholars such as Gause (2005) where there is still a possibility for no causal relationship between regime type and terrorism in some cases. For example, in Iraq the decision by the major Kurdish groups to not sanction terrorism was not a direct result of the country’s regime type, and terrorist activity actually became more frequent as Saddam’s grip over the country became even more repressive and authoritarian.

Because the case studies do not support the findings of the quantitative analysis and because Sri Lanka uncovered a potential causal link for the adoption of terrorism when a country slides from democratic to anocracy, this thesis concludes that the hypothesis (H₁) proposing that insurgent groups who face democratic regimes are more likely to adopt terrorism is not valid in the case of Sri Lanka and finds no support in the case of the Kurds because they were far from facing a democratic regime.

**Strong Central Command**

Chapter three also showed a correlation suggesting that the stronger an insurgent group’s central command is, the more likely an insurgent group will be to adopt terrorism. Both case studies confirm a causal link between the variables but in the opposite direction as what the statistical results suggest. This is likely the result of the loss of data when coding variables for a conflict that lasts decades.

The quantitative analysis loses data for variables whose values change over time because each conflict can only have a single value for each variable. The case of the Tamils in Sri Lanka confirms this where the adoption of terrorism by the LTTE occurred
while the insurgency as a whole was fragmented, even if the LTTE’s individual central command strength was strong. The LTTE did eventually consolidate their control over the entire insurgency which provided a strong central command for the insurgency as a whole, but by then the LTTE had been committing terrorist attacks for over 10 years.

The first act of terrorism committed by the Iraqi Kurds in 1975 also uncovered a causal relationship in the opposite direction than what the quantitative analysis suggests. While the KDP was the most relevant Kurdish insurgent group in Iraq at the time and fought very well against the Iraqi military, the insurgency was very fragmented in 1975 with constantly shifting tribal allegiances and the cooption of some tribes by the Iraqi government. The inability of the KDP to maintain a strong central command over the entire insurgency allowed for rogue militants to conduct terrorist operations that would have not been approved by the KDP leader, Mustafa Barzani.

Because there are diverging results between the quantitative analysis and the in-depth case studies, this thesis cannot confidently conclude that a weak central command is likely to lead to the adoption of terrorism outside of the two cases examined. Furthermore, this thesis supports the notion that a central command with a high level of control over an insurgency can make the insurgency strong in some instances but weak in others, just as Arquilla (2001), Hoffman (2006), and Frisch (2011) explain the advantages of a decentralized network structure for insurgent groups.

**High Mobilization Capacity**

The quantitative analysis falsified the assumption that an insurgent group with a low mobilization is more likely to adopt terrorism compared to an insurgent group with a high mobilization capacity. In addition, the quantitative analysis suggested exactly the
opposite of what the proponents of the weapon of the weak argument would expect where one of the statistical models showed that as insurgent groups increase their mobilization capacity, they are more likely to adopt terrorism. In addition, the case studies produce mixed results for a relationship between mobilization capacity and an insurgent group’s adoption of terrorism which also suggests randomness with respect to a relationship between terrorism and an insurgent group’s mobilization capacity.

In Sri Lanka, the LTTE adopted terrorist tactics when mobilization capacity was relatively low compared to the government, and the targets they chose were likely chosen in an effort to solicit a governmental reprisal against Tamil civilians which would in-turn increase their mobilization capacity. This worked to an extent, but not all of the Tamil insurgent groups adopted terrorism when their mobilization capacity was low. All of the other Tamil insurgent groups except for the Karuna Faction adopted terrorism while mobilization capacity was at its highest point in the conflict. In contrast, Mustafa Barzani prohibited terrorist tactics for the Kurdish militants under his command in order to maintain the moral high ground and to capitalize on a potential increase in mobilization capacity following unprovoked attacks by the Iraqi military on Kurdish civilians.

Moreover, the cases show that any potential causal arrow between the adoption of terrorism and a high mobilization capacity run in the opposite direction of what the weapon of the weak argument proposes. Both Prabhakaren and Barzani were attempting to tip the balance of the tripartite war in their favor by either adopting or forgoing terrorist tactics. Therefore, the causal links uncovered in this thesis with respect to a relationship between mobilization capacity and an insurgent group’s adoption of terrorism falsifies the weapon of the weak argument as proposed in H₃ for both case
studies and suggests that the same findings may be generalizable to a much larger population given the findings of the statistical analysis.

Low Arms Procurement Capability

The quantitative analysis in chapter three supports the assertion that weak insurgent groups as measured by a low arms procurement capability are more likely to adopt terrorism, but both case studies were inconclusive when determining a causal link for the correlation.

In the case of Sri Lanka, the LTTE adopted terrorism before their arms procurement capability was fully developed and many of their early attacks targeted the police and banks with armed guards in an effort to not only steal cash to fund their insurgency but to also plunder additional weapons. Therefore, in the early stages of the Sri Lanka conflict, terrorism and other criminal behavior was the primary arms procurement mechanism. Moreover, as the insurgency gained momentum and the arms procurement capability of both the LTTE and other groups grew, the adoption of terrorism proliferated among the other groups. In addition, the first act of terrorism in the case of the Iraqi Kurds occurred when the insurgency’s arms procurement capability was at a high point. Although, it is not clear if the rouge Kurdish militants who hijacked the Iraqi airliner benefited from the broader insurgency’s arms procurement apparatus, they likely could have if they joined the Peshmerga to fight the Iraqi military on the battlefield.

The conflicting results for the arms procurement variable between the case studies and the quantitative analysis section is likely due to the conservative coding of arms procurement capability in the NSA data. Only five out of the 109 conflicts included in
the quantitative analysis were coded as having a high arms procurement capability, and only one of those groups used terrorist tactics. Moreover, the case studies showed that insurgent groups are often able to supplement their arms procurement capability with foreign support provided by external actors. For example, the Kurds periodically enjoyed the benefits of long-range artillery cover-fire from Iran without ever procuring a single piece of heavy artillery, and they enjoyed the benefit of a No-Fly Zone after the 1991 Gulf War without purchasing or operating a single aircraft.

Direct Material Foreign Support from a Non-State Actor

Interestingly, the quantitative analysis did not show a correlation between the adoption of terrorism and the benefactor type variable or the foreign support type variable alone, but it did show a correlation between the type of foreign support provided by foreign non-state actors and the adoption of terrorism. In addition, a comparison of the case studies uncovered a causal link between the adoption of terrorism by an insurgent group and the level of foreign support from non-state actors.

In Sri Lanka, the Tamil insurgent groups enjoyed a large amount of direct foreign support from several different types of non-state actors including the Tamil diaspora, the Tamil Nadu sub-state government, and Palestinian terrorist organizations. While the Tamil insurgency did receive some support from India in the early years, their primary source of external support through the duration of the conflict was from non-state actors. On the other hand, the Kurds in Iraq received the vast majority of their external support from state actors, and while they did receive some direct support from Kurds in neighboring countries, it had very little impact on their capabilities in comparison to the state actor support they received.
Taken together the cases appear to be an example of “strategic and tactical diffusion” as described by Hafez (2007, 24) where the knowledge of how to employ tactics and the doctrine for their use was passed from benefactor to beneficiary. Of note in the case of the Tamil insurgency, a causal link was uncovered where tactics such as truck bombings and suicide attacks employed by the LTTE were conducted using a very similar modus operandi to what their Palestinian benefactors employed in Lebanon. A similar causal link did not exist between the Iraqi Kurds and their non-state supporters, but rather in the case of the Kurds, a large number of Peshmerga were trained by Israeli advisors whose military doctrine de-emphasized the use of terrorist tactics. In effect, the Tamil insurgency was primarily influenced and strengthened by the direct support they received from non-state actors whereas the Kurdish insurgency was primarily influenced and strengthened by the direct support they received from state actors.

In addition, the tactical diffusion of the differing doctrines and their constraints appeared to extend beyond just the adoption of terrorism where the continued and consistent use of terrorism varied greatly between the Kurdish and Tamil insurgencies. The Kurds committed a low number of terrorist attacks with a low lethality rate whereas the Tamils committed a very large number of terrorist attacks with a much higher lethality rate. In comparing the two cases, it is clear that the tactical doctrine of the Tamils, which was very likely reinforced by training received from Palestinian terrorist organizations, placed far fewer constraints on the use of violence against civilians than did the Kurdish military doctrine.

Because the statistical analysis backs up the findings of the case studies with respect to the hypothesis (H₈) proposing that insurgent groups are more likely to adopt
terrorism when they receive direct material foreign support from non-state actors, this thesis first concludes that the hypothesis may be generalizable to cases other than the Sri Lankan Tamils or the Kurds in Iraq.

However, the fact remains that Iraqi Kurdish militants still adopted the limited use of terrorist tactics. The second major conclusion of this study is the provision of direct material support from a non-state actor is not the sole determinant of when insurgents adopt terrorism. A comparison of the Iraqi Kurdish insurgency with the Tamil insurgency shows there can be other causal paths to the adoption of terrorism. For example, the existence of a divided command with little influence over fringe components of the insurgency who are not constrained by the same rigorous military doctrine adhered to by the larger umbrella insurgent groups are more likely to stray from the primary group’s tactical doctrine.

**Areas for Additional Future Research**

While completing this thesis, there were several items identified that should be considered for additional research. The items below were identified because it is reasonable to believe that they could either enhance the predictive capability of the research design or build upon the conclusions of this thesis.

**Additional Cases**

There were several variables across all three quantitative models that fell just short of statistical significance. This leads to the conclusion that the precision of the statistical analysis and its ability to produce even more meaningful results could be achieved with future research that identifies and adds cases to the sample population used.
in the quantitative analysis. This could be accomplished in a number of ways. First, cases could be added to the sample population if additional data is added to the datasets used by this thesis permitting the cross reference of variables for a broader period than 1972 to 2007. The principal challenge to doing so is the laborious task of conducting the research necessary to add new case descriptions to the NSA data set for the insurgent groups identified in the COW Intra-State War Data for conflicts occurring from 1817 to 1971.

With respect to additional case studies for follow-on research, the case of the Shi’ites in Iraq should be considered as an additional critical case to examine as they have very similar values for the independent variables compared to the Kurdish insurgency in Northern Iraq. In fact, the only variable with a difference between the Shi’ites and the Kurds in Iraq is the insurgent group goal type which was found to have no correlation with the adoption of terrorism.

Another case that fits into the most similar systems design of this thesis is the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Azerbaijan. Of all the variables included in this study, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has all of the same attributes as the Iraqi-Kurds conflict in Northern Iraq except for a difference in regime type. Similarly, it has all of the same attributes as the Tamil insurgency except for the regime type and strength of central command. Moreover, the Nagorno-Karabakh insurgency did not adopt terrorism according to the RWDTI and therefore should provide some additional insight in the decision to either adopt or forgo terrorist tactics when comparing it to the Kurdish and Tamil insurgencies.

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44 Iraq was coded as autocratic and Azerbaijan was coded as an anocracy.
The JVP in Sri Lanka would also be an interesting case to compare to the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka, but it would not fit as neatly into the most similar systems design of this thesis. Therefore, the JVP could be examined if future research were to employ a most different systems design instead.

Additional Independent Variables

Additional independent variables could also be added to the multiple logistic regression models in order to increase their pseudo r-squared values and thus increase their explanatory capability. First, the length of the conflict could be an independent variable worth examining because there is some evidence in both case studies to suggest that the violence may not have escalated to terrorist tactics if the conflicts were resolved more quickly.

Second, a geographic region variable could help shed light on trends in the adoption of terrorism and may help provide additional support for the “strategic and tactical diffusion” causal mechanism where geographic proximity between an insurgent group and external non-state actors may show a correlation with the adoption of terrorism.

Third, including a dichotomous variable for specific benefactors of interest could also help identify trends in the adoption of terrorism from select benefactors. For example, a dichotomous variable could be created for support from Palestinian terrorist organizations or for support from the Soviet Union, United States, Israel, Iran, Pakistan, or India among others.
Fourth, the inclusion of cultural variables such as religious or ethnic difference may also be worth including in the regression models because both case studies showed that divisions along religious and ethnic lines were present within the conflict.

Fifth, the inclusion of a socio-economic variable that measures the level of relative deprivation among the insurgency could possibly improve the predictability of the models because the core grievances of the insurgencies examined in this thesis’ case studies arose from the denial of economic, social, or political status that was either previously enjoyed by the insurgency or was promised and then never given to them.

Finally, just as the quantitative analysis controlled for the end of the Cold War, another control variable for the legacy of British colonialism could be included in the study because the background information for both of the case studies in this thesis suggest that decisions made by former British rulers had a lasting impact on ethnic tensions in both conflicts.

Norms and Constraints

This thesis made some progress toward a more complete understanding of the nature of tripartite warfare as termed by Betts (2002). However, there is still much research to be done to gain a full understanding of the concept. Specifically, the leaders of both leading insurgent groups in the case studies attempted to capture the support of their civilian populations in order to strengthen their insurgencies. However, one leader did so by adopting terrorism and the other did so by forgoing terrorist tactics. Future research is required to fully explore the following questions and to help determine the effects of the adoption of terrorism on a tripartite war. First, when does the adoption of terrorism result in retaliation against a civilian population by the central government?
Second, does retaliation against a civilian population increase an insurgency’s mobilization capacity or does it break the will of the people to rebel? Third, when a civilian population is being purposely targeted by a government, does a civilian population still constrain the use of terrorist tactics or are they more permissive of their use?

Additional in-depth case studies could also reveal more details about the constraints on the use of support provided to insurgent groups, especially support provided by state actors. Future research in this area will help make even a stronger determination about the relationship between tactical diffusion, military doctrine, and the adoption of terrorism.

Related to constraints on the use of foreign support, future research could also explore whether the adoption of terrorism is more likely when an insurgent group has only one benefactor versus multiple benefactors. Unfortunately, the case studies in this thesis did not help answer this question as both the Tamil insurgency and the Kurdish insurgency enjoyed foreign support from many actors.

Finally, if future research was able to definitively conceptualize and operationalize a variable for radical ideology or radical beliefs, additional correlations and causal links concerning the adoption of terrorism by insurgent groups could be uncovered. This could be especially helpful in comparing insurgent groups whose primary modus operandi devolved to suicide terrorism, like the LTTE, to groups who showed significant restraint in using suicide tactics or even killing civilians on the opposite side of the conflict, like the KDP.
Conclusion and Policy Implications

When considering the complete body of results from all of the hypotheses across both case studies and the quantitative analysis, this thesis concludes that the most generalizable finding is that insurgent groups with a weak or non-existent central command who primarily receive direct material foreign support from non-state actors are the most likely insurgent groups to adopt terrorism. Of all the variables examined, the level of foreign support from a non-state actor had the most apparent causal link to the use of terrorism when comparing the cases of the Iraqi Kurds to the Sri Lankan Tamils. Also, the quantitative analysis showed the log odds likelihood for an insurgent group to adopt terrorism increases by over 170% for each higher level of non-state actor support provided to the insurgent group.

Foreign support appears to have an effect, but the research in this thesis shows foreign support, in and of itself, is not a determining factor for the adoption of terrorism by an insurgent group. Rather, this thesis only supports a causal relationship when an insurgent group receives foreign support primarily from non-state actors. More specifically, the causal link is most likely present when non-state actors train the insurgent group on terroristic tactics. Interestingly, the dynamic between the receipt of foreign support and an insurgent group’s strength, as measured by the five indicators of strength, shows that in most instances an insurgent group gets stronger as a result of foreign support. Even if the increase in strength is somewhat marginal compared to the government, the insurgent groups who adopted terrorism after receiving foreign support were not weaker as a result. Therefore, if foreign support has a causal effect on an
insurgent group’s adoption of terrorism, then the weapon of the weak argument is not valid in the case of Sri Lanka and possibly in many more cases too.

*Policy Implications for State Benefactors*

By surveying results of this thesis, there are a few implications to policies that states adopt with respect to providing foreign support for insurgent groups.

First, implementing a foreign policy that includes providing foreign support to an insurgent group is risky for states. There are virtually no absolute truths concerning how support provided to an insurgent group is ultimately used and how it shapes the outcome of a conflict. State actors who debate whether or not to provide support to an insurgency should take warning from this thesis’ research showing that the outcomes are tempered with what is more or less likely to occur but not what absolutely will or will not occur. For example, Indian politicians initially provided aid to the Tamils in Sri Lanka for both internal political purposes and for fear of Sri Lanka becoming a proxy of other regional or global powers. However, they were not able to shape the tactics adopted by most of the insurgents and they could not tame the proliferation of terrorism in Sri Lanka which eventually spilled over into India itself. Therefore, state actors should not attempt to support insurgent groups as a sole means to an end, and additional factors should be considered before providing support.

Second, state actors who do not want to be labeled as state sponsors of terrorism need to consider the level of control an insurgent group has over the insurgency as a whole and whether the leadership is committed to not using terrorism. Even then, it is still risky because the health and safety of an insurgency’s leadership cannot be guaranteed especially in the midst of an ongoing conflict. For example, after the KDP
leader Mustafa Barzani passed away there was a slight increase in terrorist activity committed by the Kurds. Also, support given to insurgent groups with no history of committing terrorism could be eclipsed by rival groups, and their weapons and other military articles could fall into the wrong hands just like when the LTTE ruthlessly eliminated their rivals and commandeered weapons in Sri Lanka. Therefore, the best way to ensure support does not end up fueling terrorism is to not provide it in the first place as there is always a risk of unintended beneficiaries.

Policy Implications for a State Fighting an Insurgency

For states who find themselves embroiled in a conflict with an internal insurgency, the results of this thesis also provide a policy suggestion concerning the tactics the state adopts to fight an insurgency. First, the insurgencies examined in this thesis’ case studies were very durable and the civilian populations that supported them were mobilized by the repressive tactics of the governments who opposed them. States combating insurgent groups need to resist the temptation “to go berserk,” as the Sri Lankan General said, even when they suffer terrorist attacks. Government attacks and reprisals against civilian populations in response to terrorist or other attacks by insurgent groups are likely to increase an insurgent group’s mobilization capacity and make it more likely for the insurgency to attract foreign support, especially from ethnic diasporas. In turn, this makes it more difficult to seek non-military options to resolve the conflict in the future and also invites foreign interest in an otherwise domestic conflict.

Policy Implications for Insurgent Groups

With regard to the acceptance of support from benefactors and the tactics insurgent groups employ, the results of this thesis provide some policy guidance for
insurgent groups also. First, insurgent groups should understand that foreign support from state actors is highly contingent on the benefactor’s state interest, and the insurgent group should not expect a state actor to put the insurgent group’s goals above the benefactor’s interest. The Kurds were left to their own devices on more than one occasion after receiving significant support from various state actors that had a material effect on the course of the conflict. Likewise, the Tamils were cut off from Indian support when India could no longer stomach the political, financial, and human cost of their involvement.

Finally, insurgent groups who cross the line into terrorism from other guerrilla tactics must understand that once they cross the line, they cannot go back. No matter how charitable and despite how many services an insurgent groups offers to the civilian populations they represent, insurgent groups are still likely to be considered terrorist organizations by the international community after they cross the line into purposely targeting civilians. Even if an insurgent group adopts terrorism and achieves a de facto independence or replaces the government they oppose, very few members of the international community are likely to recognize their independence or the legitimacy of their government. Therefore, the adoption of terrorism limits the opportunities for achieving an insurgent group’s political goals even if it helps them achieve their military goals.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this thesis achieved what it set out to accomplish. It thoroughly examined the impact of foreign support on insurgent groups who committed terrorism while involved in asymmetric conflicts with their domestic governments. The research
completed shows that in such cases there were multiple factors that impacted the decision to adopt terrorism, and there can be more than one path an insurgent group takes from guerilla warfare targeting the opposition’s military to the use of terrorist tactics to purposely kill civilians. Ultimately, the research in this thesis seriously questions the unequivocalness of the weapon of the weak argument and the other prevailing explanations of terrorism. Most importantly, the research in this thesis advances the understanding of how foreign support impacts the decision to adopt terrorism by deducing that under the right circumstances direct material support provided from foreign non-state actors alleviates the local and international norms against the use of terrorism and can make it more likely for insurgent groups to cross the line into terrorism.
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# APPENDIX A

## Table A.1 - Insurgent Groups Participating in Conflicts that Start and End during the Cold War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insurgent Group</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Start Year</th>
<th>End Year</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>Anti-Khomeini Coalition</td>
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<td>1984</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>1979</td>
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<td>Baluchi Separatists</td>
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<td>Communist Insurgency</td>
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<td>1973</td>
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<td>Contra War</td>
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<td>1990</td>
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<td>Third Chad (Deby Coup)</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>1978</td>
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<td>1979</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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<td>1987</td>
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<td>1972</td>
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<td>JVP</td>
<td>Second Sri Lanka-JVP</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1989</td>
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<td>Karen &amp; Kachin Rebels</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>1988</td>
</tr>
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<td>First Cambodian Civil War</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1991*</td>
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<td>Fifth Iraqi Kurds</td>
<td>1985</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>1975</td>
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<td>Kurds, PKK</td>
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<td>1984</td>
<td>1986</td>
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<td>South Yemen</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1986</td>
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<td>Saur Revolution</td>
<td>1978</td>
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<td>1989</td>
<td>1990</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>1981</td>
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<td>1997</td>
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*Conflicts with a start or end year in 1991 occurred prior to the official dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991.

Total of 46 insurgent groups participating in a total of 47 conflicts
<table>
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<td>Kosovo Independence</td>
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<td>Croatia-Krajina War</td>
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<td>1995</td>
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<td>2003</td>
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<td>1999</td>
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<td>Second Philippine-Moro</td>
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<td>2001</td>
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<td>2003</td>
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<td>Oromo Liberation</td>
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<td>1999</td>
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<td>1996</td>
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<td>Guinean</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2001</td>
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<td>1992</td>
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<td>Zaidi Muslims</td>
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<td>2005</td>
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**Total of 43 insurgent groups participating in a total of 48 conflicts**

*Conflicts with a start year in 1991 occurred after the official dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991.

**Ongoing conflicts are as of 2008*
### Table A.3 - Insurgent Groups Participating in Conflicts that Start During the Cold War and End After the Cold War

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insurgent Group</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Start Year</th>
<th>End Year</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1992</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
<td>Croatian Independence</td>
<td>1991*</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>FARC &amp; Drug Lords</td>
<td>Eighth Colombia</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Ongoing**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kashmiri Guerillas</td>
<td>Kashmir Insurgents</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
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<td>Kurds, PKK</td>
<td>Second Turkish Kurds</td>
<td>1991*</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mujahadin</td>
<td>Second Afghan</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mujahideen Uprising</td>
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<td>NPA</td>
<td>Philippines-NPA</td>
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<td>1992</td>
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</tr>
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<td>RUF</td>
<td>First Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<td>Front</td>
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<td>Tamils</td>
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**Total of 14 insurgent groups participating in a total of 14 conflicts**

*Conflicts with a start year in 1991 occurred prior to the official dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 25, 1991.

**Ongoing conflicts are as of 2008
### Table B.1 – Cases Missing Valid Input for at Least One Independent Variable

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<td>RDFG</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
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<td>Strength of Central Command, Mobilization Capacity, Arms</td>
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<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>WSLF</td>
<td>Strength of Central Command</td>
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<td>Strength of Central Command</td>
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<td>Waziristan</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Waziri tribes</td>
<td>Strength of Central Command</td>
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<td>First Congo (Brazzaville)</td>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>FDU (Cobra militia)</td>
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<td>Oromo Liberation</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Oromo Lib. Front</td>
<td>Arms Procurement</td>
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<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>Anti-Khomeini Coalition: Fedayeen</td>
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<td>Fifth Burmese</td>
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Table C.1 – Cases Missing Valid Input for Used Terrorism Dummy C Variable