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Information Communication Technologies and Identity in Post-Dayton Bosnia: Mending or Deepening the Ethnic Divide

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Information Communication Technologies and Identity in Post-Dayton Bosnia: Mending or Deepening the Ethnic Divide

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

By

WILLIAM MCINTIRE
M.A. History, Wright State University, 2009

2014
Wright State University
WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

02 May 2014

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION
BY William McIntire ENTITLED Information Communication Technologies and Identity in
Post-Dayton Bosnia: Mending or Deepening the Ethnic Divide, BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts.

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Abstract

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**Information Communication Technologies and Identity in Post-Dayton Bosnia: Mending or Deepening the Ethnic Divide**

In the new digital world connected by ICT the methods and availability of communication have not only transformed the way people interact, learn, and do business, it also has political implications. ICT, specifically Web2.0 social media, increase the reach of campaigns and assist in organizing and executing reform movements. The state of Bosnia-Herzegovina presents a unique test case as it is a post-conflict state moving toward democratic consolidation that emerged in 1995, when the World Wide Web was making inroads into daily life. The state is divided, politically and socially, into ethnic cleavages. ICT in BiH has not been a vector for major political reform like what was seen in the Arab Spring. It does however contribute to the long term mending of cleavages and building of civil society through its use by non-governmental organizations. It also allows, through principles of the contact theory, for citizens to build inter-ethnic relationships.
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CCI</td>
<td>Center for Civic Initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIESEC</td>
<td>International Association of Students in Economic and Commercial Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARDS</td>
<td>Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITSEE</td>
<td>The Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNAB</td>
<td>The Congress of North American Bosniaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRA</td>
<td>Communications Regulatory Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIT</td>
<td>Diffusion of Innovations Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIFL</td>
<td>Knowledge without Boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EZLN</td>
<td>Zapatista Army of National Liberation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBiH</td>
<td>Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSP</td>
<td>Croatian Party of Rights of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSS-NHI</td>
<td>Croatian Peasant Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communications technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Intergovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IP</td>
<td>Internet Protocol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Information technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITU</td>
<td>International Telecommunications Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMBG</td>
<td>Unique Master Citizen Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JNA</td>
<td>Yugoslav Peoples’ Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDAS</td>
<td>Mongolian Information Development Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Progress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>Republika Srpska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilization and Association Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBiH</td>
<td>Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Party of Democratic Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Serbian Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNSD</td>
<td>Alliance of Independent Social Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRS</td>
<td>Serbian Radical Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSD BiH</td>
<td>BiH World Diaspora Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSIS</td>
<td>World Summit on the Information Society</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acknowledgments

My interest in Balkan politics began in 1995 when the peace talks that lead to the Dayton Peace Agreement were being held a mere nine miles from the 19th century farm house I grew up in just outside of sleepy Medway, Ohio. I remember going to mall as a 13 year-old and seeing diplomatic delegations and international news organizations everywhere. Dayton was suddenly thrust on the world stage in ’95 and it left a big impression on me. The history and politics of the Balkans have interested me ever since. This thesis is intended as both a nod to the connection between Dayton and Sarajevo and the people I met from Bosnia-Herzegovina. It will also hopefully provide some insight on how to progress in the future with complicated issues.

The credit for this thesis goes to many people without whom I would not be where I am today. First, to the Wright State History Department. I want to thank Dr. Ed Melton for being a fantastic professor and making history something his students could feel, not just a field of study focused on the memorization of facts and dates. Secondly, I would like to thank Dr. Robert Sumser who challenged his students and made me think critically more than any other teacher I’ve had. You are surely missed, but your students will never forget all the ‘questions, comments, and observations’ you taught us. Finally, the most heartfelt thank you for the History Department is owed to Dr. Jake Dorn who is both a great friend and a venerable academic. The texts from your library were handy in crafting this thesis.

Acknowledgment is due to all the great professors I have been fortunate to have over my years at Wright State. With that said, the single person who deserves the most recognition and greatest thank you of all is Dr. Laura Luehrmann of the Department of Political Science. Dr. Luehrmann has been there for me through thick and thin and without her guidance, assistance, and persistence this thesis would never have gotten done. I really truly can’t thank her enough, so I hope this mention in the acknowledgment is satisfactory.

I also want to thank my friends and family, particularly my sister, mother, and father. Finally, I owe a great debt of thanks to my wonderful wife, Erin and my son, Tyler. They stood by me throughout the entire process and kept me on task. I know I had to miss out on a lot of things but they supported me and humored me when I would go on and on about mundane parts of my research. Thanks for sacrificing so much so I could, as my wife says, “finally get this done so you don’t have to worry about it anymore.” I love you both. Cheers!
Introduction

In June of 2013 nearly 10,000 people took to the streets of Sarajevo to protest outside of the House of Peoples (Dom Naroda), one of the two parliamentary houses of Bosnia and Herzegovina, completely surrounding the building. The AP reports the protestors were a diverse crowd comprised of Croats, Serbs, and Bosniaks all voicing opposition to a governmental plan to update the country’s identity card law—which lapsed in February of 2013. Lawmakers argued whether the new identity cards, known as the Unique Master Citizen Number (JMBG), should include a special digit identifying whether a baby is born in the Serbian dominated Republika Srpska (RS) or the country’s other main political unit, the Croat and Bosniak Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). The press reports this change is seen as an attempt to further divide the nation along ethnic lines and undermine efforts to further a unified state. The lapse had left newborns without identification, meaning a child cannot qualify for healthcare or a passport. The parents of one infant claimed their child died because the lack of state-issued identification kept them from taking the child to a hospital in Belgrade.

The protests against the inability of lawmakers to find a solution subsequently spread to other cities in the post-war nation of four million and was dubbed the Babylution (a portmanteau of ‘baby’ and ‘revolution’). The protestors however were concerned with more than healthcare access for newborns. They called for unity across ethnic lines and an end to the political system built around maintaining and furthering those divisions. The protestors stated they were tired of
“nationalistic excess” and politicians “thinking of ways to divide us.”¹ The twitter hashtag #JMGB was used to spread information, organize protests, and call out politicians. Dozens of Facebook pages devoted to the JMGB protests were created, some with more “likes” than Chairman of the Presidency Nebojša Radmanović’s official Facebook page. Numerous videos of the protests as well as informational videos on the Babylution were uploaded to Youtube. Those involved with the protests created the site, www.jmbg.org which included the message,

We are the citizens of this country – parents with children, university students, housewives, workers, the unemployed, pensioners, regardless of ethnic or religious groups, or any other status, so it is in our common interest that the rights of every person be respected, those of children above all. We address all male and female citizens who wish to live in a state in which politicians do their jobs and complete their legal obligations. A state in which national and partisan interests are secondary and the dignified and safe lives of citizens are primary.²

The above story is anecdotal but it illustrates a modern trend, the use of information technology (ICT) as an instrument for reform movements. The use of the Internet and other electronic forms of communication are now a significant factor in political activism. Some scholars believe ICT make it easier for grass roots reform to be effective.³ Others are skeptical of its utility without being coupled with tradition methods.⁴ This thesis seeks to add to the discussion on ICT and politics by focusing on information technology and the evolution of ethnic divisions in the post-conflict state of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH).

The sovereign state of BiH came to be in 1995 after a bloody civil war where belligerents were divided along ethnic lines. In this conflict the once cosmopolitan city of Sarajevo, which was host to the 1984 Winter Olympics became a killing field where snipers were commonplace and residents were desperate for bare essentials such as food and water. After peace was brokered the state found itself divided still along ethnic lines; however instead of partisan paramilitary groups physically segregating the parties, it was the top-down government structure that cemented ethnicity into national politics. This thesis examines the ethnic foundations of BiH’s governmental system and establishes whether grassroots efforts, specifically in the utilization of ICT, are used to mend ethnic cleavages.

**Hypothesis**

This thesis continues the investigation into the nature of ICT and politics by focusing on the ethnic divisions and consociational political framework of post-conflict BiH. The goal is investigating if in post-conflict situations such as BiH, citizens utilize ICT to interact with members beyond their ethnic community and if so, what the nature of that interaction is. The interaction, if present, may be positive to mend cleavages and promote civil society. It could also manifest itself in negative, regressing behavior such as promoting exclusion and maintaining, if not broadening, societal exclusions and rendering further consolidation as a unified state difficult.

Because the politics of BiH are structured in a way that reinforces ethnic divisions, it is my contention that reform for a unified state is more likely to be found among the citizenry as the elites have a vested interest in maintaining the heterogeneous status quo. The sub-hypothesis of this study is that I expect to find that in situations where the ICT is grassroots based; that is, in ICT usage not severely limited by the governmental power structure, interactions will be
inclusive and reconciliatory. There are of course other possibilities; citizens may use ICT to further divide the state in hopes of regions splintering off and joining neighboring states with similar ‘ethnic makeup’ (specifically the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia). Another possibility is that citizens adopt a pan-European approach and use ICT to promote a European identity that downplays traditional classifications in hopes of acceptance into the larger European community, specifically full member statues with the European Union. Finally, there could be insufficient evidence that ICT is used in the manner suggested; this possibility is itself fruitful because it addresses the debate in the literature on the nature of ICT in modern political movements.

As BiH emerged as an independent state during the era when the Internet was coming into being, a second sub-question that is likely to emerge is a case study on how ICT adaption occurs in post-conflict states. Of specific importance in the case of BiH are the role of state political actors as well as IGOs; specifically the European Union and the United Nations High Representative on Bosnia.

This thesis addresses these issues with a review of identity, citizenship, political satisfaction and trust in institutions in two main political entities of BiH; The Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The lens through which these ideas are viewed is the online activity of intergovernmental organizations (IGO), political actors (elected officials and bureaucracy), non-governmental organizations (NGO), education, the diaspora community, and private citizens. The study begins with an analysis of BiH’s political history and a review of the political structure since the Dayton Peace Accords. The post-Dayton analysis is centered on the coscotiational structure of the government and politics rooted in the state. The thesis utilizes both quantitative statistical data and qualitative studies to answer the questions at hand.
The genesis for this thesis is a working paper published by the University of Edinburgh’s ongoing study institute, The Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia (CITSEE).\(^5\) The paper found discourse in the traditional BiH media was biased in favor of, or in opposition to, other ethnic groups. There are media outlets that were pro-Serb, Pro-Croat, or pro-Bosniak in their reporting and story selection. The extended summary of the paper notes that the influx of the Internet into the region provides an opportunity for discussions on citizenship, and that this aspect is relatively unexplored.\(^6\) A second scholarly article aiding in the formation of this theses asks, “if the Internet is understood by B&H audiences as a “virtual Agora” (a place where they can promote their ideas), what kind of ideas are promoted on the B&H part of the web and are they transferred to off-line life of B&H society afterwards or do they stay in a “digital ghetto?”\(^7\) As seen in the above story on the June 2013 protest, there is some use of ICT to promote political reform that not only is free of ethnic bias, but actively seeks to eliminate questions of ethnicity in the formation of policy. Whether this instance is an anomaly or the continuation of a trend is what is addressed in this study.

**Operationalization**

**ICT**

The concept of information and communication technology spans a great number of information technology devices; however what can studied is limited by what data and primary sources are available. Aside from secondary scholarship on the ICT in BiH, this study relies heavily on primary source data collected by international organizations. The United Nations

\(^5\) CITSEE is sponsored by the European Research Council (ERC), an independent body that funds investigator-driven frontier research in the European Union and is part of the EU funded Seventh Research Framework Programme.


International Telecommunication Union (ITU) does extensive research on ICT penetration and proliferation throughout the world. The indicators are based on infrastructure/access and usage. These variables include households with computers, Internet users, mobile broadband users, and so forth. The ITU database is update through 2012. The variables indicated are not a perfect picture of how people are utilizing communication technologies and the Internet, yet they provide data on how accessible the technologies are. Published studies, both by academics and institution white papers, provide a clearer picture of how the Internet and ICT in general are being used in the state. When used in tandem, the ITU data and the secondary sources provide a convincing picture of how ICT is utilized in BiH.

**Societal Cleavages: Ethnicity**

To study the influence of ICT on domestic politics it is first necessary to identify the fissures within Bosnia. Ethnic identity politics are by their very nature complex, confusing, and ever in a state of flux. This study focuses on the ethnic societal cleavages of the three main national communities in BiH; Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks).

This classification is valid for two reasons. First, the collapse of Yugoslavia saw independence movements centered on autonomy chiefly for Croats, Slovenians and Bosniaks. Serbia perceived these secession movements to be at their own expense. Slovenia and Croatia formed their own ethnically homogenous states while Bosnia and Herzegovina, another Yugoslav breakaway republic, was ethnically mixed between Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs. The peace plan resulted in the formation of semi-autonomous regions within BiH that are dominated and seen as the de facto homeland for the three main ethnic groups within BiH; the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (mainly controlled by Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats) and the Republika Srpska and the Brčko District (both mainly governed by Bosnian Serbs). Moreover, political

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8 The ITU data is compiled by the World Bank and is included in their Development Indicators.
parties are built upon ethnic lines and the state operates under a power-sharing consociational political framework.

The second reason for adopting the tri-ethnic classification is that it is the standard view of BiH in the literature. Similarly, policy organizations such as the European Research Council, and The Europeanisation of Citizenship in the Successor States of the Former Yugoslavia (CITEE) that study the ethnic issues within BiH use these classifications when presenting findings to EU groups and governmental organizations in the form of policy recommendations.

Identifying these nationalities is important because it could influence the way ICT are implemented and utilized by political actors. For an explanation of this I rely on the Diffusion of Innovations Theory (DIT), which states that new technologies are adopted differently in each society depending on the intentions of that state. A state where ethnicity is written into the Constitution and policy makers gain positions of influence by the means of ethnic pandering would likely see innovations implemented in a way to support the status quo. This theory should be paired with the findings of Jason Brownlee that political leaders overwhelmingly make decisions that result in gaining and maintaining power. Brownlee’s Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (2007) finds that “regimes hold power in the face of societal mobilization so long as significant rifts do not divide the ruling house against itself.” Therefore, a leader whose constituency is one ethnic group finds ways to create and maintain that group’s hegemony at the expense of others.

Similarly, it is in their direct interest to see that ICT are not used for promotion of a pan-Bosnian or pan-European identity. ICT accessibility could be limited to the regions where the

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strongest political actors’ base lies. One group being more dominant on the Internet than another would in turn influence the ICT dialogue that is observable. Under the DIT, it is plausible that the ICT adopted into Bosnia, under the guidance of nationalistic leaders, is less useful for bridging the ethnic fissures. This ensures, under Brownlee’s theory, that while ICT “mobilization” is introduced there is no challenge to ethnic-party hegemony.

Changes in Cleavages

The heart of this study is to see if BiH citizens utilize ICT to discuss and promote changes in inter-ethnic relationships. Ethnic identity is important in BiH because the political structure of the state depends heavily on these divisions; and the future of the state depends on whether these ethnic divisions prevent the consolidation of democracy. There are identifiers noted in the literature that provide information on ethnic divisions and the relation to ICT—specifically the Internet. This study focuses on five of these identifiers. The first is education. The education of the youth in BiH is of crucial importance as they will inherit the state and either continue or change the dynamic of ethnic cleavages. The second is civil society, including the work of non-governmental organizations (NGO) that work outside of the auspices of governmental control and seek to improve the social foundations of the state. The third is the international community, specifically the organizations that work directly with the Bosnian government to manage the state. International actors contribute to the domestic infrastructure investment and thus can influence what groups have access to the Internet and which, if any, numerically lag behind. The fourth is the Bosnian diaspora community as they lobby for governmental change and work with the community still residing in the state. Finally of importance is the use of ICT by the government, specifically the Internet use of political parties

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12 O’Loughlin, “Inter-Ethnic Friendships,” 26-53
and bureaucratic organizations. Political actors may want ICT investment for the economic benefits, but the Internet that is available may be limited to reduce challenges to established political structure.\textsuperscript{14} Use of ICT could be connected to political party electoral success and Bosnian democratic satisfaction.\textsuperscript{15} This notion is of importance because with a few exceptions, the main political parties of BiH represent ethnic groups. Electoral victory and data on citizen attitude toward the government couple with data on Internet usage can provide indicators on whether citizens desire changes in the state divisions.

Within this thesis importance is given to the inter-ethnic relationships and identity of the citizenry because it is fundamental to the both understanding the state and for its political future.\textsuperscript{16} Of particular interest is whether citizens desire and seek inter-ethnic friendships and whether they use ICT to achieve these goals. This includes the use of relevant surveys and educational programs that are Internet based. Finally, general ICT usage patterns and Internet traffic by Bosnian citizens is also studied. Similar to the June 2013 protests, this factor includes qualitative evidence printed in established media, as well as social media interactions; while not definitive it serves as ancillary evidence for what the surveys and literature state.

**Methodology**

While quantitative data is used, this thesis is a qualitative case study focused on the two main political units of BiH: the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This preliminary chapter outlines the research question, defines methodology, and provides examples in academic literature of ICT in state politics. The second establishes the groundwork


\textsuperscript{15} Bailard, “The Internet's Influence on Democratic Satisfaction,” 10.

\textsuperscript{16} Bakke, Kristin et al “Cooperation without Trust in Conflict Ridden Societies: Survey Results from Bosnia and the North Caucasus.” (Manuscript Presented at 2006 Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association August, 31-September 3).
for the hypothesis and focuses on qualitative studies and historical analysis of primary and secondary sources. The third chapter utilizes both quantitative data and qualitative sources for examining the main question of ICT and mending of ethnic cleavages. Chapter IV, the final chapter, summarizes the findings and provides analysis of the case of ICT and ethnic cleavages in BiH.

**Chapter Summary**

Chapter II of this thesis examines the ethnic divisions after the conclusion of the Bosnian War in 1995. It establishes that the ethnic divisions in BiH are tangible and present a problem for democratic consolidation. The chapter begins by defining ethnicity and establishing the theoretical framework of constructivism through which ethnicity is viewed. The chapter then provides a brief history of Yugoslavia (the South Slav state) in order to better understand the circumstances preceding the war. From this, there is a discussion on the consociational form of government adopted in post war BiH, including an analysis of the nation’s constitution and how ethnicity is so intertwined with the very structure of the government.

Chapter III addresses the main hypothesis; are ICT used as a tool to in relation to ethnic fissures in the post-conflict state of BiH. This chapter employs a multi-faceted examination of ICT in BiH; using the framework established in the previous chapter by giving attention to both international organizations and domestic actors. The chapter provides a brief history of ICT infusion into the state in two phases; beginning with the post-Dayton period of 1995 to 2005 and then from 2005 to 2012/3. This includes statistical data and analysis on infrastructure and Internet usage. The chapter focuses specifically on civil society, NGO, IGO, Bosnian Diaspora, and governmental use of ICT for political reform.
Chapter IV provides the conclusion which reviews the nature of ICT in BiH and its use in mending cleavages and influencing the discussion on the future of the state. It relates the experiences studied in this thesis with other examples of ICT activism. It ends with a discussion on future possible uses, specifically the role of NGOs as political actors.

Theory

Before beginning it is first necessary to operationalize “ethnicity” and establish a framework through which this thesis views it. Ethnicity is defined as “an identification of an individual or group with a ‘people’ or ethnie. The membership of an ethnie may be defined by language, religion, geographical location, the sharing of a common historical experience, or many other criteria. The defining characteristic is that people consciously identity themselves as belonging together.”

Ethnicity is different from nationality as the latter is related solely to political characteristics of a state, although ethnic groups can aspire to political autonomy. People who ascribe an ethnicity hold that a common identity, or kinship, exists with others in their group within the varied ways ethnicity can be defined. There is no consensus in the literature on what constitutes an ethnicity, its origins, or its effect on politics; though there are many theories within the field, two of the most common are primordialism and constructivism.

Primordialism asserts that ethnicity and ethnic identity is natural phenomena rooted in ancient history, often including biological factors and territory. Primordialism further asserts that once established, ethnic identity is “fixed” for future generations who cannot help being attached to the identity. According to the theory, while these classically defined ethnicities “are

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According to Van Evera, ethnic identity is hardened when inter-ethnic conflict exists as well as when mass literacy is achieved as the sagas and symbols of the ethnicity can be passed along easier than in a time where general histories of a people were not accessible. Primordialism’s foundation is based in ancient ethnic lines that are passed down through the generations, these ethnic features form a cultural bond, or kinship, among the members and inter-ethnic strife is virtually unavoidable.

The ethnic divisions in BiH viewed through a primordial lens finds the three main ethnic groups to be locked in competition that existed well before the collapse of Yugoslavia. Ethnic divisions were relevant there before the First and second World Wars and certainly played a part in both the actions and outcome of those conflicts. The divisions were perhaps maintained but did not disappear under Tito’s Yugoslavia. Van Evera, commenting on the post-Dayton reconstruction of the state finds that the creation of a pan-Bosnian or Pan-European identity in BiH is impossible even if strong inter-ethnic relationships such as marriage are common; efforts to morph identity will meet failure, which, he asserts, is why the international community still policies BiH even though hostilities ended in 1995. They only real hope is muting the more dangerous aspects of ethnic divisions to make the relationship between the groups more benign and the groups less threatening to the each other.

Constructivists view ethnicity as a product of agency, a tool used by elites to rally or exploit a constituency for political power. Unlike primordialism, the origins of the ethnicity is

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21 Ibid.
not particularly important, it is simply a means to achieving an end.\textsuperscript{25} The manufacturing of ethnicity is intentional, though long standing cleavages can be utilized. Another difference is that fluctuations in identity are not uncommon if it serves the larger purpose of obtaining and maintaining hegemony and for “enforcing membership into coalitions.”\textsuperscript{26} Constructivists find the theory particularly useful in discussing societies that lack ethnic homogeneity.\textsuperscript{27}

Constructivism holds that political actions depend heavily on normative values and how actors view phenomena; agency is crucial and shapes the way situations are perceived. This theory is well suited for examining issues of ethnicity as it sees identity as a key variable in understanding politics as it emphasizes unit-level analysis, “the relationship between social and legal norms and the identities and interests of states.”\textsuperscript{28} Social relations and identity, according to constructivists, will influence how political actors will behave in relation to the state and what choices they make.\textsuperscript{29} Constructivist theory holds that identity and norms are not fixed, they are intangible ideas that can change over time; As Wendt states, “identity is the basis of interests;” international and domestic politics exist in a world of anarchy and anarchy is what we make of it.\textsuperscript{30}

Constructivists view the Bosnian War as a power struggle that resulted in the political vacuum after the death of the strong-leader Marshall Tito. The collapse after the 1991 secession of Slovenia allowed for opportunistic rulers to divide the country and promote ethnic sovereignty

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid
\textsuperscript{30} Quoted in Reus-Smit, “Constructivism,” 221.
as the *caus de guerre*. Without the pressure by local elites, there would not be inter-ethnic conflict. Before the collapse of the state the three groups interacted harmoniously, thus the ethnic competition was an artificial “astro-turf” creation by nefarious leaders looking to gain and retain power.\(^{31}\) The constructivists provide a political approach to understanding the foundations of ethnicity and how these cleavages can ultimately lead to conflict.

Constructivist V.P. Gagnon asserts that “violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is provoked by elites in order to create a domestic political context where ethnicity is the only politically relevant identity.”\(^{32}\) Conflict was the result of elites striving to achieve more power in the wake of domestic issues by using ethnic scapegoats. In the case of Serbian nationalist resurgence, Milosevic blamed economic problems, which had nothing to do with ethnicity, on other groups who he deemed were the enemies of Serbia. The focus on ethnic cleavages works in the example of BiH as the Communist Party was the sole political entity. Thus placing blame on opposition parties was not an option. In the case of Yugoslavia, there existed few serious cleavages between groups, the ethnically mixed regions did not want to go to war with one another, yet violence was “imposed by forces from outside.”\(^{33}\) Political actors will draw in a selective manner upon history to make conflict appear as if it is inevitable, and the only path left for the survival of the state or people. As a result of manufactured rivalries for political gain in the face of non-ethnic difficulties, violence emerged. The implantation of “violence on a scale large enough to affect international security is the result of purposeful and strategic policies rather than irrational acts of the masses.”\(^{34}\)


\(^{33}\) Gagnon, “Ethnic Nationalist and International Conflict,” 164

\(^{34}\) Ibid.
Mueller observes the conflict in the Balkans as emerging “not out of inevitable historic necessities, but were instigated and orchestrated by designing politicians and local extremists who, however, often did not know how to control the violent processes they had set into motion.”

Ethnicity is an ordering device that calls certain segments of society to action. Mueller identifies these segments as the criminals, thugs, hooligans and lowlifes. The elites often do not have full control over the military, but their rhetoric can provoke criminals to take their message to the extreme and engage in violence. In the case of Bosnia, Serbian football fans formed their own paramilitary groups that would harass Croats and Bosniaks. The thugs carry out the goals of the elites without being directly controlled by them, in the same way a leader controls army. As Mueller states that these thugs focus on one targeted group and that group leaves the area out of fear. Those who match the thugs ideal person would, perhaps reluctantly, come to recognize the thugs as their protectors against reprisals. In that way the cycle of violence grows.

Finally, Crawford and Lipschutz hold that identity does not dictate what individuals do, it is the individuals who drive identity and what it means to belong or be excluded from the group. Identity politics are a means to an end in which history is used selectively to justify action, not to render an action inevitable. Identities are “politically constructed during periods of upheaval by certain members of political and economic elites, who we can call ‘political entrepreneurs’.”

This thesis uses constructivist theory in its analysis as it stresses the importance of malleability of identity and how identity influences the way citizens of BiH interact with others as well as the legal and political institutions of the state, the latter being the focus of this chapter.

It also provides a deeper explanation than those presented by the primordialist theory. Primordialism seeks to provide the foundation of ethnic identity; however it does not fully address how these identities influence interaction with institutions. Moreover, Van Evera, even in his defense of primordialism, states that ethnicity is indeed a social construction.\(^{38}\) A purely “primordial” explanation towards inter-ethnic violence cannot explain the degree to which it proliferated and intensified.

Elites in BiH very well use ethnicity as a tool for power, but that a unit level synopsis constructivism provides also explores all actors and institutions. Furthermore, noting a politician presents themselves as the Bosniak candidate still requires understanding the construction of the Bosniak identity and its relation to institutions. Understanding the normative values and meanings associated with and toward Bosniaks, and how those values at play in domestic sphere is important to understanding the politics of BiH; in the same way that Wendt finds understanding that during the Cold War nuclear weapons held by the UK had a different meaning than those possessed by China.\(^{39}\)

The conflict in Bosnia was then not a matter of biology or ancient hatred coming to the forefront, it is the contention of this study that the fissures were deliberately designed by elite who sought improve their own standings. Furthermore, these cleavages were cemented by the actions of the international community operating in the state. The war was a product of individuals in which the causes are a “recent rather than an ancient phenomenon.”\(^{40}\) This is specifically what Horowitz describes as the “modernization and economic interest perspectives

\(^{38}\) Van Evera, “Primordialism,” 21.
\(^{40}\) David, Charles-Philippe. “Alice in Wonderland meets Frankenstein: Constructivism, Realism and Peacebuilding in Bosnia”, in Contemporary Security Policy, vol 22 no 1 pg 8.
of ethnic conflict where rivalry is promoted by elite for political power and among non-elite for economic competition."\(^{41}\)

### Literature Review: ICT and Political Movements

The proponents of Internet technology as a vehicle for political change view ICT as a trump card, an equalizer in the great chess game of man versus state. The enthusiasm was flamed by those who viewed the technology as a means to fulfill Huntington’s promise of the “Third Wave” and bring about Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history.”\(^{42}\) The Internet is viewed by many proponents as a technology that levels the playing field allows anyone wanting to perform meaningful activism.\(^{43}\) Proponent authors state the Internet changes the government-citizen relationship in favor of citizens; strengthens grassroots movements; decentralizes media sources and information; and strengthens democratic culture and institutions.\(^{44}\)

Though the field of ICT and politics may seem relatively new, but there is a wealth of published scholarship in this area. Major research universities have undertaken a study on information technology and society. In 1996 Harvard University established the Center on Law and Technology, now called the Berkman Center for Internet and Society.\(^{45}\) The UK’s Oxford University followed suit when it opened its Oxford Internet Institute in 2001. In the same year, the Munk Centre for International Studies at the University of Toronto began its Citizen Lab program to study the impact of the web. Scholarly journals began reviewing literature and publishing articles on the ICT and politics; for example the History of Information became a

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\(^{41}\) Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, (Berkeley: University of California Press), 95-140


\(^{44}\) Abramson, Jeffrey. The Electronic Commonwealth: The Impact of New Media Technologies on Democratic Politics. (New York: Basic Books, 1988).

popular subfield in some academic institutions. The Journal of E-Government (now Journal of Information Technology and Politics), a scholarly journal devoted to the topic, was founded in 2004. Investigation an impact of the Internet on society was apparently prominent enough that it gained the attention and resources of top universities and journals.

**International Organizations**

As stated above, an area of importance in this study is the role of international organizations, particularly the European Union, in shaping post-war BiH. These organizations had a goal for the future of the state, and these goals could include the infusion of ICT it was deemed important. As the literature shows, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations have a history of promoting ICT in foreign states.

In the decade after the foundation of the world-wide-web, many well established intergovernmental organizations, seeing the potential of Internet technology, retooled their efforts to include Internet advocacy to the developing world. In 1992, The International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the leading United Nations agency for information and communication technology issues, established the Telecommunication Development Sector (ITU-D) to “spread equitable, sustainable and affordable access to information and communication technologies” to the developing world. The work of the ITU is built upon by the UN’s World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), which meets to establish goals and tactics to increase ICT opportunities in developing states.

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**Grassroots Movements**

As noted, the political structure of BiH is built upon ethnic power sharing agreements. This could serve to reinforce existing norms and make top down change undesirable or political inexpedient. The scholars in the field have stated that ICT is a tool for grassroots reform when other methods are viewed as ineffective.\footnote{52 Tremayne, Mark, *Blogging, Citizenship, and the Future of Media,* (New York: Routledge, 2007).} An excellent example of a movement that utilized the Internet to bring about democracy can be found in the case of Indonesia in the late 1990s.

Suharto served as President of Indonesia from 1967 to 1998. Although officially serving under the title of president through elections, his administration fell drastically short of the conditions for a liberal democracy. The number of Internet users in 1998 was estimated at about one percent of the population, about 900,000 users, and this was group was believed to be made
of the elite and largely for financial purposes. Though the total number of users in a country with a then population of roughly 210 million was relatively small, the openness provided a “vehicle for dissent” for the grassroots student movement that eventually brought down the Suharto regime in what was called the “Net’s first revolution.” The rising middle class, which flourished during the New Order economic liberalization, created a generation of frustrated youth which longed for political openings. These students “were among the first to embrace the new technology” at their universities, while many more were “gaining net access through low-cost cyber cafes.” It was through the universities and the Internet cafes, or “warnets,” that the seeds for revolution grew. This resulted in a pro-democracy movement called the Reformasi that ousted the president on May 21 1998.

In the case of Indonesia, the Internet did not serve as the basis for the revolt, but it allowed the users to organize online for the coordination of protests and demands for democratic reform. As Lim notes, “as the crisis broke, Indonesian authorities had no geared-up plans for controlling or censoring the Internet and were quite naïve about its political potential.” In this way we see that even one percent of the population can work for reform when the Internet is not restricted. It may not have been necessary, but it was sufficient to hasten the end of the Suaharto regime and create reforms where the control of the state resisted more in the ballot box than at the end of a bayonet.

Political Parties

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55 “Lim, Internet and Reform,” 278-279.
56 Lim, “Internet and Reform,” 282.
In BiH political parties as they are overwhelmingly connected to ethnic groups. This study examines the use of social media, party websites, and interaction between citizens and the politicians. Political scientist Larry Diamond argues that political party participation is an essential component of democratic consolidation—which post-conflict BiH is working toward at this time. He states “not only are electoral outcomes uncertain, with a significant opposition vote and presumption of party alienation in government, but no group that adheres to constitutional principles is denied the right to form a party and contest elections.” As we saw in the case of Indonesia, a “democracy” without any real competition is often just a façade for a strong man dictator.

If the BiH political parties are safe due to ethnic ‘Gerrymandering’ it is possible they are heedless to the demands of the people—as evidence shows in the signs and slogans stated by demonstrators in the June 2013 protests in Sarajevo. The political party establishment could use the ‘dark side’ of ICT to further the ethnic divide, or, as Diamond alludes, citizens could ICT to start political parties or lobby established ones for reform. A method for discovering whether a political party is viable is by its ability to present policy and gain members. Two instances where the Internet has served to strengthen political parties are found in the cases of England and Russia. One entered the Internet age as a consolidated democracy, the other is a Soviet Successor state that struggled with severe domestic issues related to democratization.

The collapse of the Soviet economic and political system in the early 1990s ushered in an era of democratic and market reforms in the former communist bloc. The creation of viable political parties was part of the reforms to create a democratic country. The Russian Federation,

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for instance, had over 197 political parties by 2001. The advent of the World Wide Web occurred at the same time as these Russian reforms and the information technology presented itself as a natural marriage for political organizing. Although the total number of Internet users in Russia has been historically low (roughly 10 percent of the population), the number of users was the “fastest growing in Europe in 1999-2000.” Moreover, similar to the case in Indonesia, those online were generally the elite who the pioneers in establishing the parties. This is crucial as, if we work with Brownlee’s assertions, it is these elite who are fundamental in bringing political reforms. The online (Internet) presence of established political parties, according to Römmele, serve as an “additional channel for the distribution of material and a medium for campaign management, it also enables region-wide mobilization of the active party base. For new parties in particular, such developments provide the means to building an organizational infrastructure that avoids the usual costs of regional headquarters.” The Russian Internet, at this time, was viewed as the last uncensored source for information. Rash describes the Internet as a force multiplier, which “makes your resources seem larger and more effective than they really are and in the process may give you greater capabilities.” Moreover, the Russian parties on the net influence offline activity, including the building of coalitions and dissemination of information is useless unless it leads to real world results.

The Internet in the case of the UK, a consolidated democracy, will not “revolutionize” democracy, yet it has succeeded to “strengthen communication pluralism and widen the

59 March, “Russian Parties and the Internet,” 370.
60 Ibid.
61 March, “Russian Parties and the Internet,” 375.
65 Rash, “Politics on the Net,” 80-81.
availability of information available about electoral choices.” Norris notes, “the direction of party messages will tend to reflect traditional hierarchical Weberian power structures [as] most party communications will therefore tend to be ‘top-down’, flowing from the party leadership and elected representatives towards the grassroots and the electorate.” The materiel available for supporters to use in civic engagements was the main reason why people visited party websites. The second most common reason was to organize for specific campaigns, causes, and protests.

Finally, smaller, or “fringe parties” used the net to gain “a greater voice and visibility” than what would be possible in through traditional media sources. Smaller parties such as the Unionists and the inclusive Alliance Party of Northern Ireland can reach more voters online as their platform and materials were freely available for anyone to access.

Civil Society

The formation of civil society outside of political parties is described by Larry Diamond as “…multiple, ongoing channels for expression and representation of interests and values, including diverse, independent associations and movements, which [citizens] have the freedom to form and join.” The creation of civil society is often noted as crucial to creating and maintaining a democratic society’ specifically through the building of trust, community, and deliberation. The question of whether the Internet can facilitate civil society has historically

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68 Norris, “Political Website,” 14-15
69 Norris, “Political Website,” 26
70 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 11
been a topic of debate among scholars.\textsuperscript{72} We can look to Mongolia from 1996-2006 as an example where there was an attempt to use the Internet as a tool for constructing civil society.

Mongolia is another success story of the Third Wave of Democratization, emerging as a constitutional democracy in the early 1990s. Mongolia embraced neoliberal economic restructuring shortly after achieving political reforms. As a result of privatizing and foreign investment, “The Internet is the first electronic media to develop in Mongolia after the collapse of the socialist regime and Soviet domination.”\textsuperscript{73} In the decade of 1996-2006, the number of Internet users per 100 persons in Mongolia increased from 0.01 to 7.6.\textsuperscript{74} The Mongolian government has been friendly to increases in Internet technology, the Mongolian Information Development Association (MIDAS) established in 2000 the Vision for Developing Information and Communication Technology in Mongolia by year 2010. The goal of the MIDAS program is to integrate information technology into Mongolian political, civil, and economic life. This includes access to educational material and hosts for several online newsmagazines that host very lively and “unfiltered” message boards.\textsuperscript{75} Furthermore, expat/diaspora websites such as MGLclub, are noted by Baasanjav to strengthen democratic practices through the discussion of civil society principles with Mongolians living in established democratic countries.\textsuperscript{76}


\textsuperscript{74} Undrahbuyan, “Mediated Political and Social Participation ,”42.

\textsuperscript{75} Undrahbuyan , “Mediated Political and Social Participation ,” 50.

\textsuperscript{76} Undrahbuyan , “Mediated Political and Social Participation ,” 53.
Illiberal Speech and Government Restriction of Content

States in transition fail to recognize the potential of the Internet to achieve the same goals of traditional media and also surpass it in means of political organization. This is particularly the case in states that are ‘less free’ than others. The “ICT sphere is the incarnation of globalization,” and its integration presents additional problems in the instances of states where elites may be cautious if their state is not sufficiently open and transparent and full democracy is not a clear, shared goal. The Internet, ideally, creates an open communication space and possibilities for pluralism. A state accustomed to centralization and closed methods of communication find the Internet contradictory as it represents a “free zone with no guards at the door.” This is the very situation alluded to by Brownlee as elites will manage a political and economic system to their advantage. Similarly, as the Diffusion of Innovations Theory states, a nation will implement an innovation in the way that benefits their situation the most. Under the constructionist ethnic theory, elites are forging the political and social climate, it seems fitting that governmental incursion would be a real issue.

The OpenNet Initiative, a collaborative partnership between university and think tanks to study Internet access, finds governments particularly those in states categorized as ‘less free’ will implement the Internet for its economic gains but place serious limitations on what can be done online. They document deliberate blocking of specific Internet domains through the use of electronic “friewalls.” These domains often include sites that elites believe could serve as a threat to their hegemony (western media outlets, webpages on democracy, and so on). Leslie

78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
Simon of the Woodrow Wilson Center finds similar results; the Internet can be fruitful for furthering democracy, yet the largest gains are in states already consolidated. States that are in transition or are not democratic will see governments use ICT as a propaganda tool or to monitor the actions of civilians through IP addresses and other electronic monitoring methods.\textsuperscript{81} Governments must be receptive of it, accept it in their states, and adapt communication (news, constituent outreach, initiatives) to it.\textsuperscript{82}

There is also the issue of actors using social media to exacerbate cleavages. Social media was used by Albanians and Macedonians in Skopje to express ethnic based anger. The social media posts included hate speech, threats, and calls for war. Off-line hatred would not be unexpected online especially when anonymity is given.\textsuperscript{83} This allows users to express feels of inter-ethnic anger toward a target without paying a negative social cost.

**Alternative Media**

As noted above, traditional media sources in BiH can be biased in favor of one ethnic group over another. Academics have noted the possibility for the Internet to provide an additional source of information that operates outside of the traditional media.\textsuperscript{84} Diamond argues that in a liberal democracy, “There are alternative sources of information (including independent media) to which citizens have (politically) unfettered access.”\textsuperscript{85} In the West, citizens are familiar with the importance of multiple, independent media and news sources. The Internet, by its very nature, is a natural venue for the dissemination of information. News and information websites

\textsuperscript{82} Turcilo, “Internet and Political Communication,” 59.
\textsuperscript{84} McCaughey, Mary, *Cyberactivism: Online Activism in Theory and Practice*. (New York: Routledge, 2003), 100.
\textsuperscript{85} Diamond, Developing Democracy, 11.
originating outside a country’s borders can be accessed from within. More traditional methods media (television and print, for example) are easier to control.

In case of Ukraine’s 2004 Orange Revolution, the protestors used the Internet to counter the regimes monopoly on information. One of the most outspoken protest groups was a civic youth organization known as Pora!, which is Ukrainian for It’s Time!. Pora! was “singled out for harassment by the authorities because its excellent organization and appeal to young people made it extremely dangerous.” Pora! chose to make their case online as they believed the Internet was the exploitable weak point. There was very little access to alternative sources of information in the Ukraine where all but one of the television stations was controlled by the regime. Because of this control, the traditional media sources were regarded as “propaganda dressed up as neutral journalism.” Pora! established a series of Ukranian .ua domain websites to keep voters informed about the protests, election information, and voter’s rights. This alternative source of information kept Ukrainians informed and applied pressure to the regime. The Orange Revolution resulted in a run-off election, overseen by international observers, in which the opposition candidate won. Leaders of the main opposition to Viktor Yanukovych noted that the Pora!-run websites, because of their ability to supply independent sources of information, were more important in achieving victory than physical protests.

89 Wilson, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” 119-120.
90 Wilson, “Ukraine’s Orange Revolution,” 75-76.
91 ibid.
Ethnic Minority Expression

As this study is focused on ethnic divisions in a state, studies on ethnic minority activism are of particular benefit. For liberal democracy to flourish, Diamond asserts that “cultural, ethnic, religious and other minority groups [cannot be] prohibited from expressing their interests in the political process or from speaking their language or practicing their culture.” In this case Diamond is arguing that a democracy cannot flourish if the majority is repressive to a minority—whether the minority be religious, ethnic, linguistic, or other. Citizens should, according to Diamond, be free to engage in the system politically without fear of subjugation. One instance where we see minority groups using the web to lobby for domestic recognition and freedom to participate politically in the state is with Mexico’s Zapatistas.

The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) is a leftist revolutionary movement located in the Southeastern Mexican state of Chiapas. The EZLN is comprised primarily of indigenous Mayan Indians who oppose what they see as oppressive policies of the Mexican state. While the movement turned into armed revolt in 1994, the group’s origins lie with their hero Emiliano Zapata, a major figure and champion of land reform during the 1910 Mexican Revolution.

The EZLN struggle is considered the first instance of net-warfare. The importance of the Internet to the EZLN is apparent as the group representing the rural poor was online within two days of announcing the rebellion. The Internet was used to “disseminate information about the indigenous struggle in Chiapas around the world and open the space for the creation of networks

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92 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 11.
of transnational support.”96 As a result of this global support, sympathetic westerners lobby their governments to pressure Mexico, the net based marketing has been “crucial for the movement because [it] has bolstered [the EZLN] position with the Mexican Government.97

**ICT and Political Movements**

The examples of the Internet having an influence on democratic movements reveal several trends. First, the Internet’s impact is not as potent as cyber-enthusiasts would like it to be. To call the Internet completely ineffective in the political realm is perhaps too harsh; it is, better stated, a tool still maturing in its technological features and number of users. The examples above show that the Internet may not be necessary to impose small political change, but it has been sufficient in some ways. The impact, though small, is real. The piecemeal victories underwritten by digital activity certainly add a level of optimism for the future of the technology.

The second trend, naturally related to the first, is that the Internet is most effective in states with some form of established democratic tradition. The examples where the Internet served as a valuable tool occurred almost exclusively in democratic states. This is not to say that the Internet cannot be an asset for opposition movements in non-democratic states. The examples show, however, that the success of the technology is most apparent in helping to consolidate new democracies; those who emerged from the authoritarian Iron Curtain.

The third trend we see from the examples is that the Internet tends to function as a top-down technology. This is not surprising as a common criticism of the technology is that it is used by elites for elite agendas, it seldom is solely a domain for pure grass-roots organizing. This however is in line with the Diffusion of Innovations Theory: the elites are the first to adopt the technology and format the technology to meet their goals and standards. Moreover, we find this

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96 Ibid
trend to mesh well with Brownlee’s theory on political change: meaningful political transformations, especially in less-democratic states, are frequently fomented by society’s elites. The final trend we see emerge from the literature is that economics play a role in the success of net based political movements. The examples of Internet achievements in Mexico, Indonesia, Russia, and Mongolia were grounded in economic considerations. The economic variable manifested itself in several ways.

1. The desire of governments to further incorporate the state into the world market brought in an Internet that was unregulated (Indonesia).
2. The net-based outreach by reform movements were considered by the government because a violent backlash could hurt investment opportunities (Mexico).
3. Neoliberal privatization (through foreign investment) brought the Internet to newly democratic states (Mongolia).

Based on these findings the focus on both IGO attitude and domestic plans for ICT is, according to the literature, crucial for understanding the use of ICT and ethnic politics in the state of Bosnia Herzegovina. The purpose of this thesis is not to find definitive answers on the nature of ICT in the post-conflict state, it seeks to build upon the existing literature and continue the dialogue of how information technology manifests itself in this brave new digital world.
Chapter II: International Partners and the Consociational Framework of the Bosnia and Herzegovina State.

In December of 2008, thousands of Bosnians joined the Facebook group “Close Group Noz Zica Srebrenica,” over six-thousand of which joined in the first 48 hours of the group’s opening.\(^98\) The members were protesting a Serbian Nationalist Facebook group titled 'Noz, Zica, Srebrenica,' which translates to “The Knife, The Wire, Srebrenica.” This alluded to the 1995 Srebrenica Massacre, Europe's worst atrocity since World War Two, in which over 8,000 Bosniaks were detained and killed by Serbian Nationalist forces. The Noz Zica Srebrenica Facebook group, which was written in Serbian Cyrillic script, listed itself as place for "all those who think that Muslims are best on the spit and while swimming in sulfuric acid."\(^99\) Aside from the “Close Group Noz Zica Srebrenica,” Facebook group, which reportedly had over 19,000 members by mid-December, the story was picked up by several BiH related blogs including the expat Bosniak group The Congress of North American Bosniaks (CNAB), which called for Bosnia to strive to be an inclusive, united country.\(^100\)

The above story is yet another anecdote on the ethnic divide in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) finding its way to the realm of social media. This chapter examines the issue of ethnic cleavages by looking at the institutional framework through which they endure. It accomplishes this task with an a look at recent historical between the primary actors, an analysis of the Bosnian governmental structures established by the Dayton Agreements and by examining the role of international partners, specifically the European Union.

\(^99\) Ibid.
History of a “South Slav” State

The “Yugoslav Idea,” the notion that the people living in the Balkans should be united, is not an idea born in the Post-WWII restructuring of Europe. The South Slavic people (Yugoslav means South Slav) have historically existed in a unique geographical area. They found themselves buttressed against great empires of early-modern Europe; Ottoman, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian (and the Kingdom of Hungary before it). Each empire had particular interest in the fate of the region and sought to influence its political future.\(^{101}\)

Pertinent to the understanding of a unified Yugoslavia is the politics of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867-1918). Pedro Rament, utilizing Kaplan’s typologies of systems of international behavior, finds the Austro-Hungarian Empire classifies as “perhaps one of the clearest examples of a tight bi-polar system.”\(^{102}\) The empire was never unified into one bureaucratic system; it maintained separate institutions for education, postage, judiciary, taxation, and transportation among others. The two Austrian and Hungarian halves competed with each other and often clashed over foreign policy as well as internal power struggle. The Austrian monarchy, hoping to create a wedge that could counter Hungarian interests (and promote those of the Austrian half) promoted the idea of South Slav unification.\(^{103}\) This was structured around Austrian support for Croats as the arbiter of this Yugoslav unification, or “trialism” as it is referred to.\(^{104}\) Croatia, which had some historical context as a sovereign state, was willing to carry the torch of unification on behalf of the Austrian crown—it previously

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104 Ibid.
existed under tutelage of Hungarian rule and underwent a period of romantic nationalism during the tumultuous European revolutions of 1848.

This trialism saw the creation of academies bearing the moniker “Yugoslav” and adopted resolutions acknowledging, if not implementing, some ideas of self-governance. After the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, in which the Kingdom of Serbia gained independence from the Ottoman Empire, The Austrian administration occupied the Ottoman-held land of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a land that contained South Slavs who were religiously followers of the Islamic faith. The Croatian leaders regarded the Bosniak population not as a separate ethnic entity, but as an extension of their own Slavic people and thus integration into the trialistic system would not be a challenge. This idea of Croat-Bosniak Yugoslav homogeneity is accentuated in a 1936 statement by the left-leaning Croatian peasant Party politician Vladko Maček, “…the entire Croat nation considers the Bosnian Muslims to be the purest part of the Croatian nation,” Maček’s political rival, fascist Ustase member Ante Pavelic agreed, stating in 1938, “…Bosnia is the heart of Croatian state, and the Muslim tribes part of the Croatian nation.” It was the Austrian administration, however, that fostered a sense of separate “Bosnian identity” among the Muslim population in order to play them off of Croatian and Orthodox interest; very much in the same way it used pan-Yugoslav idealism to counter Hungary. There is even a debate within the field that the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, which sparked World War One, was undertaken because the Austro-Hungarian Empire stood in the way of a national homeland for the South Slave peoples.

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107 Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 8.
When the ashes of World War One settled, the pan-Yugoslav trialism forged the creation of a new state uniting the South Slaves—the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1918-1941/5). This kingdom was supported by both of the major Yugoslav groups, the Croats and Serbs. The South Slavic peoples now had a homeland, a sovereign state, but the new challenged presented was how it should be governed. Ramet finds the politics of Kingdom of Yugoslavia to suffer the same issues of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in that it was a bi-polar system in which, “two permanently hostile core powers around which lesser powers cluster in a non-random fashion that approximates equal distribution of allies.”\(^\text{110}\) The result is polarization into camps and competition. Both the Croatian and Serb political leaders saw themselves as the champion of the Yugoslav people, the heirs and protectors. These were the two largest and most influential Slavic groups in the new state. Historian John Keegan writes, “Yugoslavia’s unequal racial composition might have been brought into balance with good will; as events turned out, the determination of the Orthodox Christian Serbs to dominate, particularly over the Catholic Croats, undermined its coherence from an early date.”\(^\text{111}\) The political leaders, hoping to gain an advantage, used small differences between the polities to accentuate otherness. These include the Croatian use of the Latin script while Serbs used Cyrillic and, in the same vein, matters of adherence to Catholicism versus Orthodox faiths.

The new kingdom was dominated by Serbians who staffed the government and bureaucracy. Unlike Croatia which was under the Austro-Hungarian rule, Serbia existed as an independent state and had the structure for administration in place. Serbian political elites backed a “Serbianization” program and attempted to run the state on a unitary basis and disregard

\(^{110}\) Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism*, 5-6.
Croatian leaders. A main point of contention was control over the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina as neither the Croats nor Serbs held a majority there. Each side courted the Muslim population, which tended to be allied with the Serbs in its outlook on politics.

The examination of the period from the mid-19th Century to the dawn of World War II matches Ramet’s analysis of Kaplan’s typology of systems of international behavior for bi-polar models. Within this model we see two opposing forces of generally equal strength who view politics as a zero sum game. Croatia was a lesser ally in the bi-polar Hapsburg system and then saw themselves as an equal in competition with another partner. Interwar Yugoslavia is different than that of better known bi-polar models such as the Cold War, because in the Cold War the rivalry was between two sovereign states that saw their interests at odds with each other. In Yugoslavia, the conflict was domestic among competing political leaders. These leaders found ethnicity (and variables that comprised it such as religion and written language) as the most convenient tool to seek hegemony. Ramet states that, “It appears that group interest may be monolithic at least within the context of intergroup conflict, for regardless of what the real interests of Croatian peasants, merchants, sailors, priests, and intellectuals may have been, they united to support the same program in the conviction that their principle foe was one in the same (Serbian Hegemonism).”

These pan-Slavic movements were not based primarily on ethnocentrism, but a desire for autonomy for all South Slavic people. The pan-Slavic movement emerged in the area when revolutions of liberalism and nationalism spread throughout Europe. The pan-Slavic movements on the outset, however, did not promote ethnic-nationalism of one group while disregarding the

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112 Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 6.
113 Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 7-10.
114 Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism, 8.
next. Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, and various other southern Slav intellectuals sought a homeland where all would exist in a singular state. The literature reviewed does not point to instances of groups being excluded or given ‘other’ status until the formation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia after WWI. On the contrary, the political elite of the two main groups, Croats and Serbs, embraced the unified state and both regarded Bosniaks as natural partners.

Events outside of the Balkans may provide a key to understanding the change in inter-ethnic relations. The inter-war period saw the rise of fascism in Europe and unfortunately, internal antipathies were to rob [Yugoslavia] of the power to resist Italian and German attack in 1941."115 Mussolini viewed the Dalmatian coast as part of his sphere of influence and worked closely with, and supported, fascist leaders there (Croatian Ustase Party).116 Hitler’s National Socialism was based much more in racial politics than was Mussolini’s. The NSDAP’s Aryan weltanschauung included Croats, Slovenians, and Bosniaks but excluded the Serbs who were deemed as Slavic and therefore irreconcilable with the racial politics of National Socialism. The fascist Croatian Ustase Party, with help from Germany and Italy, gained control of the Croatian political establishment in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia thus the political elites incorporated a new ethnocentrism against the Serbs who elites now referred to as different from them-- before, in the 1920’s, the agenda was trialism and other south Slavic groups were at least rhetorically treated as equal partners.

The Balkans suffered a great deal of violence during the Second World War. Not only was Yugoslavia occupied by the fascist armies of Mussolini and Hitler, but it also descended into a destructive and complex civil war that pitted, among other factions, the Nazi-back Croatian Ustase against Yugoslav partisans. At the end of the war Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980) served as

115 Keegan, First World War, 425.
President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a post he held from 1953 until his
death in 1980. Yugoslavia under Tito was divided into six socialist republics operating under the
federal government in Belgrade: Bosnia-Herzegovnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia,
and Slovenia. Two other provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, were within the republic of Serbia
but enjoyed a degree of autonomy.\textsuperscript{117}

As is evident, The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was divided primarily along lines that
gave ‘established ethnic communities’ their own state. Thus the pan-South Slav state had
elements of ethnic cleavages in the political framework, though none of the states was a pure
homogenous state demographically. The Serbs, Croats, and Muslims were the three largest
ethnic groups in the county. Within the Tito period there was generally an aura of calm on ethnic
tensions; however it must be noted that several constitutional conventions were held to debate
problems related to Croatian and Serbian sovereignty within the state. In 1981, the year of Tito’s
death, Serbs were thirty-six percent of the nation Croats were twenty percent, and Muslims held
nine percent of the population.\textsuperscript{118} The most heterogeneous state was BiH which had majority
Muslim but still a strong presence of Croat and Serbian residents, they represented the second
and third most heavily populated groups in the area.

It appears that Tito gave BiH its status as a republic within Yugoslavia is because it
would balance between the competing states of Serbia and Croatia. It was feared giving it or
dividing between the two would give one advantage over another which would weaken a system
built on unity. Rament finds that many political figures in Yugoslavia considered the Muslims in
BiH to be the “least nationalistic” of all groups in Yugoslavia, meaning that there were not

\textsuperscript{117} Ramet, \textit{Nationalism and Federalism}, 20.
\textsuperscript{118} Ramet, \textit{Nationalism and Federalism}, 21.
particularly well organized or vocal in comparison to other actors.\textsuperscript{119} The Croats and Serb leaders in particular were quick to deny the existence or even possibility of a Muslim nation or separate ethnic group. A great debate began on who the Muslims were and what their origins could be. The two sides claimed the Muslims were of their people, each side claimed the rights to BiH stating that the Muslim population were members of their own polity who converted under Ottoman rule and therefore, if secession was discussed, BiH was rightfully a province of their own states.\textsuperscript{120}

The Rise of Milosevic: The End of the South Slav Experiment

The late 1960s saw an era of economic and political reform as Yugoslavia was the foremost member of the nonaligned movement. The 1960s to saw an attempt to institute a “modernized self-management” style; in that the state would flirt with free-market activities at the republic level while still holding true to socialist ideology nationally.\textsuperscript{121} This effort to reform the economic and political system culminated in the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974. The 1974 Constitution, at the time one of the longest in the world with 406 articles, created a complex and sometime contradictory system of power sharing between the federal executive position and that of the nine republics and provinces.\textsuperscript{122} It weakened the federal system by allocating more authority to the republics and provinces; as a result each newly formed republic unit inherited a semi-autonomous status somewhat akin to that of a sovereign state.\textsuperscript{123} At the same time, the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo obtained a semi-federal status while still remaining under the control of the Serb republic, a decisions made to appease members of the Serbian

\textsuperscript{119} Ramet, \textit{Nationalism and Federalism}, 145.
\textsuperscript{120} Ramet, \textit{Nationalism and Federalism}, 146.
\textsuperscript{122} Dimitrijevic, “The 1974 Constitution,” 55.
Communists leaders. The state of Yugoslavia, after the 1974 constitution, was run by the consensus of the federal unites yet with the ultimate authority was retained by Tito. The 1974 Constitution created two presidencies; the lesser institution was a power-sharing branch divided among the nine republics and provinces, each entity provided a delegate. The higher office, with the real power, went to Tito who, under article 333, would hold the office for “an unlimited term,” he was president for life. Finally, it allowed for self-determination through secession but did not properly establishing the procedures of how to do so, or to what political entity (province or individual level ethnic group) this right applied.

The fault in the 1974 Constitution is that it was centered on the monopoly of power enjoyed solely by Marshal Josip Broz Tito. The idea of a life-term presidency was idyllic for regional leaders who utilized populist regional nationalism as a tool for filling Tito’s void after his death. The implementation of *perestroika* and *glasnost* by the Soviet regime, at the time Yugoslavia’s leading foreign aid investor, meant the South Slav state endured economic hardship, that allowed “nationalism [to be] the only conceivable remedy to communism in Yugoslavia.”

The state began an economically painful shift from communism to a mixed socialist, free-market economy; backed by loans from international monetary groups.

The success of a post WWII Yugoslavia relied heavily on the charismatic leadership and management style of Tito. After his death in 1980 the power shifted to regional demagogues who “quickly discovered that beating the drum of ethnic nationalism was the surest way to accumulate more personal power.” Kosovo had been granted a semi-independent status under Tito, but the province was still under the federal administration of Serbia. The strained

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127 Ibid.
relationship between the ethnic Albanians and Serbs living in Kosovo continued in the years after Tito’s death. The Albanians wanting their own sovereign state, or at least more autonomy in their affairs, struggled. Meanwhile the nationalist Serbs, who saw Kosovo as the birthplace of their homeland and a birthright, did not want to cede the region to a “foreign” entity. The late 1970s and early 80s was witness to an “exodus” of Serbs and Montenegrins from the region due to political unrest. In the late 1980s the situation resulted in protests by Albanians against the Serbs, whose treatment of the Albanians was described as “apartheid.”

Slobodan Milosevic, a rather unknown Serbian bureaucrat, used the crises to propel himself to the leadership of the Serbian Communist Party as a hawk of nationalism. Milosevic was elected Serbian Communist party Chief in May 1986. Under the Thirteenth Yugoslav Party Congress held in July 1986 the Serbian delegation secured rights for Serbian majorities in Kosovo at the expense of the Albanians. The delegation cemented themselves as the dominant force in Yugoslav politics. Playing off of the situation in Kosovo, Milosevic utilized traditional ICT of television and newspaper to propel himself and his faction to the head of the Serbian party and making himself the “de facto sole ruler of Serbia.” Riots in face of rising Serbian nationalism portrayed in traditional ICT as a flight from Albanian terror and oppression. Serb nationalists responded to the Albanians with violence. Milosevic in 1987 gave a speech in Kosovo Polje emboldening the Serb cause and to not give into Albanian pressure. The speech was widely broadcasted over Serb media and resulted in an outpouring of Serb national pride. Kosovo would lose the semi-independent status it was guaranteed under the 1974 Constitution and the leadership was replaced with Milosevic loyalists.

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Between 1988-1989 Milosevic consolidated his power through the use of the media and by mounting an “anti-bureaucratic revolution” that saw purges of leaders not in his camp, who were then replaced by loyalists.\textsuperscript{131} Milosevic continued his efforts of ethnic demagoguery in a 1989 speech celebrating the 600\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, the region which nationalists claim is the birthplace of the Serbian state. The speech was filled with jingoistic rhetoric and allusions to Serbs defending the gates of Europe from the Ottomans. It called for unity among all Serbs living in Yugoslavia for the benefit of a greater Serbian ideal.\textsuperscript{132} In the wake of the Kosovo’s loss of autonomy, the speech made clear Milosevic’s intentions; Milosevic saw himself as the heir to Tito’s reign as president for life. The future of Yugoslavia would not include egalitarianism among the republics and ethnic people, it would be a future dominated by Milosevic’s agenda which was the building of Greater Serbia as the sole hegemon over the other republics and provinces.

This was exacerbated by further abuse of Slovenes and Croats in 1990. The two republics elected governments that promised to stand up to aggressive behavior from Milosevic. Faced with a new crises in which the secession of Croatia and Slovenia was a possibility, Milosevic refused to hold a referendum to review, and possibly change, the Yugoslav confederation.\textsuperscript{133} Despite the calls for reform, “Serbia remained an unreconstructed neo-communist dictatorship that had adopted the forms of Serbian nationalism in order to revalidate its decaying power in the postcommunist era.”\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{131}Milivojescic, Marko “Milosevic, Slobodan ” in \textit{Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, an Encyclopedia} (Denver: ABC-CLIO, 1998), 176.
\textsuperscript{133}Milivojescic, “Milosevic, Slobodan ” 177.
\textsuperscript{134}Ibid.
Further economic failures, grandstanding by provincial politicians, and most notably strong-man, nationalistic movements by the Serbian leadership to undermine the other Yugoslav republics would ultimately seal the fate of the South Slave state. The system collapsed completely in the Spring of 1991 when the yearly rotation of the office of the presidency was to take place. The Constitution of 1974 established that each of the six republics and two autonomous regions within Yugoslavia would select delegates who would rotate the presidency depending on pre-established order of rotation. \(^{135}\) The system had worked well in the decade since Tito’s death; however in the current climate of excessive nationalism, particularly that from the Serb camp. The president in 1991 was a Serb named Borisav jovic, who was a close ally of Milosevic. The next in line for the presidency was Stipe Mesic, a Croat. The vote for Mesic was blocked by Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina which were under the control of Milsoevic’s inner-circle. This Serbian coup of the highest office in the state resulted in Croatia and Slovenia to announce their independence, thus the drums of war beat once again in the Balkans.

Milosevic had garnered control over the federal Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA) and reformed the national military into a unit loyal to him. In Summer of 1991 he used the JNA to fight against Slovenia which had declared its independence. The JNA was also used to assist an ethnic-Serb rebellion in secessionist Croatia. International recognition of both Slovenia and Croatia in January of 1992 halted his efforts to include these states into his new Serb-dominated Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He then turned his eyes toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of the nine republics of the now former Yugoslavia. A Republic contested because of the ethnic diversity, a Republic ostensibly designed by Tito to allow the Bosniaks a homeland.

The absence of a strong charismatic leader contributed to the 1991 fracturing of the state into a complex and tragic civil war. From this several new states emerged. Including the

Republic of Croatia (1991), Republic of Slovenia (1991), Republic of Macedonia (1991), Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1992), and Serbia and Montenegro (also referred to as Yugoslavia, 1992). The war was the largest military conflict in Europe since the Second World War and saw tragedies and ethnic cleansing, the most extreme of which was focused on BiH and which breakaway republic would control the region. After international involvement, the bloody conflict was ended with the signing of the 1995 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Peace Accords or Dayton Agreement.

Analysis of Yugoslav History

The question, it appears from the history of Yugoslavia from the end of WWI to the collapse of the state in the 1990s, is who would dominate the region? The period after WWI saw a ‘great game’ between Croats and Serbs, accentuated by the separation of institutions and political distrust. The post-WWII era was dominated by the strong, charismatic leadership of Tito, a role that Milosevic sought for himself. The decades of dictatorship reveal that the individual leader, the cult of personality, has a strong foundation in the former Yugoslavia. The traditional sources of ICT in BiH were dominated by elites and worked for their agenda. The focus of this thesis is not the top-down use of ICT, but the bottom up approach. It is a study of everyday citizens using ICT that is not under the auspices of elites and possibly working to reform the system at the grassroots level.

Impact of The Dayton Peace Accords

When reviewing the international community’s commitment to the Balkans it is necessary to note that scholars find prejudice in historical attitudes directed toward the region. Professor Bruce MacDonald, an authority on nationalism in Yugoslavia says the following on Western predisposition toward the Balkans.
In western Historiography Eastern Europe, particularly the Balkans has been portrayed in a resoundingly negative fashion. The Balkans have traditionally been condemned as the focus of passionate violence, blood feuds, despotic kings and communist dictators, and subjugated women, welded together by primitive superstition. In many ways, the Balkans as a quintessential “other” close to home has helped Western and Central Europe define themselves against that which they are not.\textsuperscript{136}

This “othering” of the Balkans stems largely from the cultural heritage of the region. This part of Europe was under the religious influence of the Orthodox faith and had considerable connections with the Islamic Ottoman world. As such, it was left out of the historical progression claimed superior by Enlightenment-influenced Western Europe. Furthermore, its geographical location has led itself to be conquered and colonized and thus unable to cement itself as power in foreign relations.\textsuperscript{137} The economic stagnation, or lack or major economic power, is explained as being a byproduct of this “cultural unlikeness” by those who find culture to be the prime mover in moving the wheels of history. Samuel Huntington, in his text Clash of Civilizations, view the conflict in the Balkans as an example of natural strife at the fault lines of civilizations—a region in the gray area between east and west.\textsuperscript{138}

MacDonald notes the Western community operated under a three-tier system in evaluating the conflict. The Catholics of Croatia and Slovenia were held in the highest regards as they represented the greatest cultural likeness to the West. Second were the Orthodox Serbs who, while still were inheritors of the Christian faith, were regarded as part of the alien Slavic east. Finally, the Bosniak community was held as the most foreign of the belligerents.\textsuperscript{139} It is unclear

\textsuperscript{136} MacDonald, Bruce “The Importance of Being European: Narratives of East and West in Serbian and Croatian Nationalism” \textit{Multiplicity of Nationalism in Contemporary Europe} ed Karolewski and Suszycki (New York: Lexington Books), 240.
\textsuperscript{137} MacDonald, “The Importance of Being European,” 241.
\textsuperscript{139} MacDonald, “The Importance of Being European,” 242.

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if any of this Balkan-Orientalism directly influenced policy either in ending the war or in post-war relations. A survey of Richard Hollbrooke’s book on the peace process, To End a War (1999), do not indicate that this orientalism played a part in negotiations; however it should be noted that some of these tropes were present by policy leaders in analyzing the conflict.\textsuperscript{140} US Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberberg asserted in 1995, “They have been killing each other with a certain amount of glee for some time now,” Warren Christopher called it “ancient ethnic antagonisms,” President Bill Clinton asserted, “until these folks get tired of killing each other, bad thing will continue to happen.”\textsuperscript{141}

The Dayton Peace Accords and the subsequent signing of the agreement in Paris of that year brought the conflict in the Balkans to an end. Ending a war, however, is never an indication that peace will be an easy transition. A Bosnian journalist discussing the legacy of the Dayton Accords stated, “1. It brought the war to an end; 2….there is no 2.”\textsuperscript{142}

The Dayton Agreement established that the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was to exist as a sovereign independent state free of territorial claims by other states—notably Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro. The agreement further established the framework for a functioning democracy, including “free and fair elections,” and a constitution based on western principles designed to “produce peaceful relations within a pluralist society” among other ideals.\textsuperscript{143} As identity has been a factor in post-Dayton BiH (discussed at the actor level in Chapter 3) it is important to investigate how ethnicity was handled by the international community brokering the peace.

\textsuperscript{140} Hollbrooke, Richard, To End a War, (New York: Random House, 1999).
\textsuperscript{141} MacDonald, The Importance of Being European,” 251-252.
\textsuperscript{142} Mulalic, Nermin, From Daytonland to Bosnia: Rediviva, (Bosnia: Bosnian Institute, 1999), Forward.
The agreement crafted by the peace brokers addressed specifically the issue of ethnicity, often explicitly listing the three ethnic groups by name (though other terms such as national and social origin are also used). The Constitution includes sections on protection of human rights, civil rights and liberties, and even the protection of national monuments important to each ethnic group. The Constitution states explicitly in several sections that all people of the state are to be awarded citizenship and discrimination based on “national or social origin, association with a national minority” is forbidden under the law.\textsuperscript{144}

Annex II of the agreement establishes the “intern-entity” boundaries of the district. These included the formation of its two main entities; the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina (comprised of Croat and Bosniak), and The Republika Srpska (Serb). Although BiH was, under the agreement, a unitary sovereign state these entities were awarded in the constitution a certain level of autonomy. These include the right to “establish special parallel relationships with neighboring states,” and enter into unitary agreements with these states (with approval by the national Parliament).\textsuperscript{145}

In relation to the central question of ethnicity and politics, Articles IV and V are of critical importance as they address the structure of Legislative and Executive branches of BiH’s government. Article IV establishes a Parliamentary Assembly with two chambers: the House of Peoples and the House of Representatives. Quoting directly from the Article, the House of Peoples “shall comprise 15 Delegates, two-thirds from the Federation (including five Croats and five Bosniacs) and one-third from the Republika Srpska (five Serbs).”\textsuperscript{146} Furthermore, “Nine members of the House of Peoples shall comprise a quorum, provided that at least three Bosniac,

\textsuperscript{144} Annex IV: Constitution, Articles I, II.
\textsuperscript{145} Annex IV: Constitution, Article III, Section 2: Responsibilities of the Entities.
\textsuperscript{146} Annex IV: Constitution, Article IV: Parliamentary Assembly, Section I: House of Peoples.
three Croat, and three Serb Delegates are present.”\textsuperscript{147} The Constitutional language of the House of Representatives omits specifically listing ethnic qualifiers, but proportional representation for the Entities is included. Section III further delves into the nature of ethnicity and politics as it provides at least three separate clauses that discuss ethnic group ability to block votes and it lists the three groups by name.

Article V of the Constitution established the office of the Presidency. It states that the Presidency is to consist of three members, held jointly by “one Bosniac and one Croat, each directly elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the territory of the Republika Srpska.”\textsuperscript{148} Each president can challenge legislation if they deem it to be “be destructive of a vital interest of the Entity from the territory from which he was elected.”\textsuperscript{149} The powers of the Presidency are fairly standard when compared to western states. The only provision in which ethnicity comes into play is the appointment of ambassadors; no more than two-thirds can come from the federation. As is evident, these two main Entities are crafted around ethnic identity. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court is comprised of seven judges, two from each entity and three international judges appointed but the European Court of Human Rights.\textsuperscript{150} Several times in the constitution we see the importance of the Federation and Republika Srpska in choosing delegates for assorted governmental posts. The two main Entities crafted around ethnic identity and can even form “parallel relationships” with neighboring foreign states (ostensibly this means the Republika Srpska can form closer ties with Serbia and the Federation, likewise, with Croatia)—this has been the case in relation to passports (discussed below).

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{148} Annex IV: Constitution, Article V: Presidency.
\textsuperscript{149} Annex IV: Constitution, Article V: Presidency, Section II: Procedures.
\textsuperscript{150} Recchia, Stefano, \textit{Beyond International Trusteeship: EU Peacebuilding in Bosnia and Herzegovina}, (Paris: The European Institute for Security Studies), 21-22.
Based on this look at the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina we see that ethnic identity is written explicitly into the governing document of the state and embedded directly into the political framework of the country. It is difficult to transcend identity politics when representation in several branches of the government is dependent on it.

Why then was the Constitution crafted in this way? Would not this make for a state unable to achieve consolidation? Did the aforementioned voices who felt this was a classic case of people ‘killing each other for centuries’ play into the political framework of nation building? With that said, international diplomacy is not crafted based on those sorts of principles. There are precedents on forming a state with established ethnic fissures with the goal of alleviating possible further devolution into war. Horowitz identifies these principles of power sharing as the conflict reduction measure known as consociationalism.

Theories of consociationalism or conflict regulation diverge in several important respects from the earlier maximalist theories. They are far more about modest goals. They assume that it is necessary for ethnically divided states to live with ethnic cleavages rather than wish them away. They argue that efforts to contain conflict must begin at the top. Consequently, they assume that the agreement of group leaders is an important step toward accommodation, especially because the habits, sentiments, and loyalties of followers are difficult to alter in the short run…And, finally, unlike theories of national integration, which emphasized informal social processes to the near-exclusion of formal arrangements, theories of consociation and conflict regulation ten to accord considerable weight to formal institutions, such as federalism or proportional representation. In all of these ways, they are refreshingly realistic counterpoint to the earlier theories. If they fall short, at least they are pointed in the right direction.151

Lijphart identifies the four characteristics found in consociational democracies as a “grand coalition” of ethnic groups; equal veto power in decision making; proportional representation in that one group does not gain an uncheckable majority; and federalism in the

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151 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 569.
form of muted ethnic autonomy. This is precisely what is seen in the Constitution of BiH. The goals of consociaionalists are described by Horowitz as “humble” in that they see their approach does not provide a cure-all to mend cleavages, but it does provide a framework for workable government in a political environment where fissures cannot easily be brought together harmoniously. As such, it appears that the international and domestic framers of the BiH constitution set out to create a postwar state with the checks and balances needed to function. Indeed, the framers crafted a state that avoided the inter-ethnic entanglements of the inter-war Yugoslavia and ensured that BiH have unified ministries, institutions, records, economic bodies, public health systems, infrastructure and so forth.

Rustow holds national unity, the vast majority of citizens with no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to, as the only possible prerequisite for a transition to democracy. Consociational systems have two major components, “segmented pluralism in social stratification and a concordant democracy.” Segmentated pluralism is focused on voluntary association along cleavage lines while concordant democracy depends on segmented elites coming together in cooperation to reach agreements. Basch argues that if there is any risk of ethnic separation in a country, all political institutions must be overtly pluralistic for a democratic state to exist. In BiH the three groups have their own social and political networks with hardly any crosscutting memberships, aside from professional environment.

153 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 569-570.
154 Mulalic, From Daytonland to Bosnia, 14-57. The text provides discussion of State/Joint Institutions and Organizations of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
158 Erlap, Politics of The European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 32-33.
The consociational style of government in BiH was crafted to avoid the continued hostilities by allowing ethnic cleavages to associate among themselves while, at the same time, national unity is preserved through the deal making and veto powers granted to the concordant executive.

This consociational system is not without its faults. As Horowitz states, the system is designed to address realistic conditions on the ground by focusing on “modest goals” that are “pointed in the right direction” of elite cooperation. It does however have the detrimental quality of reinforcing cleavages at the expense of consolidation. Stefano Recchia, writing for EU Institute for Security Studies, produced a concise table of setbacks created by the BiH Constitution that is recreated below.

**Table 2.1: Institutionalized Ethnicity in Dayton Bosnia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutionalized Ethnicity in Dayton Bosnia</th>
<th>Ethnic Power Sharing</th>
<th>Sub-State Autonomy</th>
<th>Minority Veto</th>
<th>Proportionality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Principles as Foreseen by the Dayton Constitution:</strong></td>
<td>All legislative and executive authority shared between BiH’s three ‘constituent peoples’</td>
<td>Extremely generous ethnic self-government at the level of Entities and cantons</td>
<td>Each group has extensive veto power on matters considered to be in its ‘vital interest’</td>
<td>Proportional appointments on an ethnic basis throughout public administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Undesired effects</strong></td>
<td>Nationalistic leaders in BiH were often unable to agree on major reforms</td>
<td>Sustained secessionist tendencies, particularly in the RS</td>
<td>Arbitrary determination of what constitutes a ‘vital’ interest contributes to frequent decisional deadlock</td>
<td>Clientelistic relationships between group-leaders and their followers; increased corruption</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Recchia, Beyond International Trusteeship, 12.

The table illustrates that the institutionalized ethnicity puts in place checks and balances to protect one ethnic group from gaining hegemony over another. Representation is proportional at all levels (legislative, executive, and judicial) thus each group has a voice in the direction of
the state. This, however, can relegate the state to a situation of static gridlock in which sides are unable to agree on reforms. It also perpetuates the importance of ethnicity over other factors (economic, social policy) and it allows leaders to pander to inter-ethnic fears for political gain.

Bieber notes that at the end of the war there was no municipality in either entity where a non-dominant ethnic group had a majority. This allowed for nationalist parties to entrench themselves without the necessity of inter-ethnic compromise with a focus on other issues. The failing economic system worked to exacerbate the inter-ethnic tensions because poor financial outlook bred uncertainty. Bieber provides an overview of the main BiH political parties and their level of nationalism.

Table 2.2: Political Party Nationalism in BiH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Bonsniak Party</th>
<th>Serb Party</th>
<th>Croat Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Extreme nationalist</td>
<td></td>
<td>SRS</td>
<td>HSP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>HD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Nationalist</td>
<td>SBiH</td>
<td>SNSD, PDP</td>
<td>NHI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Nationalist/Crossnational</td>
<td>SDP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Bieber’s table indicates that the Serb and Croat parties have the most nationalistic characteristics while the Bosniak parties, while espousing nationalistic qualities, are less nationalistic when compared to the others.

160 Bieber *Post-War Bosnia*, 39.
The European Union in BiH

An “inextricable net” of organizations, both NGO and IGO, are involved in the formation of post-conflict BiH.161 The most prominent connected to the future of the state is likely the European Union (EU). The European Union constitutes the largest economic bloc in the world and its member states make up the second largest economic zone outside of the United States and is of critical importance to the transition and future of BiH as a sovereign state. While the United States played a prominent role in the NATO military effort to bring the war to an end in 1995, as well as played diplomatic host and served as a chief negotiator in the Dayton Agreement, it is clear that the future of BiH is dependent the internal politics of Europe. This is substantiated on many levels; most notably the clear geographic interests and economic benefits of access to the Euro and European Union markets. The European Union has a sharp eye toward the future of the Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 2002 EU commissioner for external relations Chris Patten, stated, “[t]he choice for us in this case is very clear: either we export stability to the Balkans, or the Balkans export instability to us.” It is, therefore, necessary to review the EU plans for crafting, or directing, the future of the state.

The European Union decides on potential client states based on their “degree of perceived fit within the EU community.”162 States wishing to join the EU are more likely to reform to abide more closely with EU rules and preferences, therefore the strongest “Europeanization” occurs with candidate states. Europeanization is described by Ladrech as “a process or reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and

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163 Trauner, The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans, 6
economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy making.”

This description was later furthered by Radaelli to include “domestic discourse, identities, political structures, and public policies.”

According to the EU Institute of Security Studies, the majority of political elites in Bosnia are desirous of future inclusion in the greater European community through candidate status and membership in the EU. They are also aware of the “orientalism” projected onto the region by Western European states. This has resulted in cultural arguments by political actors to bolster their ethnic group as qualified partners in the western section of the concert of Europe. The most notable examples come from the Serb and Croatian camps.

The Serbians presented themselves to the larger European community as the defenders of Europe from the Islamic, Asian invaders from the east—clearly projecting the “other” status applied to them to neighbors in the region. The traditional Serb orthodoxy in matters of confession was downplayed and greater emphasis was put on their resistance to Muslim Ottoman influence in the Middle Ages and early-Modern eras. The question of Bosniaks, and thus the future of BiH as an independent state, were answered using the same arguments put forward in the Tito era. The Bosniaks are merely “fallen Serbs” who converted to Islam under Ottoman rule and thus they are but victims who belong to Serbia’s proud European tradition and can easily be coopted into a Greater Serbia. Croats were regarded as unequal in both their claims for sovereignty over BiH and for Croatia to join the EU. The Serb political elite presented Croats as a people without institutions or history of self-government, only as a people who historically

existed as a conquered power without the tradition or institutions necessarily to be full members in the United States of Europe. These charges against the Croats are similar to the rationale used in the first attempt at a Yugoslav state before WWII; a time when Serbs dominated both the structure and agency of the state.  

Croats, like Serbians, used matters of faith to promote their cause for acceptance in the European community. The political leaders presented their traditional Catholicism as being a prime example of their qualifications for inclusion. Croatian priests “excelled as patriots” for the Croatian cause. Serbian Orthodoxy was presented as simply a regional, ethnic church not belonging to the larger traditions of faith in Catholic Italy, France, and Spain. The claimed appearance of the Virgin Mary in Medjugorje, Herzegovina on June 24, 1981 was promoted widely to link the Croatian people and faith with similar instances in places like Portugal and France. Our Lady of Medjugorje “became an enduring symbol of the cultural divide between east and west.”

The Croatian political elite distanced themselves from the Slavic community after realizing it was not fashionable for future dealings with Western Europe. Croats saw “being part of the Balkans means being part of the backwards part of Europe.” The Croatian delegations too claimed ownership of the Bosniak community. Croatian academics claimed Bosnia Herzegovina formed the “core of the old Croatian state and Bosniaks were simply Catholic converted and used as Janissaries in the Ottoman army.

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167 MacDonald, “The Importance of Being European,” 242-246.
169 MacDonald, “The Importance of Being European,” 249.
170 Ibid.
171 MacDonald, “The Importance of Being European,” 250.
The Bosniaks are described as the “least autonomous among the Yugoslav denominations.”  Though there were some movements to promote a homogenous Bosniak political movement, there were small and rather muted when compared to their Croatian and Serb counterparts, as noted earlier. It was clear to the elite that their status and future depended on good relations with the other ethnic entities in the area. As such, “religious pluralism and tolerance” were viewed as fundamental in the new BiH state.

Both sides during war accused Bosniaks of wanting to wage holy war and set up an Islamic state in Europe, this was to play to Western audiences as to proof to their own credentials of modernity.

When the dissolution of Yugoslavia began in 1991 the EU attempted to mitigate the situation in order to avoid hostilities that could foment a civil war on the continent. Member states, such as Germany, stated they were willing to formally recognize the breakaway states in an effort to continue the effort of a peaceful end to the conflict, which was already heating up in breakaway Slovenia. The EU Peace Conference chair devised a resolution known as the “Carrington-Cutileiro Peace Plan” that called for Yugoslavia to be divided in a loose federal system where states would be divided along ethnic majorities. This plan was summarily rejected by both nationalist and non-nationalist political leaders as unfeasible and exacerbating the already tenuous ethnic divisions. Each breakaway state, Slovenia, Croatia, and BiH, were recognized by the EU by April of 1992.

When full civil war was clear the EU effort became part of the United Nations attempt to end the hostility. Although EU member states made up the bulk force of UN (and eventually

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173 Ibid.
174 MacDonald, “The Importance of Being European,” 251.
NATO) military detachments to the region, the EU appeared generally impotent in efforts to end the violence. Peace proposals presented by EU negotiators were routinely rejected by the belligerents, and continued efforts to divide the state among ethnic-majority federal districts in exchange for peace were not accepted. Chiefly among the concerns for the Bosniak elite was that the EU plans to form the consociational state left out a homeland for the Bosniak ethnic group. The lack of military strength to end the conflict coupled with the inability to end the war diplomatically showed the weakness of the European Union in mitigating issues on its own continent.\textsuperscript{176}

Following the peace the EU focused its strategy chiefly on border security issues as a prerequisite for economic aid. This included a number of economic incentives and programs for the region, the most important of which is the 1999 initiative known as the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP). It is important to accentuate that these programs were formulated with entire Western Balkan region in mind as the EU envisioned the creation of an economic bloc so interconnected through the market that future disagreements could only reasonably be rectified through diplomacy.\textsuperscript{177}

These SAP economic benefits were marketed as an incentive to membership in the EU. The program set “the framework of the relationship with the EU for the Western Balkans…all the way to their future accession.”\textsuperscript{178} From 1996 to 2003 the EU financial assistance constituted billions of Euros in reconstruction, trade, and investment. The EU was the single largest investor into BiH.\textsuperscript{179} The stipulations for the investment was that the condition that BiH government respect human rights and the democratic process.

\textsuperscript{176} Erlap, \textit{Politics of The European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina}, 64
\textsuperscript{177} Erlap, \textit{Politics of The European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina}, 65.
\textsuperscript{178} Erlap, \textit{Politics of The European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina}, 67-68.
\textsuperscript{179} Erlap, \textit{Politics of The European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina}, 66.
The EU has done work to resolve disputes in the region, such as agreements for borders around the Port of Ploče.\textsuperscript{180} With that said, the EU focused chiefly not on domestic elections or inter-ethnic cooperation, but on the issues of border security, visas, migration, and fighting organized crime. This was handled through the SAP and the 2001 Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (CARDS) program.

In regards to border security, which appears in the literature to be the issue of most crucial importance, the focus of the EU was not on ensuring established BiH borders were not violated by either Croatia or Serbia, but to ensure the movement of people from BiH into the EU was done under established framework. The levels of Entity sovereignty granted under the BiH Constitution culminated in a situation where Serbs in BiH are able to acquire Serbian passports and Croats in BiH, likewise, passports from Croatia. Croatia was an EU candidate from 2003 until its recent succession as a full member in July of 2013. The Croatian passports allow Croatian residents of BiH to have an easier access in getting Croatian visas and thus access to the EU economic market.

This situation has made BiH a target for those seeking jobs in the EU and international human trafficking rings. They acquired forged Croatian passports in BiH and thus matriculate into Croatia and from there the rest of the EU. Under the CARDS program the EU initiated a number of strategies in the region to contain immigration issues. Including an agreement with Croatia in 2005 known as the “Support to and Coordination of Integrated Border Management Strategies in the Western Balkans,” similar initiatives were presented to BiH and Serbia in 2008.\textsuperscript{181} The assorted Balkan states are individually encouraged to enter into immigration agreements with other states.

\textsuperscript{180} Trauner, \textit{Europeanisation of the Western Balkans}, 81-82.
\textsuperscript{181} Trauner, \textit{European of the Western Balkans}, 127.
The reason for the focus on the movement of people as opposed to other issues is that the EU is concerned with the migration issues through Croatia as Croatia is a conduit for human trafficking. BiH comparatively liberal visa problem allows guest workers from Turkey and other “high migratory risk” countries. They then are smuggled into Croatia. Though it should be noted that from 2000-2005 the trafficking from BiH has dropped significantly, under the indication from the EUs Stabilization and Association Agreement.

The EU’s differential treatment of Bosnia and Herzegovina in terms of visa requirements is a sensitive issue, as noted in the introduction of Chapter I. Bosnian Croats, have benefited from the liberal EU visa policy towards Croatia as the majority of them have Croatian passports. In contrast, the Serbian and Bosnian citizens require visas to travel into the EU and have therefore been at a disadvantage because of their nationality. However Serbians in BiH can acquire Serbian passports through a similar program. This has created a de facto dividing line in Bosnia. The issue of visa-free travel became politically salient issue for EU-Western Balkan relations. Visa liberalization was a catalyst for cooperation in the region among the Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats and they have worked together to achieve more travel opportunities.

The EU goals to reform BiH democratic institutions has mixed results. In 2006 The European Union decided to continue BiH on the process of integration even though many benchmarks were reached. Indeed, it has been documented that political elites are not willing to sacrifice long-term EU hopes if it means electoral defeat in the short term. Some notable examples of EU failure to rectify the ethno-nationalist situation is the divided police forces in the state. During the war it was the police and security forces responsible for much of the ethnic cleansing that occurred. The Croat and Bosniak forces have merged but Republika Srpska has

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182 Trauner, European of the Western Balkans , 87.
183 Trauner, The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans ,” 160.
184 Erlap, Politics of The European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina , 4.
resisted attempts to unify their force into a unified national institution.\textsuperscript{185} The EU pushed the Mostar Declaration which sought to reform the structure of ethnically divided police forces, dubbing it Bosnia’s last chance if they sincerely want to join the EU.\textsuperscript{186} Though the Declaration was signed in 2008 none of the reforms have been implemented. Similarly, public broadcasting is still highly divided between the Federation and the Republika Srpska and exhibits ethno-nationalist rhetoric. The two districts also have two separate processes for privatization market entry.

In surveys of BiH politicians regarding the progress of the EU, the four most popular responses show the elites found the EU to lack political muscle, were unclear, imploring, and contradictory.\textsuperscript{187} These are not positive attributes to be associated with an agency trying to reform a state divided along ethnic lines. The European Court on Human Rights ruled that BiH was guilty of ethnic discrimination in the 2009 Sejdic-Finci case in which a Roma and Jewish citizen were denied running for office because they did not meet the Constitutional ethnic criteria. Noncompliance with the verdict could, theoretically cost BiH its seat on the Council of Europe, a partner organization with the EU.\textsuperscript{188} This is a conundrum for BiH as the constitution created by the international community explicitly states that BiH had no other choice but to deny the two men a chance to run for office. Indeed, the very first peace plans proposed by the EU called for a consociational federal structure.

The EU has not been an effective institution for democratization in Bosnia. The various and seemingly overlapping economic plans and bureaucratic structures of the EU toward BiH are likely necessary and perhaps the only available option to make progress, yet it is clear that in the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{185} Erlap, \textit{Politics of The European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina}, 74-75.  \\
\textsuperscript{186} Erlap, \textit{Politics of The European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina}, 77.  \\
\textsuperscript{187} Scewczyk, \textit{Powers, Decisions, and Legitimacy}, 40.  \\
\textsuperscript{188} Erlap, \textit{Politics of The European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina}, 82.
\end{flushleft}
decades after the end of the war the EU has been largely ineffective in transitioning BiH to a liberal democracy that can fully integrate into status as a member state. Erlap identifies four factors that make this evident. 1. The EU is not equipped to engage with a post-conflict state. 2. The EU’s actions toward BiH are built upon moral superiority and self-righteousness. 3. As the EU is made up of member states, there is no uniform policy among members. 4. Expansion fatigue has caused the EU to push down the road dates for meeting benchmarks.\textsuperscript{189}

**Office of the High Representative**

The Dayton Peace Agreement set up the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) that oversees the implementation of the agreement. The PIC Steering Board consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, the Presidency of the European Union, The European Commission (the executive body of the European Union), and the Organization of the Islamic Conference which is represented by Turkey. The Steering Board appoints the Office of High Representative (OHR), a position developed in 1995. Initially the powers of the OHR were relegated on observing and mentoring the political developments of the state to ensure the protocols of the Dayton Agreement were being followed. After the 1996 election, however, the international community was concerned that nationalistic politics would continue to segregate the society.\textsuperscript{190} It was then decided at the Bonn Conference to increase the authority given to the OHR. According to the decisions made at Bonn, the Office has the authority to make “binding decisions” regarding the time, location, and chairmanship of institution meetings, impose decisions when elected leaders are deemed unable to do so, and

\textsuperscript{189} Erlap, *Politics of The European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 111.
\textsuperscript{190} Erlap, *Politics of The European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, 42-43.
remove from office officials deemed to be working in contradiction to the spirit of the Dayton Agreement.\textsuperscript{191}

Since its inception, five people have held the OHR office. Each High Representative has used the Bonn powers in different frequencies and with different intentions to fulfill the Dayton Peace Agreement. Since 1997 the OHR has used the Bonn powers more than 900 times, including 191 “suspensions or removal from office” of officials; including both elected and appointed.\textsuperscript{192} Notable instances of OHR insertion into BiH politics are the 2001 removal of the Croatian member of the BiH presidency for promoting a separate Croatian Entity to determining sales tax, a power delegated to the national government.\textsuperscript{193}

The OHR has faced serious criticism. Detractors find the Office undermines the democratic growth of the state and that it has contributed to low voter turnout and low satisfaction with the government of the state.\textsuperscript{194} The Office is accountable only to the PIC and its decisions are not open to appeal. It has been called the “European Raj” and is often considered the true ruling office of the state, not that of the elected government.\textsuperscript{195}

It has, however, been noted by others as a necessary feature of the state. Bosniak leaders, for instance, see it as a welcome and needed check to the Serbian Entity elite in the Republika Srpska. Erlap finds that the OHR is an “integral” part of the state that strengthens institutions and keeps extremists nationalism from resurging, he finds the “long term stability” of BiH to be dependent on the work of the OHR, without which would leave the state paralyzed and regressing.\textsuperscript{196}

\textsuperscript{191} Erlap, Politics of The European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina , 42.  
\textsuperscript{192} Erlap, Politics of The European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina , 50.  
\textsuperscript{193} Erlap, Politics of The European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina , 43-50.  
\textsuperscript{194} Venneri, “Modelling States from Brussels?,” 32-35.  
\textsuperscript{195} Erlap, Politics of The European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina , 45.  
\textsuperscript{196} Erlap, Politics of The European Union in Bosnia-Herzegovina , 50.
Citizen Desire to Mend Cleavages

The previous section establishes that ethnic identity is a deeply entrenched element in the political structure of the state—evident the intentions of the international community that provides oversight, the foundations of the constitution and the political posturing of the political parties. Though the partners in this three-pronged ethnic conundrum have different goals (the international community and the constitution are designed to ameliorate strife, while the political parties are often antagonistic for their ends), it has created undesirable stagnation in consolidation. The responsibility of overcoming inter-ethnic division therefore is placed considerably on the shoulders of regular citizens.

As Balkan scholar Stef Janses notes, “It was believed that the assimilating forces of industrialization…would diminish, and finally erase ethnic cleavages.”197 With that taken into consideration, achieving that goal is not an easy task, “The very existence of mass burial sites cannot be suppressed, nor can its significance in everyday life of local communities.”198 The scholarship reviewed reveals a varied outlook on the possibility of reconciliation. On one hand, citizens remark that they want to transcend the divisiveness and move forward both nationally and within their personal lives. One the other hand, however, there are considerable reservations, anxiety and fear on whether this is possible—both in relation to the future of the BiH state and among neighbors. Both the negative and positive positions are briefly examined below utilizing accounts found in the reviewed scholarship. This is not intended as a definitive representation of the feelings of Bosnian citizens, it is merely anecdotal, but is intended to capture a general mood that exists in the state.

197 Jansen, Stef, “Against Cultural Anesthesia: Identity, Nationalism and Modernity in former Yugoslavia” in Ethnicity and Nationalism in East Central Europe and the Balkans, Williams, Christopher et al. (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 1999), 275.
Negative Outlook on Mending Ethnic Cleavages.

As noted above, the wounds of war are often the hardest to heal and it is no doubt further exacerbated when nationalistic rhetoric is commonplace in the national political arena. The experience of violence is, even almost two decades after Dayton, is increasingly part of individual memory and “public constructions of truth and history.” The scholarship finds that war memory and distrust from the war is what drives people from forming relationships and allows people to fall prey to hyper-nationalist rhetoric from political leaders. The fear of what may come in the future drives people to shelter in a in the safe-space of their own ethnic community and in some cases, look toward unification with neighboring states as to fully escape potential future hostilities. Memory and uncertainty appears to be the culprit and from that, nationalism and ethnocentrism remain the most prominent obstacles toward reconciliation.

An example to best accentuate this are the war crimes tribunals initiated to prosecute those suspected of ethnic cleansing, rape, and other crimes during the war in Bosnia. The trials in The Hague are viewed through a nationalist lens where Serbs feel the trials are a witch hunt instigated by the international community and no proof that systematic, top-down persecution existed. To further add to the disconnect, Bosniaks are least likely to demonstrate empathy for the wartime experiences of others rely on feelings of victimhood and exploitation concerning matters of inter-ethnic issues, conversely Serbs and Croats are far more likely to resort to espousing nationalism. The future looks little better, especial among the Muslim population living in the RS, as they have, despite the work of the international community and the OHR,

“presumably few illusions of a rosy future and none at all regarding cooperation with the Serbs.”

Distrust is passed along through education—either personal experience or from societal values delivered to them; people must be taught to see ethnic differences and favor or fear on group over another. Mostar is the fifth largest city in BiH and was once a vibrant, diverse multi-ethnic community. In the years following the war the schools were largely segregated. The fears of integration are positioned on the belief that there will be violence and prejudice against one group or another. Parents blame politicians for maintaining and supporting segregated schools. While neither group is openly hostile to each other, this anxiety prohibits their children from making inter-ethnic contact at the neutral school setting. They feel powerless however to change the divided landscape.

Contact Hypothesis: Future of the State

American sociologist and religious scholar David Moberg notes, “Distrust increases with strangeness, tolerance with familiarity. Cultural pluralism provides a framework for such cooperation.” The concept that increased “contact among individuals from conflicted groups could help distinction between group and individual and indirectly help the process of reconciliation” is known as the Contact Hypothesis.

Originally proposed as a method for improving relations in communities in the United States that endured racism and segregation, the Contact Hypothesis has since been applied “for

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206 Birlo, “Attitudes Toward Justice,” 204. Also known as the Contact Theory.
improving intergroup relations following large scale violent conflict." The Contact Hypothesis is postulated as one of the most productive ways to improve relations among inter-ethnic groups that have experienced conflict. Contact among groups builds empathy and understanding of the other from which individuals are more likely to cooperate or desire to reform systems, (whether they be “law, custom or social atmosphere”), built upon separation of groups. The theory identifies four elements needed to produce positive contact:

1. Equal Status between groups
2. Institutional support
3. Collaboration on shared goals of cooperation
4. Development of meaningful relationships between members of different groups.

Of course, the nature of the contact is important. For the theory to be productive, the intergroup contact must be positive in nature. The building of civil society in institutions like clubs, social groups, and sports teams are all examples of positive interaction as members are equals and share a shared interest and common goals outside of competition between cleavages. If people isolate themselves from the societal other they are more likely to build, believe, and continue stereotypes that maintain cleavages. The scholars searching for evidence that relations are forming among different ethnic groups in BiH are cautious but optimistic, if not confident, in their findings. The existence of intermarriage among groups in Yugoslavia during the reign of Tito is a sign that inter-ethnic contact is not completely foreign to the people of BiH.

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210 Freeman, “The Psychological Need for Intergroup Contact,” 19.

211 Alcock, John, “Interrmarriage” in *Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia, an Encyclopedia* (Denver: ABC-CLIO, 1998), 123-124. Note: Inter-ethnic marriage varies between cities and countryside. Some places such as Vukovar in present day Croatia saw 34% missed marriages. It is estimated that rate present day BiH was between 10-12%;
Unfortunately, a history of violence and negative stereotypes in the “20 years of intolerant and divisive ethno-nationalist policies” have limited many of the the positive aspects garnered in the Tito era.\(^{212}\)

University of Macedonia professor of Political Science and International Relations, Ioannis Armakolas, conducted a series of oral interviews with Bosnian Serbs over the 2007 time period regarding identity and inter-ethnic relations. Dr. Armakolas revealed that people in suburban Sarajevo who found work in the ethnically diverse city were at first apprehensive about working alongside other groups; fearing that there would be strife. The results, however, revealed that once in the work environment the Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks were able to work with each other to accomplish the shared goal. While it is unknown if solid and deep friendships were formed, from this professional work relationship, “they transcended the boundaries erected by the separatist political programs.”\(^{213}\)

Similar findings were reported in the literature in relation to Bosniak views of Croats. In the Herzegovina town of Stolac the Bosniaks viewed the Croats not as a monolithic force in which all are acting in collusion for a common goal and all are accountable for the actions of some. There exists a “counter-discourse” when discussing Croats, the narrative “shift[ed] away from ethnic categories towards non-ethnic cultural and moral categories in order to” explain relationships. Occupations and rural versus urban were descriptive characteristics to explain behavior, not ethnic identity. \(^{214}\) The Bosniak and Croat groups would attend cafes and other

\(^{212}\) Freeman, “The Psychological Need for Intergroup Contact,” 19.


public locations that ‘belonged’ to the other ethnic group, for example young Bosniaks would frequent the Croat pub because it had a pool table while theirs did not. This contact can lead to greater trust. Kolind notes that in Stolac, “Ethnicity and religion did not matter in many aspects of everyday life.”

This is interesting as” Stolac is divided on both political and administrative levels, and there is only meagre interaction among members of different ethnic groups.

The piecemeal approach to inter-ethnic relationships is certainly not a cure-all that will transform a fractured state overnight. It does however, start the foundations of communication, trust, and viewing moving past ethnic rivalry or fear of dominance or retribution. New networks of social relationships can be established to improve communities, and “with these new relationships come trust.”

If the nexus between ethnic cleavages on the personal level and national level is a fear of the future, what sort of future do the parties involved want? The four existing options are:

1. Devolution into their own, ethnic majority nation-states (any combination of an independent Federation, RS, or Bosniak state)
2. Maintaining the status quo and work toward reconciliation.
3. Secession and annexation to neighboring states (i.e. Croatia and Serbia, proper).
4. Joining the European Union.

Any one of these proposals, would ostensibly solve the problem of fear of the other. Numbers one and three are not mending the cleavage, but a complete divorce from the problem. Number four would change the dynamic by including the people of BiH into the fruitful EU economic zone. Citizens could then still maintain their ethnic identity but the certainty of the

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215 Kolind, “In Search of ‘Decent People’,”138. It should also be noted that Bosniaks and Croats had later formed a united front in the war and that they share the Federation. Though not specifically stated, this “allie” relationship could account for some of the inter-ethnic trust.

future could allow them make contact and increase trust and familiarity—nationalist leaders would no longer need to rely on nationalism to frighten people into votes. With that said, there are multiple and diverse polls addressing what future the people of BiH desire.

It appears from the polling that overwhelming opinion of citizens for the future of BiH is to join the European Union. According to The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, when presented with all other options, almost 9 in 10 (86%) citizens supported accession of BiH to the EU over all other options. The lowest level of support was in East RS, but the proposal still garnered 59% of citizens.\textsuperscript{217} An the question of whether entities as the level of government division should be abolished, 69% in the Federation agreed while only 9% in RS thought it was good proposal. The notion of the state being dissolved and three, independent states form did not garner over 10% support in any Entity (this idea did, however, receive 14% approval in the Brcko District, an administrative region part of both Entities). Based on the NDI findings, the citizens are frustrated with the current conditions. There is still an inter-ethnic trust issue at hand when accounting for the question on whether Entities should be dissolved (large support in the Federation versus almost none in RS). The only plan to have wide support is accession into the EU.\textsuperscript{218} Gallup polling over the same 2010 period had slightly different numbers but still, joining the EU enjoyed a wide and clear majority overall in the country and in each Entity.\textsuperscript{219}

A 2013 UN Poll on attitudes in BiH found that each group was proud of their ethnicity and considered their ethnic identity important and believed their religious leaders were the most

\textsuperscript{218} NDI, \textit{Opinion Poll}, 41.
trustworthy. With that in consideration, dividing the territory in neighboring states received less than 10% support across all ethnic lines. Dividing the country into three independent states received less than 10% among all ethnic groups except Serbs who favored the proposal 22%. Like the other polls, when asked if the EU was necessarily or preferable for the future of BiH, each ethnic group agreed in majorities.

This does not mean that ethnicity is disregarded and replaced by a pan-Bosnia identity. The issue of a singular, unique BiH identity, according to the UN survey results, is not very important to the citizens of BiH. Instead, “ethnic and religious identities are the most important aspects of identity. Even the regional/town identity is considered more important than BiH identity. However, compared to Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats have a stronger BiH identity. It appears from the polls that while citizens of BiH are proud of their ethnicity.” However, the data indicates they believe that EU membership is the most practical way of moving forward as a nation’ “In general, the citizens believe that EU, USA, UN and OHR should have most influence on the future of BiH.”. Of the other options, only dissolving the entities came close for Croats and Bosniaks while Serbs preferred having some autonomy. Rural residents were more likely to proud of their ethnicity and religion above other designations. Urban and rural have confidence in the EU and support a future with it.²²⁰

The statistics match the analysis in the literature, “European integration has emerged as the only tentative Bosnia-wide political consensus and cross-party and cross-ethnic commitment.”²²¹ The idea of succession is not commonly thrown about by Croat and Serb political parties, likely because the post-war idea is no longer obtainable but more so because this rhetoric will result in

²²¹ Bieber, Post-War Bosnia, 146. Emphasis in original.
financial and electoral penalties from the international observers who maintain mandated power of political institutions. Moreover, neither the Croatian or Serbian government advocate for annexation or merging the BiH entities into their own states.\footnote{Bieber, \textit{Post-War Bosnia}, 146-147.}

On the question “Do you think that in order for ethnic groups in BiH to reconcile their past they should ...?” the most popular answers among all ethnic groups was to reach common truths about the past and reconciliation.\footnote{UNRCO, \textit{Public Opinion}, 27.} It seems that neither group want to abandon their identity, the contrary, the statistics show they are proud of it. But the results show that a political solution is sought that does not extinguish ethnic identity or extrapolate the cleavages.

Coupled with ethnic opinions, it is also necessary to review the opinions of different demographics. College educated citizens education are less likely to prefer to live in an area where their ethnic group is the majority and they have positive expectations about the future. When asked the question of “I would like to have friends among people of difference nationalities in this region,” a plurality across ethnic lines of those with higher than a high education strongly or mostly agreed.\footnote{O’Loughlin, John. “Inter-Ethnic Friendships,” 29. Results are in Appendix at end of article.} Fractured ethnic relations were more of a problem for urban than rural. While both urban and rural blame government and politicians for problems, urban more likely to blame government rural likely to blame politicians. Youth (18-35) are more likely to join a citizens action group and demonstrate.\footnote{UNRCO, \textit{Public Opinion}, 19.} Youth in BiH were noted to be both angry at the current political situation but were also more optimistic than other age brackets about the future. Youth, while proud of their heritage, are less likely to identify solely with
Finally, youth are slightly more likely to have faith in international organizations such as the EU.

In regards to making interethnic connections and friends, a University of Colorado study indicated that while over half of the residents of BiH (54%) have all or most of their friends from their nationality, almost half (47%) of Bosnian adults want more friends from different nationalities. Three of the strongest correlation with building interethnic friendships was a better financial situation, urban versus rural, and more education. NDI data reveals the urban residents are more likely to see ethnic divisions as a problem. The modernization theory, in relation to ethnic tolerance, postulates that there is “greater tolerance by urban residents, by younger people, persons living in ethnically-diverse republics and regions, and in those born of mixed ethnic parentage.”

Conclusion

The overarching point of the EU mission and its interest is to remove the need for future humanitarian intervention in BiH and to prevent refugee and human trafficking flows into the rest of Europe. With that said, the overall outcome of peace in BiH is of crucial importance as this mission, if successful, would be a “victory for the EU as an institution and signal it is a fully capable world body and validate the EU model of government demonstrating credibility of EU foreign policy.”

Although the Dayton Peace Agreement brought the violent conflict to an end, it also burdened the new state with a governmental framework based on a federal system of two states formulated on ethnic divisions and fraught with ethnic tension and inter-ethnic competition. Few

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226 UNRRCO, Public Opinion, 54.
consolidations are made for the betterment of the state as a whole and decisions are largely made by elites bolstering their ethnic authenticity. For instance, the Serbian Delegation in the Republika Srpska passed a referendum on independence from BiH based on the Kosovo vote for independence from Serbia.

The scholarship does not indicate the foundation for the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not malicious in its intent. It was drafted to mitigate a very fragile and hostile situation in order to work towards the goal of a unified state at a later date when the memories of war were calmed. With that in mind, it is evident that the basic foundation for the state are crafted along ethnic lines and therefore the political choices of citizens are relegated to ethnic representation as the basic component of their own law. It is also clear that international actors, while benevolent in their goals, have focused on issues such as border control at the expense of other issues like mending ethnic fissures. There are few, if any, practical avenues for BiH to work with the goal of forming a consolidated multi-ethnic state through the international institutions or based on their own laws because the elites who crafted the government did not allow that framework.

Therefore, an opportunity for a multi-ethnic nation working toward consolidation is the political activism of the ordinary residents of the state. A grassroots effort is needed to reform institutions from the bottom up to work around the ethnic roadblocks enforced upon them. The next chapter focuses on the efforts of these grassroots actors in the area of political inter-ethnic relations. It does so by looking at information technology as a tool for cooperation and reform.
Chapter III: The Future of the State

The previous chapter established that the state is fractured at the constitutional and political level, yet there are some openings among citizens to mend those cleavages and form inter-ethnic cooperation and the grassroots level. This chapter reviews the nature of information technology as a tool for mending the cleavages. It begins with a review of how Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) can act as a tool for change. It then reviews actors’ use of ICT in the decade after Dayton (1995-2005) and from 2005 to 2013.

ICT as a Tool for Change

The following chart illustrates how the use of ICT changes the dynamics in a situation of disagreement. The chart was adapted by Reimann based on an earlier model of conflict resolution by Kempf. It illustrates that a problem exists which in turn initiates a dispute between parties. The use of ICT brings mediation into the equation where it may not have existed or been feasible beforehand. ICT allows an exchange of opinions and, most importantly, an exchange of knowledge where both parties learn the interests and intentions of the other. If it were not for a channel of mutual discourse from other perspectives, actors would likely only receive a biased, one-sided argument that is triangular in nature---they would hear exclusively a one-sided story and little progress would be made to rectify a situation and, at the same time, resentment and frustration would remain. As Reimann notes, “Mediation is possible only when interactions and knowledge about intentions, etc. with both sides actively occurs... In Bosnia, often "multiple perspectives" means "multi-ethnicity".”

231 Reimann, Michael “Das Internet als Medium für Demokratisierung und Verständnisbildung Beispiel Bosnien- Herzegowina.” Conflict and Communication Online, Vol 1, No 2 (2002), 10 (all citations of this source translated by author).
The figure indicates that when there is a policy disputed among ethnic groups, each side will advocate for their position. This position could be at the direct expense of the other group (i.e. education funding, ID card reform). There is a decision made (action) and the outcome rectifies the situation which could either benefit one party, both parties, or neither. The introduction of ICT in the mediation process allows for the groups to participate and exchange ideas with each other. This connection builds understanding with the position of the other side. For instance, in the Babylution example, those in the RS who have access to state IDs may not be aware of the problems arising from the lack of identification for newborns in the Federation. Without the discourse taking place over the Internet, actors may not have a chance to hear the other side. When there is two way communication, understanding, if not empathy, can be a product. Thus those who would ignore the tribulations of an ethnic community with which they have minimal contact could advocate for action the benefits all citizens; not one ethnic cleavage.
For this exchange to be possible the Internet cannot simply be static websites that display information in the same way a print advertisement would. People must be able to “tinker” with it, to use it in a “generative” way where they can create content and interact with other users.\textsuperscript{232} This is known as Web 2.0; a change from the earlier Internet to a new mode dominated by chat, email, social networking, and user created content—exchange, dialogue and participation.\textsuperscript{233}

Moreover, for ICT to be a useful tool there must be equal access by all parties and an even exchange of dialogue. This means that, for instance, the Internet must be free of blocking and firewalls; have spaces where parties can ideas can be exchange in a safe, anonymous environment; state and federal leaders must be reachable; and international partners (in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Office of the High Representative and European Union) should also have emails and websites available.

Websites need to utilize web 2.0 to encourage the two way discourse necessary in the model. Without it, it is just a one way discussion no different than traditional forms of communication. Accordingly, there exists a worry that the largest threat to democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is the “looming temptation of authoritarianism” from government entities. When the elites control the political process without consultation or discourse from citizens, policy decisions will be made that benefit the ruling elites: “At the heart of the Bosnian governance problem...lies the lack of engagement by Bosnian citizens and interest groups in the practice of government...Just as a company without the interest of an owner will not use its assets wisely, public institutions which are not subject to constant pressure


from citizens exerted through the democratic process will not respond to the needs of the public effectively.”

The following is a review of information technology in BiH in the decade after the end of the war. It reviews the notable actors and institutions of the Diaspora Community, education, government, civil society, the international community, and private citizens.

**Transitioning State: A Decade after Dayton**

A great deal has been written on the pitfalls of ICT to operate as a vector of change, focused not just on government regulation (discussed below) but on basic access. This field of research is known as the Digital Divide. It stresses that ICT can be a useful tool but basic limitations on physical accessibility render it much less useful than its champions would hope. Two of the biggest concerns are basic infrastructure, and accessibility (cost, having a device available).

In the decade after the war the number of places where Bosnians could ‘get online’ was relatively low. However in the years after the war both the British and Austrian governments established libraries with Internet “access points” around the country. George Soros’ Open Society Fund created a Mostar training center to provide access and teach people the skills to navigate the web. International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also established Internet youth centers in the state. One most fruitful methods to examine how many people have access is to review the raw data of the number online. The following is a chart utilizing World Bank data on the number of people online and the number who have computers in relation to neighboring states.

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In terms of affordability, the cost of an Internet subscription in mid 2000s was “in absolute terms a little below the German level, in relation to the average monthly income in the Federation.” It was however still rather expensive and accounted for roughly 5% of monthly income. The increase in Internet service providers did bring down costs by a few percent, but it was still unaffordable for the elderly, unemployed, and students outside of schools, libraries, and universities. This is an important point as the Internet in the ten years after the peace process was bottlenecked to those who could afford these costs or lived in an urban setting where IGO/NGO Internet cafes and libraries were available.

**Diaspora: A Decade After Dayton**

It is estimated that nearly 1.4 million Bosnians live outside of the borders of BiH, this accounts for roughly 38 percent of the global Bosnian population. The Bosnian Diaspora began in earnest as a result of the war, with roughly 800,000 refugees, mostly Bosniaks, fleeing the country in 1993-1994. The largest recipient of the war-era migration were Croatia, Germany and Serbia. The troubled economic history of BiH has contributed to continued migration. The three aforementioned stated continued to be the main receptors of Bosnian immigrants in the post-war era, but sizable populations did move, many time sunder guest worker programs, to Australia, Austria, , Britain, Croatia, Norway, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, and the USA. The question is if, and to what ends, the diaspora population maintains contact with the home country? Do connections and relationships exist and, if so, are these networks effective in peacebuilding democratization in BiH? Bosnians who have sought asylum in other states possible encounter a more consolidated democratic political system that is both economically

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238 Reimann, “Das Internet,” 15.
240 Ibid.
and socially more desirable, these individuals can use their position to both lobby their new home country for reform in BiH and, at the same time, serve as a conduit for news, information, and opinions; indeed, studies have shown that diaspora networks can be vectors for positive reform in home countries.\textsuperscript{241}

The Bosnian Diaspora evolved in the Internet age, as opposed to historical examples, and has been described as a "digital diaspora" in the use of ICT in their efforts, this is beneficial to the influence of organizations as the "Internet increase the range and quality of diasporas" in both the new and old homeland.\textsuperscript{242} Throughout Europe and North America the diaspora community, largely made up of Bosniaks, an inter-working organized networks of clubs and organizations devoted to issues such as cultural awareness, assistance for communities in BiH, assistance for refugees, communication with family and friends, and hold conferences. These organizations’ goals are to educate and promote their issues and they rely heavily on the Internet—utilizing chat forums, debate, emails and websites in the local and native languages. The diaspora community is, “[n]ot fractured like previous diasporas where youth quickly assimilate” therefore members of different age groups participate.\textsuperscript{243} In regards to direct action and lobbying on BiH issues, the international community had regular contact with embassy officials and direct contact with government and BiH political officials. Particularly notable is the North American Congress of Bosniaks which seeks to amend the Dayton Accord Constitution. Other notable examples include an online Jobs for Youth program in Italy, extensive coordination between foreign investment in BiH and diaspora communities in Britain,

\textsuperscript{242} Kent, “Organised Diaspora,” 453.
\textsuperscript{243} Kent, “Organised Diaspora,” 460.
and Swedish groups raising money to rebuild mosques.\textsuperscript{244} Gregory Kent notes that when the opinions of the Bosnian Diaspora community are coupled with domestic pressure it adds greater weight to the demands.\textsuperscript{245}

**Education: A Decade After Dayton**

The education system in Bosnia is so highly segregated based on ethnicity, one activists described it as “educational apartheid.”\textsuperscript{246} After the war, the Dayton Agreement did not address the nature of primary and secondary education in the country (though the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has monitored and provided advice as a member of the international institutions overseeing the nation). This resulted in a fractured educational system in which the content and tone of curriculum is biased toward the ethnic majority in that area. The BBC reports that there are over 50 segregated school in Bosnia in which each ethnic group is physically separated in their own classrooms. One student described it as "not good for our future, but that's how it is…You can see that the different students don't communicate," she says. Another noted "That will be a big problem for our country because we learn to be separated, if we were together at school, we'd be able to understand and get to know each other…As it is, we can't form our own opinions about others. We have to solve the school separation issue before we can start to tackle other problems here."\textsuperscript{247}

In this segregated system, the neighboring country is often the country of reference in regards to history and social studies. This influences the curriculum in that there is no shared academic BiH narrative, “in BiH it is claimed that the subject of history is being manipulated to

\textsuperscript{244} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{245} Kent, “Organised Diaspora,” 461.
\textsuperscript{246} Lowen, Mark “Balkan Divisions Survive in Bosnian Schools” *BBC News*, last updated 1 Apr. 2010 Accessed February 2014, ([http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8596904.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8596904.stm)).
\textsuperscript{247} Ibid.
create segregated identities.” The United Nations (UN) Declaration on Human Rights states that all children have the right to be educated in their own language; this was taken as justification for parties to implement segregated education even though the Dayton Accord listed the three languages as essentially the same but in different dialects. One scholar noted in a review of curriculum found, “the most prominent finding of my research is the use of "us-them" terminology in textbooks, in which hostile stereotypes about other national groups of the country was typical…The Serb book, for instance, stated how the Serbian people were again forced to defend their honor and dignity with weapons while the Bosnian version stated that "Serbian-Chetnik genocide against Muslims has deep roots." In 2000 a law was passed forbidding the import of text books from neighboring countries to try an halt this ethnically charged education; however the same books were used but new covers and Bosnian authors were added.”

**Government: A Decade After Dayton**

In 2004, ten years after the war, the government was slow to adapt to the Internet. The international community stressed the unification of communication systems, however, this did not come to pass. Each entity developed its own communication infrastructure that was separate and not connected to the other entities. Entities put forth an emphasis on repairing and rebuilding their own infrastructure but not on connecting it with neighboring entities. For example, in 1998 it was nearly impossible to make a phone call from Serbian Banja Luka to Croatian Mostar, the Internet would be a “wonderful medium for overcoming these boundaries.” In the years following the Internet did gain a foothold, but the information was largely not Web 2.0 and this did not initiate discussion.

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250 Ibid..
251 Reimann, “Das Internet,” 2.
In writing about the nature of Bosnian Internet in 2004, Turcilo finds it functioned as a one-sided medium, more as a “bulletin board” for elites than a place for discourse—monologue rather than dialogue.\textsuperscript{252} The main participants online were the international community, political parties, and governmental bureaucracy. Turcilo notes that the 2004 landscape was utilized to persuade not to discuss problems, off-line goals and rhetoric or governmental agencies and parties were simply transferred online for self-promotion.\textsuperscript{253} In the realm of outreach of political structure and agency, the websites of parties were often “under construction” or listed outdated or inactive email addresses—this meant that there were few Web-based, two way communications between constituents and the country’s leaders. Perhaps even more troubling is that in 2002 several parties did not have websites (mostly those situated in the RS) and others “barricaded themselves behind passwords” thus rendering them inaccessible to those seeking information.\textsuperscript{254}

Aside from these shortcomings the literature does not indicate that a concerted effort to regulate the Internet came to pass in BiH. The elites largely ignored the Internet rather than sought to control it. The focus of the elites was on traditional news sources and to maintain ethnic based outlets established in the waning days of the war. The Dayton Accords included an open and independent media establishment in their proposals but no solid plan was put forth to accomplish this goal. When the Office of the High Representative (OHR) actively engaged in a media reform campaign, there was considerable pushback by the ethnocentric political parties in national elections. Likely as a result of this, the trust in the media by BiH citizens is low and, in

\textsuperscript{252} Turcilo, Lejla “Internet and Political Communication,” 60.
\textsuperscript{253} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{254} Reimann, “Das Internet, “16
the “10 years after Dayton, a failure to comply with professional standards and deliberate manipulation of information are still common features of broadcast journalism in BiH.”

Civil Society: A Decade After Dayton
Larry Diamond describes civil society as “the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules…it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere.” Civil society consists or private citizens who form groups, organizations, or other connections for a shared goal or interest. This can be either an NGO working to remove landmines from a post-war nation, a trade union, fraternal organization, a sports club, or any other private citizen group outside of the direct authority of a government. Civil society is important for both the functioning and consolidation of a democratic state for the following six reasons:

- Protecting against the state’s encroachment on the private sphere and therefore safeguarding a private and social space
- Monitoring and controlling state power
- Encouraging the democratic and participatory socialization of citizens and the recruitment of democratic elites for the state’s decision-making bodies
- Opening up channels for the development, aggregation and articulation of common values and social interests outside the political parties and parliaments
- Contributing to local democracy-building which in fledgling democracies often lags behind democratic development at the national level.
- Encouraging overlaps in the membership of civil society groups and organizations, initiatives, and movements in order to help ameliorate or overcome entrenched lines of conflict within society.

For civil society, the main focus of this thesis is on the work of NGOs as, “NGOs are just one of the pillars of civil society alongside citizen’s action groups, and independent media, and the

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255 Topic, Tanja “Electronic Media Regulation Efforts in a Semi-Protectorate,” in Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia Herzegovina: Ten Years after Dayton (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006), 181.
256 Diamond, Developing Democracy, 221.
257 Sejfija, Ismet “From the Civil Sector to Civil Society: Progress and Prospects” in Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Bosnia Herzegovina: Ten Years after Dayton (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006). 126.
critical public, but in Bosnia-Herzegovina there are it dominant component.”

In BiH, the “law provides for freedom of association, and the government generally respected this right in practice.” In the ten years after Dayton there was an estimated 8,000 NGOs listed as humanitarian organizations alone, and another 30,000 addressing issues from the environment to women’s rights. This illustrates that civil society has a definite presence in the country; however its record for establishing solid democratic principles and inter-ethnic cooperation has been “diverse and contradictory.”

NGO groups in BiH that focus on political reform gained ground in the decade after Dayton, in 2000 citizens groups exerted pressure to have non-government appoint delegates attend council meetings in several cities across the country. This effort spearheaded the formation of the Center for Civil Initiatives (CIC), and NGO dedicated to the monitoring of elections. In 2003 the CIC had centers in ten municipalities across Bosnia-Herzegovina and partnered with twenty eight other NGOs. Similarly, in 2003 agricultural NGOs united to protest environmental policies that were viewed as a detriment to the nation’s farmers, the subsequent organized protest “transcended ethno-political divisions” a rare occurrence in the state.

Other NGOs are focused on peacebuilding and mending cleavages. A youth organization in 2000 produced brochures and held workshops on forming an inter-ethnic dialogue. Other organizations worked with marginalized groups such as the disabled, gays and lesbians, veterans, women, and national minorities (Roma and Jewish groups) to lobby for their concerns at regional

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258 Sejfija, “From Civil Sector to Civil Society,” 125
260 Sejfija, “From Civil Sector to Civil Society,” 125.
262 Sejfija, “From Civil Sector to Civil Society,” 127.
263 Sejfija, “From Civil Sector to Civil Society,” 128.
levels. This was fruitful as due to the lobbying efforts of NGOs, public institutions in Tuzla offered access and facilities to the disabled.  

There were roadblocks in NGO efforts. According to Sejfija, a number of projects were shelved or to followed to fruition because of ethno-politics; one group saw another as gaining an advantage in a particular project (such as the construction of homes for veterans or democracy training for youth, sports leagues) and the project was tabled. Of concern is that for many projects, it is required that an ethnic balance of Croat, Serb and Bosniak be maintained—which served as an excuse for blocking efforts. Civil society seen as “risky business for nationalist elites, who fear it will jeopardize their control over the economy, the media and the general public.” Other areas of concern revolve around securing funding which takes up a great deal of time for NGO groups and thus subtracts from implementing programs.

**International Community: A Decade After Dayton**

In the ten years after the war, international organizations (IGOs and NGOs) had a much larger presence online than did political parties and governmental bureaucracy. Over forty “major international organizations operated in Bosnia in 2004, the majority of which had an online presence in the country.” Their online activity centered around their goal, or mission statement: whether that would be mitigating potential social conflicts or strengthening their company. The international organizations did a better job of interactivity and forming a dialogue with citizens—while chatboards were not available, active email addresses were provided and queries responded to.

Another example of online inter-ethnic activity is the children’s website project, Kidopolis, an International Forum for Youth funded by UNESCO. Marketed to youth, users

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264 Sejfija, “From Civil Sector to Civil Society,” 128.
265 Sejfija, “From Civil Sector to Civil Society,” 132.
266 Trucilo, “Internet and Political Communication,” 61.
logged in and met others from around the world. Rooms had different themes all centered on the Greek ideas of the *polis* and democracy. On this site the users did not describe themselves as German, Serbs, or Bosnians or Croats, but as members of the Kidopolis community. Children from different backgrounds socializing in a safe space is a first step to real world encounters, which could be difficult in the real world.\(^{267}\) It appears Kidopolis had a special initiative for youth in the Balkans as their page archive contains a flier for an “OnLive Tour” in July of 1999.\(^{268}\)

The website for the OHR, the most powerful IGO in Bosnia, was not particularly effective at conveying their message. The page included relevant news and speeches but the information was entirely in English and the option for a translation to a native tongue was not present. Moreover, the “contact” information was difficult to find so if a citizen wanted to ask a question to the OHR, it would be difficult without a solid command of English and knowledge to navigate the website.\(^{269}\)

Conversely the website for the OSCE met criteria for both Web 2.0 access and participation. The site, upon first entering, gave the viewer the option to select which language to use, both Cyrillic and Latin scripts were available. While navigating the website the page stayed in the same language setting. It also included a number of forums which users could contact the OSCE and discuss matters among themselves. This allows for the needed participation, two-way dialogue that makes ICT innovative.\(^{270}\)

**Citizens: A Decade After Dayton**

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\(^{267}\) Reimann, “Das Internet,” 2.


\(^{269}\) Reimann, “Das Internet,” 16.

\(^{270}\) Reimann, “Das Internet,” 17.
Citizen use in the decade after the war fell prey to the problems of the digital divide in that elites were the ones most common to have access. This is due largely to the economic situation as few could afford an electronic device through which to access the Internet and lacked digital knowledge to navigate the World Wide Web. According to a 2003 United Nations Development Fund report, most accessed the Internet at Internet Cafés or through workplace computers, not at home.\(^{271}\)

Citizen activity on the Net was generally utilitarian in nature. With that being said, early Bosnian ‘netizens’ had access to email, unrestricted websites, and chat. Bosnians used the Internet for access to “semi-objective” information as the media had low trust among citizens.\(^{272}\) The chat logs reveal that most stayed away from controversial political topics, yet even discussion of pop culture and other topics does build a foundation for the Contact Hypothesis.\(^ {273}\) There was however some evidence of political discourse. In 2002 the City of Gorazde (Federation) maintained a webpage that had a forum in which Serb and Bosniak residents discussed political issues. Though some insults were used, the discussions were generally positive and possibly served as a “testing ground” for real life dialogue.\(^{274}\) The anonymity of the chatroom allows for this discourse in a safe environment.

As discussed, introducing the Internet in a transition state is not a clean and easy process. It is, however, a solid stepping stone to greater access and usability. The early stages saw a one-sided net with the interpersonal discourse and dialogue needed to make the ICT more than just another source for the same filtered information. There were however points to consider as hopeful. The international community establishing contact features, unrestricted access to foreign

\(^{271}\) Trucilo, “Political Communication,” 61.
\(^{272}\) Topic, “Electronic Media,” 159.
\(^{273}\) Trucilo, “Internet and Political Communication,” 61.
\(^{274}\) Reimann, “Das Internet,” 2.
news services and chat features available to citizens. It was, even if limited, decentralized, contained some aspects focused on the user, and had aspects of Web 2.0 participation.

**Current ICT Proliferation: 2005-Present.**

In the past decade the ICT usage and accessibility has grown throughout the world, this holds true for the former Yugoslavia. The following are a series of charts to analyze ICT penetration in BiH and neighboring states that were once parts of Yugoslavia. I include former members of Yugoslavia as to show how the situation in BiH compares with its neighbors in the region; a comparative approach yields better understanding of the situation at hand. The data is from the International Telecommunications Union in conjunction with the World Bank.

The first chart provides information on households with a personal computer in 2010. The computer being a traditional way to access the Internet and Web 2.0 software. Bosnia-Herzegovina, in relation to other neighboring states, lags behind in the percentage of households with access to a computer in the home. BiH, which had 25% of the population with a home computer, surpasses only Montenegro (2007 data latest available), which became an independent state in 2006. Slovenia and Croatia are full members of the European Union, this it is not surprising that the access to computers is nearly double BiH’s level.  

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275 This is some discrepancy with the data as a 2009 UNDP E-Readiness Assessment report listed 51% of household with a computer at home. I did not include this statistic in the chart as the measurements for other neighboring states was not included.
Aside from having a computer in the home, there is the central question of how many BiH citizens have access to the Internet. A home computer may not be routed to the Web or may lack a wireless converter. There exists an increasing number of ways people can go online; whether it be at work, a library, Internet café, cell phone, and so forth. The following chart lists Internet users per 100 people from 1995 to 2012, when the data was last available. As is indicated in the chart, out the former Yugoslav states, BiH ranks behind only Slovenia (70 per 100 people) in the number of people online. BiH’s total of 65 per 100 is slightly higher than Croatia (63 per 100) and is well past Serbia and Montenegro who are at 57 and 48, respectively. This data tells us that residents of BiH are increasingly active and familiar with using the Internet. Over half the total of Internet users use it on a daily basis.²⁷⁶

Broadband Internet is a faster, more durable form of online connection. It utilizes satellites and fiber-optic cables as opposed to the rudimentary dial-up modem method. This variable is defined as “are the number of broadband Internet subscribers with a digital subscriber line, cable modem, or other high-speed technology.” This type of ‘high speed’ Internet is more conducive to surfing the web. As of 2012 BiH had a total of 11 per 100 people with access to broadband. This was slightly better than Serbia and Montenegro but still well behind the EU states of Croatia and Slovenia. 

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278 Dzihana, “Mapping Digital Media,” 6. The Open Source Foundation indicates different numbers. It finds that broadband subscribers accounted for 80% of Internet users.
Chart 3.3: Fixed Broadband Internet Subscribers (per 100 people): 1995-2012

As noted above, cost can be a detriment to accessing ICT technology. The following chart lists broadband Internet subscriptions as a percentage of monthly GDP as an indicator of affordability for the year 2009. As the chart shows, the affordability of a broadband Internet subscription is in line with Croatia and Serbia and much cheaper than what is available in Slovenia and Montenegro. This bodes favorably, from a standpoint of being on par with neighboring states.
An Internet Server is the software and computer through which a person interacts to connect to the Internet. Secure servers are servers using encryption technology in Internet transactions. According to the Communications Regulatory Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina (CRA) there are 73 ISP companies in the state. The three largest of which, HT Mostar BH Telecom and Telekom Srpske, are partly owned by the government. The data below on from the World Bank indicates that there are 99 secure ISP servers in BiH. Clearly the data from the World Bank indicates more servers that what is listed by the CRA, as such, a discrepancy in the data exists. This can possibly be explained by the nature of ICT technology, individuals can create servers through their own computer systems or through proxies if they have the knowledge. With that said, the number of servers is still low in BiH, beating only Montenegro. Population differences could account for some of the discrepancy in relation to Croatia and Serbia, as this is a total number and not a per capita measurement.

Another increasingly popular method of accessing the Internet is the use of cellular phones. Cell phone usage for Internet access is increasingly common in states that are new to ICT because it operates through the use of satellites and not infrastructure. The cell phone usage per 100 people in BiH is the lowest in the area but, it stands that 89.5 out of 100 people have a cellular phone. Croatia, Slovenia and Montenegro have 113, 110, and 177 cell phones per 100 people respectively—indicating that it is not uncommon for people to have more than one phone or likely multiple per family under one subscription. According to the CRA, there are 3.5 million cellular telephone subscriptions in a country of 3.8 million people; moreover, 70% of the country is covered by 3G/4G mobile Internet access.  

The domain name for BiH websites is “.ba.” A domain tells through what agency a website is administered (for example, .gov is a governmental domain name in the United States). The establishment of domains is another factor in Internet proliferation as it indicates there is growth among people who are going online. The BiH domains are administered by the University Telinformatic Centre. The chart below illustrates that the Internet is steadily growing in BiH, with 2,750 unique Internet domains established in 2013 alone. The largest upswing in domain registration happened after 2005.
Compared to Serbia, the only other neighboring state for which data was available, we see that BiH is well behind in the number of total unique domains up to first months of 2014. However population size could account for the discrepancy as Serbia has nearly double the population as BiH.

As indicated in the chart above, though it is not a leader in ICT among its neighboring states, there is established access to the Internet for residents of BiH. The literature doesn’t indicate a threshold for when computer or Internet proliferation is substantial enough to initiate reform, the numbers indicate its presence is worthy of examination. Nearly 34 per 100 households have a computer, 65 per 100 use the Internet, 89 per 100 own a cell phone, and its cost is relative to states in the area. The question is then, what do people in BiH do when they go online? To analyze this I use Alexa.com’s statistics on the top twenty-five most visited webpages in BiH.
Though there are several sites that provide online analytics, Alexa.com is established in literature of Bosnia and the Internet.\textsuperscript{282} I list the site domain name, a description of the site, the majority education level of users (the largest majority listed), and the access location. I provide this only for sites in which BiH and other surrounding states were the majority users. This was to leave out data that was not overwhelmingly from the Balkans. Alexa lists the data for all users and sites that were globally popular. Analytics for sites such as social media site Facebook would not provide a clear picture of how the site is use in BiH, but would give a general overview for all users. For sites that were popular in Bosnia but majority used in Serbia or Croatia, I include the data as I believe similar people in the region access these sites in a similar way. Below is a list of the top ten sites and a description on what the sites are.

Table 3.1: Popular Websites in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Education level of users</th>
<th>Access Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Facebook.com</td>
<td>Online social networking site</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Google.ba</td>
<td>Search engine as well as other Internet related services</td>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Youtube.com</td>
<td>User driven video sharing website</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Google.com</td>
<td>Search engine as well as other Internet related services</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Pik.ba</td>
<td>Online auction and shopping</td>
<td>No college/Some college</td>
<td>School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Klix.ba</td>
<td>News</td>
<td>No college/Some college</td>
<td>School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Neobux.com</td>
<td>“Paid to click” ad/marketing</td>
<td>No college</td>
<td>School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Avaz.ba</td>
<td>News</td>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>Home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Wikipedia.org</td>
<td>User generated online</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table indicates that the most popular websites are news (including sporting news) as this classification accounts for eleven of the top twenty five websites. News sites have bolded text. Web 2.0 sites (user generated interactive sites) account for nine of the top twenty five. While not “user generated” in themselves, an Open Source Society study finds that many of these news sites include forums and a comment section. I include Google and Yahoo in the Web 2.0 classification because, while they are primarily search engines, they do provide social networking and other interactive features such as email, chat, Yahoo Answers and Google+. I

also include Pik.ba as it is a user-driven market place that would encourage inter-ethnic economic transactions which would, like adding a friend on Facebook, ostensibly initiate contact between two people. I also include Wikipedia in this designation as it is user generated and each page includes a “talk” section where users can discuss the article anonymously. Web 2.0 sites are highlighted in gray.

As social networks cast a wide net and are often global in their scope, I was not able to capture reliable data on who in BiH accesses these sites and where. The news, being local in content, had reliable data. The information from Alexa.com indicates that most visitors to these sites have at least some college experience. They are mixed between accessing at home and through school facilities. This would indicate that those who access the Internet are higher educated and the youth, who access the Internet from schools and universities. The data indicates that people still identify with established ethnic designations. With that said, again, citizens generally see the EU as the future of the state and college educated and urban are more likely to want to mend cleavages. It appears from the Alexa data that college educated and youth are accessing the top 25 websites in the state.

These assumptions are supported by the Open Society Fun which finds that, “Internet activity is still heavily concentrated within younger age groups and the urban population…65% of people in the urban population owned a computer compared to 40% in rural areas.” Youth in Bosnia access the Internet almost daily use the service as their basic source of news and information. Furthermore, 75% of Bosnians between 15-24 use the Internet and of that 80% are students. More than three-quarters of the BiH Internet audience are between 10 and 75 years of age use the Internet every day. With that age range noted, the 15-24 bracket accounts for 93% of

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This point is furthered by Turcilo in a 2010 study that showed The Internet in Bosnia-Herzegovina is still a media of younger, urban elite…mainly situated in cities and with at least high school education.\textsuperscript{286}

Based on this data, it is clear that the use of ICT, especially the Internet is near monopolized by the youth of Bosnia, making this demographic group particularly important for this study. The previous statistics from the UN, and University of Colorado focused primarily on attitudes among ethnic groups and touched briefly on non-ethnic demographics. Based on the knowledge of the age bracket that uses the Internet, it is necessary to revisit some of the questions in the survey with a focus on this group. The following is a selection of questions taken from the 2013 UN report, listing a synopsis of questions asked and the percentage who agreed with the statement. The UN data also shows that college education and urban v. rural are important factors in attitudes, but I find it more beneficial to focus on the youth demographic as the youth can encompass both the educational and geographic criteria.

**Public Opinion Poll Results for Youth (18-30/5)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Percentage (Age 18-30/5)\textsuperscript{287}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? (Percentage for “dissatisfied”)</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who do you hold most accountable for those problems? (Percentage for “government”)</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who do you hold most accountable for those problems? (Percentage for “politicians”)</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much confidence do you have in... ? (percentage for political parties)</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{286} Turcilo, “Will the Internet Set us Free: New Media and Old Politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina” Media, vol 4 no. 8 (2010), 14.
\textsuperscript{287} The data collected is for youth between 18-35, some questions are listed as 18-30. Though not a perfect fit with the 93% frequent Internet users listed above, I believe the age range is not so far off as to miss the weltanschauung of youth in BiH.
The poll results above indicate that the youth hold economic issues and corruption as the most pressing concerns in the state—not antipathy to other ethnic groups. The economic difficulties in BiH have caused high unemployment rates among youth and increase the desire to leave the state altogether in search of a better financial future. The blame for these problems is placed on the government and politicians at all levels, from national to the cantons. The dissatisfaction reveals a disdain for the status quo of inter-ethnic rivalries to amass power. The data indicates the youth see their needs as being ignored by those in office.

**Table 3.2b: Ethnic Identity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Percentage (Age 18-30/5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How proud are you of ...? (percentage for “Proud of ethnicity”).</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How proud are you of ...? (percentage for “Proud being a citizen of BiH”).</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How proud are you of ...? (percentage for “Proud of religion”)</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2b illustrates that youth in BiH are proud of their ethnicity with a clear majority answering in the affirmative. They are also proud of their religion, which in the case of BiH is an important variable in identity; with Croats identifying as Catholic, Bosniaks as Muslims, and
Serbs with the Orthodox faith. At the same time, they are proud to be citizens of BiH, to a lesser degree than their pride in ethnicity and religion but still with a clear majority at almost 75%.

Table 3.2c: Views on Future of the State

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Percentage (Age 18-30/5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To what extent are you willing to take part in the following activities?</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percentage for “voting”)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent are you willing to take part in the following activities?</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percentage for “Would join a citizen’s action group”)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent are you willing to take part in the following activities?</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percentage for “Would take action such as demonstrating”)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent are you willing to take part in the following activities?</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percentage for “join a political party”)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent are you willing to take part in the following activities?</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percentage for “use violence or force if it becomes necessary”)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To what extent are you willing to take part in the following activities?</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Percentage for “leave BiH”)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you believe that further deterioration of the situation in BiH could lead to new violence in BiH?</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeping in mind your ethnic group, would you defend the integrity of BiH?</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(percentage answering “use all peaceful means”)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keeping in mind your ethnic group, would you defend your ethnic/national territory? (percentage answering “use all peaceful means”)</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrespective of what you think is realistic or not, in what kind of a country would you most wish to live in? (percentage for “BiH within its current borders and entities.” This 25% was the highest percentage for 18-35 demographic among all options)</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which of the following countries and organizations should have most influence on the future of BiH? (Percentage answering “EU”)</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In your opinion, what are the three most important priorities of the International Community in BiH? (percentage answering “economic and business development” as the most important priority).</td>
<td>87%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The first four questions listed in Table 3.2c indicate a slim majority of youth are willing to vote in elections and less than a quarter would participate in the political process by other means—though 30% did indicate they are willing to demonstrate. The lack of enthusiasm for
participating in the political process is problematic for youth in BiH who are, according to Table 3.2a, frustrated with the current political climate in the state. Moreover, Table 3.2b shows that youth are proud of their identity. With those principles established, less than 10% indicate they would participate in violence, though a majority fears that further deterioration of the state could lead to a renewal of violence. Considering the frustration at the economic climate and political leadership, the youth do not wish to dissolve the state and have their Entities become independent or join neighboring states. The 25% response for “BiH within its current borders and entities” appears small, but it was the most selected response in the poll. The choice of a separate Bosniak entity received 12% and a separate RS garnered 15%, which was the second highest response in the poll. The responses of “other” and “no answer” each received 12%. No other responses were above 7%. Therefore, of those responding, the consensus is that dissolving the state is not sought after by youth in BiH. The youth indicate the European Union should have the most influence over the future of the state, and that influence should be based upon economic development. Based on the three charts of NDI data, youth are proud of their ethnicity (and with that the variable of faith), yet they are not hyper-nationalistic in that they want to break the state up or place blame for their problems on the ‘other.’ They are frustrated by the current consociational government and political cultural and have little faith in the political elites’ ability to solve the problems of the state. They want economic reform and they want it to involve the European Union. They are willing to vote and at a lesser level join civil society institutions, and demonstrate to voice their concerns.

This is a demographic that has few memories of the war and thus do not directly carry the scars of the conflict. The fact that their stated main focus is the economy and not inter-ethnic fears possibly indicates that the youth of BiH are willing to mend ethnic fissures, indeed the
literature indicates they have a greater preference for inter-ethnic friendships.\textsuperscript{288} As stated earlier in the chapter, those who have access to the Internet tend to be higher educated and urban. Education and urban living were shown to be positively correlated with pluralism and inter-ethnic friendship. The youth dominate Internet usage, and Internet users are more likely to be urban and higher educated, therefore, it is likely that the youth activity online is encompasses inter-ethnic cooperation to lobby for reform.

The next section explores the usages of ICT to mend cleavages and initiate activism on governmental reform. It reviews the institutions discussed earlier in this chapter but the time period is from 2005 to present. The goal is to discover if the literature points to ICT usage to solve problems in the state.

**Education: 2005 to Present**

As previously discussed, education in Bosnia is often fragmented along ethnic lines, whether through outright segregation or methods such as text book selection. A fractured education system likely leads to a continuation or prejudice and mistrust as students do not have the contact to build positive relationships. With that said, the scholarship indicates the Internet is being used in Bosnia as a tool to overcome these hurdles.

The implementation of ICT and social networking is already used in Bosnia in legal training and to a degree in further education in the medical fields, but also in general education as well; most notable of which are integrated computer sciences courses online.\textsuperscript{289} The use of interactive (Web 2.0) tools and social media sites changes the way students communicate within and outside of school, “these applications are emerging with educational potential thanks to unique opportunities of Web 2.0 for improvement of teaching tools in practice, collaboration,

\textsuperscript{288} O’Loughlin, “Inter-Ethnic Friendships.”20.

communication, individual expression, and literacy.\(^{290}\) The Internet in Bosnia is most used by the younger generation, between 15-24 years of age. Moreover, 84% of students and pupils have used Internet at least once. It is used “mostly for communication (25%) and for educational purposes (24%), slightly less for entertainment purposes (21%), it was shown that 93% of student respondents have a Facebook account, and 66% of them visit Social networks, Wiki and live chat forums were the most popular.”\(^{291}\)

Bosnia’s eight public universities have initiated an effort to utilize social media sites, specifically Facebook, in their curriculum. This is a fruitful step as nearly 93% of those in school have an account with the site. The use of information technology in forming curriculum allows. This allows students to communicate with individuals they may have little contact with if schools are segregated. Moreover, it has allow students to “changing the way they communicate within and outside of school.”\(^{292}\)

Another approach toward pluralism in the classroom is the use of ICT resources by teaching staff. Educators may be limited to the instructional resources on hand—as noted, these resources may carry a bias not conducive to multi-ethnic perspectives. In a research study on the use of ICT in Bosnian classrooms it was found that teachers trained in ICT were more likely to incorporate their findings in classroom material, “When knowledge, attitudes, and hours of Internet use increased, the level of ICT usage for learning and teaching purposes increased as well.”\(^{293}\) The increased training of teachers allows more opportunities for inter-ethnic understanding and exchange of ideas and knowledge.


\(^{292}\) Almir, “Implications of Web 2.0,” 3.

Another example of ICT use in education is through the libraries of the country. In 2010 the library in the Federation town of Zavidovići initiated a series of ICT related education programs for high school students. The young people were commuters who were spending up to four hours a week waiting on the bus. The library “created a multimedia center with modern Information and Communication Technology (ICT) to encourage them to come into the library.”\textsuperscript{294} The ICT center, named the Youth Corner, attracted over 190 youth a week. At the library they learned computer, Internet, and media skills as well as using social media websites such as Facebook and YouTube. The library also offered courses in English, digital photography, journalism, and audio and video production. The youth made videos and photographs of their town and posted them to social media sites, which attracted several thousand views including many of the diaspora community who were from the area.\textsuperscript{295}

The organization Knowledge Without Boundaries (EIFL) does extensive work with libraries to promote education in developing and transitioning countries “to contribute to sustainable economic and social development.”\textsuperscript{296} EIFL seeks to bridge the digital divide by training librarians to use ICT resources and making software, hardware, and digital reference material available.\textsuperscript{297} Library patrons in BiH through EIFL programs gained access to scholarly journals, art, music, and other information that would not be available with resources at hand, in this way libraries can bridge the gap left by schools that are ethnocentric in attendance or via

\textsuperscript{295} Knowledge without Boundaries, “Youth Corner and Media,” 5.
\textsuperscript{297} Knowledge without Boundaries “EIFL-FOSS Looks Back at Four Years of Achievement.” Accessed February of 2014. Available at (http://www.eifl.net/news/eifl-foss-looks-back-four-years-achievements).
curriculum. There are 85 libraries in BiH that are part of the EIFL consortium; these include university libraries, local public libraries, archives, and NGO libraries.298

Education reform is a crucial element to the future democratization in the state as those educated in a pluralistic society are less likely to hold prejudicial ideals. ICT use in the classroom and through public services is a hopeful sign, but it likely has too small of an impact at this time to initiate much measurable change.

Civil Society: 2005 to Present

As noted above, NGOs are the most “dominant component” of civil society in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Though many have offices around the country, utilizing information technology would allow for a broader reach to the public. The chart below lists twelve active domestic NGOs in the state. The chart lists the name and focus of the NGO followed by an assessment of their Internet footprint. The goal is to see if the NGOs are actively engaging Bosnians online and if there are opportunities for Web 2.0 cross-communication or discourse that would indicate potential according to the Reimann ICT conflict resolution chart.

The table below provides names of NGOs and a brief description of their focus. Included is whether the organization has a working website and what written languages used. As language is a controversial subject in BiH, I list only the script; Latin based as used by the Croat and Bosniak community and Cyrillic by the Serbian community. If neither the domestic language is present, but the site is in English, I list English in the column. The news variable indicates whether the site has up to date information on what the organization is doing. Contact is whether the website provides an easy to find email contact. Web 2.0 indicates if the site has a forum or message board for users. The last three indicators, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, are popular

social media, user generated Web 2.0 websites. I included a check mark if the site links directly to their account on these sites.

Table 3.2: NGOs Operating in BiH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of NGO</th>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Script</th>
<th>News</th>
<th>Contact</th>
<th>Web 2.0</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
<th>YouTube</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Civic Initiatives</td>
<td>Democracy and Civil Society</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Cyrillic/Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Free Access to</td>
<td>Freedom of information</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information</td>
<td>Inter-ethnic cooperation</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Forum Bosnia</td>
<td>Inter-ethnic cooperation</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Plan Institute</td>
<td>Media research/Education</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Napredak Croat Cultural Society</td>
<td>Promote Croatian Cultural traditions</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open Society Fund</td>
<td>Democracy/Civil Society</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research and Documentation Centre Sarajevo</td>
<td>Genocide/War Crimes Investigation</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency International BiH</td>
<td>Anti-corruption</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Network of BiH</td>
<td>Cooperation between Youth Organizations in BiH</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community boost_r</td>
<td>Promote technology for civil participation and transparency</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin/Cyrillic</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Organization Websites. Listed in Index.

As the chart indicates, nearly all have news and contact information, but only three had any interactive, Web 2.0 capabilities. The lack of interactivity and discourse means that Bosnians are less able to communicate with the NGOs operating in their state. There is not a digital exchange. It also means that they may be less likely to engage and work with them as their presence is not ‘on the digital radar’ for young Bosnians who use the Internet and indicate they would join, at a 21% rate, a civil action group. NGOs need to do a better job of making their organizations visible and interactive online. The following is a review of the online activity of
the two groups who include Web 2.0 capabilities on their websites: Centre for Civic Initiatives
(CCI), and Community boost_r.

The CCI is a local, non-governmental, non-profit organization that works in both entities of BiH. Its missions is to “promote active citizen participation in the democratic process and to
strengthen the capacities of organizations and citizens to solve community problems in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.” Its long term goals include strengthening the NGO sector, increasing
transparency in government, and increasing citizen participation in the democratic process. The
CCI has a long list of accomplishments, including changed the Federation Constitution to allow
direct voting for municipal mayors, improved governmental transparency in 47 municipalities,
implementing elections of school principals in Tuzla and Kalesija, an the adoption of the Law on
Professional Rehabilitation and Employment of Disabled.

The online presence of CCI is very extensive. The organization maintains a Facebook
page with over 5,000 followers and it is updated several times a week. Their YouTube account
contains several hundred videos however they have very few subscribers and videos rarely reach
more than 200 views. Their e-newsletter is published on their website every three months. Alexa
does not provide much data on their website as its global rank is too low; however it does show
that popular Bosnian websites (such as blogger.ba and klix.ba) link to them extensively. CCI
used ICT extensively in the run up to the October 2010 election, which was described as “the
first elections where civic organizations have played a significant role in terms of the turnout.”
CCI developed a website (www.cistparlament.com) that provided information such as voting

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history, salary, number of legislative proposals, for all parliamentarians up for election. \(^{303}\)

Recent activism CCI undertook involving ICT include the creation of a website in 2013 to monitor “state and entity-level governments and parliaments and cantonal assemblies” as well as “launched a new Internet-based television station highlighting civil society initiatives.”\(^{304}\)

Community boost\_r is an organization that began in 2012 as an online hub for those interested in the connections between technology and reform in government, their website states their focus is to “inspire, enable and promote tech for civil participation in transparency and accountability initiatives in the Western Balkans.”\(^{305}\) The website indicates the organization has received funding from large charitable organizations such as the Charles Stewart Mott Foundation and the National Endowment for Democracy. Their website includes news, videos, graphs and interactive features relating to technology in the political sphere—particularly in relation to oversight. They also maintain online resources such as downloadable software so citizens can create their own technology-centric projects. The site also includes a discussion forum where users can exchange ideas and interact with others. The organization runs an online “challenge” where users from BiH, Serbia, and Kosovo submit ideas of innovations and creative uses of technology. These are vote on and winners get their project funded. \(^{306}\)

Community boost\_r started a program called “Responsible Neighborhoods and Police Forces” in which they set up a series of Facebook groups where each city’s police force would have a designated page. Using this, citizens could interact directly with the police and show evidence of everything from illegal parking to bribery and corruption cases. This worked to

\(^{303}\) Ibid.


instill accountability with the police force and to build a positive public connection and importantly trust with them. They also developed a cell phone app that allows users to photograph instances of trash and pollution and submit it to local officials in charge of community cleanup. Finally, the group developed an Android phone app and a Facebook group of a “virtual parliament” which allowed users to learn about the legislative and legal processes of the country as well as contact directly their elected representatives. This is a direct use of ICT to link constituents to their government as users have two-way communication with MPs and government agencies.307

The two examples listed show considerable effort from civil society to link citizens to their government. Other organizations find that civil society is not yet matured enough to make large inroads into consolidating democracy. Freedom House notes that “Civil society organizations in BiH have acquired neither the social status nor the financial self-sufficiency to play a major role in public life.” 308 The majority of funding comes from international sources and groups with foreign money are regarded as “colonized by international actor.”309 Moreover, some civil society organizations fully align themselves with political parties thus undermining their credibility to be outside the scope of government and acting on good faith. Political leaders do not often consult NGOs when making policy decisions.310

309 Sejfija, “From Civil Sector to Civil Society,” 135.
310 FreedomHouse “Nations in Transit.”.
Intergovernmental Organizations: 2005 to Present

Similar to NGOs, there are a healthy number of intergovernmental organizations (IGO) operating in BiH.\textsuperscript{311} As discussed in the previous chapter, these organizations, made up delegates from sovereign states, operate with the stated goal of transitioning BiH to a stable, consolidated state. Several IGOs are perhaps more important to the future of BiH than NGOs as they have direct influence over political matters per specifications of the Dayton Peace Accords. Below is a chart of 15 IGOs with a presence in BiH. The chart gives an introduction to their presence online. Citizen contact with IGOs is desirable as their decision have a direct impact on the lives of average citizens—those living in Bosnia do not have a choice of voluntary association with them as they would in civil society.

Table 3.3: List of IGOs Operating in BiH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of IGO</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Script</th>
<th>News</th>
<th>Contact</th>
<th>Web 2.0</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
<th>YouTube</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Delegation Special Representative to BiH (EUSR)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO (Sarajevo Office)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin/Cyrillic</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE in BiH</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin/Cyrillic</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin/Cyrillic</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Telecommunication Union</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP in Bosnia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin/Cyrillic</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF Bosnia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Intellectual Property Organization</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Health Organization in Bosnia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Organization Websites. Listed in Index.


\textsuperscript{312} News is on the official delegation website, not the EUSR, but it the link is provided.

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The intergovernmental organizations had numerous features related to ICT interaction. All but four had a Facebook page, nine had a Twitter account, and eight maintain a YouTube channel. This at first seems surprising as IGOs work through proper and established diplomatic channels when interacting with other states; however, as these are organizations with a global reach and prominence, it would be in their best interest to be noticeable. The largest barrier is the language divide as seven sites were not available in a native language. The following is a brief review of ICT activity involving two of the most prominent IGOs operating in BiH: the OHR and the OSCE.

The Office of the High Representative exists to ensure the spirit and letter of the Dayton Peace Accords and Bosnian Constitution are followed without the threat of extremism. As such, ICT utilization does not operate in the same way as previous examples. The OHR does maintain a website but other than a contact email there were no other tools, interactive or otherwise, for the OHR to inform the public on what they are doing. A larger web presence would likely be in the best interest of the OHR as 34% of those between 18-30 years of age believe the Office has the most influence on the future of the country.313

Even though the virtual footprint is small, the actions of the OHR were likely a key element in why ICT can flourish in the state. In 2001 the OHR established the Freedom of Access to Information act for both entities, and therefore the entirety of the country. Bailard asserts that because of this law, “there are no formal restrictions of content or use of ICT at the government level.”314 This is supported by the US Department of State, which finds “[t]here were no government restrictions on access to the Internet or reports that the government

313 UNRCO, “Public Opinion,” 55.
314 Bailard, “The Internet’s Influence on Democratic Satisfaction,” 97.
monitored e-mail or Internet chat rooms.” Brownlee’s theory asserts that those in charge of a state will work within the system to achieve the ends they want. This should be coupled the Diffusion of Innovations theory that states a society will implement technology in a way that fulfills their needs. As the Office of the High Representative had particular control over this matter, and the ends for the OHR is a pluralistic Bosnia-Herzegovina, the type of ICT implemented in the state to fulfill this need was without restrictions, firewalls, or government monitoring.

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina “is one of the main promoters of civil society building. It works to support the education reform process and to promote and protect the human rights of all citizens of BiH.”

Another part of the OSCE’s stated mission is to assist states in security measures. In Bosnia, this entails investigations of hate speech and threats. On the monitoring of hate speech, if someone is threatened a legal case can be opened just like in a traditional crime but they do not advocate extra laws, instead they rely on moderators and administrators to maintain a civil setting on their forums. The OSCE helped steer online hate speech policy so as to fall in line with laws that oversee conventional media and still ensure “Internet governance in BiH remains aligned with European standards, permitting unrestricted access and freedom of expression.” This includes education on the usefulness of self-moderation by administrators of chat rooms and forums rather than implementing new government regulations.

315 US Department of State. “Bosnia and Herzegovina Executive Summary.”
316 The 2001 Act does stipulate exemptions for defense, security, public safety, crime and prevention of crime.
In November of 2013 the OSCE developed an user generated website to collect and track data on hate crimes. This is proposed as a positive step to end random, ethnic based violence as “the interactive map of community conflict and cohesion aims to foster dialogue among local authorities, civil society, and the judiciary in actively reducing the number of bias-motivated incidents.” On civil society, the OSCE has work closely with the ITU to promote social media and other ICT components to increase media freedom and freedom of assembly. A proposal implemented involved the training of journalist to utilize web-based applications, such as mapping tools and info-graphics.

**Diaspora Community: 2005 to Present**

The experience of the migrant and refugee Bosniak community in the decade after the war was described as a “digital diaspora” because of the utilization of the Internet to connect with other diaspora communities and their home country. The diaspora community showed evidence of interacting with the government and people for reform. This section provides a review of this community’s actions after 2005, with a focus on the world of two of the most prominent diaspora organizations: the BiH World Diaspora Association and the Congress of North American Bosniaks.

Scholars point out that Bosnians living in other countries have transitioned from a “victim” identity, based largely on experiences from the civil war and refugee status, to a new identity that is economic in nature. They no longer fear persecution if they were to return, however the economic situation in BiH is poor and many stay abroad to enjoy the work and trade

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Accessed March 2014. The OSCE does advocate government online sophistication be increased for counter-terrorism measures and fighting crime.


Among the diaspora community there exists still a feeling of pride in BiH as their home. Facebook groups establish this connection with the home country in forums on everything from Bosnian pride to recipes to remembering the war. Young Bosniaks in Germany use diaspora forums to discuss a wide range of broader political topics including inter-ethnic marriage and integration into German society. Similarly, the International Association of Students in Economic and Commercial Sciences (AIESEC), an organization that provides leadership training to students, maintains a Bosnian branch that connects diaspora students with those in country. The user generated social media website Reddit.com (64th most popular website in the world according to Alexa.com) maintains a page on Bosnia Herzegovina. The Reddit page, /r/bih, was started in November of 2010 and contains posts and discussion on political topics, inter-ethnic relationships, and sports among other topics. The users are approximately 60% BiH residents, 30% diaspora, and the rest from neighboring countries.

Though the national dialogue continues, the focus for many organized groups, however, is “trans-local” in nature in that lobbying efforts and fundraising is geared toward villages and municipalities from which immigrants came. Many diaspora website emerged that specifically address the issues these smaller communities face, and these websites have a global reach, such

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as the organization Klub Brčko in Melbourne that is focused on events in the Brčko District. Bosnians from a particular region living in Germany or Australia collectively raise money for scholarships, public works efforts, money for ill relatives and in the case of Srebrenica and Prijedor, “have campaigned for the recognition of genocide and the right to memorialize the sufferings in their native towns.” The finances sent to family and friends back home are substantial, they provide for 13–20% of Bosnia’s national GDP, this is “six times more than the amount of foreign direct investment and three times the amount of official development aid” that Bosnia received in 2012. The diaspora efforts continue to resonate with the wider political decisions of the state, Halilovich affirms “they act as lobbying and pressure groups, taking the issues of war crimes, and return to and rebuilding of their ‘former’ hometowns, into the public domain both in Austria and Bosnia. Increasingly, many of these activities take place in cyber space, connecting different individuals, groups and places into a borderless digital diaspora.”

The largest diaspora organization is the BiH World Diaspora Association (SSD BiH). Started in 1999 from a diaspora network in Birmingham, UK, the SSD BIH acts as an organizing umbrella organization for global groups. It was through the SSD BIH that the First BiH World Diaspora Congress was organized in May of 2002. The SSD BiH encourages organizations to implement their own visions and goals for the future of BiH and their respective communities. The SSD BiH particularly “stresses the importance of education as the best possible investment for the political, economic, cultural and scientific development of a democratic and prosperous

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329 Halilovich, “Trans-Local Communities,” 172.
BiH, as well as an open and free civil society.” It is involved in lobbying the government of BiH for political reforms, including liberalization of visas, voting rights for diaspora citizens, election reform, subsidizing teachers, purchasing of textbooks, and constitutional change to greater emphasis youth, economics and “European standards.”

The Congress of North American Bosniaks (CNAB) maintain the domain name Bosniak.org and a web magazine on Bosniak.net. CNAB is a “National Umbrella Organization, representing at least 350,000 Americans and Canadians of Bosniaks descent and origin. Its membership is comprised of fraternal, educational, veteran, religious, cultural, social, business, political organizations and individual members.” The organization’s website and newsletter contain news of domestic politics in BiH and SNAB states it is “a strong voice in support of the democratic process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and provided material and moral support for democratic initiatives.” With that noted, it appears that the main focus of the organization is the fostering of the diaspora community in the United States and Canada. It’s focus is educational and culture efforts for Bosniaks to learn about cultural heritage. Of main concern for the groups is remembrance and recognition of war crimes, including the Srebrenica Massacre. The initiatives section of the group’s website is focused on “activism alerts” for groups that deny or downplay war crimes, it links to a blog (http://srebrenica-genocide.blogspot.com) that raises awareness of the 1995 killings. The accomplishment section contains news stories giving praise to US and Canada government s and institutions that formally recognize the genocide.

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334 World Diaspora Association of BiH, “About Us.”
336 Congress of North American Bosniaks, “About CNAB.”
The diaspora has two ICT prongs it uses to form discourse with those in the home country. First are the user-driven network of social media websites such as Facebook, Reddit, blogs, forums and message boards where issues and ideas are discussed. The second are the institutions such as SSD Bih and CNAB who use the Internet as a way to communicate online their activities off-line. Though both maintain Facebook and Twitter accounts, their main focus is information dissemination. Diaspora communities are by their very nature out of state and thus unable to participate in domestic politics the same way someone in the country can, they diaspora community of Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the least those of the Bosniak ethnic group, have a rare opportunity. They are economically important to the state and ICT allows them to communicate in real time with citizens and political institutions back home. They can discuss democratic principles and ideas with citizens not accustomed to such norms and lobby the state for reform.

**Government and Politics: 2005 to Present**

Using Bieber’s list of nationalistic political parties, below is an examination of their online footprint. The goal is to see if the parties at the national level have embraced ICT and incorporated Web 2.0 in their communication with the public. I included only social media websites that were linked directly on the party pages as it was an indication that it was the official site and not one made by a follower or detractor.

**Table 3.4: National Party Websites in BiH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Nationalism</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Script</th>
<th>News</th>
<th>Contact</th>
<th>Web 2.0</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
<th>Youtube</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SRS</td>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>X³³⁸</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDS</td>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Cyrillic ✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNSD</td>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Cyrillic/ Latin ✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>Serb</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Cyrillic X³³⁹</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³³⁸ The SRS Party in Serbia (.rs domain) has a website with Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, and message board features. However there was no indication it was also the main party website for the sister party in BiH.
³³⁹ News was mostly from July 2013, nothing up to date. Email was a Hotmail account, not a party email address.
<p>| | | | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HSP</td>
<td>Croat</td>
<td>Extreme</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDZ</td>
<td>Croat</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HSS-NHI</td>
<td>Croat</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>Nationalist</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBiH</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Bosniak</td>
<td>Non-Nationalist</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Party Websites. Listed in Index.

The above shows that only three of the political parties lack a Web 2.0 presence, it should be noted, however that the Croat HSS-HNI party includes only a forum on their site. Of particular interest here is the language barrier. Only one, the Serb SNSD (highlighted in grey), provides both Latin and Cyrillic script for users. While the websites incorporate social media, the language barrier keeps those who do not know the other language from interacting with the party on their official site. This is not in-line with the principles of the ICT conflict resolution chart because the participatory exchange of ideas is much harder to initiate if there is a language barrier.

This is perhaps not surprising, as Turcilo finds, “Political parties and candidates still consider the Internet as a “place for a better promotion”, rather than an additional communication tool. Their on-line discourse is based on a paradigm of web 1.0, which means that they prefer web sites in which they control the information flow, and that they are not ready to open more, letting voices of citizens to be heard in their on-line presentation.” In the 2010 elections more than 48 political parties and fifteen independent candidates ran for 8,000 open positions in either state, entity and/or cantonal parliaments. Of the 3 Million Euros total that were spent, only 5% of that went towards Internet based advertisement. Of the 48 political parties, 31 had website but nine of the 31 had not been updated in the months before the election. The

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340 Turcilo, Will the Internet Set Us Free? New Media and Old Politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina” Media, vol 4 no. 8 (2010), 16.
majority of the content was informational in nature with almost no cross-communication with constituents.\textsuperscript{341}

The bureaucracy is the government institutions that implement policy that have a direct impact on the daily lives of citizens. The online presence of government institutions allows for citizens to communicate with them on questions and concerns they may have. The following is a list of fifteen Federation of BiH ministry websites to assess their availability on the Internet.\textsuperscript{342}

**Table 3.5: Government Ministry Websites in the Federation of BiH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FBiH Government Ministries</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Script</th>
<th>News</th>
<th>Contact</th>
<th>Web 2.0</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
<th>Youtube</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Water-Management and Forestry Ministry</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and Sports Ministry</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displaced Persons and Refugees Ministry</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Ministry</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism Ministry</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance Ministry</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Ministry</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior Ministry</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues of Veterans and Disabled Veterans Ministry</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin/ Cyrillic</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice Ministry</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin/ Cyrillic</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor and Social Policy</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Ministry</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communication Ministry</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Development, Entrepreneurship, and Crafts</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin/ Cyrillic</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Planning Ministry</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Latin/ Cyrillic</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry Websites. Listed in Index.

\textsuperscript{341} Turcilo, “New Media and Old Politics,” 17-19.

\textsuperscript{342} I did not include ministry sites from the RS as they often utilize a “rs.org” domain name instead of the .ba domain. This is too similar to Serbia. Moreover, as they are in Cyrillic script, I was not confident these sites were for the RS or Serbia proper.
Of these fifteen sites four are offered in both Latin and Cyrillic script. This perhaps understandable as the majority of the Federation use the Latin script. Only three have any aspects of Web 2.0, the Sports Ministry being the only site with an official linked Facebook page. From this example, the listed ministries in the Federation lack the aspects of Web 2.0 to connect with citizens. The following chart is an assessment of ten bureaucratic agencies operating in the entirety of the state.

**Table 3.6: Bureaucratic Agency Websites in BiH**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Script</th>
<th>News</th>
<th>Contact</th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
<th>Youtube</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National University and Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>Latin/ Cyrillic</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Aviation Directorate of BiH</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>Latin/ Cyrillic</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service Agency of BiH</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>Latin/ Cyrillic</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directorate for European Integration of Council of Ministers of BiH</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>Latin/ Cyrillic</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Commission of BiH</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>Latin/ Cyrillic</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Investment Promotion Agency of BiH</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>Latin/ Cyrillic</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statistical Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>Latin/ Cyrillic</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulatory Agency for Communications</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>Latin/ Cyrillic</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Action Center (BHMAC)</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>Latin/ Cyrillic</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>✔</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bureaucratic Agency Websites, Listed in Index.

The bureaucratic agencies bode much better than the FBiH ministries. All but the National University and Library were available in both Latin and Cyrillic. Interestingly, some national historical institutions are divided on language; for instance the assorted branches of the Bosnian national archives are divided on .ba or rs.org depending on what Entity they are located. The bureaucratic agencies did a better job of cross-communication with residents as the majority had linked social network accounts and four had Web 2.0 capabilities (polls) on their main page.
This is a positive note for e-government in BiH as national institutions are accessible to all citizens at least in language and ability to contact.

The European Union (EU) defines eGovernment as “using the tools and systems made possible by Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) to provide better public services to citizens and business.” The use of websites and online forms for bureaucratic institutions allows citizens to engage with their government more easily than visiting a brick-and-mortar branch of the facility. Studies show that the level of eGovernment in BiH is steadily increasing with a majority (87%) of BIH municipalities has fully networked PCs with applications on a central server. There is however mixed results. Collaboration between and among agencies is not the norm and there is no central coordinating body to work between municipalities. Furthermore, while forms can be downloaded and submitted, staff are often slow to respond to email queries related to the processing of documents. To reach full potential, “BiH state institution should realize that e-Government is not just implementation of IT projects; it is part of the overall public administration reform.”

The central question of this thesis is to investigate whether ICT is being used to mend ethnic cleavages. One way to investigate mending of cleavages is the desire to make inter-ethnic friendships; another is what vision citizens have for the future of the country (for example dissolving the state or joining the European Union). As ethnic identity is enshrined in the Constitution and championed by the political party structure, ethnic identity and inter-ethnic relations carry, by their very nature, a political component. As the data shows the youth in BiH

make up the overwhelming majority of Internet users. Their main concerns are jobs and the overall economic future of the state, this is understandable as youth aged 18-30 have a 70% unemployment rate. While they are proud of their ethnic and religious heritage, they want BiH remain a sovereign state within its current borders. They are likely, especially in urban centers, to desire inter-ethnic friendships, as one teen in Mostar stated "I believe that a difference between Bosnjak and Croatian teenagers does not exist. Basically, we are all the same, only after the war there are some 'constructed' differences."

From this demographic 67% believe the EU should have the most influence on the future of BiH and 49.9% say they are willing to leave BiH altogether. For the problems of the country, they blame the government and politicians. As established in Chapter 2, the political parties are prone to use ethnic nationalism as a banner for winning elections. Therefore, a connection can be made to state that the at least some online activity in Bosnia, as it comes primarily from the youth, will be centered less on exacerbating cleavages and more on pushing for accountability and reform especially as an ends to increase favorability with the European Union. The pervious sections of this chapter certainly touched on political activity of different societal pillars. This final section continues this by examining cases of online activity for political reform in the past 10 years to investigate whether interactions on the Internet transferred to the off-line world. Social media is of particular interest as, depending on the site, allows users to create profiles, add friends, and maintain contact. Scholarship finds that social media websites increase the potential for positive face-to-face interactions especially for those who are of “the

349 UNRCO, Public Opinion, 19. This is the same percentage willing to vote.
generation born after 1980 grew up with access to computers and the Internet and is therefore inherently technology savvy.”

There exist studies that find both the affirmative and negative; however a 2013 study on social capital and pro-social behavior in Bosnia did find a correlation that finds “offline bridging social capital can benefit from online interactions.” This positive transfer from online to offline actions can “that transcend ethnic boundaries raising awareness about volunteering, and promoting the development of civil society associations with cross-cutting membership.” Of course the nature of the online activity and the site used is important. On sites that provide total anonymity it is much less likely to yield fruitful results.

One of the popular social media websites is Blogger.ba which monthly publishes 19,000 different posts. Posts are tagged into ten categories including news, technology, and politics. Within the political topics is a category called United Bosnia and Herzegovina which users discuss current events and activism. Also discussed are broader issues about the future of Bosnia and the events of the 1992-1995 war. The message boards “do not carry nationalistic insults or extreme language.”

The most prominent social media website at this time is Facebook.com as it is the number one site in Bosnia and the number two site globally. In terms of activism, in 2011 over 43,000 people joined a group supporting Ejup Ganic, a member of the BiH presidency arrested in London and the request of Serbia. Similar groups for support of arrested former General Jovan

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Divjak garnered over 10,000 supporters. Similarly, media organizations have linked the February 2014 protest to Facebook and Twitter, and that these protests are centered around unemployment and corruption. This low-risk activism of “liking” a Facebook page does not mean that reform is imminent or that people will take to the streets. In February of 2011 the Bosnian Labor Party, inspired by protests in neighboring Croatia, developed a Facebook page to organize a protest against the government. Over 25,000 people joined the Facebook group and the page had over 8,000 comments (ranging from support to disagreement with the planned protest). When the day of the protest came no one showed up. The Labor Party tried two more times to initiate the protests but it yielded the same results. This illustrates that while online activity is regarded as a “powerful tool of communication in mobilizing protests and demonstrations that can lead to social change” it does not necessarily indicate offline results are certain.

Social movements to promote minority and women’s rights have also used the Internet as an organizing tool. In 2008 the organization DOSTA! (Romani word meaning “enough”), an NGO focused on Romani human rights, mobilized protests largely through social media networks in response to attacks on Romani teenagers in Sarajevo. The DOSTA! website includes videos, forums, newsletters and contact information for the group. In 2010 several Bosnian NGOs partnered with Amnesty International for the 16 Days of Activism Against Gender Violence campaign. The NGOs partnered in this program “produced six local digital

358 Barakovic, “Facebook Revolutions,” 196.
359 Dzihana, “Mapping Digital Media,”
stories dealing with the experience of female convicts.”\textsuperscript{361} A digital format was preferred over conventional forms of activism as it was more cost effective and allowed a wider audience to be reached.

Digital memorials for the war remembering violence in Sarajevo and Srebrenica are evident on social media, especially blogs and image sharing sites such as Flickr. Users create artwork at the site or take a photograph of the memorial and upload it to social media. From there, other users can participate with the understanding of the vent through comments. James finds the existence of these digital memorials “extends opportunities to participate in the discussion and ‘share’ (repeat, rewrite, reinterpret, represent) experience within and beyond users’ personal networks.”\textsuperscript{362} The exchange however is not always centered on reconciliation. James notes that some comments are constructive and desire cooperation to understand and accept the past; while others provide counter interpretations and believe the different ethnic groups will remain divided.\textsuperscript{363}

The issue of the citizenship identification number (JMBG) controversy, known as Babylution, introduced in chapter I warrants further discussion as it dealt directly with ethnic citizenship, access to basic rights, and access to the wider European Union. As noted in the previous chapters, both the Babylution protests and visa reform are two points on which there is broad inter-ethnic agreement and, as one scholar noted, “it represent for some the largest and most significant example of social mobilisation in Bosnian post-war history.”\textsuperscript{364} The central issue around the babylution protest arose when a debate occurred whether the a regional “entity”

\textsuperscript{361} Dzihana, “Mapping Digital Media,”

\textsuperscript{362} James, Deborah, “Social Networking Sarajevo Roses: Digital Representations of Postconflict Civil Life in (the Former) Yugoslavia,” Journal of Communication Vol 63 No 5 (2013),

\textsuperscript{363} James, “Social Networking Sarajevo,”

label should be added in the 13-digit BiH national ID number. This debate, which divided the consociational parliament, caused the ID system to lapse and newborns were without ID and thus without citizenship. This limited accessibility to medical centers, especially those in neighboring states that had better facilities for certain medical conditions. As a result, at least one young girl died because she was denied treatment due to lack of identification. At the time, the RS passed an ordinance allowing its newborn citizens to gain entity citizenship. The Federation leadership complained that this RS identification system was extra constitutional—according to the constitution, is a federal matter—not something relegated to the entities.

Thousands of people took to the streets to protest the inability of the federal government to rectify the situation. The protestors were mostly urban and young—members of youth associations and NGO activists—gathered in front of the parliament to protest. These protests were organized using social media. The protests had broad support over BiH, 95 percent in the Federation and a lower, but still notable, 77 percent in the RS. Protestors made it clear that this was intended to be a pan-ethnic protest with the main point of contention the political elite who were, in their eyes, “maintaining political deadlocks under the pretext of endangered ethno-national interests.”

With that noted, however, there was some political blowback. Croat and especially Serb politicians blamed the protest on Bosniak nationalists and wrote it off as ethnic posturing. Moreover, though the protest gained large national support both in attendance and on social media, they were largely relegated to the Federation (Croat and Bosniaks) with few in the RS (Serb) joining. Maksimovic describes the situation as thus, “The feeling of solidarity - mostly expressed through social media remained latent in the Serb-dominated RS, whose equally

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dissatisfied citizens failed to raise their voice against political ills.\textsuperscript{367} The JMBG empowered citizens to mobilize and express dissatisfaction at the government for using ethnic political banners to promote their cause while regular citizens were left disadvantaged. The protests, though benefiting from cross-cleavage support, did not result in a change to laws nor did it start protests in both Entities. As a show of support on the Internet for desiring ‘good government’ over standard fractured politics it was a victory, but it fell short of gaining off line ‘boots on the ground’ action.

\textsuperscript{367} Armakolas, “Babylution,” 10-11.
Chapter IV: Implications of ICT in BiH: Revolution, Slacktivism, or Something in Between?

In this thesis the central examination is of ethnic divisions and the use of information technology to either mend or further divide the future of the Balkan state. The issue at hand is if cleavages have control over their political and economic futures. Uncertainty of the future, coupled with memories of bullets and bombs, fuel inter-ethnic stress. The desires espoused by citizens help to elucidate what the future may hold. Below is a table of the hypotheses with the findings from the research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Expected</th>
<th>Findings</th>
<th>Implications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Citizens will utilize ICT to interact with members beyond their ethnic community.</td>
<td>The exchange will be inclusive, with inter-ethnic discussions.</td>
<td>Evidence indicates ICT activity did include inter-ethnic discourse.</td>
<td>ICT creates familiarity with other ethnic groups beyond the users’ own community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The interaction will be positive and ICT users will mend cleavages and promote civil society.</td>
<td>The exchange will build upon mending cleavages, reconciliation, and cooperation for shared goals for a unified state.</td>
<td>ICT activity largely centered on day-to-day issues of life. Some discussion of politically sensitive, inter-ethnic issues. NGOs forefront of political cooperation.</td>
<td>ICT used in Building foundations of inter-ethnic cooperation around shared concerns. Foundations of civil society flourish.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT exchange could be negative. Promoting exclusion and maintaining/broadening cleavages</td>
<td>Some pro-status quo and secessionist actors use ICT to build up established cleavages.</td>
<td>Limited instances of ethnic rivalry and negative interactions.</td>
<td>Instances of cleavage broadening events in the minority; it does not exacerbate divisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT usage is not limited by the governmental control will be inclusive.</td>
<td>Elite monitoring of online activity to maintain status-quo is desirable.</td>
<td>No evidence of government involvement in ICT to limit activity or promote cleavages.</td>
<td>ICT is beneficial for open discourse as dialogue and exchange is not hindered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT usage is illiberal in nature, thus promoting hatred or violence.</td>
<td>Expected to find substantial evidence of intolerance in the fractured society.</td>
<td>Limited instances of illiberal behavior.</td>
<td>ICT usage in BiH does not exacerbate cleavages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT is used to promote dissolving the state</td>
<td>Ethnic rivalries promote devolutionist or secessionist dialogue online.</td>
<td>Online activity built upon foundation of continuing the state as a single sovereign entity.</td>
<td>Internet users, especially the youth, see the future of BiH as a sovereign state with a future outside of fracturing the country.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT users adopt pan-European approach and</td>
<td>ICT users lobby for EU membership for</td>
<td>Youth, who are overwhelmingly ICT</td>
<td>Users want greater EU cooperation and</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There is insufficient evidence that ICT is used socially or politically. ICT use is utilitarian in nature without evidence of use other than basic economic transactions. Alternative sources of information are accessed and two-way discourse among cleavages is present. Building a foundation for familiarity among ethnic communities.

Based on the table 4.1, do ICT facilitate the mending of cleavages and promote a unified state with the goal of EU accession? Yes, but not there is not as big an impact as expected. Bosniak, Croat, and Serb youth are online, and they show evidence of mending cleavages and desire to increase associations with the EU, as it is seen as the institution that should have the most influence over the future of the state. Though no direct evidence was found that ICT caused changes in behavior among the elites, it does build a foundation for inter-ethnic relationships among citizens. The majority of the research is focused on general societal aspects of ICT in relation to mending cleavages, not exclusively on cyberactivism lobbying for reform; however the review of NGOs as well as the discussion on government did touch upon Internet-based activism. Anecdotal evidence of actors utilizing ICT for changing political conditions outside of promoting ethnic cleavages exists. There was not, however, an abundance of evidence illustrating that the technology has resulted in significant political shifts.

**Why No Revolution 2.0?**

Lessons of the Arab Spring “highlights the importance of avoiding the two faulty extremes of either underestimating or overestimating the role of social media in triggering public

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mobilization and promoting political change”369 it is necessary to “avoided the technologically deterministic approach which prioritizes the role of social media over face-to-face mass action in bringing about political change…social media may be necessary, but are not sufficient, tools for pursuing and achieving sociopolitical transformation.”370 ICT may have some very promising aspects but it is not necessary a vector through which change can exclusively come—offline action needs to be coupled with the online to achieve this goal. ICT should be used to strengthen offline reform, not necessarily initiate or carry it to fruition.

ICT activism can manifest itself as “slacktivism” or “clicktivism,” in which actors exhibit “willingness to perform a relatively costless, token display of support for a social cause, with an accompanying lack of willingness to devote significant effort to enact meaningful change.”371 Essentially, “liking” something on Facebook or “re-Tweeting” a post gives the illusion of fully and effectively participating in the political process and contributing to change when in fact little is really accomplished.372 The UN data indicates that 39.9 percent of youth (18-30) describe their “state of mind” as lethargic, while this is better than the numbers for Bosnians over 31 (53.6) it still specifies that over a third of youth may be susceptible to exuding minimal effort to lobby for change. An example of this in the discussion of the Labor Party protests in which the Facebook page over 25,000 followers but no attendance at the event. Furthermore, the review of political parties, including the discussion of the 2010 elections, revealed that the government relies little

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370 Ibid
on ICT to engage voters and therefore they are somewhat insulated against the demands of purely online action.\textsuperscript{373}

Certainly there are instances of people using ICT to further the divide; one example is the Facebook group that celebrated the Srebrenica Massacre. The findings indicate, however, that instances of exacerbating cleavages are in the minority. There was evidence that citizens of BiH utilized ICT to interact with members beyond their ethnic community and the nature of that interaction was generally inclusive in nature. There is evidence that citizens used ICT to promote reform on economic means and desired reforms on visa issues which allows greater access to the EU.

Constructivist theory proposes that the elites are the agency who promote and direct inter-ethnic attitudes—especially in a system where they are deemed the ethnic standard-bearers by the Constitution. Political leaders fan the fears of a possible zero-sum ethnic future, yet the end-game desire of elites appears to be accession in the European Union—not fracturing of the state’s borders. The scholarship revealed that “none of the mainstream parties now dispute the central political tenant that integration in Europe is the overarching aspiration of politics, economy and society in BiH.”\textsuperscript{374} Certainly the IGOs, specifically the OHR, would frown upon rhetoric and action that is deemed too extreme; moreover, the Constitution provides a veto safeguard against action that could harm other ethnic communities. It is not in the interests of the elites to continue divisions as this keeps the country further from EU accession; however it is also not in the interest of the elites to end divisive rhetoric as this is how they retain power. Changing attitudes from the youth utilizing ICT may negate the future prospect of divisive rhetoric to be a tool for winning elections.

\textsuperscript{373} Turcilo, “New Media and Old Politics,” 17-19.
ICT and NGOs: Foundation for Civil Society

ICT have a small role in some areas, most notably the long-term strengthening of civil society. Inter-ethnic cooperation, even non-political in nature, can be regarded as political because the foundation of the state is an ethnic based consociational system. Constructivist theorists postulate that rhetoric and actions carry with them a political component. Moreover, taking on political issues such as jobs and corruption shows a rejection of inter-ethnic tension because it does not address notions of ethnic competition. Issues such as integrated education, community groups, war remembrance, and support for political movements like the Babylution protests received cross-ethnic support and did so in several instances on the Internet. Users of ICT in BiH used Web 2.0 Internet technology to initiate the mediation process from the Conflict resolution and Mediation Chart (Chart 3.1).

Users discussed issues such as inter-ethnic relationships; meet members of the diaspora community; use online civil society crafted tools for accountability in government; meet students from their segregated schools; discuss peace and reconciliation; and so on. Each tweet, like, upvote, share, post, comment, and message is another step to build familiarity and trust in an environment where cleavages and distrust are too normal. This is a digital fulfilment of the Contact Hypothesis in which even minimal interaction can reduce prejudice, an online version of Bosniaks meeting Croats because the Croat pub has a pool table.

The NGOs have shown to be a promising tool in bridging cleavages in line with the Contact Hypothesis and they are the key for reform over the long term lies with continued and strengthened efforts by NGOs. The NGOs operating in Bosnia as enjoying a large reach and abundant influence. The NGO webpages indicate that efforts to add transparency to government and educated voters had an influence on the 2010 elections. If NGOs utilize Web2.0 tools they

will more efficiently communicate their goals and enjoy a “broader range of potential supporters.” Long term NGO goals for mending the cleavages should utilize ICT, “being an effective social movement means utilizing social media… transition[s] to democratization and reform will likely depend on the continuing use of social media by the public to ensure that democracy takes root and leads to permanent and profound change.” The multimedia center at the Zavidovići Library training future journalists to use the Internet and the cell phone app that shows voting histories, when coupled with inter-ethnic discourse on net, could lead to an inclusive future where divisive rhetoric will no longer work at the ballot box. NGOs should be strategic in their efforts, emphasizing the grassroots qualities to avoid accusations that they are merely agents of foreign governments working to fulfill foreign policy of another state.

NGOs like the League of Women Voters, The Youth Initiative for Human Rights, and the International Commission on Missing Persons are exemplary for their ability to bridge intergroup divides and bring people together on equal footing for a shared, common goal. The use of ICT can bridge the problem of geographic isolation which hampers the success of intergroup interaction. The growth of NGOs, especially ones that include intergroup interaction focused on reconciliation, coupled with access to new digital forms of communication, is the best way to increase civil society and mend the fissures of the country.

Moreover, NGO focus on grassroots efforts are equally necessary, especially to engage and encourage participation to those in the younger demographic, as the youth show a desire to leave BiH altogether to improve their future, thus the state may lose a valuable resource. The youth provide the generational change for the country, if they were to leave in large numbers, the

378 Freeman, “The Psychological Need for Intergroup Contact,” 29.
country would stagnant from this lost demographic. The potential brain-drain of youth is a real possibility. The poor economic conditions provide the push to the leave the country, while news of a better life from the diaspora community provides the pull. The NGO use of ICT has positive effects in democracies moving toward consolidation; namely allowing diverse media and learning of norms in consolidated states. There is, however, a darker side in poor performing democracies. In these states the Internet shows correlation with a desire to “abandon the current elected system of government if problems are not resolved quickly.”

Furthermore, there is the risk that states with a history of strong leaders (dictatorships) may experience an authoritarian resilience in which citizens in troubled states prefers the stability of non-democratic institutions to the uncertainty of democracy that falters. This is not to say that strong-men style of government is preferred or a forgone, inevitable conclusion in the Balkans. There is however precedence for it and leaders may try to carry the torch once held by Tito; citizens who had comfort and security during those times may be receptive to the derailing of democracy. For this reason it is crucial that civil society flourish and strengthen democratic foundations in the post-conflict state.

NGOs have the ability to engage the youth and convince them that remaining in the state necessary and change is viable. In this way the state retains a key tool for reform. The people of Bosnia must decide what they want the future to hold, be it continued nationalism, populism, or another form of government. The possibility of changes in BiH is very real as a convention to discuss and possibly reform the BiH Constitution is tentatively scheduled to take place on the 20th anniversary of the end of the conflict in 2015.

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379 Bailard, “The Internet’s Influence on Democratic Satisfaction,” 113.
Is Membership with the European Union Optimal for the Future of BiH?

Joining the European Union is perhaps realistically the best available option for maintaining peaceful relations in the region. The Yugoslav Wars of the early 1990s focused on the devolution of Yugoslav territories into sovereign states. These new states were largely cut along established ethnic territory. The primary point of contention is, and somewhat has been since the idea of a Pan-Yugoslav state was first formulated, the future of the Bosniak people. Historically, Bosniaks were claimed by both the Croat and Serb political elite as “belonging” to their camp. These are the same camps that are most likely to put forth nationalist rhetoric directly at the expense, and often in opposition to, the Bosniaks. They have served as both a prize and a scapegoat for national aspirations. If an option for a non-status quo future of the state other than joining the EU were sought, it would need to include the considerations of the Bosniaks who would form a vulnerable minority in either a Serb or Croat state. The two main Entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Repulika Srpska, were designed by the Dayton Agreement to provide a safe space, or buffer zone, for ethnic cleavages. The reality however is much more complicated. The Cantons, Municipalities, towns, and neighborhoods are often mixed among the three groups—a velvet divorce along gerrymandered lines is not likely to yield constructive results. This is especially true in the larger cities such as Sarajevo, which witnessed many tragic events during the conflict.

Though Bosnia Herzegovina was given a roadmap for accession and received guidance from the EU in the form of the EU delegation to BiH, there remain questions of whether the EU would take in Bosnia as a member state at this time. The European Union and the OHR/EUSR is in a challenging position. If policies are stringently enforced, they will be accused of meddling in domestic affairs and keeping the state in a state of political infancy. If policies allow for nuances
and are considered lax in enforcement, the charge will be that they are too ineffective to promote change. This is truly a difficult and delicate situation for the EU to navigate.

A number of experts assert that “European leaders and many EU citizens remain cautious about further EU enlargement,” of states in poor economic or social conditions; especially after the economic crises of Spain, Ireland, Cyprus, Italy, Portugal and Greece.\(^{381}\) Certainly the EU through the EUSR/OHR holds inter-ethnic cooperation as priority; however The EU roadmap plans for BiH appear to stress the securing of borders, immigration, and illegal trafficking as a higher priority than economic growth. In other words, items that help the EU within its current border and not overwhelmingly lifting BiH to a point where membership status is viable in the eyes of established, member states. There is also the issue of expansion fatigue in which European Union member states are reluctant to add members to the ‘club.’ Especially in the instance of state that has serious issue of interethnic discord. The enlargement fatigue is the reason why notions of future additions to the EU are on “life support' and flat lining.”\(^{382}\)

The EU is described as having a “credibility gap” among the Bosnia political leaders.\(^{383}\) The positions and procedures for mending the future of the state may be direct but at times they are not fully followed to fruition, or given protocol on how BiH leaders can undertake the task required. A clear example of this is the divided police forces in the state that, though were called for full integration, remain nationalistic organizations. Moreover, EU member states have not put forth a unified position on how the BiH Constitution should be reformed in the wake of joining the EU, especially since representatives from the state will need to be elected to serve in the


Parliament of the European Union. The execution of the roadmap process for BiH illustrates the EU is “deeply divided, incoherent, and weak in terms of its Europeanizing policies in Bosnia thus further deepening political impasse in the country.” The credibility gap allows BiH politicians to “successfully manipulate” the sometimes ambiguous platitudes put forth by EU leaders so that the status quo remains with the gilded appearance of progress.

The credibility gap is a symptom of the enlargement fatigue as EU leaders from member states are not yet ready to answer the question of whether Bosnia should join the economic and political union, thus a realpolitik approach of protracted efforts with underfunded mandates, lacking a system for policy implementation. Politically ‘kicking the can down the road’ is good for neither the EU or BiH. The credibility gap allows Bosnian elites to maintain ethnic divisions as the way to retain power and skirt both reporting and responding to human rights issues and poverty. For the European Union, a failure in Bosnia would be a substantial diplomatic and ideological defeat for the IGO as it seeks to promote its philosophy, economic, and political systems as preeminent on the world stage. The future of Bosnia will likely stand as either one of the first major successes or failures of the EU. In the current geopolitical climate that sees a resurging Russian-dominated economic sphere, success in the Balkans is of certain importance for the EU.

**ICT Adaption in Post-Conflict States**

The diffusion of ICT into BiH was not driven by elites who sought to implement it for their own gain, under their personal control as is often the case with traditional media. The work of international partners, most notably the OSCE and the OHR, to establish rules for new media

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384 Ibid.
allowed an open Internet to flourish. This was certainly helped by the liberalization of the economy in the post-communist state. The lessons to be taken from the case of ICT in Bosnia is that foundations for ICT in post-conflict states should be guided by impartial international partners whose goals include equality of access and open use for citizens.

**Assessment of ICT in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

Under the Diffusion of Innovations Theory and Brownlee’s study on authoritarian states, it was expected that the type of Internet implemented would be limited in scope so as to not pose a threat to the elites. The Diffusion of Innovations Theory (DIT) asserts that states will implement technology based on the criteria and purpose they see fit. As BiH operates under a liberalized economic market, certainly one much more open than the communist state operated economy of Tito, and, more importantly, the domestic policy is subject to approval by international authorities, the Internet in BiH is free and open. In cases of less-free states the government regulation of the Internet is commonplace. As the elite of BiH benefit from ethnic discord, I fully expected this to be continued into the nature of how ICT works in the Balkan county. This assessment is not accurate because the OHR (and to an extent the market) provides the final check and balance of policy; therefore, according to the DIT and Brownlee, the type of ICT implemented in the state will be one favorable to the openness and ethnic heterogeneity of the market and international partners.

**Scope Limitations**

The primary points of limitation in this study are the language barrier of accessible literature and the availability of quantitative data. The secondary source information utilized in this thesis is almost exclusively written in English. A number of quality academic journals and texts exist that are written in other languages which could provide a greater level of discourse on
the subject. Of particular interest are the scholarly publications produced in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The second limitation of this study is the statistics available. The field of ICT and politics continues to grow and more statistical data is collected each year. With that said, the field is still young; the Journal of Information Technology and Politics, perhaps the premier academic journal on the subject, was only established in 2004. As scholars in the field, governments, IGOs, and NGOs collect data and conduct surveys, more resources will be available for the further understanding of ICT and society.

**Suggestion for Future Research**

Possibilities for the future research include a more in-depth study of e-government, the use of ICT by political parties and in elections, the nature of citizen discourse on Web 2.0 websites. The use of information technology by the bureaucracy reveals the prevalence of the medium as a standard and fruitful method for communicating and operating with the citizenry. Greater Internet diffusion in the state creates more opportunities for citizens to interact with the various ministries and governmental institutions and encourage reform; as well as receive and send documents permits in a neutral environment. These transactions could otherwise be subject to ethnic prejudice in a face to face meeting, as was the case with NGOs planning programs. A more thorough study of e-government yields greater incite in to ICTs and society. Similarly, the use of ICT by political parties and to organize for campaigns reveals the nature of the discourse between the elected official and the voter in a non-traditional format, particularly the youth voter. Also, studying the use of ICT for get-out-the-vote efforts is integral to ICT and politics. Finally, the content of messages, comments, and posts on the various Web 2.0 websites (YouTube, Facebook, etc) reveals the content of the discourse and whether it is inclusive or exclusive. For all of these suggestions, a strong foundation in the local language is necessary.
Implications for Future Cases

The findings in this study are perhaps applicable to other instances of post-conflict states addressing issues of societal fissures. Case studies of Northern Ireland, Syria, Kurdish regions of Iraq and Turkey, and Lebanon among others. These states have the ICT infrastructure to bridge the digital divide and have cleavages similar to those of the Balkans. Moreover, their parliamentary systems allow for diverse political parties that could operate as the political wing of an ethnic or religious group. This is certainly the case in Northern Ireland where political parties, and the future of the state, are often divided along ethnic and religious lines; also in Lebanon which has a confessional political system similar to the consociational system of Bosnia.

Conclusion

UN data shows citizens along all demographic lines retain strong pride in ethnic and religious groups. This is expected as these qualities are promoted by the elites; yet, there does not appear to be a strong ICT based effort to divide the state. The data indicates that the youth, who are the majority of the Internet users, have positive feelings about accession in the EU and they are concerned with economic issues and corruption above. It should be noted that no evidence was found that the youth desire economic opportunities for their own ethnic group while the other remains stagnant or declines. The youth are more likely to desire and seek out inter-ethnic friendships—indeed, the interviews and quantitative studies reviewed indicate they see themselves as more similar than different. There is perhaps not a ‘smoking gun’ that shows ICT to be sole vector through which changes will be made possible, but it does contribute to a growing foundation on reform based on inter-ethnic cooperation, peace-building, and reconciliation. As we have seen elsewhere The transition to a consolidated multi-ethnic state is a
difficult one. Political elites gain and maintain power by promoting ethnic divisions and are unlikely to change course if it means losing power. Yet, “the importance of social media has to be recognized by the leaders of the Balkan countries...[i]n order to prosper and keep up in the rapidly changing information society, to build a viable, respected and competitive Balkan community, policy makers, academic, business and political leaders must join together to take action.”

People are a product of the structure in which they operate. Human agency is dynamic and cultural shifts, albeit slow, are not uncommon. ICT in BiH today may not show overarching results of societal change, but it is present and has provided a number of examples of both bridging divides and promoting civil society.

## Appendix of Websites Used

### NGO Websites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of NGO</th>
<th>Website</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centre for Free Access to Information</td>
<td><a href="http://www.cspib.ba/">http://www.cspib.ba/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Media Plan Institute</td>
<td><a href="http://www.mediplan.ba/">http://www.mediplan.ba/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Research and Documentation Centre Sarajevo</td>
<td><a href="http://www.idc.org.ba/">http://www.idc.org.ba/</a></td>
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### IGO Websites

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<thead>
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<tr>
<td>EU Delegation Special Representative to BiH (EUSR)</td>
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<td>International Telecommunication Union</td>
<td><a href="https://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx">https://www.itu.int/en/Pages/default.aspx</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERPOL</td>
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<td>NATO (Sarajevo Office)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE in BiH</td>
<td><a href="http://www.oscebih.org/oscebih_eng.asp">http://www.oscebih.org/oscebih_eng.asp</a></td>
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### Political Party Websites

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<tr>
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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Website</th>
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and Herzegovina

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Website</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Party of Rights of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>HSP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatian Pleasant Party- New Croatian Initiative</td>
<td>HSS-NHI</td>
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<td>Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>SBiH</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Action</td>
<td>SDA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Progress</td>
<td>PDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbian Democratic Party</td>
<td>SRS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>SDP</td>
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**FBiH Ministry Websites**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>FBiH Government Ministries</th>
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<tr>
<td>Culture and Sports Ministry</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fmks.gov.ba/">http://www.fmks.gov.ba/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Displaced Persons and Refugees Ministry</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fmroi.gov.ba/">http://www.fmroi.gov.ba/</a></td>
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<td>Education Ministry</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fmon.gov.ba/">http://www.fmon.gov.ba/</a></td>
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<td>Finance Ministry</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fmf.gov.ba/">http://www.fmf.gov.ba/</a></td>
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<td>Health Ministry</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fmoh.gov.ba">www.fmoh.gov.ba</a></td>
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<td>Interior Ministry</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fmup.gov.ba/">http://www.fmup.gov.ba/</a></td>
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<td>Issues of Veterans and Disabled Veterans Ministry</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fmobi.gov.ba/">http://www.fmobi.gov.ba/</a></td>
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<td>Justice Ministry</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fmp.gov.ba/">http://www.fmp.gov.ba/</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Labor and Social Policy</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fmrsrp.gov.ba/">http://www.fmrsrp.gov.ba/</a></td>
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<td>Physical Planning Ministry</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fmup.gov.ba/">http://www.fmup.gov.ba/</a></td>
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<td>Tourism Ministry</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fmoit.gov.ba">www.fmoit.gov.ba</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trade Ministry</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fmt.gov.ba/">http://www.fmt.gov.ba/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and Communication Ministry</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fmpik.gov.ba/">http://www.fmpik.gov.ba/</a></td>
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**Bureaucratic Agency Sites in BiH**

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<th>Website</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td><a href="http://www.cbbh.gov.ba/">http://www.cbbh.gov.ba/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Aviation Directorate of BiH</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bhdca.gov.ba/">http://www.bhdca.gov.ba/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Service Agency of BiH</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ads.gov.ba/">http://www.ads.gov.ba/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directorate for European Integration of Council of Ministers of BiH</td>
<td><a href="http://www.dei.gov.ba/">http://www.dei.gov.ba/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Commission of BiH</td>
<td><a href="http://www.izbori.ba/">http://www.izbori.ba/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Investment Promotion Agency of BiH</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fipa.gov.ba/">http://www.fipa.gov.ba/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine Action Center (BHMAC)</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bhmac.org/">http://www.bhmac.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National University and Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td><a href="http://www.nub.ba/">http://www.nub.ba/</a></td>
</tr>
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</table>

389 Website for the party in Serbia.
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<tr>
<th>Regulatory Agency for Communications</th>
<th><a href="http://www.rak.ba/">http://www.rak.ba/</a></th>
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<tr>
<td>Statistical Agency of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td><a href="http://www.bhas.ba/">http://www.bhas.ba/</a></td>
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</table>
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