2016

An Unrelenting Past: Historical Memory in Japan and South Korea

Hannah Elisabeth Collins
Wright State University

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AN UNRELENTING PAST: HISTORICAL MEMORY IN JAPAN AND SOUTH KOREA

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

By

HANNAH ELISABETH COLLINS
Bachelors of Arts, Wright State University, 2012

2016
Wright State University
I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Hannah Elisabeth Collins ENTITLED An Unrelenting Past: Historical Memory in Japan and South Korea BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

Collins, Hannah Elisabeth. M.A. Department of Political Science, Wright State University, 2016. An Unrelenting Past: Historical Memory in Japan and South Korea.

Every population maintains collective memories which provide meaning and identity for members (Langenbache, 2003). Elites have exerted influence on what is being remembered and the interpretation of the remembrances for specific objects, through the concept of historical memory. Wang (2012) has shown that authoritarian governments leverage historical memory to increase legitimacy. Similarly, Bernhard and Kubik (2014) have demonstrated that transitioning democracies also benefit from elite use of historical memory for consolidation. The lack of studies concerning consolidated democracies’ use of historical memory raises many questions, including whether consolidated democracies manipulate historical memory for the purpose of legitimacy? I contend that, similar to Wang’s findings, elites within consolidated democracies manipulate historical memory for the purpose of enhancing party legitimacy and that the concept of historical memory is a tool that continues to be utilized by elites after consolidation. Japan and South Korea constitute the case studies for this examination.
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<tr>
<td>AWF</td>
<td>Asian Women Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Commission</td>
<td>The Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization Under Japanese Colonialism in Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Corps</td>
<td>Women’s Voluntary Labor Service Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPJ</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DJP</td>
<td>Democratic Justice Party (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Democratic Party (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Grand National Party (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Society</td>
<td>Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Korean Council</td>
<td>The Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KWAU</td>
<td>Korean Women’s Associations United</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democracy Party (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Joha LTD</td>
<td>History Museum of Comfort Women (Media Joha LTD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEXT</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (Japan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFAT</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOGEF</td>
<td>Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (South Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPO</td>
<td>Non-profit Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Saenuri party (South Korea)</td>
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<tr>
<td>STDs</td>
<td>Sexually Transmitted Diseases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRC</td>
<td>Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
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<td>UN Commission</td>
<td>United Nations Crimes Commission</td>
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<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<td>WSU</td>
<td>Wright State University</td>
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<tr>
<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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I. Introduction: The Influence of Historical Memory and Nationalism

In his book, *Never Forget National Humiliation*, Zheng Wang states, “The past is not solid, immutable, or even measureable; rather, it is a fluid set of ideas, able to be shaped by time, emotion, and the political savvy” (2012, 17). In his case study focusing on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) from 1989-2011, Wang demonstrates the power of an authoritarian state in manipulating the collective memories of the past for the purpose of legitimacy. The PRC influences historical memories by controlling messages within textbooks, monuments, and political statements with the purpose of increasing nationalism within the population. The development of nationalism in turn increases the legitimacy of the regime (Wang, 2012). I contend that similar to Wang’s study of an authoritarian government, democratic governments also manipulate historical memory with a goal of increasing nationalism to bolster political parties’ legitimacy. This exploitation of historical memory by democratic governments also provides an avenue in which to understand the state’s democracy, and worldview of the public.

Historical memory is a focused awareness that repeats certain significance and current relevance about the past in close connection to the present and the future, without holding to the accurate retelling of history (Toshechenko, 2011, 3). This concept is often created or manipulated by elites for specific purposes. Thus it does not follow factual aspects of history but uses history instrumentally to have the collective purposely remember or forget specific events to achieve the manipulators goals, such as increasing the legitimacy of government (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014).
Historical memory also aids in the development of other concepts such as collective identity, national identity, nation building and nationalism as it provides members with a past, and an additional way to define the group. Historical memory’s potential depth in defining the collective also impacts the worldview of the population. Scholars of history, psychology, political science, and sociology have demonstrated that history can be a powerful tool in which to bring a population together and that the control of such an influence can also mobilize a population (Wang, 2012; Hutchinson & Smith, 1994; Johnston, 2012).

Historical memory is a relatively new concept, emerging nearly 30 years ago, and has centered on traumatic events that occurred within the 20th century; such as the World Wars, the Holocaust, and the fall of the Soviet Union (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014). Such events created vast amounts of disturbing memories for many populations, changed how people defined themselves, and their view of the world (Tolvaisis, 2013). Generally, the study of historical memory provides descriptive information with which to understand how the public views the past and the present in relation to those traumatic events. However, there is a growing area within the study of this concept in providing new or better understanding of government through the analysis of the manipulation that elites are engaging (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014; Ghodsee, 2014; Paabo, 2014).

Historical memory has also been identified as a tool in creating internal and international conflicts. Conflicts in relation to this concept have been recognized as disagreements between two populations over the remembrance of specific events and the way in which past events are remembered (Wang, 2012; Cui, 2012). Historical memory’s support of identity within the collective and the othering of the out group also aids in the
prevalence of violent struggles. Such case studies on conflicts and tense relationships related to historical memory include Serbia where historical memory crystalized two distinct groups and “othering” based on ethnicity that quickly led to a violent conflict (Tolvaisis, 2013). Israel where the historical memories of the Palestinian 1948 exodus changed over the years, and how the new Israeli state used historical memory to aid in the creation of a new nation (Nets-Zehngut, 2011; Gabel, 2013), Japan, China, and South Korea currently demonstrate active historical memories on events surrounding World War II (WWII) causing tense international relations (Wang, 2012; Lawson & Tannaka, 2011), and Estonia in creating a new identity as an individual nation after the fall of the Soviet Union (Lanko, 2011).

As illustrated in the above mentioned cases, an important trait of historical memory is its link to nation building by providing the ability for elites to construct a past and influence the identity of a population. A noticeable feature of state formation is the development of nationalism. Nationalism can be utilized as a way in which to promote unity among a population by creating an accepted in-group and out-group with a strong loyalty to the in-group (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994). Nationalism is defined as a positive, emotional attachment to one’s group that builds into a mentality of loyalty coupled with a negative view of the out-group (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994). The Soviet successor states have exemplified the relationship of historical memory and nationalism as many of the new state governments work to reframe history in a way that supports the emergence of new states such as in creating new individual democracies while developing space to understand the past (Hewer & Roberts, 2012).
The message of historical memory is commonly dispersed through history textbooks, memorials, museums, and statues, and can ignite tense relationships between states. Such tense disagreements have been demonstrated through the relationship between Germany and its neighbors, such as Poland, in the remembrances of events from WWII (Wang, 2012; Kucia, Duch-Dyngosz, & Magierowski, 2013). The idea of correct remembrances through these items has also caused stressed international relations throughout the Asian region, most notably between China, South Korea, and Japan (Wang, 2012; Lawson & Tannaka, 2010). Struggles stemming from how the past is being remembered continue to illicit strong public responses which are commonly displayed in the form of protests (Lawson & Tannaka, 2010; Yoshida, 2014 f).

While every nation has a form of historical memory, Europe and Asia have been common areas where this concept has been studied. Such studies have frequently focused on how nations’ worldviews have changed since the impact of the specific historical event (Watson, 2012; Bernhard & Kubik, 2014; Nets-Zehngut, 2011), in understanding how specific events are being remembered and for what purpose (Wang, 2012; Unger, 1993; Selling, 2011) as well as understanding how populations are choosing to understand and carry out reconciliation between groups and or other states (Wang, 2012; Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009; Hovland, 2013).

The concept of historical memory has the ability to provide greater understanding of a population and its respective government. As such there is a growing emphasis on the analysis of government manipulation of historical memory to achieve specific purposes such as authoritarian regimes’ use to influence or repress a population as well as its use in the transition to democracy, and what such manipulation illustrates of the
regime type, the specific government, and the government and populations relationship (Wang, 2012; Hewer & Roberts, 2012; Crenzel, 2015; Bernhard & Kubik, 2014).

Democracies are an under analyzed field within this area of study. Given the limited scope of scholarship involving democracies involvement with historical memory questions arise, such as do consolidated democratic governments utilize historical memory? What do democratic governments gain from manipulating historical memory? Can historical memory be used by consolidated democratic governments for legitimacy?

In this research I will explore how consolidated democracies utilize historical memory through a detailed analysis of two prominent historical events; state visits to Yasukuni Shrine and Comfort Women.

II. Literature Review

The literature demonstrates a strong relationship between historical memory and nationalism. Many scholars have illustrated how state builders and elites utilize historical memory as a way to unify a population in an effort to create a new state, to gain support for specific policies, or to uphold government legitimacy; as exemplified by case studies on Israel (Shelef, 2010), Belarus (Marples, 2012), Slovenia (Luthar, 2013), and South Korea (Park, 2010) among others. Along with governmental actors’ involvement with history, three core concepts emerged within the literature: historical memory, nationalism, and identity. Identity and historical memory have been widely agreed upon as interdisciplinary concepts with continued influence by such fields as history, psychology, political science, and sociology (Toshechenko, 2011; Hewer & Roberts, 2012; Cui, 2012).
Historical Memory

Historical memory is part of collective memory. Collective memories are built on the personal memories that each member carries, personal interpretation or not, and are shared understandings of selected, commonly experienced historical events with framing values entangled with the memories. These memories of the past are not necessarily historically accurate (Langenbacher, 2003; Gabel, 2013). Collective memory provides a member with an understandable, coherent story which gives the collective a past as well as defining who they are today (Paabo, 2014). Memories of the collective also allow the population to remember together, such as the traumatic events that have occurred to the group. Such remembering as a collective is typically stifled under oppressive governments (Hewer & Roberts, 2012). Langenbacher (2003) claims, “Memory is a way of packaging and operationalizing shared history and becomes the means by which history becomes an influential attitudinal force within a political culture.” As illustrated, memory is a personal and often an emotional portion of a person’s identity.

Historical memory is instrumentally crafted to create a specific vision within a population through selective remembering and forgetting of history that shapes a population’s memory of the past to achieve the crafters’ goals. The writing of history has been associated with power as the manipulation of the past and the collective’s historical memory have been a source of legitimacy for “mass-incorporating regimes” (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014). Thus elites have utilized historical memory as a way to support the legitimacy of their government or political policies (Selling, 2011). But elites are also constrained by the history they are manipulating through the collective memories of the population. There are limits to the manipulation of history as the collective has
constructed a history that they deem true. Thus, influence of this history works within the constraints of what the population will regard as true; once elites cross the unstated threshold of what is acceptably believable in historical memory they lose the trust of the population and are not able to achieve their goals (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014).

Nationalism

Nationalism is a positive emotional attachment to one’s group that builds into a mentality of loyalty. Group members’ become loyal to a defined group through the development of affection for the homeland and receive a form of identity and self-esteem from group membership. Nationalism aids in the definition of the ‘in-group’ or ‘we’ through the development of group loyalty as well as creating an ‘out-group’ or ‘other’ that is counter to the in-group. The out-group is often portrayed as the aggressor or source of contention toward the in-group. With nationalism’s development of a strong sense of love for the in-group, often an aggressive dislike for the outside group also develops (Druckman, 1994). Patriotism is very similar to the concept of nationalism, as they both have a love for the nation but, according to scholar Elie Kedourie, nationalism also contains a sense of xenophobia against the outside group along with the intense love for the ingroup. This conglomeration of patriotism with xenophobia gives nationalism a distinct style of politics (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994 p. 49).

There are two major schools of thought in regards to how nationalism develops within a population: the instrumentalist and primordialist. The primordial scholars believe that nationalism is a natural development that occurs through commonalities among a population such as through language, ethnicity, region, religion, and customs, among others, which aids in uniting a people (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994 p. 29). The
instrumentalists, like Eric Hobsbawm and Paul Brass, contend that nationalism is not a natural development but that it is purposefully crafted by elites to achieve goals such as political objectives and legitimacy of power (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994). While the instrumentalist theory differs from primordialism, it does not refute primordial elements but utilizes them to promote the development of nationalism such as through manipulating history, culture, and education and at times can be constrained due to primordial elements (Hutchinson & Smith, 1994 p. 83).

Identity

Identity is defined as, “A deeply held sense of who a person is, where he or she fits in the political and social world” (Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors, & Preston, 2010). Individual identities make up the collective which aids in forming what a group is and what it stands for which in turn also shapes the identity of the individual (Brewer, 2001). This concept forms the worldview of a person, how they see themselves and their connection with others, including the state (Klandermans, 2014). The concept of identity not only provides understanding on how citizens define themselves individually and as a collective but also provides the ability to gain information on the worldview held by a collective (Enjelvin & Korac-Kakabadse, 2012).

The identities of a person and the collective are prone to multiple influences (Herrera, Johnston, & Mc Dermott, 2006). As such, elites have used this permeable concept as a tool to shape the collective’s identity and in turn their worldview for specific ends. History textbooks have been a common medium in which elites have crafted identity as the texts are commonly presented as legitimate forms of information (Ghosh, 2014). In the study of historical memory, identity illustrates the way in which the
population is crafted to be connected to the past as well as provides understanding of the influences on the population’s worldview.

*Trends in the Literature*

History textbooks and newspapers are the largest area in which historical memory and nationalism have been studied. Through this channel, clear and concise messages are able to be distributed throughout the public. In the setting of education, history textbooks have a captive audience to receive the approved top-down message. National education is a powerful institution that employs cultural and collective memory to share governmentally sanctioned knowledge to the collective and new members for internalization (Paabo, 2014). “Textbooks are inherently political” as the country’s image of itself, of others, and of its past are presented within their pages and offered as legitimate knowledge to the public (Schneider, 2008). Commonly, textbooks have utilized and developed historical memory to achieve a national narrative, an identity within the nation, and creating an out-group to the nation’s in-group, thus aiding in the growth of nationalism (Paabo, 2014). Textbooks also play a “dual role” in that they bridge the gap between the past and the present through historical narratives and collective memory, and are thus employed to suit “contemporary needs” (Paabo, 2014). When history textbooks are approved by the state, such as in Japan and South Korea, they gain a “quasi-official character” and thus represent the voice of the state (Schneider, 2008).

Studies concerning history textbooks have been conducted in Norway, looking at the government’s objective of changing the populous’ negative view of Sweden (Hovland, 2013). Similar studies on the type of history being manipulated to encourage a
specific national narrative or myth has been done on South Korea (So, Kim, & Lee, 2012) Belarus (Marbles, 2012) Slovenia (Luthar, 2013) Japan (Lawson & Tannaka, 2011), and China (Cui, 2012). Benedict Anderson (1991) utilized newspapers as a channel in which to study a population. Anderson found that a population can be united through common language often found in newspapers that are widely distributed. Newspapers have also been utilized by elites and governments as another way to achieve the elements similar to those of textbooks such as demonstrated in studies on Israel’s historical memory and nationalism (Gabel, 2013; Shelef, 2010).

Historical memory and nationalism have also been studied as channels for memory reconciliation through history textbooks. Europe and Asia have been analyzed in the area of reconciliation with focuses on Germany and Japan in their relations with regional neighbors (Blatz, Schumann, & Ross, 2009; Lawson and Tannaka, 2011; Wang, 2012).

Monuments and museums are also a common area of study in historical memory and nationalism. Manipulation of history occurs in museums through what events are being displayed or not displayed as well as the type of objects being exhibited to remember specific events (Evans, 2011; Han, 2012; Inuzuka & Fuchs, 2014). Museums that are owned or supported by governmental agencies provide a second avenue in promoting specific identities or political messages beyond that of text (Wang, 2012; Emre Ates, 2014; Han, 2012). Nationalism is reinforced within the population by how the group and the other are portrayed through these mediums. Statues are very similar to museums with physical representation being made of a piece of history or of a person commonly dubbed a “national hero” or icon which can reinforce specific messages or a
sense of strong loyalty to the population (Tolvaisis, 2013). The location of statues and “memory sites” can also be a point of significance in regards to the manipulation or how an event is being remembered (Paabo, 2014). For much of Europe and Asia, the study of museums and statues has focused on traumatic events from the 20th century, similar to the memory that is manipulated by elites.

In Asia, the most common museum under study is the Yasukuni Shrine, as the shrine also maintains a museum as part of its structure as a memorial (Inuzuka & Fuchs, 2014). The Shrine continues to illicit criticism and intense response from governments throughout Asia as well as around the world. Many studies on this site have focused on populations’ identity, remembrance, governmental manipulation, and reconciliation (Inuzuka & Fuchs, 2014; Fukuoka, 2013; Deans, 2007; Ryu, 2014; O’Dwyer, 2010).

Given technological advancements, mass media, including television, radio and film, have become another channel in which historical memory and nationalism are studied. Elites and independent organizations have utilized this technology as a way to easily spread their message to a majority of the public and the world. Mass media has been analyzed for the portrayal of the past, of the in and out group, and of the representation of the state and nation. Recent studies have looked at popular icons, such as pop singers, and their influence on the growth of nationalism for instance with South Korea’s pop singer Psy and the ‘Korean Wave’ that followed with a growth of Korean nationalism (Joo, 2011).

Trends in the literature have shown common ways in which historical memory and nationalism are studied, but as previously mentioned there is a trend in the type of government examined. The transition of oppressive governments, such as authoritarian
regimes and dictatorships, to democracy is prevalent throughout the literature. Oppressive governments commonly inflict traumatic experiences on a population and repress the collective from understanding the events through collective remembering (Crenzel, 2015; Bernhard & Kubik, 2014). New democracies allow for the collective to remember and frame this remembering to support the new government by typically blaming the old regime. This framing has been studied to forecast whether a new democracy will consolidate and become stable (Hewer & Roberts, 2012; Brewer, 2008; Pridham, 2014).

Elites have also used historical memory to propagate pro-democratic values to support and legitimize the new democratic state. The creation of pro-democratic values has been studied in transiting, unstable democracies to estimate the ability of the new state to survive (Langenbacher, 2003).

Consolidated democracies have also been studied in their use of historical memory, although to a lesser extent compared to that of transitional democracies. Such studies have focused on democracies’ use of historical memory to retain legitimacy of political parties and to gain support for specific governmental legislation (Selling, 2011; Ghodsee, 2014). However, studies such as those done by Selling and Ghodsee, on Sweden and former communist states, fail to demonstrate the rise or fall in legitimacy through analysis of public approval ratings. The literature also illustrated a lack of studies concerning democracies use of historical memory in the Asian region as a majority focuses on former Soviet Union states. Many journalists have asserted that democratic states, such as South Korea, manipulate historical memory for the purpose of nationalism to increase legitimacy (Fackler, 2012) but it seems the claims are not supported by academic studies.
III. Background Information

Historical memory has been prominently displayed in East Asia, including South Korea and Japan. The memory of past events has been cited in newspapers, mass media coverage, and by political actors as the cause for the current strained relationship between the two states and as a mobilizer of the population. A study of public opinion toward Japan within the Asia-Pacific region conducted by Pew Data in 2013 illustrates a low public opinion of Japan within the South Korean public. The unfavorable opinion held by the total population rates at 77%, which is higher by 25% since 2008 when the study was first administered. Pew relates this unfavorable public opinion to the South Korean population’s belief that Japan has inefficiently apologized for past actions that took place in the 1930s and 1940s (Pew Data Research, 2013). While there is currently no Pew Data on the view of South Korea within the Japanese public, such strong opinions toward another state due to actions that occurred more than 70 years ago highlights an active historical memory in which South Korea and Japan are engaged.

Wang (2012) states, “Political leaders often use historical memory to bolster their own legitimacy, promote their own interests, encourage a nationalistic spirit, and mobilize mass support for social conflicts” (p. 26). South Korean political parties have been driven by personalities since the transition to democracy in 1988. Party candidates have typically been chosen for their strength in pulling votes during the general election. Such tactics has led the political party system in South Korea to be seen as unstable with multiple political parties emerging and dissolving due to their centered nature around one particular candidate (Lee, 2014). President Park Geun-hye’s party, the Grand National Party (GNP), now known as the Saenuri or New Frontier Party, underwent a rebranding
campaign in 2012 to change the party’s image in an effort to revitalize it after multiple personal factions threatened to break up the GNP (GlobalSecurity.org, 2012).

In Japan, the Liberal Democracy Party (LDP) has held political power since the transition to democracy in 1952, only losing power twice in 60 years. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) overwhelmingly defeated the LDP in the general elections in 2009, which was the second loss for the LDP. With the restoration of power in the 2012 general elections, it has been speculated that the LDP is facing a lack of faith from the public. This may be affecting their claim to power as the economy continues to stagnate with ongoing deflation and growing trade deficit coupled with a large aging population. It is also important to note that while the LDP returned to power in the 2012 election, it hosted 1,504 candidates which is the largest pool of candidates ever in Japan’s general election, even though there was only a 59% voter turnout which is claimed to be one of the lowest voter turnouts on record by the New York Times (Fackler, 2012).

Specific events have been cited by political actors, nongovernmental organizations, and news agencies as reasons for the poor public opinion and cold relations between South Korea and Japan to include the Japanese Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery, commonly referred to as “Comfort Women,” the content and revisions of history textbooks as well as other government sanctioned literature, and the Yasukuni Shrine. Each event demonstrates government involvement with the remembrance of the past, which continually elicits public outcry against the offending state. In this research, I plan a detailed analysis of two historical events that impact international relations between South Korea and Japan; Comfort Women and state visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, to examine the use of historical memory by democratic leaders.
The largest issue of contention between South Korea and Japan is the history of Comfort Women. The plight of the Comfort Women was brought to international attention in 1991 when three South Korean women filed a class action lawsuit against the Japanese government seeking reparations for the violence incurred against them as sexual slaves in the state led campaign of the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery during WWII (Tanaka, 2002). As of late 2015 there are 53 known Comfort Women alive. Cho Yoon-sun, a former Korean Minister of Gender Equality and Family, attempted to meet each South Korean Comfort Woman individually during her term (Fantz & Armstrong, 2014). President Park Geun-hye has also made the issue of Comfort Women a prominent concern for her administration through repeated public demands for the Japanese government to issue an official apology. President Park has also refused to meet with Prime Minister Abe, citing his “incorrect” view of history (Xinhua, 2014).

The Japanese government has responded to these accusations from Seoul. In 1993, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei gave a statement apologizing on behalf of the Japanese government for the actions that brought about the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery. This apology has not been accepted by the former Comfort Women, South Korean Women’s organizations, or the South Korean government as it was not issued by the Prime Minister himself, is not deemed sincere, and does not compensate the former Comfort Women. Prime Minster Abe has publicly refused to issue a new apology and stands behind the current Kono Statement (Richards, 2014).

But Prime Minister Abe has not always stood behind the Kono Statement in his current administration.¹ In 2014, Prime Minister Abe called for a governmental review of

¹ Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was previously elected to the position of Prime Minister in 2006 and served until 2007. He left office before he was required to call an election which would have occurred no later
the Kono Statement for its reliability on factual information which ignited public
demonstrations and governmental outbursts in South Korea and China. After the study
Abe ultimately chose to stand by the statement (Richards, 2014). Other governmental
entities, such as mayors and Diet members, in Japan have also questioned the authenticity
of Comfort Women and commonly claim that the Comfort Women system was a
necessity during the war, not an evil (Tabuchi, 2013).

Similar to the Kono Statement, the Japanese government under Abe has also pushed
for a partial revision to the 1996 United Nations special rapporteur’s report which details
the plight of the Comfort Women at the hands of the Japanese military. The report
recommends a governmental apology from the Japanese government to the women who
were victimized as well as pay reparations (Panda, 2014). While neither statement nor
report was edited, the public retraction of a series of stories concerning the plight of
Comfort Women by the popular Japanese newspaper the Asahi Shimbun, due to false
personal accounts, has fueled Abe’s Administration’s doubt on the Comfort Women
issues as a whole (Yoshida, 2014 b).

History textbooks and other governmentally sanctioned publications have also caused
public reactions and tense international relations between South Korea and Japan. Texts
are approved by the Japanese and South Korean government before use in the educational
system, which connotes governmental approval of the information contained within the
publication. History textbook “incidents” against Japan occurred in 1982, 1986, 2001,
2005, and 2009 where the South Korean and Chinese governments, and outcries from the
respective public, claimed that the Japanese government was “down playing” past
atrocities by changing the words used to describe Japanese military aggression and the military use of sexual slavery (Yi, 2009).

In December 2013, Prime Minister Abe expressed the mission of “restoring the country’s self,” which he contends has been stifled due to the explicitly negative views of Japanese action in past wars within educational texts. To achieve this “restoration of self” Abe aims to increase patriotism and a positive view of the past among the population through the revision of texts used within the educational system. Abe created a governmental committee to review possible changes to the textbook approval process, which suggested putting mayors in charge of their local school districts instead of the current national approval process. An advisory committee to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) also proposed new standards requiring textbooks that do not nurture patriotism be rejected. Such actions are nothing new for Abe as during his first term as Prime Minister, he also vehemently pushed for educational textbook revisions to change books that cast Japan’s war time actions in an unfavorable light (Fackler, 2013).

The South Korean government, under current President Park, has also been pushing for textbook revisions that restore pride in the nation’s past. Hwang Woo-yea, current Minister of Education, has begun pushing for the inclusion of Yu Kwan-sun, a young female martyr who resisted Japanese colonialization, into history textbooks. Hwang claims he is concerned of Yu Kwan-sun’s absence, and is contemplating government involvement in the publication of historical texts in an effort to address this oversight (Kim, 2014).
The publication of texts overseas has also become a point of contention between South Korea and Japan. In 2015, Prime Minister Abe publicly criticized an American textbook published by McGraw-Hill for producing a chapter that he claims depicts Japan as the sole aggressor during WWII and the portrayal of the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery. The Japanese Consulate General Office in New York met with McGraw–Hill officials and demanded revisions to the text. McGraw-Hill rejected the proposed changes citing factual evidence for the claims. The rejection prompted the criticism made by Abe (Fackler, 2015).

The South Korean government has engaged the United States in a different way compared to the Japanese government. In 2015, Media Joha, a South Korean online media company located in Palisades Park, New Jersey, announced that it would be distributing 20,000 copies of the book *Can You Hear Us? The Untold Narratives of Comfort Women* to U.S. politicians and public libraries for free in an effort to increase knowledge and awareness of the plight of victims in the Japanese Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery campaign. The testimonies that make up the book were compiled and published by the South Korean Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization Under Japanese Colonialism in Korea (the Commission). The book was first published in Korean and distributed by the Commission to the South Korean public in 2013 (Alvarado, 2015).

The Yasukuni Shrine is also a medium of historical memory in contention between South Korea and Japan. The Shrine was first established in 1869 to commemorate the fallen supporters of the emperor in the Boshin War (Ryu, 2007). The enshrinement of Japan’s war dead within the Yasukuni Shrine was later expanded to
include all of Japan’s fallen military members. The ritual of the Japanese emperor visiting Yasukuni Shrine was also established by the Meiji government with the justification of ensuring the nation would continue to receive blessings from the divine spirits of the fallen which helped to institutionalize the Shrine in society (Breen, 2008).

At the end of WWII, the International War Tribunals and the U.S. occupation of Japan changed the government’s association with the Yasukuni Shrine and the country’s relationship with the WWII war dead. With the commencement of Japan’s new constitution in May, 1947, the separation of church and state was instituted in Article 20. Due to this division, Yasukuni Shrine became a private religious institution (O’Dwyer, 2010). The privatization of Yasukuni Shrine as well as the classification of war criminals created new difficulties in enshrining military members. The International War Tribunals found numerous Japanese military personnel, including top leaders, guilty of war crimes and classified them as class A, B, and C war criminals\(^2\) with varying punishments such as jail time or execution. The classification of Japanese military personnel as war criminals went against the ideology that had been promoted within Japan during WWII of fighting a righteous war in the name of the emperor (Higurashi, 2013).

WWII war criminals were not immediately enshrined within Yasukuni Shrine. With the transition of the Yasukuni Shrine to a private religious institution, the Shrine was no longer able to access governmental records on military service in which to identify persons for enshrinement. This was a problem for hundreds of survivors who wanted to see their loved one memorialized within Yasukuni Shrine. In response, a new

\(^2\) Class A war crimes refer to crimes against peace. The Class A war criminals were more widely known from the Tokyo Trials as they are comprised mostly of prominent leaders who are widely believed to have led the war throughout Asia and due to the publicity of these trials. Class B war criminals refer to conventional war crimes. Class C war crimes refer to crimes against humanity (Higurashi, 2013).
The process for enshrinement was set up with the Yasukuni Shrine petitioning the Health and Welfare Ministry for information on the war dead. Once approval of the petition is granted, the Ministry gathers the needed information from the population and nominates persons from the gathered data for enshrinement at the Shrine. Yasukuni Shrine leaders then make the final decision on who will be memorialized (Higurashi, 2013).

The process of enshrinement for the WWII war dead was completed in 1959; war criminals were excluded from this large enshrinement. After occupation, survivors of convicted war criminals began petitioning the government to have their loved one’s honored at Yasukuni Shrine. In response, the government reinstated convicted war criminals civil rights and made their survivors eligible for survivor benefits in 1953, similar to other military personnel who had died while serving. In 1959 the Health and Welfare Ministry’s Repatriation Relief Bureau began sending the Shrine nominations of B and C war criminals for enshrinement. By 1967, 984 B and C war criminals had been honored, mostly without notice to the public. In 1970, the process of enshrining Class A war criminals began quietly. The complete honoring of this population at Yasukuni Shrine did not occur until 1978 due to the controversial issue of venerating class A war criminals. The public did not know about this commemoration until 1979, a year after the ceremony had already occurred (Higurashi, 2013).

The emperor stopped his ritual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine at the news of the completed enshrinement of the Class A war criminals (Ryu, 2007). Regular visits by Prime Ministers to Yasukuni Shrine, which had been a tradition since 1945, stopped briefly after the enshrinement of all war criminals in 1979, although it temporarily resumed again in 1985 (Deans, 2007).
In 1985, Prime Minister Nakasone was the first Prime Minister to visit Yasukuni Shrine since the enshrinement of war criminals. In 1996, Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto made one visit to Yasukuni Shrine during his term. The visit coincided with a tense period of Japanese relations with China and the quick return of the LDP to power after its first defeat in public elections (Deans, 2007). Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro visited the Shrine every year during his term from 2001-2006. Koizumi’s visits, while opposed outside of Japan, fulfilled a campaign promise of visiting Yasukuni Shrine on August 15th every year and he enjoyed considerable high levels of public support throughout his term (Deans, 2007). While he avoided the Yasukuni Shrine during his first term, current Prime Minister Abe visited Yasukuni Shrine in December, 2013 which provided additional reasons for South Korean President Park not to meet with Abe during her first term and elicited public demonstrations in South Korea (Payne & Wakatsuki, 2013).

Manipulation of facts is common within historical memory as elites use history to fit their needs (Bernhard & Kubik, 2014). South Korea and Japan have had a long tenuous relationship, the history of the specific events being remembered have the potential to illustrate the importance of Comfort Women, history textbooks and governmental sanctioned publications, and the Yasukuni Shrine in relation to the populations’ collective identity and nationalism.

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3 August 15th is a significant date to both South Korea and Japan and is honored very differently in each country due to how each had been involved during WWII. In Japan August 15th is remembered as Surrender Day, the day in which the Japanese government formally surrendered to Allied Forces which ended WWII (“Three ministers visit Yasukuni,” 2014). In South Korea August 15th is celebrated as National Liberation Day, as with the surrender by the Japanese government in WWII, Japan lost control of the Korean peninsula which it had governed as its colony from 1910 to 1945 (Lee, 2008).
Post WWII, relations between South Korea and Japan normalized in 1965 under President Park Chung-hee and Prime Minister Sato Eisaku. The normalization of relations was a benefit to both economies but caused mass public protests in South Korea. The South Korean public was against the normalization due to the lack of reparations and acknowledgement of past wrongs by Japan, which the public demanded before the normalization was signed (Seth, 2011). Given the dictatorship of President Park Chung-hee, public protests were forcefully put down and the normalization proceeded. However, with the settlement of normalization, Japan agreed to pay $800 million in aid to South Korea. Once the Normalization of Relations Agreement was signed the issue of reparations and past wrongs were agreed to be closed (Seth, 2011 pg. 387). While the act of normalization was not government manipulation of historical memory, this event has continued in present day discussions of reparations in relation to the past.

The Japanese Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery was a campaign of state approved human trafficking to appease Japanese soldiers who were given little to no leave during WWII. Stations of captured women were set up for soldiers to visit during their free time (Tanaka, 2002). The campaign was very popular among soldiers, everywhere the Japanese military was present so were Comfort Stations. These stations drew upon invaded states’ native women and Korean women to fill the “women’s positions;” these women were commonly referred to as Comfort Women (Chung, 1997). It is estimated that 200,000 women were enslaved in this system, with 80% being Korean (Lie, 1997). The exact number of women enslaved during this time period is unknown as soldiers would commonly murder the women when evacuating the area, as the soldiers
committed suicide themselves, or were causalities of war as Allied forces advanced and Japanese forces withdrew (Chung, 1997).

During and after WWII, forced sexual slavery had been rumored among the public, especially in Korea. If a Comfort Woman had survived sexual slavery and been able to return home she typically suffered from severe Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and many women had become sterile because of their ordeal. Survivors typically never spoke about the violence against them due to the public shame they would incur to their family and themselves. The Japanese government also kept the campaign secret by destroying documents related to Comfort Stations and Women at the end of WWII (Tanaka, 2002).

The three South Korean women who had filed the reparations lawsuit against Japan had been supported by the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan (the Korean Council). The Korean Council is made up of 35 different, independent women’s organizations that came together to bring awareness to the specific issue of Comfort Women along with seeking compensation and an official apology on behalf of these women from the Japanese government (Pyong, 2005). Additionally, this issue had not been tried at the Tokyo War Trial at the end of WWII even though provisions in international law had made legal action for sexual violence possible (“Memory of an Injustice,” 2013). The Korean Council utilized government involvement for their cause by petitioning the South Korean government for support of the women identified as former Comfort Women and also in petitioning the Japanese state on their behalf (Pyong, 2005).
After the normalization of relations, history textbooks in both South Korea and Japan reflected the political tension surrounding the normalization. South Korean textbooks placed strong emphasis on the victimization of the Korean population by the Japanese during the colonization period from 1910-1945 and events during WWII. A number of Japanese textbooks have commonly downplayed Japanese atrocities during the same time period, reflecting the government’s stance against apologizing and reparations for the Korean population (Seth, 2011).

Today, history textbooks within each state gain a “quasi-political character” reflecting state opinion since educational textbooks in Japan and South Korea are approved by the state before use in the education system (Schneider, 2008). Given this claim, it warrants a look at how texts are approved for education in each state.

Japan has followed a governmental approval system of textbooks since 1947; before this time the government authored all educational texts. According to Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the process of textbook approval begins with nongovernmental publishers creating an academic text that fits the requirements of the Curriculum Guideline and educational standards set forth by the MEXT. Once the publisher’s book is complete it is then submitted to the Research Council who examines the text for compliance to the Textbook Examination Standards. From this review the MEXT can suggest changes, approve or reject the text. The final decision of approval lies with the MEXT. Upon approval of a textbook, sanctioned texts are presented as options for specific areas of study for the various local boards of education. Each board of education choses a text from the approved list to adopt for their own curriculum. The
MEXT bares all costs for publication of the chosen text for each institution (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology, 2014).

The publication of educational texts in South Korea is similar to the process found in Japan. The Ministry of Education (MOE) classifies textbooks into three types; type one being texts whose copyright is held by the Ministry of Education, type two are textbooks authorized by the MOE and written by private publishers and type three are textbooks recognized by the Minister of Education as being relevant and useful. The MOE utilizes bureaus and review committees to scrutinize and create textbooks that follow the national guidelines and curriculum. The approved textbooks are presented to the local educational boards as texts from which they may choose when implementing the national curriculum (South Korea Ministry of Education, 2008).

History textbooks first gained international attention within the Asia-Pacific in 1982. During this year it was alleged that the MEXT ordered textbook authors to make changes to the wording of history texts; such as replacing the terms “aggression” and “invasion” to “advancement” when referring to Japanese action during WWII. This action incited public and government outcry from China and South Korea. While this event does not fall within a democratic South Korea, it spurred the creation of the “Neighboring Country Clause” which specified the consideration of neighboring countries perspectives in the creation and editing of Japanese texts (Yi, 2009).

The contents of educational texts are also under scrutiny in South Korea. Since democratization in 1988, conservatives and more ‘left-of-center’ political groups have struggled against each other on how to present the past in history textbooks. Since her election to office in 2013, current president Park Geun-hye has been suspected of
working to reinterpret her father’s, former President Park Cheung-hee who lead South Korea for twenty years, legacy in history texts more positively (Kim, 2014).

IV. Methodology

This research is based on Wang’s work (2012) and as such will follow closely his methodology. Similar to Wang, the independent variable in this study is historical memory. The dependent variables are nationalism and legitimacy, as it is hypothesized that democratic governments purposely manipulate historical memory for the growth of nationalism and thus legitimacy of political parties (Malici & Smith, 2013).

Comparative methodology provides the most beneficial framework in which to study historical memory in relation to the growth of nationalism and legitimacy. This methodology focuses on the internal pressures of a country, allowing a researcher to take into account multiple influences on the independent and dependent variables (Lim, 2010). I will conduct two case studies on Japan and South Korea and review the topics of the Comfort Women, Yasukuni Shrine, and history textbooks as these historical events have been found to be the largest issues of the past with government involvement in South Korea and Japan. The most similar case study method provides the ability to employ process tracing and content analysis which aids in drawing connections between the dependent and independent variables throughout multiple sources of data. Wang also used case studies and is the dominant process within the comparative methodology which provides credence to its utility.

The most similar case design has been selected as this approach offers the most control of variation between cases which allows for the influences to be identified in relation to the independent variable (Dogan & Pelassy, 1990). South Korea and Japan
both demonstrate the use of active historical memory within each state which has influenced public opinion and internationals relations (Yoshida, 2014 f.) These two countries were also selected due to their similar regional location within Asia, their shared history, and democratic regime type as well as similar controversy over the amount of democratic consolidation within each state (George & Bennett, 2005).

I will analyze the cases from 1988 to 2015. The starting point of 1988 was selected as this was the first point in time that both states were democratic; South Korea began free elections at the national level in 1988. Data collection from this time period will be gathered through public newspapers, government personnel speeches and press releases, as well as history textbooks or literature publications supported by the government. Newspaper sources will include The Japan Times and The Korean Herald. Google Alerts will also be utilized in retrieving newspaper sources from the internet from a wide variety of newspaper sources like CNN, Reuters, Yonhap News, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal as well as other popular domestic and international news agencies. Key phrases such as “Comfort Women,” “Yasukuni Shrine,” and “history textbooks” will be screened in the sources to determine their usefulness to the research as well as any government involvement with the remembrance of the past. Information on history textbooks and government supported literature will be gained through official government websites. Government officials’ speeches will be accessed through news agencies, including those previously mentioned and official government websites.

Statistical data will be gathered through Pew Research Center, The Genron Non-profit Organization (NPO), and East Asia Institute as well as other potential nongovernmental organizations to aid in determining public opinion and attitudes toward
governmental actions and of the populations’ “other” group. Statistical data will also be
gathered on election results, in relation to election years or seasons, and the voter
population as well as public support of candidates throughout their term in office. Such
figures will be gathered from nongovernmental organizations and news agencies.

While multiple tense events related to the remembrance of the past fall within this
time period, the time frame does pose a challenge for the scope of this research. Process
tracing and content analysis rely on careful review of multiple sources of data. Twenty
seven years is a vast time frame for review. To aid in further limiting the amount of time
under review, years of when specific events occurred, such as official visits to Yasukuni
Shrine or the governmental release of literature, will be identified and reviewed.

Language also poses a difficulty to the research as dominantly English sources
will be utilized due to a language barrier. Sources only in English have the potential to
have biases due to the material being written for a more “western” audience, therefore
missing conceptual meanings or importance found within the original language.
Additionally, popular English news agencies which present information that fit within the
scope of research also present the data with a cultural bias. I will work with Wright State
University (WSU) Japanese language students, WSU Asian Association as well as friends
and family members who are fluent in Japanese or Korean to locate and translate Korean
and Japanese source material such as newspaper articles and governmental documents to
help offset the dominant English language sources. This form of data collection with
translation has the bias of human error through the incorrect translation of meaning or of
words and is also constrained by time and the ability to reimburse translators for their
time.
There are four expected findings in this research:

1. Elites will use historical memory to legitimize their term in office when faced with challenges to the state or population, such as an economic crisis;
2. Historical memory is used similarly during elections in South Korea and Japan, even though both countries hold a different type of democracy;
3. When historical memory is promoted by elites, public protests against the outside group will increase; and
4. Similar to other regime types, consolidated democracies will manipulate historical memory through textbooks, political speeches, and monuments.

The subsequent chapters will proceed by first presenting the factual history of the issue involved within the historical memory of the Japanese and South Korean population. After the history is presented the chapters will review the governmental involvement of Japan within the specific topic of historical memory along with the South Korean government’s response to such action through the organization of a case study. Likewise, the case study will then review the South Korean government’s involvement with the specific topic and the response of the Japanese government. The chapters will conclude with analysis over the events discussed. Three case studies will be presented on the historical memory issues of the Comfort Women, Yasukuni Shrine, and history textbooks.

Chapter two will examine the historical memory of Comfort Women by first presenting the Comfort Women history and the events that led up to the exploitation of women within the Asian region during WWII. The case study will progress into a discussion of events where the Japanese government was involved with the remembrance of this population and the South Korean response to such actions. In turn the case study
will then delve into the events where the South Korean government was involved in the historical memory of Comfort Women and the response by the Japanese government. The chapter will close with an analysis of the governmental actions.

Chapter three will begin by exploring the history and significance of the Yasukuni Shrine. Once the history of the Shrine is presented, the case study will show the Japanese governmental involvement with the historical memory of the Shrine and the South Korean government’s response to Japan’s actions. The South Korean governmental action will then be detailed as well as the response by the Japanese government toward the South Korean government’s action. The chapter will conclude with an analysis of the governmental actions.

Chapter four will present the importance of history textbooks within a population and the history of the textbook conflict between Japan and South Korea. After the history and importance are discussed, the case study will review the government of Japan’s involvement with history textbooks and the South Korean elite’s response. Likewise, the government of South Korea’s involvement with history textbooks will be discussed along with the response by the Japanese government to the South Korean governmental action.

Chapter 5 will provide a general analysis of the three case studies focusing on the trends in governmental action and the populations’ response, along with the tendencies in the growth and decline of public support of the respective government during the presence of historical memory. Since historical memory is a concept that is created by the population with unspoken boundaries, the constraints of elites will also be discussed. Additionally, since Japan and South Korea had distinctly different experiences within in WWII, an examination of the influence of their unique involvement in this dramatic
period of time will also be included within the final analysis. The chapter will close with final conclusions and suggestions for further research.
I. “Comfort Women” in Historical Memory

Rape has been used as a weapon of war since the beginning of war itself. According to the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High commissioner, the intent of rape as a weapon is to, “humiliate, dominate, instill fear, disperse and/or forcibly relocate civilian members of a community or ethnic group” (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2008). The Japanese Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery was a campaigned of human trafficking that mercilessly exploited the women of occupied territories during WWII. This large enterprise clearly represents the definition of a weapon used in war as multiple societies lived in humiliation and fear of this specific act by Japanese Imperial forces.

Japan had been involved in military altercations with China that began in 1911, which stemmed from the Japanese seizer of Manchuria (Drea, 2009). As the war with China prolonged and became stalled, the Japanese military came to view military brothels or “comfort stations” as a necessity since soldiers were not given leave to return home from war during this period of time. Comfort stations were provided to military members as a leisure experience while on deployment. The idea that comfort stations were a requirement of military forces led to the expansion of stations throughout all Japanese occupied territories, and further, wherever the Japanese military was present from 1932 until 1945 (Tanaka, 2002). Accurate numbers of the amount of women victimized through the system of comfort stations, known as the Military Mobilization of Sexual
Slavery, are not available due to the destruction of evidence by Japanese forces at the conclusion of WWII (Tanaka, 1998). However, historians and human rights scholars estimate that 200,000 women had been brutalized through this system of government sectioned and supported human trafficking (Henry, 2013).

The earliest record of comfort stations identified in the Pacific region was found in a letter of request from Japanese Army Lieutenant Okamura Yasuji, dated 1932, who was stationed in Shanghai, China. The letter was sent to the governor of Nagasaki Prefecture to petition for the acquisition of women for comfort stations, commonly referred to as Comfort Women, for the Japanese troops fighting in the Shanghai War. Within the request Okamura stated that he found the idea of comfort stations from the Japanese Navy which was stationed in the same area during that time. His letter further suggests that Japanese overseas military brothels had been created prior to 1932 (Chung, 1997).

As expansion progressed, Japanese leaders’ had rising concerns over the increasing anti-Japanese sentiment throughout occupied areas, which they attributed to the rape of occupied citizens by military members. Supporters of military brothels asserted that repressing sexual desires of military men would lead to the escalation of rape and other sexual crimes (Garon, 1993; Lie, 1997). Okamura claimed after the establishment of military brothels in his region that “he was pleased to see that soldiers’ rapes of Chinese women decreased after the arrival of women from Japan” (Chung, 1997, 223).

Early military brothels were made available exclusively to officers and only contained prostitutes from Japan. The prostitutes dedicated to war time brothels had to
undergo medical examinations from military doctors, which mimicked the standard examination process of prostitutes enforced within Japan. Along with controlling sexual crimes committed by military members, brothels dedicated to military use were also justified as being an effective way to control venereal diseases among soldiers since women without sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) were being supplied to troops (Lie, 1997; Tanaka, 2002). A Ministry of Army survey conducted in 1938 found that 11 out of 1,000 soldiers had a venereal disease (Lie, 1997).

In 1938, Japan created a full scale system of Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery. The war in China was lasting longer than anticipated which increased calls by Japanese leaders for the mobilization of human resources. The mobilization of women for sex slaves occurred in war efforts throughout Japan, in the colony of Korea, and later throughout occupied territory. This mobilization effort increased the number of women being recruited and brought to places like China for comfort stations (Chung, 1997).

Recruiters were employed by the Japanese military to find women to fill the comfort stations, often by any means necessary. Women in poverty typically fell prey to recruiters as the promise of work or money was a common phrase to lure females into slavery. Korea became a prime location for the abduction of women as the population was made destitute by colonization which pulled resources from Korea for use in Japan thus obliterating the Korean economy. Forced kidnappings of women became prevalent as the sexual slavery campaign continued, especially as the populations became more aware of the recruitment lies and women increased in scarcity (Tanaka, 2002).

In the expansion efforts of the sexual slavery campaign in 1938, the Japanese government granted the Ministries of the Army and Navy the power to create and manage
comfort stations without interference from local consulates. The same year the Ministries approved access to comfort stations for all military members and banned attendance at non-military brothels. In response to new comfort station regulations, military units were told to prepare for an increase in comfort stations through the mobilization of women and the establishment of designated areas for stations. Comfort stations were provided with food, limited medical supplies, and condoms furnished by the Japanese military (Tanaka, 2002).

Forced sexual slavery became part of the Japanese Imperial Army’s strategy as the Meiji government planned to conduct war against the Allied Forces. Stations began to be systematically established in country soon after occupation occurred. Comfort stations appeared throughout Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines while maintaining the stations in China (Chung, 1997).

While the Ministries of the Army and Navy regulated and helped to maintain comfort stations throughout the military, there were three different classifications of locations that were utilized by military forces. Permanent stations were attached to large supply bases located in or near major cities. When Japanese women were involved with comfort stations they were commonly found at permanent stations. Semi-permanent stations were attached to large army unites such as divisions, brigades, and regiments. Both the permanent and semi-permanent stations were rigorously controlled by the unit or branch they belonged too but were often directly managed by private brothel owners that had been contracted by the Japanese military. Temporary stations were set up and maintained by small battalions, usually near the front lines. Native women of occupied countries were used for semi-permanent and temporary stations, while the Korean
population could be found throughout the Military Mobilization System in all stations (Tanaka, 2002).

Hundreds of thousands of women were needed to fill the demand for comfort stations. Scholars estimate that upwards of 200,000-400,000 women were victimized as Comfort Women, 80% of which were Korean. This “Korean hunting” relied heavily on force and deception. Comfort Women were treated like military supplies, with one woman for every 40 men (Lie, 1997). While Japanese women were not excluded from the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery, racism facilitated the exploitation of non-Japanese women for the system as the nationalism promoted by the Meiji government depicted other populations as inferior, even the Korean population whom had been upheld as racially similar to the Japanese (Lie, 1997).

Women were procured through many different avenues such as state sponsored recruiters and brothel owners as previously mentioned, but records have also indicated that policemen, local officials, and leaders from the colonial government also took part in forcible trafficking (Chung, 1997). Many Women were taken through means of deceit through promises of employment within factories and restaurants (Kim, 2014). Other women were physically kidnapped off the streets. During her testimony in 1992 at the first press conference held by the Task Force on Filipino Comfort Women, Maria Rosa Henson gave a detailed account of being forcibly kidnapped as she was traveling within the Philippines and held against her will for nine months where she was repeatedly brutalized (Henson, 1999; Chung, 1997).

The life of a Comfort Woman was brutal. Comfort station facilities were designated by military authorities; typically any large building near the base was
converted into stations, even school buildings and temples. As stations were set up closer to the front lines, military tents or part of the barracks were used. Facilities were typically divided with the use of thin screens or curtains. The women lived in small rooms usually with only a bed or futon in each room. Women were provided with a disinfectant, typically a cresol soap solution, and were instructed to wash after every encounter (Tanaka, 2002). Often times this instruction was not followed due to the large amount of soldiers arriving each day. As soon as the comfort station opened for service in the morning men often waited in line until the close of the station late in the evening (Henson, 1999).

Maria Rosa Henson describes such days of not having any rest except for an hour at lunch and an hour at dinner. Comfort Women very rarely received days of respite, at times she was given rest days when she was menstruating or ill but this was not guaranteed. In addition, Women were only given a small ration of food each day, typically only enough to keep them alive. A Comfort Woman’s day was filled by being raped repeatedly anywhere from 10 to 30 men a day (Henson, 1999).

Soldiers were allotted certain times they could visit the station with regular file and rank members usually allowed to visit on their off days once a week and officers allowed to visit any time they wished. Before their visitation, soldiers were often required to purchase tickets for their visits which were given to the Comfort Woman upon entrance into the room. At the end of the day or beginning of the next the woman would turn in the collection of tickets to the station manager. Military regulations stated that members were allotted 30 minutes with Comfort Women but on very busy days men only received a few minutes. The common standard throughout the mass human trafficking
campaign was that Comfort Women received no part of the ticket sales even though regulations allowed for women to be compensated (Tanaka, 2002).

Even though it was promoted as a way to prevent the spread of STDs, the comfort stations were unsuccessful in this promise. The Ministries of the Army and Navy provided stations with condoms that men were required to use during each visit. However, men would often refuse the condoms. In addition soldiers rarely disclosed venereal diseases to their senior officer for fear of punishment. Thus contracting STDs was a fear for Comfort Women. When STDs were discovered at the routine medical examinations, the woman would be injected with the highly potent “Number 606,” salvarsan, which has harmful side effects. Other women who were found to have serious venereal diseases were prohibited from returning to the comfort stations. It is not known where the women were sent or if they left the facility alive (Chung, 1997).

Along with STDs, pregnancy was another health concern for Comfort Women. Due to the violent life they were forced to endure many women did not know they were pregnant until a miscarriage occurred. However, if a pregnancy resulted in a live birth Comfort Women were not permitted to keep the infant, the child was typically taken from the mother soon after delivery. It is not fully known what happened to the infant after being taken from its mother but it has been suggested by scholars that the child was killed. If a woman knew she was pregnant she would typically assist in bringing on a miscarriage herself by not eating or by drinking a certain strong herbal tea. The military doctors who performed the routine medical examinations would not perform abortions (Tanaka, 2002).
Physical abuse was also present in the daily lives of the Japanese sex slaves. Accounts from former Comfort Women detail events where they were beaten multiple times a day by men who would hit them with closed fists all over their body, or would smash their heads or other body parts against room walls or bed posts (Henson, 1999). Women usually sustained severe injuries due to these encounters. Violence was fueled by soldiers who would take their anger out on the Comfort Women, were quick to anger if they did not feel satisfied after their visit, or were violent when they were drunk. Regulations stated that men were not to enter the station premise while intoxicated. Nevertheless nothing was done to enforce this regulation or to keep violence from occurring on site beyond controlling riots while the soldiers were waiting in line (Chung, 1997).

Due to the lifestyle and mistreatment, the overall health of Comfort Women rapidly declined. Because of the amount of forced intercourse, the violent nature of such attacks, and home abortions, the women often became sterile or physically deformed (Lie, 1997; Chung, 1997). While enslaved, some women became addicted to drugs as a way of mental escape. Others committed suicide as the physical and mental trauma was too much to bear. Suicide was committed by drinking the cresol soap solution that was provided for washing or purposefully overdosing on drugs which were openly provided within the station (Tanaka, 2002). The women who survived were typically left with paralyzing PTSD. Maria Rosa Henson vividly recounts her physical response to her past mistreatment which included losing her hair, being unable to speak for years, and being afraid in the presence of men. It took her years to overcome the physical response to the
mental scars she had sustained while the painful memories and panic attacks attached to them lasted the rest of her life (Henson, 1999).

Women enslaved in this system were held for different lengths of time. Policy stated that women were “mobilized” for about twelve months. However, Korean women who were transported to foreign countries were enslaved for three to five years. If they were freed from captivity there was no support in returning to their home nation. Other populations, typically women native to the area, were held for less time, anywhere from three months to a year (Tanaka, 2002).

As the demand from comfort stations remained undiminished throughout WWII, the Japanese government had to increasingly rely on local, non-military personnel for the procurement of women as the military campaign became widely known and feared throughout the general public. In 1943, the Women’s Voluntary Labor Service Corps (the Corps) was organized in Korea by the Japanese government and quickly became synonymous with the forced sexual slavery campaign. Through the Voluntary Labor Service Law, enacted in 1944, any unmarried woman between 12 and 40 years old was required to serve at least 12 months in war time activities. Women in the Corps were moved across Korea and into Japan where they worked in factories, assisted medical personnel, and other war activities. But the law increased the difficulty and scarcity of women who could be mobilized for the comfort stations. Due to the shortage, some women were deferred to comfort stations to fulfill their required war time activities without notice of the sex work in which they were slated (Lie, 1997; Tanaka, 2002).

Many Korean families tried to have their daughters married quickly as a form of protection but ultimately no women were safe. The demand for Comfort Women was so
great that neither age nor marital status were taken into account when kidnapping females. Women also searched from employment so as to already be employed in wartime activities without service in the Corps. Unfortunately, official employment offices as well as promises of employment with local brokers created an easy way in which to capture women (Chung, 1997; Lie, 1997; Tanaka, 2002).

As WWII was drawing to a close the comfort stations fell into chaos. As Allied troops advanced, Comfort Women became civilian casualties of war through the Japanese military neglect or with purposeful intent. Some women were forced to serve Japanese soldiers in underground shelters during bombing attacks, perishing along with them. Others were murdered while the Japanese forces committed suicide. Some were murdered by being placed in caves or submarines and then deserted. The most common response was for the Japanese military to abandon the stations with the women inside, but some battalions would burn the station with the women inside, as they left (Chung, 1997).

Many of the women who were abandoned and survived had great difficulty returning home. Some were saved by U.S. military and aided in their return home. Unfortunately, some overseas Comfort Women were unable to return home or chose not to return due to the shame they felt they would incur to themselves and their family from their enslavement. It is not known how many women died as victims of warfare (Chung, 1997; Lie, 1997; Tanaka, 2002).

The settlement of peace between the Allied nations and Japan was a vast and complicated task. The end of WWII was made more complex given the expansive war crimes and excessive violence that occurred throughout the Asia Pacific, specifically
where the Japanese military was present (Maga, 2001). In 1945, the United Nations Crimes Commission (UN Commission) was created to ensure the detection, apprehension, trial, and punishment of persons accused of war crimes, with potential charges of Class A-crimes against peace, Class B-conventional war crimes, and Class C-crimes against humanity. Due to the vastness of WWII, the majority of responsibility for field investigations and the preparation of charges fell to individual Allied nations in countries where the crimes occurred (Henry, 2013).

Of the many trials of Japanese personnel after WWII, the Tokyo Trails became the most widely known due to the high ranking military leaders and government officials indicted on crimes against peace. Laws establishing the protection of human rights and peace were first created for the Tokyo and Nuremberg Trails, as the UN Commission created a list of 32 crimes that were punishable at the subsequent trials which included rape and the abduction of girls and women for the purpose of enforced prostitution (Maga, 2001; Henry, 2013).

While the Tokyo Trials, as well other WWII criminal trails, created important laws and precedence for the protection of humanity as well as settling the matter of peace after WWII, the Tokyo Trials have been met with criticism since their conclusion. Such criticism includes that the verdicts favored the victors, or Allied Nations, and that there was a lack of support for Asian victims within trial decisions (Maga, 2001). Sexual slavery has also become a point of contention in review of the trials as crimes conducted against women forced into sexual slavery were never brought to trial. No rape victims or surviving Comfort Women were ever called to testify at the Tokyo Trials or any of the
other trials held across Japan. Additionally, rape was not counted as a crime against humanity or a war crime in the Tokyo Charter (Henry, 2013).

While information was not brought before the courts for the crimes of rape and forced sexual slavery as the law had allowed, there was information available to do so given public knowledge of the campaign by participating Japanese military members, forced Korean laborers, testimony of surviving victims, and the U.S. military involvement in returning surviving Comfort Women home (Tanaka, 2002). Justice for Comfort Women was socially constrained at the time due to cultural and societal beliefs of not speaking of sexual relationships in public forums and the lack of women’s rights within the region and the world (Pyong, 2005; Henry, 2013).

Relations normalized in 1965 between South Korea and Japan under South Korean dictator, President Park Chung-hee and Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku. While normalization occurred 50 years ago, details within this agreement continue to influence South Korean and Japanese relations today. The normalization of relations brought a boost to both states’ economies but it incited riots within the South Korean public. Riots broke out as the normalization process progressed as the public demanded reparations and Japanese governmental acknowledgement of past wrongs before normal relations were restored. Given Park’s control of the government, he forcefully put down the protests and the Normalization of Relations Agreement was signed. With the agreement, both states consented to close the issue of reparations and past wrongs related to WWII and the colonization of the Korean peninsula, which included the issue of Comfort Women. The Japanese government also agreed to pay $800 million in aid to South Korea as a whole (Seth, 2011).
The history of Comfort Women did not enter into the Japanese national discourse and discussion of WWII upon its conclusion. Information regarding the issue was not readily available to the public due to the destruction of information at its conclusion and information being contained within classified government documents. The national discussion and educational representation of the WWII in Japan focused more on the Japanese experience than that of also including the victimization of other nations due to Japanese action (Tanaka, 2002; Lawson and Tannaka, 2011; Harney, 2014).

Even though the Japanese government did not directly acknowledge their involvement with atrocities such as the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery, Japanese soldiers’ diaries and memoirs concerning events of WWII were published as books available for purchase by the public. The Japanese public had vague knowledge of the events of forced sexual slavery during the war, but it was often portrayed as freely chosen military prostitution or romanticized as love during the struggles of war (Hyun & Yi, 2003).

Rumors of the forced exploitation of women during WWII within the Korean public were rampant after WWII. Due to the Korean War, dictatorship, and the authoritarian regimes that followed WWII there was not an open social space to discuss and pursue the collective remembering to address the atrocity of Comfort Women fully until democratic elections in 1988. During the South Korea’s struggle for democracy in the 1970s and 1980s, women’s rights organizations grew alongside pro-democracy groups. These women’s rights organizations first started with the cause of equality in the work place and in society but soon expanded to championing the rights of former
Comfort Women when their plight came to light during the 1980s as women’s groups were continuing to increase (Cho, 1998; Pyong, 2005).

I. Japanese governmental use and response to the history of Comfort Women

In 1991, lawsuits filed by South Korean Comfort Women brought the atrocities of the Japanese Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery to international attention. After the first South Korean case, similar lawsuits followed from Filipinos and Taiwanese women. Of the lawsuits filed by Comfort Women in 1991 to 1992, all were rejected by the Japanese courts. Comfort women from the around the world have continued to submit lawsuits requesting compensation and governmental acknowledgement of the pain the Japanese government inflicted during WWII, as of yet no such lawsuit has won in the Japanese judiciary system (Asian Women’s Fund, 2007).

The first Comfort Woman to file a lawsuit against the Japanese government and publicly share her testimony was Kim Hak-sun from South Korea. Her testimony inspired Japanese historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki to conduct research on the Japanese government’s involvement in the Comfort Station campaign. Yoshimi’s research unearthed governmental documents pertaining to the organization of Comfort Stations within the archives of the Japanese Self-Defense Agency. He published his findings in major newspapers around Japan in 1992 (Nozaki, 2002). Due to the strong accusations made against the Japanese government within the lawsuits and from Yoshimi’s evidence from governmental records, Prime Minister Miyazawa’s administration launched a governmental investigation in 1991 to assess government involvement in the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993 a.).

Speeches and Pronouncements
The governmental study on the issue of Comfort Women was carried out by the Japanese Cabinet Councillors' [sic] Office on External Affairs from December 1991 to August 1993. The study reviewed governmental agencies and their documentation related to WWII that included the National Police Agency, the Defense Agency, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Ministry of Labor, the National Archives, and the National Diet Library. Along with Cabinet officials exploring Japanese government documentation, they also visited the U.S. National Archives to gather relevant information (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993 a.). 190 documents pertaining to the issue of Comfort Women were found throughout the government agencies. Along with government documentation the Cabinet Councilors’ Office also collected personal testimonies from 16 former Comfort Women as well as Japanese military veterans (Asian Women’s Fund, 2007).

The study concluded with results of the investigation being publically announced by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono Yohei on August 4, 1993. Kono stated that the study confirmed that the Japanese Imperial Military was involved with the establishment, organization, and recruitment of a great number of women whose totals were largely composed of Korean citizens. Kono further acknowledged that women forced into the Sexual Slavery Campaign suffered immense misery and indignity. He offered apologies on behalf of the Japanese government for the brutality that was inflicted on these women which is reflected in the full statement in appendix A. Kono’s public announcement is commonly referred to as the Kono statement (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1993 b.; appendix A).
The Kono Statement has been pivotal in framing the government response from Japan on the issue of Comfort Women, specifically towards South Korea, since its creation. After the Kono Statement, three Japanese Prime Ministers offered apologies for the comfort system campaign, which included, Miyazawa Kiichi in 1992, Hosokawa Morihiro in 1993, and Murayama Tomiichi in 1995, please see Appendix B,C, and D for full statements (Memory & Reconciliation in the Asia Pacific, 2007 b.; Appendix B,C,D respectively). Most notably, these apologies were on behalf of the Prime Ministers themselves and make a clear distinction between the current democratic government of today versus the Imperial government during WWII.

While Japanese Prime Ministers have publicly offered their sincerest apologies to the Comfort Women, no compensation has ever been provided by the Japanese government. The Japanese government refuses compensation to individual South Korean Comfort Women citing the 1965 normalization agreement where the issue of reparations for past violence was agreed to be closed (Japan Daily Press, 2013).

Current Prime Minister (as of 2016) Abe Shinzo has also been actively involved with the issue and remembrance of Comfort Women. Since the beginning of Abe’s second term in December 2012, there have been four incidents where the authenticity of the Comfort Women history has been publicly questioned through rhetoric or action.

The first such event includes the possible revision of the Kono statement. As Abe began his second term, he was under suspicion by the international community for potentially revising the Japanese Comfort Women apology due to multiple statements on the topic before being elected to his second term. He refuted these claims when he was
officially assumed office as Prime Minister. In March, 2014, Abe made a public announcement that he would not revise the statement (Quigley, 2014).

But in April 2014, Abe created a committee of five experts, in the fields of law and history from prominent universities with previous distinguished careers from around Japan to review the Kono Statement. The panel was given the task to evaluate the Statement for evidence of coercion by the South Korean government and the historical accuracy of information relating to the Japanese government’s involvement in the sexual enslavement of women. The panel reviewed classified governmental documents concerning the Kono Statement and historical evidence on the sexual slavery campaign. While the review was being conducted, Abe and his cabinet stated that they would not revise the Kono Statement no matter the outcome of the review. In June, 2014, the committee released their findings and stated that there was evidence of coercion by the South Korean government through specific wording to force the Japanese government take responsibility, that during the creation of the apology the South Korean government was not seeking compensation for Comfort Women, and that the statement was issued so that bilateral relations with South Korea would not deteriorate. The panel also claimed they did not find any evidence directly connecting the Japanese government to the recruitment of Comfort Women (Yoshida, 2014 a.).

The intention of not revising the Kono Statement became uncertain again in August, 2014 when a large popular newspaper based in Japan, the Asahi Shimbun, retracted a number of stories published concerning the Comfort Women in the 1990s. The first publication of the Comfort Women articles was controversial due to the blame that was placed on the Japanese government and their publication around the time of the first
lawsuits that were being filed by former Comfort Women. The articles were given credence due to their reliance on personal testimony from Yoshida Seiji, a man who claimed he kidnapped Korean women to work in comfort stations. These articles were retracted in August, 2014 as the Asahi Shimbun claimed they had evidence that Yoshida had falsified his testimony (Yoshida, 2014 b.). This retraction of Comfort Women articles by a leading newspaper has helped to fuel Abe’s apparent campaign of questioning the history of Comfort Women.

On October 1, 2014 Abe weakly reaffirmed his commitment to not revising the Kono Statement (Richards, 2014). However, following this second claim of not revising, his cabinet vowed to correct “wrong” information circulating worldwide. On October 16, 2014 Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide contacted Radhika Coomaraswamy, former Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women at the U.N. Human Rights Commission, and requested a partial revision to the 1996 United Nations special rapporteur’s report on the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery she authored. Suga and the cabinet pressed for the revision due to the inclusion of testimony from Yoshida, which the Asahi Shimbun had found false. The request was denied citing that the report was based on multiple sources of evidence with a strong reliance on former Comfort Women’s testimony. Yoshida’s testimony was just one supporting piece of evidence that was included (Yoshida, 2014 e.).

Response to Challenges

Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi (1994-1996) set up the Asian Women Fund (AWF) in 1995 in response to the demands from regional governments and their respective sexual slavery survivors for reparations. Prime Minister Murayama stated that
the AWF was created so that the Japanese population could atone for the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery. This sentiment of country wide atonement is also reflected in the AWF’s mission statement. While the Japanese government paid for the operational costs of the AWF, it was led by its own Board of Directors (Asian Women’s Fund, 2007).

The AWF raised 600 million yen during its twelve operational years through donations from multiple sources throughout the population which included Diet members, Cabinet Ministers, companies, labor unions, political parties, and individual contributions in an effort to compensate and support former Comfort Women. Beginning in 1996, each woman who was identified by their respective government as a former Comfort Woman, and then whose name was sent to the AWF, received 2 million yen for her personal use and 3 million yen provided by the Japanese government for medical expenses through governmental agencies and welfare projects (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014).

The Comfort Women who received the monetary offerings from the AWF included 211 women from the Philippines, 61 women from South Korea, and 13 women from Taiwan. Women from the Netherlands, and Indonesia were never identified by their governments and so the AWF conducted social welfare projects in the respective countries which included the construction of living facilities for the elderly in places where Comfort Women were believed to have lived with first priority occupancy provided to former Comfort Women. Grant money for the care and support of WWII survivors was also made available to Indonesia and the Netherlands’ welfare programs (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014).
When a former Comfort Women received compensation from the AWF, an apology letter from the Japanese Prime Minister followed. The letter acknowledged the atrocity that Comfort Women were forced to endure and expresses atonement for the past in the form of monetary compensation on behalf of the Japanese people including the Prime Minister. The letter was first written and sent by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro and was subsequently resigned by Prime Ministers Obuchi Keizo, Mori Yoshiro, and Koizumi Junichiro. The letter stayed the same under each administration as shown in Appendix E. Unfortunately, rumors abounded that the women who accepted compensation from the AWF would be barred from filing lawsuits against the Japanese government for the atrocities they were forced to endure. The AWF published a statement on their website refuting these claims (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014; Appendix E).

While the AWF’s main objective was to atone for the Japanese population’s misdeeds of the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery, it avowed in its mission statement that the fund would also support projects aimed at resolving contemporary problems concerning women such as domestic violence. In the effort to tackle women’s issues, the AWF created the Women’s Dignity Project where it supported various NGOs that championed women’s rights, held round table discussions, and led international conferences (Asian Women’s Fund, 2007).

In 2000, former Prime Minister and creator of the AWF, Murayama Tomiichi was elected as the fund’s President. Seven years later, under Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, the fund closed, as it was determined that the AWF had completed its mission of atonement and remembrance. The AWF compiled a digital history of the Military Mobilization of
Sexual Slavery on its website (Asian Women’s Fund, 2007). Funds, such as the 2 million yen for personal use and the 3 million yen for medical support is no longer provided to any additionally identified Comfort Women from the AWF or the Japanese government. Interestingly, on March 1st, 2007, the same month that the AWF closed, Abe gave a quote stating, “The fact is, there is no evidence to prove there was coercion,” which supported a group of 120 LDP lawmakers in their proposal that same year to revise the Kono Statement (Tabuchi, 2007).

The Internet has also become a point of contention where the Japanese government has had to respond to challenges on the issue of Comfort Women. On October 15, 2014, Japan’s Foreign Ministry took down a page of its website dedicated to the 1995 appeal for donations on behalf of the AWF. While the AWF has been closed since 2007, the Foreign Ministry page also included a deeply remorseful apology to the victims of the sexual slavery campaign. According to the Reiji Yoshida, the key portion of the donation appeal read:

Particularly brutal was the act of forcing women, including teenagers, to serve the Japanese armed forces as ‘comfort women,’ a practice that violated the fundamental dignity of women. No manner of apology can ever completely heal the deep wound inflicted on these women both emotionally and physically (Yoshida, 2014 d.).

The repeal of the page came after Yamada Hiroshi’s, Secretary-General of Party for Future Generations, request at the Diet session on Oct. 6, 2014 for the review and removal of government documents that erroneously cite government responsibility in the issue of Comfort Women. In response to protests from South Korea, Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga held a press conference where he claimed the removal of the page was in
Memorials

Memorials have also been a point of contention between Japan and South Korea. Japanese leaders, including Ministers and Director-Generals, have been frequently vocal in their call for the South Korean government to remove statues commemorating Comfort Women within South Korea and around the world during their respective Minister and Director-General meetings.

Of specific concern is the Comfort Woman commemorative statue placed outside the Japanese Embassy in Seoul. The statue is of a young Korean woman, dressed in traditional garb, sitting solemn in a chair with an empty chair beside her. The statue is strategically placed across the street from the Japanese Embassy, facing the building’s front entrance (The Korean Herald, 2014). The Japanese government is also concerned about similar statues placed around the world commemorating Comfort Women. Of those, two have been erected in the United States, one in Paradise Park, New Jersey and the other in Glendale, California. Both sites are home to identical statues to the one in Seoul and were erected by Korean-American organizations (Schrank, 2013).

The discussions on commemorative Comfort Women statues peaked in late 2014. Japanese leaders demanded the removal of the Comfort Women statues in Seoul to improve bilateral relations, but South Korean leaders responded saying that they were unable to remove the statues since they were erected by private organizations who had followed proper procedure to have them placed, they also encouraged Japanese leaders to
resolve the issue themselves through a correct apology and compensation to victims (The Korea Herald, 2014).

II. South Korean governmental use and response to the history of Comfort Women

Similar to the Japanese government, the South Korean government has been actively involved with the remembrance of the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery campaign but, unlike the Japanese government South Korean leaders have acted in support of the former Comfort Women and their history. Government involvement with championing the cause of reparations, support, and remembrance of Comfort Women began most notably during the transition of the state from authoritarianism to democracy, specifically under the growth of South Korea’s Women’s Movement.

The Women’s Movement within South Korea first developed under the authoritarian leadership of President Park Chung-hee (1961-1979) in response to his agenda of rapid industrialization (Seth, 2011). This agenda left labor rights, protections, and safety nonexistent within the workplace. Women were specifically targeted during the industrialization campaign as they were seen as a source of cheap labor and easily controlled. Many women toiled long hours in factories that were unsanitary and dangerous. These women also typically experienced violence, such as sexual harassment and abuse, from supervisors who were usually male (Ching & Louhe, 1995).

Women’s unions, composed mainly of financially poor factory women, developed in the late 1960s in response to the continued deplorable working conditions. A second major focus of the women’s movement developed around abolishing the Family Law in the 1970s within educated, middle class women. The Family Law was passed in 1958.
under South Korea’s first president, Rhee Syngman. This law institutionalized many of
the Confucian values that were entrenched within Korean society as well as a Japanese
family organization system that was used during colonialism (Lee & Lee, 2010).

Lee Tai-young, the first South Korean female lawyer, advocated for the
abolishment of the Family Law and constructed as well as sponsored nine organizations
to support women around South Korea, which included the Women’s Issues Research
Center and the Young Women’s Christian Association (Cho, 1998).

Both movements came together for the cause of democracy. The South Korean
public had strived for democracy since the end of the Korean War and had over thrown
the first president, Rhee Syngman, through public protests over corruption. The
movement for democracy continued under President Park Chung-hee, although it was
severely oppressed through force. The Women’s Movement joined the cause of
democracy in the 1970s. Through the democratic cause, the Family Law and women’s
labor movement came together to become more organized, expand their objectives
beyond that of labor and the Family Law, and develop a collaborative network
connecting multiple women’s groups. A great influence from the democracy movement
was the developed awareness of equality within a democratic state where women and
men can equally shape the government.

The democracy movement succeeded in 1988 with the free election of Roh Tae-
woo as President. The Women’s Movement blossomed at the dawn of democracy. In
1989 there were 2,000 women’s organizations compared to 18 in the 1970s and 23 in the
1960s (Lee & Lee, 2013). The large number of women’s organizations provided the
opportunity for multiple organization to work together to accomplish a broad amount of
objectives. In 1987, 27 women’s organizations came together to form the Korean Women’s Associations United (KWAU) with the fundamental objectives of passing legislation for the protection of women and children against sex trafficking and violence, to make such actions illegal, and the abolishment of the Family Law which was successfully repealed in 2005. An important feature of the KWAU, that continues today, is that while KWAU provides a platform for multiple women’s organizations to collaborate, it is also organized with the purpose of the Women’s Movement speaking to the government with one voice (Ching & Louhe, 1995).

Another important collaboration of women’s organizations is the Korean Council for the Women Drafted for Sexual Slavery by Japan (the Korean Council) which was created in 1989 from 36 independent women’s organizations that focused on combating sexual tourism and sexual violence. With the liberties that came with democracy many of the individual member organizations, like the Korean Church Women United, began to conduct research on the long rumored Japanese Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery, which initiated the creation of the Korean Council for a combined effort in researching and addressing this issue (Pyong, 2005).

Part of the research the Korean Council conducted was collecting testimonies from living former Comfort Women. The Korean Council took out newspaper ads as well as ads on the radio asking former Comfort Women to come out from hiding and share their story. One of the women was Kim Hak-sun. Kim, working with the Korean Council, held a press conference in 1991, in Seoul where she publicly shared her experience of being a Comfort Woman. After her public testimony, 200 women from South Korea and China also provided their experience to the Korean Council. Women from the Philippines
and Taiwan also chose to share their encounters with the Korean Council once Kim’s testimony gained international attention, which prompted the Korean Council to expand their call for testimonies beyond South Korea. Later that same year in December, the Korean Council supported and encouraged three former Comfort Women as they filed lawsuits against the Japanese government for reparations due to violence against them during WWII (Pyong, 2005).

Speeches and Pronouncements

Since the 1991 Comfort Women lawsuits, the South Korean leadership has been calling for the Japanese government to make a correct apology and reparations to living Comfort Women to atone for misdeeds in WWII. Such calls have come from standing Presidents, Foreign Ministers, Cabinet Members, and Chief of Commissions among others. The Minister of the Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF) and the Chief of the Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea (the Commission) have been two fervent outspoken leaders on the issue of Comfort Women as both organizations prioritize this issue within their respective mission objectives (The Korea Herald, 2013 a.; Fantz & Armstrong, 2014).

Even though South Korean leadership had been pushing the Japanese government for redress on the issue of Comfort Women since 1991, some activists groups and survivors claimed that the South Korean government was not doing enough on the behalf of the former Comfort Women to reach a solution. In August 2011, South Korea’s Constitutional Court ruled that “the Korean government had failed to make all diplomatic effort to obtain compensation for the comfort women” (The Korea Herald,
2013), which “constitutes infringement on the basic human rights of the victims and a violation of the Constitution.” (The Asahi Shimbun, 2012). The Constitutional Court ruling ignited an active whole of government response in making diplomatic effort to obtain compensation and solution for the former Comfort Women.

After the Constitutional Court decision during a regular scheduled Foreign Ministers meeting in October, 2011, Kim urged Gemba for compensation and a governmental apology from Japan to the former Comfort Woman. Likewise, the 2011 MOGEF Minister, Kim Kum-lae called for the Japanese government to make an official apology while former Comfort Women are still alive during a visit to a shelter for elderly women. The Chief of the Commission, Yoon Mi-hyang, also made a public statement calling the Japanese government to help the surviving Comfort Women regain their human rights and repair their reputation by issuing a government apology (Laurence, 2011).

In December, 2011, President Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013) also participated in rectifying the issue of Comfort Women during his visit to Japan where he urged Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko (2011-2012) to make the issue right, with an official apology and compensation, while surviving Comfort Women are still alive. Noda, like all of the Japanese Prime Ministers before him, stood behind the Kono Statement and the 1965 Normalization of Relations Agreement (Foster, 2011).

The fervency of seeking acceptable governmental resolution on behalf of surviving Comfort Women did not end with President Lee. President Park Geun-hye (2013-present) has made the resolution of Comfort Women central to her administration. Park refused to meet Prime Minister Abe citing his incorrect view of history upon taking
office. This freeze in relations has lasted nearly three years, since the beginning of Park’s term in 2013 until the first initial meeting in November, 2015 (Choe, 2015).

Park has been vocal in calling for Japan to acknowledge the history of Comfort Women to make amends for the state’s past atrocities through compensation and a correct government apology. Park has been quick to issue such statements and rebukes in response to Abe’s controversial actions such as over the committee review over the Kono Statement. In addition to publicly stating frustration over Japan’s actions and decision, in this event the Park administration also lodged a formal complaint with Japan’s ambassador to Korea. Additionally, other actions that have elicited responses from the Park administration include Abe’s visit to Yad Vashem, a memorial in Jerusalem for the victims of the Holocaust in January, 2015 (Yonhap News, 2015). Park has also been willing to criticize Japan’s incorrect view of history and its failure to address the Comfort Women issue around the world such as at the South Korean-European Union Summit on November 9th, 2013 (Hofilena, 2013).

Park has not been the only active member of her administration in addressing the issue of Comfort Women. While Park has not been holding high level meetings with Abe until late 2015, lower levels of government such as Foreign Ministers and MOGEF Ministers have been continuing to meet and address the Comfort Women. Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se made a public statement on October 23rd, 2014, while in the United States, urging Japan to resolve the Comfort Women issue. Additionally, MOGEF Minister Cho Yoon-sun (2013-2014) had been attempting to meet each South Korean Comfort Woman individually (Fantz & Armstrong, 2014).
While the Japanese government continues to stand behind the Kono Statement and the 1965 Normalization of Relations Agreement and thus not issuing an apology or reparations, the Japanese government also believes that the AWF provided appropriate compensation to surviving Comfort Women. The South Korean government, as well as activist groups, does not see compensation from the AWF as an acceptable form of compensation for the atrocities former Comfort Women sustained as the funds are not directly from the government but by donations from private individuals and businesses (Asian Women’s Fund, 2007).

Of the registered surviving Comfort Women only 61 accepted the funds from the AWF before its closure in 2007 (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). Many former Comfort Women were pressured by activist groups as well as governmental agencies not to take the compensation the AWF was offering. According to the project completion report from the AWF, President Kim Dae-jung created a fund to support surviving Comfort Women with money from the South Korean government as well as the Korean Council, but this money was only provided to women who did not accept AWF funds. 142 women accepted this fund and agreed not to accept funds from the AWF (Asian Women’s Fund, 2007).

Response to Challenges

The Korean Council and the KWAU, have been, and currently are, active in the remembrance of Comfort Women. During the administrations of Presidents Kim Young-sam (1993-1998) and Kim Dae-joung (1998-2003) women’s organizations enjoyed strong support from the government. Such support propelled the South Korean women’s movement into participation in international forums such as the U.N. Fourth World
Conference on Women in 1995 held in Beijing, China. One of the most important takeaways from both of these administrations was that it set the framework for increased government involvement into the Women’s Movement through a small commission on Women Affairs, which planned and carried out policies for women. The success of the Women Affairs commission in supporting women through government action led to the creation of the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (Ministry of Gender Equality & Family, 2012).

The MOGEF was founded in 2001 by its first title, Ministry of Gender Equality. In 2005 the Ministry was renamed to include family. Objectives of this Ministry include implementation of “women, family and youth policies so that each member of the nation can be benefited through the whole life [sic]” (Ministry of Gender Equality & Family, 2012). The MOGEF works directly with the KWAU, and as such places large emphasis on combatting human trafficking. Through the emphasis on human trafficking and KWAU’s work on the issue of Comfort Women, the MOGEF is a leading governmental agency with dedicated efforts to the issue of Comfort Women. The MOGEF has allocated funds for the support of Comfort Women with the objectives of “Support to stabilize the livelihood of comfort women and related commemoration business” (Ministry of Gender Equality & Family, 2012).

While the MOGEF includes support for former Comfort Women as part of its mission, this is not the only government agency within South Korea to do so. In 2005, on the 60th anniversary of the conclusion of WWII and the end of the Japanese colonialization of Korea, President Roh Moo-hyun established the Commission. This commission is currently organized as a temporary committee under the authority of the
President, and has been empowered by each successive President since 2005. Beginning in 2013, the Commission has been actively working toward becoming a standalone governmental agency (The Korea Herald, 2013 b.).

The mission of the Commission is to provide awareness of the atrocities that the Korean people were forced to endure in WWII at the hand of the Japanese and to seek redress for the victims. Such reparations include the return of Korean people’s remains to South Korea, public Japanese governmental apology to the victims and their families, as well as financial compensation. The Commission also maintains a record of self-identified victims (The Korea Herald, 2013 b.).

The Commission has estimated that 7.8 million Koreans were forcibly mobilized under Japanese occupation for labor, such as in factories and coal mines, for military service, and to service Japanese personnel, such as Comfort Women, throughout its growing empire. As of August, 2012 there were 226,000 registered South Korean forced labor victims (The Japan Times, 2012).

Under President Lee’s Administration, the Comfort Women issue reached a particularly tense period in February, 2012 when a former special rapporteur on the U.N. Human Rights Council, Gay McDougall, met with Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan to suggest forming an arbitration panel with Tokyo to reach a resolution for surviving Comfort Women. McDougall argued that, “The Japanese government remains liable for grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law, violations that amount in their totality to crimes against humanity.” Kim acknowledge the option that McDougall presented and stated that due to the constrains of time, given the advanced age of the
survivors, the South Korean government is determined to do everything it can to resolve the issue (The Korean Times, 2012).

While Lee again pressed for an apology and compensation from Prime Minister Noda during a second state visit in August, 2012 South Korean Foreign Ministry officials claimed that an arbitrations board would not be perused due to the potential deterioration of relations such an action would cause (The Asahi Shimbun, 2012).

Memorials

While the South Korean and Japanese governmental view of how to rectify the issue of Comfort Women has been at a standstill for a number of years, the beginning of meetings between Abe and Park have brought new matters to the forefront. The growth of commemorative Comfort Women statues around South Korea and the world, particularly in the United States, has become an additional point of contention within the Comfort Women dispute. Bilateral talks between South Korean and Japan are currently stalled as Abe has placed the condition of removing the statue outside the Japanese Embassy in Seoul for resolving the tense diplomatic relations surrounding the history of Comfort Women (The Asahi Shimbun, 2015). The commemorative statue outside of the Japanese Embassy was erected by the Korean Council in 2011 not only to honor former Comfort Women but to also highlight the 1,000th weekly protest held by supporters of Comfort Women demanding an official apology and compensation. The Japanese government has requested the removal of this particular statue multiple times since its creation, first by Prime Minister Noda (Foster, 2011).

Such commemorative statues have been created and placed by private, student, and activist groups in South Korea and Korean-American groups in the United States.
South Korean leaders, Foreign Ministers, Director-Generals, and President Park, have stated that all of the monuments that have been raised, which have been in the last five years, are not of the South Korean government’s doing but by private donors who follow the law when they are established. South Korean leaders commonly refer the Japanese government back to the South Korean government’s approved method of resolving the Comfort Women issue and the most likely way of removing the Comfort Women statues issue (*The Korea Herald*, 2014).

III. Chapter Analysis

Japan and South Korea have both demonstrated involvement from the entire government in the history of Comfort Women as illustrated through the events detailed in the previous sections. There is a trend in the position of government involved with this history. Figure 1 below categorizes each event in the case study in relation to governmental position.
Figure 1. *Position of Government action in relation to the remembrance of Comfort Women*

**Japan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Gov’t Actions</th>
<th>Officials Involved</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 6                       | 4 actions: Prime Ministers  
                          2 actions: Chief Cabinet Secretary | Speeches and Pronouncements | 1. PM Miyazawa apologizes in regards to Comfort Women at the South Korean National Assembly, 1992  
2. PM Hosokawa apologizes for Comfort Women at the 127th session of the Japanese National Diet, 1993  
3. PM Tomiichi publicly apologizes to Comfort Women at the founding of the AWF, 1995  
4. PM Abe creates a committee to review the Kono Statement, 2014  
5. Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono issues the results of the Japanese Comfort Women Study, 1993  
6. Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga request revision of UN report on Comfort Women, 2014 |
| 8                       | 7 actions: Prime Ministers  
                          1 action: Diet Members/Lawmakers | Response to Challenges | 1. PM Tomiichi creates AWF, 1995  
2. PM Hashimoto creates apology letter for AWF compensation, beginning in 1996  
3. PM Obuchi resigns AWF apology, 1998-2000  
4. PM Mori resigns AWF apology, 2000-2001  
5. PM Koizumi resigns AWF apology, 2001-2006  
6. PM Abe closes AWF, 2007  
7. PM Abe gives a public statement against the Kono Statement, 2012  
8. 120 LDP lawmakers draft a proposal to revise the Kono Statement, 2007 |
<p>| 5                       | 5 actions: Ministers and Directors | Memorials and Offerings | 1. 2014 Japanese and South Korean Ministers met during Director-General meetings to create better Japanese-South Korean bilateral ties. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>Number of Gov’t Actions</th>
<th>Officials Involved</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
2. Pres. Lee calls for an official apology and compensation to PM Noda, 2001  
3. Pres. Park refuses to meet with PM Abe, 2013  
4. Pres. Park lodges formal complaint against Japan, 2015  
6. At 2011 Foreign Ministers meeting, South Korea Ministers call for an official apology and compensation to former Comfort Women  
7. MOGEF Minister calls for apology an official apology, 2011  
8. Chief of the Commission calls for compensation and an official apology, 2011  
9. Foreign Minister gives a public statement calling for an official apology and compensation, 2014  
10. MOGEF Minister publicly meets with Comfort Women, 2014  
11. Constitutional Court ruling on government involvement with the settlement of the Comfort Women issue, 2011 |
| 4           | 3 actions: President    |                    | Response to Challenges | 1. MOGEF established under Pres. Kim, 2001  
2. Pres. Roh established the Commission, 2005  
3. Pres. Lee calls for an official apology and compensation after arbitration is cancelled, 2012  
4. Foreign Minister considers arbitration panel, 2012 |
| 2           | 2 actions: President    |                    | Memorials and Offerings  | 1. Pres. Lee told PM Noda an official apology and compensation will remove the statue, 2011  
2. Pres. Park told Japanese leaders that they have the power to remove the statue with an official apology and compensation, 2014 |
All of the events under review show the active involvement of high levels of
government. Participation by multiple levels of government casts doubt on popular
newspaper claims that engagement in the history of Comfort Women center around single
political actors such as Prime Ministers Abe or Koizumi.

For the category of Speeches and pronouncements, Japan had four events of
government involvement while South Korea had eleven. In both governments, the
Executive was equally as involved in addressing the issue. Likewise, the category of
Response to Challenges also saw the most involvement from the President and Prime
Minister while the category of Memorials was divided with the South Korea President
responding more than the Japanese Prime Minister. The number of acts from the
leadership of each respective government, as well as the involvement of high level
officials, demonstrates a vested interest in how the history of Comfort Women is being
told as well as perpetuating their specific understanding of what it means to have the
issue of Comfort Women resolved.

The majority of the Comfort Women issues between the Japanese and South
Korean government has been over the idea of remedying the wrongs of the past on behalf
of the former Comfort Women. The Japanese government has offered apologies for the
event of the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery, as Figure 2 illustrates, but has never
offered compensation as the Japanese government stands behind the 1965 Normalization
of Relations Agreement as do the Japanese Courts (Asian Women Fund, 2007). A chart
depicting the ideas or words used by political leaders was not created as four out of the
six Speeches and Pronouncement category were found to be apologies on behalf of the
Japanese government. Likewise, the South Korean government’s dominate rhetoric was a
call for compensation and an appropriate apology. However, since apologies by the
Japanese government have been issued in the two categories of Speeches and
Pronouncements as well as Response to Challenges, Figure 2 provides some analysis of
the data in relation to Japanese government involvement.

Figure 2. Japanese government apologies for the Military Mobilization of Comfort
Stations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Gov’t apologies</th>
<th>Officials Involved</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 9                         | 8 apologizes: Prime Minister
1 apology: Chief Cabinet Sec. | 1. PM Miyazawa apologizes in regards to Comfort Women at the South Korean National Assembly, 1992
2. PM Hosokawa apologizes for Comfort Women at the 127th session of the Japanese National Diet, 1993
3. PM Tomiichi publicly apologizes to Comfort Women at the founding of the AWF, 1995
4. PM Tomiichi creates AWF, 1995
5. PM Hashimoto creates apology letter for AWF compensation, beginning in 1996
6. PM Obuchi resigns AWF apology, 1998-2000
7. PM Mori resigns AWF apology, 2000-2001
8. PM Koizumi resigns AWF apology, 2001-2006
9. Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono issues the results of the Japanese Comfort Women Study, 1993 which offers an apology and the history is reaffirmed as true. |

Similarly, while the Japanese government has apologized through the Kono
Statement, which is currently the government sanctioned way to resolve the issue of
Comfort Women, the case study demonstrates that the South Korean government has
continually rejected all of the apologies as an appropriate form of atonement for the past
wrongs against Korean Comfort Women. South Korean leadership have continued to call
for compensation and an official apology from the Prime Minister on behalf of Japan.
The previous apologies issued from the Prime Ministers have all been rejected by the
South Korean politicians because they were not on behalf of the Japanese government but personal apologies and not accompanied with compensation directly from the Japanese government to former Comfort Women. The same message of an appropriate apology and compensation to surviving sexual slavery victims is found throughout all the categories by the South Korean leadership.

While the Japanese courts have been involved with the issue of Comfort Women in relation to lawsuits, the South Korean Constitutional Court has also been involved by requiring the South Korean government to seek compensation and an appropriate apology from the Japanese government. The case of government involvement in seeking and obtaining compensation for former Comfort Women was first brought to the courts through distressed activists and survivors for the cause. Such an action to prompt the Court to motivate the government illustrates a strong relationship of government legitimacy to the memory of Comfort Women. The population expects a competent government to work towards and achieve compensation and apology on behalf of survivors. Additionally, in the 17 events of governmental involvement in the memory of Comfort Women, Japan is the sole perpetrator of crimes against Comfort Women and the only government that is able to provide the complete resolution to the history. This idea of a “sole perpetrator” is an act of othering by the South Korean elite towards Japan. The Korean Comfort Women are portrayed as part of the in group, one of the population’s own, who have been victimized by the out group. Thus, the population is motivated by a sense of nationalism to seek redress from the outside group.

Likewise, the Japanese elite are developing a sense of nationalism within the population through the idea of compensation. While the government has issued multiple
apologies compensation is withheld as a point of national pride. The government seeks to separate itself from the dark past through the Normalization of Relations Agreement with South Korea. The government of Japan today is portraying itself as separate from the evil past and thus as a good government, population, and in turn as a positive “in group” through apologizing and moving forward.

All the government officials involved in the case study have maintained the status quo of their respective government in relation to Comfort Women except for Prime Minister Abe. Abe and his cabinet have deviated twice in the four events under the Speech and Proclamation section, first in making a committee to review the authenticity of the Kono Statement and in his Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga requesting a revision to the UN report on Comfort Women. Through his actions, Abe has directly questioned the history of Comfort Women which has increased the negative response from the South Korean government.

His actions to revise the Comfort Women history illustrate a motive in changing the narrative of the historical memory within the Japanese population. The goal of creating a more positive retelling of history has the potential to create a more positive view of the Japanese society and again developing a more positive view of the in group. This development of a more positive view of the in group bolsters the creation of nationalism.
I. Yasukuni Shrine in Historical Memory

Yasukuni Shrine (literally ‘peaceful national shrine’) (Inuzuka & Fuchs, 2014) is a Shinto shrine in Tokyo, Japan that was created by the Meiji government in 1896 to memorialize and house the souls of those who died fighting on behalf of the emperor in the Boshin War (O’Dwyer, 2010). At Japan’s entrance into conflicts after the Boshin War (1868-1869), the Shrine was expanded to honor all of Japan’s citizens, military and civilian, who died on behalf of the country in military altercations. The conflicts memorialized at Yasukuni Shrine are the Saga Uprising (1874), the Seinan War (1877), the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the First World War (1914-1918), the Manchurian Incident (1931-1932), the China Incident (1937), and World War II (1937-1945) (Yasukuni Shrine, 2008; Drea, 2009). The Shrine proclaims, “the 2,466,000 divinities enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine all sacrificed their lives to the public duty of protecting their motherland” (Yasukuni Shrine, 2008). These persons who gave their lives are honored as heroic souls (The Asahi Shimbun, 2013). Among Japanese citizens there are also a number of former colonial Korean and Taiwan soldiers enshrined at Yasukuni who died while serving Japan in WWII (Inuzuka & Fuchs, 2014).

Yasukuni Shrine follows the traditions and belief system of Shinto. A part of Shinto is the tradition of respecting and worshipping the deceased. It is believed that while no longer physically present, ancestors remain on earth as guardians protecting
their loved ones. The act of worshiping the guardian deities becomes a way in which to show honor and respect to these persons (Yasukuni Shrine, 2008). While Yasukuni Shrine honors the war dead and reveres them as deities who impart their blessings on the nation (O’Dwyer, 2010), there are no bodies or ashes contained on premise. Enshrinement is a ritual, or spiritual ceremony, conducted by the Shrine’s priests. The only physical connection to the person being honored is a small slip of paper with their name that is housed at the Shrine’s repository (Breen, 2008).

Along with the repository of the enshrined names, Yasukuni Shrine is made up of other significant historical items that are specifically militant in nature given the original intent of the Shrine’s creation. Around the grounds and at the Shrine’s entrance are multiple statues of imposing military figures and tributes to military events. Depictions include events from the Meiji (1868-1912) and Showa (1926-1989) periods (Perez, 1998) as well notable events from WWII, such as a statue depicting a Kamikaze pilot (O’Dwyer, 2010). Along with memorials such as these, Yasukuni Shrine also encompasses the Yushukan. According to Shaun O’Dwyer, the Yushukan is a museum dedicated to memorializing the history of sacrifice and weaponry of Japanese forces before the Meiji era until present day. Such artifacts include weapons, uniforms, battle relics and other memorabilia throughout these periods, however, materials from WWII dominate the museum (O’Dwyer, 2010).

Yasukuni Shrine has had a unique history with the Japanese government since its creation. Yasukuni Shrine’s commemoration of war casualties and Shinto’s connection with the emperor became a tool used by the Meiji government. The emperor preformed various Shinto rituals at Yasukuni Shrine which cemented ancient traditions into the
Meiji oligarchs’ modernizing agenda. The Meiji government’s use of Shinto traditions was the beginning of the modern ideology known as State Shinto (Breen, 2008; O’Dwyer, 2010). The tradition of the Emperor visiting Yasukuni Shrine and presenting the Shrine with offerings at the Great Rites of Autumn and Spring was established under the Meiji government as well (Breen, 2008). The commonality of Shinto and a shared place to mourn the war dead helped to unite Japan after the Tokugawa era (1600-1868) (Perez, 1998) and also aided in developing a sense of nationalism throughout the population.

The Meiji government continued to utilize the Yasukuni Shrine as a source of nationalism and unity for the population throughout its time in power. Such use is exemplified in the Imperial Rescript for Soldiers and Sailors (1882) as it stressed loyalty to the emperor as commander-in-chief and promised the reward of enshrinement as a divine spirit at Yasukuni Shrine. A customary farewell by kamikaze pilots to each other, as reported by Shaun O’Dwyer, was, “see you at Yasukuni” illustrating the power of the Shrine within society and the role of the Meiji government in promoting such a belief (O’Dwyer, 2010). Due to the glorification of death on behalf of the emperor, the Yasukuni Shrine became identified with the virtues of loyalty, self-sacrifice, and nationalism within the population (Breen, 2008; Ryu, 2007).

With the significance placed on the Yasukuni Shrine, the Meiji government directly oversaw its administration. The Shrine was overseen jointly by the Ministry of the Army and Ministry of the Navy. The Ministries handled the operations of Yasukuni Shrine such as determining the days of ritual, appointing priests, and managing the Shrine’s funding. In 1879, the Yasukuni Shrine was given the status of Special state-funded Shrine, which
provided the Shrine with ample amount of funds to cover expenses (Breen, 2008). With the government oversight, the Ministry of the Army and the Navy were able to directly nominate and approve persons for enshrinement (Ryu, 2007).

The conclusion of WWII and the U.S. occupation of Japan (1945 to 1952) changed the Yasukuni Shrine’s relationship with the government. During occupation, the U.S. and the new Japanese government⁴ created a new constitution for Japan which included the separation of government and religion, this separation is still a part of the Japanese constitution today in Article 20 (O’Dwyer, 2010). With the installation of the new constitution, Japan had the option of making Yasukuni Shrine a non-religious governmental organization or a private religious institution. The Shrine today is a private religious organization separate from the government (O’Dwyer, 2010). With the separation, Yasukuni Shrine lost the status of Special state-funded Shrine as well as the direct relationship with the government that had aided it in receiving government records of deceased military members for enshrinement (Breen, 2008).

While it became a separate entity apart from the government, the Shrine maintained its original mission of honoring citizens who died on behalf of the state through enshrinement. The Health, Labour, and Welfare Ministry’s Repatriation Relief Bureau (today the Social Welfare and War Victims' Relief Bureau) (Japan Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, 2015) provided former military members and repatriated citizens with social services. Since this bureau worked directly with the population who

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⁴ The pre-war Japanese Constitution, written in 1890, was found to be flawed in a post-war Japan, in part, due to the extensive power that was given to the military. The Japanese leaders created the Constitutional Problems Investigation Committee to draft a new constitution for Japan which was comprised of various Japanese groups and scholars. The first draft created by the committee was submitted to the MacArthur government for approval. The draft was rejected and returned with a suggested draft and edits from U.S. scholars. The second draft constitution was submitted to the Japanese National Diet where it was debated, revised and ultimately adopted in 1946 and enacted in 1947 (Learning Gateways, 2015).
had the potential to be honored at Yasukuni Shrine, the responsibility of gathering the information needed for the process of enshrinement, such as name, age, regiment, rank, place and date of death, was organized under the Repatriation Relief Bureau once the Ministries of the Army and Navy were reorganized (Breen, 2008). A new process of sending governmental records to Yasukuni Shrine was implemented.

Instead of being readily supplied with the government personnel information as had been done previously, Yasukuni Shrine now has to officially request information on the war dead from the government. From this request the Health and Wellness Ministry sends each prefecture a survey to compile the necessary information. Once the surveys are completed, the Health and Wellness Ministry compiles information cards which are then sent to Yasukuni Shrine for consideration. The Shrine makes the final decision on who are honored and who are not (Higurashi, 2013).

The new system of enshrinement was first practiced in April 1959. The vastness of WWII in the Asia-Pacific left a large number of persons available for enshrinement as well as numerous persons missing in action, unidentified, or left behind, who also had the potential for enshrinement albeit missing crucial information. Honoring those deceased in WWII began slowly in 1945 and concluded in 1959 with a mass memorial service. There were no war criminals enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine during these subsequent rituals (Breen, 2008; Higurashi, 2013).

The label of war criminal was first established and tried in a court of law at the conclusion of WWII at the Nuremberg Trials and Tokyo Trials (Maga, 2011). With the conviction of nearly 5,000 Japanese military members as Class A, B, and C war criminals, the government of Japan was left with the challenge on how to interpret
Japanese war criminals in relation to honor at Yasukuni Shrine (Higurashi, 2013). During WWII, propagandists had promoted the divinity of the emperor and that through the pledge of loyalty to him any soldier that died in battle died for a just cause since the emperor was divine (O’Dwyer, 2010).

The enshrinement of war criminals occurred gradually. Class A war criminals were widely known, given the publicity of the Tokyo Trials where 28 military and government leaders were indicted on crimes against peace as they ordered and led the war in Asia. 25 men were sequentially charged, two died in prison before trial proceedings were finished, and one man’s case was dismissed due to mental instability (Maga, 2011). There were 4,830 military members convicted as either Class B or C war criminals (Higurashi, 2013). Due to Allied war crimes trials throughout the Asia-Pacific, and with the high volume of military members indicted for crimes, these persons were not widely known by the public (Maga, 2011).

In 1958, the Health and Wellness Ministry quietly sent out the informational surveys to gather the personal information of Class B and C war criminals for consideration of enshrinement at Yasukuni Shrine, due in part to the lobby of deceased war criminals’ loved ones. The public was not notified of the dissemination of the surveys or of the plans to pursue possible enshrinement of war criminals, due to the government’s fear of widespread negative public opinion and possible repercussions. The limited knowledge of war crime classification also helped to keep the process of enshrinement quiet (Higurashi, 2013).

In 1959, under Head Priest Tsukuba Fujimaro (1946-1977) the first collection of Class B and C war criminals were quietly enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine. By 1967, four
sets of Class B and C war criminals had been enshrined, totaling 984 persons. Family members of the Class B and C war criminals were not notified of the enshrinement until after enshrinement occurred, even though some families had opposed enshrinement of their loved one (Higurashi, 2013).

The enshrinement of Class A war criminals was not as simple as Class B and C. The Japanese government had to proceed with greater caution than before due to the widespread knowledge on who constitutes a WWII Class A war criminal. In 1966, the Health and Welfare Ministry once again began quietly sending out informational surveys, this time for the collection of Class A war criminals’ personal information. The public was not notified of this collection of data with the intention of enshrinement (Higurashi, 2013).

In 1970, a group of 14 deceased Class A war criminals was submitted to the Yasukuni Shrine for consideration of enshrinement. The Lay Council of Yasukuni Shrine passed a resolution calling for the enshrinement of the Class A war criminals but left the timing of when to perform the ceremony up to the head priest. While Head Priest Tsukuba had worked quickly to honor Class B and C war criminals, he was not in favor of enshrining Class A war criminals and held off the enshrinement for this population as long as possible (Higurashi, 2013).

Tsukuba died in March, 1978. That same year in July, Matsudaira Nagayoshi was installed as Head Priest. Matsudaira moved quickly to honor the Class A war criminals. In October, 1978 all 14 Class A war criminals were enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine during a secret enshrinement ceremony (Higurashi, 2013).
In April 1979, it was announced to the public that all of Japan’s war criminals had been enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine. According to Higurashi Yoshinobu, the public had a limited reaction to the news (Higurashi, 2013). However, the enshrinement of Class A war criminals did affect the relationship between the Emperor and the Yasukuni Shrine. The Showa Emperor stopped his visits to the Shrine as a show of opposition to the Shrine’s decision to honor Class A war criminals. The last visit by the Emperor to Yasukuni Shrine was in 1978. Currently, while the tradition of an Emperor visiting Yasukuni to pay respects to the war dead have been informally stopped, an imperial emissary continues to visit the Yasukuni Shrine and provides offerings on behalf of the Imperial Family (O’Dwyer, 2010; Inuzuka & Fuchs, 2014).

While Imperial visits stopped after 1978, visits by Japanese prime ministers to Yasukuni continued. It had become a tradition since the conclusion of WWII for prime ministers to pay their respects to the war dead at Yasukuni Shrine during their administration. According to Phil Deans, every prime minister from 1945 until 1985, except for Prime Ministers Hatoyama Ichiro (1954-1955) and Ishibashi Tanzan (1956-1957), visited the Shrine at least once during their time in office. While the tradition of visiting Yasukuni Shrine by sitting prime ministers still occurred after the enshrinement of Class A, B, and C war criminals such visits came under scrutiny once the enshrinement of all war criminals was brought to light (Deans, 2007).

The scrutiny of prime minister visits stemmed from the discussion of separation of religion and government detailed in the Japanese Constitution (Article 20). Many prime ministers, such as Prime Minister Miki (1974-1976), declared that he was visiting the Shrine as a private person and refrained from signing Yasukuni Shrine’s guest book.
with his official title or using any state funds and properties to visit the Shrine which he claimed did not violate Article 20 (Deans, 2007).

Visits by prime ministers to Yasukuni Shrine briefly stopped in 1985 under Prime Minister Nakasone (1982-1987) in response to the negative international reaction to his visit. Prime Minister Nakasone visited Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, 1985 in honor of the fortieth anniversary of the conclusion of WWII. His visit was met with protests from China and South Korea who believe that such visits to Yasukuni Shrine by prime ministers honor the atrocities committed by war criminals enshrined there. 1985 was the first time a prime minister had been criticized internationally for visiting Yasukuni. Nakasone personally did not visit the Shrine again as Prime Minister out of respect for Japan’s relationship with China and South Korea. An incumbent Japanese prime minister did not visit Yasukuni Shrine again until 1996 with a visit by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro (Deans, 2007).

I. Japanese governmental use and response to Yasukuni Shrine

Memorials and Offerings

Visits by Japanese leaders to Yasukuni Shrine have continued to be the largest part of neighbors’ complaints in regards to the Shrine itself. As such the section of memorials and offerings was chosen to be discussed first in this chapter. Beginning in 1996, there have presently been eight visits by an acting prime minister to the Yasukuni Shrine as illustrated in Figure 3 below, each was met with criticism from the Asian area, including South Korea.

Figure 3: Japanese Prime Minister’s Visits to Yasukuni Shrine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Event for visit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 29, 1996</td>
<td>Hashimoto Ryutaro</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>In honor of his 59th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

79
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 13, 2001</td>
<td>Koizumi Junichiro</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Campaign Promise; Honoring the end of WWII while avoiding 8-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 21, 2002</td>
<td>Koizumi Junichiro</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Campaign Promise; Annual Spring Festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 15, 2003</td>
<td>Koizumi Junichiro</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Campaign Promise; New Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1, 2004</td>
<td>Koizumi Junichiro</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Campaign Promise; New Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 17, 2005</td>
<td>Koizumi Junichiro</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Campaign Promise; Annual Fall Festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 15, 2006</td>
<td>Koizumi Junichiro</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Campaign Promise; Anniversary of end of WWII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 26, 2013</td>
<td>Abe Shinzo</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Honoring 1st anniversary of administration in office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996-1998) was the first acting prime minister to visit the Shrine in over a decade since visits stopped in 1985 with Prime Minister Nakasone. When questioned about his visit to the Shrine as a government official as well as its potential impact on relations with other states in the region, Hashimoto stated, “Why should it matter? It’s time to stop letting that sort of thing complicate our international relations.” Further, Hashimoto signed the Yasukuni Shrine guest book with his official title. Additional questions concerning his visit were directed to the Prime Minister’s Office where they were left unanswered (*The New York Times*, 1996).

Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006) has gone to Yasukuni Shrine more than any other incumbent prime minister since 1996. Out of the eight prime minister visits since 1996, Koizumi attended the Shrine six times; once a year during his administration. The visits came as the fulfillment of a campaign promise where he pledged to visit Yasukuni Shrine every year while in office, even on August 15th, the anniversary of Japanese surrender in WWII (French, 2002; Onishi, 2006).
Koizumi’s first visit occurred on August 13, 2001, purposely avoiding the August 15th anniversary so as not to further infuriate regional neighbors. The visit brought criticism from China and South Korea as well as reproach from supporters and some LDP party members who had pressed for the first visit to occur on August 15th (Strom, 2001). However, his final visit as Prime Minister occurred on August 15th to commemorate the 61st anniversary of WWII (Onishi, 2006; Keck, 2013).

The eighth visit by a serving prime minister was made by Prime Minister Abe on December 26th, 2013 in honor of the 1st anniversary of his administration taking office (Abe, 2013). Multiple television stations documented his motorcade as well as his entrance into Yasukuni Shrine. After his time in the Shrine, Abe told reporters, “There is criticism based on the misconception that this is an act to worship war criminals, but I visited Yasukuni Shrine to report to the souls of the war dead on the progress made this year and to convey my resolve that people will never again suffer the horrors of war” (Slodkowski & Sieg, 2013).

While visits by prime ministers to the Yasukuni Shrine have elicited harsh international attention, they are not the only governmental officials who pay their respects at the Shrine. It is a common practice for lawmakers to visit Yasukuni Shrine during high ritual days every year which occur during the Spring and Autumn festivals held on April 21st-23rd and October 17th-20th, respectively, as well as the anniversary of the end of WWII on August 15th (Yasukuni Shrine, 2008). Such attendance has occurred through the cessation of visitation by the Emperor and limited attendance by prime ministers.
Visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Koizumi brought greater media attention to the appearance of lawmakers at the Shrine as well as an increase in the scrutiny of Ministers’ and Cabinet Members’ attendance due to their rank in government. This has been evidenced by the lack of news articles focusing on other government representatives during Prime Minister Hashimoto’s administration from 1996-1998 and during his 1996 visit within the Wright State University Library’s online database as well as through searches of popular newspapers’ archives such as *The New York Times*, *CNN*, *BBC World News*, *The Japan Times* and the *Korean Herald*. Figure 4 illustrates the attendance of lawmakers and cabinet ministers at the Yasukuni Shrine as reported by newspapers.

**Figure 4: Cabinet Ministers and Lawmakers visits to Yasukuni Shrine**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Notable Ministers/Lawmakers</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Event for visit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>October 17, 2006</td>
<td>84 lawmakers, 8 ministers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Annual Autumn Festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 17, 2007</td>
<td>67 lawmakers, 4 ministers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Annual Autumn Festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 15, 2009</td>
<td>Koizumi, Abe, Minister Noda Seiko, 35 lawmakers</td>
<td>Koizumi, Abe, and Noda-LDP</td>
<td>Commemoration of WWII end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 18, 2012</td>
<td>Abe, 2 cabinet ministers</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Annual Autumn Festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 21, 2013</td>
<td>168 lawmakers, 3 ministers-which included Finance Minister and Former PM Aso Taro</td>
<td>Ministers-LDP</td>
<td>Annual Spring Festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 23, 2013</td>
<td>159 lawmakers, 2 ministers</td>
<td>Ministers-LDP</td>
<td>Birthday of current emperor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1, 2014</td>
<td>Shindo Yoshitaka, Internal Affairs and Communications Minister</td>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>New year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 15, 2014</td>
<td>83 lawmakers, 3 ministers</td>
<td>Ministers-LDP</td>
<td>Commemoration of WWII end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 17, 2014’</td>
<td>Newspaper reported Lawmakers attended</td>
<td></td>
<td>Annual Autumn Festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 21, 2015</td>
<td>106 lawmakers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Annual Spring Festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 15, 2015</td>
<td>66 lawmakers, 3 ministers</td>
<td>Ministers-LDP</td>
<td>70th anniversary commemoration of WWII end</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 17, 2015</td>
<td>169 lawmakers, 2 ministers</td>
<td>Ministers-LDP</td>
<td>Annual Autumn Festival</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Koizumi did not announce his visits to the Shrine and varied the dates of his attendance. As such he conducted the visits by himself, unless his appearance coincided
with the high ritual days where the tradition of attendance by political leaders is in practice.

Both Koizumi and Abe also made an appearance at Yasukuni Shrine while they were out of office as prime minister on August 15th, 2009 along with the Cabinet Minister of Consumer Affairs, Noda Seiko. Noda told reporters that her visit reconfirmed her belief that “we should never have a war. Peace is not something that naturally exists—it is something that has been built” (Nagata, 2009). This was not Abe’s only appearance while out of office as he made a second visit to the Shrine on October 18, 2012, the same week as the annual Autumn Festival where he was accompanied by two cabinet ministers (FlorCruz, 2012).

While the annual Spring Festival at Yasukuni Shrine in 2013 was welcomed by 168 lawmakers as well as three Cabinet ministers who paid personal visits to the Shrine, it is notable that among the three ministers was Former Prime Minister and current Finance Minister Aso Taro. While Aso did not attend the Shrine during his tenure as prime minister, his appearance at Yasukuni Shrine as a cabinet minister was noted among the public and international community (Kim & Liang, 2013).

Abe’s December 26th visit was prefaced on December 23rd by visits not only of lawmakers but also of two cabinet ministers, one of which was Abe’s brother, Senior vice Foreign Minister Kishi Nobuo. The lawmakers gave a group supported statement saying, “How the war dead are commemorated is determined according to each country’s own culture and tradition. This long tradition of homage and commemoration is a matter of national sovereignty and should not be subjected to distortion by outside interference and propaganda” (Park, 2013). Likewise, Chairman of the National Public Safety
Commission Cabinet Minister, Furuya Kiji who also attended, made a statement stating that he did not wish to anger regional neighbors, only to fulfil his duty as a national Diet member by praying for the peace of Japan and honoring their heroic fallen (Park, 2013).

Shindo Yoshitaka, Internal Affairs and Communications Minister claimed he visited the Shrine on January 1, 2014 to, “pay respects to those who lost their lives in war and to pray for peace” (Qatar News Agency, 2014).

The same year on August 15th, 2014 three Cabinet Ministers claimed their attendance were private visits. Cabinet Minister Furuya stated, “It’s only natural to extend sincere condolences to people who dedicated their lives to their country. I paid a visit to pray for peace.” (Yoshida, 2014 c.).

The following year on August 15, 2015 in honor of the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII, again three Cabinet Ministers made an appearance at Yasukuni Shrine. Armura Haruki, Minister of Women’s Empowerment, stated “I offered my prayers in the hopes that Japan will continue to make efforts to contribute to the safety and peace of the world.” (Osaki, 2015).

While Cabinet Ministers have participated in high ritual holidays, they have not attended every one as noted in Figure 4 on October 17, 2014 and April 21, 2012. The gathering of lawmakers at the Shrine has also incurred criticism from the South Korean government, similar to the visits of prime ministers and cabinet members (Zheng, Ueda, & Wang, 2015).

While not an elected government official, Abe’s wife, Akie, has also made public visits to Yasukuni Shrine. On May 22, 2015, Mrs. Abe posted photos of herself in front of the Shine to her official Facebook page with a caption saying her visit was in honor of
the 70th anniversary of WWII. While paying her respects, Mrs. Abe stated she prayed and reflected upon the pain and suffering endured by soldiers and their families (Kageyama, 2015). The First Lady made a second similar visit to the Shrine on August 19th again in honor of the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII. Like her first visit, photos of her second visit were also posted on her Facebook page (The Japan Times, 2015).

Many visits by lawmakers, cabinet members, and prime ministers are accompanied by personal offerings to Yasukuni Shrine. Such offerings have included monetary donations, tree branches from a sacred Shinto tree, wreaths, plaques, and ordainments. Figure 5 shows the offerings made by Prime Ministers’ Koizumi and Abe during their time in office.

**Figure 5: Offerings made to Yasukuni Shrine by Prime Minister Koizumi and Abe**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Type of Offering</th>
<th>Event for Offering</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Koizumi</td>
<td>August 13, 2001</td>
<td>$250 wreath with name and title</td>
<td>Campaign Promise; Honoring the end of WWII while avoiding 8-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koizumi</td>
<td>April 21, 2002</td>
<td>$230 cash donation</td>
<td>Campaign Promise; Annual Spring Festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koizumi</td>
<td>January 15, 2003</td>
<td>Flowers</td>
<td>Campaign Promise; New Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koizumi</td>
<td>January 1, 2004</td>
<td>Flowers</td>
<td>Campaign Promise; New Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koizumi</td>
<td>October 17, 2005</td>
<td>Flowers</td>
<td>Campaign Promise; Annual Fall Festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koizumi</td>
<td>August 15, 2006</td>
<td>Flowers</td>
<td>Campaign Promise; Anniversary of end of WWII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abe</td>
<td>December 23rd, 2013</td>
<td>(not stated by news reports)</td>
<td>Emperor’s Birthday</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abe</td>
<td>April 21, 2014</td>
<td>Wooden plaque with his name and title</td>
<td>Annual Spring Festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abe</td>
<td>August 15, 2014</td>
<td>Tamagushi tree branch</td>
<td>Commemoration of WWII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abe</td>
<td>October 17, 2014</td>
<td>Tamagushi tree branch</td>
<td>Annual Autumn Festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abe</td>
<td>April 21, 2015</td>
<td>Wooden plaque with his name and title</td>
<td>Annual Spring Festival</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abe</td>
<td>August 15, 2015</td>
<td>Cash Offering</td>
<td>Commemoration of WWII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abe</td>
<td>October 15, 2015</td>
<td>Tamagushi Tree branch</td>
<td>Annual Autumn Festival</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Koizumi presented offerings to Yasukuni Shrine during his personal visits (Strom, 2001; French, 2002; The Daily Yomiuri, 2004). Since his personal appearance, Abe has routinely sent offerings in his place on key dates, such as the annual Spring and Autumn
Festivals and August 15th. Offerings were accompanied at times by statements from Abe such as on August 15, 2014 were he wished to, “extend sincere condolences to the people who fought and died for the state and to pray for eternal peace” through his donation (Yoshida, 2014 c.). Abe’s offerings have been identified as private donations by the Japanese government (Sieg, 2014; The Japan Times, 2015).

Speeches and Pronouncements

The Japanese district courts have been involved with upholding Article 20, the separation of church and state, in relation to the visits by prime ministers to Yasukuni Shrine. Beginning in 2004, 900 people have filed eight lawsuits with six district courts seeking a court ruling on the constitutionality of Koizumi’s visits to the Shrine as Prime Minister as well as compensation for mental anguish plaintiffs claimed they incurred due to the annual visits (The Japan Times, 2005 b.).

Out of the eight lawsuits, only two district courts ruled that the visits by Koizumi were unconstitutional, while all denied compensation to plaintiffs. In 2004, Fukuoka District Court decided that the 2002 visit made by Koizumi was unconstitutional as his appearance was made as a government official (The People’s Daily, 2004). Likewise, in a case brought to the Osaka High Court by 236 people, comprised of Japanese and Taiwanese citizens, also ruled that Koizumi’s visits from 2001-2004 to the Yasukuni Shrine were unconstitutional because his attendance was carried out in an official manner at a religious institution. The Yasukuni Shrine gave a public statement saying that the court decision was regrettable (The Japan Times, 2005 b.). As evidenced through the documentation of newspapers and the Yasukuni Shrine guest log, the court rulings did not impact Koizumi’s annual visitation to the Shrine.
Similar to Koizumi, the Osaka District Court also heard a case concerning Abe’s 2013 visit to Yasukuni Shrine. The case was brought before the court by a group of 765 people comprised of Japanese and Korean citizens living in Japan. The plaintiffs sought an injunction barring Abe from visiting the Shrine as well as compensation from him, the Japanese government, and Yasukuni Shrine due to the violation of Article 20. The Court dismissed the case. While it did not provide a verdict on the constitutionality of Abe’s visits, it did release a statement saying that the Yasukuni Shrine has a different significance than other shrines due to its history and that the act of visiting Yasukuni Shrine does not impair another’s belief or life. Upon the Court’s dismissal, Hagiuda Koichi, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, stated that the “state’s claims have been upheld” while the Yasukuni Shrine welcomed the ruling as, “it hoped it would foster proper historic understanding of the shrine among the greater public” (The Japan Times, 2016).

While the Japanese district courts have made pronouncements on the constitutionality of visits by the Prime Minister, the Prime Ministers themselves have also given speeches on their attendance to the Shrine. On the day of his first visit to Yasukuni Shrine in 2001, Koizumi gave a statement declaring his remorse for the victims of WWII and his pledge in the belief that Japan should never hold war again. He included in his speech his decision not to attend the Shrine on August 15th, as he had originally promised, as he felt a visit on that day would cast doubt on Japan’s denial of war and pledge to cultivate peace. In addition to his announcement of a new visitation date, Koizumi also called for meeting with the leaders of China and South Korea to discuss the peace and development of the Asia-Pacific regions as well as the possibility of creating a
process for peoples of the Asian region to pay respect while honoring feelings toward Yasukuni Shrine and the Japanese Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery (Koizumi, 2001).

Koizumi again made a statement on the day of his second visit to the Shrine in 2002. In his reflection, Koizumi reaffirmed his visits’ intention of mourning those who had given their lives for Japan as well as to once again promising to never resort to war. Additionally, Koizumi mentioned that Yasukuni Shrine is a central institution for many Japanese citizens to mourn the fallen and thus he had no intention of causing stress on relations at home or abroad (Koizumi, 2002).

Koizumi continued to address international concern that was raised from his annual appearance at Yasukuni Shrine by using a portion of his speech at the Asian-African summit in 2005 to reassert the understanding that Japan caused a great amount of suffering to many people and states during WWII, promising that “…Japan squarely faces these facts of history in a spirit of humility. And with feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved in mind…”, Japan moves forward in to the future cultivating peace and prosperity at home and abroad (Koizumi, 2005).

Equivalent to his predecessor, Abe also gave a statement regarding his appearance at the Shrine the same day after his visit. In his observation he stated that his attendance was to pay respects and pray for the souls who made the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of Japan at Yasukuni Shrine and also Chinreisha National Cemetery, where he meditated on the sufferings the fallen, as well as their families, had endured. Abe further stated that the purpose of his visit was to also report to the souls of the war dead the progress of the first year of his administration while renewing the pledge to uphold peace and never to wage war again (Abe, 2013).
While Abe has not currently made a second visit to Yasukuni Shrine, during a
plenary session of the House in February, 2015 Abe included in his speech
encouragement for Cabinet members to decide for themselves if they would like to attend
the Shrine or not. Abe stated, “It is natural for the nation’s leaders to want to visit
Yasukuni Shrine to pay their respects to those who died for the country,” emphasizing the
importance of leaders paying their respects and praying for those who gave their lives on
behalf of Japan (JiJi., 2015).

Response to Challenges

Koizumi, Abe, and the Japanese government have responded to the various
criticism stemming from the appearance of active prime ministers at the Yasukuni Shrine.
Nearly All of the responses centered around the claim that prime ministers were visiting
the Shrine as private citizens, with no bearing on the issue of Article 20 or international
relations since they would be in their personal right to worship freely. While the visits to
the Shrine were publicized as private by the Japanese government and the politicians
themselves, for Koizumi his attendance did fulfill his campaign promise of attending the
Shrine every year while in office.

Koizumi was vocal in regards to the lawsuits levied against him by Japanese and
foreign citizens. After the first unconstitutional court ruling in 2004 by the Fukuoka
District Court, Koizumi declared that his visits to the Shrine were made in a private
capacity as a citizen, citing that the Japanese government had already asserted his visits
did not violate the Constitution. Within his statement, Koizumi lamented his uncertainty
as to why visits to Yasukuni Shrine elicit criticism as being unconstitutional whereas
visits to other shrines, such as the Ise Grand Shrines, do not-even though they are both
considered religious places as shrines. Koizumi declared his visits were based on personal beliefs; as such he would not change the style of his visits to Yasukuni Shrine. Koizumi’s Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo also gave a statement in regards to the Court ruling saying the Court’s decision went against the position of the government as it believed the visits were made by Koizumi as a private citizen (The Daily Yomiuri, 2004).

The 2005 Osaka District Court’s verdict of unconstitutional visits prompted Koizumi to again publically assert that he did not believe his visits to Yasukuni Shrine violated the Constitution as he was not paying visits as an official and was confused as to why the Court would make such a ruling. Koizumi declare that he ultimately won the lawsuit while adding that the Court verdict would have no impact on his future decisions to visit the Shrine. The Yasukuni Shrine also gave a public statement saying the Court’s decision was regrettable (The Japan Times, 2005 b.).

Prompted by the two district court rulings as well as the harsh disapproval from regional neighbors, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a memo outlining the basic position of the Japanese government toward Koizumi’s visits to the Shrine in October 2005. The document reiterated Koizumi’s personal belief that Yasukuni Shrine is a place of mourning to honor the war dead, emphasizing that his personal appearances at the Shrine were as a private citizen. The message is also very clear in stating that the belief of Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shine as a glorification of Japan’s aggressive military past is wrong and further summarizes two of Koizumi’s public statements describing Japan’s deep seeded feelings of remorse. The memo ends with declaring the stability and prosperity of the East Asian region as one of Japan’s most important policy
priorities and thus places great importance on friendly relations with regional neighbors including South Korea and China (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not published a memo on Abe’s initial visit to Yasukuni Shrine, however, Abe has altered the way he honors the war dead from personal attendance to the donation of personal offerings on key dates, such as the seasonal festivals and the anniversary of WWII, in response to severe reproach from China and South Korea.

II. South Korean governmental use and response to Yasukuni Shrine

Memorials and Offerings

The South Korean government claims they view the Yasukuni Shrine as a commemoration of Japan’s militaristic past. A sentiment often reiterated by South Korean officials is that each visit to Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese leaders glorifies the atrocities that were committed against the Korean population by the Japanese state, including the brutalities that occurred during the forced colonization period and crimes committed during WWII.

South Korea maintains their own specific memorials and traditions commemorating the war dead and notable events of the past, but beyond the Comfort Woman statue located outside of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul, the state does not maintain a memorial that receives negative attention from regional neighbors like that of the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo.

However, while the similarity between a physical South Korean memorial and a Japanese memorial is non-existent, both states have an overlapping day of commemoration. August 15th is observed as a national day of mourning in Japan, commonly known as Surrender Day, since 1982 and honors Japan’s surrender to Allied
forces and the Japanese war dead. Commemorations of this day include visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by some and a memorial service commonly held at Nippon Budokan Hall. The Emperor and his family commonly attend this ceremony due to the informal hiatus with the Yasukuni Shrine (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002; O’Dwyer, 2010; Smith, 2015). Whereas in South Korea this day is celebrated, and referred to as, National Liberation Day. National Liberation Day celebrates the end of the Japanese colonization of the Korean peninsula. This national holiday is filled with official ceremonies, parades, performances, and a key note address by the South Korean president (Korea.net, 2012). While a comparison of a physical structure is not applicable in this instance, the South Korean presidents have often used their key note address to focus on the South Korean-Japanese relationship which has included criticism and recommendation toward Japan on their shared history.

The government of South Korea maintains an online archive of presidential speeches two administrations at a time. The two administrations currently available are the Park and Lee, which span from 2008 to the present. Out of Lee’s five National Liberation Day addresses, only his 2009 speech did not use explicit language to highlight Japan’s military past. The other four, 2008, 2010, 2011, and 2012, contained pointed statements toward Japan calling for such actions as, “Japan should face up to history and refrain from making the foolish mistake of repeating the unfortunate past again today” in his 2008 address (Lee, 2008) and “Japan has a responsibility to teach its young generation the truth about what happened in the past” within the 2011 speech (Lee, 2011). The 2010 address was milder toward Japan on historical issues compared to the other three speeches in that it only called for more to be done to resolve historical issues,
citing a Japanese government apology on the forced colonization of the Korean peninsula that year (Lee, 2010). Lee’s 2012 address was very critical of Japan as he cited the crime committed against Comfort Women by the Japanese government in WWII and urged the state to take “responsible measures in this regard” (Lee, 2012). While Lee did not specifically address past visits to Yasukuni Shrine, his broad statements on historical issues eluded to multiple concerns which encompasses the South Korean state’s alarm over elite visits to Yasukuni Shrine.

As of this writing, President Park has currently given three National Liberation Day speeches. Her first address in 2013 directly dealt with historical conflicts as she stated:

…Yet the recent situation surrounding historical issues has cast a dark shadow on the future of our two countries. In the absence of courage enough to face the past and determination enough to care for another’s pain, it will be difficult to build the trust necessary for our future. … it is time for the political leaders of Japan to show us a leadership of courage that seeks to bring healing for the wounds of the past. Yi Am, a great scholar of the later Goryeo Kingdom, said the nation is the body of a people and their history is their soul. What nation or what people would consent to the affliction of their soul, or the taking of any part of their body? Japan must confront this issue. I look forward to seeing responsible and earnest action that will seek in particular to heal the pain of those who, even now, carry with them the scars of history (Park, 2013, 5).

Park’s first address set the tone for the rest of her keynote presentations as they did not shy away from expressing negative opinions against the government of Japan’s actions and attitudes toward historical events as well as pointedly requesting a change in the behavior of Japan’s elite. 2014 marked the 49th anniversary of the South Korean-Japanese relations, as such Park purposely included in her speech the statement, “It is now time to set our sights on the next 50 years and start making progress toward future-oriented
friendly, cooperative relations. To do so, efforts must be made to heal the wounds of history that persist to this day. …Yet in Japan, the actions of some politicians have caused rifts between our two peoples and brought serious pain” (Park, 2014). Likewise, the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII in 2015 provided Park with fodder to continue the criticism of Japan, specifically of Abe’s address commemorating WWII, of which Park found fault with as being less than what was hoped for in apologizing for past atrocities. In her 2015 speech she also called for Abe to follow the lead of past Japanese cabinets who have issued apologizes like that of the Kono Statement (Park, 2015).

President Park’s 2014 and 2015 National Liberation Day speeches specifically mentioned the historical remembrance of Comfort Women but all of the addresses did not exclude Yasukuni Shrine from the difficult relationship with Japan even though it was not specifically mentioned.

*Speeches and Pronouncements*

Each time a Japanese prime minister personally visited Yasukuni Shrine, statements of denouncement have been quickly produced from a spokesman of the South Korean government. In response to Hashimoto’s 1996 visit, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) released a statement the same day condemning his appearance at the Shrine (*The New York Times*, 1996).

Due to Koizumi’s public campaign promises of an annual visit to Yasukuni Shrine, in July 2001 before his first visit the same year, the South Korean Ambassador to Japan, Choi Sang-yong, issued a statement to the press underling the impending negative impact on South Korean-Japanese relations if such promises were to be carried out, “I can only presume that Prime Minister Koizumi does not understand what kind of impact
his visit has on countries in Asia” (Tolbert, 2001). After the visit, the MOFAT released a public statement issuing deep regret and concern over the Koizumi’s attendance at the Shrine where he paid respects to war criminals, “who destroyed world peace and inflicted indescribable damage to the neighboring countries” (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001).

In an act of goodwill, on August 25th, 2001, twelve days after his visit to the Shrine, Koizumi publically made known that he would like to meet with the leaders of South Korea and China in an effort to smooth the tense relations that had begun to develop due to the MEXT’s approval of a controversial textbook. The potential meeting between Koizumi and current South Korean President Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) was speculatively set to occur during the U.N. Special Session on Children in May, 2002. Instead of publically rejecting Koizumi’s meeting request, Kim laid out preconditions that Koizumi had to abide by before Kim would agree to a meeting. The terms required Koizumi to issue a new apology that reaffirmed the 1998 Apology for Wartime Atrocities published by Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo (1988-2001) within the Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration, for Koizumi to adhere to the agreements contained within the declaration, as well as publicly acknowledge that the decision by the majority of local school boards within Japan not to use the controversial history textbook was the correct choice in regards to the national approval of the text (Stuck, 2001).

The 1998 Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration details the public apology by Obuchi where he expressed acknowledgement of the facts of history, through a spirit of humility, that Japan caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of South Korea through colonial rule, and expressed deep remorse over past actions (Japan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998). The declaration further details multiple avenues of increased integration of South Korean and Japanese relations through cultural, economic, and military activities. While the terms of a meeting set by Kim were acknowledged as lofty by some reporters, ultimately, Koizumi never fully satisfied the preconditions to the South Korean government’s approval. After his 2001 visit to Yasukuni Shrine, Kim did not hold one-on-one meetings with Koizumi while he was president (Stuck, 2001).

The MOFAT issued negative statements toward Koizumi and his personal attendance at the Yasukuni Shrine after each visit from 2002 to 2004 under the Kim and Roh administrations. These statements followed a similar structure of expressing regret towards the visit due to the Shrine’s representation of Japan’s militarism and honor to war criminals. The 2002 statement exemplifies this format in stating, “Our government expresses deep regret toward Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni shrine, which represents Japan’s militarism” (Los Angeles Times, 2002). In 2003 the Foreign Minister included within the statement a call “for a sensible determination from Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and the Japanese Government so as not to damage the sentiments of the Koreans who suffered from the Japanese invasions” (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2003). Koizumi’s 2004 visit increased the hostile verbiage used in a statement from the South Korean Foreign Ministry which read, “We cannot understand why the Japanese prime minister continues to pay homage to war criminals, and express much disappointment and anger that the national sentiments of the Koreans have been damaged once again” and expressly called for Koizumi to end his attendance at Yasukuni Shrine (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004).
Visits to Yasukuni Shrine increased in sensitivity during 2005 as the year marked the 60th anniversary of WWII’s end. While Koizumi did not attend the Shrine on August 15th that year, his attendance in October was met with harsh criticism from the South Korean government. The Korean Foreign Ministry issued a statement of regret akin to those issued before it and included a call for the Prime Minister and other Japanese leaders to, “halt acts that nullify its apology and reflection of past wartime atrocities,” the South Korean government also summoned Japan’s Ambassador and lodged a formal protest (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005; Onishi, 2005 a.).

Likewise, Koizumi’s visit to the Shrine on August 15th, 2006, brought harsh condemnation from the South Korean government and continued the standstill of high level meetings that had been ongoing since 2001 (Faiola, 2006 b.). The Foreign Ministry again issued a statement condemning Koizumi’s visits declaring such actions damaging to South Korean-Japanese relations and urged Japanese leaders in “responsible” positions not to “hinder the development of friendly relations” (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2006).

While not formally in office, Abe’s visit in 2012 prompted a statement from South Korea’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Cho Tai-young, saying, “It is regrettable to hear about the irresponsible behavior that ignores the feelings of the people in neighboring countries, who have been victimized by Japanese imperialism in the past” (FlorCruz, 2012).

2013 was a turbulent time in the South Korean-Japanese relationship in relation to the issue of Yasukuni Shrine. Abe’s December, 2013 visit was the first by an acting prime minister in seven years, the last visit occurring with Koizumi in 2006.
Days before Abe’s 2013 visit, the Spokesperson on behalf of the South Korean MOFA issued a public statement condemning the attendance of leading politicians and cabinet members at the Shrine. The Spokesperson expressly stated that the visits were deemed “deeply deplorable” and through the disregard of repeated concerns from South Korea and the international community about governmental visits to Yasukuni Shrine, Japan is physically illustrating that the government is still “turning a blind eye to their history” (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2013).

In 2013, with the beginning of the Park Administration, the MOFAT began issuing statements against the offerings made by Prime Minister Abe and visits by Japanese leaders to Yasukuni Shrine. With Abe’s first offering on April 22, 2013 while as Prime Minister, the South Korean First Vice Foreign Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Kim Kyou-hyun, lodged a formal protest with the Japanese Ambassador on the, “latest retrograde comments and behaviors by the Japanese government officials and political leaders”. In his formal protest Kim declared, “it is completely incomprehensible that Japan, which deeply values honesty and trust, turns a blind eye and a deaf ear to excruciating loss and pain that Japan inflicted on neighboring countries through its aggression and colonial rule” further adding a call for Japanese leaders to reflect on past atrocities and in correct actions for the future (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2013). Such sentiments were reiterated again on August 15 and October 17th, 2015 by an official statement by the MOFAT (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2015 c. and d.).

Abe’s personal attendance at the Shrine elicited even greater criticism from the South Korean government. While the MOFAT issued a statement expressing “deep
President Park also issued a public statement where she declared, “Japan needs to face up to the issues of history, I expect the country to take responsible and sincere measures to alleviate the agony of those living in pain, and scarred by history” (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2013). Additionally, South Korea’s Minister of Culture, Sports, and Tourism, Yoo Jin-ryong, broadcasted his message against Abe’s visit live on television where he stated, Abe’s visit was an “anachronistic act” that “hurts not only the ties between South Korea and Japan but also fundamentally damages the stability and cooperation in Northeast Asia” (Yamaguchi, Gillian, & Lee, 2013).

While Abe has not visited Yasukuni Shrine since December, 2013, the political leadership of South Korea has continued to strongly scrutinized and criticized current events involving the Shrine since his attendance. In 2014 the MOFAT issued public statements against Abe’s offering to Yasukuni Shrine for the annual Spring and Fall Festivals as well as on August 15th saying it deplores the offering to the Shrine that glorifies “Japan’s colonization and invasive war” adding that “Japan should move forward to a bright future based on serious reflection on the past, not locking itself in the dark past” (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014 a., b., c.; Adamczyk, 2014).

2015 also brought statements against Abe’s offerings and Japanese leaders’ visits to the Shrine. Statements of public denouncements and regret were issued on April 22, August 15th, and October 17th against the honoring of Japan’s militaristic past and war criminals which caused devastating harm to the South Korean population and Asian neighbors. Given the public attention that was directed toward the Japanese government
that year due to the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII with the anticipated apology from Abe, the MOFAT also included within their criticisms that without proper actions and reflection such public statements of regret are hollow (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2015 a., b., c.).

Response to Challenges

On August 13th, 2001, 20 men stood in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul to protest the impending visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine. During the public demonstration the 20 men chopped off one of their little fingers as an act of defiance towards Koizumi’s decision to voluntarily visit the Shrine (Prusher, 2001). Such a strong negative reaction within the public illustrates a deeply held adverse belief of the Yasukuni Shrine within the South Korean population.

While there currently is no record of an active government official participating in self-mutilation in response to Japanese officials visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, the South Korean government has vigorously acted to deter Japanese Officials, specifically prime ministers, from using the Shrine as a place of commemoration. In 2001, after Koizumi’s first visit to Yasukuni Shrine, President Kim Dae-jung refused to meet with the Japanese Prime Minister until Kim’s list of conditions were met (Stuck, 2001). This standoff between Kim and Koizumi lasted beyond Kim who he left office in 2003. When Roh Moo-hyun became president in 2003 he chose to continue the status quo of impasse due to visitations to the Yasukuni Shrine until 2005. 2005 was the 60th anniversary of the end of WWII as well as the 40th anniversary of the normalization of relations between the two states. In an effort to end the stalemate, President Roh met with Koizumi for two hours in Seoul discussing ways to move beyond historical issues. Roh had emphasized that visits
by government officials to Yasukuni Shrine was “the core of the history related problems between the two countries” and pressed for the creation of an alternate facility to commemorate the fallen of Japan without war criminals. No agreement was reached from the meeting and South Korea and Japan were again at a standstill on head of state meetings (Onishi, 2005 a.).

On August 5, 2013 Cho Tai-young, the MOFAT Spokesperson, released a public request asking Japanese officials to abstain from visiting Yasukuni Shrine on August 15th. Cho’s appeal stated, “Worshipping at the Yasukuni Shrine by the Japanese government and political leaders is something that should not happen. The stance of our government is clear and known to the world” (United Press International, 2013).

While attendance by Japanese lawmakers occurred even though the MOFAT Spokesperson requested officials to withhold their public visit, a strong governmental response was enacted as a result of Abe’s personal attendance in 2013. Coupled with the many vocal denouncements of his visit, the South Korean Defense Ministry cancelled multiple defense meetings and military exchange programs that were scheduled for the following year (Emirates News Agency, 2013). President Park also added Abe’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine as an additional reason to prolong withholding heads of state meetings with Japan (Xinhua, 2014).

Meetings between Park and Abe did not occur until November 1, 2015 where the leaders met to discuss accelerating talks on repairing the strained relationship that stems from historical grievances. The meeting was an effort to protect other areas of the South Korean-Japanese affiliation such as economic interests and military collaboration. Park went into the meeting “calling for Japan to heal the painful history” while Abe advocated
for South Korea to look toward the future. While the meeting was a break from Park’s Administration’s staunch stance against engagements with Abe until Japanese leaders acknowledged past wrongs, no issues were resolved at this meeting (Choe, 2015).

III. Chapter Analysis

Similar to the historical issue of Comfort Women, leaders in South Korea and Japan have been actively involved in the remembrance of the past in regards to Yasukuni Shrine and in promoting how they believe the Shrine should be viewed by the Asian region and the world. Figure 3 below illustrates the position of government officials and their involvement with the historical issue of Yasukuni Shrine.
Figure 6: Position of Government action in relation to the remembrance at Yasukuni Shrine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Gov’t Actions</th>
<th>Officials Involved</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>3 actions: Prime Minister&lt;br&gt;1 action: Cabinet Minister&lt;br&gt;1 actions: Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Response to Challenges</td>
<td>1. 2 responses from Koizumi due to unconstitutional court rulings, 2004 and 2005 &lt;br&gt;2. Abe alters the way he pays respects at Yasukuni from visits to offerings &lt;br&gt;3. Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda statement that the 2004 court ruling went against the government’s position &lt;br&gt;4. Ministry of Foreign Affairs memo on the Basic Position of the Japanese government toward Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni 2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Newspapers have highlighted visits by political leaders during the years that a prime minister attended the Yasukuni Shrine, or due to tense statements denouncing such visits from regional neighbors like South Korea. Given the Japanese tradition of political leaders visiting Yasukuni Shrine that dates back to the Meiji era, the number of cabinet members and lawmakers in attendance from 1988 to 2015 is probably much higher than what is gathered here.
Both governments have an all-of-government approach with multiple persons and offices addressing the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine. Top offices initiate the event of concern and respond to the action of the other. Within the South Korean state, Japan is portrayed as the sole perpetrator of the issue, in an effect of othering, where Japan is the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Gov’t Actions</th>
<th>Officials Involved</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
villain by glorifying past wrongs through visitations and offerings by leaders to Yasukuni Shrine. Likewise, the Japanese government differentiates itself from other Asian nations by promoting Yasukuni Shrine as a uniquely Japanese place of worship and respect for Japanese people while justifying the promotion and action of visitation by relating it to the rights of every other nation to honor their dead. Both states actively embrace the concept of nationalism in promoting the good or evil of Yasukuni Shrine in relation to their population, or in group.

Within the case study of events surrounding the Shrine, it is evident that speeches and pronouncements were the largest area for the South Korean government in addressing the issue, in part, due to Yasukuni Shrine’s location in Japan. However, the Japanese government and political leaders also worked to define their actions through government statements and press interviews. Since there is data on the statements and words used to describe the Yasukuni Shrine, a comparison was charted to analyze the similarity, difference, frequency of political actors engaging in public communication about the Shrine, and the medium in which the message was delivered to the public. The full chart comparison is located in appendix K. Figure 7 below is a summary of the larger comparison of the type of words used between the two states and how it was presented to the public. The selection of statements under review were taken from the accounts presented within the case study, however, many of the assertions used in the chart were taken out of larger documents or statements as to gain more focus on the sections specifically related to Yasukuni Shrine. For the chart summary, phrases relating to the Yasukuni Shrine were organized by statement idea and at times exact words used. The statements are also organized by the way in which they were delivered. Official
government statements refers to accounts written and released directly from the
government itself while statements to newspapers refers to the causal interactions with
newspapers by government officials where they are not necessarily highlighting their
governmental role or asserting their personal opinion. A chart was not created to analyze
smaller portions of the event data, as was conducted in chapter 2 on Japanese apologies,
as there was believed to be not as many similar occurrences between the different
categories in which to equally compare, since all of the categories hinged on state leaders
visits or offerings to the Yasukuni Shrine.

Figure 7: Summary of the comparison of Government Statements regarding the Yasukuni
Shrine

Japan: 12 speeches and statements concerning the Yasukuni Shrine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of statements from Gov Officials</th>
<th>Occurrence of Descriptors</th>
<th>Medium of Delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PM Abe: 4</td>
<td>Died in the battle for country: 7</td>
<td>Official Government statements: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM Koizumi: 2</td>
<td>Promise to never wage war again: 6</td>
<td>Statements to Newspapers: 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Minister Furuya: 2</td>
<td>To express mourning: 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister Armura: 1</td>
<td>To express remorse: 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Minister Noda: 1</td>
<td>To express condolences: 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group of Lawmakers: 1</td>
<td>To express my belief: 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 1</td>
<td>Natural to visit: 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka District Court: 1</td>
<td>Honor victims of war: 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Duty of a Diet member: 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Different significance than other shrines: 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Country’s own culture and tradition: 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
South Korea: 21 speeches and statements concerning the Yasukuni Shrine

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of statements from Gov Officials</th>
<th>Occurrence of Descriptors</th>
<th>Medium of Delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade: 18</td>
<td>Call for sincere response from PM and Japanese government: 16</td>
<td>Official Government statements: 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism: 1</td>
<td>Honor national sentiments of neighbor countries: 12</td>
<td>Statements to Newspapers: 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>President Park: 1</td>
<td>Call for the correct understanding of history: 11</td>
<td>Broadcast on Television: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambassador to Japan, Choi Sang Yong: 1</td>
<td>People and countries suffered as a result of Japan’s invasion and imperialism: 7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Praying to/Honoring war criminals: 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Visits impact countries in Asia: 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Visits are disappointing: 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Visits cause anger: 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7 shows that the South Korean officials’ dominant form of communication concerning the Shrine is by official government statements. Out of 17 instances, only three are not government statements but government officials making comments to the press. However, in Japan’s communication out of 13 instances only four were made as an official government statement while nine were made as statements to the press.

Additionally, the message relayed by Japanese political leaders did not have as similar messages as did the South Korean leaders. The largest similarity in the statements from Japanese leaders were on the ideas of “to never wage war again” and “for those who died in battle” while those were only found in six and seven instances of the messages, respectfully. The difference in wording of the message could be that as a religious institution the Shrine holds different meaning to every person. However, in this difference of meaning, the Shrine’s portrayal either as a place to remember and promote
peace or as a national memorial may not be uniformly agreed upon within Japanese political leaders as the ideas, “Natural to visit,” “Duty of a Diet member,” and “Country’s own culture and tradition,” which reflect more of the Shrine being a national memorial, combined marks four instances which places it in the top three of common ideas delivered.

The South Korean leaders had very similar messages which is due in part to the majority of communication on the Shrine being delivered from the MOFAT. The most common idea was the “call for sincere response from the Prime Minister and Japanese government leaders” while “Honor national sentiments of neighbor countries” was second, followed closely by the “Call for the correct understanding of history.” The majority of messages with the idea of “call for sincere response from the Prime Minister and Japanese government leaders” instead of the “call for the correct understanding of history” reflects that the South Korean government views the physical action of visiting or worshipping at the Shrine as more offensive than the incorrect understanding of history behind the action.

For Japan such a governmental silence on the issue of Yasukuni Shrine demonstrates an approval of the Shrine as being a personal decision for Japanese citizens which also upholds the various arguments of Koizumi and Abe on Yasukuni Shrine. Likewise, from the statements of Abe and Koizumi, the “natural duty” of Japanese lawmakers to pay respects at the Shrine has not been met with any denouncement from the Japanese state. As demonstrated by lawmakers’ statements to public newspapers coupled with the various statements from prime ministers there is an idea that it is good for a Japanese leader to pay respects at the Shrine.
It’s important to also note Koizumi’s promise of attending Yasukuni Shrine during his campaign for election as Prime Minister. While this promise may not have been the whole basis of his argument for election, however, such a promise illustrates the use of historical memory as a tool to gain public opinion and support in obtaining political power.

The majority of governmental responses from the MOFAT tend to follow the same structure and wording. Exemplifying this similarity are the statements issued on Koizumi’s visits from 2002-2004 whose wording are nearly identical. Statements from the MOFAT and other governmental officials increased in severity in 2013 before Abe’s visit to the Shrine, beginning with the MOFAT statement against offerings and lawmakers’ visits along with the governmental protest from the 1st Vice Foreign Minister’s summons of Japan’s Ambassador over Japan’s wrong perception of history in April, 2013.

Whereas the South Korean government issued statements against lawmakers and Prime Ministers’ attendance at the Yasukuni Shrine, under Park’s administration the state included offerings made by Prime Minister Abe. The expanse of criticism from the South Korean state to include offerings correlates with the strong stance President Park’s Administration initiated upon the start of her presidential term.

With the timely statements against the involvement of prime ministers and lawmakers at the Yasukuni Shrine, the South Korean government has portrayed such responses as duties of the state. The state has championed the specific time period of colonialism of South Korea and atrocities of WWII, relating such violence back to the oppression of Japanese forces. The specific focus on a certain period of time highlights
the specific memory the Korean government’s wishes to remember and the way in which they want it remembered; through a narrative of victimization. The framing of victimization allows the South Korean government to bolster nationalism in that the government, through political parties, are creating an environment based on a uniquely Korean experience that must be made right before time ends for those who had a firsthand account of brutalities.
I. Manipulation of Historical Memory within History Textbooks

In his popular novel, *1984*, George Orwell penned the statement, “Who controls the past controls the future; who controls the present controls the past” (Orwell, 1949, 35; Kim, Moon, & Joo, 2013, 1). Orwell’s quote encompasses the contention innate within history textbooks as these educational materials are a tool utilized by the state to cultivate loyal citizens. According to Heiko Paabo, every state develops a national narrative that is used to guide the writing of history textbooks. As he states, the national narrative “provides the general framework explaining what the nation is, where it comes from, and what its future is;” this includes inundating the younger generation and new citizens with shared values, norms, and beliefs which shape their national identity (Paabo, 2014). This framed understanding is presented within the educational system as legitimate, accurate knowledge (Schneider, 2008).

The development of national identity, which is advanced through the national narrative, is the primary object of history textbooks, where the national narrative is presented. Elites define and give meaning to the collective memories held by a population, which are then used to help craft the narrative through connecting the past to the present (Paabo, 2014), similar to the concept of historical memory. Thus, political agendas influence textbook content in an effort to achieve specific goals such as shaping national identity and cultivating patriotism or nationalism (Shin & Sneider, 2011). This political influence inevitably effects the selection of events as well as their description.
(Paabo, 2014). Shin Gi-wook claims that “vocabulary is significant in describing events in the creation of national identity” as the overall story of a textbook, through the “events described,” leads students to a very distinct understanding of the past which in turn influences their current worldview and potential future of the state. The power of history textbooks in shaping the population and the potential future fuels the anger within the parties involved in a history textbook dispute (Shin & Sneider, 2011).

In addition to the political burden they are endowed with, textbooks are inherently political as they gain a “quasi-official” character in representing the voice of the state through the involvement of the government in control mechanisms. The process of approval or regulating textbooks occurs not only in a system of state sponsored texts but also in pluralistic textbook systems, which ultimately empowers history textbooks with the near official status beyond whatever system is implemented (Yi, 2009). This representation of the voice of the state has the potential of spurring tense relations between countries due to the idea of a government’s acceptance and promotion of what others may believe is an incorrect understanding of the past.

As described in chapter 1, both Japan and South Korea maintain a pluralistic textbook system where the Ministry of Education outlines general topics that are to be included in the text that are written by private publishers. In each state, the final approval of the privately produced educational material lies with the Ministry of Education. The texts that are approved are provided to the schools without charge as the respective governments bear the burden of printing costs (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science & Technology, 2014; South Korea Ministry of Education, 2008).
Beyond the information constraints set forth by governments, the physical format of textbooks also plays a role in how history is portrayed to the intended audience. In Japan, history textbooks are limited to 220 pages and are required to go over the country’s entire history which spans approximately 1,300 years (Shin & Sneider, 2011). While the page limit enables the Japanese government to regulate printing costs, the expanse of the time frame required for history textbooks coupled with the traditional year-round school calendar, limits the amount of time educators are able to spend on each era. Additionally, with the cultural pressure of college entrance exams, “teaching to the exam” is also a common practice throughout the Japanese educational system which adds a level of distortion to the history presented (Shin & Sneider, 2011).

South Korea faces many of the same challenges with textbooks that Japan does such as the government’s burden of financing textbook printing and the cultural emphasis on entrance exams. However, South Korea’s recent history of military dictatorship and authoritative rule after liberation in 1945 has had a lasting impact on the educational system. In 1974, Dictator Park Chung-hee set up a system of state controlled history textbooks where the government wrote and published the educational text used in schools. This state production of history textbooks was not revised until 2003 under President Roh Moo-hyun when the current system, as of this writing, was set in place for a more liberal and pluralistic educational framework (Denny, 2015).

The history textbook controversy between Japan and South Korea centers on events that occurred during WWII and how they are portrayed within educational material, as well as a the territorial dispute of the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands. While

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5 The Takeshima/Dokdo Islands are a grouping of uninhabited land formations within the East Sea located between Japan and South Korea. The area provides valuable fishing locations. Both countries claim
Japan and South Korea were involved in the same war, they had vastly different experiences largely due to the colonization of the Korean peninsula by Japan which has shaped the nations’ view of the past. With the retelling of history, Shin claims, “Involved nations are simultaneously bound together and separated by distinct-often contradictory historical accounts and perceptions” (Shin & Sneider, 2011).

South Korea’s history textbooks concerning this time period focus on its own nation’s plight during WWII with comparatively little mention of the ensuing battles and destruction outside of the peninsula (Shin & Sneider, 2011). Japan’s textbooks, likewise, place strong emphasis on what Alexander Bukh describes as “Japanese victimhood” which delineates between the Imperial military as perpetrators and the Japanese population as victims of the military’s transgressions. Before 1982, Japanese textbooks focused largely on Japanese victimhood with limited information on regional neighbors’ suffering. After 1982, textbooks increased the incorporation of regional neighbors’ sufferings and the complacency of the Japanese public (Bukh, 2007). However, the vocabulary used to describe these events has become points of contention domestically in Japan and abroad which relate back to the concept of national identity formation and the potential future of the state. This tension over vocabulary has led some history textbooks within Japan to become more reflective of a time table of events, lessoning the national narrative but adding to the burden of the educator in disseminating historical understanding (Shin & Sneider, 2011).

ownership of the islands and both use historical documents dating back thousands of years to state their claim; South Korea claims Japan recognized the formations as Korean territory in 1696 stemming from a skirmish between Korean and Japanese fishermen. South Korea has occupied the islands with a coastguard detachment since 1954 (BBC World News, 2012).
Textbook controversies between Japan and South Korea first began in 1982, ignited by a prominent Japanese historian’s challenge of Japan’s textbook approval system, charging that it was a form of censorship (Memory & Reconciliation, 2007 a.). Ienaga Saburo filed his first of three lawsuits against the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) in 1965 for suppressing intellectual freedom when his history textbook was rejected for containing “too many illustrations of the ‘dark side’ of the war, such as an air raid, a city left in ruins by the atomic bomb, and disabled veterans” (Memory & Reconciliation, 2007 a.). In 1982, Ienaga’s textbook was again rejected by the MEXT with recommended changes to 41 different passages that included softening words used to describe the Japanese military action during WWII such as replacing “aggression” to “advancement.” The Japanese press had been closely following the textbook approval process that year, and unlike the 1965 rejection, Japan’s regional neighbors picked up on the 1982 denial of Ienaga’s text (Woods Masalski, 2002).

North and South Korea, along with China, responded to the MEXT’s dismissal with public and formal protests from the respective governments and populations. Additionally, Vietnam also formally requested changes to approved textbooks. The Japanese government responded to the large outcry by sending senior LDP Diet leaders to South Korea and senior MEXT officials to the Chinese government to explain the MEXT’s decision of accepting and denying the year’s textbooks (Shin & Sneider, 2011).

In addition to the government visits, Chief Cabinet Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi also issued a statement to help smooth diplomatic relations with South Korea and China the same year. In his statement, Miyazawa acknowledged that the Japanese educational system and textbook authorization process should keep the same spirit of humility in
regards to past atrocities that is contained within the Joint Communiques, issued between the respective countries and Japan when relations normalized after WWII. To achieve this end, Miyazawa promised that Japan, “will pay due attention” to criticisms from neighboring countries from a “perspective of building friendship and goodwill.” Miyazawa further stated that the guidelines for textbook authorization would be revised and future textbooks would also, “give due consideration” to criticisms from regional neighbors. Miyazawa’s complete statement can be found in appendix L. (Miyazawa, 1982; appendix L). Miyazawa’s statement is known as the Neighboring Countries Clause and continues to provide a basis, according to Daniel Sneider, for “Asian nations to intervene regarding the content of Japanese textbooks” (Shin & Sneider, 2011, 249).

The year 1986, the culmination of the traditional four year cycle of textbook authorizations in Japan, also brought another round of controversy. The “National Conference to Defend Japan” was formed after the publication of the Neighboring Countries Clause in 1982⁶ and promised to publish its own textbook that year. According to Sneider, in September, 1986 the National Conference to Defend Japan submitted their textbook to the MEXT and received approval due to political pressure (Shin & Sneider, 2011).

The adoption of this text once again prompted outcries from the South Korean and Chinese governments as the countries contended the textbook did not adequately address the Japanese atrocities committed against their nations in WWII, citing the Neighboring

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⁶ Miyazawa’s statement, known as the Neighboring Countries Clause, required the textbook authorization process in Japan to take regional neighbors’ concerns as well as objections to textbook content under careful advisement before any text is published. This clause provides neighboring countries with an official pathway to submit apprehensions and recommendations for change to the MEXT on any pending textbook. A channel for regional involvement within the MEXT’s textbook approval process had not been available until the publication of the Neighboring Countries Clause in 1982. (Yi, 2009).
Country Clause. Frustrated by the criticisms made by South Korea and China as well as the new constraints of consideration by the Neighboring Countries Clause, Education Minister Fujio Masayuki made public comments denying the wrongdoing associated with the Nanjing Massacre, questioned the legitimacy of the Tokyo Trials, and claimed the colonialization of Korea was mutually agreed upon by the Korean and Japanese government. This was the third of such comment by the Education Minister who had taken office in July, 1986. The South Korean government lodged a formal complaint concerning the comments, cancelled multiple scheduled foreign ministers meetings, and threatened to cancel an official visit by Prime Minister Nakasone to Seoul in honor of the opening of the Asia games. Fujio was removed from office for his remarks and lack of incorporation of the Neighboring Country Clause (Jameson, 1986; Shin & Sneider, 2011).

II. Japanese government’s use of history textbooks

The Neighboring Countries Clause was first used in Japan after the Japanese Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery campaign was brought to light in 1991. Beginning in 1992, approved history textbooks all contained some reference to Comfort Women and increased the portrayal of regional neighbors’ history. However, the incorporation of multiple understandings of the past within history textbooks also spurred the growth of conservative organizations with the mission of creating textbooks that are more “balanced” in comparison to regional histories as well as casting Japan’s own history in a more positive light (Shin & Sneider, 2011, 251).

In 1997, the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Japanese Society) was created with the mission of countering textbooks that are “biased against Japan,”
promote “self-denigration” within the Japanese population, while promoting a “healthy form of nationalism” (Prusher, 2001 c.; The Japan Times, 2005 a.). The Japanese Society has been a leader in the campaign of creating a “balanced” history within Japanese schools through the publication of texts that heavily casts Japan’s history in a positive light. The Japanese Society’s textbooks have been approved every year of the textbook approval cycle since 2001. This organization maintains an objective of having its textbooks in 10% of Japanese public schools (The Japan Times, 2005 a.).

*Speeches and Pronouncements*

Japan’s history textbook controversies did not end in 1986. Since 1988, there have been 15 controversial events within Japan concerning the content of history textbooks. Figure 8 below outlines the events which occurred during the 1988 to 2015 time frame.

**Figure 8. Japanese Textbook Incidents 1988-2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Controversy</th>
<th>Government Agency</th>
<th>Administration</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1995 Murayama Statement</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Murayama</td>
<td>SDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Textbook Approval</td>
<td>MEXT</td>
<td>Koizumi</td>
<td>LDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>MEXT Denies 2nd Textbook Review</td>
<td>MEXT</td>
<td>Koizumi</td>
<td>LDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Textbook Approval</td>
<td>MEXT</td>
<td>Koizumi</td>
<td>LDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Deletion of Imperial Military’s role in Okinawa Mass Suicides within Textbooks</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Abe</td>
<td>LDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Educational Program to Increase Education on Japan’s Territorial Claims</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Aso</td>
<td>LDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Textbook Approval</td>
<td>MEXT</td>
<td>Aso</td>
<td>LDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Textbook Approval</td>
<td>MEXT</td>
<td>Noda</td>
<td>DJP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Abe’s mission of “restoring the country’s self”</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Abe</td>
<td>LDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>National involvement in Local Textbook Adoption</td>
<td>MEXT</td>
<td>Abe</td>
<td>LDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Proposed new Textbook Screening Standards</td>
<td>Minister of Education</td>
<td>Abe</td>
<td>LDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>MEXT Advisory Committee proposal to reject texts that do not foster patriotism</td>
<td>MEXT</td>
<td>Abe</td>
<td>LDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>New Screening Standards for textbooks Approved</td>
<td>MEXT</td>
<td>Abe</td>
<td>LDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Japanese Diplomats speak with U.S. Virginia Lawmakers</td>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Abe</td>
<td>LDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Abe publicly denounces U.S. History textbook</td>
<td>Prime</td>
<td>Abe</td>
<td>LDP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As textbooks began to change in light of the 1992 Neighboring Countries Clause, Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi went further to advance the diversity of perspectives within Japan’s compulsorily education through his 1995 WWII commemoration address. His statement focused on the remembrance of history as he apologized for Japan’s past actions and urged reflection on the lessons learned from atrocities to promote peace and democracy, and to, “foster relations with all countries based on deep understanding and trust” (Murayama, 1995). Murayama subsequently launched the Peace, Friendship and Exchange Initiative to cultivate this “deep understanding and trust” between Japan and its neighbors which supported historical research into their respective joint modern relations. Murayama’s full statement can be found in Appendix M (Murayama, 1995; appendix M). The expanded exchange program included the participation of educators in the compulsory education system as well as professors from multiple universities (Prusher, 2001 a.). Murayama’s statement continues to guide Japan’s involvement with the past as purported by the MOFA (Suga, 2014).

Progress continued to be made within history textbooks on the content and description of events related to other nations until 2001, as Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro began his first year in office. In 2001, the MEXT approved a controversial history textbook authored by the Japanese Society, entitled *New History Textbook*, for junior high schools. The *New History Textbook* had been described as controversial by news media following the textbook approval process as it left out pertinent details of Japanese actions during WWII; including the history of Comfort Women, and insinuating that Korea had supported and benefited from Japanese occupation (French, 2001). The
textbook’s approval resulted in violent public protests within South Korea as well as harsh responses from Seoul. Likewise, Japanese teachers’ unions carried out a mass public campaign against the New History Textbook’s use in public schools (Prusher, 2001a). One of the Japanese Society’s leading members responded to criticism saying the textbook, “merely balances out a distorted view of history and presents a more appropriate picture for young students” (Prusher, 2001a).

Citing the Neighboring Countries Clause, the South Korean government demanded 25 changes to the Japanese Society textbook and petitioned the MEXT for a second review. The MEXT granted the second review but only accepted two of the 25 changes cited by the South Korean government. The two accepted changes concerned aspects of ancient history; no history of the 20th century was revised. The South Korean government challenged the MEXT’s second review and pushed further for the acceptance of the full 25 changes. Further reviews were denied by the Japanese government (French, 2001).

In the 2002-2005 textbook cycle, the Japanese Society’s textbook was only used by six out of 532 public school districts, missing the organization’s goal of the textbook being in 10% of schools by a large margin at 0.04% (Prusher, 2001c). However, while the MEXT did not push additional revisions on the Japanese Society textbook beyond the two accepted from the South Korean government’s demand, the authors voluntarily made nine revisions, after the book become a national best seller, which included removing suggestions that Korea supported colonization (French, 2001).

In 2005, as Prime Minister Koizumi was nearing the end of his time in office, the Japanese Society’s history textbook was marginally revised and submitted again for
approval to the MEXT for the next round of junior high school textbooks. While revisions were made before submission, the text still downplayed atrocities that occurred during WWII, did not mention Comfort Women history, and claimed Japanese ownership of the Dokdo Islands (The Japan Times, 2005 a.). The same year, Shimane Prefecture declared February 22 as “Takeshima Day,” incorporating various forms of celebration in honor of Japan’s ownership of the Takeshima/Dokdo islands (Konishi, 2005). Takeshima Day sparked outrage within the South Korean public and government (BBC World News, 2012) and has aided in enhancing the Dokdo claims within educational resources.

While the New History Textbook contained the most controversial portrayal of history, seven out of the eight history textbooks approved that year also did not mention Comfort Women, a change in the trends that began in 1992. Similar to the reaction in 2001, the MEXT’s approval of the New History Textbook once again ignited violent protests and harsh responses from the South Korean public and government (Sakamaki, 2005). With their approved book, the Japanese Society still did not meet its 10% school adoption rate, however, use of the textbook in public schools increased to 0.44% that year compared to the 0.04% use in 2001 (Nakamura, 2005).

Abe had praised the MEXT’s approval of the Japanese Society’s textbook as he entered office as Prime Minister in 2006. He claimed the lessons contained in the book were tools for creating a “more confident nation” (Faiola, 2006 a.). During his campaign for office, Abe had made the objective of increasing patriotism within education part of his platform; promising to enact a “sweeping education bill” that would strengthen the idea of patriotism within Japan’s school system during his tenure as Prime Minister (Faiola, 2006 a.; Vries, 2006).
Abe’s textbook reforms began most notably in early 2007, during the beginning of the textbook screening process, as the MEXT ordered publishers to delete sections in history textbooks that stated the Imperial Army was responsible for ordering civilians to commit mass suicide during the Battle of Okinawa (Norimitsu, 2007 a.). During WWII, as the war was nearing its conclusion, Okinawans had been indoctrinated by the Japanese military to believe the lie that suicide would be a preferable death than being slaughtered by the advancing Allied forces (Norimitsu, 2007 b.). Public protests within Okinawa against the revision erupted after the MEXT’s announced the new requirements. Abe publicly responded to criticism of political involvement regarding the exclusion stating, “I believe the screening system has been followed appropriately.” (Norimitsu, 2007 a.). However, after Abe stepped down as Prime Minister in October, 2007 (succeeded by Fukuda Yasuo), the MEXT reconsidered the earlier requirements of silence on Japanese military involvement to softer language of involvement (Norimitsu,” 2007 b.).

Similar to the controversial textbook approvals in in 2001, and 2005, in early 2009, the New History Textbook was once again approved by the MEXT, while Aso Taro was Prime Minister. The 2009 version of the textbook still maintained the controversial issues that many consider to be “whitewashing” history in Japan’s favor. The 2009 approval once again saw public South Korean protests and incurred harsh responses from the South Korean government (UPI, 2009).

The beginning of the 2012 textbook screening process brought the textbook controversy to the forefront with renewed intensity. In March, 2012, under Prime Minister Noda, the MEXT approved three high school textbooks that claimed Japanese ownership of the Dokdo islands. The ownership claims stemmed from an educational
program supported by Aso’s administration in 2009 to increase territory related education in schools which was strongly reflected in the 2012 textbook screening process. Of the 39 total social studies textbooks undergoing review in 2012, 21 claimed Japan’s ownership over the Dokdo islands. Within those 21 books, three mentioned the ownership for the first time, while the other 18 had mentioned Japanese ownership in previous editions (Kim, 2012 a.). Likewise, 12 out of the 19 history textbooks submitted did not contain any reference to Comfort Women (Kim, 2012 b.).

Abe’s 2012 campaign for Prime Minister added to the intensity as he made history textbooks a central issue of the LDP party platform stating that, “Japanese schools take a self-deprecating view of history” and vowed to revise the textbook screening process in an effort to correct this interpretation. As such, contention over the portrayal of history has occurred every year of Abe’s administration. Abe’s Minister of Education, Shimomura Hakubun, expounded on the proposed revision after the election of Abe in December, saying that the intention for reform stems from the goal to develop the “Japanese spirit” the population is currently lacking and to teach Japanese youth the “2,000 year history of Japan’s wonderful traditions and culture” (Ito, 2012).

The goals that were set in the 2012 election began to take shape in 2013 through multiple events. In October, the MEXT ordered a local school board to use a controversial history textbook that had been selected by the school district for the upcoming four year cycle. A local school board within the district unanimously voted not to use the newly selected text due to its, “overtly revisionist content.” According to Martin Fackler, this was the first instance of the national government involving itself within local politics on the issue of textbooks (Fackler, 2013).
Following the local dispute, the Education Minister proposed new screening standards in November that would require textbooks to portray a “balanced picture” of disputed history. A balanced history would be shown in textbooks by including the understanding of events from nationalist scholars on the two most controversial issues in Japan’s history; the Nanking massacre and the history of Comfort Women (Fackler, 2013). The advisory committee to the MEXT took the proposed standards further in December, recommending that textbooks that do not nurture patriotism be rejected. The advisory committee’s recommendation came at the same time as a government appointed committee to the MEXT suggested changing the power of textbook selection to city mayors instead of school districts (Fackler, 2013).

Education Minister Shimomura’s proposed textbook standards were adopted in 2014 and required that publishers “state the government’s unified views” within history and social studies textbooks. The standards were immediately put in place with the ongoing textbook screening cycle. Due to the adoption, in May, 2015, five textbooks were mandated to undergo major revision which included rewriting passages concerning Comfort Woman as well as past racial violence against Koreans living in Japan and forced labor during WWII (Osaki, 2015). The textbooks that were approved also strengthened Japanese ownership of the Dokdo Islands (Qatar News Agency, 2015 a.).

Differing from his predecessors, Abe has taken an international approach to history education and vowed to fight inaccurate interpretations of the past concerning Japan’s involvement during WWII abroad. The United States has become a notable foreground in the apparent battle to influence the understanding of the past against South Korea’s interpretation. In 2014, Japanese diplomats spoke to Virginia state lawmakers
concerning a pending requirement for new textbooks to include the name “the East Sea”
to describe the body of water in between South Korean and Japan. The Japanese
diplomates pushed the U.S. lawmakers to only use the name “the Sea of Japan” without
success (Fackler, 2015).

In January, 2015, Abe publicly denounced a U.S. high school textbook published
by McGraw-Hill for its portrayal of the Japanese military involvement with Comfort
Women and their forced service, saying he was shocked at such a depiction of history.
The Japanese Consulate General in New York had met with leaders of McGraw-Hill in
December, 2014 and demanded revision to the textbook. The denial of revision by
McGraw-Hill, who backed their decision with factual evidence, sparked the public
denouncement from Abe (Fackler, 2015).

Response to Challenges

Japan’s revision of standards and approval of controversial textbooks have been
met with international criticism to which the government has publicly responded. The
2001 textbook approval and the subsequent denial of additional reviews, per request of
neighboring countries, ignited a firestorm of diplomatic and economic repercussions
which was led by the South Korean government. At the MEXT’s announcement of the
approval of the New History Textbook in April, 2001, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda
Yasuo, also issued an official government statement defending Japan’s textbook approval
system. In his statement, (located in full within appendix N) Fukuda claimed that the
textbooks selected for approval was done so without bias in an effort to include a diverse
group of textbooks for use in schools. He further stated that while textbooks are reviewed
within the approval process, the MEXT only looks for fundamental flaws which include,
“obvious mistakes or a lack of balance” which the MEXT then recommends for correction with support by academic research. Fukuda stressed that approved textbooks do not reflect the Japanese government’s views on history but that it continues to support the 1995 Murayama Statement and reiterated a general apology from Japan for actions in WWII with its commitment to promote mutual understanding and trusts with the world community (Fukuda, 2001).

Fukuda’s statement did not appease the international community as the South Korean government continued to threaten diplomatic and economic recourse for the lack of Japan’s action in remedying the controversial textbook. In May, 2001, in response to strongly worded governmental threats from South Korea’s MOFAT, Japan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tanaka Makiko, issued a comment stating that South Korea’s position was received by the Japanese government with sincerity and would be studied closely. He further encouraged the upcoming Japan-ROK National Exchange as a time for both countries to “join their hands” to further Japan-South Korea relations and to face the past squarely (Tanaka, 2001).

In July, 2001, the MEXT announced that no further revisions would be made to textbooks once the first neighboring countries’ petition was complete. A public statement was issued by the MEXT defending their position, according to Howard French, saying, “Under the current textbook screening system, it is up to the authors to decide what historical facts to include in their books. We [the MEXT] cannot force inclusions of certain points” (Tanaka, 2001). Koizumi also weighed in on the matter as he entered office a few days after the MEXT’s April approval, saying, in regards to the feelings of regional neighbors, “Apart from such contentious issues, there are areas where we can
cooperate more peacefully. There is a need to turn our eyes to those areas. It is not good to only look at points of contention.” He also added that since a lot of work had already been done to adjust textbooks, he did not believe additional work would be required (Tanaka, 2001).

The second approval of the *New History Textbook* in 2005 brought a new round of international criticism. At a press conference held by the MOFA on April 5, the same day as the sanctioned history textbooks for the upcoming school year were announced, the Press Secretary defended Japan’s textbook approval system; reaffirming once again that approved textbooks do not reflect the governments’ stance on history but that its stands behind the 1995 Murayama statement (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005 a.). The MOFA also publicly released a detailed description of the process involved in the textbook approval system which was placed on the MOFA’s website to support the MEXT claim of involvement within the educational process (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005 b.). Translated copies of Japan’s 20th century history contained within the eight approved junior high school history textbooks were also placed on the MOFA’s website in an effort to eliminate any confusion of the Japanese history that is used within schools (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005 c.). Koizumi also publicly called for “restraint of emotions” in regards to regional neighbors’ ignition while supporting the MOFA objectives of transparency (Sakamaki, 2005).

While Koizumi took a passive stance against the complaints of regional neighbors, not every political leader did so. In November 2005, during an appearance on a popular Asahi network television program, the DPJ leader, Maehara Seiji, urged Koizumi to resolve the territorial disputes with South Korea and called South Korean
President Roh’s understanding of Japan’s textbook policy and territorial claims “shallow” (*The Japan Times*, 2005 c.).

The MOFA has not published any new statements regarding the approval of history textbooks under Abe’s administration, but has upheld the 2005 publications produced under Koizumi and the 1995 Murayama statement in relation to the issue. However, Abe and his Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga have released multiple general statements on issues related to the remembrance of history, concerning issues such as the Comfort Women and the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).

Even though it has been at the center of the issue, the MEXT has been largely silent on the controversy surrounding history textbooks. The focus of the MEXT’s webpage is posting reports on policy standards, general information on the Japanese educational system, as well as a few announcements such as new policy objectives for the educational system as a whole. In 2004, the MEXT released a statement on a program for compulsory education reform, entitled, “Japan! Rise Again!” The program was created under Koizumi’s administration in acknowledgement that “It is necessary for Japan also to open up a new era and aim to foster spiritually rich and strong Japanese people, and, as a national strategy, to promote educational reform.” (South Korea Ministry of Education, 2005).

Similar to Koizumi, Abe has also implemented a reform program in an effort to instill a greater love of the nation within the educational system. However, coupled with his stated campaign of patriotism, Abe has also created scholastic objectives to increase study abroad programs to and from Japan, increase universities’ global ranking compared
to international leaders such as the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as to increase Japan’s competency in the English language (Shimomura, 2014).

A New York Times article published in October, 2014 described Abe’s education reform as a divided strategy that promoted an inward looking nationalism while striving for globalization objectives. The author, Michael Fitzpatrick, had used an email interview with the Minister of Education, Shimomura Hakubun, as one of his resources for the article. As such, Shimomura posted a statement to the MEXT website defending the educational reform supported by Abe by claiming that the change positively shapes student’s national identities while improving areas of weakness within the current educational system, with no inherent dichotomy. Shimomura’s full statement can be found in appendix O (Shimomura, 2014).

Memorials and Offerings

In 2012, the Comfort Woman statue in Seoul reemerged as a point of strife within the history textbook division between South Korea and Japan. As the South Korean government continued to demand revision of history textbooks that claimed Japanese ownership of the Dokdo Islands, Prime Minister Noda asserted the Comfort Woman statue outside the Japanese Embassy in Seoul distorts historical facts. Noda specifically referenced the inscription on the statue as erroneous (Kim, 2012 b.).

III. South Korean government’s use of history textbooks

South Korea has sustained multiple turbulent events during the 20th century which have now become points of contention in how the past is remembered. The disputed history begins in 1910 with the formal colonization of the peninsula by Japan and ends roughly in 1988 with the election of the first President in a successful democratic
election. This time period includes not only colonialization, but also the Korean War which ultimately divided the peninsula, two dictators; one of which was Park Chung-hee who ruled South Korea for 18 years from 1961 to his death in 1979, vast political corruption, economic growth and the rise in living standards, as well as massive social movements in the struggle for democracy (The Japan Times, 2014; Seth, 2011).

Park Chung-hee was the first South Korean leader to implement a system of state written textbooks with an objective of framing the understanding of current and past events. Upon taking power, Park employed the new textbook system to cast his military takeover of the government in a more positive light, referring to the event as a military revolution instead of a military coup. Even in the founding of a democratic state, government involvement with history textbooks have continued (The Japan Times, 2014; Choe, 2015).

Speeches and Pronouncements

Comparable to Japan, South Korea has also experienced multiple controversial events regarding history textbooks from 1988 to 2015. 29 events have been classified under the Speeches and Pronouncement section and have been divided into two charts due to the large number of incidents. Below, Figure 9 illustrates government pronouncements and action concerning history textbooks within South Korea. Figure 10, presented later, displays the statements issued from the South Korean government against Japan in regards to history textbooks.
The Ministry of Education (MOE) was established after the conclusion of WWII with the purpose of providing democratic education to the general public. While democracy was not fully achieved until 1988, the pre-democracy era set up a modern educational institution for the state. In the era of democracy, the MOE is charged with creating national educational policies that promotes not only high quality learning within schools, but also loyal and well-rounded citizens. Additionally, the MOE manages educator standards, national entrance exams, university standards, as well as financial elements related to educational services. An important role of the MOE is its involvement with educational material. Since the beginning of South Korea in 1948, the MOE compiled and freely distributed textbooks for compulsorily education (South Korean Ministry of Education, 2008).

While the liberalization of history textbooks began with the establishment of democracy, the biggest impact of openness on textbooks occurred under President Roh’s administration from 2003 to 2008. During his first year in office, Roh reformed the production of history textbooks from the state to third party private publishers who
maintained content standards set forth by the MOE. The system that Roh implemented is used today, as of this writing, and mimics the system used in Japan (Koo, 2015).

Roh took the idea of openness toward the peninsula’s 20th century history a step beyond educational texts and established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in 2005. The TRC’s goal, according to the first Commissioner Kim Dong-choon, was to, “create favorable conditions for achieving historical, political, and legal justice through revealing long-suppressed truths” (Selden & Kim, 2010). The TRC focused their efforts on giving a voice to Korean victims through the exposure of events that had been repressed which occurred under the rule of multiple dictators, the Korean War, and colonialization (Selden & Kim, 2010).

The TRC operated under a renewable four year mandate with a completion date set for early 2010. The TRC accomplished many projects and reports concerning atrocities in South Korea’s modern era but their work on the history of the Korean War proved to be one of the most sensitive issues. Their work on the Korean War inadvertently touched upon the national identity of South Korean citizens in relation to the formation of the state and its relationship with vital allies, including the United States, which increased tensions politically and domestically.

Roh’s appointed officers’ term limit expired in 2009, under President Lee’s administration (which began in 2008). While Lee appointed new personnel to fill the TRC’s vacancies, he did not approve the TRC’s renewal. According to Kim Dong-choon, under the Lee administration the government was not open to working with the TRC for the effort of transparent history as it had been under Roh and there was fear of not being
able to complete reports, specifically on events which occurred during the Korean War. The TRC officially closed in June, 2010 (Selden & Kim, 2010).

The Lee administration did not advance the liberalization of history education after Roh, but worked to once again constrain the content within textbooks. In 2008, the MOE announced that it would “straighten the facts” within history textbooks by requiring the textbook committee to necessitate changes in potential texts on the topics of the 1948 Jeju Uprising, and South Korea’s past leaders. Specific changes included referring to the 1948 Jeju Uprising, a large political protest that was violently put down by Korean soldiers, under US command, that resulted in thousands of civilian deaths, instead of as the Jeju Riot. The Rhee and Park years were to include positive aspects that occurred during their reign to balance the negative history of vast political corruption and authoritarian rule. Additionally, more aggressive descriptors against North Korea were also inserted (McNeill, 2008). The textbook revision was met with objection from the Democratic Party (DP), the largest opposition party at the time, who claimed Lee’s Administration was working to “beautify the past” (McNeill, 2008).

In 2010, the MEO announced a revision to the national history curriculum through increasing the information presented on the Dokdo Islets. According the MOE’s “Revision of History Curriculum” press release, which can be found in appendix P, “the content on the Dokdo islets has been beefed up to shed light on the wrongfulness of Japan’s illicit claim for sovereignty over the islets and raise students’ awareness on Korea’s sovereignty over Dokdo, so that they may hold an informed view of history” (South Korea Ministry of Education, 2010; appendix P).
Textbooks have continued to escalate as points of contention within the current Park Administration. In November 2013, the MOE approved eight history textbooks for use in the upcoming school year, one of which was published by Kyohak Publishing. The approval of Kyohak’s text ignited public protests against its use in schools, citing that the text presents past atrocities in a positive view; such as the history of authoritarian rule, leaves out specific brutalities, as well as downplays the struggle for democracy. DP lawmakers expressed outrage over the approved controversial text and called for its remove from the approved list (Nam, 2013).

The approval of the controversial text was part of a yearlong disagreement surrounding the textbook approval process. In 2013, President Park publicly cautioned advancing “ideological prejudices” in history textbooks in response to the criticisms of approved textbooks (Choe, 2015). In October, 2013 the MOE had proposed 830 revisions within the eight textbooks that had already been approved for use in South Korean high schools. The MOE claimed the recommended changes comprised factual errors, typos, and ideologically imbalanced descriptions of historical events. The publishers corrected all but 41 recommended changes. However, after the completed 789 changes, the MOE ordered the publishers to make all 830 changes or risk suspension of their book. The publishers responded to the MOE by filing a lawsuit with Seoul’s Administrative Court citing that the order was based on a lack of evidence and that the government was requiring unnecessary revisions as the texts had all followed the mandated screening process and been approved, leveraging a Supreme Court ruling that requires additional screening processes before recommended changes can be enforced (Nam, 2013).
The history textbook dispute did not end in 2013 with the approval system. In 2014, the Minister of Education, Hwang Woo-yea, began campaigning for the inclusion of a colonial era Japanese resistance fighter, Yu Kwan-sun, into South Korean history textbooks. Yu Kwan-sun was a 17 year old Koran girl who was imprisoned and tortured to death for opposing Japanese rule during the March First Movement.

One March 1, 1919, nearly 1 million Korean colonists marched against Japanese colonial rule throughout the country in a largely peaceful movement throughout the spring, 1919. The Japanese colonial government brutally put down the protest with an acknowledged 553 deaths, 1,409 injured and over 14,000 imprisoned. However, Korean history estimates that more than 7,000 people died and tens of thousands were arrested by the Japanese for this protest for independence (Seth, 2011).

Hwang found it problematic that only four of the eight history textbooks approved the previous year contained any mention of the young woman. In an effort to amend the missing piece of Yu’s history, Hwang publicly suggested a single history textbook be used for all South Korean schools which would also hedge against, “sowing seeds of division in public opinion” (The Japan Times, 2014). When the MOE was questioned about the possibility of a state led textbook, a spokesperson responded saying that creating a history textbook in today’s world is an open process that includes the involvement of multiple historians. The government only seeks “consistency” in the teaching of history (The Japan Times, 2014).

In the Education Minister’s push for inclusion of specific points of history, the Dokdo Islands once again became a point of national pride. In 2015, two million copies of a supplementary booklet focusing on the Dokdo islands were distributed to every
school to be used in conjunction with the approved history textbooks. The MOE released a statement concerning the booklet upon its circulation. The statement asserted that the booklets improved the learning material that was devised by the MOE in 2011, made the material easier for students to understand, and incorporated “new research outcomes” on the islands. For elementary students, the information was simplified and for high school students the information presented contained more, “in-depth legal grounds based on international law” which supported the Ministry’s overall educational goal of Dokdo Islet education, which states, “Students should be able to understand why Dokdo is Korean territory based on both historical and geographical facts, as well as by the perspective of international law” (South Korea Ministry of Education, 2015).

South Korea’s internal struggle of how to portray the past within textbooks reached a peak in late 2015 when the Minister of Education announced that the state would be issuing one history textbook for required used in compulsory education beginning March, 2017. Hwang assured opponents of the government textbook that the history presented would be “objective and balanced” as the MOE will invite a committee of historians to write the history book with a variety of persons to review the final draft before its use in schools. The Minister further defended the decision for a state issued text claiming that the main objectives of textbooks should be teaching “the proud history of South Korea” emphasizing the country’s achievement of democratic transition and its very quick industrialization and economic rise. The Deputy Minister of Education, Kim Jae-choon, bolstered Hwang’s assertions stating that the textbooks currently used in schools are lenient in their portrayal of North Korea and its direct involvement with causing the Korean War, while providing many critical interpretations of South Korea’s
history compared to the North (Choe, 2015). Park also defended the state issued text publicly asserting that textbooks and history classes must “inspire pride in students for being South Korean citizens” (The Japan Times, 2015 c.).

Opponents of the state issued text, including the DP and educators, claimed such a move by the state embarrasses the country globally and sets up a textbook system that is reflective of the repression of history under Park’s father. Likewise, critics asserted that the mandated text will whitewash history, and is an effort by Park to redeem her father’s reputation within the South Korean population (Jun, 2013; Choe, 2015). The Park Administration’s decision to author the history textbook ignited riots throughout South Korea; 50,000 people have signed a petition against the textbook (Kirk, 2015), historians from over 20 universities as well as 800 associated with the Korean History Research Association refused to participate in the government’s writing process for the book (The Japan Times, 2015 c.). The DP has also vowed to create a bill to ban the government from writing textbooks, even though such a bill would not likely pass due to the Senauri Party majority in the National Assembly, which supports the state issued textbook initiative (Choe, 2015).

While the MOE was dealing with controversies surrounding the approval and publication of history textbooks, The Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea (the Commission) was publishing their own books for wide dissemination within South Korea and the world. As of 2015, the Commission has published 14 volumes of accounts from the Korean population who suffered under Japanese colonial rule as forced soldiers and laborers since its creation in 2004 under President Roh.
In 2013, the Commission produced and released its 15th book entitled, *Can You Hear Us? The Untold Narratives of Comfort Women*, a compilation of oral testimonies from 12 surviving Comfort Women and one civil activist on their experience with Japan’s Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery campaign (*Yonhap News Agency*, 2015 a.). The book’s stated objective is to spread the history of Comfort Women in an effort to lessen their secret pain and ensure their history does not fade from public knowledge.

Coupled with the idea of increasing public awareness, the book also admonishes the Japanese government to make appropriate amends to resolve the Comfort Women issue, currently rife between South Korea and Japan (*The Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea*, 2015). The book was first released in 2013 in Korean to the South Korean public (*Yonhap News Agency*, 2015 a.; *The Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea*, 2015). However, the Commission quickly set to work producing the text in English for global consumption, beginning first with the U.S. public. This was the first book produced by the Commission that was distributed overseas (*The Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea*, 2015).

The volume is set up in a similar fashion to a case study with methodology of collection and the history of Comfort Women mentioned before the section of transcribed testimonies. The personal accounts were gathered by the Commission employees from 2005 to 2006, with one former Comfort Woman adding her testimony later in 2012 due to her own personal choice. No personal identifiers of the women are given beyond their age, except for one woman who volunteered all of her demographic information for
publication. The average age of the 12 women at the time of their interviews was 81 (The Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 2015).

The English version of Can You Hear Us? was completed in 2014, with the translation provided by the History Museum of Comfort Women (Media Joha LTD) (The Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 2015). The translation was conducted in Palisades Park, New Jersey home to a well-known Korean American community. This particular town has been sympathetic to the issue of Korean Comfort Women as it is home to one of two US memorials to Comfort Women that are identical to the original statue located in Seoul, South Korea (Schrank, 2013; Alvarado, 2015; The Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 2015).

As part of its mission to distribute the book within the U.S., the Commission worked to gain support from local, state, and national U.S. leaders. Political leaders’ support is also documented in front of the text though official letters produced by the officials themselves. In January, 2015, 20,000 copies of the book were available and distributed free of charge to US politicians and public libraries (Alvarado, 2015).

The South Korean government has not only focused attention on their own history textbooks but also on history textbooks of their regional neighbors, specifically Japan. Beginning in 2001, official statements against the content of Japanese history textbooks have been issued by the South Korea government each time the MEXT concluded their cycle of textbook approvals. Figure 10 below displays the statements issued from the
South Korean government beginning in 2001 until 2015. This figure comprises official statements issued directly from various governmental ministries as well as leaders’ statements gleaned through newspaper articles. However, Figure 10 is not fully comprehensive due to time limits placed on archival documents and the accessibility of websites available to English users.

Figure 10. List of South Korean government statements against Japan’s history textbooks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gov’t Person</th>
<th>Gov’t Department</th>
<th>Statement Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Han Seung-soo Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
<td>MOFAT</td>
<td>Statement of deep disappoint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Han Seung-soo, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
<td>MOFAT</td>
<td>Korea’s Demand for Correction of Distortions in Japanese History Textbooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Spokesperson of MOFAT</td>
<td>MOFAT</td>
<td>Statement by MOFAT Spokesperson on the Outcome of the Japanese Government’s Screening of History Textbooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Spokesperson of the Task Force Team on the Issue of Distorted Japanese History Textbooks</td>
<td>MOFAT</td>
<td>Statement on the Outcome of the Japanese Government’s Screening of High School History Textbooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Minister of Education</td>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education issues strong protest and urged correction of Japanese history textbooks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Spokesperson and Deputy Minister for Public Relations of MOFAT</td>
<td>MOFAT</td>
<td>Spokesperson’s Statement on Japan’s Approval of a Middle-School History Textbook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Lee Ju-ho, Minister of Education</td>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Minister Sends a Letter of Protest to Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Cho Byung-jae, Foreign Ministry spokesperson</td>
<td>MOFAT</td>
<td>Seoul rebukes Tokyo over textbooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Cho Sei-young, Director-General for Northeast Asian Affairs</td>
<td>MOFAT</td>
<td>Director-General for Northeast Asian Affairs Summons a Japanese Diplomate of the Textbook Issue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>President Lee</td>
<td>Executive</td>
<td>Lee calls for Japan to muster up courage to face up to history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Spokesperson and Deputy Minister for Public Relations of MOFAT</td>
<td>MOFAT</td>
<td>Spokesperson’s Statement on the Outcome of Japan’s High School Textbook Examination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Spokesperson and Deputy Minister for Public Relations of MOFA</td>
<td>MOFAT</td>
<td>MOFA Spokesperson’s Statement on Japan’s Approval of Elementary School Textbooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
<td>National Assembly</td>
<td>S. Korea’s Parliament Denounces Japan for Dokdo</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While multiple ministries issued statements during each year of controversy, they all followed a similar structure of denouncement, such as utilizing the phrases, “The Government of the Republic of Korea strongly protests” (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, 2012), “expresses deep regret” (South Korea Ministry of Education, 2011), “strongly appeals” (Kim, 2012 b.) the decision to approve. All the statements of denouncement go further to declare that the victims of the MEXT approval are the youth of Japan who will ultimately become Japan’s future. The statements also declare that the South Korean grievances are supported by the 1982 Neighboring Country Clause, the 1995 Murayama Statement, and the 1998 Joint Declaration on a new Korea-Japan Partnership for the 21st Century.

The MOFAT’s 2001 statement, “Korea’s Demand for Correction of Distortions in Japanese History Textbooks,” seemingly sets precedents for future governmental action in relation to the history textbook controversy with Japan. This particular assertion discusses the 25 items submitted to the MEXT for correction within their history textbooks which were identified by a team of researchers commissioned by the government. After the explanation of the items submitted and their support through previous legal agreements, the South Korean government promised to, “demise mid to long term measures to prevent the recurrence of such distortions of history and to offer the world an accurate and objective understanding of Korea’s history” along with consideration in “reinforcing history education in the schools.” The complete statement can be found in Appendix Q (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001 b.). Actions following this MOFAT’s 2001 statement supports its claim of “mid to long
term measures” as the MOE has been involved with the petition of corrections within Japanese textbooks (South Korea Ministry of Education, 2011) and the governments continued involvement with its own history education.

While Figure 10 demonstrates a wide array of government participation within the history textbook controversy, an interesting point of involvement is the resolution issued by the National Assembly in 2015. Since the disagreement’s outbreak in 1982, there has not been evidence of the National Assembly’s engagement in the issue as a whole until 33 years later when a resolution was issued in 2015. The issued adopted by the National Assembly denounced Japan’s continued claims on the Dokdo islands, stating, “the parliament strongly denounces Japan’s repeated provocations of violating South Korea’s territorial sovereignty and distorting history.” The resolution passed with 181 votes out of a possible 182 (Qatar News Agency, 2015 b.).

Response to Challenges

While South Korea has used speeches and pronouncements to call for the change of Japanese history textbooks, this has not been the only means utilized to push the government of Japan to redress the issue. In response to the Japanese government’s refusal to correct history textbooks, South Korean leaders have used the threat of harming economic and diplomatic relations to pressure change within Japan’s educational texts.

President Kim Dae-jung initiated strong repercussions in response to the MEXT’s decision to approve a controversial textbook coupled with Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine in 2001. In 1999, Kim had begun to ease restrictions on the imports of Japanese cultural items which had long been strictly controlled since the end of WWII. Kim threatened to reverse the trade liberalization with Japan if the textbook was not revised
Cold relations between South Korea and Japan continued under President Roh’s administration, which began in 2001. In 2005, with the creation of “Takeshima day” combined with the approval, once again, of the controversial *New History Textbook* ignited a formidable response from Roh himself. Roh published a three page letter to the nation on the current status of South Korean-Japanese relations (Konishi, 2005). In his letter, Roh called the claims on the Dokdo islands and the history textbook row as Japan’s attempt at justifying its colonialist and expansionist past to which he declared, “This government has no choice but to respond firmly.” While “Takeshima day” was organized by a local government, Koizumi nor his administration gave a statement against its production or comment on how such an event would affect regional neighbors, as such Roh remarked on the event specifically saying, “These actions are not just undertaken by a single local government or some thoughtless extreme nationalists, but they are done under the abetting of the Japanese leadership and the central government. That is why we can only look at them as the actions by Japan. These are actions that completely nullify repentance and apologies made so far by Japan.” Roh further stated that South Korea’s determination may cause a “diplomatic war” (*Gulf News*, 2005) and that the South
Korean people must be prepared for a “prolonged fight with economic and social implications” (Konishi, 2005).

Presidents Kim and Roh took aggressive stances towards Japan’s textbooks, whereas Lee’s administration focused on bolstering South Korea’s own history within textbooks as evidenced by events outlined previously. While Lee had a large internal focus on educational texts, he met with Prime Minister Noda three times during Noda’s time in office; December, 2011, August, 2012, and October, 2012, where Lee discussed the correct presentation of history, specifically in relation to the issue of Comfort Women (Foster, 2011; The Asahi Shimbun, 2012, The Korean Times, 2012 b.). Park also took a hard stance against the portrayal of history within educational texts, citing such representation of histories like the Comfort Women, and refused to meet with Abe until November, 2014 (Xinhua, 2014).

**Memorials and Offerings**

The Comfort Woman memorial in Seoul, South Korea was erected in 2011 at the beginning of Prime Minister Noda’s administration, as discussed in chapter 2. President Lee responded to Noda’s calls to take down the statue by saying, “The monument would not have been erected if only Japan had shown a little bit of concern” over the issue, warning, “second and third statues will be set up each time one of the elderly women dies, unless sincere measures are taken” (Choi, 2012). President Lee stood behind this statement throughout the rest of his time in office.

**IV. Chapter Analysis**

Both Japan and South Korea’s national government have been actively engaged within the controversy surrounding history textbooks. While national level involvement
with the production of educational materials is innate in both educational systems reviewed, Japan and South Korea have displayed increased government involvement into the production of textbooks since 1988. Figure 11 below depicts the actions of involvement by government officials relating to history textbooks.

Figure 11. Position of Government action in relation to history textbooks

Japan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Gov’t Actions</th>
<th>Officials Involved</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Speeches and</td>
<td>1. 2001 Chief Cabinet Sec</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Pronouncements</td>
<td>Fukuda statement defending textbook</td>
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<td>approval system</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2. 2001 MOFA issued response to South</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Korea’s letter against approved textbook</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. 2001 MEXT statement defending decision not to review a 2nd time</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. 2001 Koizumi’s statement to newspapers</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>on need to focus on positive elements of the Japan-South Korean</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>relationship</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>5. 2004 MEXT program “Japan! Rise Again!” released</td>
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<td>6. 2005 MOFA Press Secretary statement defending MEXT</td>
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<td>7. 2005 MOFA released description of textbook approval process</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8. 2005 MOFA translated passages of textbooks coverage of 20th century history</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9. 2005 Koizumi calls for “restraint of emotion”</td>
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<td>10. 2005 DJP leader calls Roh’s policies on Japan’s textbooks shallow and urged</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Koizumi to resolve the issue</td>
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<td>11. 2012 Abe’s proposed educational reform program begins</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12. 2014 MEXT responds to NY Times Article defending Abe’s</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>educational reform program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| 15                      | 5 actions: Prime Minister 11 actions: MEXT 1 action: MOFA | Speeches and Pronouncements | See Figure 8 for Event descriptions |
| 1                       | 1 action: Prime Minister | Memorials and Offerings | 1. Noda claims Comfort Woman statue’s inscription contains incorrect history |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Korea</th>
<th>Number of Gov’t Actions</th>
<th>Officials Involved</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6 actions: President 10 actions: MOE 8 actions: MOFAT 2 actions: The Commission 1 action: National Assembly</td>
<td>Speeches and Pronouncements</td>
<td>See Figure 9 and 10 for Event Descriptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6 actions: President</td>
<td>Response to Challenges</td>
<td>1. 2001 Kim refused to meet with Koizumi until conditions were met; threat to reverse trade liberalization 2. 2005 Roh threatens diplomatic war 3. 12/2011 Lee meets with Noda to discuss historical issues 4. 8/2012 Lee meets with Noda to discuss historical issues 5. 10/2012 Lee meets with Noda to discuss historical issues 6. 2012 Park refused to meet with Abe due to historical issues, including history textbooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2 actions: President</td>
<td>Memorials and Offerings</td>
<td>1. 2011 Lee refused to move or revise the Comfort Woman statue until an appropriate apology was issued by Japan 2. 2012 Park has kept with Lee’s initial stance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The respective Ministries of Education have had the most involvement with history textbooks since they are endowed with the power of approving and producing educational material, which sets this ministry at the center of the controversy. It is important to note that both Japan and South Korea’s Minister of Education are appointed by each incoming Prime Minister or President as part of their respective cabinets (Jun, 2014). While both governments have proclaimed unbiased and historically accurate books (McNeill, 2008; The Japan Times, 2014; Fackler, 2013; Ito, 2012) the Ministry of Education typically follows the policy set forth by the President or Prime Minister, which is exemplified throughout the previous sections. Figure 12 below examines the number of history textbook events that occurred during each administration.
While Koizumi had the most overall number of events dealing with history textbooks, Abe had the most events that occurred within Speeches and Pronouncements due to history textbooks being a part of his election campaign, whereas most of the history textbook events for Koizumi occurred as Response to Challenges. In South Korea, Lee had the most number of events while Park had the most events under Speeches and Pronouncements. Like Abe, history textbooks have become a major point of Park’s Administration but led by her Education Minister and supported by herself.

Both governments have described textbooks’ similarly with their objective being to develop a love for the nation within compulsory education. Such rhetoric has increased under Abe and Park with both using very similar phrases in describing the creation of educational policies or textbooks with words such as “instilling pride in the past” or “inspiring pride of being a South Korean” used. The case study suggests that both governments have maintained objectives of creating a textbook that favors the in-group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Japan Administration</th>
<th>Number of Events by Section</th>
<th>Total Number of Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murayama, SDP</td>
<td>1-Speeches and Pronouncements</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koizumi, LDP</td>
<td>3-Speeches and Pronouncements, 10-Response to Challenges</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aso, LDP</td>
<td>2-Speeches and Pronouncements</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noda, DPJ</td>
<td>1-Speeches and Pronouncements, 1-Memorials and Offerings</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abe, LDP</td>
<td>7-Speeches and Pronouncements, 2-Response to Challenges</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Korea Administration</th>
<th>Number of Events by Section</th>
<th>Total Number of Events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kim, Democratic Party</td>
<td>4-Speeches and Pronouncements, 1-Response to Challenges</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roh, Uri Party</td>
<td>6-Speeches and Pronouncements, 1-Response to Challenges</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee, SP</td>
<td>9-Speeches and Pronouncements, 3-Response to Challenges, 1-Memorial and Offerings</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park, SP</td>
<td>10-Speeches and Pronouncements, 1-Response to Challenges, 1-Memorial and Offerings</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with specific political parties defending such a book by using rhetoric as “pride” and “love for the nation” to support such a text. While these phrases are not bad, as they also correspond with the description of patriotism, how the in-group is compared to the out-group is of the utmost importance to political parties as well as to the development of patriotism or nationalism.

According to the various news sources describing textbook revision in both countries, the out-group is portrayed as evil, or corrupt, or even lessened in importance compared to the in-group within controversial texts. For South Korea, the Saenuri party supports the portrayal of North Korea as villainous and the inclusion of details of Japan’s brutal acts during colonialism and WWII. While the events being described, such as the division of the Korean peninsula and the atrocities by Japan are true, there fervent inclusion within history textbooks and the specific verbiage used to describe them is a form of othering. This othering not only separates the countries by experiences and population but also separates them through a sense of evil. The in-group encapsulates the good victims while the out-group are inherently evil villains. This love of the in-group coupled with viewing others as evil is a form of nationalism that is promoted by the Saenuri party.

Likewise, within Japan’s controversial texts, the out-group’s experience during pivotal events, such as colonialism and WWII is downplayed. Such a moderate portrayal of experiences lessens the importance such a population has on the in-group. This lessening of events ignores the out-group as a way of othering. The in-group is promoted by focusing on their own actions and losses while the out-group is forgotten. This form of nationalism has been supported by the LDP.
All of the administrations involved with the production of textbooks, except for a few policies under Roh in South Korea, have claimed to “straighten facts” or in some way present an idea of true history while achieving its goal of instilling pride within the reader. However, every administration has failed to promote the idea of intellectual freedom when producing textbooks. Civil society in both countries, has at some point, protested the government involvement in history textbook writing. But the lack of governmental support of intellectual freedom within the publication of history textbooks through government objectives like growing the love of the nation and rigorous policies that follow administrations, empowers both governments to present a manipulated and controlled version of history within the educational system. South Korea’s return to a state issued textbook increases the state’s ability to manipulate historical information for specific objectives.

The control of educational material, with intellectual freedom or not, is a point of national sovereignty in how a nation chooses to educate its youth. Japan and South Korea have stated such a belief in response to challenges throughout the case study (South Korea Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2001; Cho, 2012; Prusher, 2001). Specifically, South Korea’s MOFAT stated in 2012 that textbooks have the power to influence a country’s future either positively or negatively (Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, 2012). This potential influence of a nation’s future that could negatively impact the region or neighboring countries has seemingly been cited as a security concern by South Korea. As such, the government of South Korea has responded to Japanese textbooks aggressively through the publication of its own educational material as well as texts for the general public. The administrations of Lee and Park have
used textbooks almost as a weapon. In response to the MEXT approval of conservative
texts, South Korea has also increased its approval of controversial texts. With the issue of
the Dokdo islands, where Japan has begun to increase education on Japanese ownership,
so has South Korea in an effort to lay claim counter to Japan. Since textbooks are a point
of national sovereignty, the South Korean government under Lee and Park have chosen to
combat the future threat by creating a population that is opposite of Japan and the
potential external security concern through the development of nationalism by
manipulating the historical memory of the population. This work of influencing the future
populations moves the potential losses such as monetary losses through trade embargos
as well as losses related to war, to the next generation and bolsters their political party as
they are seen as champions for the South Korean population against Japan.

The publication of texts for the general public has been prominent in South Korea
through the work of the Commission. Whereas the Japanese government has not been
involved with the publication of texts for the general public beyond approving
educational texts that are also sold privately by the third party publishers, the
Commission has published 15 texts of testimony concerning Japanese atrocity since
a unique opportunity to examine the Commission’s publication since this was the first
copy produced in English.

Upon review, the text clearly presents political motives with statements of support
from South Korean and U.S. officials and has an additional purpose of influencing
Korean-Americans and the American public’s interpretation of the Comfort Women
history since it was freely given to public libraries and U.S. politicians (The Commission
The text presents background information on the history of Comfort Women that is widely agreed upon within the academic community and sets up the text as a case study with mythology and limitations on research. Questions were asked by the interviewer to the survivor in an effort to gain an overall portrayal of her time in servitude. However, due to their varied experiences, not all the questions are similar and some questions were leading in their effort to gain a depiction of events. Such leading examples include asking for specific nationalities of the traffickers and persons who visited comfort stations such as, “Have you seen a Korean?” (referring to servicing Korean soldiers as a comfort Woman) (The Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 2015, 71). Additionally, out of place questions were at times asked by the interviewer such as, “Have you ever learned to sing
a Japanese war song?” (The Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 2015 p. 170). While this question may give a view into life at the comfort station, learning a war song may have also been a part of life within the education system in Korea and in factories as well during colonialism, no information was presented demonstrating that learning a war song was unique to the comfort station. Moreover, the question, “Don’t you hate Koreans because it was a Korean who took you away?” (The Commission on Verification and Support for the Victims of Forced Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea, 2015, 174) led to an opinionated paragraph of how much the woman hated the Japanese because of their orchestrated violence which caused her pain. While the book does provide valuable testimonies from surviving Comfort Women, it is filled with biases as well as the issue of contending with an older population with fading memories.
I. Analysis of Case Studies and Final Conclusions

Historical memory is a powerful influence within populations. Its basis of shared remembrances within the collective helps shape identity and provides elites with sensitive material in which to mobilize persons for a specific cause. The instrumentally directed selective remembering (and forgetting) of past events gives this concept a very distinct attribute when compared to collective memories. Both concepts place awareness and certain significance on specific events of the past, without holding to their accurate retelling. Every population develops and maintains collective memories that define who the population is and where they came from (Langenbacher, 2003; Toshechenko, 2011; Bernhard & Kubik, 2014). Since every population holds collective memories, elites have the opportunity to exploit these remembrances for specific purposes as historical memory is the elite manipulation of collective memories.

While historical memory builds into a person’s identity, it also helps to develop patriotism and nationalism, as well as the concept of nations. Elites have utilized historical memory for specific ends, such as legitimizing governments and political parties, legislation, and government programs. Elites who instrumentally influence the perceptions of a population have come from different forms of government including authoritarian as well as democracies. With the case of modern China, Wang demonstrated that authoritarian governments have the ability to manipulate historical memories to increase the legitimacy of the ruling collective (Wang, 2012). Democracies have entered the study of historical memory through such events as the fall of the Soviet Union, where
elites of successor states have utilized historical memory as a tool to aid the transition from an authoritarian state to a new democracy. Scholars have also relied on the new states’ use of this concept to gauge the ability of the new democracy to consolidate (Brewer, 2008; Hewer & Roberts, 2012; Pridham, 2014).

While the study of elite manipulation of historical memory has currently provided a new understanding of legitimacy in authoritarian states and in transitions to democracy, there is a dearth of information relating to consolidated democracies’ (Diamond, 1999) use of historical memory in relation to legitimacy. The lack of information raises many questions, largely centered on whether consolidated democracies manipulate historical memory for legitimacy.

II. Revisiting Expected Findings

The two case studies examined in this thesis presented three topics of Comfort Women, Yasukuni Shrine, and history textbooks in Japan and South Korea. The four expected findings that were presented in chapter 1 have provided further focus to this research in relation to how democracies are impacted by the elite manipulation of historical memory.

The first expected finding states that elites will use historical memory to legitimize their term in office when faced with challenges to the state or population. This expected finding was partially supported by the research. The case studies supported the hypothesis that elites will use historical memory to legitimize their term in office when faced with challenges to the state such an economic crisis. Both elites in Japan and South Korea have been managing the effects of ongoing economic stagnation which began in the 1990s. The 1998 Asian financial crisis dealt a harsh blow to both Japan and South
Korea’s economy (Seth, 2011; International Monetary Fund, 1998). The 2008 recession also negatively impacted the small, positive changes that had been occurring since the 1998 economic decline (The Economist, 2008; Seth, 2011). Other challenges both states endured between 1988 to 2015 included corruption of political officials and the loss of political power for the dominant political party.

South Korean President Lee came into office with the promise of reviving the economy, which had made some gains through his proposed government initiatives (Onishi, 2008; The Economist, 2011). Along with new initiatives, Lee maintains the highest number of memory events out of all the South Korean Presidents, with a total of 22 occurrences. Likewise, Abe is nearing the most memory events out of all of Japan’s Prime Ministers with 21 events. He has also prominently addressed the economic stagnation within his own government programs for the economy.

South Korean Presidents have all had to contend with the image of corruption as it has become a trait of South Korean politics, most notably in regards to relationships with big business (Choe, 2012). President Roh had been suspected of corruption during his time in office and later committed suicide as he was being investigated on charges soon after he left office (Sohn, 2009). Additionally, Lee came into office under suspicion of corruption as a leading business executive (Onishi, 2008) and exited with renewed scrutiny when his political aids as well as his brother were charged with crimes of embezzlement and bribery (Choe, 2012). Both of these Presidents had been involved in more than ten events related to history. In Japan, the Liberal Democracy Party (LDP) had been facing issues with corruption before Koizumi was in office. During his Administration, Koizumi lead a series of political reforms targeted at corruption within
the LDP (The Economist, 2006), his Administration also holds one of the highest number of historical memory events out of all of the Japanese Prime Ministers with 21 events.

The LDP has been the dominant political power within Japan since the end of occupation in 1952. The LDP has lost power only twice since 1952, with the first loss beginning in 1994 to 1996. In 1996, the LDP regained power but had transitions in Prime Minister about every two years until Koizumi entered office in 2001. Koizumi entered office with a clear interpretation of history, particularly on the topic of Yasukuni Shrine and remained in office for six years. The LDP lost power again in 2009 to the Democratic Party of Japan (DJP) and returned to power in 2012. Abe entered office as Prime Minister in 2012 also with a distinct understanding of history, specifically on Comfort Women and has currently served for four years.

The Grand National Party (GNP), now known as the Saenuri Party (SP), is the dominant political party in South Korea with three out of six Presidents identified as members. The South Korean President is limited to one five year term. As such, the number of years in office was not a significant factor in this analysis. However, the GNP first came to power in 1993 with Kim Young-sam who had two events of historical memory during his tenure. The South Korean GNP lost power from 1998 to 2008 to the most popular minority party, the Democratic Party (DP), as well as the short lived Uri Party who supported Roh (BBC World News, 2009). The GNP regained power in 2008 with Lee and again in 2012 with Park, even though it suffered a split and rebranding under Park’s Administration (GlobalSecurity.org, 2012). Lee and Park had the highest amounts of historical memory events compared to the other South Korean Presidents, with Lee having 22 memory events and Park having 21.
The case studies demonstrate that elites in democratic governments will use historical memory to legitimize their term or political party for office when faced with challenges to the party. Correlating evidence was not found to support the claim that elites would utilize historical memory when the population was faced with challenges.

The second expected finding states that historical memory is used in similar ways during elections in South Korea and Japan, even though both countries hold a different type of democracy. This expected finding was supported by the case studies. Both governments are mature, consolidated democracies with multiple successful public elections and transitions of power. These democracies also provide two different structures of democratic government for review. Japan maintains a parliamentary (constitutional monarchy) democracy while South Korea is a presidential republic. The case studies illustrate that both countries’ governments manipulate historical memory in many similar ways.

In the campaigns of President Park and Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe, there were limited differences in how historical memory was portrayed during the campaign. Each presented an interpretation of history that crafted an image of elites championing the in-group (the governments’ respective population) and promised a specific resolution to a perceived historical injustice or actions that ignored the shame of the past. The specific resolution includes the South Korean acceptable form of apology from the Japanese government with compensation for the South Korean Comfort Women in regards to the Comfort Women history. These campaign promises also played upon the nationalist sentiments of the population in that not only was an image crafted of the elites but pride for the in-group was promoted. Further, historical memory was manipulated
through the same avenues and for similar purposes throughout the three topics under review.

The similarities between Japan and South Korea continued even though there are differences in the process of elections. South Korean political parties are generally driven by personalities. The use of personalities within election campaigns has been a trait of South Korean politics since the transition to democracy in 1988 and has led to the quick creation and dissolution of political parties due to their often centered nature on one particular candidate. Candidates are often selected by political parties to run for office due to the amount of votes they are expected to gain. The estimated number of votes takes into account the political regionalism that is prominent in South Korea. The selection of candidates have leveraged support from specific regions to garner votes. At times, the candidates are also constrained by regionalism due to stereo-types and an internal mentality of an in-group, out-group idea based on the region a person is from (Lee, 2014). The use of historical memory may bolster the broad appeal of a particular candidate on a national level to balance the strong reliance on personalities and regionalism. This concept may also aid in helping to reframe and unite internal in-group, out-group identities into a broader understanding of a national in-group versus a national out-group such as Japan.

The elections in Japan are not as personality driven as in South Korea. Political parties’ platform and position on issues such as the economy and nuclear power, hold a greater influence in gaining votes than necessarily the person running for office. As Martin Fackler claimed that during the 2012 parliamentary elections, the exit polls described voters’ decision was in part due to the view of success or failure of the policies
implemented by the incumbent party, which at the time was the DJP (Fackler, 2012). Historical memory provides political parties in Japan with the ability to bolster party platforms through the idea of historical support. Additionally, the political parties are able to focus an internal in-group, out-group mentality within the election by promoting their own support of the population while ostracizing the opposition party through manipulated selective remembering. The LDP has a long history of successful time in power to draw from within the population’s collective memory due to the nearly consecutive rule since 1952. The research purports that democracies will use historical memory similarly during elections no matter the different structural forms democracy may take.

The third expected finding states that when historical memory is promoted by elites, public protests against the out-group will increase. This expected finding is partially supported by the case studies. In South Korea, every historical memory action such as Prime Minister visits to Yasukuni Shrine, the approval of controversial history textbooks, doubting Comfort Women history and denouncing reparations ignited public protests. The elite perpetuated the intense mood of the public through publicly responding to every action related to historical memory by Prime Ministers, such as Park’s inclusion of offerings in her rhetoric of reproach towards the Yasukuni Shrine. Additionally, the rebuke of Japan from multiple governmental agencies for the same cause also aided in strongly motivating the public to action.

In Japan, there was limited evidence of public protests on each topic. Japanese protests against Prime Ministers’ attendance at Yasukuni Shrine were small, the approval of history textbooks saw one large protest against the MEXT (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology) sanction of the New History Textbook,
additionally, and there was no mention of public protests against Prime Ministers action within the issue of Comfort Women beyond that of a few criticisms from Japanese scholars. Albeit, newspapers’ accounts may have overlooked Japanese protests against governmental action in favor of covering the international response on Comfort Women.

The limited public protests throughout Japan in relation to historical memory may stem from how the out-group is portrayed within Japan’s historical memory. The elites’ message within historical memory has consistently been regaining pride in their own past through manipulated interpretations of memories that promote a nationalistic love for the nation. The out-group to the Japanese in-group has been downplayed as exemplified in the *New History Textbook*, the Yasukuni Shrine where the purpose was to remember Japanese sacrifices and not necessarily the sacrifices of colonial citizens, as well as diminishing Japan’s role in the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery even against its own citizens. The out-group, relating to regional neighbors, has been lessoned in importance to the Japanese in-group. In comparison, the South Korean elites have identified Japan as the sole perpetrator and thus the villainous out-group. Where the Japanese public has had limited response to the out-group as they focus more on their own history, the South Korean public has directed all of their anger from the contentious history to their out-group of Japan. This leads to the finding that when historical memory is promoted by elites against a specific out-group, public protests against that group will increase.

Within this thesis, the in-group has referred to the country’s own population. This is understood as South Korea’s in-group is the South Korean population where as Japan’s in-group is the Japanese population. The term out-group has been used to denote
populations not within the country’s in-group on an international scale such as the out-group to South Korea’s in-group is Japan. This in-group, out-group relationship is only one way in which an in-group out-group mentality can be used. Domestically, elites are able to frame the idea of an in-group against an out-group in terms of political parties such as during an election. In an election, a political party can portray themselves as a party for the in group or as supporting the in-group against the other political party who is portrayed as the out-group. The designation of in-group or out-group can be facilitated by the use of historical memory to highlight specific historical understandings to support their framed image. Within the case studies of Japan and South Korea, both conservative parties, the LDP and the SP, had the most rhetoric that bolstered the framed understanding of supporting the in-group through the use of historical memory as they crafted an image for themselves as being the champion for the nation in the resolution of the perceived unresolved history like that of Comfort Women and thus the best supporter of the in-group.

III. Comparison of Japan and South Korea within Historical Memory

The democracies of Japan (post-1945) and South Korea (post-1987) have demonstrated government involvement in historical memories through the previous three topics within the case studies. Both governments influence historical memory through speeches and pronouncements, response to challenges, and memorials and offerings which are similar to the ways in which the People’s Republic of China, in Wang’s study, also manipulated historical memory. This observation supports the fourth expected finding which states; similar to other regime types, consolidated democracies will manipulate historical memory through textbooks, political speeches, and monuments.
In all three topics within the case studies, speeches and pronouncements were the most used where the elites addressed historical memory, followed closely by response to challenges, and finally memorials and offerings. Speeches and pronouncements are straightforward ways for both governments to present their interpretation of memories as part of the required and traditional duties of elected officials which involve speeches as well as issuing pronouncements on a regular basis. This has been exemplified with in the case studies by the key note address in South Korea on National Liberation Day and addressing the Diet during the plenary session in Japan. Both governments unashamedly included the issue of history in both these addresses, as well as in many others.

While the Japanese and South Korean governments have many similarities with in speeches and pronouncements there were differences in how they were used. In Japan, speeches and pronouncements were commonly used within the topics of Comfort Women and Yasukuni Shrine to justify actions or to offer regrets for past events with nine out of thirteen speeches and pronouncements doing so. This majority is most likely due to the South Korean elites’ criticism against Japan. The South Korean elite used speeches and pronouncements as a means to criticize Japan for past and present actions as evidenced by 29 out of 30 speeches and pronouncements on the topics of Comfort Women and Yasukuni Shrine. History textbooks were different for both Japan and South Korea in that the Japanese elite focused speeches and pronouncements on issues specifically of interest to the Japanese population, such as educational programs and textbook approval, which at times also offended the South Korean elite. There was only one out of 15 speeches and pronouncements that justified or apologized on behalf of Japanese officials. Such a difference of history textbooks between Comfort Women and Yasukuni Shrine could be
related to the notion of national sovereignty in educating the nation’s youth through textbooks. In South Korea, while the amount of speeches and pronouncements related to the South Korean population increase on history textbooks compared to Comfort Woman and Yasukuni Shrine with 10 out of 26 given, the number of speeches and pronouncements against Japan also increased with 16 out of 26 made. The actions of including a perspective of history within governmental duties illustrates that elites can act with historical memory in the boundaries of democracy.

Japan and South Korea have used responses to challenges as a means to bolster the image of the person in office, and their respective political party, as a champion for the in-group. For South Korea, responding to challenges became the central opportunity for addressing historical grievances since Japan is depicted as the sole aggressor within the historical memory. The elite metaphorically stand ready to respond to challenges as the image that is being crafted is one opposite to victimization. The South Korean elite evoke power and the idea of champion through strongly responding to Japanese acts that are contrary to their sanctioned selective remembering.

The response to challenges is different for Japan, compared to South Korea. The Japanese elite have more of an internal focus in relation to historical memory since there is emphasis on interpreting the past more positively. South Korean elites have framed Japanese action in regards to history as initiating events. As such, Japanese elites have most commonly utilized response to challenges as a means to exercise restraint in diplomatic relations to lessen the escalation of potential conflict as well as defending governmental action and thus defending the sovereignty of the Japanese population.
In South Korea, the elite have currently found a niche with the history of Comfort Women with which to campaign. This is especially evident beginning with Lee’s Administration and has continued during Park’s election campaign and Presidential term. By raising the profile of Comfort Women, the government promoted the idea of unresolved history by pressuring the Japanese government for a specific resolution. This pressure aids in crafting an image of the elite as a champion of the nation through its work to achieve the solution on behalf of the population. Elites utilizing a specific message of historical memory during a campaign also illustrates politicians navigating the population’s accepted boundaries of collective memory.

While the issue of Comfort Women was available to Roh and Kim since the concern came to the forefront of public knowledge in 1991 (Tanaka, 2002), they leveraged the history of Yasukuni Shrine, in part, due to the media attention that had been drawn to official visits by Koizumi’s campaign for office (French, 2002). Roh and Kim influenced the memories of forced labor and conscription in the same way that Lee and Park have used the remembrances of Comfort Women in that both Administrations promoted the idea of an unresolved crime with specific terms of resolution required from Japan. Roh and Kim created an image of the government as being a champion for the nation as they stood against the “Japanese commemoration” of atrocities committed against the Korean public. The construction of the image of champion by South Korean Presidents through selective memories is in contrast to the history of victimization that has been selected for the population’s remembrance.

Compared to the South Korean government, the Japanese government is molding an image of defender of the nation by restoring pride in the past, or in Abe’s terms
“restoring the country’s self” (Fackler, 2013). Many within the LDP have worked for a more positive remembrance of history through actions such as high profile visits as well as providing offerings to Yasukuni Shrine (Slodkowski & Sieg, 2013). Classifying such events as a person’s, including government officials’, right to do so also bolsters the acceptability of not only official visits but pride in the past. As evidenced through history textbooks, the LDP has worked to approve texts that promote a more positive interpretation of the past, citing, again, a population’s right to be proud of that nation’s history. The Japanese elite championing pride in the past is juxtaposed to the memories of shame that are being selected for remembrance.

Memorials and offerings were the least used of the three mediums to influence historical memory. Memorials, as well as museums, are powerful influencers of populations as demonstrated by scholars such as Zheng Wang and Marek Kucia, Marta Duch-Dyngosz & Mateusz Magierowski. The only two notable memorials and related offerings were the Comfort Woman statue in Seoul and the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo. South Korea is home to museums dedicated to the history of the Military Mobilization of Sexual Slavery that were sponsored by the population through individual donations and non-profit organizations (Jung, 2014; The Japan Times, 2015). By leveraging the Comfort Women history and the statue that was created and funded by the population themselves, the government is working within the boundaries of the collective’s historical memory. Likewise, the Japanese elite utilize the historical memory of Yasukuni Shrine as a place of commemoration, which reaches back to the Meiji era for Japan (O’Dwyer, 2010). Since the Shrine was once a place of commemoration, the elite are presenting an
interpretation of history through attendance and offerings at Yasukuni Shrine (Higurashi, 2013).

However, where the South Korean government had large involvement from the population in creating statues and museums that the elite were able to leverage, no evidence was found of the Japanese population being involved with the creation of statues or museums. The elite have used existing structures that were created by past elite, such as the Yasukuni Shrine. This difference in public involvement could stem from the disparity in the collective memories held between the South Korean and Japanese public. Where the South Korean public holds a clear interpretation of victimization from past events due to atrocities from colonialization and WWII, the Japan public collective memory may not be as clear due to the elite control of events within the 20th century and the manipulation of information presented to the public.

Elites in both countries have demonstrated manipulation that is acting within the constraints of the populations’ collective memories; with such limitations described by Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik (2014). The South Korean public illustrated a collective memory of Comfort Women through the work of the Women’s Movement and corresponding organizations. While the Lee and Park Administrations have worked within the population’s accepted memory boundary of Comfort Women, Roh and Kim’s involvement with Yasukuni Shrine was also similarly navigated. Both Roh and Kim’s use of Yasukuni Shrine directed the population’s collective memories of Japanese forced labor during colonialism towards the Shrine as a remembrance of such atrocities. The Commission (The Commission on Verifications and Support for the Victims of Forced
Mobilization under Japanese Colonialism in Korea) work on seeking reparations for Korean forced labors bolstered this selective remembering, most notably under Roh.

Similar to South Korea, Japanese Prime Ministers have also had to navigate the boundaries of the population’s collective memories. The Japanese Prime Ministers have had to contend with a difficult history post-World War II (WWII) that is not equally accepted throughout the Asian region’s population. The controversies surrounding such events as Prime Ministers attendance at Yasukuni Shrine was met with demonstrations from regional neighbors. Newspapers also documented outcries from within Japan such as lawsuits filed on behalf of foreign and Japanese citizens as well as individual testimonies of criticism. However, despite the turmoil against Prime Ministers attendance at the Shrine, the longevity of Koizumi’s tenure as Prime Minister as well as the continued election of LDP party members for office illustrate that the majority of the population accepts the LDP’s interpretation of history that is continuing to be presented by the party.

History textbooks often challenge elites and push the limitations of populations’ historical memory. In both Japan and South Korea, protests have erupted within the population over history textbook content. Both protests cited historical facts related to the disagreement over textbooks, such as in the 2001 *New History Textbook* publication (French, 2001) as well as the 830 state mandated textbook revisions (Nam, 2013). Such protests exemplify the accepted boundaries of collective memory as well as the objectiveness of scholars in helping to identify a distortion of history. The upcoming state issued history textbook in South Korea has created an interesting point of elite use of historical memory with the SP is promoting the state sponsored text as helping to develop
pride in the past through selective remembering while the main opposition party, the DP, is portraying the book to be similar to those created by the state under the authoritarian rule of Park Chung-hee (Choe, 2015). Both political parties are using different selective elements of the collective’s memory to justify or denounce this current program.

While it is evident that both governments are operating within the boundaries of the population’s accepted historical memory, they are also freely maneuvering within the confines of democracy. Both elites have utilized historical memory within election campaigns as shown especially by Park, Koizumi, and Abe. The use of selective remembering has been a tool by elites to bolster the incumbent’s image through the interpretation of history to justify political programs such as textbook publications.

Interestingly, the most events regarding historical memory throughout the case studies in Japan occurred during Koizumi and Abe’s Administration; as both Administrations had 21 events, as of this writing, while the other 16 Prime Ministers averaged 1.25 events during their time in office. Similarly, in South Korea the most events relating to memory occurred during Lee’s Administration with 22 events and is currently closely followed by Park’s with 21 events. President Roh had 12 events while Kim Dae-jung had ten, and Kim Young-sam had two.

While both Koizumi and Abe are members of the LDP, they have also pushed for some large changes within Japan. This includes Koizumi’s support for the privatization of the postal service (Faiolia, 2005) and Abe’s goal of increasing the amount of women in the workforce through his economic program commonly referred to as “Abe-nomics” (Rafferty, 2015). Abe has also championed the campaign of revising Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution which currently limits Japan in maintaining a full military with the
ability to hold offensive capabilities (*Japan Today*, 2014). Their large amounts of action within the collective’s memories also correlate with their time in office. Before Koizumi, the longest serving Prime Minister since 1988 was Takeshita Noboru, who served as Prime Minister for three years. The following nine Prime Ministers averaged one and a half years in office. Koizumi is currently the longest serving Prime Minister since 1988 with his six years in office (as of mid-2016). Abe is the second longest serving and is currently continuing to serve after four consecutive years as Prime Minister.

South Korea has had similar experiences to Japan, as there is a correlation of historical memory to support while in office. The manipulation of the Comfort Women history aided Park’s election through the ability to craft an image of champion. While her campaign developed an image with the use of collective memories, she was also associated with negative remembrances due to her father’s role as Dictator. Additionally, it is notable that Park Geun-hye obtained office as she is South Korea’s first female president. This feat is made more notable give the information presented from the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap report which rates South Korea’s Global Gender Gap index at 117 out of 142 total countries rated (*World Economic Forum*, 2014). Park was able to utilize historical memory not only to craft an image but to also counter balance negative attributes and memories associated to her.

Other Presidents also used historical memory to support difficult programs they were undertaking. Roh had the third most amount of memory events, his Administration saw the most transparency and liberalization of governmental records regarding tenuuous periods such as the Korean War as well as greater liberalization in education as compared to his predecessors (*Koo*, 2015). Kim Dae-jung’s ten memory events also occurred during
the same time as he implemented a dramatically different engagement plan with North Korea, known as the Sunshine Policy (Choe, 2009).

Japan and South Korea have displayed many similar actions in the use of historical memory, however, there are some differences in how the two countries utilize this concept. Both governments are led by the Executive in a program of addressing collective memories. As such, it is common for governmental departments to incorporate the historical memory issues, such as responding to the history of Comfort Women and creating sanctioned government texts, into their respective duties.

However, in South Korea the elites have created a government that is focused on the issue of collective memories through the establishment of multiple departments which includes the Commission, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF) which incorporates the Comfort Women as a major role, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The centering of government on historical memory illustrates an investment by the elites in controlling the message being presented. The South Korean government has been able to compel the population into accepting that it is the elite’s duty to contend with unresolved history therefore a legitimate government actively works for the specific resolution promised. Such actions were exemplified through the creation of the mentioned government bureaus sequentially beginning in 2001 and cumulating into pressure from the population for continued work by the government on redress through the 2011 Constitutional Court Ruling (The Asahi Shimbun, 2012).

The South Korean population has also been motivated to support a government that utilizes more of an assertive recourse such as threats of diplomatic war and ending military and trade engagements which has been common tactics of Presidents beginning
in 1988. The history of oppression that the selective remembering emphasizes is a justification of a more assertive response in that while the previous government failed to protect its citizens in the past, the current government is utilizing every means possible to protect those who are alive today, such as the surviving Comfort Women and forced laborers. These actions of a more assertive government response also continued to bolster the image of the elites as a champion for the nation.

Whereas the South Korean government has created a structure that is more focused on collective memories, the Japanese government has leveraged the existing governmental structure to address collective memories. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as the MEXT have been active in addressing the issue of unresolved history, most notably within response to challenges from South Korea. The Japanese elite maintain a somewhat passive response to historical memory in comparison in that there were no threats of repercussion to diplomatic relations issued. Yet, such supposed passivity aligns with the elite objective of manipulation in that it is leveraging the common order of government which supports the idea promoted by Abe and the LDP that it is natural for a country to honor its past. The elites acting with historical memory are following the common structure as it is the natural order of any government. Thus, responding to challenges promotes the idea of defending the nation in their right to remember.

In addition to framing collective memory for specific objectives, elites view the three topics as either internal or external issues which influences how each government responds to challenge. For Japan, history textbooks and Yasukuni Shrine are internal issues that are related to national sovereignty in the way that a country educates their youth and worships. Government actions regarding these issues have been largely
responses to criticism as the elite believe they have the right to freely act within these topics. The Comfort Woman issue is viewed more as an external issue in that regional neighbor’s petition for Japanese governmental response whereas the Japanese elite view the issue as closed through the 1965 Normalization of Relations Agreement. The majority of the three topics are viewed as internal issues within Japan which correlates with the perception of the seemingly passive response.

For South Korea, Comfort Women and Yasukuni Shrine are external issues. All three topics require outside involvement from Japan as the sole aggressor for resolution. While the history of Comfort Women plays a role in internal matters such as in relation to the identity of the South Korean population and the social services provided to survivors, the predominate concern and resolution lies outside of the state. Yasukuni Shrine is wholly an external issue given the location of the Shrine as well as the contention centered on governmental visits. In the same way, history textbooks are also an external issue where Japan is being portrayed as a potential threat through misinforming their youth. The elite have worked to combat the external potential threat through additional information internally within compulsory education, however, the Park Administration has also portrayed this topic as being an internal issue through creating a more positive understanding of history. The majority of the three topics are viewed as external issues which correlate with a more aggressive response to historical memory, particularly when coupled with a targeted out-group.

Japan and South Korea have displayed elite use of historical memory to achieve specific objectives. As use of manipulation by elites has been demonstrated throughout the case studies, every action concerning the historical issues, like that of Comfort
Women, Yasukuni Shrine, and history textbooks, may not all be exploitation but a governmental response to the population. Democratic governments have a relationship with their population such as in the form of constituents. In South Korea, the issue of Comfort Women was first brought before the government by non-profit organizations. This leads to the understanding that the government could have been initially responding to requests of the population for the government involvement in pursuit of resolution. However, the South Korean government has created specific demands of what constitutes a resolution which has continually been used to continue the ongoing struggle for an unresolved history. Similarly in Japan, various public criticism against the continued apologies for ongoing international historical issues as well as public support for Yasukuni Shrine, may bolster the Japanese government in supporting the idea of pride in the past as well as elite visits to the Shrine.

IV. The Importance of Historical Memory and Suggestions for Future Research

The research presented two countries with different structures of democracy and a shared contentious history. Both governments acted in similar ways in how they addressed collective memories; both manipulated remembrances to craft an image of the elite and the dominant political party as a champion of the in-group to win political power and to advance governmental programs. To advance these goals speeches and pronouncements, response to challenges, and memorial and offerings were utilized. The case studies presented three topics in which the elites could react either by manipulating or ignoring the memories. In this research similar in regards to some authoritarian states, Japan and South Korea have demonstrated that consolidated democracies will manipulate historical memories for the purpose of legitimacy.
Wang’s work (2012) illustrated that authoritarian governments have the ability to manipulate memories to increase legitimacy. For democracies, the works of Brewer (2008), Hewer & Roberts (2012), and Pridham (2014) demonstrate that historical memory is a vital tool in the transition from an authoritarian state and consolidation for the new democratic government. But democracies’ reliance on historical memory does not end when the new democratic state is consolidated. Manipulation of historical memory is a tool that continues to be utilized by elites within consolidated democracies. The strategic influence on the collective memories is a powerful motivator of the population to act in specific ways, such as voting for a particular candidate or supporting a certain policy.

Authoritarian governments employ similar stimuli of historical memories to move a population just as democracies, albeit, for similar as well as different objectives at times. The research shows that the manipulation of historical memory is not confined to a specific government type but that it can be utilized by various forms of government as every population maintains a collective memory, as detailed by Eric Langenbacher and Ines Gabel. As collective memories build into a person’s identity and the understanding of the collective, potentially every country has the ability to utilize historical memory for specific objectives.

This research has shown that historical memory is a powerful concept in that it moves populations to act for the identifiable objectives of the elite. While this concept offers descriptive information of what moves a population and how a nation navigates past atrocities, historical memory also provides information on how consolidated democracies are working and relating to the masses through the elites’ struggle to maintain power.
Historical memory can and has been used similar to the idea of marketing in that elite utilize this concept to frame political programs and political candidates either positively or negatively to achieve specific ends. Elites in South Korea have exemplified such attributes in this study as well as in Norway where the out-group was reframed in a more positive light through a new textbook (Hovland, 2013).

Historical memory appears to be the strongest when associated with the most poignant memories and those past events that are the strongest remembered. Some of the most sensitive memories touch upon a collective’s identity. The memory of Comfort Women has become nearly a representative icon of the suffering of the whole South Korean nation during colonialism. Many of the South Korean population have a female relation, such as a grandmother or great grandmother, who experienced some sort of repression by Japanese forces during colonialism, and as such the elite as well as the population have affectionately referred to surviving Comfort Women as grandmothers (Ministry of Gender Equality & Family, 2012). This selective remembering and the potential family connection to the past coupled with the collective’s identity of victimization through multiple traumatic events in the 20th century has produced a sensitive collective memory that is shaped and manipulated by elites.

Historical memory has the potential of being stronger in South Korea as compared to Japan. The South Korean population holds an overall generally accepted understanding of past events stemming from a concrete point of view. Many South Koreans either directly experienced atrocities during the 20th century such as colonialism and WWII or have direct relations who did and have heard firsthand accounts and seen suffering stemming from the oppressive rule of the Japanese. The clear and similar understanding
of the past events, specifically relating to atrocities, enables the collective memories to be solid and nearly universally accepted for the South Korean population. The “concreteness” of South Korea’s collective memories provides elites with a powerful motivator in which to mobilize the population. In contrast, the Japanese collective memory is somewhat murky in relation to past events. The incidents that occurred during the 20th century, notably colonization and WWII, where elite driven with limited input from the population. The population was directed by government leaders through the manipulation of history textbooks and propaganda as well as additional indoctrination tactics. Due to the elite directed actions, the Japanese population has been left with an unclear remembrance of these past atrocities. Thus, the elites’ use of historical memory may not be as great as in places such as South Korea given the “murkiness” of the collective memory.

It is evident by the literature and the case studies under review that post war and revolutionary societies maintain strong and highly motivational historical memories as demonstrated through Soviet successor states and the Asian region. Such patterns have become a trend within the 20th century due to the vast amounts traumatic events during that period of time. The study of historical memory has centered on this type of state, such as Japan and South Korea as post war, in part due to their abundance after WWII as well as Cold War. However, there are numerous studies conducted on states that have sustained traumatic events, which brings to question the influence of the idea of triumph. Does a history of triumph hold similar influence over a population, or does trauma have a longer lasting impact? Future studies may also be interested in the length of time
historical memory can reach. Do more recent events have a stronger impact on historical memory or is the manipulation of elites more important to this concept?

Future research should not disregard the influence of historical memory on governments and people as Japan and South Korea have illustrated that strategic manipulation of memories can aid in the obtainment of legitimacy and policy. This concept has descriptive attributes with such abilities to identify what motivates a population to action and elite goals as well as how a nation navigates the past and defines itself. Currently, the study of historical memory is dominated by descriptive research, this provides opportunities for continued study of strategic manipulation and its relationship to government. As this concept continues to expand with new understanding and research, it increases the ability to interpret pressures on relations between states and interactions between elites and the population. Since historical memory is guided and constrained by typically unspoken believed truths, a cultural understanding and fluency in the native language serves to enhance research within this area. The ability to potentially gauge what policy or legislation will be passed due to a memory referenced or manipulated as well as a political candidate or party’s potential to win office provides new understanding in the workings of any government.
APPENDICES

A. Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono
   on the result of the study on the issue of "comfort women"  August 4, 1993

The Government of Japan has been conducting a study on the issue of wartime "comfort women" since December 1991. I wish to announce the findings as a result of that study.

As a result of the study which indicates that comfort stations were operated in extensive areas for long periods, it is apparent that there existed a great number of comfort women. Comfort stations were operated in response to the request of the military authorities of the day. The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women. The recruitment of the comfort women was conducted mainly by private recruiters who acted in response to the request of the military. The Government study has revealed that in many cases they were recruited against their own will, through coaxing, coercion, etc., and that, at times, administrative/military personnel directly took part in the recruitments. They lived in misery at comfort stations under a coercive atmosphere.

As to the origin of those comfort women who were transferred to the war areas, excluding those from Japan, those from the Korean Peninsula accounted for a large part. The Korean Peninsula was under Japanese rule in those days, and their recruitment, transfer, control, etc., were conducted generally against their will, through coaxing, coercion, etc.

Undeniably, this was an act, with the involvement of the military authorities of the day, that severely injured the honor and dignity of many women. The Government of Japan would like to take this opportunity once again to extend its sincere apologies and remorse to all those, irrespective of place of origin, who suffered immeasurable pain and incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.

It is incumbent upon us, the Government of Japan, to continue to consider seriously, while listening to the views of learned circles, how best we can express this sentiment.

We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterate our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and teaching of history.
As actions have been brought to court in Japan and interests have been shown in this issue outside Japan, the Government of Japan shall continue to pay full attention to this matter, including private researched related thereto. In a speech to South Korea's National Assembly, Mr. Miyazawa said: ‘Recently, the issue of ‘comfort women’ in the service of the Imperial Japanese Army has come into light. I cannot help feeling acutely distressed over this, and I express my sincerest apology.’

B. Policy Speech by Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro to the 127th Session of the National Diet

August 23, 1993

“Self-awareness as an International State and Contribution to the International Community”

August, when my Cabinet was formed, is a month that Japan will never forget. Going back just four turns of the twelve-year cycle, it was with the end of the war in August 1945 that we realized the great mistake we had made and vowed to start anew, resolutely determined never to repeat the wrongs of the past.

Forty-eight years later, Japan has now become one of the prime beneficiaries of world prosperity and peace. Yet we should never forget that this achievement rests upon the supreme sacrifices made during the war and is the result of the great efforts made by previous generations. I believe it is important at this juncture that we state clearly before all the world our remorse at our past history and our renewed determination to do better. I would thus like to take this opportunity to express anew our profound remorse and apologies for the fact that past Japanese actions, including aggression and colonial rule, caused unbearable suffering and sorrow for so many people and to state that we will demonstrate our new determination by contributing more than ever before to world peace.”

C. Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama on the occasion of the establishment of the "Asian Women's Fund"

July 1995

I would like to share with you my sentiments on the occasion of the establishment of the "Asian Women's Fund."

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the end of the War, an event that caused many people, both in Japan and abroad, great suffering and sorrow. During these past 50 years we have worked hard to cultivate, step by step, friendly relations with our neighboring Asian countries and others. However, the scars of war still run deep in these countries to this day.

The problem of the so-called wartime comfort women is one such scar, which, with the involvement of the Japanese military forces of the time, seriously stained the honor and dignity of many women. This is entirely inexcusable. I offer my profound apology to all those who, as wartime comfort women, suffered emotional and physical wounds that can never be closed.

Established on this occasion and involving the cooperation of the Government and citizens of Japan, the "Asian Women's Fund" is an expression of atonement on the part of
the Japanese people toward these women and supports medical, welfare, and other projects. As articulated in the proponents’ Appeal, the Government will do its utmost to ensure that the goals of the Fund are achieved.

Furthermore, to ensure that this situation is never again repeated, the Government of Japan will collate historical documents concerning the former wartime comfort women, to serve as a lesson of history.

Turning from yesterday to today, we still see many women suffering violence and inhuman treatment in many parts of the world. The "Asian Women's Fund," as I understand it, will take steps to address these problems facing women today. The Government of Japan intends to play an active role in this regard.

I am convinced that a sincere effort on the part of Japan to implement these measures will further strengthen the true relationships of trust we share with our neighbors in Asia and other nations around the world.

The Government of Japan intends to cooperate, to the greatest extent possible, with the "Asian Women's Fund," in order that its aims are achieved. I call on each and every Japanese citizen, asking for your understanding and cooperation.

D. Letter from Prime Minister to the Former Comfort Women 1996

Dear Madam,

On the occasion that the Asian Women's Fund, in cooperation with the Government and the people of Japan, offers atonement from the Japanese people to the former wartime comfort women, I wish to express my personal feelings as well.

The issue of comfort women, with an involvement of the Japanese military authorities at that time, was a grave affront to the honor and dignity of large numbers of women. As Prime Minister of Japan, I thus extend anew my most sincere apologies and remorse to all the women who underwent immeasurable and painful experiences and suffered incurable physical and psychological wounds as comfort women.

We must not evade the weight of the past, nor should we evade our responsibilities for the future.

I believe that our country, painfully aware of its moral responsibilities, with feelings of apology and remorse, should face up squarely to its past history and accurately convey it to future generations.

Furthermore, Japan also should take an active part in dealing with violence and other forms of injustice to the honor and dignity of women.

Finally, I pray from the bottom of my heart that each of you will find peace for the rest of your lives.

Respectfully yours,

Ryutaro Hashimoto
Prime Minister of Japan
(Subsequent Prime Ministers who signed the letter are: Keizo Obuchi, Yoshiro Mori and Junichiro Koizumi)
E. Statement of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi

August 13, 2001

The day after tomorrow, August 15, is the fifty-sixth anniversary of the end of the war. Looking back to the last war at the very beginning of the twenty-first century, solemn feelings fill my heart. During the war, Japan caused tremendous sufferings to many people of the world including its own people. Following a mistaken national policy during a certain period in the past, Japan imposed, through its colonial rule and aggression, immeasurable ravages and suffering particularly to the people of the neighboring countries in Asia. This has left a still incurable scar to many people in the region.

Sincerely facing these deeply regrettable historical facts as they are, here I offer my feelings of profound remorse and sincere mourning to all the victims of the war.

I believe that Japan must never again proceed a path to war. Every year, before the souls of those who lost their lives in the battlefield while believing in the future of Japan in those difficult days, I have recalled that the present peace and prosperity of Japan are founded on the ultimate sacrifices they made, and renewed my vow for peace. I had thought that people of Japan and those of the neighboring countries would understand my belief if it was fully explained, and thus, after my assumption of office as Prime Minister, I expressed my wish to visit Yasukuni Shrine on August 15.

However, as the anniversary of the end of the war came closer, vocal debates have started at home and abroad as to whether I should visit Yasukuni Shrine. In the course of these debates, opinions requesting the cancellation of my visit to Yasukuni Shrine were voiced not only within Japan but also from other countries. It would be totally contrary to my wish, under these circumstances, if my visit to Yasukuni Shrine on August 15 could, against my intention, lead people of neighboring countries to cast doubts on the fundamental policy of Japan of denying war and desiring peace. Taking seriously such situations both in and outside of Japan, I have made my own decision not to visit Yasukuni Shrine on that day, and I would like to choose another day for a visit.

As Prime Minister, I deeply regret withdrawing what I have once said. However, even if I have my own views on a visit to Yasukuni Shrine, I am now in a position to devote myself to my duty as Prime Minister, and to deal with various challenges, taking broad national interests into consideration.

If circumstances permit, I would like to have opportunities as soon as possible to have face-to-face meetings with leaders of China and the Republic of Korea, in order to exchange views on the peace and development of the Asia-Pacific region of the future and to talk about my belief mentioned above.

Furthermore, as an issue for the future, I think that we need to discuss what could be done in order for people at home and abroad to pay memorial tribute without discomfort, while respecting the feelings of the Japanese people toward Yasukuni Shrine and Chidorigafuchi National Cemetery.

I do sincerely ask the people of Japan to understand my genuine feelings.
F. Observation by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the Visit to Yasukuni Shrine
April 21, 2002

Today I paid a visit to Yasukuni Shrine.

The purpose of my visit was to mourn sincerely all those who lost their lives for their country, leaving behind their families in spite of themselves, during the course of our country's history since the Meiji Restoration. I believe that the present peace and prosperity of Japan are founded on the priceless sacrifices made by many people who lost their lives in war. It is important that throughout the days to come we firmly adhere to the resolution to embrace peace and renounce war to ensure that we never resort to tragic war.

I consider it to be natural for me to pay homage at the Yasukuni Shrine, which has become over the course of many years, a central institution for many people of Japan to mourn those who sacrificed their lives for the country.

It is not my intention to once again cause anxiety and elevate tension in Japan and abroad by visiting Yasukuni Shrine on or around the day of anniversary of the end of the second world war. After careful consideration, I decided I could sincerely express my honest feelings by visiting the shrine on this day, on the occasion of the Annual Grand Festival in Spring. I believe that this would be fully understood by the people of Japan.

G. Speech by H.E. Mr. Junichiro Koizumi, Prime Minister of Japan
April 22, 2005

Honorable Chairs,
Distinguished participants,

It is a distinct pleasure to attend this historic meeting, at which the countries of Asia and Africa have gathered together for the first time in fifty years. I extend my deepest appreciation to the honorable co-chairs from Indonesia, our kind host for this gathering, and South Africa. I have come to this meeting to do two things. One is to look back upon the road we have traveled together, realizing anew once again the strong ties that have connected us during these last fifty years. I have come to this meeting also to participate in frank exchanges of views about what the countries of Asia and Africa must do to enhance the peace and the prosperity of people around the globe in the 21st century.

Fifty years ago, Japan stood before the Asian and African nations assembled at Bandung to declare its determination to develop itself as a peaceful nation. That spirit of fifty years ago remains steadfast to this day. In the past, Japan, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. Japan squarely faces these facts of history in a spirit of humility. And with feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved in mind, Japan has resolutely maintained, consistently since the end of World War II, never turning into a military power but an economic power, its principle of resolving all matters by peaceful means, without recourse to use of force. Japan once again states its resolve to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world in the future as well, prizing the relationship of trust it enjoys with the nations of the world.

Honorable Chairs,
The development of Japan over these last fifty years has come about as the result of the untiring efforts of the Japanese people. Yet we were first able to realize development through the assistance extended to us by the international community. Japan will not forget this fact. The Japanese people rose from devastation after World War II. I, as a representative of that generation, hope to walk together with the people of Asia and Africa, who are striving to improve their lives by the sweat of their brows. Based on this thinking, Japan has been extending its development assistance to the Asian and African regions with emphasis on human resource development, infrastructure building, and health and sanitation measures, including issues of safe water and infectious diseases. Japan has also been making efforts to improve trade/investment environment.

Today, I would like to focus on three points as to what we should do together hand in hand from now on: first, economic development, second, peace-building, and third, promotion of international cooperation.

First, Japan places great emphasis on the strengthening of partnerships in the areas of poverty reduction and development. To achieve nation-building, the most critical thing is each nation's determination to bring about development through its own will and its own efforts. Japan respects and supports such efforts. Japan will continue its efforts towards the goal of providing official development assistance (ODA) of 0.7% of our gross national income in order to contribute to the Millennium Development Goals. From this point of view, Japan will ensure a credible and sufficient level of ODA. In addition, Japan will be seeking concrete actions to further expand market access to products from the least developed countries in order to support their self-reliance.

Asia has made great strides forward over these past fifty years. Yet a number of important challenges remain, including redressing of disparities in levels of development, promotion of economic partnerships, implementation of disaster prevention and mitigation measures based on the recent experience of the large-scale earthquake off the coast of Sumatra and the resulting tsunami, and strengthening of anti-piracy measures. Japan intends to formulate concrete policies and create new partnerships in Asia. We will be providing more than 2.5 billion US dollars over the next five years in assistance for disaster prevention and mitigation, and reconstruction measures in Asia, Africa and other regions.

This year is the "Year of Africa". Japan has advanced cooperation towards Africa, based on the solidarity between Africa and the international community, through the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process. I would like to take this opportunity to announce that Japan will hold TICAD IV in 2008, and that in the three years to come Japan will double its ODA to Africa, with grant aid continuing to be its central feature.

Moving on now to the theme of strengthening of cooperation between Asia and Africa, the one most fitting for this gathering, Japan proposes creating an Asia-Africa Young Volunteers program, by which Asian young adults would meet, interact with, and promote human resource development among the youth of Africa. Furthermore, Japan, through public and private sectors, will provide assistance in applying to Africa the knowledge garnered through Asia's movement towards higher productivity. I am pleased to announce that, through such efforts, Japan will foster human resources in ten thousand Africans over the next four years.
Second, Japan considers the peace-building to be of great importance. It is, indeed, peace and security that constitute the requisite basis for economic development. Japan has been working hard towards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the prevention of terrorism. Japan has also been making efforts towards the peace-building such as in Cambodia, East Timor, and Afghanistan. Japan will be actively providing assistance to the Palestinians for the promotion of peace in the Middle East, and to Africa, which is demonstrating dynamic movement towards peace. We should all play an active role in preventing disorderly trade in weapons, as well as in disseminating universal values such as the rule of law, freedom, and democracy.

Third, as the globalized world pursues a new international order, Japan will promote further international cooperation, enhancing its solidarity with Asia and Africa. The United Nations should continue to serve in the centermost role in international cooperation. Yet, in order for it to respond effectively to the various challenges that the world now faces, the United Nations, particularly the Security Council, needs to be reformed, so that the organization reflects the realities of the today's world. Japan will cooperate to the fullest to take a decision on the reform of the Security Council before September, as proposed by the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan. As we fortify the partnership between Asia and Africa, it will be critical to share our experiences and our knowledge through dialogues between civilizations, between cultures, and between individuals. Japan will host the World Civilization Forum in July, to share the experiences of the countries to preserve tradition while moving to modernization.

Honorable Chairs,

Last year, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded for the first time to an African woman, Professor Wangari Maathai, Assistant Minister for the Environment of Kenya. This great honor reflects recognition of her contributions to sustainable development through the planting of trees. Professor Maathai was present at the opening ceremony of the 2005 World Exposition Aichi in Japan, whose theme is "Nature's Wisdom." Citing the Japanese notion of mottai nai, Professor Maathai emphasized the importance of the efficient use of resources and environmental conservation. Using things with care, using them to the full, and reusing things whenever possible-- these are the heart and soul of these words mottai nai, which Professor Maathai understood completely. Asia and Africa are blessed with a richness of nature that yields enormous potential. I believe that through the progress of science and technology, it is possible to create a vibrant and dynamic society in which environmental conservation and development are both achieved. In conclusion, I would like to state Japan's resolute determination to spare no effort to create just such a society.

I thank you for your kind attention.

H. Statement by Prime Minister Abe  -Pledge for everlasting peace-
December 26, 2013

Today, I paid a visit to Yasukuni Shrine and expressed my sincere condolences, paid my respects and prayed for the souls of all those who had fought for the country and made ultimate sacrifices. I also visited Chinreisha, a remembrance memorial to pray for the souls of all the people regardless of nationalities who lost their lives in the war, but
not enshrined in Yasukuni Shrine. While praying for the souls of the war dead, the preciousness of peace Japan enjoys today really came home to me.

The peace and prosperity Japan enjoys today is not created only by those who are living today. The peace and prosperity we enjoy today is built on the precious sacrifices of numerous people who perished on the field wishing for the happiness of their loving wives and children, and thinking about their fathers and mothers who had raised them. Today, I have contemplated on this, and paid my deepest respects and gratitudes on my visit.

Japan must never wage a war again. This is my conviction based on the severe remorse for the past. I have renewed my determination before the souls of the war dead to firmly uphold the pledge never to wage a war again.

I have also made a pledge that we must build an age which is free from the sufferings by the devastation of war; Japan must be a country which joins hands with friends in Asia and friends around the world to realize peace of the entire world. For 68 years after the war, Japan created a free and democratic country, and consistently walked the path of peace. There is no doubt whatsoever that we will continue to pursue this path. Under the spirit of international cooperation, Japan will discharge its responsibilities for the peace, stability and prosperity of the world.

Regrettably, it is a reality that the visit to Yasukuni Shrine has become a political and diplomatic issue. Some people criticize the visit to Yasukuni as paying homage to war criminals, but the purpose of my visit today, on the anniversary of my administration’s taking office, is to report before the souls of the war dead how my administration has worked for one year and to renew the pledge that Japan must never wage a war again.

It is not my intention at all to hurt the feelings of the Chinese and Korean people. It is my wish to respect each other’s character, protect freedom and democracy, and build friendship with China and Korea with respect, as did all the previous Prime Ministers who visited Yasukuni Shrine.

I would like to ask for the kind understanding of all of you.

I. Basic Position of the Government of Japan
   Regarding Prime Minister Koizumi's Visits to Yasukuni Shrine

   October, 2005

   Prime Minister Koizumi is of the firm conviction that Japan's present peace and prosperity are founded on the noble sacrifices made by those who lost their lives in the war. He visits Yasukuni Shrine to mourn and offer his respect and thanks to those who had to lay down their lives on the battlefield against their will; to reaffirm the importance of ensuring the present peace and prosperity of Japan, which those who died in the war were unable to witness; and to uphold Japan's pledge not to engage in a war. He makes the visits as an individual citizen, not in an official capacity.

   It is erroneous to view that Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine are an attempt to glorify Japan's past militarism. The Prime Minister has stated clearly that the purpose of his visits to the shrine is to express respect and gratitude to the many people who lost their lives in the war, that he does not visit for the sake of the Class-A war criminals, and that Japan accepted the results of the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East. He has acknowledged that Japan, "through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations." The Prime Minister has repeatedly declared that Japan should squarely face "these facts of history in a spirit of humility, and with feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved in mind" and asserted Japan's "resolve to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world, prizing the relationship of trust it enjoys with the nations of the world." He recently conveyed this message to the international community in his speech at the Asian-African Summit in April 2005 and reaffirmed it in his statement on the sixtieth anniversary of the end of the Second World War in August.

East Asia today is increasingly well placed to become one of the most developed regions in the world. The formation of a future East Asian community is a common goal for the countries of the region. At this historic turning point, Japan is determined to contribute constructively to the future of East Asia and, to that end, places great importance on its friendly relations with neighboring Asian countries, including China and the Republic of Korea. Japan has demonstrated this spirit through its actions over the past 60 years. The task of further strengthening its relations with neighboring countries and contributing to the peace and stability of the East Asian region is one of Japan's most important policy priorities.

J. Comparison of Government Statements regarding Yasukuni Shrine; full chart

This chart was created by selecting passages from political leaders’ statements concerning the Yasukuni Shrine. Some statements were taken from larger messages, while others were short statements themselves. I chose the statements under review based on their expression of Yasukuni Shrine. The sections within the chart that are italicized have been identified as especially important to the understanding the portrayal of the Shrine to each country.

The categories of Official Government Statement and Statement to Newspapers were chosen to differentiate between how statements and ideas were delivered to the public. Statements to Newspapers categorize casual comments made to various newspapers by political leaders. It was found through the review of multiple comments by Japanese leaders that the dominate medium of delivery were from statements to newspapers. Often, these statements were gathered by journalists who claimed they stood outside the Yasukuni Shrine to specifically interview Japanese politicians. While many statements incorporated the idea of honoring those who “died in the battle for country” or as a “promise to never wage war again,” which are charted in the summary chart in Figure 4, these statements did not necessarily impact or sway the message from the Japanese government who messages were similar to each other in stating that visits to the Yasukuni Shrine by political leaders were conducted as a private citizen.
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<th>Governmental Official</th>
<th>Statement or declaration</th>
<th>Yasukuni Descriptors</th>
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<td>“Observation by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the Visit to Yasukuni Shrine” <em>Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs</em> April 21, 2002</td>
<td>“The purpose of my visit was to mourn sincerely all those who lost their lives for their country, leaving behind their families in spite of themselves, during the course of our country's history since the Meiji Restoration... I believe that this would be fully understood by the people of Japan.”</td>
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<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>“Basic Position of the Government of Japan Regarding Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visits to Yasukuni Shrine.” Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs October, 2005</td>
<td>“Prime Minister Koizumi is of the firm conviction that Japan’s present peace and prosperity are founded on the noble sacrifices made by those who lost their lives in the war. He visits Yasukuni Shrine to mourn and offer his respect and thanks to those who had to lay down their lives on the battlefield against their will; to reaffirm the importance of ensuring the present peace and prosperity of Japan, which those who died in the war were unable to witness; and to uphold Japan’s pledge not to engage in a war. He makes the visits as an individual citizen, not in an official capacity.”</td>
<td>Official Gov’t Statement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cabinet Minister Noda</td>
<td>“Japan Premier Visits Shrine to War Dead.” The New York Times July 30, 1996 by Kazuaki Nagata</td>
<td>Visit reconfirmed her belief that “we should never have a war. Peace is not something that naturally exists-it is something that has been built.”</td>
<td>Statement to Newspaper</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM Abe</td>
<td>“Japan’s Abe visits shrine for war, dead, China South Korea angered. Reuters Dec. 26, 2013 by Antonia Slodkowski and Linda Sieg</td>
<td>while there is criticism “I visited to report to the souls of the war dead on the progress made this year and to convey my resolve that people will never again suffer the horrors of war”</td>
<td>Statement to Newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM Abe</td>
<td>“Statement by Prime Minister Abe –Pledge for everlasting peace-” Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dec. 26, 2013</td>
<td>“Today, I paid a visit to Yasukuni Shrine and expressed my sincere condolences, paid my respects and prayed for the souls of all those who had fought for the country and made ultimate sacrifices…. Some people criticize the visit to Yasukuni as paying homage to war criminals, but the purpose of my visit today, on the anniversary of my administration’s taking office, is to report before the souls of the war dead how my administration has worked for one year and to renew the pledge that Japan must never wage a war again.”</td>
<td>Official Gov’t Statement</td>
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Japan

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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Group lawmakers statement</td>
<td>“Yasukuni shrine visits: Japan honoring the dead or insulting the neighbors?” CNN Dec. 26, 2013 by Madison Park</td>
<td>“How the war dead are commemorated is determined according to each country’s own culture and tradition. This long tradition of homage and commemoration is a matter of national sovereignty and should not be subjected to distortion by outside interference and propaganda.”</td>
<td>Statement to Newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Minister Furuya</td>
<td>“Yasukuni shrine visits: Japan honoring the dead or insulting the neighbors?” CNN Dec. 26, 2013 by Madison Park</td>
<td>Did not wish to anger regional neighbors, only to fulfil his duty as a national Diet member by praying for peace of Japan and honoring their heroic fallen</td>
<td>Statement to Newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM Abe</td>
<td>“Three ministers visit Yasukuni on surrender day anniversary; Abe refrains.” The Japan Times Aug. 15, 2014 by Reiji Yoshida</td>
<td>Offering to “extend sincere condolences to the people who fought and died for the state and to pray for eternal peace”</td>
<td>Statement to Newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Minister Furuya</td>
<td>“Three ministers visit Yasukuni on surrender day anniversary; Abe refrains.” The Japan Times Aug. 15, 2014 by Reiji Yoshida</td>
<td>“It’s only natural to extend sincere condolences to people who dedicated their lives to their country. I paid a visit to pray for peace”</td>
<td>Statement to Newspaper</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM Abe</td>
<td>“It’s ‘natural’ for leaders to visit Yasukuni, Abe says” The Japan Times Feb. 18, 2015 by JiJi</td>
<td>“It is natural for the nation’s leaders to want to visit Yasukuni to pay their respects to those who died for the country. Abe said he believes Cabinet members should decide for themselves whether to go or not”</td>
<td>Statement to Newspaper</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister Armura</td>
<td>“Ministers visit divisive war shrine on 70th anniversary of war end.” Japan Times August 15, 2015 by Tomohiro Osaki and Reiji Yoshida</td>
<td>“I offered my prayers in the hopes that Japan will continue to make efforts to contribute to the safety and peace of the world”</td>
<td>Statement to Newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka District Court</td>
<td>“Ministers visit divisive war shrine on 70th anniversary of war end.” Japan Times August 15, 2015 by Tomohiro Osaki and Reiji Yoshida</td>
<td>Yasukuni Shrine has a different significance than other shrines due to its history and that the act of visiting Yasukuni does not impair another’s belief or life</td>
<td>Statement to Newspaper</td>
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The statements issued by the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) all follow a similar structure. The first paragraph contains a statement of regret, condemnation or disappointment toward the actions by the leaders of Japan. The second paragraph provides various details which the negative reaction from the South Korean government stems from, such as the aggressive militarist past that the Yasukuni Shrine represents. The third paragraph is typically a recommended action or more detailed feelings toward the action. Since the MOFA statements vary in length only
statements that fluctuate from the typical structure have been compiled for review. These statements have typically been taken from the 3rd paragraph.

The presidential speeches from the National Liberation Day celebration where not compiled for this figure as they did not expressly address the Yasukuni Shrine.

Figure 7 Government Statements regarding Yasukuni Shrine

South Korea

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<tr>
<td>Ambassador to Japan, Choi Sang Yong</td>
<td>“At Japan’s war shrine, wounds unhealed; Koizumi plans visit despite condemnation from Asian neighbors.” <em>The Washington Post</em> July 28, 2001 by Kathryn Tolbert and Doug Struck</td>
<td>“I can only presume that Prime Minister Koizumi does not understand what kind of impact his visit has on countries in Asia”</td>
<td>Statement to Newspaper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
<td>“Statement by MOFAT Spokesperson on Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to Yasukuni Shrine.” August 13, 2001 by MOFAT</td>
<td>“If Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi is willing to cultivate genuine friendship and cooperation with the neighboring states, we reiterate that he should respect the positions and national sentiments of the countries concerned based on a correct understanding of history.”</td>
<td>Official Gov’t Statement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
<td>“Statement by the MOFAT Spokesperson on Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visit to Yasukuni Shrine.” May 8, 2002 by MOFAT</td>
<td>“We believe that if Japan is to establish genuine friendly relations with its neighbors, it should, on the basis of a true recognition of history, respect the national sentiments of neighboring countries which have suffered as a result of Japanese invasion and imperialism. <em>We therefore call for a sincere response from Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and the Japanese Government</em>”</td>
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South Korea

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<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
<td>“Statement by the MOFAT Spokesperson on Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visit to Yasukuni Shrine.” May 8, 2002 by MOFAT</td>
<td>“We believe that if Japan is to establish genuine friendly relations with its neighbors, it should, <em>on the basis of a true recognition of history</em>, respect the national sentiments of neighboring countries which have suffered as a result of Japanese invasion and imperialism. We therefore call for a sincere response from Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and the Japanese Government”</td>
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<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
<td>“Statement by the MOFAT Spokesperson on Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.” January 14, 2003 by MOFAT</td>
<td>“The ROK government cannot understand the logic of paying homage to war criminals who destroyed peace while insisting it is a prayer for peace. We therefore call for a sensible determination from Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and the Japanese Government so as not to damage the sentiments of the Koreans who suffered from the Japanese invasions.”</td>
<td>Official Gov’t Statement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
<td>“Statement by the MOFAT Spokesperson on Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.” January 1, 2004 by MOFAT</td>
<td>“…and paid homage even to war criminals who led the past Japanese colonial rule and invasion and thereby destroyed world peace and inflicted indescribable grief and pain on the people of Korea. “…and express much disappointment and anger that the national sentiments of the Koreans have been damaged once again.” “…We therefore strongly call for Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to stop visiting Yasukuni Shrine.”</td>
<td>Official Gov’t Statement</td>
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<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
<td>“Statement by the MOFAT Spokesperson on Prime Minister Koizumi’s Visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.” October 17, 2005 by MOFAT</td>
<td>“…we have continued to urge Japan to halt acts that nullify its apology and reflection of past wartime atrocities.” “…it must show that it is gravely reflecting on its past as well as take on corresponding acts. Once again, we strongly urge the Japanese Prime Minister as well as other leaders of Japan to stop paying such tributes.”</td>
<td>Official Gov’t Statement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cho Tai-young</td>
<td>“Honoring War Criminals: China, South Korea Harbor Bad Feelings For Japan’s Yasukuni Shrine.” International Business Times October 18, 2012 by Michelle FlorCruz</td>
<td>“It is regrettable to hear about the irresponsible behavior that ignores the feelings of the people in neighboring countries, who have been victimized by Japanese imperialism in the past”</td>
<td>Statement to Newspaper</td>
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**South Korea**

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<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
<td>“1st Vice Foreign Minister Summons Japanese Ambassador to the ROK over the Issue of Japan’s Wrong Perception of History.” April 25, 2013 by MOFAT</td>
<td>“…It is completely incomprehensible that Japan, which deeply values honest and trust, turns a blind eye and a deaf year to excruciating loss and pain that Japan inflicted on neighboring countries through its aggression and colonial rule.” “…urged Japanese leaders to reflect on Japan’s past aggression and colonial rule in an honest and humble manner through the mirror of history, and to correct their retrograde perceptions, comments, and behaviors today.”</td>
<td>Official Gov’t Statement</td>
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<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
<td>“MOFAT Spokesperson’s Commentary on Japanese Prime Minister’s Offering and Japanese Officials’ Visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.” April 22, 2013</td>
<td>“…urges the Japanese government to immediately stop its retrograde behavior which ignores history, and to behave responsibly based on a correct understanding of history…”</td>
<td>Official Gov’t Statement</td>
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<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
<td>“MOFA Spokesperson’s Commentary: Until When do Japanese Politicians Intend to Lock Their Country up in the Yasukuni Shrine?” Aug. 15, 2013</td>
<td>“…urges Japan to work proactively to win trust from neighboring countries by facing up to its history with courage and sincerely showing remorse for its past wrongdoings.”</td>
<td>Official Gov’t Statement</td>
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<tr>
<td>President Park</td>
<td>“China, South Korea angry after Japanese PMs visit controversial war shrine.” Aug. 16, 2013 by Australian Broadcasting Corp.</td>
<td>“Japan needs to face up to the issues of history, I expect the country to take responsible and sincere measures to alleviate the agony of those living in pain, and scarred by history”</td>
<td>Statement to Newspaper</td>
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South Korea

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<td>Ministry of</td>
<td>“MOFA Spokesperson’s Commentary on the Japanese Prime Minister’s Offering to the Yasukuni Shrine.” Oct. 17, 2014</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>“…Japan’s political leaders should be well aware that their paying respect and homage at such shrine is nothing less than an action denying the international order and nullifying the basis of Japan’s post-war return to the international community. “Japan, instead of confining itself to its dark past, should take steps forward into a bright future based on serious reflections on and deep remorse for its past wrong doings.”</td>
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<td>and Trade</td>
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<td>Ministry of</td>
<td>“MOFA Spokesperson’s Commentary on Japanese Leaders Sending Offerings to and Paying Tribute at the Yasukuni Shrine.” April 22, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>“…the ROK strongly urges Japan to show heartfelt remorse and apologize for its past wrongdoings and thereby meet the aspiration of the peoples of the two countries for the improvement in bilateral relations.”</td>
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<td>and Trade</td>
<td>Official Gov’t Statement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ministry of</td>
<td>“MOFA Spokesperson’s Commentary on the Japanese Prime Minister Sending a Cash Offering to the Yasukuni Shrine.” August 15, 2015</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>“…only when leading figures of Japan sincerely carry out self-reflection and demonstrate their remorse through actions, will Japan be able to win trust from its neighboring countries and the rest of the international community.”</td>
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<td>and Trade</td>
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<td>Ministry of</td>
<td>“MOFA Spokesperson’s Commentary on the Japanese Prime Minister Sending an Offering to the Yasukuni Shrine.” October 18, 2015</td>
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<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>“…only when Japan demonstrates through action its humble reflection and remorse based on correct recognition of history with the ROK-Japan relations move stably forward.”</td>
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**K. Statement by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kiichi Miyazawa on History Textbooks**

August 26, 1982

The Japanese Government and the Japanese people are deeply aware of the fact that acts by our country in the past caused tremendous suffering and damage to the peoples of Asian countries, including the Republic of Korea (ROK) and China, and have followed the path of a pacifist state with remorse and determination that such acts must never be repeated. Japan has recognized, in the Japan-ROK Joint Communique of 1965, that the "past relations are regrettable, and Japan feels deep remorse," and in the Japan-China Joint Communique, that Japan is "keenly conscious of the responsibility for the serious damage that Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself." These statements confirm Japan's remorse and determination which I stated above and this recognition has not changed at all to this day.

This spirit in the Japan-ROK Joint Communique and the Japan-China Joint Communique naturally should also be respected in Japan's school education and textbook authorization. Recently, however, the Republic of Korea, China, and others have been
criticizing some descriptions in Japanese textbooks. From the perspective of building friendship and goodwill with neighboring countries, Japan will pay due attention to these criticisms and make corrections at the Government's responsibility.

To this end, in relation to future authorization of textbooks, the Government will revise the Guideline for Textbook Authorization after discussions in the Textbook Authorization and Research Council and give due consideration to the effect mentioned above. Regarding textbooks that have already been authorized, Government will take steps quickly to the same effect. As measures until then, the Minister of Education, Sports, Science and Culture will express his views and make sure that the idea mentioned in 2. Above is duly reflected in the places of education. Japan intends to continue to make efforts to promote mutual understanding and develop friendly and cooperative relations with neighboring countries and to contribute to the peace and stability of Asia and, in turn, of the world.

L. Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama "On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war's end"
August 15, 1995

The world has seen fifty years elapse since the war came to an end. Now, when I remember the many people both at home and abroad who fell victim to war, my heart is overwhelmed by a flood of emotions.

The peace and prosperity of today were built as Japan overcame great difficulty to arise from a devastated land after defeat in the war. That achievement is something of which we are proud, and let me herein express my heartfelt admiration for the wisdom and untiring effort of each and every one of our citizens. Let me also express once again my profound gratitude for the indispensable support and assistance extended to Japan by the countries of the world, beginning with the United States of America. I am also delighted that we have been able to build the friendly relations which we enjoy today with the neighboring countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the United States and the countries of Europe.

Now that Japan has come to enjoy peace and abundance, we tend to overlook the pricelessness and blessings of peace. Our task is to convey to younger generations the horrors of war, so that we never repeat the errors in our history. I believe that, as we join hands, especially with the peoples of neighboring countries, to ensure true peace in the Asia-Pacific region -indeed, in the entire world- it is necessary, more than anything else, that we foster relations with all countries based on deep understanding and trust. Guided by this conviction, the Government has launched the Peace, Friendship and Exchange Initiative, which consists of two parts promoting: support for historical research into relations in the modern era between Japan and the neighboring countries of Asia and elsewhere; and rapid expansion of exchanges with those countries. Furthermore, I will continue in all sincerity to do my utmost in efforts being made on the issues arisen from the war, in order to further strengthen the relations of trust between Japan and those countries.

Now, upon this historic occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war's end, we should bear in mind that we must look into the past to learn from the lessons of history, and ensure that we do not stray from the path to the peace and prosperity of human society in the future.
During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.

Building from our deep remorse on this occasion of the 50th anniversary of the end of the war, Japan must eliminate self-righteous nationalism, promote international coordination as a responsible member of the international community and, thereby, advance the principles of peace and democracy. At the same time, as the only country to have experienced the devastation of atomic bombing, Japan, with a view to the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, must actively strive to further global disarmament in areas such as the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It is my conviction that in this way alone can Japan atone for its past and lay to rest the spirits of those who perished.

It is said that one can rely on good faith. And so, at this time of remembrance, I declare to the people of Japan and abroad my intention to make good faith the foundation of our Government policy, and this is my vow.

M. Comments by the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Mr. Yasuo Fukuda on the history textbooks to be used in junior high schools from 2002
April 3, 2001

With respect to the history textbooks that are to be used in junior high schools from 2002, the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology has recently decided to officially authorize a total of eight books which were submitted.

Japan's textbook authorization system is founded on the basic principle that a diverse range of textbooks employing the creativity and originality of private sector authors and editors will be published, and without the Government defining specific historical perspectives or outlooks. Historical perspectives or outlooks represented in textbooks should not be identified as those of the Japanese Government. The standards to be applied are, first and foremost, whether the book to be authorized is appropriate as a textbook in accordance with the Regulations of Textbook Authorization. What the text approval system considers fundamental is to ensure that flaws, such as obvious mistake or a lack of balance, to be eliminated and remedied in light of objective academic research and appropriate reference material at the time of authorization.

During the process of the recent authorization of textbooks, various concerns have been expressed from neighboring countries. However, the authorization was carried out impartially based on the Regulations of Textbook Authorization, including the Course of Study and the "Provision Concerning Neighboring Countries."

In this connection, the Japanese Government's basic recognition of its history is reflected entirely in the Prime Minister's statement issued on 15 August 1995 commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the end of World War II. Japan humbly accepts that for a period in the not too distant past, it caused tremendous damage and
suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations, through its colonial rule and aggression, and expresses its deep remorse and heartfelt apology for this. Such recognition has been succeeded by subsequent Cabinets and there is no change regarding this point in the present Cabinet.

Japan would like to endeavor to promote mutual understanding and trust with its neighboring countries and contribute to peace and prosperity not only in Asia, but in the rest of the world too.

N. Statement by Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology of Japan on the October 12 International New York Times article "Japan's Divided Education Strategy"

An October 12 International New York Times article criticized Japan’s education strategy for being “divided.” The article claims that, “Japan’s simultaneous embrace of nationalism and cosmopolitanism is generating ambiguous signals from its education policy makers. They are rewriting textbooks along what they call ‘patriotic’ lines, alienating their Asian neighbors in the process.” This is completely counter to our understanding.

A dramatic change in the direction of education is underway in Japan in order to respond to globalization – not to promote nationalism. The reforms we are undertaking center on three main areas: foreign language education, the internationalization of Japanese universities, and the teaching of Japan’s traditions, culture, and history to strengthen students’ sense of identity.

Regarding foreign language education, we intend to have elementary school students begin learning foreign languages at an earlier age – starting at the third grade from the current fifth – and to raise the level of English language education in middle and high school.

Although reading, listening, writing, and speaking are the four necessary competencies for English language education, the university entrance exams administered by the National Center for University Entrance Exams to over half a million students around the country each year focus almost exclusively on reading, with slight coverage of listening and almost nothing on writing and speaking.

Many Japanese people cannot speak English despite receiving six years of English language education in middle and high school. The reason is the problem with Japanese school education. This is why we are moving ahead with reform not only to start English language education earlier, but also to introduce university entrance exams that balance the four competencies mentioned above.

At the same time, we are promoting the internationalization of high schools and universities in order to develop human resources that can compete on the global stage. Through our Top Global University Project, which provides financial support to 37 universities, we intend to promote the internationalization of Japanese universities with a specific target of seeing ten Japanese universities placed in the top 100 in global university rankings within a decade.

Japan has sent a large number of students overseas, but the number has unfortunately declined to around 60,000 in 2011 after peaking at 83,000 in 2004. In particular, the number of students studying in the United States fell from a peak of about...
50,000 in 1999 to around 20,000 (or 40% of the peak) in 2011. To address this trend and the risk of becoming overly inward-looking, the government intends to double the number of students studying abroad from 60,000 to 120,000 by 2020. We also plan to increase the number of foreigners studying in Japan from the current 140,000 to 300,000 by 2020, by financially supporting students and universities.

To succeed as a truly globalized person, however, requires a sense of one’s own identity. To nurture that identity, the learning of Japanese traditions, culture, and history – the elements that make up the Japanese identity – is essential. Without this knowledge, we cannot discuss many matters of substance concerning Japan, including our traditions, culture, and history. Indeed, a commonly cited problem is that many Japanese students cannot explain aspects of their own country while overseas. Inadequate foreign language ability is one part of the problem, but the weak sense of identity many young students possess is also a factor. Unfortunately, Japanese young people often come up against this problem.

I do not believe that it is a problem with Japanese students individually, but rather that Japanese schools have not properly taught Japanese traditions, culture, and history. There naturally exists differences between various nations and ethnicities, and it is important to respect such differences. To nurture such an attitude of respect for differences, it is surely indispensable to teach one’s own country’s values.

The International New York Times criticized Japanese education for becoming “nationalistic” and undergoing a “rightward shift.” However, teaching Japan’s traditions, culture, and history, which are the foundation of the Japanese identity, is intended only to foster an attitude of love for one’s country and native environment; it is not meant to promote nationalism or education that evokes contempt for other countries, especially our neighbors. In the 7th century, Prince Shotoku instituted the Seventeen-Article Constitution, one of the earlier constitutions in the world. The foundation of that Constitution is Japan’s long-held “spirit of harmony.” It is this value that underpins much of our educational reforms.

I believe the people of the world recognize that bonds among people, thoughtfulness, and a spirit of harmony are at the core of the Japanese spirit, as exemplified by the actions of the victims in the aftermath of the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake.

That is to say, the Japanese traditions, culture, and history taught at schools are not synonymous with the idea of “nationalism.” There is no contradiction between Japan placing great value on its traditions, culture, and history on the one hand, while coexisting in the international community on the other. We believe rather that providing education that deepens the understanding of Japan is important for Japanese to succeed in a globalized world.

The role that Japan and the Japanese people must serve in the international community in the 21st century is based on the “spirit of harmony” and the “spirit of hospitality” that have been cultivated in Japan since ancient times. We intend for the 2020 Tokyo Olympic and Paralympic Games to show this spirit to the people of the world. We wish to promote reforms through the education I have described, so that the direction of Japanese education will provide greater alignment with the people of the world.
O. Revision of History Curriculum Press release on May 12, 2010 National Curriculum Planning Division

Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) announced the final version of the revised history curriculum, which put more emphasis on the historical fact about Dokdo, on May 12, 2010.

According to the Revised National Curriculum 2009, history subject is mandatory for primary and middle school students, and is elective for all high school students. In the course of the revision, the need for reinforcing the content on several historical facts including the Dokdo islets has been raised.

Accordingly, MEST decided to revise the history curriculum as follows:

① The basic framework of history curriculum of the Revised National Curriculum 2007 and 2009 will remain unchanged, except the following:

② History curriculum for the middle school students will be focused on nurturing the basic history literacy that is required for all Korean citizens.

③ With the subject name changed from history to Korean history, the curriculum for high school students has been restructured so that the content would be suited to the new title of the subject.

④ The content on the Dokdo islets has been beefed up to shed light on the wrongfulness of Japan’s illicit claim for sovereignty over the islets and raise students’ awareness on Korea’s sovereignty over Dokdo, so that they may hold an informed view of history.

MEST commissioned the Korea Institute for Curriculum and Evaluation to conduct the research on the draft for the revised history curriculum between January and April in 2010.

And then, on April 9, a seminar was held to hear advice of the outside experts on the draft. The revision was finalized after going through the deliberation of the council on national curriculum.

The revised history curriculum will start to be incorporated into high school textbooks from March 2011 and middle school textbooks from March 2012.

P. Korea’s Demand for Correction of Distortions in Japanese History Textbooks

1. Mr. Han Seung-soo, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea conveyed an aide memoire to the Government of Japan on May 8, which contains the
Korean Government's item-by-item demand for correction in the controversial Japanese history textbooks. The demand is the latest in the series of effort made by the Korean Government regarding the Japanese history textbooks, following the statement by the Foreign Ministry Spokesman on April 3 and the expression of profound disappointment by Minister Han to the Japanese Ambassador to Korea on April 4.

2. The Korean Government's demand is based upon a thorough and in-depth analysis of the textbooks by a team of history researchers. The team's report was then evaluated by the National Institute of Korean History and reviewed by an advisory council of experts in the related area. Although the analysis found the Japanese history textbooks to contain numerous problems, the Korean Government has limited its demand for correction to only the parts which are clearly false, obscuring, distorting and/or misleading. The list of the Korean Government's demand is composed of 35 items: 25 in Fusosha textbook, ten in seven other textbooks.

3. In conveying the aide-memoire to the Japanese Ambassador in Korea, Minister Han pointed out that the problematic contents in the textbooks are out of step with historic 1998 Joint Declaration on a new Korea-Japan Partnership for the 21st Century as well as with the pledges Japan has made before the international community such as the 1995 Statement by Prime Minister Murayama and the 1982 Statement by the Minister of Education on history textbooks. Furthermore, the textbooks in question go against the fundamental stance of the international community on history education, as enshrined in the 1995 UNESCO Declaration and Integrated Framework of Action on Human Rights and Democracy Education for Peace. Minister Han urged the Japanese Government to take prompt and effective actions in the spirit of these international pledges and agreements to correct and prevent the distortion of history.

4. In making the demand for corrections, the Korean Government has no intention to interfere with the education of history in Japan. The demand is made of the concern that textbooks in question may reopen the wound incurred upon the Korean people by the unfortunate past in the relationship between Korea and Japan, damage the amicable ties that have developed between the two countries and negatively affect the regional situation in Northeast Asia.

5. In the belief that an objective understanding of history is the cornerstone of friendly and cooperative relations between Korea and Japan, the Korean Government will continue with the multi-faceted and steadfast diplomatic efforts in the international arena in parallel with bilateral efforts toward Japan, so as to clear the textbooks of the problematic contents.

6. In addition, the Korean Government will demise mid-to-long-term measures to prevent the recurrence of such distortions of history and to offer the world an accurate and objective understanding of Korea's history. As part of such efforts, the Korean
Government will consider reinforcing history education in the schools and establishing a permanent body within the Government to promote the exchange of historians between Korea and Japan, to prevent future misunderstanding of history and to strengthen the understanding of Korean history in the international community.

Spokesperson of MOFAT
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