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Revisiting Afghanistan's Modern History: The Role of Ethnic Inclusion on Regime Stability

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REVISITING AFGHANISTAN'S MODERN POLITICAL HISTORY: THE ROLE OF
ETHNIC INCLUSION ON REGIME STABILITY

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

By

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B.A., Berea College, 2014

2019
Wright State University

WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

December 6, 2018

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Rahimullah Akrami ENTITLED Revisiting Afghanistan's Modern Political History: The Role of Ethnic Inclusion on Regime Stability BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

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Revisiting Afghanistan's Modern Political History: The Role of Ethnic Inclusion on Regime Stability

This study examines the role of ethnic inclusion as a factor of regime stability in Afghanistan through an historical case analysis from 1880 until 2009. By utilizing case study research methods, the goal of the study is to examine all the past regimes in order to show whether there is a relationship between the dependent variable *regime stability* and the independent variable *ethnic inclusion*. The study assumes the hypothesis that an ethnically inclusive regime will be stable while an ethnically exclusive regime will be unstable. Five indicators are used to measure each variable respectively. Each indicator is assigned a score of 1 or 0, with a total possible score of 0 or 5. The differences of the combined scores on each variable are utilized to test the hypotheses, where a lower denominator indicates robustness and a higher denominator indicates weakness.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

In the last few decades, Afghanistan has experienced a plethora of social, economic and political crises. The current Afghan government has struggled to provide security and bring stability to the country. A SIGAR (*Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 2017*) finding shows the Afghan government in Kabul only had about 60% of the country's total territory under its control in 2017, while 11% was under the direct rule of the insurgent groups such as the Taliban and ISIS, and 29% was contested among them (Clark, 2017). Moreover, the *Asia Foundation's* annual survey on observing the national and personal security of Afghan citizens, found that overall, 69% of Afghans felt their personal safety was at risk, while over 19% of all Afghan families had been victims of the violence and insecurity (Burbridge et. al., 2016, p. 7).

However, President Ashraf Ghani current government's failure to bring stability is only a reflection of Afghanistan's frequent regime instability in the recent history. A brief historical review of each regime in the past 120 years shows that there have been numerous regime collapses and failures. From the founding of Afghanistan as state by Abdur Rahman Khan in 1880 until the country's first full democratic government in 2002, virtually all regimes have been unstable at some level. For example, although Abdur Rahman established a strong monarchic reign during his 21-year rule in 1880, his regime faced over 40 different rebellions from opposition groups (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010).

Abdur Rahman's son and heir to the throne, Habibullah Khan similarly faced tensions from organized uprising during his 19-year reign. Habibullah Khan's son and

successor, Amanullah Khan's monarchy was overthrown in an uprising by a Tajik rebel Habibullah Kalakani in 1929 after ten years in power (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010). However, Kalakani's own time on the throne lasted only nine months before Nadir Shah overthrew him as an "illegitimate ruler" and was himself appointed king for five years.

After Nadir Shah's assassination on November 8, 1933, his 19-year old son Muhammad Zahir was crowned king (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010). The newly appointed King Zahir Shah ruled for forty years from 1933 to 1973, establishing a dominant Pashtun monarchy for decades. However, his cousin Daud Khan overthrew Zahir's monarchy in a nonviolent coup in 1973 and established the country's first Presidential Republic under the Democratic Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. During his five-year tenure, Daud Khan saw rising ethnic violence and tensions as more political parties were created along ethnic lines (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010). But his republic was short-lived. On April 27, 1978, the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), with support from the Soviet Union, staged a military coup, overthrowing Daud's regime (Runion, 2007).

PDPA soon split into two rival factions along ethnic lines over struggles for power and had four different heads of state from 1978 until 1992. The Soviets gradually lost faith in PDPA leaders and invaded Afghanistan in February 1979, marking the beginning of a ten-year occupation until their withdrawal in February 1989 (Runion, 2007). When PDPA's last ruler Najib's government collapsed in 1992, the country plunged into complete chaos and lawlessness as the Mujahedeen factions, which were organized along ethnic lines, began internecine fighting to take control of the country in their respective regions (Runion, 2007).

The Mujahedeen parties eventually came to a stalemate that gave rise to a group calling itself the Taliban (*Seekers of Knowledge*), a predominantly Pashtun ethnic group, that saw an opportunity to fill the vacuum of power left by the internecine rivalries among Mujahedeen factions (Runion, 2007). The Taliban quickly rose to power amid a civil war, making sweeping victories leading to the capture of the capital Kabul in 1996, and subsequently over 90 percent of the country a year later (Runion, 2007). Although initially it was well received by Afghans, people came to resent the regime's brutal practices and radical Sharia religious laws (Runion, 2007).

After the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. launched a military invasion toppling the Taliban regime. Soon a UN mandated international conference in Bonn, Germany was convened to create a new transitional, democratic Afghan government. On June 22, 2002, a *Loya Jirga* ("Grand Assembly") was convened, consisting of representatives from all ethnic groups. The assembly elected Hamid Karzai as an interim president for 2 years. Karzai then went on to win his first five-year presidential term in 2004, and a second full term in 2009 (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010).

This brief history review shows that for more than a century most political regimes in Afghanistan have been unstable. This regime instability raises an important question: what are the underlying roots of 'political stability' and how does ethnic inclusion impact regime stability in Afghanistan? One of the fundamental ways to find the answers, lessons and implications is to conduct an historical analysis of past regimes.

This study examines the role of ethnic inclusion as a factor of regime stability in Afghanistan. Through an historical analysis of past regimes from 1880 until 2009, this study informs the debate on whether there is a relationship between ethnic inclusion and

regime stability. By examining each regime separately, using a criterion I have developed, the study will examine the independent variable *degrees of ethnic inclusion* to determine its impact on the dependent variable *regime stability*.

CHAPTER TWO: TRENDS IN LITERATURE

The Origins and Application of Ethnicity in Afghanistan

Since its founding, Afghanistan has been known to be a multiethnic and diverse nation-state (Rubin, 1995; Barfield, 2010, Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, Dupree, 2002; Maley, 1997; Mustafa & Khan, 2015). Dupree (2002) argues Afghanistan's ethnic diversity is a product of its location at the crossroads of ancient trade routes and invasion paths extending from Central Asia to South and Southwest Asia "...where four great civilizations meet" (p. 976). Moreover, Dupree (2002) writes, "conquering armies, men of intellect, missionaries, pilgrims, traders, artisans, nomads and political exiles...[have] all contributed to Afghanistan's heritage over the millennia" (p. 977). And, "It is in this reciprocal interaction of diverse influences that the medley of Afghan culture germinated" (Dupree, 2002, p. 997).

Contrary to this view, other scholars note that Afghans are a collection of "...disparate groups [which] have been brought together by historical accident and not by any shared historical experience or urge to live together" (Mustafa & Khan, 2015, p. 31). In either case, present day Afghanistan is a reflection of its past, and has been home to various tribes, clans, sub-clans and ethnic groups. Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group at 40% of population, followed by Tajiks at 33%, Uzbeks at 9%, Hazaras at 8%, Aimaq 4%, Turkmen at 3%, Balochi at 2% and others at 5% of the total population (Burbridge et. al., 2016).

Pashtuns, who predominantly live in the South and South East, have dominated state politics since the creation of the Pashtun Durrani Empire in the seventeenth century (Mazhar et al., 2012). The Tajiks, who have recently gained more political power in the

post-Taliban regime in 2000s, are the second biggest group (Mazhar et al., 2012). Hazaras, who are descendants and “part of the invading hordes of Genghis Khan in the 13th century”, have settled in the central part of the country and have been historically marginalized (Mazhar et al., 2012). Uzbeks, mostly concentrated in the northern territories, are “refugees and fighters escaping the Russian armies and subsequently the Soviet forces in Central Asia” (Mazhar et al., 2012).

However, like the historical roots of these groups, there is also considerable disagreement on the historical origins of the concept and application of *ethnicity* in Afghanistan. The arguments in the literature to this extent are twofold: one, the concept of ‘ethnicity’ is categorically complex, intertwined and ambiguous in the context of Afghanistan’s ethnic relations; and two, it is difficult to accurately pinpoint the concept’s origins. Simonsen (2004) notes the “essentialist concept of ethnicity [in Afghanistan] can easily be challenged... [Because] language, religion and descent have all [been] used to define ethnic groups” (p. 708).

Furthermore, other sources of identity, such as “tribe, region, and sub-groups within ‘ethnic groups’ ... and rural-urban (and indeed literate (educated) –illiterate)” are also interchangeably used to define one’s ethnic identity (Simonsen, 2004, p. 708). However, the basic term *qawm*, defined as a ‘solidarity group,’ has been traditionally applied to define ethnic affiliations in Afghanistan. The denomination of *qawm* is an all-encompassing term which can be “situational and relative, and may thus (alternatively) describe tribe, region, ethnic group or profession” (Simonsen, 2004, p. 708).

Mazhar et al. (2012) also agree that Afghanistan does not have a single ‘uniform’ ethnic identity nor it is a ‘self-contained ethnic unit’ and its ethnic make-up consists of

‘multilayered identities’ (p. 97). However, “There had been no term of ‘Ethnic Groups’ till 19th century and more realistically, the ‘Foreign academicians and governments began to divide Afghan society systematically into ethnic categories by the difference in language, sect, culture etc.’” (Mazhar et al., 2004, p. 98).

Moreover, they note the term ‘ethnic groups’ is a foreign invented concept, which was “first used by the French researcher and anthropologist, named Dollot (1939:47), who “categorized Afghan people in several ethnic units” (Mazhar et al., 2004, p. 98). Regardless of the debate on the origins of ethnicity, Mazhar et al. argue that ethnic diversity is a major force in Afghanistan that drives “religious, ideological, economic and geographic and linguistic” differences among the ethnic groups but these groups “...apart from the Muslim faith, [have] little in common” (Mazhar et al., 2012, p. 99).

Arif Sahar (2014) argues ethnicity is socially constructed and is often politicized by Afghan elites for political agendas. Sahar explains, “ethnies” provide the basis for the primordial identities for ethnic groups, which give them a “...sense of belonging to a homeland (*watan*), ‘country’ (*mamlakat*), ‘peoples’ (*qawm, tayfa*), and religion (*mazhab*)...” (2014, p. 294) In the case of Afghanistan, the ethnicization of ethnic groups was “...strongly entrenched in the societal fabric and is fully institutionalized” as a consequence of civil wars and violent conflicts, especially after the 1978 PDPA coup (Sahar, 2014, p. 296). This opened up the “ethno-regional networks, which skillfully manipulated availability of malleable ethnic identities that were constitutively created and negotiated in the face of other groups’ loss of power” (Sahar, 2014, p. 297).

Giustozzi (2006) agrees with the politicization narrative and presents the 2004 presidential elections as a real life example, where candidates appealed to their own

ethnic core groups for votes. The voters reciprocated the candidates' pleas by voting along ethnic lines: 95 percent of Pashtuns voting for Hamid Karzai; 90 percent of Uzbeks voting for Dostum; and 80 percent of Hazaras voting for their candidate, Mohaqiq (Centliveres-Demont, 2015, p. 211). Although the Tajik vote was nonpartisan to a larger degree, still over 60 percent voted for Qanuni. The parliamentary elections a year later followed a similar voting trend to the presidential elections.

Rubin (1995) has noted that ethnicity is not only limited to the domination of one large ethnic group such as the Pashtuns, but all the ethnic groups in Afghanistan utilize the principle of *qawm* or ethnic relations. The difference is that among some groups, such as the urbanized Tajiks, *qawm* is seen more on a regional level, while among Pashtuns, it is tribal. According to Rubin, ethnic political alliances in Afghanistan have often shifted from one to the other purely based on self-interest and political gains.

For instance, the Persian speaking Hazara leader Abdul Ali Mazari formed an unlikely alliance with the Pashtun Taliban to get on the winning side during the 1994 civil war. However, when the Taliban lost the battle for capturing Kabul, they turned on Mazari, imprisoning him on charges of treason and being loyal to the anti-Taliban Persian speaking alliances. Similarly Hekmatyar, who was ethnically Pashtun, fought against the predominantly Pashtun Taliban militias, while simultaneously attacking the Tajik Ahmad Shah Massoud's government during the 1990's civil war.

The Impact of Ethnic Politics on the Afghanistan as a Nation-State

The role, implications, and consequences of ethnicity date back to when Afghanistan was founded as a tribal nation in 1774 during the Pashtun Durrani Empire (Mishali-Ram, 2008). Although the Durrani king Ahmad Shah was able to force the

Afghan tribes into a loose ethnic federation and hence establish a strong Pashtun hegemony over the other tribes, his kingdom often faced ethnic revolts and power struggles by non-Pashtun groups (Mishali-Ram, 2008, p. 480). Tensions over the Pashtun hegemony of the political system has since then led to ‘power struggles’, ‘internal revolts,’ and fighting “within the Durrani ruling class and...by non-Pashtun groups...[who began] challenging Pashtun hegemony” (p. 480).

Nazif Shahrani (2002) similarly argues modern Afghanistan was founded on “...an utterly inappropriate model of a... ‘modern’ nation-state government structure with discriminatory policies...” (Shahrani, 2002, p. 717) According to this view, Afghan rulers have tended to manipulate and exacerbate the role of ethnicity, kinship and religious ideologies to benefit their private agendas (Shahrani, 2002). Such policies have had a massive impact on the Afghan society and politics because ethnicity, kinship and ideology are the “most fundamental bases for individuals and collective identities and loyalties...” (Shahrani, 2002, p. 717)

Hyman (2002), on the other hand, argues Afghanistan’s ethnic problems are a result of a false sense of nationalism created by the Pashtun hegemony over the other groups in the ‘form of internal colonialism’. According to Hyman, since the creation of the modern state in Afghanistan in the beginning of 19th century, the Pashtun elites have established dominance over the politics. Because of this dominance, “Afghan nationalism developed in tandem with state power and state control over peoples living in the kingdom” (Hyman, 2002, p. 306). Under Amir Abdur Rahman’s reign, “State power grew by a form of internal colonialism, with military pressure and coercion used against

unruly, often independent Pashtun tribes and against non-Pashtun minority peoples gradually brought under firmer control by the center” (Hyman, 2002, p. 307).

Rubin (1989), however, argues the opposite of the internal colonization thesis, namely that the historical roots of the ethnic fragmentation in Afghanistan lie in Afghanistan’s imperialist past when the country was a ‘buffer state’ between Czarist Russia and the British Empire in late 18th century. According to Rubin, “The state that developed within the boundaries drawn by these imperial powers never developed the capacity to extract sufficient resources from its own territory and population, but instead depended on the financial and military resources it obtained from foreign governments” (Rubin, 1989, p. 151).

Saikal (1998) joins Rubin in this view arguing that outside interventions have often “polarized the Afghans along ethnic lines...” in order to create an “ethnic clientele” state (p. 114). According to Saikal (1998), ethnicizing Afghan politics began with the Soviet Union who created an “ideological polarization” by installing a Marxist-Leninist regime in a traditionally Islamic country, which gave rise to guerrilla resistance factions generally referred to as Mujahedeen (p. 114).

Maley (1997) notes Afghanistan has not had a “full legitimate national government” in most of its recent history, and has failed to create a unified national elite (Maley, 1997, p. 168). According to Maley, in the past hundred years, only King Zahir Shah, who ruled from 1933 to 1973, enjoyed “a certain degree of traditional legitimacy...” and even he was “careful not to put it to the test through challenges to the core interests of Afghanistan’s micro-societies” (Maley, 1997, p. 168). But all the other regimes were dependent “...on non-legitimate forms of domination” (168). Maley adds,

Afghanistan's failure to create a national legitimate government is result of a lack of a 'unified national elite,' which "consist of competitors for control of the central government, and should be distinguished from local elites which have no aspiration to exercise nationwide power" (p. 169).

However, although ethnicity has often been a source of conflict and violence, and despite being an extremely ethnically diverse state, Afghanistan has not experienced ethnic secessionist movements (Adeney, 2008, p. 539). Adeney contributes this lack of secessionist movements to the existence of a strong 'national Afghan identity,' noting that an "Afghan national identity exists, irrespective of the complex of diversity in the country" (p. 539). Moreover, this "nascent sense" of the Afghan identity that emerged with Pashtuns was not only crucial to the nationhood, but "it also provided the Pashtuns with a lasting dominance over other ethnic minorities" (Jawad, 1992, p. 14).

The denomination of *qawm*, an all-encompassing but relative term, is the overarching ethnic label that describes a tribe, region, ethnic group or profession in Afghanistan (Simonsen, 2004). Ethnicity as a social construct is often politicized by Afghan elites for political agendas because it provides the basis for the primordial identities for ethnic groups, such as a 'homeland' (*watan*), 'country' (*mamlakat*), 'peoples' (*qawm*, *tayfa*), and 'religion' (*mazhab*) (Sahar, 2014).

However, ethnicity is not only limited to one large ethnic group such as the Pashtuns or other smaller groups, but all the ethnic groups in Afghanistan utilize the principle of *qawm* or ethnic relations. The difference is that among some groups, such as the urbanized Tajiks, *qawm* is seen more on a regional level, while among Pashtuns, it is tribal.

In order to better understand Afghanistan's unique ethnic history, ethnic nuances and ethnic conflict, it is essential to comparatively explore some common trends in the larger ethnic literature. The next few sections explore trends and the best systems in the literature on how to accommodate ethnically diverse societies and how to fairly represent ethnic minorities.

Managing Ethnic Minorities through a Democratic Framework

Scholars have debated which approach is best suited to manage ethnically-diverse societies (Geddes, 1999; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Rustow, 1970; Lipset, 1959; Diamond & Linz, 1989; Skocpool & Goodwin, 1994). Ethnic conflicts can have many causes, but most often, lacking systems that accommodate all minorities equally leads to conflict of interests and hence violence (Reilly, 2001). Because ethnic groups are usually set along deep ethnic cleavages rooted in long historical divisions and differences, designing a system that represents all ethnic groups equitably is difficult (Reilly, 2001).

Although scholars agree that any meaningful solution to accommodating ethnic minorities must come from a democratic arrangement, there is little consensus on which framework is the most effective (Anderson, 2013; Lijphart, 1969, 1991; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Roeder & Rothchild, 2005; Sen 1999; Rustow, 1970; Dahl, Shapiro, & Cheibub, 2003). Technically many systems could provide accommodation to minorities, but every approach has consequences.

Anderson (2013) best captures the essence of the issue at stake when discussing how to manage ethnic societies, noting, "The problem then is not just about resolving ethnic conflict— this can be achieved through a variety of coercive techniques, from the forcible suppression of ethnicity to the elimination of entire ethnic groups... [but] the

problem is how to do this within a peaceful democratic framework” (p. 2). Anderson adds, “...While democratic solutions to ethnic conflicts are undoubtedly difficult to engineer, the undemocratic alternatives (forced assimilation, or genocide, for example) are almost always far worse” (p. 3). Hence, along these assumptions, the present study argues that democracy by default, both in theory and practice, is the most desirable system to manage minorities.

Engineering a Democratic Approach to Accommodate Ethnic Societies

While democracy is the best system to accommodate ethnic societies, there is little agreement among scholars on which approach is the best for that task. Since ethnically divided societies are usually more prone to violence due to a lack of an equitable system that can accommodate all groups in a society, building the best system to equally accommodate ethnic societies is debated (Geddes, 1999; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Rustow, 1970; Lipset, 1959; Diamond & Linz, 1989; Skocpool & Goodwin, 1994). The argument revolves around two competing perspectives— the *consociational* arrangement advocated by Lijphart and the *centripetalist* approach developed of Horowitz.

In the consociational system, Lijphart (1969) proposes a power-sharing mechanism among the elites based on political compromise such as coalition building. A successful consociational democracy requires four conditions in order to survive: (1) the elites’ ability to represent everyone’s interests; (2) the ability to overcome conflicts of interests by joining rival groups; (3) the commitment to maintaining the system; and (4) the elites’ understanding of ‘political fragmentation’ (p. 216).

According to Lijphart (1969), competition in fragmented societies can drive the government to political instability because the stakes are extremely high. The elites would therefore voluntarily avoid political competition in order to “prevent passions aroused by elections from upsetting the carefully constructed, and possible fragile system of cooperation” (Lijphart, 1969, p.143). Lijphart (1969) notes that the consociation practice must be extended to the electoral system in order to function and bring political stability. The elites of a state must be willing to come to a compromise and build grand coalitions in order to form a government (Lijphart, 1969, p.145). Although Lijphart (1969) concedes that consociational arrangement of government does not always work since the experience failed in Cyprus, Nigeria and Uruguay due to various factors, he stresses that when all the conditions are met, it is a suitable option for any diverse society (Lijphart, 1969).

Horowitz (2002) agrees that forming coalitions in ethnic societies is essential, but criticizes consociationalism on the grounds that the leaders, who hold the majority (i.e. 60 percent votes), are not likely to enter into a coalition with others because it would not be desirable to give up power, and therefore, they will likely “retain control for themselves...” (p. 148) Second, “the assumption that elites in divided societies are likely to be more tolerant of other ethnic groups or less inclined to pursue advantage for their own group is extremely dubious” (Horowitz, 2002, p.148). Third, even if the elites agree to “compromise across ethnic lines in the face of severe divisions, there is usually a high price to pay” (Horowitz, 2002, p. 148).

Instead, Horowitz (2002) argues that the incentive-based electoral systems are the best way to accommodate ethnic societies because it rewards them for working together.

According to the author, “If political leaders are likely to be more willing to compromise under some electoral systems than under others, it follows that the electoral system is the central feature of the incentives approach to accommodation” (Horowitz, 2002, p. 150).

In summary, instituting a system that equally accommodates ethnic groups reduces the likelihood of ethnic conflict. And because sustaining some system is better than no system at all or an authoritarian system, many scholars suggest that a democratic arrangement is the correct framework to represent ethnic minorities.

The two main approaches for engineering the best democratic arrangement are the power-sharing approach in the consociational arrangement developed by Lijphart and the incentive-based system of the centrepetalism developed by Horowitz. Both have merits and downfalls and their success and failure depends on further factors such as where and how they are applied and implemented. For the purposes of this study, a general introductory discussion on these relevant literature theories of these designs for the context of study should suffice.

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT

Research Design

This study is designed as a qualitative case study framework in order to examine the role of ethnic inclusion on regime stability. Through an in-depth analysis, the goal is to determine whether there is a relationship between the dependent variable *regime stability* and the independent variable *ethnic inclusion*. By applying the case study methodology, the study consists of two variables, each of which is measured by five indicators, where each indicator is assigned an individual score. Additionally, the process-tracing method, a qualitative analysis tool, is used within the case analysis to examine the relationship between the variables and test the hypothesis.

Operationalization of Variables

Two sets of five indicators are assigned to measure the dependent variable *regime stability* and independent variable *ethnic inclusion* respectively. If the indicator meets the criteria, it is assigned a positive score of 1, for a total of 5 possible scores. However, if an indicator does not meet the defined criteria, it receives a score of 0. For example, if a regime is legitimate, then it will score 1 on the indicator *legitimacy* of the dependent variable *regime stability*. On the contrary, if a regime does not meet the criteria, it would score 0. This process of scoring consequently applies to all the indicators for both dependent and independent variables for all the cases under examination.

Dependent Variable Measurement

The criteria developed to measure the dependent variable *regime stability* include five indicators that are defined as follows:

Regime Legitimacy: whether a *Loya Jirga* approved a regime in power.

Loya Jirga, a traditional grand assembly of ethnic representatives, has historically been held to approve regimes by consensus before they assume power. Regimes that were ratified through this process score *1*, and those that weren't score *0*.

Regime Transition: whether transition of power was nonviolent.

Regimes that transitioned to power through peaceful means, that is, without a war or violence, score *1* each. Those that took power through coercion or aggression, score *0*. Hereditary transitions of power, where a ruler inherits the throne through dynastic lineage, are considered too.

Uprising Frequency: whether a regime faced uprisings while in power.

This criterion does not assume the intensity of uprisings, but assigns scores on the basis of whether regimes have faced any uprisings or not. To maintain consistency, uprisings, rebellions, resistance movements, and revolutions are all used synonymously.

Power Consolidation: whether a regime used authoritarian means to consolidate power. A distinction should be noted that this variable is not measuring a regime's legal sovereign power to govern a state, but it is examining the concentration of power by regime through means of authoritarianism.

Regime Failure: whether a regime collapsed while in power.

Examines regimes that were violently brought down by a rebellion, military coup, invasions, and civil war or combination of these factors.

Independent Variable Measurement

The criteria for the independent variable *ethnic inclusion* include the following five indicators:

Regime Leader: how the head of the regime was appointed.

Examines who the ruler of each regime was, and whether the position was open to eligible candidates from across any ethnic groups to contest and hold.

Army Head: how the head of the army was appointed.

Examines who held the position of head of the national army, and if it was open to eligible candidates from across any ethnic groups.

Government Positions: how key ministerial positions were filled.

Examines how key ministers were appointed and whether the positions were open to eligible candidates from across any ethnic group.

Political Representation: how seats in the parliament were allocated.

Examines who held parliamentary seats in each regime, and whether ethnic groups were equally represented.

Political Opposition: how the government allowed political dissent.

Examines whether certain ethnic groups were banned from dissenting against the government based on their ethnic identity.

Hypothesis

The working hypothesis for this study assumes that *the more ethnically inclusive a regime is, the more likely it is to be stable*. The relationship between the dependent and independent variables is determined by the difference of their scores. For instance, when a case scores low on one variable, it should similarly score low on the other, and vice-versa.

Moreover, the lower or higher difference in the scores between the variables will show whether a hypothesis is robust or weak. In other words, a hypothesis would hold true in cases with the lowest difference in scores, while it would be false in cases with the highest difference in scores. Cases that fall under a difference of 1 are considered robust while cases that fall above 1 are considered weak.

Case Selection

The cases under examination in this study include all the political regimes from 1880 until 2009. This time frame covers fourteen different regimes as identified below in the table.

Table 1. 1: Selected Case

No.	Case	Regime Type	Date in Power
1	Abdur Rahman Khan	Monarchy	1880-1901
2	Habibullah Khan	Monarchy	1901-1919
3	Amanullah Khan	Constitutional Monarchy	1919-1929
4	Habibullah Kalakani	Kingdom	1929-
5	M. Nadir Shah	Monarchy	1929-1933
6	M. Zahir Shah	Constitutional Monarchy	1933-1973
7	M. Daud Khan	Single-party/Presidential Republic	1973-1978
8	Nur M. Tarakai	Communist/People's Democratic Republic Party	1978-1979
9	Hafizullah Amin	Communist/People's Democratic Republic Party	1979-
10	Babrak Karmal	Communist/People's Democratic Republic Party	1979-1986
11	M. Najibullah Ahmadzai	Communist/People's Democratic Republic Party	1986-1992
12	The Mujahedeen & B. Rabbani	Theocracy/Islamic Republic	1992-1996
13	The Taliban & M. M. Omar	Theocracy/Islamic Emirate	1996-2001
14	Hamid Karzai	Democracy/Presidential Republic	2002-2009

CHAPTER FOUR: CASE REVIEW & ANALYSIS

Abdur Rahman, (ruled) 1880–1901

Abdur Rahman became *amir* (“ruler”) of Afghanistan at the end of the Second Anglo-Afghan war in May 1880 after signing a truce treaty with the British (Barfield, 2010).

Rahman’s next goal was to consolidate power and pacify the country. He easily defeated his Pashtun rivals Ayub Khan in 1881 and Muhammad Ishaq in 1888 respectively, thereby ending the debate over succession to the throne (Kakar, 1979, p. xxi-xxii).

Uprisings, however, continuously sprang during the amir’s reign. By 1887, Rahman’s army had put down a serious rebellion from the Pashtun Ghilzai tribe while the Hazara rebellion had been crushed by 1893 (p. xxiii). Abdur Rahman’s last major military campaign ended with the surrender of the Kafiristan region residents, who were later coerced into mass conversion to Islam (p. xxiv).

After the Ghilzais were defeated, the amir rewarded the Muhammadzai clan of the Pashtun Durrani tribe by appointing them to high bureaucratic posts, giving their families stipends and allowing their exiles to return (Kakar, 1979, p. 9). The amir also made Muhammadzais *sharik-i-dawlat* (“partners of the state”), hence guaranteeing them official political status and economic benefits (p. 9). The amir’s relations with the second major Pashtun ethnic group Ghilzais were stable until they rebelled against his regime in 1886. After the Ghilzais were defeated and were no longer a considered a threat to the throne, the amir made efforts to reconcile with them (p. 9). However, the Ghilzais did not receive any special status or rewards apart from lenient treatment of their tribal leaders.

The Tajiks in Kohistan had rebelled only a year after Abdur Rahman had become amir in 1881 (Kakar, 1979, p. 10). Rahman was further annoyed with the Tajiks when

they refused to help him put down the Ghilzai rebellions. The amir was also suspicious of the Persian Qazilbash ethnic group and the Hazaras who had shown a pro-British attitude (Kakar, 1979, p. 10). Even though the Hazaras had earlier helped the amir in the fight against Ishaq Khan in the succession wars, he was skeptical of the non-Pashtuns as a whole when they “showed inclination toward Russia...” (Kakar, 1979, p. 10)

Rahman was once quoted, saying, “It was a wrong policy that up until now the chiefs of tribes other than Afghans (i.e. Pashtuns) were vested with power” (Kakar, 1979, p. 10). A strong supporter of the Sunnis, which most Pashtun groups fall into, the amir did not look favorably upon the Shia speaking tribes. The amir later held the view that “no reliance can be placed on any other tribe than on the Afghans [i.e. Pashtuns]” (Kakar, 1979, p. 10).

Although Rahman initially pursued a policy of tribal unification after his succession to the throne, he reversed this policy later. In the beginning, he reconciled the Hazaras with the major Pashtun ethnic group Ghilzais, which saved the ethnic minority Hazaras from being massacred in tribal wars (Kakar, 1979, p. 10). However, the amir later abandoned this policy when ethnic rebellions became more frequent and saw that dividing the tribes was the only way to reduce their power and ability to organize rebellions (p. 10). Another major shift in tribal policy began in the 1890s. After the amir had crushed most domestic rebellions and had established a strong central government capable of pacifying the tribes, he now feared a foreign threat. Thus the amir began a new campaign of national unity among the tribes by utilizing their sense of nationalism and urging them to help him protect Islam from infidels (p. 10). The amir even created the *jashn-i-mutafiqiya-i-milli* (“the national festival of unanimity”) and ordered its annual

observance “throughout the country in hopes that it might ‘beget a feeling of unity among Afghans’” (Kakar, 1979, p. 11).

In general, Rahman utilized all the means to ensure his absolute status as the ruler including using his personal relationships (Kakar, 1979, p. 16). He had multiple wives most of whom were married for political reasons. The amir had a policy to “unite the tribes with the State through marriages” and his own political marriages were mostly symbolic (Kakar, 1979, p. 16). Moreover, his two sons, Habibullah and Nasrullah, were subject to a formal relationship with the amir, addressing him as amir (p. 16). Rahman never appointed any of his sons to positions such as governors, fearing that they would revolt against him (p. 16). But as long as his sons didn’t have any political ambitions on their father’s throne, they were treated second only to the amir, by being appointed to positions in the royal court as well receiving hefty stipends (p. 17).

Rahman had assumed the *amir al-muminin* (“commander of the faithful”) title thereby giving him full legal and religious authority (Kakar, 1979, p. 21). Other titles such as *zia al millat-i-wa aldin* (“the light of the nation and religion”) as well as the more prestigious *shahansha-i-adil* (“the just emperor”) gave amir the absolute authority over all matters and judicial decisions (p. 21). The extent of his reach over the legal system can be seen in the amir’s autobiography, where he claims that all laws are “subject to my approval” (Rahman, 1900, p. 66). The amir similarly never liked to delegate authority and directly oversaw administrative tasks of the government. He did not have a deputy to act on his behalf, except his son Habibullah Khan, who sometimes acted as amir (Kakar, 1979, p. 22).

Rahman also established an executive council called *darbari aam* (“public court”) that resembled a kind of parliament, consisting of *darbar-i-shahi* (“royal court”), *khwannin-i-mulki* (“khans with feudal privileges”); the two chambers that acted as upper and lower houses respectively (Kakar, 1979, p. 23). The council was made up of *khwanin-i-mulki*, the *ulema* (“religious clerics”) and the court members. However, like the high court, the amir did not give the council any official authority and used it a channel to ‘rubber stamp’ his decisions (Kakar, 1979, p. 23). Only those who were chosen to serve on the council had proven their loyalty, did not have political ambition and “neither [had] the capacity nor the courage to detect anything wrong in the law or the policy of the sovereign” (Kakar, 1979, p. 23). The few *khan-i-ulum* (“chief justices”), *qazis* (“judges”), *muftis* (“advisers”) and *mullahs* (“religious clerics”) simply held symbolic seats “in the council for reasons of seniority and service” (Kakar, 1979, p. 24).

The amir’s policy for key ministries and governmental departments was also to avoid concentration of power in the hands of those who were appointed to these posts. Although high-level officials maintained titles like *sadr-i-azam* (“prime minister”), *wazir* (“minister”), *mustaufi* (“attorney general”), “they were not used officially or were used only a short while” (Kakar, 1979, p. 27). Abdur Rahman’s “relationship with his ministers was not like that of a king with ministers, but like that of a master with his servants” (Kakar, 1979, p. 27). Because there were no official laws or policies that defined or gave these officials their responsibilities during the amir’s reign, ministers mostly “relied on his good will” (Kakar, 1979, p. 27).

Even though the bureaucracy greatly expanded during Rahman’s reign, the amir did not have a formal cabinet nor made any efforts to form one like his predecessor Sher

Ali Khan (Kakar, 1979, p. 27). The amir imprisoned his finance minister shortly after his brief tenure for holding ‘sympathies’ for one of the amir’s rivals (p. 27). He also jailed his general attorney on corruption charges but in “reality [it was] because of the amir’s opposition of authority in one hand” (Kakar, 1979, p. 28). The amir had banned all senior officials from “getting together, forming friendships among themselves and talking about state affairs” (Kakar, 1979, p. 28). However, publicly the amir maintained a positive image of the high governmental officials by giving them civilian and military titles and high salaries. The highest military officials included the amir’s son Habibullah Khan as the brigadier and Diwan Naranjan as a colonel. Other high-level officials included a *sipah salar* (“superintendent”) of Kabul and the head of the auditing office (p. 28).

Although the amir appointed officials based on prestige, status and loyalty to the amir, he openly recruited people to high official bureaucratic positions from various ethnic groups including minority tribes like the Qizilbash, the Tajiks, and the Hindus (Kakar, 1979, p. 28). In fact, “it was the amir’s policy to give high positions in the administration to members of the smaller ethnic groups or those with no basis of power” (Kakar, 1979, p. 28). Moreover, “members of the larger ethnic groups were not barred from the bureaucracy if it could be proved that they were loyal to the amir” (Kakar, 1979, p. 28). However, “no matter what their origin, most senior officials were dismissed, often disgracefully, before they became important” (Kakar, 1979, p. 28).

Lower level positions as *sarishtadar* (“head of the financial departments”), *safdaftari* (“head of main bureau”), and *munshi* (“secretaries”) were predominately run by *ghulam pachas* (“page boys”) and *mirzas* (“junior secretaries”) (Kakar, 1979, p. 29). In his biography, the amir writes that he recruited from all the ethnic groups and that

some of his most trusted and loyal members of the government were slaves. Although the Qizilbash dominated most of the administrative positions, they were not enough to fill the expanding bureaucracy. Therefore, the amir recruited *mirzas* from other ethnic groups as well including the minority Hazaras as well as Uzbeks (Kakar, 1979, p. 29).

During Rahman's reign, governors were not allowed to "wield both military and civil powers" as they had traditionally done in the amir's predecessor's reign (Kakar, 1979, p. 48). The governors were also limited to a "small number of armed *khassadars* ("militia") in the provinces... [And] In emergencies governors relied upon the army stations in the provinces" (Kakar, 1979, p. 48). Moreover, the amir only appointed governors who were "unambitious and insignificant...who had little or no tribal backing" (Kaka, 1979, p. 48). The governors were at the amir's mercy and were often humiliated and disgraced. The more important governors were given titles such as viceroys, lieutenants but most had the title of *hukumran* ("chief"), *hakim* ("administrator") or *wali* ("governor") respectively (p. 49). Most governors did not have formal authority and "were warned not to interfere in the affairs of the court or the diwan... Neither were they permitted to spend government money liberally" (Kakar, 1979, p. 49).

Essentially the local government in Rahman's reign was "a remote extension of the central government" (Kakar, 1979, p. 69). Local government offices were inferior to the central offices and "had to send in reports of their work to Kabul regularly" (Kakar, 1979, p. 69). Policies were channeled down from the center in Kabul and they had little discretion beyond what the amir had allowed. In fact, "Heads of all provincial and district offices, including governors and *hakims*, were appointed, dismissed, promoted, or demoted by the center" (Kakar, 1979, p. 70). Besides some elders who were technically

not government officials, “no official was elected” (Kakar, 1979, p. 70). Even “Governors were merely officials who carried out the instructions they received from the amir. Once a precedent had been established on a subject governors were not supposed to ask for further instructions” (Kakar, 1979, p. 70).

The National Army was another important instrument that helped Rahman become the amir and establish strong authoritarian regime (Kakar, 1979, p. 92). The amir did not “inherit the army of his predecessors but created a large, disciplined army of his own, independent of tribal control” (Kakar, 1979, p. 93). He built his own weapon factories to arm the army with modern weapons. Rahman used the army for two purposes: to consolidate power and eliminate his opposition and to “shield Afghanistan against foreign invasion” (Kakar, 1979, p. 96). In his biography, the amir claims that he was the first king in Afghanistan to have a well-trained and disciplined force and that “Every person is practically a soldier, and *Ghaza* (to fight for the truth and faith) is every citizen’s bounden duty; every true Muslim must fight for his religion” (Rahman, 1900, p. 51).

Conscription was mandatory and recruitment followed a system where, “...the people themselves send one man out of every eight, and pay all his necessary expenses during the time he is occupied learning drill and military training” (Rahman, 1900, p. 53). However, the amir only recruited “men of little significance to military posts” (Kakar, 1979, p. 96). Sons of elders were recruited as officers while the *pehskhidmat* (“slave soldiers”) were often promoted to the rank of officers to “meet the demand of a growing army” (Kakar, 1979, p. 97). The Hazaras and Qizilbash were dismissed from the army altogether during the Hazara Rebellion temporarily but the Hindus “who had not rebelled

were also recruited to the army...” (Kakar, 1979, p. 97) The amir also recruited from the tribal regions of the other side of the Durand Line including Waziris, Afridis, and Khattaks.

In other words, “...although the army was dominated by the Pashtuns... [it] included almost all ethnic groups including Uzbeks and Aimaq” (Kakar, 1979, p. 97). Not all soldiers were treated equal, however, and sometimes the soldiers serving in the army fought against their own tribes such as the Ghilzai Regiment who fought fellow tribesmen during the Ghilzai Revolt (Kakar, 1979, p. 113). The second largest ethnic Pashtun group, Ghilzais, were also treated lower in status compared and considered unequal to the largest Pashtun ethnic group Durrani soldiers (Kakar, 1979, p. 113).

Overall, Rahman had a mixed record on managing minorities, elevating some socially and economically while brutally oppressing and often dismissing others (Kakar, 1979; Omrani, 2014; Barfield, 2010). For example, although the amir was a strong advocate of the Sunni sect of Islam, the minority Shia sects were allowed to practice their sect openly. Moreover, a small number of other minorities such as Christians, Hindus, Sikhs, and Jews also practiced their religions openly (Kakar, 1979, p. 148). Hindus were “given high positions in the bureaucracy” and had a special council that would judge cases according to Hindu laws (Kakar, 1979, p. 149). Although some Hindus voluntarily converted to Islam, they were never forced to do so. Jews, who had historically been settled in various parts of Afghanistan, built synagogues during Rahman’s reign and were “regulated according to their own customs...” (Kakar, 1979, p. 149) However, other minorities such as the residents of the Kafiristan region were not as fortunate since their entire population was forced to convert to Islam after their failed rebellion against the

amir (Kakar, 1979, p. 151).

Abdur Rahman's transition (0) to power came by means of means of war, tribal support, and coming to terms with the British (Barfield, 2010). Rahman 'raised' an army, recruited the Pashtun ethnic group Ghilzais and Tajik ethnic residents of Kohistani tribes to help him secure the throne while striking a deal with the British to be recognized as the amir in July 1880 in exchange for protecting their 'interests' (Barfield, 2010, p. 143). His regime's legitimacy (0) is also debated as Rahman regularly eliminated and killed his rivals who challenged him for power (Barfield, 2010, p. 143).

Uprisings (0) were common throughout Rahman's reign and he faced over forty rebellions from various ethnic tribes that protested his policies (Barfield, 2010, p. 147). However, Rahman had crushed every 'autonomous' group and tribe in Afghanistan to create a powerful centralized government and kept complete authoritarian control (0) on the state and country as a whole (Barfield, 2010, p. 149). Although the amir faced many uprisings and revolts against his regime, his regime did not collapse (1) and remained intact until his death (Barfield, 2010, p. 151).

Table 1: A. Rahman Regime Scores

DV Stability Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Legitimacy	0	0
Regime Transition	0	0
Uprising Frequency	0	0
Power Consolidation	0	0
Regime Failure	1	1
Grand Total		1

Rahman was an absolute head of the regime (0), who maintained total control of the state in 'autocratic' style bureaucracy (Barfield, 2010, p. 152). He "centralized

Afghanistan and destroyed the power of the regional elites” and Afghanistan became a ‘unitary’ state under rule (Barfield, 2010, p. 160). The amir did not share executive power with anyone, including his sons, and had the power to appoint or remove all levels of government officials including clerics, ministers, governors, head of the army and others at will (Barfield, 2010, p. 160). Rahman had created a state in which no one was allowed to dissent (*0*) politically or otherwise and “no internal actors could challenge him or his government” (Barfield, 2010, p. 160).

Rahman not only lay down the structure for the modern Afghan state, but in his conquest of maintaining complete authority over the country, he built a strong national army to pacify the tribes (Kakar, 1979, p. 92). While conscription was mandatory and every Afghan was essentially a ‘soldier’, conscription within the army (*1*) were open to all ethnic groups (Rahman, 1900, p. 51). However, the amir only recruited “men of little significance to military posts” and often recruited loyal slave soldiers to high-ranking positions (Kakar, 1979, p. 97). Recruitment in the army was based purely on whoever pleased the amir the most and was loyal to him while some soldiers were treated better than others (Kakar, 1979, p. 97).

Table 2: A. Rahman Regime Scores

IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Leader	0	0
Army Head	1	1
Government Positions	1	1
Political Representation	0	0
Political Opposition	0	0
Grand Total		2

Moreover, Rahman had created a kind of façade of popular political representation (*0*) in his government, which was in fact a complete autocracy (Fletcher, 1965, p. 149). Although he had created a ‘Supreme Council’ and a ‘General Assembly’, none of the members had real power and were “formed from among the chiefs whom the Amir preferred to keep in Kabul; but their function was purely advisory, and their advice was infrequently sought” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 149).

Ironically, however, Rahman recruited people to high level government positions (*1*) from minority ethnic groups, with the assumption that minority groups had no power base and were the least likely to revolt (Kakar, 1979, p. 27). Although he appointed members in the administration and high posts in the army from Qizilbash, Tajiks, the Hindus, Hazaras, Uzbeks and others, the majority of his administration was still made up of Pashtun Sardars (Kakar, 1979, p. 28). He only chose people to government positions who “showed little ambition” and would routinely shuffle officials if there were the “slightest suspicion of dissent” (Omrani, 2014, p. 52). In short, Abdur Rahman had ruled by spreading fear and subjugating the population through coercion and oppression.

Habibullah Khan, 1901-1919

Abdur Rahman had left such a lasting legacy of fear and subjugation after his death in 1901 that no one challenged his successor to the throne (Barfield, 2010). Thus, the transition of power marked the first time in Afghanistan's history where one ruler succeeded another without a war of succession (Barfield, 2010). The amir had designated his eldest son Habibullah Khan to inherit the amirship after his death (Barfield, 2010, p. 175). The British still had control of Afghanistan's foreign affairs after Habibullah's succession. Tensions arose in the Anglo-Afghan relations when the British Empire wanted to renew an old treaty but Habibullah Khan refused to sign it, arguing for Afghanistan's independence (Fletcher, 1965, p. 173). After several rounds of negotiations and threats of war, both sides signed a new treaty on July 21, 1905 that reaffirmed the British control of the Afghan foreign affairs, while Habibullah had "obtained the renewal of the annual subsidy, 400,000 pounds for the arrears, and tacit agreement that he was "Independent King" (Fletcher, 1965, p. 174).

Domestically, Habibullah allowed the return of various political, powerful and influential families exiled by his father. These included his father's rivals the Pashtun Muhammadzai family (i.e. the five Muhasiban brothers), the ethnically Pashtun Mahmud Tarzi from the Ottoman Syria, the various Sufi movement followers such as the Pashtun Mujadaddi family among many others (Barfield, 2010, p. 175). Soon the Muhasiban brothers re-merged as an influential political family during Habibullah's reign and the amir personally appointed Nadir Shah, the oldest of the five Muhasiban brother, as his commander-in-chief of the national army (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 102).

Tarzi, an intellectual and modernist, who lived in exile through progressive and nationalist movements in India, Central Asia, Turkey, Syria and Europe, was personally welcomed by Habibullah Khan. He had worked under prominent reformists such as Jamal Al-din Al-Afghani for the pan-Islamic cause (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 102). Moreover, Tarzi had been influenced by the reformist movements around the world and began to apply these principles in Afghanistan (p. 103). He founded the *Young Afghan* movement, which was inspired from the *Young Turk* movement that had played a major role in modernizing Turkey. He also founded the country's first ever-independent newspaper *Siraj-ul-Akhbar* in 1911, with Habibullah's permission, which played a major role in promoting pan-Islamism and condemning British imperialism and their indirect control of Afghanistan (p. 104). Tarzi also personally tutored Habibullah's two sons Amanullah and Inyatullah (p. 104).

Habibullah also allowed tribal chiefs to shape state policy (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 101). Thus, "the incipient national bureaucracy established by his father...became open to infiltration by traditional, localized power bases" (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 101). The tribal chiefs consisted of local *maliks* (the village chiefs elected by locals to represent them in the government), who often took bribes in exchange for passing laws (p. 101). Moreover, provincial governors or district officials were now elected from the local khans or landlords, too. The local tribal chiefs now maintained a large presence in the bureaucracy and thereby "often used state funds and patronage to reinforce traditional power structures" (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 102). Moreover, "Policies laid down by the increasingly Westernized national

bureaucracy had to penetrate these insulating layers before they could be put in effect” (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 102).

Habibullah Khan’s inner political circle included his brother Nasrullah Khan, and his two sons Inayatullah Khan and Amanullah Khan. Outside his political circle, three other groups formed an important part of his cabinet including the five brothers of the Muhasiban family (Fletcher, 1965, p. 176). Of the five brothers, Nadir Khan was promoted as the amir’s commander-in-chief after beating the eastern Pashtun Mangal tribe’s revolt in 1913, while Hashim Khan, Shah Wali Khan, Mohammad Aziz and Shah Mahmud were all given high political positions in the government (p. 177). The Tarzis was the second most important political family in the amir’s reign. The third important group outside the amir’s immediate circle was the ethnic Tajik Charkhi family, whose two sons Ghulam Hyder Charkhi and Ghulam Siddiq Charkhi were both appointed as generals (p. 177). Although Habibullah maintained influence over these families and considered them important to his domestic policies of modernization, at the same time, he was wary of them (p. 177).

Man of the other exiles had also been associated with independence movements in India and the Ottoman Empire while others were reformist-nationalists, who were influenced by events such as Japan’s victory over Russia in 1905 (Barfield, 2010, p.176). The exiles were driven by change and brought in new secular and religious ideas into a society that had been alienated from much of the outside world (p. 176). Moreover, the returnees “Argued that Muslim societies needed to modernize by adopting or adapting cultural and economic innovations from the West to compete more effectively with it”

(Barfield, 2010, p. 176). Soon the various exile parties clashed among themselves as their beliefs and ideologies came at a crossroad and split into separate factions.

The Western-influenced reformist exiles argued for a push to modernize the Afghan society while the religious clerics argued for unity of the people based on Islamic principles and support for a Pan-Islamic movement (p. 176). Although both camps had differences, they shared a broader goal of rejecting British influence and stirring anti-British views (p. 176). The religious *ulema* was worried that British domination of the Afghan society would undermine the Islamic and social order in the long term, while the reformist camp—the *Young Afghan* movement— believed that a continued British domination was dangerous to Afghan pride and progress (Barfield, 2010, p. 176). The Young Afghan movement followers believed that the religious leaders were primarily reactionary and obstructionists and that “structure of religious life and belief needed to be reformed or displaced before Afghan society could progress” (p. 176).

The Islamic parties countered this argument by claiming that the Afghan society did not lack such a void and “that if Muslim societies were weak, it was because they had been oppressed by the Western colonial powers, and needed to display stronger religious solidarity and stricter applications of the faith in order to become independent again” (Barfield, 2010, p. 176). Although the religious camp’s position was more popular with the Afghan population especially their call against the British in India, the nationalists and modernizers had greater support among the elites and those who supported a change (p. 176).

While Habibullah still concentrated power and maintained full authority over the state, he was soon caught between these two influential camps, both of which sought to

bring large social and political changes by directly impacting state policies (Barfield, 2010, p. 177). The religious camp included members of the *ulema*, leaders of the Sufi movement, as well as the amir's younger brother Nasrullah Khan. The second camp included members of the nationalist and modernist factions largely influenced by Muhammad Tarzi (p. 177). Other influential members of this second faction included students of the progressive Habibia College founded by the amir and his two sons Enyatullah Khan and Amanullah Khan (p. 177).

Although amir Habibullah was "Initially...content to let both camps flourish because while he was fairly devout himself..." he eventually withdrew his support and began to crackdown on both movements when they started to criticize his policies, especially Afghanistan's official Policy of Neutrality during World War I (Barfield, 2010, p. 177). The amir quickly lost support of the *ulema* and the religious factions after he made a call to Jihad against the British but later reversed his decision (p. 177). The amir had threatened the British with Jihad after the Anglo-Russian Convention, which demarcated their territories of influence on Afghan soil without consulting with the Afghans. However, when the call to Jihad proved immensely popular with the public, Habibullah feared he would lose control of the war. Moreover, under pressure from the British, he not only blocked any efforts to the Jihad but also executed some of the organizers (p. 177).

The crack down on groups demanding Jihad infuriated the amir's brother Nasrullah, who had armed and organized some of the groups. Thus, the nationalist camp also attacked and criticized the amir for allowing the Anglo-Russian Convention without Afghan's participation and for accepting limitations on Afghan sovereignty "by giving

into British demands and not pushing for complete independence” (Barfield, 2010, p. 177). The amir brushed aside the criticisms but was furious when he found out that a secret party of constitutionalists (*mashruta*) had been conspiring without the amir’s knowledge to “abolish the monarchy” (p. 177). This secret group was organized by his students in his own Habibia College and included high profile members from the nationalist camp, liberal *ulema*, and even his two sons according to rumors. Habibullah moved quickly before the constitutionalists could further plot against his regime and in 1909 the amir arrested and executed many of the members (p. 177). This act created a public outcry among the population and alienated many of the *Young Afghans*, who saw themselves as the vanguard of change.

The amir’s support further waned when he announced the state policy of neutrality during the First World War (Barfield, 2010, p. 178). The amir was caught up between the Central powers, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, and the Allied Powers (p. 1778). Turkey Sultan’s call for a pan-Islamic Jihad had found considerable support in Afghanistan and reached its peak when a joint Turkish-German delegation arrived in Kabul in 1915 “seeking permission for Central Power troops to pass through the country to attack India” (Barfield, 2010, p. 178). In reality, they had “hoped to use Afghanistan as a base from which to inspire jihadist revolts against the British in the NWFP and perhaps beyond” (Barfield, 2010, p. 178). Germany had used this Islamic appeal to their full benefits by allying with Turkey and providing gold and money in order to make more allies in the Middle East and Asia. The Germans secret service similarly used these tactics to raise anti-British revolts in India by supporting militant Islam (p. 179).

Although the British countered these efforts and put high clerics on their payroll both in Afghanistan and India, it was not enough to sway the growing anti-British sentiments, including some from the amir's closet members in his court. Both the amir's brother Nasrullah Khan and his favorite son Amanullah Khan as well as Mahmud Tarzi supported the plan to stir up trouble through the border tribes (Fletcher, 1965, p. 180). Only the amir himself and a few other advisers were against the war hawks and rejected an all-out attack on India (p. 180). Habibullah, who did not wish for war, knew that the British were militarily more powerful and also believed that the Allied Powers would prevail and "show gratitude to Afghanistan for its neutrality" (Fletcher, 1965, p. 181).

Although Habibullah was courteous and welcomed the mission warmly listening to the arguments of the Central Powers, the mission eventually left without success. In fact, the amir had found the mission plan of making him the King of India outrageous. In the end, "...the wisdom of Habibullah's inaction became evident with the collapse of the Central Powers..." (Fletcher, 1965, p. 183) After the War, Habibullah wrote a letter to the Viceroy of India explaining the benefits of Afghanistan's neutrality and not siding with the Central Powers and asking for a complete sovereignty of Afghanistan in return (p. 183). However, the amir lacked an understanding like his father Abdur Rahman "namely that gratitude has small place in the dynamics of power politics" (Fletcher, 1965, p. 183). The British, who were already facing a new threat of communism "...were in no mood to listen to Afghan importunities" (Fletcher, 1965, p. 183).

The British evaded the question of giving Afghanistan full independence, further weakening the amir's resolve. The British did not realize that the amir had been the victim of various attacks after the collapse of the world order in Europe, Middle East and

Central Asia and that he was “bearing the brunt of attacks by those unhappy with outcome” (Barfield, 2010, p. 179). The conservative religious *ulema* in Afghanistan blamed the amir for the defeat of the last great Islamic empire, the Ottoman Empire. The nationalists and other camps blamed Habibullah for failing to regain independence of the country from the British as a price of the neutrality policy (p. 179). Therefore, the nationalists-modern faction turned to a new ally, the Soviet Union— “a radical socialist regime determined to spread its ideology from the ashes of the old czarist empire...” (Barfield, 2010, p. 179) However, Habibullah’s regime was still strong enough to hold on to absolute power and because his father Abdur Rahman’s repressive policies had left a strong legacy of fear, “...dissatisfaction with the amir never resulted in significant popular revolts against him” (Barfield, 2010, p. 179).

However, personally the amir’s troubles were doubled by a loss of his favorite winter capital, Peshawar. In order to escape the harsh winters of Kabul, the amir chose Jalalabad as his new winter capital and in December 1918 the amir went on a hunting trip with his brother Nasrullah Khan and his oldest son Inyatullah Khan, leaving Amanullah Khan “in charge of the treasury and garrison at Kabul” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 183). On February 19, 1919 the amir was found mysteriously dead after he had camped out at a district in Lagham, just outside of Kabul (Fletcher, 1965, p. 183). Although there were various theories of his assassination involving the Russians, British and his own cabinet members as possible suspects, the assassin was never identified.

In mensurating the Habibullah Khan regime, he inherited the throne in 1901 after facing minimal resistance from his half-brother (Fletcher, 1965, p. 171). However, his brother failed to garner enough support and therefore his claim to kingship never

materialized (Dupree, 1973, p. 430). Thus, Habibullah was able to become king without any opposition and it marked the first time in Afghanistan’s history that power had been transitioned (*I*) from one amir to another peacefully (Dupree, 1973, p. 430). Habibullah had the loyalty of the army but his regime’s legitimacy (*I*) came from giving positions of power and subsidies to religious leaders whose political influence had been suppressed by his father (Dupree, 1973, p. 430).

Table 3: H. Khan Regime Scores

DV Stability Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Legitimacy	1	1
Regime Transition	1	1
Uprising Frequency	0	0
Power Consolidation	0	0
Regime Failure	1	1
Grand Total		3

Although Habibullah’s nearly twenty-year reign as king largely remained stable domestically and he primarily dealt with foreign policy issues, he did face a few revolts (*0*), most notable from the Pashtun Mangal tribes in the eastern Khost province (Fletcher, 1965, p. 175). The Mangals, who had protested higher taxes, were promptly defeated and were granted a truce by the amir (Fletcher, 1965, p. 176). As king, Habibullah intended to consolidate power (*0*) and was able to maintain one of the most stable periods in Afghanistan’s modern history (Fletcher, 1965, p. 184). Although Habibullah was assassinated while still king, his regime did not collapse (*I*) while he was in power (Fletcher, 1965, p. 184).

Table 4: H. Khan Regime Scores

IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Leader	0	0
Army Head	1	1
Government Positions	1	1
Political Representation	1	1
Political Opposition	1	1
Grand Total		4

Although Habibullah remained the absolute head of state (0), he reversed many of his father's policies including allowing political exiles to return and giving religious and tribal leaders power to influence state policy (Dupree, 1973, p. 431). Moreover, Habibullah was the first king to break tradition and officially appointed Nadir Shah as his commander in chief for the army (1), instead of taking the position for himself as past amirs had done (Fletcher, 1965, p. 177). Political representation increased during Habibullah's time after he opened up government positions (1) to previously exiled dissenters including appointing influential political families such as Barakzais, Tarzis among others to key ministerial (1) positions (Fletcher, 1965, p. 177). Habibullah was also known for allowing a greater degree of free speech and political dissent (1), although later he would crackdown on protestors (Fletcher, 1965, p. 177).

Amanullah Khan, 1919-1929

After Habibullah Khan's death, his brother Nasrullah Khan declared himself king, ruling for nine days before he was arrested. Habibullah Khan's two older sons, Enayatullah and Hayatullah had sworn allegiance to their uncle Nasruallah, but the third son, Amanullah Khan, refused to recognize him as king and challenged him for right of inheritance (Barfield, 2010, p 180). Serving as Regent and Commander-in-Chief of the army in his father's reign, Amanullah had garnered the support of the army (Dupree, 1973, p. 441). On his orders, the army captured Nasrullah and brought him in chains to Kabul along with his supporters, where he was imprisoned in the *Arg* dungeon. Amanullah became amir by seizing "...The *Arg* (a combination of royal residence, fort, and treasury), the traditional seat of power..." (Dupree, 1973, p. 441) Inyatullah, who swore allegiance to the new king, was released while Nasrullah was imprisoned (Dupree, 1973, p. 441).

While the new king Amanullah began consolidating power, his first order of business was to gain complete independence from the British, who still controlled Afghanistan's foreign affairs (Barfield, 2010, p. 181). Amanullah declared a Jihad and appointed Nadir Khan as the minister of war, who scored some victories by overrunning British posts on the border. However, the Afghan campaign was largely unsuccessful against the British's more advanced weaponry and aerial advantage (p. 181). The British, who felt that the tribal revolts in their backyard could spill over to India and that they could lose the tide in the Great Game to Russian influence, were also keen on a truce (Barfield, 2010, p. 181). Hence, by August 1919, both sides had signed the Treaty of

Rawalpindi, which recognized Afghanistan as a full sovereign state independent in its foreign affairs (p. 181).

Gaining independence had made Amanullah extremely popular with the people, especially with the conservative Islamic *ulema*, who “rewarded him with the title of *Ghazi* as a victor of a holy war” (Barfield, 2010, p. 182). The enthusiastic amir embarked on his next goal of modernizing Afghanistan by releasing a series of social reforms and state regulations (*nizamnamas*) to push Afghanistan into the early twentieth century modernization drive. The most crucial of these was introducing Afghanistan’s first ever constitution in 1923, which “laid out the structure of the government, and gave the amir supreme executive and legal authority, but also established the Council of Ministers to run the government and the State Council to advise it” (Barfield, 2010, p. 183).

However, after decades of conservative rule under his grandfather’s and his father’s regimes, the new reforms quickly became controversial and overwhelming for the traditional Afghan society. These reforms, which sought to bring in generational change in a short period of time, included “...ambitious administrative, legal and financial social reforms” (Barfield, 2010, p. 183). The reforms soon drew strong reactions from the public in three areas including objections to high taxation, mandatory conscription and laws perceived to be middling in family customs (Barfield, 2010, p. 183).

Amanullah had increased taxes to make up for exhausting the national treasury (p. 183). The increase in tax was not simply an issue of paying more, but the new system had cut out the traditional middleman in the village and gave government officials unprecedented power to collect taxes directly. This not only resulted in disgruntled

villagers but also opened way for more corruption especially since cash was easier to pocket for collectors (p. 184). Moreover, the central government had failed to successfully implement the new tax system and effectively collect taxes (p. 184).

The second biggest objection to reforms was the issue of military conscription, especially in the rural tribal parts of the country. Previously exempt Pashtun tribes such as Barakzais, Mangals, Zadrans, and Ahmadzais were now required to compulsory draft in the military. Everyone else “supplied one able-bodied man for every eight eligible ones (*hasht-nafari*)” (Barfield, 2010, p. 184). Usually the community would have the discretion to choose one able-bodied man to serve in the military and would be responsible to take care of his family in his absence (p. 184). For the tribal leaders this “power to choose conscripts and negotiate with the state on behalf of the communities [was]... one of their most important roles” (Barfield, 2010, p. 184).

However, under the new Conscription and Identity Card Act in 1923, conscription became universal while “the wealthy could buy an exemption” (Barfield, 2010, p. 184). This was reinforced by introducing *Tazkira* or the national identity card, which were used to track conscripts, cutting out the tribal leaders as intermediaries in the drafting process (p. 184). The new identity cards were also required for filing a court case, registering for marriage, or doing business. The government “hoped to use its identity card system to enforce its unpopular new family law by keeping track of what individuals were doing” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185). Hence, these new state registration and conscription were “strongly resented as unwarranted state interference in community life” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185).

However, the most controversial of all the reforms were the new marriage laws and the general code of conduct towards women. The amir was “keen to discourage plural marriages, restrict marriage payments, ban child engagements, and end the custom of settling blood feuds by an exchange of women” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185). These new laws were directly in conflict with the longstanding Pashtun code of honor, Pashtunwali, which emphasized personal autonomy from the state including local community laws that interfered with family matters. Most Pashtuns “(and other rural Afghans) felt [marriage] was a private matter or already covered by sharia law principles used by local clergy” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185).

Moreover, the Afghan government did not have an overarching authority to implement change in rural parts in order to bring a “Cultural Revolution” and change the social structure of the society. Although the marriage laws were barely implemented and affected a small number of people, they were the most inflammatory and rumors spread quickly that the “state would undermine fundamental social relations sanctioned by Islam and Pashtunwali...” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185) This was partly due to the spread of false rumors as the regime had lacked an effective national system to communicate the true intentions of the reforms to the population directly (Chua, 2013, p. 55).

When false rumors reached rural areas that the government was initiating a ban on the veiling of women, Pashtuns were horrified (Chua, 2013). Therefore, “In a society concerned with preserving the appearance of honor and autonomy, men often felt compelled to act well before such threats became reality” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185). Thus, “Within three years of coming to power, Amanullah had squarely pushed two of these hot buttons with his taxation (gold) and social laws (women)” (Barfield, 2010, p. 185).

Although "...honor itself was judged in the theoretical realm perception could be more important than reality" (Barfield, 2010, p. 185).

Soon the reforms resulted in angry reactions and a revolt in the eastern Pashtun Khost province broke out in March 1924 led by Mullah-i-Lang (Dupree, 1973, p. 449). The Khost revolt, which lasted for 9 months, was guided by "local clergy who saw the new law codes a threat to their authority and livelihood" (Barfield, 2010, p. 185).

Although the Pashtun Mangal tribes led most of the fighting, the rebellion soon spread to other Pashtun areas.

To counter the criticisms sprung from the revolt and broaden his political base, Amanullah ordered to summon another Loya Jirga ("Grand Assembly") in July 1924 by inviting a thousand delegates representing the tribes, *ulema* and landowners (Barfield, 2010, p. 186). The amir had called a similar assembly in 1923 to 'rubber-stamp' his new Constitution and "expected them to renew their support of his laws to counter rebel criticism" (Barfield, 2010, p. 186). However, the parties in attendance "turned on the amir and expressed their long-repressed misgivings about his laws" (Barfield, 2010, p. 186). The *ulema* demanded that the amir allow them to interpret the laws according to the Sunni Hanifi legal system, "restore the legal distinctions between Muslims and non-Muslims as well as abandon his restrictions on polygamy" (Barfield, 2010, p. 186). The delegates, however, did support the amir's laws on raising taxes, expanding conscription and branded the rebels of the Khost rebellions as traitors (p. 186).

The rebels however were growing in numbers and had made sweeping victories coming within 8 miles of the capital Kabul, and pillaging and looting any villages in their way. Although the revolt had begun as a religious response to Amanullah's

modernization reforms, it had now included elements of dynastic struggle for the throne too (Dupree, 1973, p. 449). This shift began when Abdul Karim, the son of the former amir of Afghanistan Yaqub Khan, offered to lead the rebels against Amanullah Khan and remove him from the throne while his actual goal was to win the throne for himself (Dupree, 1973, p. 449). However, when the rebels became reluctant to let Karim assume leadership, Amanullah used this window of opportunity to shift the tide of war in his favor (Dupree, 1973, p. 449).

Amanullah spread anti-British propaganda that Abdul Karim was a British plot to take Afghanistan back. This move allowed Amanullah to rally the Pashtun tribes and change the course of the war from a revolt against the government to a jihad by the government against a foreign threat (Barfield, 2020, p. 187). This allowed the amir to recruit fighters under the call to Jihad and crush the revolt. Abdul Karim fled to India “but sixty leading rebels were taken to Kabul and publicly executed, though at least one roundly condemned Amanullah to the crowd as an infidel before he was shot” (Barfield, 2010, p. 187).

The government was “left intact” after the Khost rebellion, mostly because “historically Afghan rulers were displaced by popular rebellions only in the context of a foreign invasion—and then only when they spread across regional and ethnic lines” (Barfield, 2010, p. 187). However, what seemed to have been a short nuance confined only to the eastern parts of the country, Amanullah’s army suffered “disastrous setbacks” and the fighting cost him two years income (p. 187). The conflict had also drained the national treasury and the “necessity” to call on the border Pashtun tribes help to put down the rebellion showed his government’s weakness to handle a minor conflict. Moreover,

“it punctured the aura of military invincibility that the Afghan state had nurtured for more than two generations” (Barfield, 2010, p. 187). However, “this was no longer the case after the Khost rebellion” (Barfield, 2010, p. 187).

In order to “compensate for the losses, Amanullah had reached out for an alliance with the conservative clergy, rolling back social reforms but maintaining administrative ones” (Barfield, 2010, p. 187). Within his administration, the amir’s response to the revolt was a shake-up in his cabinet (Dupree, 1973, p. 450). He removed Nadir Khan as the Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief and replaced him with Mohammad Ali Khan (Dupree, 1973, p. 450). Mahmud Tarzi again returned from Europe and retook his old position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Tajik Mohammad Ali Khan in 1924 (Dupree, 1973, p. 450). Although Amanullah’s army successfully put down the revolt, and made wholesale changes in his government, “The end of *Mullah-i-Lang* revolt did not end opposition to Amanullah’s modernization schemes” (Dupree, 1973, p. 499).

After the fighting ended, Amanullah went on inspection tours of the eastern Jalalabad (1925) and the southern Kandahar (1926) provinces to urge his governors to “maintain better order” (Barfield, 2010, p. 188). He had found new leverage and used it to reverse most of the concessions he had made years ago in his 1924 Jirga, such as opening girls’ schools that the *ulema* had fiercely objected to (p. 188). In this brief period of peace, the amir felt “confident enough in the stability of the country to take a world tour in the company of his wife, Queen Soraya” (Barfield, 2010, p. 188). The trip, which began in November 1927 lasting until June 1928, included visits to countries such as India, Egypt, Britain, Italy, France, Germany, The Soviet Union, Turkey and Iran. This

marked the first time ever for a sovereign Afghan leader traveling abroad on an official visit beyond India or “allowed his wife to play a public role” (Barfield, 2010, p. 188).

While many of the amir’s advisers warned the king that the trip would be costly and the government would be weak in his absence, others “accused him of endangering his Islamic faith by visiting wine-drinking infidel lands and allowing the queen to appear unveiled” (Barfield, 2010, p. 188). The trip was a monumental success for public relations and remapping diplomatic ties for Afghanistan. The amir received positive press in Europe and the Middle East. However, the trip’s profound impact was on Amanullah personally who renewed his old reforms for more radical ones. The amir recalled another Loya Jirga in 1928 but this time all of the thousand participants were selected from representatives who largely “approved his new laws with little dissent” (Barfield, 2020, p. 188).

The new reforms “included plans for economic development, education, the creation of the National Assembly, and more reforms of the legal system, including family law and women’s issues” (Barfield, 2010, p. 189). More controversially, the amir ended women’s seclusion in social settings and ordered the abolishing the customary veil. These actions alienated the entire clerical establishment including those “who had supported the amir in the past” (Barfield, 2010, p. 189). But Amanullah was also ready to confront them directly and reduce their power and influence. After his return from the tour, the amir had decided to cut all ties with the clergy, refusing to meet even with the “most prominent representatives, ending their stipend, and forbidding membership in Sufi orders by government officials” (Barfield, 2010, p. 189).

Although the opposition from the religious faction was expected, the amir faced objections from the modernist camps too. For example, the Minister of Defense Nader Khan argued that social changes should be made only in selected parts of the country that can digest them “rather than through the comprehensive packages favored by the amir” (Barfield, 2010, p. 189). Although the founder of the modernist camp and amir’s Foreign Affairs Minister and adviser Mahmud Tarzi approved of the radical reforms, he too argued to implement changes slowly “for the country to absorb” (Barfield, 2010, p. 190). But Amanullah rejected Nadir and Tarzi’s advice, both of whom eventually left Afghanistan in mid-1920s and migrated to Europe.

The impact of reforms on the general populous was more influential on a day-to-day basis rather than theoretical (Barfield, 2010, p. 190). Corruption had risen during Amanullah’s trip, which had also waned his popularity. The Loya Jirga had merely ‘rubber-stamped’ the amir’s proposal for reforms that had practically doubled taxes on everything and increased mandatory military service from two years to three years. Within months of passing the reforms, fresh uprisings had begun but because this time the amir had upset a large portion of the population, rebellions spread beyond just the Pashtun tribes as in the Khost Rebellion (p. 190). Another Pashtun tribe, the Shinwaris in eastern Afghanistan, had joined the rebellion in November 1928 attacking Jalalabad and burning down the amir’s palace. The unhappy clergy soon gave their blessings to turn the uprising into a religious struggle and branded the amir an “infidel” (p. 190).

Amanullah decided to use the same strategy used in the 1924 rebellion: promising to withdraw radical reforms and seeking to win the *ulema*’s cooperation. However, it was too late and the rebellion had turned violent as the Tajik Kohistanis in the north of the

capital Kabul led by the bandit Habibullah Kalakani had also joined the fight (Barfield, 2010, p. 191). Kalakani, who had won the clergy support, soon arrived at the gates of Kabul. In his final attempt to halt the revolt, the amir offered to suspend all reforms but even this proposal was rejected. In January of 1929, more government troops started to defect to the rebels, which was the final straw for the Amanullah to abdicate in favor of his brother Enayatullah and flee to Kandahar to amass a new army (p. 191).

Within days, Habibullah Kalakani had marched into Kabul claiming victory and forcing the former king's brother Enayatullah also to abdicate. Although the Tajik Kalakani declared himself as the new amir in Kabul, other Pashtun tribes primarily the Shinwaris proclaimed Ali Ahmad as the new amir (p. 191). Back in Kandahar, Amanullah had already withdrawn his abdication and began recruiting troops in Kandahar to take back Kabul from Habibullah Kalakani. The Tajiks did not seek a Pashtun Muhammadzai royal to the throne but instead named an ethnically Tajik bandit as amir, which "sent shockwaves through the political establishment... [Because] not only was he an outsider, he was not even Pashtun" (Barfield, 2010, p. 192).

The deposed king Amanullah was received with little cordiality by the people in Kandahar. However, the frustration of a Tajik on the throne in Kabul, and the tireless efforts of Amanullah's mother to garn support for her son, encouraged him to showcase the cloak of Prophet Mohammad in an Islamic ritual to win over the population (Fletcher, 1965, p. 219). Eventually, the Pashtun Durrani tribesmen gathered a force of five thousands tribal fighters, who together with Amanullah's royal army, marched north to take back Kabul (p. 219). This attempt had the potential to be successful, as more groups including the Hazaras and the Pashtun Wardak ethnic group had joined the fight against

Kalakani. Moreover, Ghulam Nabi Charkhi, Amanullah's former commander in chief, had also raised an army in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, ready to attack Kabul (p. 219).

Then, in a surprise move, Amanullah abandoned his march on Kabul and retreated back to Kandahar. Some argue Amanullah had received rumors of his assassination by his own supporters, while the other notion was that the powerful Ghilzai tribe, through whose land Amanullah's army was passing, were ready to join Kalakani's forces in the fight (Fletcher, 1965, p. 219). Regardless of the reason, Amanullah arrived back at the gates of Kandahar, where his Durrani kinsmen were waiting, thoroughly disgusted with the king. However, Amanullah did not enter the city and left for Italy along with his family and the royal treasury (p. 219).

In mensurating Habibullah Khan regime, dynastic tensions quickly arose over regime transition (0) after Habibullah's sudden death, because the king had not named a successor (Barfield, 2010, p. 180). Nasrullah, the former king's eldest brother, seized the opportunity and proclaimed himself as the new king (180). His nephews, Habibullah Khan's eldest sons, Inayatullah Khan and Hayatullah Khan both swore their allegiance to his uncle as the new king (p. 180). Habibullah Khan's third son, Amanullah Khan on the other hand, rejected his uncle's claims to kingship, and accused him of being a traitor for assassinating his father (p. 180).

Amanullah, who had immediately seized the national treasury and had secured the loyalty of the national army, ordered the arrest of his uncle and his brothers for being complicit (Barfield, 2010, p. 180). Nasrullah, who had been king for only ten days, realized he could not attain his position and immediately abdicated in favor of

Amanullah, but it was too late as Amanullah threw his brothers along with his uncle in jail. While Inayatullah and Hayatullah were soon released and restored to royal status, his uncle later died in prison (p. 180).

Table 5: A. Khan Regime Scores

DV Stability Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Legitimacy	1	1
Regime Transition	0	0
Uprising Frequency	0	0
Power Consolidation	0	0
Regime Failure	0	0
Grand Total		1

Thus, in accordance with the tradition of royal inheritance, Amanullah claimed the kingship as the legitimate (*I*) heir to the throne (Fletcher, 1965, p. 186). Having gained Afghanistan's independence, Amanullah had become extremely popular with the public. The enthusiastic amir soon began pushing his domestic goal of modernizing Afghanistan by launching various domestic socio-economic, political and religious reforms (p. 195). The reforms became controversial and were perceived as radical in a traditionally tribal country and backfired as various Pashtun tribes across eastern Afghanistan began uprisings (*0*) in response to them (p. 195). Although Amanullah had intended to be king for life (*0*), the uprisings through his rule eventually drove him to exile and his regime was collapsed (*0*) by a Tajik rebel on January 14, 1929 (Barfield, 2010, p. 218).

Moreover, Amanullah was the absolute head (*0*) of the state and maintained the title of *Padsha* (king) (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 109). However, the constitution he had adopted brought new administrative changes to the system ensuring equal political

representation (*I*) of all groups (p. 109). It created a cabinet, a partially elected consultative body, gave women's equal rights, created an independent judicial system, and greatly reduced the previous power of tribal chiefs and religious ulema (p. 110).

Table 6: A. Khan Regime Scores

IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Leader	0	0
Army Head	1	1
Government Positions	1	1
Political Representation	1	1
Political Opposition	1	1
Grand Total		4

Amanullah also allowed government positions (*I*) to be open to all allowing the intellectual and his adviser Mahmud Tarzi to form a cabinet of ministers, with a Prime Minister position (Dupree, 1973, p. 442). Moreover, Amanullah's regime appointed Mohammad Nadir Khan as his commander-in-chief of the national army (*I*), which was filled on merit (p. 445). In addition, he had appointed an ethnic Tajik Mohammad Wali Khan as his top diplomatic adviser (p. 445). And lastly, political dissent was allowed to a greater degree (*I*) during Amanullah's regime, from holding various Loya Jirgas to establishing the first independent newspaper, the *Seraj-ul-Akhabr* (p. 439).

Habibullah Kalakani, 1929

Habibullah Kalakani, known as *Bacha-i-Saqao* (“child of the water carrier,”) after his father’s occupation, was an ethnically Tajik bandit infamous for his illegal activities and trouble with the law (Fletcher, 1965, p. 217). He had been sentenced to jail for attacking an officer in Kabul, where he later escaped to Peshawar and opened a shadow teahouse for smuggling. Saqao returned to Afghanistan in 1928 and began recruiting a band of robbers, attacking caravans along the Hindu Kush routes (p. 217). For a brief period, Saqao enlisted in the army during Amanullah’s public call for tribal aid and free pardon, and “was given rifles and a general’s admission in the Afghan army” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 217 Fletcher).

After seeing the weak and defenseless state of the capital Kabul firsthand, he abandoned his position and went to Kohistan, where he gathered a band of 300 robbers and launched a surprise attack on the city. Although this was a relatively small attack, “the audacity of the move was such that only a swift action by Abdul Aziz, the minister of war, and a determined stand by the cadets of the military school, kept it from succeeding” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 217). Saqao, however, was forced to retreat back to Kohistan after twelve days of fighting in this initial attack. Amanullah’s forces followed him into the snowy mountainous region of Kohistan, where thousands of Kohistanis flocked to join their local hero in the fighting (Fletcher, 1965, p. 217). Outnumbered, the army was forced to surrender, leaving Kabul undefended. On January 14, 1929, Saqao launched a second attack on Kabul, where Amanullah had barricaded himself in the royal palace (p. 218). After a few days of fighting, Saqao entered the royal palace on January 27 and captured *Arg*.

Declaring himself amir, Saqao began forming a government, which was a difficult task to do since Amanullah Khan had taken the entire royal treasury with him (Barfield, 2010, p. 218). Hence, Saqao began extracting a large sum from citizens and merchants of Kabul through the use of threats and torture (p. 218). Aside from facing problems funding the national treasury, Saqao had to sort out the transfer of authority as the new amir. Although it is difficult to comprehend how a bandit could control the entire country and establish a bureaucracy, Afghanistan at the time was virtually an agricultural pastoral country (Fletcher, 1965, p. 218). Therefore, the local governments at the provincial level were least impacted by a change in central government in Kabul and "...simply continued to carry out instructions from Kabul, without regard to who issued them" (Fletcher, 1965, p. 218).

Moreover, "Some of Amanullah's aids, especially those in what remained of the Afghan army, agreed to serve Saqao in return for lavish financial rewards and the promise of future favors. But the civil government was so depleted that only two of the Saqao's cabinet were able to read; the bandit Amir himself was totally illiterate" (Fletcher, 1965, p. 218). Saqao also began raising an army of ten thousand men in Kabul, mostly recruited from his hometown Kohistan by paying them "with money extorted from Kabul merchants and equipped with the stores in the government arsenal" (Fletcher, 1965, p. 219). He was quick to eliminate all other Pashtun royal rivals to the throne by executing Amanullah Khan's half-brothers Hayatullah Khan, Abdul Majid Khan as well as Amanullah's cousin Ali Ahmed Jan, who was captured when organizing a resistance movement in Kandahar (p. 219).

Moreover, “The authority of the bandit amir was mostly an illusion” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 219). His becoming amir was only possible “...because the region was so decentralized, and the cities were so few and scattered, that an individual even with the Saqao’s drive and courage was able to seize control of Kabul and Kandahar, and by the use of extorted funds recruited an army of assorted malefactors eager for loot and excitement” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 219). But in reality, “There was little to enable Saqao to consolidate his rule. He had no standing whatsoever among the Pushtoon tribes, which up to this time had taken no part in the fighting but waited aloof for the inevitable agents of the Saqao’s downfall to do their work” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 220)

Saqao’s regime was mostly reactionary, as he immediately eliminated all of Amanullah Khan’s reforms. Although Saqao was a skilled fighter, he proved to be a “poor ruler leaving Kabul in chaos during his nine month reign” (Barfield, 2010, p. 192). The Tajik born amir was successful staying in power briefly because of his monopoly on dividing “the Pashtun tribes for a surprisingly long time, keeping them at odds with one another by appealing to their local mullahs (who approved of his reactionary policies) as well as playing on a traditional animosities between Ghilzais and Durrani” (Barfield, 2010, p. 192). In Afghanistan’s history, the emperors and kings had come from the Pashtun Durrani Empire “for so long that even the most powerful regional and tribal leaders could not conceive of it being otherwise” (Barfield, 2010, p. 193). Although many had resented Amanullah’s progressive policies, recognizing a Tajik amir from the bottom of the Afghan ethnic groups was such a ‘radical break’ from the past regimes that the sight of unveiled women walking in public in Kabul was less controversial by comparison (p. 193).

In fact, Saqao was able to become amir easily because the rebels around the country were mostly concerned with toppling Amanullah at any cost and had not “agreed” on who should become the new ruler (Barfield, 2010, p. 193). Considering an amir from any other group than a Pashtun ethnicity had never been an issue in Afghan politics. Thus a Tajik amir’s presence in Kabul briefly altered the ethnic dynamic of the Afghan political culture. In the past, “regional faction leaders invariably aligned themselves with some member of the royal line who used their support to establish his own authority” (Barfield, 2010, p. 193). For example, Dost Muhammad’s son Akbar was able to assume leadership of the resistance against the British in the Anglo-Afghan wars and helped his father to the amirship. Abdur Rahman Khan had similarly been recognized by both the British government and the Afghan resistance movements allowing him to become amir. Although Amanullah Khan had many tribal critics, none of them saw themselves as rulers, and he too was able to become amir (p. 193).

Saqao’s support, however, primarily came from his own Tajik clan, the Kohistanis, who were alienated by Amanullah. The Pashtun tribes, including the Pashtun Shinwaris, rejected a Tajik ruler and threw their support behind Ali Ahmad as the new amir. Ali Ahmad had been the same “general that Amanullah Khan had sent to suppress the Shinwari’s when they had rebelled against Amanullah’s reforms. Ali Ahmad, who came from the Pashtun Qandahari Loinab sardars, was a member of the old elite and therefore an outsider himself (Barfield, 2010, p. 193). Soon Ali Ahmad and the Shinwari's launched an attack on Saqao’s forces to remove him from the throne in Kabul but this attack failed, and hence Ali Ahmad had squandered his chance of becoming amir

(p. 193). Ali Ahmad escaped to Qandahar but was captured and returned to Saqao who brutally executed him by blowing him out of a cannon (p. 193).

After this failed attempt to oust Saqao and the collapse of Ali Ahmad's army, the eastern Pashtun tribes began reconsidering their opposition to Amanullah Khan (Barfield, 2010, p. 193). Amanullah Khan too was ready to drop all previous reforms and negotiate a new deal with the tribal and religious leaders (p. 193). Many of the eastern Pashtun tribes, who feared that Saqao could consolidate and strengthen his hold on power in the long term, joined with their 'brothers' in the south to expand their support base and remove Saqao. In other words, "They pledged to restore to the throne the very amir that they had only a few months earlier declared an infidel and driven from office" (Barfield, 2010, p. 194). Afghan politics are known for side switching, hence both parties ignored their past rivalries so they could collectively face a common enemy.

Back in Qandahar, Amanullah had been rallying the influential Pashtun Durrani group to win back his throne. Amanullah had been running a shadow political campaign against Saqao by appealing to the Pashtun chauvinism "insisting that such a proud people could never accept a Tajik bandit as their amir" (Barfield, 2010, p. 194). Moreover, the former amir also spread rumors that the British had installed Saqao as their agent but "as much as the British disliked Amanullah, the uprising against him was of his own making and none of their doing" (Barfield, 2010, p. 194). However, they also did not support him in taking back power either. Declaring a 'policy of neutrality' the British neither acknowledged Saqao's regime nor allowed Amanullah Khan access to ship weapons held in India (p. 194).

Despite this setback, Amanullah's position improved when his former minister of defense Nadir Khan and his brothers returned from France in February of 1929. Nadir, who had "strong ties with the tribes," soon took the lead in organizing the tribes to overthrow Saqao (Barfield, 2010, p. 194). Although some were worried that Nadir Khan intended to make himself as the new amir, he did not give this impression and played his hand subtly by positioning "himself as an enemy of [Saqao] allied with Amanullah without ever making it clear whether or not he supported Amanullah's restoration" (Barfield, 2010, p. 194). However, in May of 1929, Amanullah's effort to restore himself as the amir failed after his army was attacked on their march from Qandahar to Kabul by the Pashtun Ghilzai's near Ghazni province (p. 194). Meanwhile Saqao had made an alliance with the Pashtun Mujadaddi family, a rival of Amanullah Khan, and began attacking their traditional enemy the Pashtun Durrani rivals (p. 194).

The leader of the Mujadaddi family, Omar Fazl had gained the support of the Pashtun Ghilzai's under the notion that Nadir Khan, who was closely communicating with Fazl, would become amir. Hence, "Faced with continued attacks by both Saqao's troops and the Ghilzai's, and having received word that Herat had fallen to Saqao's forces too, Amanullah soon took Nadir's advice that he should leave Afghanistan for exile in Europe" (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). Nadir Khan now became the sole leader of the fighting and a Pashtun champion to remove a Tajik ruler (p. 195). In order to legitimize his position as amir further, Nadir Khan called for a Loya Jirga of tribal elders to challenge his Tajik counterpart to be legitimate ruler of the country, a "contest the Tajik would surely lose" (Barfield, 2010, p. 195)

Although Nadir along with his brothers attacked Kabul four times in the summer of 1929, they failed to remove Saqao. Moreover, the Pashtun tribes had become fragmented either because of the absence of Amanullah Khan or perhaps because of it (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). On the other hand, Nadir was running out of money to support the army's campaigns and in the absence of an amir, the tribes were enjoying the power vacuum left by a central government (p. 195). Finally, the tide turned in favor of Nadir when his brother Shah Wali Khan amassed a "tribal lashkar of twelve thousand Wazir [i.e. Pashtun] tribesmen from the British side of the frontier...who took Kabul on October 13 [1929]" (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). The Waziri fighters, "In the absence of pay...looted the city before returning home" (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). And as was expected at the end of the conflict, Saqao "was hanged, along with around a dozen of his followers" (Barfield, 2010, p. 195).

Saqao's defeat raised the question of who should become Afghanistan's next amir. Nadir Khan withheld from automatically claiming the throne and recommended that a Loya Jirga pick the new amir (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). According to his brother, Nadir Khan's "position was that once the evil had ended, Afghans should choose their monarch in the time-honored way," and "he disclaimed any interest in the job himself" (Barfield, 2010, 195). However, the Jirga "rejected Amanullah's restoration and enthusiastically chose Nadir to replace him—a decision particularly welcomed by the armed tribesmen still on the streets of Kabul who refused to leave until he took the kingship" (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). And the new amir accepted the position saying, "Since the people so designate me so, I accept. I will not be the king but the servant of the tribes and the country" (Barfield, 2010, p. 195).

In mensurating Bacha Saqao’s regime, he came to power in one of the most violent transition (0) of powers in Afghanistan’s history by overthrowing Amanullah Khan’s regime in a bloody civil war (Dupree, 1973, p. 452). The bandit, who wanted to take the throne, had recruited fighters in his homeland Kohistan and had launched various attacks on Kabul during the final few months of Amanullah’s regime (Dupree, 1973, p. 452). Saqao was also able to draw support around the country from the conservative religious ulema to fight against Amanullah, who had angered the clergy with his controversial social reforms (Dupree, 1973, p. 454).

After assuming the throne in Kabul, Saqao soon assumed the titles of Ghazi (“holy warrior”) as well *Khadim-i-din-i-rasululah* (“Servant of the Prophet’s Religious”) (Dupree, 1973, p. 458). Saqqao’s regime lacked legitimacy (0) because he was a self-declared amir who had taken power by overthrowing the sitting king and killing all his challengers (Barfield, 2010, p. 191).

Table 7: H. Kalakani Regime Scores

DV Stability Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Legitimacy	0	0
Regime Transition	0	0
Uprising Frequency	0	0
Power Consolidation	0	0
Regime Failure	0	0
Grand Total		0

Moreover, the throne was up for debate as the Pashtun Shinwaris, who had also been fighting against Amanullah, had proclaimed Ali Ahmad as their amir (Barfield, 2010, p. 191). Saqao was ‘only’ able to become amir because those who were fighting to against Amanullah’s regime had not decided on who should replace him as the new king

(Barfield, 2010, p. 193). Ali Ahmad’s claim to the throne however ended when he was captured by Saqao’s men and “executed by being blown out of a cannon” (Barfield, 2010, p. 193).

Although Saqao’s rule was short, he continuously faced uprisings (0) against his regime. The Pashtuns, who had become united against a Tajik ruler, branded the bandit-amir as an agent of the British and vowed to overthrow him (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). Saqao had intended to rule Afghanistan as the new amir (0) but his regime’s only lasted 9 months before Nadir Khan and his brothers overthrow it (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). His downfall (0), however, was inevitable because all odds were against him as a Tajik ruler. Before Saqao, there had never been a Tajik ruler as all kings had come from the Pashtun tribes (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). When Nadir Khan gathered a *Loya Jirga* of prominent Pashtun tribal leaders after taking the lead role in fighting against the Tajik ruler, the Jirga quickly branded Saqao a “tyrant”, thereby delegitimizing him as a ruler (Barfield, 2010, p. 195).

Table 8: H. Kalakani Regime Scores

IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Leader	0	0
Army Head	0	0
Government Positions	0	0
Political Representation	0	0
Political Opposition	0	0
Grand Total		0

Saqao was an absolute head of the state (0) whose regime’s was dominated (0) by only his ‘friends’ and ‘relatives’ (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 113). His colleagues considered the capital Kabul as an “enemy” city where they killed off those loyal to

Amanullah Khan and extorted money from residents to fund the government (p. 113). Saqao's regime was mostly 'reactionary,' canceling all of Amanullah Khan's reforms gave the clergy power back (p. 113). He did not have an organized army (0) but irregular forces who were primarily recruited from his hometown Kohistan (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 22).

Political representation (0) was not something Saqao was concerned with since most of his administration was made of former bandits who ruled Kabul in chaos during his nine months in power (Barfield, 2010, p. 192). Moreover, he had divided the Pashtun tribes by playing on their animosities and keeping them at odds with each other (Barfield, 2010, p. 192). Saqao similarly did not allow any opposition (0) to his rule and would either buy 'influence' or simply eliminate anyone that opposed him, including all his rivals such as Ali Ahmad and Amanullah Khan's two eldest brothers (Barfield, 2010, p. 192).

Nadir Khan, 1929-1933

Nadir Khan's appointment as king was the beginning of a dynastic change that brought the Muhasiban family to power. Nadir Khan soon assumed the title of *shah* ("king") as a symbolic move to distant himself from Amanullah Khan (Barfield, 2010, p. 195). Although Nadir Shah was elected by a Loya Jirga representing the people, Amanullah's followers claimed that Nadir had no right to be the legitimate king and that the Loya Jirga was too small to elect the new amir (p. 197). However, the succession debate ended when the British recognized Nadir's regime in November 1929 and provided him with money to "stabilize his government" while the new king reiterated his support for all the existing treaties between the two nations (Barfield, 2010, p. 197).

However, Amanullah's followers were not ready to quit the fight for the amirship and in 1930, the Pashtun Shinwaris and the Tajik Kohistanis led separate revolts against the new king in the eastern tribal belt and northern regions. Nadir was quick to react and called on his border Pashtun tribes to help put down the revolt and "executed and imprisoned" many Amanullah supporters (Barfield, 2010, p. 197). By September 1931, Nadir had successfully put down any revolts or uprising against his regime and had called another larger Loya Jirga consisting of 510 members, "who approved an official declaration of deposition (*khal*) that formally abrogated the rights of Amanullah and his heirs on the grounds that he had violated sharia law" (Barfield, 2010, p. 197). Although a last major revolt led by Saqao's uncle in the Kohistan region broke out in July 1931, it was easily put down with the help of the tribes (p. 228).

The new king Nadir Shah was a cautious ruler who put the country's progress and stability as his top policies (Fletcher, 1965, p. 222). Nadir sought a middle ground policy

when dealing with sensitive religious laws and traditions. For instance, although he ordered that the *purdah* (“seclusion of women”) to be reinstated, he simultaneously reopened girls’ schools that Saqao had closed (p. 226). Moreover, in order to satisfy the religious zealots, he restored big government pensions to various influential mullahs including Mohammad Siddiq, the Hazrat of Shor-Bazaar, who had played a major role in bringing down Amanullah Khan’s regime earlier (p. 227). Nadir Shah began his rule in close consultation with his four brothers, and while there were differences among the royals when arriving at government decisions, they usually presented a united front publically (Fletcher, 1965, p. 228).

Nadir continued forming a permanent government by announcing a new constitution on October 31, 1931 largely based on Amanullah Khan’s 1923 constitution framework (Fletcher, 1965, p. 228). According to the new constitution, the throne became hereditary in Nadir Shah’s family and a new cabinet, senate and house were established (p. 228). The cabinet, which consisted of eighteen departments, included the position of prime minister, presidents for the house and senate, the directors of mines and agriculture, ministers of war, state, foreign affairs, interior, justice, education, health, finance, commerce and post (p. 228). The constitution however gave the king the power of the “head of the executive, legislative and judicial departments, made him commander in chief of the armed forces, and proclaimed the inviolability of his person” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 229).

In fact, “The major contradiction in the 1931 Constitution was that, although the government was declared to be responsible to the Parliament, members of the Parliament had to swear loyalty to the government” (Dupree, 1973, p. 463). Moreover, Nadir had the

power to declare war, appoint the prime minister, approve all officials and make emergency laws. The constitution, based on various sources such as Turkish, Iranian and French constitutions, was a ‘hodgepodge’ of contradictions (Dupree, 1973, p. 464). It tried to combine western thoughts with local Afghan traditions and customs along with *Sharia Law* (p. 464). Although the constitution did prescribe authority to the institutions it created, in reality, real power stayed with the royal family. The government was never fully able to implement its constitutional duties and even though Nadir’s reign is often described as a constitutional monarchy, it was merely an oligarchy (p. 464).

In short, the 1931 Constitution had “...created a façade of parliamentary government while leaving control in the hands of the royal family, kept the judiciary primarily under the religious leaders, created a semi-socialist economic framework with the principle of free enterprise accepted and guaranteed theoretical individual equality” (Dupree, 1973, p. 471). These powers effectively crippled the legislature body and therefore the government was merely an oligarchy where power was concentrated with the elite Pashtun Mohammadzai family (Fetcher, 1965, p. 229). Local governments also did not change during Nadir’s reign. The country was divided into five major provinces (*Wilayats*) and four smaller provinces (*Hakumat-i-Ala*). Governors or *Walis* (also referred to as *Hakumat Naibs*) were head of the provincial governments appointed by the central government (p. 229). However, power was shared between police chiefs and civilian heads of the government and in some parts such as the southern and eastern provinces, police only had basic authority.

Although Nadir implemented various economic development plans to modernize Afghanistan, many Afghans still resented him. The king launched various plans to

modernize the largely pastoral and agricultural Afghan economy by building the first National Bank and introducing a new currency (Fletcher, 1965, p. 230). Moreover, Nadir's most significant act was establishing proper transportation and communication channels by building highways and connecting large provinces (p. 230). Even though these were monumental steps towards progress, Nadir's reign remained unpopular with Afghans, many of whom believed that Nadir and his family's claim to the throne were not valid. Moreover, Nadir was less popular with the younger generation who had preferred the progressive Amanullah Khan (Fletcher, 1965, p. 230). And although Nadir was publicly accused of being a British agent, he was in fact an 'Anglophobe,' a member of the "war party" that launched the third Anglo-Afghan War in 1919 and became the hero of that war (p. 232).

Tribal turbulences also increased during Nadir's reign from 1930 to 1933 as the border Pashtun Mohmand and Afridi tribes began launching more raids in the eastern parts of the country. In 1931, a tribe was able to capture a city in Peshawar on the border briefly before the Indian Army was able to oust them. While the tensions between the British and the border tribes increased, tribal leaders pleaded to Nadir to intervene but they were uncharacteristically advised to "make their peace with the British" (Fletcher, 1965, p. 232). This was a major break away from previous Afghan amirs who would negotiate with the British on behalf of all the Pashtun border tribes. While many Afghans saw this as more evidence that Nadir was a British client, the king was simply being careful of provoking the British who he feared could arrange to overthrow his monarchy (p. 232). Nevertheless, Nadir's neglect of the eastern tribes had caused great resentment among Afghans.

The resentment took physical form when in June 1933 Mohammed Aziz Khan, the oldest of the Pashtun Mohammadzai brothers serving as the Afghan ambassador in the Afghan embassy in Berlin, Germany was shot dead by a graduate Afghan student. The student assassin, Kemal Syed, who had come to Germany for advanced studies, “gave his reason [as] the betrayal of the eastern [i.e. Pashtun] tribes by the Mohammedzais” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 233). Not long after, another similar incident occurred when a student entered the British Embassy in Kabul to assassinate the British ambassador but was stopped after killing two high level clerks. The increase in these incidents was a sign of public frustration and resentment towards the government. Eventually on November 8, 1933 another student by the name of Mohammad Khaliq approached king Nadir himself during a royal soccer game celebration in the palace, and shot him dead (p. 233).

All three student assassins were coincidentally from the same German-staffed *Nijat College*, which led to rumors that the murders were plotted at the school; however, in reality assassinating the king was more likely motivated by a personal grievance (Fletcher, 1965, p. 233). Just prior to his assassination, Nadir had accused General Ghulam Nabi Charkhi of being complicit in aiding a brief revolt by the Pashtun *Dari Khel Ghilzai* tribes. Ghulam Nabi, who was the son of Ghulam Hyder Charkhi Abdur Rahman’s commander in chief and an Amanullah Khan supporter, had rejected the accusations and verbally abused the king in his palace. Nadir, who also had a short temper, had ordered the execution of Ghulam Nabi on the spot (p. 234). The student assassin Mohammad Khaliq, who had shot down Nadir was the adopted son of Ghulam

Nabi, and was therefore, likely motivated by revenge for the killing of his adoptive father (p. 234).

Despite the resentment, Nadir's reign was relatively stable because the main goal of the Pashtun Muhasiban family was domestic stability for the country (Barfield, 2010, p. 198). A highly powerful family, the Muhasiban would rule Afghanistan for the next 50 years with Nadir's son Zahir Shah succeeding him immediately after his death (p. 198). Unlike Amanullah Khan's attempts, the Muhasiban's long-term vision was to introduce social change and modernize gradually, implementing it in Kabul first and then expanding it to the rural areas. The Muhasiban however were not able to create a strong, centralized government like the Iron Amir and realized that the greatest threat to their rule was a perceived alliance between the "disaffected rural population and the conservative Islamic establishment, but over time its own policies made these groups ever more marginal and less politically significant" (Barfield, 2010, p. 198).

Essentially, the Muhasiban family's journey to becoming a powerful royal family began with Nadir and his four brothers, who had accompanied him on his return from France and were detrimental in appointing him as king. Nadir had repaid by appointing all of them to high and powerful government posts, naming "Hashim Khan as premier, Shah Wali Khan as the minister of war and commander-in-chief, and Shah Mahmud as the minister of interior" (Barfield, 2010, p. 199). Although Nadir's son Zahir Shah became king at 19 after his father's death, real power rested with his uncle Hashim Khan from 1933 until 1946 (p. 199).

In mensurating Nadir Shah's regime, his accession to power and his subsequent transition (0) were violent and bloody. Nadir had raised an army of tribal fighters along

with his brothers and fought for several months before they recaptured Kabul from Bacha Saqao on October 10, 1929 (Dupree, 1973, p. 459). After successfully overthrowing Bacha Saqao and recapturing Kabul, Nadir initially refused to proclaim himself as the new king but later accepted on the insistence of the tribal army and the jirga (Dupree, 1973, p. 459). Nadir's ascendance to the throne, however, had infuriated Amanullah Khan's supporters, who hoped to put the deposed king back on the throne (Dupree, 1973, p. 460). However, the dispute over the right to kingship ended when Nadir called a *Loya Jirga* that legitimized him (1) as the new king in September 1930 (Dupree, 1973, p. 460).

In his five-year reign as king, Nadir faced a few major uprisings (0) early on from the Pashtun tribes such as Shinwaris, Ghilzais and the Tajiks in the Kohistan region (Dupree, 1973, p. 460). The Shinwaris revolt began with the quest to restore Amanullah Khan to the throne and protest tax increases, but Nadir cleverly bought off their *khans* ending their revolts (Dupree, 1973, p. 460). The fight against the Tajiks in Kohistan was brutal however, and Nadir had to call on his ally border Pashtun tribes once again to help put down that revolt (p. 460).

Table 9: N. Khan Regime Scores

DV Stability Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Legitimacy	1	1
Regime Transition	0	0
Uprising Frequency	0	0
Power Consolidation	0	0
Regime Failure	1	1
Grand Total		2

Nadir Shah made an early example by brutally putting down the Tajik Kohistani revolt and killing the leader, and from then on, did not face any other revolt until his

death in 1933 (p. 460). Nadir and his brothers had intended to stay in power for years to come (0) as they began pacifying Afghanistan and subjugating the tribes (p. 461).

Although a student assassinated king Nadir on November 8, 1933 in a public ceremony, his regime, however, did not collapse (1) and his son immediately inherited kingship (p. 475).

Moreover, Nadir was the absolute head of state (0) who made sure executive power stayed within the royal family by appointing his brothers to key government positions (0) in his cabinet (Barfield, 2010, p. 199). Hashim Khan was appointed as the Prime Minister, Shah Mahmud as Minister of Interior, and Shah Wali Khan as the Commander-in-Chief (1) of the army (Barfield, 2010, p. 199). However, popular political representation (1) increased under Nadir’s reign after allowing the adoption of a new constitution (Dupree, 1973, p. 463).

Table 10: N. Khan Regime Scores

IV Ethnic Inclusion	Scores	Total
Regime Leader	0	0
Army Head	1	1
Government Positions	0	0
Political Representation	1	1
Political Opposition	0	0
Grand Total		2

The same Loya Jirga that had proclaimed him king, adopted a new Constitution in 1931, which created a bicameral Parliament, albeit with the king’s approval, and a 105-body National Council to advise the king (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 115).

However, there was no indication in the constitution that would prevent the royal family from “ruling at its own discretion” (Wahab & Youngerman, p. 115). The members to the new Parliament were partly elected and partially appointed by the king (p. 115).

Although in theory the government was responsible to the Parliament, in reality the latter simply ‘rubber-stamped’ the king’s decisions and its members had to swear loyalty to the king (Dupree, 1973, p. 463). Moreover, Nadir Shah had also greatly restricted liberal free speech and political dissent (0), which resulted in “thousands of Afghan intellectuals were imprisoned or killed” (Runion, 2007, p. 93). Despite the 1931 constitution giving various institutions and government administrations authority in Nadir’s regime, real power stayed with the king and his royal family, who had essentially created an ‘oligarchy’ (Dupree, 1973, p. 464).

Zahir Shah, 1933—1973

After Nadir Shah's death, the three remaining Muhasiban brothers shared power among each other. Mohammad Hashim Khan, who had the highest authority, became the Prime Minister from 1933 until 1946 (Fletcher, 1965, p. 234). Shah Wali Khan, who was known as the *Fateh-i-Kabul* ("Conqueror of Kabul") after capturing the capital from Bacha Saqao, accepted a much lesser role as the ambassador to England and France from 1930 until 1947 (Dupree, 1973, p. 447). Contrary to previous dynastic regime changes, none of Nadir's three brothers made a 'personal bid' for the throne and instead promptly proclaimed the designated heir Nadir Shah's 19-year old son Zahir Shah as the new king (Fletcher, 1965, p. 234). This internal unity among the Pashtun Muhasiban family, who were considered an outsider clan when Nadir Shah became king, was fundamental in helping maintain the royal throne in the family as well as ensuring a peaceful transition of power in the country (p. 234).

The new king Zahir Shah had been groomed for kingship from an early age. After graduating from the military school in Kabul, he was appointed as the minister of war and education at the age of 18 (Fletcher, 1965, p. 235). However, because of his inexperience in politics and young age, he remained only in the background for twenty-two years while his uncle Hashim Khan run the government until 1946 (p. 235). During his tenure Hashim was largely able to maintain the internal stability Nadir Shah had brought to Afghanistan, but his regime was tested with a few major revolts (p. 235). However, most political challenges during this time were related to foreign policy.

Internally, the Afghan government's most persistent problem during Hashim's tenure was putting down a border Pashtun Afridi tribe's rebellion against the British

(Fletcher, 1965, p. 238). The Afghan government had been caught in the middle of the Pashtun border tribes *Madda Khel* and *Tori Khel* deadly fight against the British, but it eventually ended in a truce (p. 238). In 1939, other fresh fighting began when a Syrian relative of former Queen Soriya called Shami Pir (“Syrian saint”) vowed to restore ex-king Amanullah Khan back to the throne (p. 239). However, the British soon convinced him to abandon his conquest in exchange for twenty thousand pounds. Some argue that Shami Pir was a British plot to put pressure on the Afghan government as a response to German presence in Afghanistan, but there is no evidence to support this theory (p. 239).

Eventually Hashim, who had steered Afghanistan into stability for 13 years, stepped down as prime minister in 1946 due to poor health, with the youngest Muhasiban brother, Shah Mahmud, replacing him (Fletcher, 1965, p. 242). Shah Mahmud, who quickly gained popularity for being a progressive and liberal-minded Prime Minister, opened up the political system and brought democratic changes. However, Zahir, who was now 32 and had been mostly a ceremonial king until now, began taking an active role in the Afghan politics.

His first official state policy was to release many political prisoners including members of the Ghulam Charkhi family as well as the students imprisoned for the attacks on the British embassy in 1933 (Fletcher, 1965, p. 244). Other significant changes during Shah Mahmud’s tenure as Prime Minister was allowing relatively free elections and the creation of a new democratic Parliament 1949 (Dupree, 1973, p. 495). This liberal experiment grew rapidly and the new Parliament began holding the government accountable by regularly calling ministers to the chamber for questioning. The “Duties

and Rights of Ministers” clause gave the cabinet ministers unlimited power while relieving the king of any ministerial duties (p. 495).

Soon the new liberal parliament passed laws to allow freedom of the press, which led to the creation of several newspapers. The three major ones, *Watan* (“Homeland”), *Angar* (“Burning Embers”), and *Nida-ye-Khalq* (“Voice of the People”) were all opposed to the monarchy and began criticizing its policies openly (Dupree, 1973, p. 495). The public soon caught up and letters to the editors began pouring while “religious leaders and their supporters received the brunt of the attacks in the free press” (p. 495). The editors consistently called on the government to hold ‘genuinely free elections’ and that the “government should be responsible to Parliament” (p. 495). Moreover, a new *National Democratic Party* was founded whose members were also staunchly against Zahir’s monarchy. The government responded quickly to these developments by arresting protesters and banning the three newspapers that published from 1951 until 1952 (p. 495).

However, the monarchy could not totally cease the rise of the new democratic movement. The new Parliament had inspired a group of 30 students in Kabul University to form a student union that continued the criticism against the government (Dupree, 1973, p. 296). While they were ignored initially, the group grew in size and influence quickly, and fearing that it would hurt the status quo, the government formed a pro-government political party in response. But this failed and even government employees, who were encouraged to join the party, showed little to no interest (p. 496). The government crackdown on liberal groups also forced another prominent ‘political brotherhood’ the *Wikh-i-Zulmaiyan* (“Awakened Youth”) movement. But opposition and

attacks in the press continued against the government and “More and more pieces pointed to religious fanaticism as the major institution holding back Afghan progress” (Dupree, 1973, p. 496).

Eventually the government grew desperate and ordered the army to dissolve the student union, forcing its members to escape to Pakistan (Dupree, 1973, p. 497). Moreover, it began cracking down on all “liberal” movements by closing down all non-government newspapers and arresting over twenty-five political liberal leaders including the leaders of the *Wikh-i-Zulmaiyan* political organization. While jails began filling with liberal dissidents, only those who agreed to stop taking part in anti-government movements were later released. In short, the experiment in the so-called ‘liberal parliament’, which had begun in 1949, had failed by 1952 (Dupree, 1973, p. 497)

In September 1953, there was another internal change of leadership in the Muhasiban family. A radio announcement declared that Prime Minister Shah Mahmud, who had held the position for ten years, had resigned due to health reasons and Daud Khan had replaced him as the new Prime Minister (Fletcher, 1965, p. 259). Shah Mahmud, who was the last of the Muhasiban brothers, had restored the long-term stability in his time as prime minister. Although Shah Mahmud was liberal and in favor of progress, he had been cautious and pursued thinly veiled conservative policies. And even though Shah Mahmud’s tenure had been one of stability and peace, economic progress was slow and people had become increasingly frustrated with the government (p. 259).

When Daud Khan took over his new position, he had the support of the foreign minister, his brother Mohammad Naim as well as his cousin and the king, Zahir Shah.

Although the transition of power had been peaceful, the shift in leadership went from Mahmud Shah's semi liberal policies to Daud's aggressively progressive ones (Fletcher, 1965, p. 259). Shah Mahmud's supporters were not convinced of his health as the reason for his resignation since he had been in good health at the time of his stepping down (p. 259). And even though the concerned supporters were few in numbers, they resented the new administration and a quiet revolution had begun to take place (p. 260).

Daud however was fully committed to his new position. He had been successful as the acting defense minister in helping put down the 1949 Pashtun *Safi* tribe revolt (Dupree, 1973, p. 260). Having the support of the king and his brother, this new royal trio now controlled Afghan political affairs. For much of the 1950s, Daud was at the helm of Afghan political scene. He had become extremely popular with people, especially the progressive elites. However, Zahir was becoming wary of his cousin's popularity and consolidation of power. Moreover, Zahir had been intending to take a serious role in running the country with the resignation of Shah Mahmud in 1953 (p. 277).

Although Daud was appointed as prime minister, most Afghans knew that the government "was in reality an oligarchy with power at the hands of the royal family" (p. 278). Hence, it lacked a broad power base and many Afghans continued to resent it and its Western mentality. Daud was suddenly coerced into resigning as prime minister in March 1963 (p. 278). Daud had accomplished a great deal in a short period of time, from giving women freedoms to bringing stability and progress. However, the conservative clergy fiercely disliked him for his policies and for being a member of the royal family. His personal goal for an independent Pushtonistan had ended with the break-off of diplomatic relations with Pakistan, one that almost brought both countries to the brink of

war. In his farewell speech, he lobbied for a more open and democratic government suggesting the “separation of its executive, legislative and judicial power” (Fletcher, 1965, p. 279).

Zahir welcomed these suggestions and appointed a committee to prepare a new constitution. Daud Khan’s resignation had brought enthusiasm for more openness and a new constitutional period. Zahir had seen peoples’ drive for full democracy and was determined to begin implementing a transition to a full constitutional monarchy by separating the executive branch of government from the royal family (Dupree, 1973, p. 561). The newly appointed Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Yusuf was given full authority to appoint a new interim cabinet. No one with royal background was eligible to be elected in the *Cabinet of Ministers* while only four of the total twelve members were appointed from the Pashtun Durrani tribe. Moreover, for the first in decades, two non-Pashtun members were also elected to high-level government positions (p. 561). However, these changes in the government fell short of a complete regime change as Zahir still maintained the power to confirm the new cabinet.

Nonetheless, Prime Minister Dr. Yusuf delivered his first speech emphasizing on more constitutional reforms “and a more representative government” (Dupree, 1973, p. 562). The atmosphere around the country was positive and people expected many changes overnight but the centuries of stagnation in the country soon led to frustrations (p. 563). Realizing this discontent, the new government soon put together a committee to draft a new liberal constitution by February 1964. A 29-member advisory committee comprising of all major ethnic groups, liberals and conservative clerics as well as royal family members reviewed the draft constitution before it went to a vote for adoption in a

Loya Jirga (p. 566). The government, however, still maintained tight control over the process as well as all the media that reported on the proceedings of the new constitution. Because only around 25 percent Afghans were literate at the time, radio broadcasts were “more important than newspapers and magazine in reaching the masses” (Dupree, 1973, p. 567).

Zahir convened a Loya Jirga consisting of 452 members that would ratify the new Constitution, which included members of the National Assembly, the Senate, the Cabinet, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Committee, and members selected from all provinces to participate. However, the government did maintain strong influence over elections in the provincial elections and conveniently screened out any ‘anti-government’ candidates (Dupree, 1973, p. 568). Essentially only 176 of the total 452 members of the Loya Jirga were elected in free elections while the remaining came from the above governmental bodies (p. 569). The Jirga began its session and opened the debate on the 128-articles of the new constitution. The Jirga hall was full of all the ethnicities that had come from all corners of Afghanistan including Pashtuns, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Baluch, and Nuristanis among others (p. 569). After 11 days of intense arguing and deliberations, the Jirga eventually passed the new Constitution on September 19, 1964 (p. 574).

The new constitution declared Afghanistan as an independent, unitary constitutional monarchy with Islam as the official state religion. Although it gave non-Muslim minorities the right to practice their religion, it attached within the law clause that drew criticism from the Hindus of Afghanistan. The constitution did however put secular law before Hanafi *Sharia* law to the discontentment of many mullahs. Moreover,

criticism centered around the article that banned anyone from competing for the royal throne which stated that kingship would remain in the house of Mohammad Nadir Khan, Zahir's father, and in the event of the king's death, the throne would be passed on to his son, and so on (Dupree, 1973, p. 575). The constitution did mention that the Royal Family couldn't form political parties, or hold the positions of Prime Minister, Member of Parliament or Justices to the Supreme Court (576). However, the article giving the king the right to dissolve Parliament whenever he wished also raised debates in the Jirga (p. 578). Regardless, Zahir finally adopted it on October 1, 1964 to a cheering Loya Jirga crowd (p. 586).

The first general elections in the 'New Democracy' were held after the adoption of the new constitution for the bicameral Parliament consisting of a 216-elected *Wolesi Jirga* (Lower house) and an 84-member semi-elected and semi-appointed *Mesharano Jirga* (Upper House) (Dupree, 1973, p. 587). The king appointed 28 members to the Mesharano Jirga, while the rest were elected in provincial elections per 28 provinces (p. 587). The first elections were heavily influenced by the government, which still controlled the media and run a heavily pro-government campaign through state press (p. 588). The concept of free elections, however, was new to Afghans especially in the rural parts of the country (Dupree, 1973, p. 589).

The Parliament soon became a place of disagreements and the *Wolesi Jirga* split into various groups, each driven by a certain ideology including the conservative religious leaders, a laissez-faire economy group, a group favoring the King's progressive policies, a small group of liberals, and a far left Marxist group led by Babrak Karmal (Dupree, 1973, p. 591). Intense tension broke out during the confidence vote ceremony of

the Prime-Minister designate Dr. Mohammad Yusuf when Kabul University students who had been attending the session in the spectators' gallery began shouting anti-government slogans (p. 591). Babrak Karmal, who had invited the students to disrupt the confidence-vote hearing, invited more students to the next session a few days later when the Wolesi Jirga was approving Dr. Yusuf's cabinet. This time, the students chanted phrases like 'gaining freedom', 'exercising our constitutional right' and "...sat in the deputies' seats and refused to leave until "the dishonest rascal have been driven from government" (p. 592). The Parliament session was forced into adjournment.

For the next session on October 25, 1965, the *Wolesi Jirga* exercised its behind-closed-doors meeting clause but students poured in again with demonstrations beginning early in the morning and lasting until the evening that day. In a sudden change of events, Afghan troops opened fire on the slogan-yelling students killing three and wounding others (Dupree, 1973, p. 592). This drew nationwide criticism against Zahir's government who promptly replaced Dr. Yusuf with Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal as the new Prime Minister (p. 595). Schools in Kabul had been closed due to the protests but reopened a month later and Mainwandwal went to personally offer sympathies and hear students' demands. Student protests against the government continued in spring 1965, however.

The regime responded by promulgating freedom press laws in July 1965, which immediately led to the creation of various private journals including the highly influential *Khalq* (The Masses or *The people*). The *Khalq* journal, run by its liberal publisher Nur Muhammad Tarakai, published only six issues before it was shut down by the government in May 1966. But it had made its mark on the people by claiming "it was the

democratic voice of the people” (Dupree, 1973, p. 601). Moreover, it declared that its “policy would be to alleviate ‘the boundless agonies of the oppressed peoples of Afghanistan’” (Dupree, 1973, p. 608). *Khalq* quickly gained large audience both among the intelligent circles as well as the people.

The private journal, influenced by the Marxist ideology politically, had argued to put all power in the hands of the people and economically “favored the public over the private sector, and demanded land reform to release the Afghan peasant from ‘the feudal system, which dominates Afghan society’” (Dupree, 1973, p. 608). The *Khalq* was soon accused of being anti-monarchy, anti-Islam and anti-constitution, but the editors denied all these allegations (p. 608). Regardless, it was shut down by the attorney’s office citing its inflammatory rhetoric against the government. The shutting down of other major newspaper and journals followed and by 1968, the government had effectively banned or closed down all major print press such as *Afghan Mellat*, *Masawat* (“Equality”), *Parcham* (“The Flag”) and *Shula-ye-Jawed* (“the Eternal Flame”) (p. 611).

However, from 1965 until 1968, students had held a peaceful day every year in mourning for those who were killed in the 1965 student protests. In fact the rising student and workers strikes eventually forced Prime Minister Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal to resign in November 1967. A new Prime Minister Nur Ahmad Etemadi was sworn in by the Parliament on June 11, 1968 (Dupree, 1973, p. 649). Parliament, however, had become merely a ‘rubber-stamping’ service organ for the government. Intensely divided, it failed to pass meaningful legislation and was often dysfunctional (p. 651).

Young, liberal and leftist candidates had predominantly contested the general elections in the New Democracy period in 1965. However, even more minorities groups

such as the Uzbeks, Tajik and Turkmens contested the 1969 elections (Dupree, 1973, p. 652). The newly elected assembly's first meeting was in January 1970 where they approved the new cabinet of the Prime Minister. Zahir, against some discontentment, reappointed Ahmad Etemadi as the prime minister and because he held a large influence and 'political astuteness' in the Parliament still, the lawmakers eventually swore-in Etemadi in an overwhelming vote of confidence (186-to-16) (p. 654).

The monarchy progressively became unstable during the late 1960s and in early 1970s during the 'New Democracy' period. Frequent changes and resignations in the prime minister posts, a divided parliament, a weaker monarchy, and continuous demonstrations by students demanding more freedoms had all resulted in slow progress towards a full democratic experience. In the span of less than a decade of the new democratic constitutional monarchy, there had been four changes in the prime minister position (Dupree, 1973, p. 662). Eventually, Prime Minister Etamadi's government had failed and he was forced to resign over differences with the Parliament on May 16, 1971 (p. 664). A few weeks later Zahir nominated Dr. Abdul Zahir as the fifth Prime Minister in the past ten years. However, a sixth change prime minister followed quickly when the king accepted Zahir's resignation and appointed Mohammad Moosa Shafiq as the new Prime Minister on December 12, 1972 (p. 666).

In mensurating the Zahir Shah regime, after the death of the first Muhasiban King Nadir Shah, the remaining brothers quickly united and reasserted their control on the monarchy. Although Nadir had been king only for five years, the Muhasibans had set a strong precedent by maintaining internal stability. The legitimacy (*1*) of the monarchy, therefore, was never in question as the Muhasiban family "reasserted their control,

perhaps stronger than before” (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 117). Hundreds were arrested on the conspiracy charges for the death of the deceased king and 18 were executed (p. 117). Although the Muhasibans faced some resistance initially from the Charkhi family, the transition of power (*1*) was stable and Afghanistan remained peaceful for a decade after Nadir Shah’s death in 1933 (p. 117).

In King Zahir Shah’ forty-year long rule, the Muhasibans only faced a single low-resistance rebellion early on in 1939 in the eastern Khost region led by Pir Shami (the “Syrian Siant”) (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 117). The saint, a far relative of former Queen Soriya, had vowed to restore the deposed king Amanullah Khan back on the throne, but it promptly failed when it did not gain enough followers and the British convinced their leader to return to Syria in exchange for a large sum of money (p. 117). Otherwise, the monarchy remained without any major uprisings (*1*) throughout the four decades of Zahir Shah’s rule (p. 118).

Table 11: Z. Shah Regime Scores

DV Stability Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Legitimacy	1	1
Regime Transition	1	1
Uprising Frequency	1	1
Power Consolidation	0	0
Regime Failure	0	0
Grand Total		3

The Muhasibans had effectively controlled the state by “organizing the state’s relatively small bureaucracy and military as ‘servants of the palace,’ patrimonial institutions with little political influence and no autonomy” (Barfield, 2010, p. 210). Hence, they had intended to stay (*0*) in power for the long term. However, even though

Zahir Shah along with his uncles ruled for nearly four decades, the monarchy eventually became weak and its downfall (0) came when Daud Khan carried out a coup against Zahir on July 1973 (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 133).

Although Zahir established a quasi-liberal parliament during the constitutional period and held partially free elections, he reigned as the supreme head of state (0) throughout his rule, having the authority over the state (Dupree, 1973, p. 477). For much of Zahir's regime, key government positions (1) were filled by the royal family members including Zahir's eldest uncle Mohammad Hashim Khan as the prime minister from 1933 to 1946 and his younger brother Shah Mahmud from 1946 to 1948. However, the king did appoint non-royal family members to the prime minister position and cabinet in his last two decades in power (p. 477). Moreover, administrative positions were clearly established throughout the king's reign including the Defense Minister (1) who was in charge of the national army (p. 477).

Political representation (1) increased rapidly during Zahir's reign, especially during the last two decades (Dupree, 1973, p. 494). Zahir tried to change the regime to a constitutional monarchy and tried to establish a liberal Parliament twice during his forty-year rule. The first Liberal Parliament was established in 1949 when Western-educated-reform-minded Afghans pushed for free elections (p. 494). The new 120-member Parliament soon allowed freedom of press and held ministers accountable by calling them in for questioning to the Parliament (p. 495). Moreover, dozens of newspaper subsequently sprung up and began publishing articles critical of the monarchy. Numerous political parties, some organized by university students, were established but the monarchy initially ignored them as having little influence (p. 496).

Table 12: Z. Shah Regime Scores

IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Leader	0	0
Army Head	1	1
Government Positions	1	1
Political Representation	1	1
Political Opposition	0	0
Grand Total		3

However, when criticism peaked against the monarchy, the regime struck back by arresting the leaders of the free movement and shutting down anti-government newspapers (Dupree, 1973, p. 497). Political opposition (0) and dissent were further suppressed when Daud Khan became Prime Minister in 1953. Although initially there was hope that Daud would release political prisoners and bring back the Liberal Parliament, the opposite turned out to be true. The new Prime Minister “crushed opposition as it rose, and made no pretense of returning to the days of ‘Liberal Parliament’” (Dupree, 1973, p. 499).

Daud adopted a more autocratic style rule as Prime Minister by suppressing any anti-government opposition (p. 500). Daud served as the Prime Minister for nearly ten years and during this time broadened his political base and consolidated power (pp. 500-555). When Zahir feared Daud’s grip on power and the military, he was forced to resign on March 9, 1963 (p. 555). After forcing out Daud, Zahir Shah had realized the demand for more freedom and in order to calm the public over the prime minister’s resignation, the king announced a second experiment in democracy by switching to a full constitutional monarchy (Dupree, 1973, p. 559).

Afghans rejoiced the ‘New Democracy’ movement and for the first time royal family members were not allowed to hold executive cabinet positions in the Prime

Minister's office. In fact, when the new Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Yusuf, himself an outsider, announced his cabinet, only four were from the Durrani Pashtun tribe while two non-Durrani Pashtuns were appointed as well (p. 561). However, even during the Constitutional Monarchy, the king held absolute power, and the government was not stable. In fact, from 1965 until 1971, King Zahir Shah had shuffled the government five times and re-appointed four different Prime Ministers and their respective cabinets (p. 692).

Daud Khan, 1973-1978

Although Daud Khan's overthrow of Zahir Shah's monarchy was nonviolent, his subsequent rule was dominated by violence amid the rise of various ideological political movements. These new political movements had emerged as result of the failed democratic experiment of the 1960's (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 47). In order to avoid cracking down on anti-government movements, such political groups began meeting secretly (p. 47). The leftist-Marxist group, for instance, would regularly meet in private homes led by a close circle of four Marxist leaders: Babrak Karmal (Pashtun Ghilzai with Tajik origins), Nur Muhammad Tarakai (Ghilzai Pashtun), Mir Akbar Kheyber (leader of the Hazara and Tajik members) and Badakhshi (Tajik Panjsheri who recruited Tajiks and Uzbeks to the cause) (p. 48). It is important to note "how these small groups of left-wing activists were already dividing along the tribal and ethnic lines of Afghanistan, eventhough they were a powerless minority on the political scene at the time" (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 48).

By early 1970s, the Marxists and Islamists factions had emerged as the two leading political forces during Daud's regime. The Marxist-Communist Afghan faction was led by Babrak Karmal and Nur Muhammad Tarakai (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 47). Karmal, who had founded the *Student Union* in the early 1950s, had been imprisoned for his part in organizing protests that led to the death of multiple university students in 1954 (p. 47). It was during his time behind bars when he became a committed Marxist and adopted the name Karmal ('Comrade of the Worker's in *Pashtu*) in order to "dissociate himself from his elitist bourgeois background" (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 47). His compatriot Nur Muhammad Tarakai had also been politically active during the 1950s as

the editor of an influential weekly newspaper, where he wrote short Marxist stories highlighting “the exploitation of the Afghan peasantry by landlords” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 47).

This small political group eventually turned into a full-scale political party known as the *People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan* (PDPA) formed by Karmal and Tarakai in one of their secret meetings at the former’s house in January 1965 (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 48). The objective of the party, which emerged in secret documents later in 1966 was, to “... ‘resolve the fundamental contradictions of Afghan society’ which could only be accomplished through socialism, and by the constitution of a ‘national government’” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 48). However, soon after its founding, the PDPA had split into two factions in 1967 due to ideological differences between Karmal and Tarakai. Karmal, who believed in a democratic road to socialism, became the leader of the *Parcham* (“Banner”) faction while Tarakai, who tended to be a supporter of a more ‘doctrinaire’ route to socialism, became the leader of the *Khalq* (“People”) faction (p. 49). The split in the PDPA was also based on ethnic lines since Karmal had the support of the Tajiks and Tarakai drew most of his support from the Pashtun populous.

The second main political faction, and the PDPA’s main opposition, in Daud’s rule was the emergence of the inter-ethnic Islamist camp. This group founded in 1965 as well, consisted of *ustads* (professors, teachers) including the Tajik Burhanuddin Rabani and Pashtun Abdul Rasul Sayyaf of Kabul University’s Theology Department. The movement had been organized as an Islamic political party under the *Jamiat-i-Islami* (“Society of Islam”) led by Gholam Mohmmad Nyazi (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 50). Highly influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamists argued for a Sharia

Law based government but had little impact during the ‘New Democracy’ period in early 1960s (p. 52). This new Afghan Jamiat Party “served as a clandestine ideological umbrella for its student wing, the Organization of Youth Movement, which operated openly, organizing demonstrations and fighting communists” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 53). In fact, “Islamists won the student elections at Kabul University in 1970” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 53).

Just as there was a split in the communist PDPA party, the Islamists similarly broke into various factions. Burhanuddin Rabani along with his Tajik compatriot Ahmad Shah Massud were firm believers of establishing a long-term Islamic state “including the infiltration of the army and the bureaucracy, as they felt the Afghan people were not ready to overthrow the establishment” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 53). A more radical faction led by Pashtun Gulbuddin Hekmatyar preferred ‘direct’ confrontation’ by ‘means of popular uprisings’ (p. 53). The “Islamists as a whole were not only critical of the royal establishment, but also despised the tradition-bound *ulema* and opposed Pashtun nationalism and the idea of a Pashtunistan. There was also a latent fragmentation along ethno-linguistic lines in the Jamiat as in the PDPA” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 53).

By the time Daud had overthrown Zahir Shah’s monarchy in July 1973, these parties were operating in full force (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 60). However, Daud initially largely ignored both camps, as he was busy forming a new government after the success of the coup. He changed the state into a Republic and then condemned the monarchy as ‘despotic regime,’ which was “founded on private and class interests’ (p. 61). Daud declared himself the first president and prime minister of the new republic while also holding the position of foreign affairs and defense (p. 61). Although Daud created a 50-

member Central Committee to advise him, its full members were never revealed but it included the leading Parcham leader Karmal, and other communist leaders such as Dr. Anita Ratebzad and Noor Mohammad Noor (p. 61).

Daud shared Karmal's view that “the road to socialist revolution lay in the politics of the ‘united front’: the participation of progressive social forces in a ‘national democratic phase’” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 61). Hence, Karmal downplayed his own party’s agenda and believed that Daud’s revolution was already implementing the shared goals of the PDPA and any independent party action was believed to be counterproductive. In other words, Karmal “hoped to use the ageing Daud to advance the cause of his own revolution but without linking Parchamis too close to the regime” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 61). Although six Marxist-Parchamis were appointed to Daud’s cabinet, they never revealed their party affiliations and did not take any official position. Karmal, however, had turned down the Daud’s offer of the deputy prime minister position.

However, other notable Parchamis had adopted a more aggressive and blunt approach to infiltrating Daud’s government. Many Parchamis were placed in high-level ministries as well as lower level bureaucratic position for the purpose of pursuing Parchami political agenda. Noor Mohammad, for example, headed a ‘military wing’ in the government in order to stay connected to the progressive-minded army officers. Moreover, Karmal and PDPA’s long term goal was to “weaken the Khalq faction of the PDPA, with which he had been engaged in a bitter feud since the 1967 break-up” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 61). However, Karmal’s political honeymoon with Daud did not last long when Daud began purging PDPA sympathizers from the regime. After the 1973

coup, Daud's regime had rapidly grown into a one-man autocratic rule. Hence, a paranoid Daud began a witch-hunt to eliminate all his rivals and "sought to manipulate, and when [he] failed, he struck" (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 62).

The PDPA's response to the government crackdown was to set aside their differences and rejoin the Pashtun Khalq and the Tajik Parcham factions (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 65). In July 1977, both factions had merged to form a single party headed by a 30-member central committee (p. 65). However, "It was in reality a tenuous alliance, not a reunification, so great was the rift in the PDPA as was shown up a year later after it took power" (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 65). Daud's continued purge of the Parchamis had a zero-sum effect in that as the Parchami's presence in the army was reduced, the Khalq's presence and influence grew. Hafizullah Amin, one of the leaders of the Khalq faction, had now replaced Karmal by taking control of the military wing and further infiltrating the army (p. 65).

Daud had eventually lost a power base by distancing himself from his Soviet ally, the Parchami faction, and had been "resorting to the age-old practices of nepotism and buying allies where he could" (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 65). Moreover, he was also moving "towards a one-party dictatorship by banning all political activities and opposition newspaper and by setting up his National Revolutionary Party" (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 65). PDPA's infiltration of Daud's army, however, continued, and by 1976, Hafizullah Amin had prepared his military wing to a point "where the Khalqis believed that they could 'with a certain number of casualties on the part of the armed forces topple the Daud government and wrest political control'" (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 66). Moreover, Soviet trained government employees, who fully sympathized

with the communist agenda, also filled hundreds of technical and professional posts in Daud's government.

Daud continued transferring many PDPA officials within the government to the countryside to keep them off the capital (Barfield, 2010, p. 215). Most Parchamis either quit their jobs or simply changed their avatar "making themselves indistinguishable from the officials that they had replaced" (Barfield, 2010, p. 215). Feeling secure after driving out all the Parchimis, Daud turned to decimating the Islamist camp, forcing many of their leaders into exile after a plan to overthrow his government was uncovered. Although this led to "A series of small-scale insurrections by Islamists in 1975, including one by Ahmad Shah Massud in Panjshir Valley, [they] failed to generate any local support and were easily crushed" (Barfield, 2010, p. 215). Daud used the uprising as an excuse to arrest more Islamist leaders (p. 215).

After his coup against Zahir Shah, Daud had demonstrated "how easily a government might be replaced by a military coup" (Barfield, 2010, p. 215). Thus, both the Khalqis and the Islamists were continuously attempting to replicate Daud's successful coup and "In the absence of a mass political base [of these two] such a strike from within was seen as a shortcut to power" (Barfield, 2010, p. 215). The Khalqis especially preferred this route declaring, "Previously the army was considered a tool of the dictatorship and despotism of the ruling class... [However], this too should be wrested in order to topple the ruling class" (Barfield, 2010, p. 215).

In the end, Daud had filled his government with people loyal to him while forcing out both Islamists and Communists from power, but his regime was largely unable to "implement policies that challenged entrenched local interests" (Barfield, 2010, p. 224).

For instance, “Provincial officials had a limited agenda: to keep the peace, suppress banditry, see that conscription went smoothly, and collect what small amounts of taxes the government still demanded” (Barfield, 2010, p. 224). Daud’s strategy was to abandon building a rural political base and the “need to maintain political, financial, or ideological support from the provincial population in order to carry out its policies” (Barfield, 2010, p. 225). In other words, “National policies and programs were thus largely divorced from rural areas...” (Barfield, 2010, p. 225)

In mensurating Daud Khan’s regime, he overthrew his cousin Zahir Shah’s monarchy in July 1937 in a nonviolent coup and therefore, the transition (*I*) to power was peaceful (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 133). Daud, who had been masterminding the coup for over a year along with support of the leftist groups, revolted when king Zahir Shah was on vacation in Italy (p. 133). The coup was possible because Daud had the support of many generals in the National Army, and it took only a few hundred troops to take over key governmental buildings in the capital Kabul without firing a shot (p. 133). Although Daud did not concern himself with other’s opinions, he had justified the coup by pointing out the slow economic progress under Zahir Shah and promising to bring new economic development (p. 134).

Moreover, no one could question his regime’s legitimacy (*I*) especially since he had received a warm welcome by many Afghans (p. 134). Although Daud maintained a tight control over the state, he faced periodic uprisings (*0*) and ‘resistance movements’ (p. 135). Moreover, Daud had intended to extend (*0*) his ‘one-man’ autocratic rule as long as he could, but his regime would eventually collapse (*0*) in a violent coup five years late in 1978 (p. 138).

Table 13: D. Khan Regime Scores

DV Stability Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Legitimacy	1	1
Regime Transition	1	1
Uprising Frequency	0	0
Power Consolidation	0	0
Regime Failure	0	0
Grand Total		2

Daud was the absolute head of the state (0) of a one-party autocratic rule despite claims his regime was a ‘Democratic’ Republic (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 135). He simultaneously held several key government positions (0) including the presidency, serving as his own prime minister as well as holding the positions of interior and defense ministries (0), the latter effectively giving him total control over the national army (p. 135). Although Daud convened a *Loya Jirga* in 1977 to adopt a new constitution, “it provided for a one-party state with a strongman president and a mixed economy with state ownership...” (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 135).

Table 14: D. Khan Regime Scores

IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Leader	0	0
Army Head	0	0
Government Positions	0	0
Political Representation	1	1
Political Opposition	0	0
Grand Total		1

Moreover, Daud maintained tight control over the rising political movements and completely banned any political opposition (0) against the state (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 135). His regime not only regularly executed leaders of political movements, but

also arrested hundreds others (p. 135). Political representation (*I*), however, grew rapidly during Daud Khan's regime as the rise of political parties had continued from Zahir Shah's liberal parliament movement (p. 136). The two prominent parties were the PDPA and the Islamists, both of whom had been anti-Daud, the former eventually overthrowing his regime in military coup (p. 138).

Nur Muhammad Tarakai, 1978-1979

The communist *People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan* (PDPA) rose to power rapidly. The regime seized power after overthrowing Daud Khan's republic in April 1978 after the 'Saur Revolution' (named after the second month of the Persian calendar) (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 67). The 'revolution,' however, was a full military *coup d'état* in disguise, planned and executed by the leftist PDPA leaders and carried out by rogue officers in the national army (p. 67).

The coup was precipitated by the assassination of a prominent PDPA leader Mir Akbar Khyber, which spread fears among the other PDPA leaders (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 67). Just two days before the coup began, Daud Khan had finally arrested and taken all of the PDPA leaders to prison including Tarakai and Karmal on the eve of April 25 (p. 68). The third highest PDPA leader, Hafizullah Amin, was able to distribute the secret documents with instructions on how to carry out the coup before he was arrested the next day, on the 26th of April (p. 68). These rash arrests soon spread panic throughout both the Khalqi and Parchami camps of the PDPA amid rumors that Daud was planning to eliminate them all (p. 68).

On the morning of April 27, Major Aslam Watanjar, a Khalqi officer of the Fourth Corps was instructed to take over the *Arg* presidential palace. The plan was that an air squadron would fly over the palace to signal the attack, and Abdul Qadir, a Parchami leader of the rebel officers, would move in while other officers in position would take over the Bagram Airforce simultaneously (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 69). Although the coup was planned intricately, most of it occurred 'fortuitously' since not all went according to plan. Regardless, officers charged the palace where Daud Khan was

attending a meeting with his cabinet members and heavy shooting began (p. 69). The bloodiest fighting took place between the rebel officers and a 2000-man presidential guard protecting Daud and his family in the fortress-like palace. However, by the morning of April 28, the royal guards had fought to the last man before rebel officers broke in killing Daud and his family in his *Arg* home (p. 69). Because most fighting occurred inside the *Arg* and Kabul, there was no military resistance in other parts of the country (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 70).

A few days after the coup, the PDPA formed a 30-member Revolutionary Council and shared the seats evenly among the Khalqi and Parchami members. In its first meeting on May 1, the Council elected Tarakai as the prime minister, while Karmal, Amin and Watanjar were all given deputy-prime minister positions (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 70). Abdul Qadir and Mohammad Rafi, the other two Parchami leaders who had played a key part in the coup, were rewarded with positions of Defense and Public Works ministries. However, this "...power structure reflected in reality the outline of an incipient struggle between Karmal and Amin, with the ineffectual and indecisive Tarakai in the background as a figurehead" (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 71). In other words, the PDPA had sat up not one but three different governments for the sake of keeping a political balance. In fact, "What appeared on the surface as an equitable political balance was in fact a fearful symmetry, with the 'tiger' Amin, the actual architect of the revolution, waiting to pounce when the opportunity arose" (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 71).

However, a Soviet-style Politburo soon replaced the Revolutionary Council with Tarakai making decisions at the top. In the May 24 meeting of the Buro, Amin announced that 'Khalq' would be the victors of the revolution "without reference to the

Parchami role...” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 71) The Buro also issued orders to print pamphlets with new titles for Tarakai as the ‘Great Teacher’ and ‘Great Leader’ (p. 72). These were attempts targeted to push away Karmal and his Parchami followers from power. The main orchestrator of these maneuvers was Amin, who had been orchestrating with Tarakai to sideline Parchamis from the government, and eventually in a real Machiavellian-style, take power for himself by taking down Tarakai (p. 72). Amin’s plan to ‘outmaneuver’ the Parchamis continued and in the next meeting on June 27, the Buro announced that “state policy would be decided exclusively by Khalq” while “Amin was inducted to the Politburo and appointed to key post of general secretary” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 73). Amin’s last step in ousting the Parchamis was transferring them all abroad as ambassadors (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 73).

However, a party veteran like Karmal could not be ousted from the government easily. Before he moved to Prague to assume the ambassadorial role, he tried to plot a coup against Amin and Tarakai to overthrow them. The coup was to be executed on the national holiday of Eid, where most officers in the army would be on leave and hence less resistance (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 73). Tarakai’s Defense Minister Qadir and the Army Chief of Staff, General Shahpur Ahamdzai, both closeted Parchamis, would organize and carry out the coup planned for September 4. But this plot failed when the Afghan ambassador in Delhi ‘tipped off’ Tarakai. Qadir, Shahpur and others involved were promptly arrested, tortured and jailed. The plot gave Amin another excuse to eliminate the Parchamis and their sympathizers completely by killing and imprisoning them (p. 73).

After ousting their rival Parchamis from the government, Tarakai and Amin went on an official visit to the Soviet Union in December 1978 to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which included a crucial clause requesting military assistance when needed (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 79). The Soviet Union would later utilize this same treaty as 'legal ground' for sending military troops to Afghanistan in February 1979 (p. 79). While Tarakai and Amin were desperately asking for Soviet military help, the Mujahideen and other guerrilla elements had intensified their attacks against the PDPA around the country. Ismail Khan, a Mujahideen commander in Herat, led an attack on a government regiment all the way to Kandahar but was crushed by paratroopers, which took 25000 lives (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 80). Other major violent attacks broke out in Jalalabad in April 1979 and Paktia provinces. In June, the regime faced large violent anti-government demonstrations in the capital Kabul. Amid the growing violence and instability around the country, Tarakai and Amin began blaming each other.

In the 28 July Politburo meeting, Amin openly held Tarakai responsible for government's failure due to his unilateral decision-making and suggested a 'collective leadership and collective decisions'. Key posts were redistributed and Tarakai was reduced to a mere figurehead while Amin was able to take majority in the Politburo. Although Tarakai was still the Defense Minister and Amin his deputy, the Foreign Ministry and Interior ministries were both passed on to Amin's loyalists. Moreover, Amin gained control of the army as well as appointing one of his loyalists as the head of the presidential guard (p. 80)

When Tarakai left for a summit in Havana on September 7, reports reached him that Amin had begun conspiring to take over power and kill the 'Great Leader'. Tarakai

arranged for a secret meeting with the Soviet leader Brezhnev in Moscow on his way back, where presumably Karmal was present too (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 81). It was decided that Amin would be removed from the government and transferred as an ambassador while a new government would be formed with Karmal as the prime minister. But Amin, with his vast spy network, was a step ahead of Tarakai, and after his return on September 15, he immediately put Tarakai under house arrest while notifying the Central Committee that the ‘Great Leader’ had resigned (p. 81). A few weeks later, Tarakai was presumed dead but both the exact date and cause are unknown and it is therefore presumed that he died either on 8 or 9 of October 1979 by being suffocated by a pillow in the *Arg* palace or being hanged in the prison (p. 81).

In mensurating Nur Muhammad Tarakai’s regime, both the PDPA and Tarakai’s claims to legitimacy (0) were overshadowed by their violent takeover of power after overthrowing Daud Khan’s regime. Most Afghans saw the coup as ‘orchestrated’ with Soviet Union’s help (Maley, 2009, p. 23).

Table 15: N. M. Tarakai Regime Scores

DV Stability Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Legitimacy	0	0
Regime Transition	0	0
Uprising Frequency	0	0
Power Consolidation	0	0
Regime Failure	0	0
Grand Total		0

The transition (0) to power from Daud Khan to PDPA was one of the most violent periods in Afghanistan’s history (p. 23). The Khalqi and Parchami officers who carried out the coup killed and massacred hundreds including president Daud Khan and his

family (p. 23). Internal disputes in the party over executive power had weakened the PDPA from the beginning. Only a few months after the PDPA took power, several uprisings (0) led by various Mujahideen leaders had broken out against the regime (p. 26).

The first mass uprising began in March 1979 in Herat, which was actually a “... ‘mutiny’ by the 17th Division of the Afghan Army... in response to the brutality of the *Khalq* activists” (Maley, 2009, p. 26). The uprisings had served as warning to the PDPA and their sponsor Soviet Union, which had cautioned, “under no circumstance may we lose Afghanistan” (Maley, 2009, p. 27). Not only the Soviet Union, but the PDPA had also made it clear that they were intending to stay in power (0) for the long run to implement their ambitious socialist agenda (p. 25). By September 1979, Hafizullah Amin had effectively ousted Tarakai from power and had taken over the prime minister position in the Politburo (p. 27). Tarakai was eventually sidelined from power but his rule ended (0) completely after he was ‘murdered’ mysteriously in his home (p. 28).

Table 16: N. M. Tarakai Regime Scores

IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Leader	0	0
Army Head	0	0
Government Positions	0	0
Political Representation	1	1
Political Opposition	0	0
Grand Total		1

For over a year, the PDPA *Khalq* and *Parcham* factions struggled over sharing political positions in the government and military (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 154). After the new regime was announced, Nur Muhammad Tarakai was appointed as the president

and prime minister, therefore giving him supreme authority in the Politburo-style party (Maley, 2009, p. 24). Other key government positions (0) were shared among the other PDPA leaders who had helped organize and carry out the coup (p. 24). Hafizullah Amin was appointed as the Foreign Minister, while Abdul Qadir took the position of Defense Minister (0) and Babrak Karmal was made the deputy prime minister (Maley, 2009, p. 24).

Although the PDPA shared high government positions among themselves and their friends, political representation (1) was surprisingly high. While Pashtuns still dominated the government, the old Persian-speaking Muhammadzai elites were replaced by the eastern tribal-background Ghilzai Pashtuns (Barfield, 2010, p. 226). Hence the PDPA had ended the centuries old monarchic rule by overthrowing the last royal Durrani monarchs, opening way for various minority ethnic groups, in particular the Ghilzai, who had been marginalized from politics for centuries (p. 226). However, the PDPA lacked internal support from the majority of Afghans, and therefore used brutal tactics and the military as a tool to crack down on any (0) opposition (p. 228). Such brutality was evident in the elimination of Daud Khan and the subsequent murders of PDPA's own political leaders (p. 228).

Hafizullah Amin, 1979

Amid the internal PDPA rivalries and struggles for power, Hafizullah Amin eventually rose to power, replacing Tarakai as president of the party in April 1979 (Barfield, 2010, p. 228). However, the internal rivalries had become so destructive that of half of the PDPA's original eighteen thousand members, and the twenty eight thousand who later joined the Party after the revolution, were either killed, ousted or left the Party in a year (p. 228). A month later after assuming power, Amin had Tarakai assassinated after discovering a Soviet-planned coup to overthrow him from power (p. 228). Amin began his Khalqi rule by launching a series of new radical socialist reforms including "land reform, equality for women, the abolition of marriage payments, and the cancellation of many types of rural debts..." (Barfield, 2010, p. 229)

Although some of these reforms such as women's rights and marriage dowry were dated back to Amanullah Khan's regime, the "land redistribution and rural debt were new" (Barfield, 2010, p. 229). The Parchami camp and the Soviet Union advisors had warned against sweeping reforms in a "country as socially conservative and economically underdeveloped as Afghanistan" (Barfield, 2010, p. 229). However, Amin and his Khalqi faction considered themselves 'visionaries' and called it a "revolutionary duty" to transform Afghanistan into a communist state and crush anyone who opposed them (p. 229). The rationale was that the modern military was far stronger than any tribal militia force and therefore, no one would be able to stop them. However, while previous regimes such as the Muhasiban rulers were largely successful in employing military to stay in power and keeping rebellions in check, the PDPA faced far more rebellions that were almost always more violent (p. 229).

The rebellions against Amin's regime intensified due to the radical economic and land redistribution policies based on socialist-Marxist principles of the Soviet Union (p. 230). The traditionally tribal Afghan society starkly opposed the implementation of such policies and compared them to the Soviet Union collectivization scheme. But Amin committed and pushed for the PDPA's goals "...to break down the *qawm*-based political structure by which rural communities had insulated themselves from the central government and its officials for generations" (Barfield, 2010, p. 231). The rural people, however, did not share the government's vision and had traditionally favored the "live and let live" principle when dealing with the central government. Moreover, the PDPA was also "...not equipped to implement radical policies that struck at the core of the rural economy and society" (Barfield, 2010, p. 231).

Facing insurmountable resistance from the villages, the Khalqis were forced to abandon their 'Cultural Revolution' and shifted focus entirely to the urban areas such as the capital Kabul, where the authority of the central government was strong. The resistance, however, was gaining momentum and continued fighting the infidel regime. Through kinship, ethnic ties and using common rhetoric, the tribal chiefs reached out to their followers "...to defend their property, the faith of Islam, and the honor of their families against outsiders" (Barfield, 2010, p. 232). The rural people "...objections to the PDPA's economic policies were combined with objections to its social policies, especially those relating to marriage customs and women" (Barfield, 2010, p. 232). Therefore, the opposition was almost paradoxical because it "...was pervasive but non-centralized... without having an easily identifiable enemy at the national or international level" (Barfield, 2010, p. 232).

In mensurating Hafizullah Amin’s regime, his transition (0) and his subsequent first 100 days in power were unstable (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 81). Uprisings (0) against his regime had intensified and virtually 75% of the country had rebelled against him (p. 81). The PDPA army had been reduced to less than a third due to constant desertions from the 100,000 soldiers it maintained when it had come to power only a few months earlier (p. 81). By autumn 1979, Amin had realized that his position was ‘vulnerable’ and his relationship with the Soviet Union had progressively become worse, he began looking for support elsewhere to prolong (0) his rule including reaching out to Pakistan and the U.S. for support (p. 81). Amin even offered to recognize the Durand Line as the international boundary between the two countries if Pakistani Prime Minister Zia Ulhaq would stop supporting his enemies, the Peshawar based Islamic parties, but this never materialized. Amin also desperately tried to repair relations with the U.S., which had cut off aid programs after the death of its Ambassador Dubs in Kabul.

Table 17: H. Amin Regime Scores

DV Stability Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Legitimacy	0	0
Regime Transition	0	0
Uprising Frequency	0	0
Power Consolidation	0	0
Regime Failure	0	0
Grand Total		0

Despite these efforts, Amin’s downfall (0) was imminent as he was at odds with the Soviet Union, the biggest supplier of aid and weapons to the PDPA (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 82). In fact, in July 1979, the East German ambassador had told a U.S. charge’ d’affaires that Moscow considered Amin’s departure from the PDPA as the political

solution to the problems of the regime (p. 82). By late 1979, Amin’s regime had become weak, had lost legitimacy (0) and was near total collapse (Rasanayagam, 2003). In March 1979, Herat had fallen to the Mujahideen and Tarakai had summoned the chief Soviet Military adviser General Gorelov and the charge d’affaires to ask for help (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 84). The General had interpreted this meeting to mean that Afghanistan was asking for military help. However, there were disagreements over deploying troops in the Soviet Politburo, with some arguing that there was no legal justification under international law to send troops (p. 85).

Brezhnev agreed with the Politburo decision to not send troops but did allow delivering six MI-24s between June-Jul 1979. In the May 24 meeting, the Politburo again approved military equipment but denied Tarakai’s request for helicopters and tanks. In fact, “Contrary to what was bruited about in the international media at the time, and later in the extensive literature... the Soviet leadership was not at all eager to send their armed forces into Afghanistan” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 87). Tarakai and Amin, however, persistently asked for an active Soviet military role including creating a legal scenario at the request of Afghanistan, but the Soviet denied the request.

Table 18: H. Amin Regime Scores

IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Leader	0	0
Army Head	0	0
Government Positions	0	0
Political Representation	0	0
Political Opposition	0	0
Grand Total		0

However, it wasn't until June 18 when Soviet Union appointed four-member Commission on Afghanistan published an official report that led the Soviet leadership to consider removing Amin from power. The report presented to the Soviet Union's Central Committee had concluded that the army (*0*) was the PDPA's main weakness (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 88). Moreover, the transcript had cited reasons that Amin had become a 'dictator', had been running 'smear' campaigns against the Soviet Union and had been 'mending' relations with the U.S. as the ground for launching a Soviet Union military intervention (p. 90). Hence, by November 1979, the Soviet leadership had come to consensus that change in PDPA party leadership (*0*) was needed, and Amin was too dangerous to be left in power (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 90).

Although other options such as poisoning Amin's food through his Russian cooks were considered, but these plans went 'awry' and in the end, on December 31, 1979, Russian KGB commandos launched a surprise attack on Amin's residence by infiltrating his presidential home in *Arg*, killing the guards, and assassinating him in the operation (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 91). In the end, Hafizullah Amin had ruled for less than five months after his rise to power by ousting his opposition (*0*) Khalq, and his regime was known to be one of the 'worst in Afghanistan's modern history' (Maley, 2009, p. 28). Political representation (*0*) was nonexistent, as Amin had filled top government positions (*0*) with his Parchami 'loyalists, family and friends' (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 154).

Babrak Karmal, 1979-1986

After Hafizullah Amin's assassination, Babrak Karmal was appointed as the head of the PDPA on December 28, 1979. He paid lip service to Nur Muhammad Tarakai and blamed 'the rogue' Amin for his death (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 94). Karmal soon embarked on his mission to set up a 'national democratic government' "...that would mobilize all sectors of society before a socialist transformation could be affected" (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 94). The new PDPA had also opened the party to outsiders by appointing 78 new non-party members out of the total 191 by May 1980 (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 94). Karmal's approach was to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people through rolling back controversial reforms, releasing prisoners and allowing exiles to return through amnesty (p. 94).

Karmal also reached out to the Islamic elements by establishing a Ministry of Islamic Affairs, although this was merely a political move to keep the clergy in check by making them government employees. Moreover, Karmal ordered building new mosques, 34 new ones in Kabul alone, while renovating the ones that had been damaged in the war (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 94). However, all of these strategies fell short of rallying the Afghan population to his side. The cry for a jihad, a holy war for the liberation of Afghanistan from the infidels, was echoed all over the country. Karmal was accused of inviting the infidel Red Army, and protests against his regime multiplied (p. 95). By summer 1981, Karmal's regime had grown so desperate that he rolled back PDPA's core land reforms and eased national military service. Although these changes were appreciated in the urban areas, they did not have an effect on the rural population.

Furthermore, the Karmal regime was weakened by internal disagreements in the PDPA ranks. Some nationalist Khalqis had accused him of ousting Amin and bringing the occupying Red Army to the country (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 95). In one instance, Karmal was left red faced when he had ordered a new flag to be marched in a military parade only to find out that the Khalqis still carried their traditional red banner (p. 96). Karmal was powerless to take action against the Khalqis fearing they would revolt. These pro-Khalqi elements, which were also loyal to Tarakai's memory, began rallying around the nationalist Sarwari, who had sought the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. Karmal, however, soon sent Sarwari away by appointing him as the ambassador to Mangolia.

Next, he began filling the Puli-i-Charkhi prison with disobeying Khalqis officers, cadres and three ministers (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 96). Around 600 officers were imprisoned on conspiracy charges in January 1980 alone, although some managed to flee and joined the resistance. Essentially, Karmal's regime was effectively divided within. Karmal, a Parchami leader, for example could not remove the Khalqi Interior Minister Syed Gulabzoi and instead set up a separate Intelligence Department independent from the ministry's jurisdiction (p. 96). This new department called by its Persian acronym *KHAD* was led by Karmal loyalist Dr. Mohammad Najibullah, who was a brigadier by rank (p. 97). KHAD was soon given a complete military division with helicopters, tanks and armored vehicles, and was taken under the KGB wing. The department besides its main task of gathering intelligence had other responsibilities such as making arrests, suppressing border tribes, carrying out assassinations, and covert operations (p. 97).

The PDPA army, however, was becoming weaker and dwindling in size through defections and desertions of officers. A year after the Soviet invasion, the army had been

reduced to 30,000 men, only a third of the original size (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 99). The membership in the PDPA was similarly decreasing and by 1982, despite Karmal's exaggerated claims that the PDPA had 70,000 members, the true membership was closer to 20,000 (p. 98). Seeing that Karmal's regime was unstable, the Soviet Union began a long-term strategy of indoctrination in order to continue pursuing Soviet national interests. A new nationwide program called *Young Pioneers* recruited some 40,000 school children some as young as ten, both through volunteering and coercion, to be admitted to the *Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan*, a shadow organization run by KHAD to spread communist propaganda (p. 98). The Russian language had become compulsory in schools, and students in Kabul University were required to take political courses in Marxist-Leninist theories. Moreover, thousands of Afghan students were sent to the Soviet Union for "advanced political indoctrination" (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 99).

In effect, the Soviet Union had begun implementing a full 'Sovietization' and the 'divide and rule' policies in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union began utilizing its old strategy of "Nationalities Policy" in Afghanistan, which aimed at giving 'autonomy' to Soviet republics based on ethnic and linguistic lines. The PDPA raised some regional minority languages such as Uzbek, Turcoman, Baluchi and Nuristani to national status. Moreover, the PDPA began promoting the cultures of different ethnic minority groups through media and began educating children in their mother tongues (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 99). Nationalist Afghans saw these policies as "an attempt to isolate ethnic groups from each other and from the wider Muslim world, as the Soviets had done in Central Asia, and to drive a wedge between these groups and Pashtuns who had

traditionally dominated Afghan politics” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 99). In the southern and eastern Pashtun regions, the divide and rule policy would pit tribal *maliks* against one another, and whoever would support the communist regime, would be rewarded with weapons and cash (p. 100).

Despite the active exploitation of the ethnic groups, Karmal was cautious with the Pashtun tribes and exercised “a flexible and conciliatory policy... in effort to choke off the Mujahideen supply lines from Pakistan” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 100). For instance, the eastern Pashtun Mohmand tribe was “won over by offers of food, fuel, weapons and cash subsidies” (p. 100). Karmal’s attempts to lure other tribes to his side had reached its peak when in September 1985, 4,000 members from various tribes gathered to make the regime more ‘palatable’ to the eastern Pashtun tribes. In order to make his government appear credible, Karmal himself had to attend to fend off claims that he had been brought to power by Soviet tanks. However, new rumors about his mistress and his ‘drunken bouts had further crippled Karmal’s reputation and had reduced him to a Soviet puppet. Moreover, by mid-1985, there had also been an important shift in power when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power as the new general secretary of the CPSU. From early on, Gorbachev had intentions of withdrawing the Red Army and indicated that a regime under Karmal was not plausible (p. 101).

The Afghan Mujahideen resistance against the PDPA meanwhile continued in full force. Hundreds of thousands Afghan refugees had been displaced by the civil war and settled in the neighboring Pakistan. The United States and Saudi Arabia channeled aid, weapons and money, while Pakistan’s ISI had created sanctuaries, recruited fighters and ran training camps for the resistance (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 103). The number of

Afghan refugees who settled on the other side of the border in Pakistan grew rapidly from 80,000 in 1978 to 400,000 by 1980 (p. 103). Pakistan had the monopoly on the distribution of aid and required that the refugees had to join one of the seven Islamic Peshawar-based parties in order to be eligible to receive aid, food rations as well as weapons and money for the Mujahideen (p. 103). These parties, which were operating in Afghanistan as early as 1980 against the PDPA, included *Jamiat-i-Islami* led by the Tajik Burhanuddin Rabbani; *Hizbi-i-Islami* led by the Ghilzai Pashtun Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; a small faction led by Pashtun Mullah Omar who would later become the leader of the Taliban; *Ittehad-i-Islami* led by the Pashtun Wahabi Abdul Rasul Sayyaf; and two additional parties that were recognized by the Pakistani government were headed by the Pashtun Sufi leaders Sibghatullah Mujadaddi and Pir Sayyed Ahmad Gailaini (p. 104).

By 1986, it had become clear that forces were against Karmal. The opinion in Moscow was that his government was not popular with the Afghans anymore and that a change was necessary. An article in the *Pravda* had specifically singled out Karmal's regime for losing popularity (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 119). Even though Karmal had called nation-wide elections to a long-awaited Jirga, his regime had lost credibility and he had to go. Eventually, on the eve of the anniversary of the *Saur Revolution* in April 1986, Karmal was called up to Moscow, and was promptly replaced by Dr. Najibullah to take "the salute at the celebratory military parade" (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 119). After a month, the PDPA 'unanimously' elected Najibullah as the new general secretary of the Committee Central (p. 119).

In mensurating Babrak Karmal's regime, his transition (0) to power came at the expense of Hafizullah Amin's life, who was assassinated in a KGB operation by the

Soviet Union (Maley, 2009, p. 71). After Karmal was appointed as the new head of the PDPA, Afghanistan had descended into a civil war and resistance movements (0) had been fighting the regime on all fronts (p. 72). In August 1982, Karmal’s government suffered a ‘setback’ when the rebels attacked Bagram Airbase destroying dozens of aircraft (p. 72). However, the regime’s fighting against the Mujahideen went on until late 1986 (p. 73). Karmal also struggled to gain legitimacy (0) for his regime because its survival relied on foreign military protection (p. 77). Karmal had intended to stay (0) in power for as long as possible but his regime eventually lost support within the party and the Soviet Union (p. 78). Although his regime did not collapse (1) because of the Soviet Union military assistance, its influence and control was limited to the urban cities under its control (p. 79).

Table 19: B. Karmal Regime Scores

DV Stability Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Legitimacy	0	0
Regime Transition	0	0
Uprising Frequency	0	0
Power Consolidation	0	0
Regime Failure	1	1
Grand Total		1

The Soviet Union installed Karmal as the new supreme head of the PDPA (0) after removing Hafizullah Amin era from power (Barfield, 2010, p. 237). In 1980, political representation (1) briefly surged after Karmal released political prisoners, “rescinded the signature Khalqi decrees on land reform, rural debt, and women’s rights, and abandoned the revolutionary red flag for a version of Afghanistan’s old tricolor one” (Barfield, 2010, p. 237). Moreover, having Moscow’s support Karmal had intended to

keep the PDPA’s monopoly (0) on power in Kabul and would not let the socialist revolution falter (p. 237). In fact, Karmal was so close to the Soviet Union initially that he had become another symbolic leader similar to the British’s ally Shah Shuja (p. 237).

Table 20: B. Karmal Regime Scores

IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Leader	0	0
Army Head	0	0
Government Positions	0	0
Political Representations	1	1
Political Opposition	0	0
Grand Total		1

Furthermore, during Karmal’s regime, the Soviet Union deployed overwhelming force to fight the political opposition (0) hoping that the resistance would eventually tire out from fighting (Barfield, 2010, p. 238). This strategy included heavy bombardment, planting widespread landmines, depopulation of villages as well as controlling the urban centers and cutting supply chains to resistance controlled areas (p. 238). However, none of these tactics were successful in ending the resistance and the rebels were not willing to make peace as long as there was Soviet military presence in the country (p. 238).

The Soviet Union also invested to build up the PDPA army (0) to 90,000 hoping that they would do much of the fighting; however the commanders refused to go on missions and had secret truce zones with the Mujahideen (Barfield, 2010, p. 238). The Mujahedeen’s momentum grew stronger as they acquired more experience on the battlefield and more sophisticated weapons such as the American supplied anti-aircraft Stinger missiles in 1986, which “thereby greatly reducing Soviet air superiority on the battlefield” (Barfield, 2010, p. 238). Eventually, the PDPA and the 11,000 Soviet soldiers

were not able to “pacify” the country and were in a stalemate against the Mujahideen except from holding them off to overthrow the PDPA regime in Kabul (p. 238).

M. Najibullah Ahmadzai, 1986-1992

Mohammad Najibullah Ahmadzai, also known as Najib or Dr. Najib, succeeded as the new head of the PDPA party in 1986 (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 199). Belonging to the Ghilzai Pashtun tribe, Najib had been active in Afghan politics since he was a high school student, organizing and participating in protests. Moreover, he was loyal to Moscow and was considered as “Gorbachev’s chosen instrument to carry out his game plan” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 199). A few months after taking power, Najib announced a national reconciliation program to the Mujahideen making three promises: declaring ‘a six-month unilateral cease-fire, offering to form a coalition government of ‘national unity’ with the Mujahideen and accommodating the return of over 5 million refugees from Pakistan and Iran (p. 199).

However, both the Mujahideen leaders in Pakistan as well as the radical Khalqis were equally opposed to these offers, as the former sought to topple Najib’s regime and latter felt betrayed by him for abandoning the socialist revolution (Barfield, 2010, p. 239). Regardless, Najib established the ‘Extraordinary Supreme Commission for National Reconciliation’ with branches all around the country, urging relatives and friends of those fighting in the resistance to accept peace in return for tax concessions and confiscated property as well as ‘deferment of military service’ (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 119).

There was broad support and excitement among the Afghan refugee camps that had shown eagerness to return home, but the seven-party Peshawar alliance had rejected Najib’s program. The parties had their own agendas for ruling Afghanistan and rejected sharing power. However, a survey conducted among the Afghan refugees had shown that

less than one percent of refugees “would choose one of the seven Peshawar leader to rule a free Afghanistan” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 120).

Najib continued with the reconciliation program by extending the ceasefire for another six months in June 1987. In July of the same year, he ordered a new constitution to be drafted and again invited the Peshawar based oppositions to build a coalition government and end their resistance (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 121). A *Loya Jirga* officially adopted the new constitution in November 1987 establishing Islam as the state religion and in theory, making Afghanistan a ‘multi-party parliamentary democracy’ (p. 121). In April 1988, new elections were held under the new constitution and a quarter of the seats in the *Wolesi Jirga* (Lower House) were left vacant for the opposition. Although the PDPA allocated seats in the parliament to non-PDPA, most of the non-PDPA members came from the *National Fatherland Front*, a sub-faction of the PDPA communist party (p. 121).

Meanwhile, the efforts to withdraw Soviet troops finally paid off when all parties reached an agreement in the Geneva Accords. With Deigo Cordovez as the mediator, “The agreement [which] concluded on 14 April 1988 by the foreign ministers of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union and the United States...called for the withdrawal of all Soviet troops within nine months, non-interference in each other’s affairs by Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the voluntary repatriation of the Afghan refugees” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 121). Although these accords received universal acclaim for ending the war, they are in fact seen as a factor for continuation. Some observers noticed that Cordovez had viewed the conflict in terms of a Cold War proxy between the

superpowers Moscow and Washington, rather than focusing on its political and social origins in Afghanistan.

Moreover, Cordovez included as few parties to the negotiation as possible and had left out the leaders of the Mujahideen resistance in the negotiations as well as other regional players such as Iran (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 121). Although later Cordovez did try to start a negotiation process between PDPA and the Seven-Party Alliance in Peshawar by sending out a memorandum to the U.S., Soviet Union, Pakistan and Afghanistan, his proposal was not adopted officially. The failure was due to two factors, internal disagreements between the Seven-Parties and Zia Ulhaq's agenda, which was to "establish in Kabul a government amenable to Pakistani interests and dominated by his fundamentalist Pashtun clients in Peshawar" (p. 122).

Gorbachev officially announced that Soviet troops would begin their withdrawal on February 8, 1988 and complete it within the next ten months. The Geneva Accords were officially signed on April 14 1988 in the UN branch at Geneva, Switzerland. However, the U.S. had informed the UN secretary-general that the U.S. reserved the right to supply aid to Mujahideen, as did the Soviet Union. In essence, the war went on as both side continued to send weapons covertly meeting 'restraint with restraint' (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 124). On February 15, 1989 the Soviet Union completed their withdrawal when its last convoy left Afghanistan, leaving Najib's government in charge. It was expected that Mujahideen would swarm Kabul and Najib's regime would fall within weeks after Soviet troops left but because they were unorganized, ill-equipped and lacked a concrete strategy, but Najib was able to hold on to power.

However, the Mujahideen continued their attacks on Najib's government while receiving support from the Pakistani Secret Service *ISI*, which mobilized fighters on the Peshawar side to capture the eastern Jalalabad city (Barfield, 2010, p. 241). *ISI*'s plan initially was to take Jalalabad and move in on the capital Kabul but Najib's army was able to hold off the attack and prevent the fall of the capital in March 1989 (p. 241). *ISI*'s failed attempt to bring down the regime gave Najib a much-needed dose of confidence. Moreover, the rebels had proved to be incapable of maintaining momentum and lacked a common command structure (p. 241). The internal disorganization and rivalries among the Mujahideen seemed to affect their goal of reaching political leadership.

In a country where winners and losers are determined by whoever "turns a perception into reality," Najib seemed like a winner who could stand on his own in the absence of Soviet Union (Barfield, 2010, p. 241). Moreover, the perception that Mujahideen would easily take Kabul after the Soviet withdrawal was now waning. Although the Mujahideen dismantled many PDPA outposts elsewhere in the country especially in eastern Khost province, the number of Mujahideen commanders "willing to cut deals" with Najib increased after the failed Jalalabad offensive. Najib's regime now appeared to "have more life left in it" but the important question remained whether with Russians out if Najib could "frame the ongoing conflict as an internal Afghan affair, a dispute among fellow Muslims that could not be justified as a jihad" (Barfield, 2010, p. 241).

Meanwhile the PDPA continued to receive money and arms from the Soviet Union while the Mujahideen were funded and received weapons largely from the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Defections and switching sides for personal gain and better pay rather

than ideology were common. Similarly “At the national level, the philosophical differences between the resistance and the Kabul regime, which seemed so sharp when the war began, blurred with time” (Barfield, 2010, p. 244). Najib capitalized on the Soviet withdrawal portraying himself as a nationalist and a Muslim who “could protect Afghanistan’s interests better than the Peshawar-based party leaders” (Barfield, 2010, p. 244).

Najib offered the Mujahideen cease-fires and autonomy to run their own militias, which attracted about 20 percent of the Mujahideen fighters into joining his government. Of the estimated 85,000-man army between 1988–89, the number of Mujahideen had been decreased to 55,000 by 1990 (Barfield, 2010, p. 244). Najib’s strategy was to use the Soviet Union financial support to offer resistance money and weapons while simultaneously consolidate power “through networks of patronage and by maintaining a powerful military” (Barfield, 2010, p. 244). In 1988, around seven hundred thousand militias were on Najib’s payroll while the Soviet Union was willing to “provide [Najib] with food, fuel, cash, and (covertly) weapons” (Barfield, 2010, p. 244).

However, Najib’s government also faced “devolution of power” after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. This shift in the structure and dynamics of the contemporary Afghan politics gave way for regional players to play a direct role in the country. For the first time in the recent history, the central government in Kabul lacked the traditional dominance it had exerted over the country for decades (Barfield, 2010, p. 246). The Mujahideen aligned with regional players out of “necessity” as they depended on the support of outside players and had to expand their power base beyond the local-level commanders to fight the war (p. 246). Although the PDPA continued to implement a

Kabul-central government to better control the territories, the country was eventually divided into seven military zones with their own autonomy. As the resistance gained momentum, Najib primarily focused on safe guarding the northern territory on the border with the Soviet Union that allowed the essential aid and supply line for the government (p. 246).

Najib's regime came to the brink of collapse, however, when Soviet aid was briefly cut during the failed coup against Gorbachev in August 1991 leaving Afghanistan "without enough fuel and food for the winter" (Barfield, 2010, p. 248). However, things became worse when all Russian support and aid suddenly stopped in December 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union, leaving Najib's regime in a critical condition (p. 248). The army had shrunk facing heavy desertions while corruption in the regime had "absorbed 85 to 90 percent of the Soviet aid intended for the population as a whole" (Barfield, 2010, p. 248). And because Najib's regime survival entirely depended on "distribution" of Soviet aid to the factions that made up his government's backbone, "the sudden end of such outside assistance was a fatal blow to his regime" (Barfield, 2010, p. 248). Eventually, in March 1992 Najib resigned and agreed to an UN-brokered transitional agreement, which would create a new government.

The end of Najib's regime alarmed all the parties as different factions began attempts to dominate the new government. However, none were powerful or big enough on their own to form a central government, which soon led to a process of political compromises and alliances based on region and ethnicity (Barfield, 2010, p. 248). The radical Khalqis that had opposed Najib joined Hekmatyar's Pashtun based Islamist party. The Uzbek Dostum joined with the influential northern Tajik Massud's party in the north.

This ensued a power struggle to take over the capital between Hekmatyar and Massud, with the latter beating the former by arriving a day earlier to occupy Kabul in April 1992 (p. 248). Meanwhile, Najib sought political asylum at the United Nations headquarters in Kabul and “disappeared from view” (Barfield, 2010, p. 249).

In mensurating M. Najibullah Ahmadzai’s regime, Mikhail Gorbachev had replaced Karmal with Najib as the new General Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee on May 4, 1986 (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 172). Although this transition (*I*) of power within the PDPA was peaceful, the civil war continued to rage on in virtually all parts of Afghanistan and hence, Najib struggled to legitimize (*0*) his regime (Maley, 2009, p. 90). Resistance continued (*0*) as Najib’s regime faced attacks in the northern Panjsheer Valley from Ahmad Shah Massud, in the central Hazarajat region from *Shura-i-Ettefaq* and in the eastern and southeastern regions from various Mujahideen commanders including Hekmatyar (p. 95). Regardless, Najib had continued to consolidate his power (*0*) to maintain his grip on the regime (p. 97). However, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1992, Najib’s regime collapsed (*0*) in April 1992 (p. 140).

Table 21: M. N. Ahmadzai Regime

DV Stability Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Legitimacy	0	0
Regime Transition	1	1
Uprising Frequency	0	0
Power Consolidation	0	0
Regime Failure	1	1
Grand Total		2

When Najib became the supreme head (0) of the PDPA, he began a complete purge of the party by routing out his political opposition (0) in order to take total control of the party (Maley, 2009, p. 98). He took over the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council in 1987 and ‘demoted’ many of Karmal’s supporters while “promoting persons loyal to him” (Maley, 2009, p. 98). Moreover, he ‘systematically’ removed all prominent influential elite within the PDPA who would stand in his way to gain complete authority (p. 98).

Table 22: M. N. Ahmadzai Regime Scores

IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Leader	0	0
Army Head	1	1
Government Positions	0	0
Political Representation	1	1
Political Opposition	0	0
Grand Total		2

By 1986, Najib had replaced all key figures from top positions within the party including the regional head of the party in Herat, the Secretary of the Revolutionary Council and head of the secret police (Maley, 2009, p. 98). He did, however, appoint the Minister of Defense (1) and allowed him to exercise full authority (p. 98).

Najib did make attempts to increase popular political representation (1) in his regime (Maley, 2009). He began a ‘National Reconciliation’ program to invite the Mujahideen to end the fight and join his government (Maley, 2009, p. 100). He also assembled a Loya Jirga, which adopted the ‘Constitution of the Republic of Afghanistan’, although the document did not limit Najib’s own power in any meaningful way (p. 101). It was merely used to “create an *image* of a constitutionalist order” (Maley, 2009, p. 101).

Najib also made efforts to appeal to the conservative mullahs through various strategies such as putting many mullahs on the government's pay roll and rebuilding damaged mosques (Maley, 2009, p. 102). However, the 'National Reconciliation' program had failed to draw significant opposition since it could not be held in rebel controlled areas (p. 103). The Mujahideen also rejected his offer of a Coalition Government since the power-sharing arrangement offered by Najib would still keep him in a "dominant position, with the Mujahideen offered only crumbs from the PDPA's dining table" (Maley, 2009, p. 103).

The Mujahideen & Burhanuddin Rabbani, 1992-1996

The Mujahideen, who ran resistance movements against the PDPA and Soviet Union, comprised of various ethnic factions within and outside Afghanistan, each based on the region they represented in the country, as well as having a foreign sponsor

(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 133). The Tajik Ismail Khan was operating in the western in Herat province where he had various battalions under his command. The Tajik Ahmad Shah Massud was operating from the northern Panjshir Valley, where by 1983 he had thousands of fighters under his command (p. 133). Pashtun Gulbuddin Hekmatyar had stationed just outside Kabul and had his base in the eastern part of the country.

Essentially, “Each functioned as a sponsor of fighting militias within the specific regions or localities from which they drew their support, substantially on the basis of ethno-linguistic or tribal identification...” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 135)

After Najib’s fall, the Mujahideen leaders formed an interim coalition government through the Peshawar Agreement brokered by the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on April 24, 1992 (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 141). The agreement provided “the framework for an interim government to be implemented in stages: the dispatch to Kabul of Mujaddadi, the leader of a small Pashtun party, as a compromise choice to head a two-month transitional government, to be followed by a four-month interim government headed by Rabbani, the leader of the Jamiat, as a prelude to the formation of a council that would act as an interim government for 18 months before the holding of a nationwide elections” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 141). The agreement, however, soon became dysfunctional because Hekmatyar refused to sign it as he was opposed to the

position of the defense minister (which was held by Ahmad Shah Massud) and also protested the inclusion of Uzbek General Dostum in the government (p. 142).

However, Hekmatyar's real anger stemmed from the fact that he was not offered the prime minister position in the coalition agreement. By August 1992, Hekmatyar had begun attacking Rabbani's government in Kabul by firing hundreds of rockets from the outskirts of Kabul killing over a thousand civilians and forcing hundreds of others to escape the capital (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 142). In March 1993, he was offered the position of prime minister in another agreement in Islamabad, but Hektmatyar refused again, choosing to remain in his posts and continued barraging Kabul with rockets. In January 1994, Dostum, who had defected from the coalition government, and Mujadaddi, who had failed to extend his two-month presidency, joined in an alliance with Hekmatyar. Together, these three "unleashed the most ferocious artillery and rocket attacks Kabul had ever experienced" destroying half the city and killing an estimated 25,000 civilians (p. 142).

Hektmayar's objective was "to ensure that the Rabbani government did not consolidate power by building a credible administration and expanding its territorial control, and that it did not acquire the capacity, with lavish international support, for the reconstruction of the country, and to dispense patronage, and thus attract loyalty of the population" (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 142). However, in this process, Hekmatyar had caused more harm to himself, the Mujahideen and the Islamic parties. He had destroyed most of the city but was still unable to take Kabul. Moreover, the chaos he had released on the city 'paved' the way for other actors to make grounds including the Taliban.

In the end, Hekmatyar had lost his own ‘credibility’ in the eyes of his prominent supporter, Pakistan, which had hope to use him “as a vehicle for their regional ambitions of achieving ‘strategic depth’ by installing an amenable client government in Kabul” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 143). In fact, even the Mujahideen began despising Hekmatyar and claimed that he had killed more Mujahideen than the communists in the jihad. In the end, Hekmatyar’s failed quest to take Kabul had left the country in chaos, which presented opportunities for other actors to rise to power and fill in the void.

In order to compete with the Peshawar-based parties, Afghan leaders such as Ahmad Shah Massud formed the National Commanders Shura (NCS) in October of 1990. In the aftermath of Najib’s fall, Massud’s supporters also urged him to take charge of the transitional government. Most of the NCS members were actual commanders who had “fought against the Soviets” (Barfield, 2010, p. 249). Massud, who proved to be one of the most successful military commanders during the Soviet occupation, did not prove to be an expert politician. An ethnic Tajik, he feared “provoking ethnic conflict...[leaving] the formation of the new government to the Peshawar leaders with the expectation that they would do what was best for the country and arrange for future elections” (p. 249). However, the Peshawar parties had “no intention of seeking a consensus or presenting themselves for any electoral approval. This was their chance to seize power and they snapped at the opportunity...” (Barfield, 2010, p. 249)

The Mujahideen had no shared goals after the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, which had forced them into a “marriage of convenience”. Their “...unity was based on resistance against the Soviet Union and its client Afghan government, not on any political platform” (Barfield, 2010, p. 249). Hence, the new “Islamic State of Afghanistan” created

by the Mujahideen after Najib's regime was a "mere shell" (Barfield, 2010, p. 249). The leaders of the Peshawar parties that formed the new government did not have a national political base in Afghanistan and were opposed to any proposition that "might expose their unpopularity or narrow base of support" (Barfield, 2010, p. 250). The parties similarly did not want former king Zahir Shah to play any role in the new government including a symbolic one because "Royal legitimacy through recognized tribal lineage held enough sway to undermine the Pakistani Mujahideen parties" (Barfield, 2010, p. 250). Therefore, even the strongest factions under the leadership of Rabbani and Hekmatyar, the two leaders of their respective Tajik Jamiat-i-Islami and Pashtun Hizb-i-Islami parties, "lacked prestigious social origins or a strong tribal following of their own..." (Barfield, 2010, p. 250)

The struggle for power among the Mujahideen was "inevitable" once the PDPA collapsed. In other words, "It was not the result of some Afghan penchant for blood feud of tribal rivalries (although these did play a part) but rather the predictable consequence of having armed and funded political-military factions in Pakistan that had long waited for such an opportunity to arise" (Barfield, 2010, p. 250). And because "...each faction leader realized that if he did not obtain power now, he never would" (Barfield, 2010, p. 250). Compromise to make a coalition was also difficult because most of these parties were formed based on personalities rather than ideologies. There were efforts by Saudi Arabia to bring everyone to the table to form a government, however, these attempts failed "immediately after the Peshawar parties arrived in Kabul" (Barfield, 2010, p. 250).

In the end, "All the sides committed atrocities, and what prestige the Mujahideen had gained by expelling the Soviets was lost as they fought each other in the ruins of

Kabul” (Barfield, 2010, p. 251). In the past political crises, Afghan leaders would rise to the moment “...in order to establish political order in the country by combining some recognized claim of political legitimacy with substantial aid from the outside world...[But] both of these conditions were now lacking” (Barfield, 2010, p. 251). Because the Soviet Union had brought to power Afghan leaders from the marginalized ethnic groups, each had to “legitimize their right” to rule. However, none of the Mujahideen leaders were able to “permanently” eliminate their rivals and become the sole rulers (p. 251).

As Soviet Union had dissolved and the U.S. did not consider Afghanistan strategically important anymore, foreign resources were becoming scarce. Even Saudi Arabia was left in an awkward position of aiding one Sunni Muslim group to kill another. While the UN sent emergency humanitarian aid, it was not successful in finding a political solution for the crisis nor did it have the means to do so (Barfield, 2010, p. 251). Pakistan’s ambition of installing a Pakistan friendly government in Kabul had also faltered. The country was in a civil war fueled by political crisis because factions did not have the ability to “...find any common agreement about what a future government should look like, let alone who should run it... [making] it impossible to unify the country politically” (Barfield, 2010, p. 251). A military unification was also not viable because “...each faction was strong enough to defend its own home region but too weak to extend its power beyond it” (Barfield, 2010, p. 252).

However, unlike Yugoslavia that was splitting into smaller states along ethnic lines, “Kabul was never challenged by regional or ethnic separatist movements. No Afghan leader saw the collapse of central power in Kabul as an opportunity to seek

independence. Instead, the regions backed one of the two major contenders for national power: Rabbani and Massud's Shura Nazar (Supervisory Council), or Hekmatyar's Shura-i-Hamahangi (Coordination Council)" (Barfield, 2010, p. 252). Although this division is often seen along regional and ethnic lines, it was not. For example, the Pashtun camp led by Hekmatyar made alliances with the Uzbek Dostum and Hazara Mazari to gain leverage against Massud and Rabbani (p. 252). Pakistan threw its support behind Hekmatyar while Russia backed Rabbani and Massud (p. 253). However, Kabul had effectively become a failed state "with its national institutions bankrupt and powerless" (Barfield, 2010, p. 253).

The Mujahideen reign had descended the country into chaos, civil war and political instability. The division in the country run on the local district and village level, as commanders would set up posts and "abuse the local population, engaging in rape and pillage without fear of punishment" (Barfield, 2010, p. 253). Although Rabbani was the president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, "...his writ did not run beyond the palace" (Barfield, 2010, p. 254). The country did not have a national army, as the fighters were bands organized by each faction. The rival Hekmatyar had become obsessed with taking over Kabul and seizing national government that he had never left the outskirts of Kabul and continued shelling the city. Surprisingly both camps faced the same difference, lacking a strong regional base in Afghanistan since both Rabbani and Hekmatyar were "party political leaders who had sat out the war in Pakistan" (Barfield, 2010, p. 254).

In mensurating the Mujahideen & Burhanuddin Rabbani regimes, after the collapse of the last communist PDPA regime in 1992, Afghanistan lacked viable political institutions (Maley, 2009, p. 163). The Mujahideen leaders had succeeded in achieving

their shared common goal of ousting the Soviet Union and bringing down their client government (p. 163). However, because they no longer had a shared objective, the Mujahideen leaders immediately split into different factions (p. 163). This division among the elite led to the gradual fragmentation of the political system and internal disagreements on who should lead the country (p. 164). Although after the collapse of the PDPA, the transition (1) of power was brokered peacefully through the Peshawar Agreement, civil war soon resumed amid disagreements over power sharing (p. 165).

The Peshawar Agreement distributed top government positions among the prominent Mujahideen leaders. Hekmatyar was offered the position of Prime Minister, *Jamiat-i-Islami* the Ministry of Defense and Gailani the Foreign Affairs Ministry (Maley, 2009, p. 165). Hekmatyar, who had hoped to be the president, rejected the prime minister position as an unsatisfactory offer and began a rebellion (0) against Rabbani's government (p. 165).

Table 23: B. Rabbani Regime Scores

DV Stability Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Legitimacy	0	0
Regime Transition	1	1
Uprising Frequency	0	0
Power Consolidation	0	0
Regime Failure	0	0
Grand Total		1

In August 1992, he had abandoned any attempts to be a part of the new government and began bombarding Kabul in protest killing over a 1,000 civilians (Maley, 2009, p. 165). Meanwhile the Council of Supreme Popular Settlement had met in December 1993 to unilaterally extend (0) Rabbani's term for another 18 months (Maley,

2009, p. 166). Rabbani’s opposition, however, had ‘boycotted’ the Council’s meeting and accused Rabbani of ‘manipulating’ it to ‘his advantage’ (p. 166). The Council, which was an unelected body, further ruined Rabbani government’s (0) legitimacy (p. 166).

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia pressured Rabbani to find a solution to the Hekmatyar situation and sign the new Islamabad Accords in March 1993, which would appoint Hekmatyar as the prime minister and form a new Cabinet (Maley, 2009, p. 166). However, the ‘distrust’ among the Mujahideen, especially between Hekmatyar and Massud, had been a major factor in the failure of a joint Mujahideen government (p. 167). Eventually Rabbani had effectively ousted Hekmatyar’s Hezbi Islami from the capital and the government. But it was under Rabbani’s government that Afghanistan had disintegrated into factionalism and descended into chaos. His Defense Minister Massud could not protect the citizens in the capital Kabul (p. 168).

Table 24: B. Rabbani Regime Scores

IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Leader	0	0
Army Head	0	0
Government Positions	0	0
Political Representation	1	1
Political Opposition	0	0
Grand Total		1

By mid 1994, complete civil war had broken out between Rabbani-Massud and Hekmatyar-Dostum-Hezbi-i-Wahdat parties (p. 169). However, the Rabbani government’s total collapse (0) did not occur until September 1996 by a new emerging force calling itself the Taliban (p. 177).

The national army (*0*) under the Mujahideen had disintegrated completely and country was under the control of armed militia force, each loyal to their Mujahideen warlords (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 201). Each faction had thousands of armed militia and controlled a portion of the country where they drew support. Political representation (*0*), similarly, did not exist as the country was effectively ruled along ethnic lines and strongmen exercised authority (p. 206).

Although Rabbani and Massud had set up a 'national' government (*0*), most top government positions (*0*) were distributed among their own Jamiat Party, with Rabbani appointed as the President and Massud as the Minister of Defense (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 207). Moreover, the government's authority extended only beyond the capital Kabul to a few northern provinces under Massoud's authority (p. 207). Political opposition (*0*) was violent and bloody as all prominent Mujahideen leaders continued to battle for the ultimate supremacy to extended their authority over the entire country, but none succeeded, and the war for Kabul left hundreds of thousands dead and forcing millions to leave the country (p. 208).

The Taliban & Mullah M. Omar, 1996-2001

The Taliban rose to power as a military force during the Afghan civil war in the 1990s. The Taliban, the Arabic plural for *Talib* (“religious student”), was a Sharia movement based on “purely religious inspiration that was able to transform itself into a motivated and effective military force...” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 143) The Taliban predominantly recruited members from the madrassas in rural Afghanistan and in Pakistan. Most of the fighters that joined them were young Afghans born in refugee-camps and had never seen war before (p. 143). These new ‘children of jihad’ were “therefore rootless and receptive to the ideological influences to which they were exposed in the madrassas of Pakistan” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 143). The Taliban rose to power at a time when the inter-fighting among the Mujahideen parties had created total anarchy and chaos throughout the country, which had effectively been divided into territories controlled by different factions. Hence, the Taliban’s initial objectives were to put “an end to the activities of petty ex-Mujahideen warlords who were preying on the local population, and of establishing order and security by disarming their militia” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 145).

The group secured their first major victory when a force of 200 Taliban fighters seized a large weapons convoy from Hekmatyar in October 1994. Providing a safe passage to a commercial 30-truck Pakistani convoy further strengthened their position with their new master Pakistan (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 145). By November 1994, the Taliban had grown into a well-organized 2,500 force and had captured their first major city, Kandahar (p. 145). While Pakistan’s ISI was providing them with brand new weapons, in Kandahar they had seized Mujahideen tanks, helicopters and planes (p. 145).

Other nearby cities of Zabul and Uruzgan were taken without ‘a shot being fired’ while Helmand fell to their control after some heavy fighting. By 1995, The Taliban had taken western Herat and most southern Afghanistan. And by September 1996, the group had completely defeated Hekmatyar’s forces in eastern Paktia, with Ahmad Shah Massud left as their main rival (p. 151). Moreover, by September 26, the Taliban had reached and captured Kabul, forcing Massud to complete retreat from the capital. With Kabul’s capture, the Taliban had essentially captured over 70 percent of the country by mid-1996 (p. 152).

In May 1997, a force of 2,500 Taliban captured the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif after heavy fighting. Taliban leaders were flown in by Pakistan to Mazar, where in a press conference, Pakistan officially recognized them as the ‘government of Afghanistan,’ convincing Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates to ‘follow suit’ (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 153). In Mazar, the Taliban faced strong resistance from the Hazaras who had pushed back. When the Hazara forces took back Mazar in September 1997 forcing the Taliban to retreat to Kunduz, the latter cut off all roads leading to Hazarajat from the south and north to force the Hazaras into surrender. By winter 1997, 300,000 Hazaras in Bamiyan, Wardak and Ghor provinces were starving (p. 155). The Taliban were especially anti-Hazara, branding them *munafiqun* (‘hypocrites masquerading as Muslims’). By September 1998, the Taliban had made a comeback and defeated the Hazaras, taking back Mazar in fierce fighting (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 157).

Mullah Mohammad Omar, the leader of the Taliban had come from a poor Ghilzai Pashtun family in southern Helmand province. He was a commander in the Hizibi-i-Islami faction fighting against Najib’s regime from 1989 until 1992

(Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 191). The Taliban officially declared Omar as their leader in March 1996 days before they sacked Kabul and toppled Rabbani's government (p. 191). A 1200 member *shura* ("Grand Assembly") gathered in Kandahar and gave Omar the title of *Amir al-Muminin* ("Commander of the Believers") (p. 191). It is important to notice that the shura that chose Omar, was unlike a traditional Afghan Loya Jirga, and was based on the Islamic Arab shura practiced by the previous Islamic caliphs centuries ago (p. 191). In other words, the political legitimacy of Omar's appointment came only from the *ulema* and religious scholars as opposed to other elements that usually played a role in electing leaders such tribal chiefs, the elite, the educated middle class, royal family, and so on.

After the Taliban ousted Rabbani's government in September 1996, they installed new power structures and eliminated the traditional bureaucracy in Kabul, which they had considered corrupt. First, Omar set up a 10-member Supreme Shura in Kandahar that oversaw all government decisions and reported directly to him. In Kabul, another lower level 14-member ministerial shura was set up where the 'ministers' were held accountable to the Kandahar shura and carried out nominal 'ministerial' functions (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 192). Omar often overruled the Kabul minister shura's decisions and "There was thus a confusing dichotomy of power that did not make life easy for those who had to deal with them. The Taliban had unified but not monolithic power structure" (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 192).

Moreover, the Taliban had replaced all Hazara, Tajik and Uzbek bureaucrats in Kabul with less experienced Pashtuns. Women were entirely ousted from government positions as well as other civilian fields such as education (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 193).

Omar's friends and colleagues who primarily consisted of Kandahari Pashtuns had dominated membership in the Kandahar Shura. Most important government decisions were made in the Kandahar Shura, where provincial governors, military commanders and tribal leaders were also invited, but the council in practice was a 'loose and amorphous body' (p. 193).

Most higher-level government officials including mayors, governors, police chiefs were appointed from the Kandahari Pashtuns, including in majority Persian speaking cities such as Mazar, Herat and Kabul. The Kabul council of ministers did not include Dari speaking Kabulis, the '*lingua franca*', which made day-to-day government business difficult. The few non-Kandaharis that existed in the provincial government positions were often transferred around to prevent them from amassing political power. In short, "... Political power was centralized at the level of the Kandaharis under Omar, to whom all revenues were also remitted" (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 193).

Mullah Omar was also the commander-in-chief of the military shura, which included a chief general staff and 'chief of staffs' but there was no 'discernable hierarchical structure in the officers and commanders ranks. This was also true of the entire regime since "The Taliban movement began and largely remained a military organization..." (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 193) The Taliban army numbered between 25,000 to 30,000 fighters throughout their rule while around 30% of their manpower came from Pakistani madras (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 194). Effectively a military rule, the Taliban had controlled over 90% of the country by late 1998 except in the north where Massud's Northern Alliance had held on (p. 197). They rejected any UN mediation for

peace negotiation because their ultimate goal was to impose their will through a military rule without sharing power.

However, the regime was incapable of providing even basic services to the people and by 1990, over 70 international NGOs had been operating in Afghanistan, providing aid and food to a poverty-stricken country (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 197). During the 1990s, millions of Afghans had left their homes and settled in as refugees in the neighboring countries, with 3,722,000 in Pakistan and 2,940,000 in Iran (p. 197). Women were confined to their homes and girls were banned from going to schools, which also affected boys' education since most teachers in general were women (198). The Taliban had imposed bizarre interpretation of the sharia law that included mandatory rules such as dictating how to dress in public, banning all music and traditional festivals like the Nawroz (p. 198).

But even though the Taliban were not interested in government responsibilities, they exercised an effective monopoly of using force until they had achieved their objective. Because they were a military organization, and refused to share power, their tactics mainly included 'military option until last pockets of resistance' (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 203). In fact, Mullah Omar was not even a head of the state since he had assumed the more religious title of 'Commander of the Believers' by symbolically wrapping himself in the Cloak of the Prophet Muhammad in Kandahar (p. 203). Therefore, he was the "amir of an Islamic emirate that was more religious than statist in its connotations, and Kandahar, not Kabul, was the 'capital' of the Taliban Afghanistan" (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 204). In short, "Theirs was a 'theocratic' regime, legitimized by

religious and not by a nationalist ideology nor by tribal genealogies, which had no equivalent in the contemporary Muslim world” (Rasanayagam, 2003, p. 205).

The Taliban movement was historically different because it had exclusively relied on a clergy leadership as well as recruiting primarily from the displaced Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Refugee camps made an easy recruiting base because they tended to be generally poor, with no opportunities for the youth and were usually manipulated by political factions (Barfield, 2010, p. 256). In the case of Afghan refugees, much of the propaganda revolved around regaining control of a ‘lost’ homeland. However, this ideal recruiting rhetoric shifted when a new generation of Afghan refugees had been born, who had never seen the country. In this sense, “The past is idealized because the present is so miserable and the future so uncertain” (Barfield, 2010, p. 256). In other words, “Groups with extreme messages, whether their ideologies are political, ethnic, or religious, galvanize their followers not only with visions of reclaiming a lost homeland but also of then transforming it” (Barfield, 2010, p. 256).

Afghan refugees, who had tasted victory by defeating the Soviet Union, were also ready to return to their homeland. However, the Mujahideen, who descended the country into chaos, disorder and instability, had slashed this hope for many refugees. Although initially hailed as the liberators of the Soviet occupation, the Mujahideen had lost all respect after their pity fights and a bloody civil war (Barfield, 2010, p. 257). Such a discontent gave the Taliban an opportunity to capitalize in two ways: to recruit young refugee boys and give them a new kind of jihad, one that would bring “a truer version” of Afghanistan. Second, the Taliban drew on the discontent in areas where the population

faced chaos and were ready to promise their allegiance to any group or ideology that brought stability in their daily lives (p. 257)

Furthermore, the Taliban movement initially became extremely popular with the people in the south because it promised “security of life and property to a region that lacked both” (Barfield, 2010, p. 257). The Taliban’s style of “law and order” strategy initially “overshadowed the movement’s radical Islamist ideology, which the Taliban did not implement in full until they were better established” (Barfield, 2010, p. 257). Calling themselves God’s servants, most of the Taliban’s leadership was low-level religious clergy who relied on tribal military forces that were poorly organized. The Taliban’s initial attacks were primarily on weapon depots to arm their foot soldiers as no central government or army could challenge them.

The movement grew steadily replacing Mujahideen outposts while also recruiting former Soviet trained fighters ex-Khalqis who now adhered to an entirely conflicting ideology of Islam. Moreover, Pakistan directly supplied weapons and aid to the group, without which, it would have not survived (Barfield, 2010, p. 258). The Taliban were welcomed for bringing security and stability but their radical social and political policies especially in the urban areas proved extremely controversial. It was a regime that combined Salafi Islam with the Pashtun code of Honor, Pashtunwali. Moreover, “Their religious interpretations were often idiosyncratic and tended to dress local custom in the guise of religion” (Barfield, 2010, p. 261).

The movement largely faced two oppositions: on an intellectual level and an ethnocentric level. The former was voiced by Muslim clerics from the al Azhar in Egypt who denounced the group for lack of knowledge of true Islami after meeting with the

Taliban leadership. The second opposition came from ordinary Afghans who believed that the Islam practiced in the country for centuries did not need any change because “Afghans were victors of a successful jihad and inhabitants of the only country in the region that had never come under colonial rule” (Barfield, 2010, p. 263). The Taliban argued, however, that they were best fit to rule the country because they united Pashtun ethnic groups and diminished their existing rivalries by “appealing to a broader commonality that rose above ordinary tribal divisions” (Barfield, 2010, p. 263). In fact, “...one of the reasons for their particular success among Pashtuns was their ability to sidestep existing tribal leaders hamstrung by local rivalries” (p. 263). However, this rhetoric failed to go beyond a Pashtun base and for non-Pashtun and minorities, the Taliban were an evil force that was establishing a Pashtun political hegemony they had overthrown during the Soviet invasion.

Moreover, the Taliban regime also struggled to win any significant international recognition and support. Only Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates recognized and established diplomatic ties with the regime (Barfield, 2010, p. 264). Little international recognition was a blow for a regime that heavily dependent on foreign aid, which had decreased significantly. Pakistan, a poor country itself, could not meet the deficit so Taliban relied heavily on United Nations aid, especially food. Although the regime had violated the UN principles in every way possible such as killing Najib in UN’s Kabul compound, and losing its seat in the headquarters in New York, the United Nations could not cut humanitarian aid to the completely isolated country. Tensions were high between Taliban and the international community in early 1998 after Taliban had allowed Osama Bin Laden to set up camp in Afghanistan.

The U.S. had launched missiles on Afghanistan after the attacks by Bin Laden on U.S. embassies in East Africa demanding that he be returned. Saudi Arabia withdrew their diplomatic mission urging Mullah Omar to hand over bin Laden but Omar rejected the request and abused Saudi for cutting ties (Barfield, 2010, p. 266). Both Saudi and the U.S. wanted to try bin Laden for terrorist attacks but Omar was unwilling to expel bin Laden citing the code of honor Pashtunwali, according to which, hospitality (*melmastia*) requires to protect a guest with your life. However, because “by the same code a guest must accept the authority of his host, Mullah Omar assured the world that he had forbidden bin Laden from engaging in any improper activities on Afghan soil...” (Barfield, 2010, p. 268)

After the September 11 attacks, however, the equation changed completely as Afghanistan was now in the center of attention. The U.S. gave an ultimatum to the Taliban to expel Bin Laden or face annihilation. Omar refused these calls including from its patron Pakistan, which also eventually abandoned the regime and sided with the U.S. (Barfield, 2010, p. 269). The Taliban, who had assassinated Massud two days prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, had miscalculated that perhaps this would “derail an expected US counterattack” (Barfield, 2010, p. 269). After failing to meet the deadline, by October 2001 the U.S. launched airstrikes against the Taliban while the Northern Alliance began mobilizing forces on the ground. Mullah Omar had threatened that the U.S. would fall like previous occupying empires such as the British and the Soviet Union but his regime was overthrown in two weeks. Taliban abandoned the capital Kabul in order to regroup in their stronghold Kandahar but tribal leaders saw the Taliban regime

was faltering and regained power. In the end, both Mullah Omar and Bin Laden had fled the country and took shelter in Pakistan (p. 270).

In mensurating the Taliban and Mullah Omar regimes, they were a ‘militarized force’ whose rise to power began as a movement called *Da Afghanistan da Talibano Islami Tahrik* (“The Islamic Movement of Taliban”) in 1994 (Maley, 2009, p. 182).

Taliban drew their financial and military support from Pakistan, who had abandoned their long-time client Hekmatyar in favor of the new sudden rise of the Taliban (p. 183).

Although majority of the Taliban were Afghans, Pakistan had directly trained around 80,000 to 100,000 Pakistanis who fought with the Taliban in Afghanistan from 1994 to 1999 (p. 185). By 1996, Taliban had become a formidable force that drove out most of the Mujahideen warlords and had captured the capital Kabul.

The Taliban’s transition (*0*) to power came at the expense of ousting the Rabbani government and years of civil war (Maley, 2009, p. 180). From early 1994 until late 1996, uprisings continued (*0*) as the Taliban and the Mujahideen government fought against each other to establish dominance over Afghanistan (p. 181). The Taliban, who made sweeping military victories against the Mujahideen across Afghanistan, had grown from a small force of a few hundred to thousands (p. 180). By September 1996, the Taliban had captured Kabul after months of heavy fighting and forced out the Tajik Rabbani-Massoud government to abandon the capital (p. 180).

The Taliban had appointed a Ghilzai Pashtun Mullah Mohammad Omar as their leader (Maley, 2009, p. 186). Although the Taliban attempted to legitimize (*0*) their government through several Islamic acts, they never received formal recognition either internally or internationally with a few exceptions. Domestically, Mullah Omar took the

religious title of *Amir al-Momineen* (“Commander of the Faithful”) bestowed on him by a group of *ulema* (p. 186). Omar subsequently appeared in public to lift the Cloak of the Prophet Muhammad (*Khirqah-I mubarak*), one of the most sacred symbols in Islam as a sign to further increase his authority (p. 187).

Table 25: M. M. Omar Regime Scores

DV Stability Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Legitimacy	0	0
Regime Transition	0	0
Uprising Frequency	0	0
Power Consolidation	0	0
Regime Failure	0	0
Grand Total		0

Soon, the new regime renamed the government as “The Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan”, a symbolically significant title that stamped their absolute authority and ended any debate of sharing power (Maley, 2009, p. 187). The Taliban’s ambitions were to stay in power (0) for the long run as they began imposing their rule and established power bases in various parts of Afghanistan (p. 191). However, the regime’s inevitable fall (0) would come after the September 11 attacks when the Taliban government was brought down in a U.S. military invasion in December 2001 (p. 222). Although the regime ran “through motions of ‘state-like activity’,” Mullah Omar maintained ‘superordinate authority’ (0) and was the supreme the head of the regime (Maley, 2009, p. 196).

Mullah Omar was appointed by a shura of 1,200 *ulemas* and mullahs in Kandahar but the Taliban, however, did not bother to convene a *Loya Jirga* from around the country to appoint their leader (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 221). Omar had the

authority over all legal and civil matters through his title and Sharia Law was the de facto state religion (p. 222). Moreover, the Taliban established two shuras, a 10-member Supreme Shura in Kandahar, and a 14-member Shura in Kabul, both of which were dominated by Kandahari Pashtuns and the Kabul shura did not include any native Kabulis (p. 222). Although the Kabul Shura did establish government ministerial positions (0) and was responsible to run the administrative government duties, the ministers' decisions were often overruled by Mullah Omar's Shura in Kandahar (p. 222).

Table 26: M. M. Omar Regime Scores

IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Leader	0	0
Army Head	0	0
Government Positions	0	0
Political Representation	0	0
Political Opposition	0	0
Grand Total		0

The Taliban's army (0) did not have formal hierarchies but local commanders were provided with lump of cash to equip and feed their fighters (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 222). Political representation (0) was also one-sided or overwhelmingly biased in favor of Pashtuns as the Taliban replaced all Non-Pashtun bureaucrats in high government positions with Kandaharis (p. 222). And lastly, the Taliban did not allow any form of political opposition (0) and relied on strategies of suppression and brutal practices (p. 224). They implemented a form of exclusive Sharia Law and had established the 'Department for the Propagation of Virtue and Suppression of Vice', a body of religious police who enforced religious codes corporal punishment (p. 225).

Hamid Karzai, 2002-2009

Afghans, especially non-Pashtun groups, initially welcomed the U.S. invasion and ousting of Taliban. Twenty years of civil war had destroyed much of the country's infrastructure and institutions so the U.S. had to create a new state to bring stability and order (Barfield, 2010, p. 272). Millions of refugees returned enthusiastically from the neighboring countries. Although Afghanistan was a failed state in 2001, it was a unified nation. The lack of a central government was "counterbalanced by a strong sense of national unity forged during the Soviet war as well as the refugee experiences in neighboring Pakistan and Iran" (Barfield, 2010, p. 278). Moreover, "Toppling one Afghan regime required replacing it with another" (Barfield, 2010, p. 283). However, the U.S. did not have such candidate and gave the United Nations the task to choose the new Afghan leader after Taliban's fall.

In November 2001, The UN convened an international conference in Bonn, Germany to create "a provisional government and apportion leadership roles..." (Barfield, 2010, p. 283) The conference was attended by representatives from the Northern Front that had helped overthrow the Taliban; former king Zahir Shah's royal family members; and the Mujahideen that were based off Peshawar in Pakistan (p. 283). However, "The Taliban were excluded from the talks, and because of their previous ties to the Taliban, the Pashtuns had poorer representation than they would have normally expected" (Barfield, 2010, p. 283). However, "Despite this disadvantage, the conference elected Hamid Karzai, an ethnically Pashtun from the Popalzai tribe in Qandahar, to head the provisional administration, while the United Front took over most of the key

ministries. The whole government was "...subject to a vote of approval by a national Loya Jirga, to be held in Kabul within a year" (Barfield, 2010, p. 284).

The conference was seen as a remarkable success showing how quickly the parties came together and put aside their past differences. The United Front, who had just ousted a Pashtun-dominant Taliban regime, agreed to elect a Pashtun head of state. Hamid Karzai's appointment also marked the return of the Pashtun Durrani to power since most recent leaders had come from their rival Pashtun ethnic group the Ghilzais such as the PDPA leaders Amin, Tarakai, Najib as well as Jihadi factions such as Hekmatyar, Khalis, Sayyaf and the Taliban leader Omar (Barfield, 2010, p. 284). The rise of the Pashtun Durrani back in power and how they had outdone the Ghilzais could be explained by the traditional template of power according to which "the Durrani held substantial advantages over their Ghilzai rivals because they were more skilled in the arts of peace than they were in that of war" (Barfield, 2010, p. 284).

Karzai, was not a well-known figure in Afghan politics. He had tried to organize revolts against the Taliban after they had killed his father and quickly assumed leadership of his Sadozai tribe of the Pashtun Durrani group according to custom. The Populzais had also approached him to return to Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks to "lead them against the Taliban" (Barfield, 2010, p. 289). The question that arose was why the non-Pashtun tribes and the leaders of the United Front ceded powers to a Pashtun leader instead of taking the leadership themselves. The answer lay in the notion that "...after a quarter century of war in Afghanistan, no faction was keen to engage in more fighting if a political compromise was possible. Nor did any faction wish to dismember the country—another alternative" (Barfield, 2010, p. 291). Former king Zahir Shah's return to power

was also unlikely because he had been living in exile and was considered a weak leader even though he still had a huge following base in Afghanistan. The U.S. had also strongly opposed the return of the monarchy.

Hamid Karzai was ratified as the interim president in the 2002 Loya Jirga until a new constitution could be drawn and new elections could be held. Held in the capital Kabul, it was attended by one thousand elected representatives and five hundred delegates picked by the organizers representing virtually all ethnic groups and regions as well as including a high number of women members (Barfield, 2010, p. 296). The Jirga succeeded in its goal of appointing an interim government headed by Hamid Karzai and his cabinet but was subject to harsh verbal exchanges and walkouts over filling the executive head of the state (p. 296). Zahir Shah's supporters especially from Southern Pashtun parts of the country staged a confrontation and demanded that the former king be elected as the head of the state. This was resolved after the U.S. special envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad convinced the king to withdraw in favor of Karzai thereby ending the stand off (p. 297).

The next Jirga that followed was the 2003 constitutional Loya Jirga of five hundred representatives from all ethnic groups and political parties except the Taliban. The objective of the Jirga was to ratify a new constitution and answer the question whether the new government should be a strong, centralized, presidential system or a decentralized, parliamentarian, federal system with regional autonomy (Barfield, 2010, p. 298). The minority groups, who demanded a parliamentary system with the prime minister post, argued for more regional autonomy from the capital while the supporters of the centralized government countered that decentralization of power would strengthen

local conservative elements (p. 298). Pashtuns favored a strong central government under Karzai in hopes of restoring the Pashtun dominance again. The international community, including the U.S. also favored a strong presidential system as a better way to deal with Kabul.

The Jirga eventually ratified the constitution, which gave the parliament the power to confirm cabinet members as well as hold them accountable. Minority languages were given official status while the Shiites were allowed “legal parity” with the predominantly Sunni country (Barfield, 2010, p. 299). The Mujahideen factions also won their demands that all laws should be in compliance with Islamic principles. Additionally, the constitution restored women’s rights, considered a controversial issue throughout the history of the country.

After the new constitution was adopted, next followed the presidential elections of 2004 to pick a head of state in a full democratic electoral process. Eighteen presidential nominees were on the ballot, four of which were considered serious contenders along with the favorite Karzai (Barfield, 2010, p. 300). Others included Abdullah Abdullah, the Tajik leader of the former Northern Front; Dostum, the Uzbek head of the Junbesh-i-Milli Islamic party; and Mohaqiq, the Hazara leader of the Hizb-i-Wahdat party (p. 300). Hamid Karzai emerged as the winner with 56 percent of the eight million votes cast. The turn out had been very enthusiastic among Afghans who genuinely seemed to participate despite violent efforts by the Taliban to interrupt the elections.

Karzai’s votes came primarily from the eastern and southern Pashtun areas but he also surprisingly received high support from the Tajiks. The Hazara and Uzbek candidates “were confined to their own ethnic groups or the regions they dominated”

(Barfield, 2010, p. 300) Although the elections legitimized Hamid Karzai's government in the eyes of the international community, its impact on Afghans was less clear. In other words, "The presidential elections were an innovation that while allowing the expression of popular opinion, could not by itself create political legitimacy" (Barfield, 2010, p. 300). Karzai would be judged by how successful he would be in the future in bringing security, economic improvement and a stable government and an "electoral victory would mean nothing if he failed to do so" (Barfield, 2010, p. 301).

The parliamentary elections, initially scheduled to take place with the presidential elections, were held one year later in 2005. However, the newly elected president Hamid Karzai was "less enthusiastic about seeing a branch of government equally empowered" (Barfield, 2010, p. 301). The president was against political parties in the parliament and refused to recognize them legally. He argued that forming parties would bring back the political instability of the PDPA and confuse voters. In an attempt to "Further weaken the emergence of an organized opposition, candidates could not even identify themselves as members of a political party on the ballot" (Barfield, 2010, p. 301). Such a tactic would undermine a candidate's ability to appeal to the voters through "name recognition, ethnicity, region, and social standing" (Barfield, 2010, p. 301).

Because there were no run-off rounds in the "first past the post" voting system in the parliamentary elections, most winning candidates only received less than 10 percent of the votes because seats were contested by over a hundred nominees in some areas (Barfield, 2010, p. 301). Hence, "the chances of winning a seat better resembled a lottery than a political contest" (p. 301). Despite these initial blows to weaken the body as an opposing political institution to his administration, Karzai was dealt several blows by the

parliament, when in 2006, it rejected a proposed template for the parliament, as well as disqualifying his less educated conservative nominee to the Supreme Court Chief position.

Karzai's government eventually failed to create an "institutionalized state structure" (Barfield, 2010, p. 304). His "...model of government was patrimonial, in which the government administration and its assets were an extension of the ruler. In such a system, personal relationships determined everything from who would amass personal wealth to who would be thrown in jail" (Barfield, 2010, p. 304). For instance, Karzai would often avoid confrontation with his enemies, replace and transfer incompetent and corrupt governors from one province to another. Moreover, "Karzai did not use assets of the state to centralize power so much as he used them to create a patronage network of personal clients bound to him" (Barfield, 2010, p. 304). However, Karzai's popularity had started to decline after 2005 "...because of his inability to create an effective administration, a deteriorating security situation, and a lack of economic progress" (Barfield, 2010, p. 310).

On the other hand, "The Afghan government...was treated less as a partner than a nuisance" by the U.S. (Barfield, 2010, p. 316). Karzai's government was dependent on foreign aid but "75 percent of aid funds were disbursed and delivered outside official Afghan government channels" (Barfield, 2010, p. 316). Bush's administration had declared Afghanistan a "mission accomplished" thereby slashing aid by 38 percent from \$4.3 billion in 2005 to \$3.1 billion in 2006 (p. 318). Internally, the situation became increasingly unstable amidst insecurity, a corrupt government and abuse of power by the Karzai administration. Afghans, who seemed highly enthusiastic about elections a year

ago, were discontent with the new government. Moreover, a deadly insurgency was on the rise as the number of suicide bombs increased by 400 percent between 2005 and 2006 from 27 to 139 (p. 319).

Political and economic conditions contrasted so starkly by region that Afghanistan had virtually divided into two different countries: “the north, west, and center, which were relatively stable; and the south and east, which were not. Since the south and east were predominantly Pashtun, this division had an ethnic component as well” (Barfield, 2010, p. 322). Eastern and northern regions were stable and thriving in the absence of violence and insurgent presence while the “south lacked security, had a stagnant or declining standard of living, and had become dependent on opium as a cash crop” (Barfield, 2010, p. 323). Eventually foreign aid was stalled and reconstruction projects were often abandoned due to lack of security.

In mensurating the Hamid Karzai regime, Karzai’s attempts to build a strong base in his southern regions through promises of money and appeals to “moderate Taliban” were faltering (Barfield, 2010, p. 324). Although the U.S. had ousted the Taliban regime with ease in 2001, “There was no military follow up designed to ensure that they could not return to mobilize their followers, who had simply returned home after their defeat” (Barfield, 2010, p. 325). The Pashtun dominated areas bordering Pakistan had become the hotbed of the insurgency against the Afghan government, its ally the United States and the International Coalition Forces. The leaders of the insurgency were the same people fighting the Soviets, changed from angry young men to aging fighters who were now joined by Al Qaeda (p. 325).

The Taliban had made a comeback as the ‘Neo-Taliban,’ launching an insurgency (0) against Karzai’s government (p. 246). Although they lacked an extensive support base since most of Afghanistan was under the authority of the central government, the Taliban were ‘quite adept’ in aligning themselves with dissatisfied elements by “exploiting local grievances, particularly those of non-elite Ghilzai Pashtuns directed against Durrani...” (Maley, 2009, p. 247) Moreover, both the Karzai government and the U.S. struggled to end the insurgency as their joint ‘counter-insurgency’ campaign faced multiple challenges such as ineffectiveness, misguided airstrikes, lack of on-the-ground intelligence, and the failed attempts to minimize casualties (p. 251).

Table 27: H. Karzai Regime Scores

DV Stability Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Legitimacy	1	1
Regime Transition	1	1
Uprising Frequency	0	0
Power Consolidation	1	1
Regime Failure	1	1
Grand Total		4

Despite the security challenges, Hamid Karzai’s government marked the first in centuries where a regime had constitutional term limits (1) and was elected in free national elections (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 250). Similarly, Karzai’s second term as president also ensured that the government did not fall (1) amidst the power transition (p. 252). Hamid Karzai was elected as the democratically elected head of the state (1) in free national elections, even though there were claims of ‘fraud’ (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 252). The first national elections had a turnout of 75% around the country and the other top three candidates included an Uzbek Abdul Rashid Dostum, a Shiite

Muhammad Mohaqiq, a Tajik Younus Qanuni, the first woman candidate Massuda Jalal, and the eventual winner Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun (p. 253).

Karzai’s cabinet was also ethnically balanced as he appointed (*I*) a former Ahmad Shah Massoud successor, the Tajik Mohammad Fahim as the Defense Minister (p. 253). Moreover, other top government positions (*I*) were also representative of virtually all ethnic groups, even though the Tajiks had dominated most key ministries (p. 253). Karzai appointed former Mujahideen warlord Ismail Khan as the minister of energy, Dostum to a top army position, as well as having a Hazara vice-president on his ticket (p. 253). Although there was a clear bias for appointing or rather awarding former warlords national and local government positions, political representation (*I*) was an all time high in decades (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 253).

Table 28: H. Karzai Regime Scores

IV Ethnic Inclusion Indicators	Scores	Total
Regime Leader	1	1
Army Head	1	1
Government Positions	1	1
Political Representation	1	1
Political Opposition	1	1
Grand Total		5

Furthermore, in 2005, according to the new constitution, parliamentary and provincial council elections were held where more than 5,000 candidates ran for the 249 seats in the Wolesi Jirga (“Lower House”) (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010, p. 253). Members to the 102-seat Mesharano Jirga (“Upper House”) were ‘filled’ partially through votes and some by presidential appointment (p. 253). A large number of women were elected for the first time to the Parliament and the Constitution guaranteed ‘equal’

rights for women as well reserving 25 seats for women in the Parliament (p. 269). The Constitution also guaranteed various political opposition (*I*) and fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of press and while making Islam as the state religion, it allowed people of other religions to practice their faith freely (Maley, 2009, p. 238).

With the end of Hamid Karzai regime's analysis, this chapter ends the within case analysis of each regime. Here, the results of all the total 15 cases were discussed individually. The next chapter discusses the overall results of all the cases by highlighting the hypotheses, scores, and general trends. The scores for all the cases are presented in a table below.

CHAPTER FIVE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The goal of this study was to examine the relationship between regime stability and ethnic inclusion. Fourteen cases, consisting of all the regimes in Afghanistan from 1880 until 2009, were taken under study. Each case was assigned two sets of indicators based on the dependent variable *regime stability* and independent variable *ethnic inclusion*. If the indicator met the criteria, it received a score of 1, for a total of 5 possible scores for each variable. However, if the indicators did not meet the criteria, they received a score of 0.

The scores were then used to test the hypothesis, which assumes that the more ethnically inclusive a regime is, the more likely it is to be stable. For instance, when a case scored low on one variable, it would similarly score low on the other, and vice-versa. In other words, a hypothesis would be robust in cases with the lowest difference for their combined scores, while it would be weak in cases with the highest differences in scores.

The overall results for the hypothesis are divided into three categories: cases with perfect scores (i.e. a difference of 0); cases with the second lowest score (i.e. difference of 1); and cases with highest scores (i.e. difference of plus 1). As illustrated in the Table 1.2 below, most cases fall into the first category including the regimes of Habibullah Kalakani, M. Nadir Khan, M. Zahir Shah, Hafizullah Amin, Babrak Karmal, M. Najibullah, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Mullah M. Omar. In other words, all of these regimes had a difference of 0, which supports the hypothesis that if a regime was ethnically inclusive it was also stable; and vice-versa, that is, a regime that was not ethnically inclusive, was unstable.

Table 1. 2: Overall Case Scoring Results

No.	Case	Ethnic Inclusion Scores	Stability Scores	Difference
1	Abdur Rahman Khan	2	1	1
2	Habibullah Khan	4	3	1
3	Amanullah Khan	4	1	3
4	Habibullah Kalakani	0	0	0
5	M. Nadir Khan	2	2	0
6	M. Zahir Shah	3	3	0
7	M. Daud Khan	1	2	1
8	Nur M. Tarakai	1	0	1
9	Hafizullah Amin	0	0	0
10	Babrak Karmal	1	1	0
11	M. Najibullah Ahmadzai	2	2	0
12	Burhanuddin Rabbani	1	1	0
13	Mullah M. Omar	0	0	0
14	Hamid Karzai	5	4	1

Analyzing this first category of regimes individually, Habibullah Kalakani's regime had a total score of 0 for ethnic inclusion, and therefore, it also scored 0 on stability. This result is consistent with the case analysis since Kalakani's regime, as stated earlier, was highly exclusive and highly unstable, as it fought a violent civil war through its entire 9-month in power (Fletcher, 2003). Nadir Khan's regime, however, scored 2 on ethnic inclusion and 2 on stability, which reflects his attempts to assemble a Loya Jirga that appointed him as king, and a relatively stable rule, with only low resistance (Fletcher, 2003). M. Zahir Shah's regime, which scored 3 on ethnic inclusion and 3 on stability, is often considered as the 'golden years of stability' in modern Afghanistan, and

hence, the scores reflect his efforts of opening up the system, allowing a liberal parliament and acknowledging various political parties (Barfield, 2010).

Hafizullah Amin's regime, which scores 0 on both ethnic inclusion and stability, highlights his regime's exclusivity and instability. He and his Parchami faction had taken over power by killing Tarakai, sidelining the Khalqi faction and fighting a violent civil war in over 70% percent of the country (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010). Babrak Karmal regime's respective score of 1 on each variable are based on his attempts to assemble a Loya Jirga, form a 'national' democratic government and increase political representation (Fletcher, 2003). However, his regime was weak as civil war continued and he was only able to stay in power through Soviet Union military support and aid.

M. Najibullah Ahmadzai's regime scores 2's on each variable. The scores reflect his attempts of seeking a truce, forming a national reconciliation process, adopting a constitution and ensuring a stable internal transition of power within the PDPA (Fletcher, 2003). The Mujahideens' Burhanuddin Rabbani's regime scores 1's on each variable for a peaceful transition and political representation because after the PDPA was defeated, the civil war had been over although the peace last only for a brief period (Fletcher, 2003). And finally, the Taliban's Mullah Omar regime scored 0 on each variable. The Taliban were an exclusively Pashtun-dominated regime that was headed by a supreme council under Omar's authority (Barfield, 2010).

The second category include cases with a difference of 1 such as Abdur Rahman Khan, Habibullah Khan, M. Daud Khan, N. Muhammad Tarakai, and Hamid Karzai's respective regimes. Abdur Rahman Khan's regime scores 2 on ethnic inclusion for his policies to openly appoint various ethnic groups to government positions (Kakar, 1979).

His regime scores 1 on stability because it did not collapse, which reflects his highly centralized, dictatorial rule, where he aggressively pacified the entire country and eliminated any uprising against him (Kakar, 1979). Habibullah Khan's regime scores 4 on ethnic inclusion for his policy of allowing many political exiles to return, his inclusion of various ethnic groups in the government and giving power to the religious clergy (Dupree, 1973). The regime similarly scored high, 3, on stability for avoiding all attempts to go to war with the British Empire, continuing the national policy of neutrality and maintaining a nearly 20 year peaceful rule (Dupree, 1973).

Daud Khan's regime is the only deviant case in this study where the regime scored lower, 1, on ethnic inclusion than it did on stability, contrary to the assumptions this study was based on. Daud regime's ethnic inclusion scores are for his initial attempts to allow rise of political parties, appointing some PDPA leaders to government positions and for changing the state into a presidential republic (Fletcher, 2003). Otherwise, his rule was a dictatorial, single-party regime where political leaders and opposition were regularly eliminated (Fletcher, 2003). The reason the regime scores higher, 2, on stability is because Daud Khan had total control of the state by using the military as his tool to maintain the status quo, threaten and kill anyone who challenged his authority (Fletcher, 2003). Nur M. Tarakai's regime scores 1 only on ethnic inclusion, which reflects his willingness to share executive power with various ethnic groups (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010). However, because he only ruled for a year, was out maneuvered politically by Amin while a bloody civil war continued throughout the country, the regime scores 0 on stability (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010).

Hamid Karzai's government is the highest scoring case in this second category and in the study overall. The Karzai government scores positively on all indicators of ethnic inclusion and stability, with the exception of uprisings. After the defeat of the Taliban regime, *transition (1)* was peaceful as all parties came together to form a new, interim democratic government in an international UN-mandated conference in Bonn, Germany (Fletcher, 2003). The subsequent Loya Jirga, a new constitution, and national free elections gave the government *legitimacy (1)* and established clear authority through regular term limits for regime (Fletcher, 2003). As democratically elected president with constitutional term limits, the regime did not seek *power consolidation (1)* through means of authoritarianism. Although Karzai's government did not collapse, the regime came close to *failure (1)* due to continuing rise of the Taliban insurgency. Hence, the regime doesn't get a score only on one indicator, *uprisings (0)*. Otherwise, the position of *head of state (1)* was democratically elected, other top *government positions (1)* such as the *head of the army (1)* were clearly established (Fletcher, 2010). *Political representation (1)* drastically increased as virtually all ethnic groups were represented in the political process while *political opposition (1)* was freely exercised (Fletcher, 2010).

The only case that falls into the third category—cases with a weaker correlation or difference of higher than 1— includes Amanullah Khan's regime. The regime scores 4 on ethnic inclusion and 1 on stability, with a total difference of 3. Amanullah Khan was a radical reformist king, who won the country's independence, and initiated social modernization programs (Barfield, 2010). He established the country's first Constitution, establishing state institutions as well as holding Loya Jirgas (Barfield, 2010). His regime was ethnically inclusive, with various ethnic groups appointed to the cabinet, council of

ministers and the bureaucracy at large (Fletcher, 2003). However, despite his twenty-year rule, his regime was highly unstable. The reforms soon backfired and gave rise to uprisings and rebellions nationwide. Eventually, his regime collapsed during the civil war of 1920s (Dupree, 1973).

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS, STUDY LIMITS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

The existing literature argues ethnic societies are often vulnerable to ethnic conflict and violence (Geddes, 1999; Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Rustow, 1970; Lipset, 1959; Diamond & Linz, 1989; Skocpool & Goodwin, 1994). Ethnically diverse societies usually tend to be set along deep ethnic cleavages rooted in historical divisions and differences (Reilly, 2001). Hence, the lack of a system that fairly accommodates all groups in diverse societies often leads to disagreements between groups (Reilly, 2001). And because undemocratic options to reduce ethnic conflicts such as forcefully suppressing ethnic groups or entirely eliminating them are ‘almost always worst’, any arrangement to accommodate ethnic groups must come from a democratic framework (Anderson, 2013).

However, there is little consensus on how to design a system that accommodates ethnic societies. The consociational arrangement developed by Lijphart is one of the two competing arrangements against the centripetalist approach developed by Horowitz. Lijphart argues for power-sharing mechanism in ethnic societies among the elites based on political compromise such as coalition building (1969). Horowitz on the other hand argues for an incentive-based electoral system, which is predicated on rewarding different ethnic groups to work together (2002). While both of these approaches have their pros and cons, and regardless of which system works best, scholars agree that representing and including all ethnic groups fairly contributes to the overall stability in ethnically diverse societies (Lijphart, 1969, 1991; Hartzell & Hoddie, 2003; Roeder & Rothchild, 2005; Sen 1999; Rustow, 1970; Dahl, Shapiro, & Cheibub, 2003).

The question this study attempted to answer was how ethnic inclusion impacts regime stability in Afghanistan. The hypothesis was that ethnically inclusive regimes are more likely to be stable. Scores were assigned on the dependent and independent variables to illustrate the hypothesis. The first category of cases that scored the highest, 4's and 3's, on ethnic inclusion includes Habibullah Khan, Amanullah Khan, Zahir Shah and Hamid Karzai's respective regimes. These results are consistent with the literature as all of those regimes are known to be ethnically inclusive of various ethnic groups to a larger degree in government and political process.

Habibullah Khan inherited the throne and transitioned to power peacefully in 1901 after his father died (Barfield, 2010). He allowed political exiles to return, opened up the system to all ethnic groups, and steered Afghanistan peacefully for nearly twenty years until his assassination in 1919 (Barfield, 2010). Amanullah Khan's rule was similarly an open system where all ethnic groups were actively participated in the government and bureaucracy. The amir ruled for nearly ten years despite facing multiple rebellions but his regime was eventually brought down in civil war (Fletcher, 1965). And lastly, Zahir Shah's regime was also highly inclusive as he established a liberal parliament, opened up the system to more political parties, and kept the internal stability of the country for nearly forty years during his rule (Dupree, 1973).

The cases with the second highest scores, 2's, on ethnic inclusion include Abdur Rahman Khan, Nadir Khan and Najibullah Ahmadzai's regimes. These regimes scored relatively high on ethnic inclusion and stability because, as noted in the literature, they similarly had a relatively mixed record on ethnic inclusion and stability. For instance, although Abdur Rahman Khan recruited, hired and promoted personnel in his

bureaucracy from minority ethnic groups such as the urbanized Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, Sikh and Hindu generals in his army, his track record on ethnic inclusion was primarily driven by self-interest and political gains (Fletcher, 1965). He only included those groups in the government that had promised not to rebel against him and most often oppressed, marginalized and intentionally left out different groups that he perceived as threats to his rule (Mishali-Ram, 2008).

Nadir Khan also attempted to legitimize his rule by allowing a Loya Jirga consisting of various ethnic groups to appoint the amir after he had ousted the Tajik Kalakani from power (Fletcher, 1965). Nadir also established a constitution, which allowed for a representative government to a greater degree. However, his persistence to maintain the status quo was marred by resentment among the population that eventually led to his assassination (Fletcher, 1965). Najibullah Ahmadzai was promoted to the head of state internally without a fight, and he took some concrete steps in ensuring ethnic representation and inclusion. He created the national reconciliation program by inviting opposition to form a coalition government as well as opening up the PDPA to non-party members, but all of these efforts eventually failed to materialize (Rasanayagam, 2003). Najibullah held on to power for over five years but the civil war raged on and he was eventually forced to resign (Rasanayagam, 2003).

The next category of cases that scored the second lowest, 1's, on ethnic inclusion include Daud Khan, Nur M. Tarakai, Babrak Karmal, and Burhanuddin Rabbani's respective regimes. Daud Khan's regime is the only deviant case because it scored higher on stability and lower on ethnic inclusion. This nuance is noted in the literature and can be explained by the fact that Daud's regime was more stable than it was inclusive. It was

a single-party, exclusive government that heavily relied on the military to eliminate any rivals and oppositions that threatened the status quo (Rasanyagam, 2003). He was able to maintain tight control over the state by simultaneously holding various high positions including the presidency, ministers of defense and interiors, and the commander in chief of the army (Wahab & Youngerman, 2010).

Babrak Karmal similarly made attempts at reconciliation, calling for a national Loya Jirga, and allowing more non-party representatives in the PDPA (Rasanyagam, 2003). However, all of these attempts failed to win him the broader support of the Afghans and he was eventually removed from power by the Soviet Union as instability continued during the civil war (Maley, 2009). Burhanuddin Rabbani and his Mujahideen supporters also initially gave people hope of stability, peace and inclusion when they formed a grand coalition government consisting of representatives from all major ethnic groups. However, internal power struggles soon led to a civil war among the Mujahideen, and any praise they had won for ousting the Soviet Union, quickly waned among the population (Barfield, 2010).

The last category of cases include those which scored the lowest, 0's, on ethnic inclusion and were subsequently identified as the least ethnically inclusive and the most unstable regimes. These regimes, which were highly exclusively, closely authoritarian and made no attempt of ethnic inclusion, include Habibullah Kalakani, Hafizullah Amin and Mullah Omar's respective regimes. Kalakani, a bandit who ascended to the throne in Kabul by overthrowing Amanullah Khan's regime, established an exclusively small bureaucracy run almost entirely by his friends, relatives and sympathizers (Fletcher, 1965). The first Tajik ruler to take over the central government in Kabul, Kalakani sent

shock through the Pashtun hegemony that had been in power for centuries. However, his time on the throne was continuously marred by a civil war, and less than a year in power, he was captured and publicly executed (Barfield, 2010).

Hafizullah Amin outmaneuvered and assassinated his political rival Nur Muhammad Tarakai and took control of the PDPA (Barfield, 2010). He ousted most of his rivals from the government positions and filled the government with his Khalqi loyalists (Barfield, 2010). However, he was able to rule for only a hundred days before Soviet commandos assassinated him in his presidential palace (Rasanayagam, 2003). And lastly, the Taliban's Mullah Omar regime was also a highly exclusive regime, primarily run and dominated by Kandahari Pashtuns. The Taliban regime grew from a small military movement that eventually exercised complete control over the state (Rasanayagam, 2003). The regime openly marginalized, oppressed and eliminated groups for religious or political reasons. Mullah Omar was the supreme head of the theocratic regime and spent his rule fighting a civil war in most of the country (Maley, 2009).

In conclusion, various trends appear from the analysis of the cases above. The findings overall are consistent with the assumption that when a regime scored higher on ethnic inclusion, it was more stable. As scores on ethnic inclusion decreased, regimes tended to be less stable. Moreover, regimes that scored zeros on ethnic inclusion were also the least stable. In general, in all the cases over the past hundred years, ethnicity had an impact on the stability. This is consistent with the existing literature which stresses that ethnicity has been a major force in all aspects driving religious, ideological, geographic and linguistic differences in Afghan society (Mazhar et al., 2012; Sahar, 2014; Rubin, 1995; Adeney, 2008).

Lastly, it is also necessary to revisit the strengths and limitations of case studies in general and in the context of the present study. Case study methods are strong because they achieve high conceptual validity by measuring concepts that are difficult to measure (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 19). Moreover, case studies have the advantage of identifying new hypotheses and explaining deviant or outlier cases (p. 20). Furthermore, these methods allow a researcher to explore in-depth within-case analysis by the utilizing multiple variables (p. 21). And finally, case studies have the advantage of explaining complex causal relations (p. 22). The current study explored an in-depth historical period analysis of ethnic inclusion and regime stability in Afghanistan and thus a comparative case study design was selected as the appropriate method of research.

The trade-offs, limitations and pitfalls of case studies include case selection bias, lack of a strong cause-and-effect relationship, lack of representativeness and generalizability of results to a larger population (p. George & Bennett, 2005, p. 29). The present study controls for selection bias because it includes all cases within the period under study. Moreover, the present study applies process-tracing method to establish an association between variables upon in-depth analysis, trends and patterns discovered in the cases. For future research, a quantitative study with an extensive sample and more variables would be useful to explore a causal relationship between ethnic inclusion and regime stability over an extended period of history in Afghanistan.

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