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GAME OF SURVIVAL: EXTERNAL ACTORS' SUPPORT FOR SEPARATISTS

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

By

JOSHUA C. UNDERWOOD
B.A., Marshall University, 2014

2020
Wright State University

WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY

GRADUATE SCHOOL

November 5, 2020

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Joshua C. Underwood ENTITLED Game of Survival: External Actors' Support for Separatists BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Master of Arts.

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ABSTRACT

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This research develops a novel model for external actors' support for separatists. Three variables measuring external actors' support are identified through two case studies, Kosovo Liberation Army and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, with an emphasis on Military Aid's impact. The variables are then applied to a quantitative analysis of external actors' support in a dataset of 75 observations during the years 1991-2020, utilizing the Uppsala Conflict Data Program External Support Dataset. The findings for this research show that Military Aid and Moral Support improve the probability of survival for a separatist group. A deeper analysis reveals that military aid among the three major powers (People's Republic of China, United States of America, Russian Federation) does not have a greater impact. Finally, the PRC's Moral Support has a stronger impact than the USA's and RF's Moral Support.

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List of Acronyms

EU: European Union

FRY: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

IPKF: Indian Peace Keeping Force

KFOR: Kosovo Force

KLA: Kosovo Liberation Army

LTTE: Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam

MTA: Military Technical Agreement

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OAF: Operation Allied Force

PRC: The People's Republic of China

PTA: Prevention of Terrorism Act

RAW: Raw and Analysis Wing

RF: Russian Federation

SDMs: Self-Determination Movements

TULF: Tamil United Liberation Front

UK: The United Kingdom

UN: United Nations

UNMIK: United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo

U.N.T.S.: United Nations Treaty Series

USA: The United States of America

UCDP: Uppsala Conflict Data Program

WWII: World War II

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Dedication

For my fiancé, Destiny.

I. Introduction

The recent Russian involvement in Eastern Ukraine (2014) and Georgia (2008) conflicts has renewed debates on how external state actors help separatist groups survive. Specifically, recent studies have reopened the discussion and given new relevance to the methods by which separatist groups survive conflicts (Florea 2017, Saideman 2001, Tir 2005, Toft 2010). For separatist groups, receiving aid from an external actor can have a significant impact on their chances of survival. There are a variety of forms of aid that an external actor may offer to a separatist group to give them the advantage in their fight for self-determination. External actors may give economic, military aid, or moral support to the separatist group. This begs the question; how does an external actor's aid impact the chance of survival for a separatist group?

Survivability for separatist groups depends on the necessary success that the group has against the central government. Contributions to the separatist conflict literature focus on how foreign states use aid to influence separatist wars; however, this does not directly explain how their support improves the secessionist likelihood of survival. Most contributions in the literature on separatist wars focus on similar types of aid but have not looked at these three particular types of aid, and their impact on separatist survival. Specifically, none of the literature argues that in order to improve the chances of survival for a separatist group, the external actor must provide military aid.

The research here will bridge this gap in the literature by presenting greater nuance to how external actors improve the probability of separatist survival.

A new model is constructed to consider three types of external actor aid that increases the probability of survival for a separatist group. Specifically, the model will measure a set of novel variables that carefully consider how external actor aid can impact the probability of survival for a separatist group. After discussing the literature on external actor support for separatist groups, the separatist group's probability of survival is analyzed through the successful case of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the failed case of the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE). These two case studies will establish the impact of military aid on a separatist group's probability of survival. Lastly, a quantitative analysis of 75 separatist cases is constructed based on the variables identified for this research.

Military aid, economic aid, and moral support are not novel variables; however, this research takes the unique approach of approaching each of these variables as if they are capable of increasing the probability of survival for a separatist group. Sequentially, seeing which type of aid improves the probability of survival for a separatist group may help shed light on how separatist groups persist and strive to gain international recognition to establish an independent state. By looking at each of these variables, the type of aid a separatist group will seek from an external actor can be determined. Furthermore, it is important to also consider why external actors will provide support to separatist group.

External actors provide aid to a separatist group for three key reasons. First, naturally an external actor will support a separatist group with which they share transnational linkages and kinship, especially while simultaneously making an appeal to

their domestic audience. The external actor may see an opportunity to garner support from their domestic audience through an intervention in a neighboring state's conflict if it is in support of a kinship group that is being oppressed or having their rights violated by the neighboring state.

The second reason is more pragmatic: the external actor may benefit materially from improving a separatist group's probability of survival. The argument could be made from a realist perspective that all states are self-interested, and when an external actor intervenes to support a separatist group, they are essentially helping the group on a quid pro quo basis. Some external actors may extend their influence in specific parts of the world specifically for the benefits they may gain from helping separatist groups in a particular region. In particular, the research here assumes that world powers like the United States of America (U.S.A), Russian Federation (RF), and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are the likely external actors to exert their influence beyond their home regions to gain allies in areas they view as strategic, receiving material benefits (sea ports, bases, etc.).

The third reason external actors support foreign separatist groups is to gain security partners through which the external actor exerts greater influence abroad. The benefits of this action may not be readily apparent; an external actor may support a separatist movement because they view them as an ally which would yield more long-term investment. Establishing this partnership could greatly improve the separatist likelihood of survival. Security partnerships established through external actor support of separatist movements can be utilized to promote the values inherent to the culture/interests of the external actor. Subnational organizations like separatist groups will likely rely on the

external actor for support which may exacerbate tensions between them and their central government in future relations.

These fundamental insights provide greater depth to the existing literature by analyzing the impact of variables novel to the field of separatist conflict. This new research establishes new layers to the discussion on how separatist groups survive.

II. Literature Review

Civil Wars

Throughout history there have been numerous wars fought by subnational groups wanting to achieve independence. Some of these wars have been categorized as civil wars, while others are known as secessionist wars. Within the Civil Wars conflict literature, various causal factors are debated to explain what motivates these groups to take up arms against the central political authority. This leads to the question, what is the difference between civil wars and separatist wars? Civil wars, as defined by Fearon and Laitin (2003: 76) "...[I]nvolve fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, nonstate groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies." In other words, civil wars are fought between the central government and a group within the state with military force wanting to take control of the central government.

Pervious scholars have argued that civil wars are started because of grievances (Gurr, 1970). Grievances are tied to discrimination and disadvantages between conflict parties as well as distinctive cultural differences (Gurr, 1993). Additionally, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that civil wars are driven by greed or grievances. Specifically, they found that civil wars occur when states are too weak or poor to fight the rebels or when warlords try to loot natural resources to enrich themselves (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Furthermore, large groups that have been excluded and have less access to power are

more likely to start a conflict (Cederman, et al., 2010). Moreover, countries that are democratic and ethnically diverse are more/less likely to engage in civil wars (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002). In sum, civil wars are conflicts that are established by groups that are subsumed by greed, wishing to enrich themselves or take control of the central government. In the following section, separatist war is defined, and the interchangeable usage of the terms separatist and secessionist is explained.

Separatist Wars

There are a variety of distinctions between separatist wars; specifically, separatist conflicts occur when groups seeking independence attempt to establish their own state, while separatist autonomism occurs when groups seek self-governance without independence. Finally, separatist-merger conflicts are characterized by a separatist group aiming for reunification with another state (Heralcides 1997: 682). Moreover, separatist wars occur because subnational identity are not aligned with their state which is related to nationalist identity (Fearon, 2004). Separatists not only seek separation from the recognized state in which it resides, but seek independence while lacking international recognition (Florea, 2014). For the purpose of this research, we utilize the separatist war definition presented by Wood (1981). A secessionist war, as defined by Wood (1981: 110), is "...[A] demand for formal withdrawal from a central political authority by a member unit or units on the basis of a claim to independent sovereignty status." Evidently, there is a clear distinction between the features of a separatist war and a civil war. Secessionist wars differ from civil wars because the secessionist group wants to formally withdraw from their sovereign state to establish their own independence. In sum, secessionist wars are not

civil wars because of the demand to withdrawal from the central state and establish an independent state. This research builds off this established distinction to explain how separatist groups exploit self-determination movements in their struggle against the central state, also known as the “parent” state.

Self-Determination Movements

The right to self-determination was the main focus for human right advocates following the dissolution of the Austria-Hungarian empire at the end of World War I. Self-Determination Movements (SDMs) gives these groups the legal right to seek autonomy (Ali 2014: 419). According to the “United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 1, 993 and 999 United Nations Treaty Series (U.N.T.S.) stipulates that:

‘[A]ll people have the right to self-determination... The State Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations’ (Ali 2014: 427).

Under the United Nations (UN) Charter, any group has the legal right to separate from their parent state, and therefore, the parent state shall respect that group’s right. Any group that feels their rights are being violated or being oppressed by the central state has the right to initiate self-determination.

On the other hand, some scholars have argued that international law does not grant any group the right to self-determinate from their parent state. Secessionist groups challenge the central (parent) state’s territorial integrity and their sovereignty (Sterio 2014: 299). Separatist groups have the right to self-determination; however, international

law argues that this leads to war and instability within the region. The wars fought over self-determination have led some external actors to support separatist groups. In order to contextualize these conflicts, an analysis of how external and internal actors impact civil wars is essential.

External Actors and Internal Actors in Civil Wars

By definition, a civil war is a war between state and internal, subnational actors. The behavior of external actors in a civil war is largely driven by internal actors. Specifically, scholars have looked at the behavior of governments within these wars. Lacina (2006) argues that governments that are more democratic endure fewer conflict-related deaths and that institutional constraints affect the outcome of civil wars. Sometimes a government's institutional constraints can force them to compromise with opposition groups. Rodríguez-Franco (2016) argues that governments increase taxation of domestic elites to increase their forces' chances of winning against their opponents. Governments will use this increased revenue to manufacture weapons and resources to support their troops. Stanton (2015) states that governments raise militias to attack the opposition's civilian support base. Furthermore, Butt (2017) finds that a central government will use various methods to combat a secessionist movement depending on the level of support from a third party, ranging from their institutional constraints to using militia.

However, the focus of civil wars literature has thus far been on how external actors have influenced this type of conflict. The broad literature on civil wars examines the duration of civil wars and how external actors' influence lengthens them. Regan (2002: 1996) examines how third-party intervention can affect the duration of civil wars. The

evidence the author finds is that intervention decreases the likelihood of wars ending within the next month. The author finds that external intervention is poorly managed and only prolongs the war rather than shortening them, while policymakers can choose when to intervene in order to end a war. Moreover, Aydin (2006) analyzes how diplomacy plays a critical role in external actors' intervention. The author found that diplomatic interventions are a part of conflict management and can change the trajectory of civil wars.

Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) examine how third-party states impact civil wars. Their findings show that interventions occur because of third-party strategic decisions to do so and that there is a greater chance for civil wars to stall and potentially prolong during this period. The prolonging of wars correlates with Regan's (2002) findings. The authors suggest that further research is critical to the field in trying to understand third-party behavior and interests. The broad literature of civil wars has discovered that external actors' influence only prolongs the conflict. These conclusions reinforce how crucial external actors can be in civil wars. However, they fail to explain the reasons for external actors' involvement.

External Actors Involvement

Previous research has attempted to explain external actors' behavior and reasons for involvement in civil wars. Kathman (2010), Regan (1998), Mitchell (1970), Cunningham (2010) and Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2011) examine the conditions and behavior of third-party groups' involvement. Kathman (2010) focuses research on geopolitical wars that pose various types of threats to neighboring countries that other third-party interveners may never face. The author finds that enthusiasm to

intervene varies across third-party states because their threat reduction is different from other third-party interveners. Regan (1998) finds that external actors intervene on conditions that may involve humanitarian crises, while Mitchell (1970) finds that intervention occurs when ethnic groups in civil wars seek to gain resources from external actors. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham (2010) find that external actors that have an independent agenda extend wars significantly longer. While Cunningham (2011) contends that external actors are less likely to support strong rebel groups, Mitchell (1970) argues that transnational linkages and interstate rivalries are crucial for rebels gaining support from external actors. Khosla (1999) examines third world countries who have intervened in ethnic conflicts and expands research on the interventions. The author finds that half of the interventions were initiated by states within the same region. Also, regional powers are more likely to provide resources to ethnonationality or militant sects because of their positions against the government, especially the ethnonationalist groups who were seeking autonomy from their state.

These authors show that resources influence how external actors behave and explain why they have taken interest in certain conflicts. The behavior and interests of external actors are crucial for the field because it offers insights broadening our understanding of the motivations of those actors. However, they fail to explain separatist groups' requirements for survival. The next section will discuss what separatist groups need to survive and maintain their territory.

Necessities for Survival

Though separatist groups may not have the same access to resources as the central government, some groups find various ways to survive. Previous research has analyzed how some separatist groups have managed to survive throughout the war and beyond. Most contributions to the literature designate these groups as “de facto states” because they have their own autonomy but have not established independence as a state. Some of the de facto states have managed to survive and finding the key necessities in what helps separatists succeed is critical in understanding their survival. The literature on de facto states establishes criteria for why these states have succeeded. As stated by King (2001: 525),

“First, the territorial separatists of the early 1990s have become the state builders of the early 2000s, creating de facto countries whose ability to field armed forces, control their own territory, educate their children, and maintain local economies is about as well developed as that of recognized states of which they are still notionally a part.”

The survival of separatist regions lies in establishing their armed forces, allowing them to maintain control over territories. They are also able to structure and maintain their economy which has given them the opportunity to better educate their youth. State recognition has been difficult for most de facto states to gain; however, it is not completely out of reach. Berg and Toomla (2009) found that some de facto states have received some type of recognition (negative, boycott, toleration, and quasi-recognition) allowing them to gain status on the international stage.

Kolstø (2006) finds that some separatist groups use what resources they have in building their defensive forces. Availability of natural resources to the separatist group plays a critical role in developing these forces. The funds provided by external actors allow them to successfully capture and sell resources, giving them the capital to invest in arms

and soldiers (Ross 2004). Heraclides (1997: 684) conducted a study of 77 cases between 1945-1996 and found that the state achieved military victory 21 percent of the time, while separatists only achieved victory in 10 percent of cases. Winning 10 percent of conflicts shows the importance of military resources for any group fighting the central state because of the rarity of successful separatist outcomes. The degree of militarization is critical for any separatist group because military resources are crucial for the survival for any separatist group. However, separatist groups that receive military assistance from foreign actors restrict the opportunity for a peaceful reintegration and national recognition (Florea 2017: 337-38). While separatist groups are less likely to reintegrate after engaging in conflict, what is essential for this research is the group's likelihood of survival, for which reintegration is not necessary.

There is, however, value in understanding how these de facto states fail. Heraclides (1997: 689) contends that separatist regions fail because they have lost foreign military support and can no longer maintain their fight against a central state. The author argues that separatist groups do not have the resources needed to ensure they can maintain their territory. This conclusion indicates that separatist groups survive by maintaining armed forces, selling their natural resources, and receiving some type of political recognition. It also shows how critical military support is to a separatist group maintaining their de facto state status. However, these conclusions fail to explain why external actors are motivated to offer aid to separatist groups.

Separatists and External Actors Relations

The affiliation between separatists and external actors is critical to understand why external actors establish relations. The sub-literature on this topic analyzes secessionist and external actors' relationship in separatist wars specifically. According to Bélanger, Duchesne, and Paquin (2005) democratic states rarely help separatist movements in other democratic states, but this pattern does not correspond to autocratic states. Temporal limitations restrict the study, yet it does provide insight into how states decide what separatist groups they establish relations with. Heraclides (1990) examines the relationship between external actors and separatists. The author's findings show that support via arms and funds are motivated by tangible gain, yet some states became involved for intangible reasons. Yet, Heraclides fails to discuss what type of arms and funds external actors provided to separatist groups. Saideman (2002) and Cartmen and James (1997) examined how groups receive support, finding that ethnic politics was the major influence for states deciding to support certain groups; however, Saideman fails to discuss what type of support separatists receive from external actors. These findings depict how foreign states use instruments to influence separatist wars but do not directly provide answers as to how the aid impacts the secessionist probability of survival in the war. The precise causal mechanism to explain how external aid helps secessionist groups survive is thus an area that is critical but under-researched. Therefore, we can now look at the effectiveness of external actors' types of aid and recognition and how that impacts the outcome for a separatist group.

External Actor's Effectiveness and Outcomes

An external actor's effectiveness in determining the outcome of a separatist war depends on the type of support they have provided. Separatist groups are demonstrably able to maintain their territory by having an armed force and managing their local economies. Yet, sometimes separatist groups acquire additional support to ensure that they can maintain control of their territory and resources. Varying types of aid may be provided to support them. Florea (2017) lists four types of variables that affects de facto state survivability: military support from outside actors, state building, fragmentation within separatist groups, and veto players.

Florea (2017: 349) finds "Military support from an external actor resulted in reducing separatist incentives to negotiate." Military aid from external actors "...[I]njects vital lifeblood into the arteries of a de facto state by providing rebels with the resources needed to prevent forceful reintegration (Florea 2017: 340)." Receiving military aid strengthens the separatists' chances of surviving and provides them the opportunity to maintain their fight against the central government. Military aid improves the outcome for separatist groups because it allows them to avoid being forced into an agreement that falls short of their expectations.

Also, certain world powers, like the U.S., offer diplomatic support to ease tensions for separatist regions that have been economically isolated from the rest of the world (Pegg and Berg 2016). The separatist groups that are supported by the U.S. are treated poorly, potentially damaging their chances of survival (Pegg and Berg 2016: 284). External actors have given funds to separatists so that they may buy arms and train soldiers to accomplish

their missions (Ross 2004). The financial support from foreign governments increases separatists' incentives to continue fighting, impacting their chances of survival (Ross 2004). Furthermore, Coggins (2011) finds that when one or more great powers recognized a separatist group, it increases the likelihood that others recognize it. The author argues that external politics plays a critical role in state recognition and thus in separatist movements having a successful outcome.

Furthermore, external actor support ensures their survival by providing them with the necessary military aid and moral support. Additionally, timing is crucial to the survival of a separatist group; the earlier that an external actor begins supporting the group the more likely that they survive (Byman, et. al. 2001: 10). Receiving military aid is critical for a successful outcome for a separatist group, and adding moral support only solidifies the probability of survival for the group. Timing is also critical for a separatist group, and the earlier the external actor provides support, the greater chance for a successful outcome.

Although any kind of external dependence hurts the separatist group's status on the international stage and their strategy in gaining independence (Caspersen 2009), Ozpek (2014) discusses from a realist approach how external actors' national interest weighs heavily if a regime recognizes a separatist group. Hence, the possibility arises for a separatist group to appeal for moral support from external actors because of mutual interests or national kinship. This research provides insight into how the effectiveness of foreign state assistance impacts the survivability of separatist groups but does not directly provide answers as to which type of support most impacts survivability. Therefore, my research bridges this gap in the literature by building a nuanced argument for which type of aid improves the likelihood of separatist survival. To highlight the impact of access to

foreign military aid to the success of a separatist region, the following sections will reveal the causal mechanisms behind a successful and failed separatist war.

III. Successful Separatist Case Study: Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)

The Kosovo War is recognized by many scholars as an example of a successful separatist case. The case illustrates the importance of external support for separatist survivability, specifically the impact of military aid. The discrete impact of these concepts can be operationalized through a quantitative analysis to determine the relevance of external support's impact on separatists' survival. The Kosovo case is a prime example of how an external actor can provide military aid, economic aid, and moral support to improve the separatist group's chances for survival. Furthermore, it exemplifies how military aid has the largest impact on ensuring separatist survivability during the war and beyond.

Historical Background

In 1998-1999, the Kosovo War was described as a humanitarian war by the West because of the ethnic cleansing committed by Serbian soldiers operating within the Yugoslavian forces. The actions of the Serbian forces and the Kosovar Albanians resulted in clashes and disputes over territorial control. The violence against innocent civilians led to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention in 1999 and paved the way for international recognition for the state of Kosovo. The events precipitating this conflict provide greater context for the separatist war that took place.

Kosovo is located in the southernmost province of modern-day Serbia and was one of two autonomous provinces in Yugoslavia (Dempsey 1998: 95; Smith 2001: 2). In 1912, during the Balkan War, the Serbs were successful in acquiring the Kosovo region (Smith 2001: 2). During World War II (WWII), Axis powers were able to acquire control of Kosovo in 1941, the control of which they proceeded to hand over to Albania (Dempsey 1998: 96). In 1946, after the end of WWII, Kosovo was returned to Yugoslavia and given autonomous status (Dempsey 1998: 97). In 1963, Kosovo was upgraded to an autonomous province and eventually in 1981 gained full republic status by utilizing force; however, the ruling was met with opposition from the Communist Party of Serbia (Dempsey 1998: 97). In 1989 and 1991, Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević removed Kosovo's autonomous status, which led to Kosovo forming their own government and seeking independence (Dempsey 1998: 97). The people of Kosovo had experienced the opportunities of autonomy only to have the government authorities remove their status. The Serbian government was not without justification, however, as terrorist activities perpetrated by Kosovan separatists led to the decision to remove their autonomy.

In December 1993, in response to the Serbian government's oppressive tactics, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was created (Mulaj 2008: 1108). KLA's goal was to achieve independence from Yugoslavia and even claimed responsibility for bombings that occurred in the southern part of the country (Dempsey 1998: 94). The KLA had acquired funds through a variety of illegal activities, including selling drugs, prostitution, and extortion networks (Özerdem 2003: 80). Furthermore, in the early 1990s, the KLA devoted the majority of their attacks to sporadic assassinations against Serbian police, before moving to hit and run attacks in the mid-1990s (Mulaj 2008: 1112). In late 1996, the KLA

conducted 15 attacks against the Serbian police in which 15 were killed and 2 injured (Mulaj 2008: 1112). These terrorist attacks by the KLA led the Serbian government to create plans to counter these incidents.

In February 1999, Serbian leader Milošević introduced “Operation Horseshoe” to combat the KLA (BytyĐci 2015: 133). The goal of Operation Horseshoe was to “eliminate KLA and initiate cleansing of Kosovo of Albanians” (BytyĐci 2015: 133). The international community felt that Kosovo was an internal state issue for Serbia, and decided to not intervene (Mulaj 2008: 1109). The atrocities committed by Serbian forces against Albanians in Kosovo led to consternation from leaders around the world, particularly the UN. On March 31st, 1998, the UN Security Council initiated a resolution condemning both sides for their acts of violence and demanding that both cease their activities (BytyĐci 2015: 133). Eventually, after the continued hostile acts committed by the Serbian troops against the Kosovo Albanians and the failure to reach an agreement with Milošević, the international community decided to take action.

Kosovo Albanians were offered various opportunities for autonomy, only to have their central government strip that right away from them. The Serbian government proceed to commit atrocities against the Kosovo Albanians; however, the international community decided to take action to become involved by utilizing NATO’s diplomatic and military resources to challenge Serbian leaders and its military.

External Actor's Involvement

The international community was dismayed by the atrocities that were committed by the Serbian forces in Kosovo. NATO initiated negotiations with Milošević but failed to reach a resolution. The intention of NATO's initial involvement was to create a solution to a political crisis that had turned into a diplomatic failure (BytyĐci 2015: 136). NATO created a plan, "NATO OPLAN," which consisted of 3 phases. Phase 1 was to establish air superiority, Phase 2 was to attack military targets south of the 44 degrees north latitude, and Phase 3 was to expand air operations throughout the region (Arkin 2001: 4). Eventually, NATO OPLAN was later renamed Operation Allied Force (OAF) with the intended goal to drive Serbian troops out of Kosovo (Smith 2001: 1). NATO defended their plan of intervention by utilizing Chapter VII Article 2, Paragraph 4, which allows the use military force for humanitarian means in a regional conflict (BytyĐci 2015: 134). The atrocities that the Serbian troops had already committed in Kosovo left NATO with no other option but to use military force as a means to prevent a disaster from occurring.

On March 23, 1999, NATO's Secretary General Javier Solana authorized the use of force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Serbian forces (BytyĐci 2015: 139). NATO commenced OAF at 19:45 Central European Time (CET) on March 24 by conducting air operations. NATO's involvement was to find a solution for the Kosovo Albanians who had their autonomy stripped away on countless occasions and were being repressed by their central state. The only option NATO had to find a solution for the Kosovo Albanians was to use their military resources against the Serbian opposition.

NATO's Military Aid

NATO's military resources proved to have a critical impact on the KLA in the Kosovo War. NATO targeted key facilities, such as: "airfields, army bases, munitions storage facilities, engineer depots, arms and heavy equipment factories, petroleum storage facilities, smelters, and an aviation repair base (Haulman 2015: 17)." In particular, NATO's air forces hit 40 military facilities, with 400 flights hitting the anti-aircraft defense network and 300-350 aircraft hitting refineries, fuel depots, and military barracks (BytyĐci 2015: 143). NATO had success in targeting the Serbian military because of the mutual sharing of information with the KLA (Mulaj 2008: 1113). The KLA was able to provide key Serbian military positions to NATO's bombers, which gave the KLA an advantage against the Serbian forces. NATO's targeting capability and the KLA's strategic guidance proved a winning combination, allowing the combined forces, though overstretched, to cover over 40% of Kosovan territory (Koktsidi and Dam 2008: 170).

NATO was also successful through more diplomatic measures. As Haulman (2015: 16) states, "A combination of military and diplomatic pressure ultimately succeeded in convincing Milosevic to accept a peace deal." Therefore, the KLA greatly benefited from NATO's strategic bombing which allowed them control of over 40% of the territory. NATO's military aid helped pressure Serbian leader Milosevic to accept a peace deal but it was a combination of NATO's targeting and KLA's territorial control made the NATO intervention so impactful, ultimately forcing Milosevic to accept the peace terms. It should be noted that diplomatic pressure played a critical role, and we will discuss how NATO countries utilized their diplomatic networks later in this section.

NATO's Economic Aid

The successful conclusion to the Kosovo War saw the NATO powers establish U.N. Security Resolution 1244, which consisted of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), tasked with state-building and transferring administrative duties to Kosovan officials and institutions (Woehrel and Kim 2008: 5). Furthermore, NATO, the UN, and the European Union (EU) provided substantial monetary support to help the KLA and Kosovo rebuild the region and allow Kosovo to pursue state recognition. Since 1999, UNMIK and EU has provided Kosovo with a total of close to \$40 Billion for infrastructure development and state-building (Džihic and Kramer 2009; Elbasani 2018). The goal was to catalyze economic development and advise on rule of law institutions (Džihic and Kramer 2009: 14). Additionally, the EU utilized 14,500 Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops for security measures to ensure stability (Džihic and Kramer 2009: 2). KFOR's other goal was to enforce the provisions of the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) and the demilitarization of the KLA (Woehrel and Kim 2008: 12). The monetary support and security forces provided by NATO and other organizations has provided an opportunity for Kosovo to establish nationwide stability and pursue state recognition. Therefore, the economic aid that was provided to the KLA helped provide Kosovo a path to statehood as long as they followed the guidelines set by UNMIK and the EU. It is unlikely that any substantial economic development could have been achieved without the presence of NATO's military forces. The establishment of KFOR has also allowed officials to focus on state-building and development for the region.

NATO's Moral Support

KLA's goal was to establish their autonomy and successfully secede from Serbia. However, this was initially unlikely because of world powers opposing their independence (Woehrel and Kim 2008: 12). In 1998, the U.S. designated the KLA a terrorist organization (Özerdem 2003: 80). This condemnation of the KLA, which would restrict much of the NATO support required to establish statehood, stood as an early barrier to Kosovan statehood. Despite this, the international community established the Ahtisarri Proposal for Independence, which the U.S., NATO, and EU supported, while Russia needed more time to make a decision (Woehrel and Kim 2003: 17). The result of the proposal was inconclusive, yet eventually granted Kosovo the right to seek membership in international organizations and recommended eventual independence (Woehrel and Kim 2003: 17). The proposal's controversiality meant it was not agreed upon unanimously in the international community, which led to the Troika Talks. The Troika Talks were similar to the Ahtisarri proposal in its attempt to establish the future of Kosovo; however, the talks could not reach a mutual agreement (Woehrel and Kim 2003: 18).

Ten years after the start of the Kosovo War, Kosovo declared its independence in February 2008 (Cottey 2009: 594). Kosovo was officially recognized as a "Contact Group" which consisted of some of the main powers of the international community. As stated by Mulaj (2008), "KLA's historic recognition occurred at Rambouillet and Paris international conferences (February and March 1999) by France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (1109)." The U.S. and United Kingdom (U.K.) organized their diplomatic networks to help Kosovo achieve their independence status.

Specifically, they encouraged other countries to recognize Kosovo's statehood by consistently using the UN Security Council meetings to pressure other states (Newman and Visoka 2018: 380).

Since the recognition from the G7 countries and its established independence, Kosovo's state recognition has gained traction. According to Bytyçi (2015: 176), "Kosovo's independence has been recognized by the United States of America, France, UK, Germany, and Turkey. As of July 2013, 110 countries, among which are 22 EU states, and all G7 countries have recognized Kosovo's independence." Kosovo has seen a resounding amount of support from the international community following their secession from Serbia.

In sum, Kosovan independence could not have been achieved had the U.S. and U.K. not utilized their diplomatic network and status to pressure states to recognize Kosovo. Moreover, the military aid from NATO further legitimized Kosovo's quest for independence. NATO's resources and diplomacy were therefore crucial in helping the KLA achieve independence. Its willingness to intercede on behalf of the KLA and devote valuable resources to the cause had an irrefutable impact on the success of the secession, the effectiveness of which is quantified in the following research.

External Actor Effectiveness and Outcome

NATO's use of their resources was effective in shifting the war in KLA's favor because hitherto, KLA's troops were not successful in pushing Serbian troops out of the region. Utilizing air power had already been established as an effective option for countries that intervene in conflicts (Pashakhanlou 2018: 39). Air raids allow the intervening country to make an impact on the conflict without sacrificing thousands of ground troops. NATO launched air raids against FRY without support from China and Russia (Pashakhanlou 2018: 42-43). NATO claimed that the Kosovo Albanian population were being targeted by FRY forces, particularly Serbian police and paramilitary forces, which led them to decide that the only option to stop these acts was through military force (Pashakhanlou 2018: 42). Furthermore, the KLA was provided military aid by the U.S., Germany, and Switzerland (Mulaj 2008: 1111). In addition to providing military aid to the KLA, NATO also used air support to give them an advantage over Serbian forces.

The KLA was aided by NATO's air raids on Serbian infrastructure, which were crucial to their war effort. According to Pashakhanlou (2018: 43), "NATO utilized 38,000 aircraft sorties who conducted 10,500 strike missions and 12,000 tons of munitions, making it the alliance's largest air operation to date." Eventually, in the final days of the war, the air power used by NATO had significant success in hitting Serbian military targets (Gallis 1999: 7). The number of weapons and ammunition that were provided and used by NATO against the Serbian forces helped place pressure on Milošević to come to an agreement.

NATO's military aid forced Serbian leader Milošević to come an agreement with NATO and KLA, known as the Kumanovo Agreement. The agreement was signed on June 9th and began the process of ending the conflict and withdrawal of Serbian forces (BytyĎci

2015: 153-178). NATO's military aid played a critical role in the outcome of the war. Their aid was effective in helping secure KLA's victory by applying pressure on the Serbian opposition, which forced the Serbian leader into agreeing to end the conflict. Moreover, this allowed Kosovo to finally receive the state recognition that they had been seeking since they declared self-determination. Next, it is imperative to look at how the NATO intervention with military aid increased the likelihood of survival for Kosovo because of the success they had in the international community and how they have managed to maintain their independence.

Probability of Survival

NATO's involvement dramatically improved Kosovo's probability of survival because of their military resources. NATO's continued presence in Kosovo allowed the KLA to maintain control of their territory which ensured their independence. According to BytyĐci (2015: 179-88), "Kosovo was turned into a protectorate that was divided into five sectors with 6,000 German and Turkish forces in the South, Italian forces in the West, 6,100 French forces in the North, 7,400 U.S. forces in the East, and 6, 200 Great Britain forces in the Center."¹ NATO had established ground troops, also known as Peacekeepers, to maintain security and repel any possible attacks from the central government.

¹ See figure 3.1 below.

Figure 3.1



Who controls Kosovo? The Economist. June 24th 1999.

In summary, NATO's aid had a tremendous impact on Kosovo's probability of survival. The pressure from the aerial bombing and the economic investment by NATO and its allies improved Kosovo's chances of survival. Moreover, the presence of troops has solidified Kosovo's independence and has ensured their probability of survival within the international community. The presence of NATO has provided legitimacy for Kosovo because without the military resources, the chance of Kosovo surviving is reduced. In sum, military aid is crucial for the separatist group's probability of survival and that is why it is imperative to discuss the implications.

Implications

NATO's military aid played a critical role in improving Kosovo's probability of survival against the FRY and Serbian central state authority. The KLA would not have been as successful in their bid for self-determination without NATO's military aid, economic aid, and moral support. NATO's air support and cooperation with the KLA was strategic in helping the group maintain control of 40% of their territory. Furthermore, it helped them apply pressure on the central state to come to an agreement to grant them autonomy. Moreover, NATO's economic aid was vital for the KLA to help them begin to develop their institutions, while their diplomatic pressure convinced states to recognize them. Ultimately, none of the above would have been possible had NATO not provided military aid to the KLA during the war nor provided stability after the war so that they could build institutions and gain recognition.

NATO intervened in the Kosovo conflict because the KLA provided pragmatic and strategic benefits to the western organization. NATO was able to establish bases to challenge potential Russian aggression and exert greater influence in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, by supporting the KLA, NATO was able to create an alliance with a subnational group in the region allowing for further westernization of the fledgling state. Establishing a security partnership provides long-term benefits for both NATO and KLA because it allows NATO to counter other states that may try to influence the region and increases Kosovo's state legitimacy. Therefore, there are tangible benefits that attracted the external actor (NATO), which motivated its aid to the separatist group (KLA) to improve its likelihood of survival.

IV. Failed Separatist Case Study: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

The Kosovo War provides an excellent example of a successful separatist case because of the impact that NATO had on the outcome of the conflict. However, there are cases in which external actor support is unsuccessful. The Sri Lankan Civil War provides a unique case because of the external support the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) received from India between 1983 and 1987. The Sri Lankan Civil War is technically a separatist war because the LTTE is seeking to establish their autonomy. The withdrawal of this support post-1990 provides a unique opportunity to analyze the impact of external support on the same separatist organization. After analyzing the impact of external support (or the lack thereof) on the LTTE over three decades, the LTTE is compared to the KLA to quantify how external actor support impacts the survival of a separatist group.

Historical Background

Tamil nationalism increased with the creation of the Sri Lankan state in 1931 (Hariharan 2008: 37). During the 1940s and 1950s, Tamil nationalists demanded to receive state representation and eventually requested to become a federal state. The goal was to counter the Sinhala policies that discriminated against the Tamil community

(Hariharan 2008: 37). Specifically, the Ceylon Citizenship Act of 1948 and the Sinhala Only Bill discriminated against the Tamil community by declaring them noncitizens and making Sinhala the official language (McConnell 2008: 62-3). The systematic discrimination by the Sri Lankan government caused the Tamil leaders to take action and defend their homeland.

The Tamil separatist movement was created out of frustration toward the ethnocentric policies put in place by the Sri Lankan government (DeVotta 2009: 1021). Tamil leadership announced the right to self-determination for their homeland in 1976 (McConnell 2008: 65). The declaration for the right to self-determination was followed by the creation of armed groups taking up the cause. According to Hussain (2008: 81), “The Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam was founded by Vellupillai Prabhakaran on March 5, 1976, the day he conducted a successful bank robbery in Puttur.” The LTTE committed more than common crime; they were known perpetrators of many terrorist attacks. Similar to the KLA, the LTTE purchased their arms through the black market with ill-gotten funds from bank robberies, drug trafficking, and welfare fraud (Abel 1995; Herinrich 1986). According to Samaranayake (2007: 178), LTTE attacks between 1984 and 2004 killed 3,045 civilians while injuring 3,704. These attacks frequently utilized terror tactics as the LTTE resorted to using car bombs and assassinations of political leaders (Ministry of Defense, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 2011; Kaufman 1996).

The goal for the separatists was to establish their own independent state, which consisted of the Northern and Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka (Pfaffenberger 1995: 130). According to McConnell (2008: 72), the “Tamils’ homeland has been occupied by the

military of successive Sri Lankan governments. LTTE was engaged in an armed struggle based on the right to self-determination because of the acts of genocide committed by the Sri Lankan government.” In 1977, the Sri Lankan elections saw the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) vote on a mandate for a separate Tamil state, precipitating the conflict (Sarvananthan 2018: 2). The roots of the conflict were LTTE territory claims and Sinhalese Buddhist politicians ensuring the dominance of the Sinhalese Buddhist population throughout Sri Lanka (Devotta 2009: 1022). The violence between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE led to the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA). According to DeVotta (2009: 1028), the PTA “allowed security forces to arrest and hold anyone suspected of subversive activities incommunicado and without trial for up to 18 months. Many Tamils were caught and tortured under the PTA.” The repressive tactics used against the Tamil community violated their right to self-determination, which forced them to take up arms.

The Tamil conflict has seen at least four different phases to the war with the last occurring from 2006-2009. The Tamil community wanted to establish their own state by declaring self-determination. However, the repressive policies that were carried out by the Sri Lankan government prevented the Tamil community from achieving that dream. Those policies forced the Tamil community to create groups that would fight for their cause; yet, even though the LTTE were able to put up a fierce fight against the Sri Lankan government, they failed to achieve their goal of an independent state.

The lack of external actor support hurt the LTTE’s chances of winning their independence. Ultimately, the Sri Lankan government forces were able to capture the lost territory that the Tamil separatists had acquired throughout the war. Unlike the KLA in

Kosovo, who received military aid from an external supporter, the lack of an external actor sealed the LTTE's fate as they could not withstand the counter offensive by the central state; they simply did not have access to the requisite supplier of military aid. LTTE's early successes, which occurred concurrently to support from an external actor, were brutally reversed throughout the 1990s and 2000s.

India's Support (1983-87)

The LTTE did not have the continuous external support that the KLA received in Kosovo; however, the LTTE did receive support from India until 1987. Between 1983-1987, India provided military aid on their soil, where they trained LTTE soldiers (Hariharan 2008: 38). India was the only external actor to provide any kind of support to the Tamil separatists and was eventually considered counterproductive by later Indian administrations because of their official policy of LTTE marginalization (Pfaffenberger 1995: 135). In 1985, India tried to negotiate a ceasefire between LTTE and the Sri Lankan government in Thimpu, Bhutan, but both sides failed to reach an agreement at the summit (Hariharan 2008: 39). Eventually, after realizing the danger the LTTE posed, the Indian government sent in peace-keeping forces in support of the Sri Lankan government to help stabilize the region (Pfaffenberger 1995: 135).

India's Military Aid

The LTTE's early success against the Sri Lankan government would have been reversed were it not for India's intervention. The Indian intelligence, Raw and Analysis

Wing (RAW), provided weapons training and battlefield strategy to LTTE fighters. As stated by Sengupta and Ganguly (2013: 112),

“The RAW, India’s external spy agency, implemented India’s strategy of diffusion of the Sri Lankan Tamil insurgents by opening bases and training camps mostly in the Ramanathapuram district in southern Tamil Nadu. The RAW training typically consisted of field craft, tactics, map reading, jungle and guerrilla warfare, and training in weapons system such as light and medium machine guns, automatic rifles, pistols, and rocket propelled grenades. Instructions regarding how to use bombs, lay mines, and establish telecommunications were also provided.”

The RAW support that the LTTE received improved their chances of survival on the battlefield and throughout the war. Specifically, the LTTE’s fighting capacity was at its peak when receiving military aid from India. Between 1983-1987, the LTTE’s control of Sri Lankan territory grew; however, they did not completely control their entire territorial claim, which covered over half of the coastline and major port cities.

Ultimately, the LTTE did control a majority of the Northern and Eastern provinces (Fourman 2014: 104). The LTTE was able to utilize the training by taking control of major ports and coastline of Sri Lanka, which gave them the advantage over government forces. Therefore, the military aid provided by India improved the LTTE’s likelihood of survival because they were able to use that training to defeat Sri Lankan government forces at strategic locations. Economic aid provided by India also proved essential in the continued LTTE struggle for independence, as examined in the following section.

India’s Economic Aid

India’s military aid proved to have a significant impact on the LTTE’s likelihood of survival against the Sri Lankan government forces. However, although military aid is

critical for a group's chances of survival, additional types of aid help maintain their fight. India provided crucial economic aid to help sustain LTTE forces and civilians. Specifically, the Indian air force provided food and supplies to LTTE in the city of Jaffna, which is a key port city in northern Sri Lanka (Sengupta and Ganguly 2013: 113-14). India's economic aid made a larger impact on the LTTE's chances of survival because it allowed them to maintain their fight against the Sri Lankan government forces until they ceded control to Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF). Therefore, we can assume that the economic aid provided additional support to the LTTE's fight and ensured that they could sustain themselves for some time. India also provided moral support, which may also have impacted the LTTE's chances of survival.

India's Moral Support

India's military and economic aid was critical for their chances of survival against the Sri Lankan government forces. During the period of Indian external support, 1983-1987, it is difficult to find any evidence that India provided any moral support to the LTTE. Any Indian moral support was initiated by the Tamil Nadu population in southern India because of anger towards the Sri Lankan government and their actions. India's government was hesitant to intervene on the LTTE's behalf. The Indian government initiated covert support to the Sri Lankan government in the form of military and economic aid. India unsuccessfully tried to mediate various negotiations between Sri Lanka and LTTE between 1983-1987. Eventually, these unsuccessfully interventions led to the India government sending the IPKF to help defeat the LTTE and put an end to the fighting. The failure to obtain India's moral support seemed to hurt the LTTE's chance of

survival, and to an extent, the LTTE did lose momentum. However, that did not last long as seen in the following Eelam wars that occurred. Therefore, moral support did play a factor in ending the first Eelam war; however, India's military and economic aid provides crucial information for this study. As in the KLA case, military aid was crucial for the separatist group. The training provided by India to the LTTE provided them the necessary skills to defeat Sri Lankan forces and control key ports; therefore, providing the advantage in mediation talks. It is clear that this aid rendered the LTTE separatist movement sustainable and played a critical role in their early successes in the 1980s period of the conflict.

Lack of External Actor (1991-2020)

As this section focuses on external support that occurred from 1991 to present, the external support from India is disregarded because it occurred before the observed years. From 1991 to present, the LTTE was not as fortunate to receive the external support that they had received in 1980s.² The LTTE by this point had a reputation as a dangerous organization and the international community targeted them. Over 30 states within the international community designated the LTTE an international terrorist organization (DeVotta 2009: 1040). Many of these states declared the LTTE as the main obstacle to resolving the conflict (DeVotta 2009: 1040). The LTTE did not provide any support to counter these accusations; they continued to violate ceasefires that had been agreed upon with the Sri Lankan government.

² According to W. Alejandro Sanchez Nieto (2008), Singapore and Burma are weapons suppliers for LTTE; however, that could not be verified (578).

The LTTE suffered from not having an external actor to provide support during this period, such as was afforded them by India in the 1980s. The LTTE's reputation also ultimately diminished the likelihood of another external actor providing aid, a crucial difference from the KLA in the Kosovo war. Furthermore, by violating ceasefire agreements, the LTTE continued to portray themselves as a volatile separatist movement that only wanted to cause destruction. This reputation the LTTE created made it difficult to justify any UN member to politically support them.

External Actor Military Aid

The absence of an external actor is not always the clear reason why a separatist group is defeated by the central state, but in many cases this factor plays a critical role in the outcome of the conflict. Theoretically, any time that a separatist group receives support from an external actor, the group's probability of survival should improve. In the case of Kosovo, we saw the KLA's probability of survival improve greatly by receiving military aid from NATO. On the other hand, in the LTTE case, the absence of aid from an external actor hurt their probability of survival. At the time, when India was providing military aid to the LTTE in the 80s, the separatist group was successfully took control of entire regions of Sri Lanka. After India ceased providing aid in 1990, the LTTE failed to maintain control of those regions.

The Sri Lankan military force was larger than the LTTE which gave them a distinct advantage. According to Nieto (2008: 578), "Sri Lankan armed forces (numbered around 240,000) against Tamil rebels (10,000)." The LTTE was outnumbered by Sri Lankan forces and would have benefited significantly from receiving military aid from an

external actor. By 2004, the LTTE had lost 70% of the territory that they had controlled since the 1980s (Fourman 2014: 103). Military aid from an external actor would have helped the LTTE to maintain territory that they had successfully taken. Moreover, the external actor's military aid would have given the LTTE the opportunity to repel counter-offensives that the Sri Lankan government forces launched against them in 2008 and further diminished LTTE forces. Despite these reversals, a key reason why the LTTE may have been able to continue their conflict throughout the years could be the weapons training and battlefield strategies that India provided them. The lack of military aid had a critical impact on the LTTE for several reasons, yet they were able to continue the struggle for an additional 18 years, perhaps in part because of the Indian training that some veterans may have passed down. Ultimately, the lack of military aid was a death sentence for the LTTE.

In sum, additional military aid would have improved the probability of survival for the LTTE by providing them the extra resources necessary to allow them to survive the counterattack that the Sri Lankan government launched to recover the land they had lost. In the Kosovo case, military aid was vital for them to fight the central government and gain legitimacy. Therefore, the LTTE had initial success against their central government; however, they failed to maintain their position and succumbed to the central government forces.

External Actor Economic Aid

The LTTE benefited greatly from India providing economic aid in 1987 which allowed them to continue to fight until India decided to shift their position. In particular,

as with the lack of military aid, a lack of economic aid hurt the LTTE. There is no evidence that an external actor provided the LTTE with economic aid from 1991 to present. The lack of economic aid was a blow to the LTTE because they did not have the luxury of providing resources to their fighters as they once did in 1987. The lack economic and military aid greatly diminished the LTTE's likelihood of survival because they did not have the necessary resources to keep fighting against the capable Sri Lankan military force. Since the LTTE did not have military or economic aid, it is important to analyze how moral support impacted their chance of survival.

External Actor Moral Support

The LTTE's failure to establish an independent Tamil state was caused by not having external actor support to fight the Sri Lankan government. The Indian government played a critical role in shaping the international community's perception of the LTTE. As stated by Sengupta and Ganguly (2013: 118), "India's stance against the LTTE, convinced U.S., U.K., and Canada to designate LTTE as a Terrorist Organization." India heavily influenced some of the great powers of the world to declare LTTE a terrorist organization. Furthermore, India utilized their diplomatic networks to depict the LTTE as a ruthless terrorist organization that murdered thousands of innocent civilians (Sengupta and Ganguly 2013: 119). The LTTE's criminal activity, including smuggling and drug trafficking, only reinforced India's claims which impacted the international community decision to not support their self-determination movement.

30 states in the international community considered the LTTE the root problem of the Sri Lankan war, making it a challenge for the separatist group to convince any

country to provide them military aid. The international community's negative perception of the LTTE meant few, if any states were willing to support the separatist group for fear of diplomatic repercussion.

The LTTE's geographic location may have dissuaded any external actor from providing military aid because the LTTE presented few tangible advantages or benefits for an external actor. Moreover, LTTE's leader, Prabhakaran, failed to exploit any of their territorial or military gains to establish political legitimacy (DeVotta 2009: 1040). The failure to utilize political gains, as well as the lack of resources or strategic geography ultimately eliminated any opportunity for states to give the LTTE legitimacy. The failed legitimacy from any state made the LTTE's fight for self-determination difficult to achieve because they were viewed as the problem and not the solution to the conflict. This case fortifies the argument that receiving military aid from an external actor is crucial to a separatist group establishing legitimacy because if the external state views the separatist group as a liability, the likelihood of receiving aid is slim; however, if the potential external actor viewed the group's fight for self-determination as righteous the chances are high. Therefore, the probability of survival for the LTTE was slim because unlike the KLA, the international community did not see its cause as legitimate and would not provide military aid because of their reputation.

Probability of Survival

The LTTE was defeated by the lack of external actor support and in particular military aid. On January 2, 2008, the Sri Lankan government pulled out of the 2002 ceasefire agreement which was mediated by Norway and successfully recaptured LTTE

occupied territories (Wickramasinghe 2009: 59). The successful offensive was crucial in helping end the conflict spanning over four decades. The LTTE's likelihood of survival was slim because although they were able to fight the central government forces for decades, they could not maintain their cause for self-determination due to the lack of military aid. In the Kosovo case, military aid was critical for the separatist group's survivability. The LTTE did have external support from India initially, though it was not as comprehensively supported as the KLA was by NATO, which led to them failing to repel the counteroffensive that the Sri Lankan government forces launched in 2008. Receiving military aid from an external actor would have increased their likelihood of survival because it would have provided them an opportunity to maintain control of their occupied territories and establish legitimacy for their cause of self-determination. In sum, the lack of external actor aid from 1991-present hurt the LTTE's probability of survival.

Implications

The LTTE's case provides insight for why military aid increases the chances of survival for a separatist group. The LTTE had great success in their initial fight for self-determination when supported by India. However, once the LTTE lost this aid, they failed to maintain control over their captured territories, which was a crucial blow. The failure to hold this territory is linked to not having the necessary military aid to continue their fight. The LTTE failed to take political advantage of the territory they had captured, but I think you should expound on that here. If they had used their control of that territory to secure autonomy or semi-autonomy, especially with India's tacit support, they could still have their independence today. Furthermore, the KLA had success in maintaining

control of their territory because of the targeted bombing NATO provided. The LTTE did not have the same level of support from India, which made it difficult for them to hold off the central government forces' counterattacks. Yet, the LTTE's reasons for not receiving external actor military aid go deeper than lack economic aid and moral support.

In order to receive any type of external aid, a separatist group must have some kind of strategic importance. The LTTE did not represent territory or resources of strategic importance to any great powers, nor did the prospect of supporting them offer any pragmatic benefits for an external actor to gain. Sri Lanka sits just south of India and does not provide any significant ports for an adversary to utilize, and does not offer any potential for the formation of a security partnership because they are isolated from the rest of South and Southeast Asia. Therefore, an external actor would be taking a great risk by supporting the LTTE because of the lack of potential they offer.

In sum, the LTTE case provides insight as to why an external actor would provide a separatist group with military aid. The LTTE did not provide any strategic benefits for an external actor to establish relations with them because ultimately, they failed to provide an alliance that could benefit a regional power outside of India. Supporting the LTTE with military aid would be unappealing to an external actor because it would necessarily challenge India; therefore, hurting their chances of being able to influence the rest of Asia. The LTTE case reveals the importance for a separatist group to offer pragmatic benefits to a potential external actor. Without this, a strategic alliance for an external actor to provide military aid is unlikely.

V. Research Design and Analysis

Case Selection, Dataset, and Limitations

The case studies of the KLA and LTTE were selected to provide significant insight about some of the concepts that have an impact on the probability of survival for separatist groups. Specifically, we selected both cases to illustrate the effectiveness of military aid is to a separatist group's probability of survival. A quantitative analysis of 75 cases looking at external actors' support for separatist groups, over 29 years from 1991 to present, should shed light on the frequency of these occurrences and establishes a correlation between external actor support and an increase in the probability of survival for a separatist group.

This analysis hopes to contribute to the literature on separatist survival by identifying three essential variables. My research utilizes Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) External Support Dataset (2011) database to establish quantitative support for three variables. These variables are [1] Military Aid, [2] Economic Aid, and [3] Moral Support. Furthermore, World Bank GDP Per Capita (2020) data is utilized to analyze an external actor's wealth. If the external actor has a larger GDP then they are expected to provide more aid, while lower GDP is expected to correlate to a lower likelihood of providing aid. There are limitations to this research; only 75 cases were observed, which makes statistical significance more challenging to achieve. The 75 cases that were identified are

the universal separatist cases for the time period observed. I verified that in each case observed, the separatist group wanted to establish their independence; any case where this did not occur was excluded. Only three cases provided data on economic aid that external actors gave to separatist groups because most states do not disclose support for a separatist group; which further limits the results for this research. Furthermore, these are three bivariate results and are not conclusive. They are indicative which suggests that further research is needed along these lines. Additional control factors, such as proportion of a group's population that are fighting for succession and military power of the host country would help further clarify this research.

Lastly, this research conducted for the exclusive intent of establishing whether there is a difference in impact from various types of aid on the outcome of a conflict. If there is a distinction, then further research is needed. The findings here are thus necessarily preliminary.

Operationalizing Dependent Variable

For the dependent variable, the various levels of survival for a separatist group are analyzed. Survival is operationalized on a scale from [0,1,2,3,4], with [0] representing failed secession, [1] indicating secessionists still fighting but have not succeed, [2] de facto state, secessionists have limited recognition, [3] secessionists have general recognition but not universal, and [4] secessionists achieved independence and have received recognition from a majority of the world. The concept of survival is defined by whether a group has achieved the necessary success that is prerequisite for independence. These measurements provide insight into how likely it is that a group will survive.

Groups are also measured by strength, which is expected to correlate strongly with survivability and thus achievement of independence.

Operationalizing Independent Variables

The goal of this research is to find which of these variables has the greatest impact and most improves the separatist group's probability of survival. Hopefully, we can distinguish which variable, or variables are universal to the cases that have been observed. Specifically, military aid is expected to be the most crucial aid to a separatist group's probability of survival

1. Military Aid

Nonstate actors, like separatist groups, do not have the necessary military resources and thus receiving military aid from an external actor is critical to their probability of survival. As seen in the Kosovo case, the KLA's probability of survival improved dramatically when NATO began their air operations and targeting strategy against the Serbian government forces. On the other hand, in the LTTE case, military aid from India improved their ability to enter into conflict with Sri Lankan government forces. However, the lack of military aid from 1991 to present damaged the LTTE's chance of surviving because it did not have the external support that could have improved their odds against the government forces. Military aid can provide a variety of benefits for the separatist to use to their advantage against the central government.

The military aid variable is measured on an index ranging from [0] to [5], with [0] no external actor support being the lowest level of support, [1] weapons and troop

training provided by advisors, [2] advisors providing organization and insight for combat operations, [3] provides small arms ammunition, armored personnel carriers, artillery, tanks, fighter jets, helicopters, missiles, and attire, [4] provides security forces to conduct co-vert operations in support of secessionist forces, [5] external actor armed forces that provide control over contested territory and/or engage in combat operations against the central government, which is the highest support a separatist group may receive.

2. Economic Aid

Most separatist groups do not have the wealth to support a conflict against their parent state. Some separatist groups may have the fortune of possessing resources that originate in their region to sell for weapons and supplies, but that narrative is not relevant to this research as separatist groups need outside support. Also, external actors become involved because they are self-interested and will initiate support to a separatist group if there are tangible gains. We saw that NATO helped sustain Kosovo and KLA for a decade after the war ended, while the LTTE only received limited supplies from India, which did not last.

The economic aid variable is operationalized as an average of money groups received from an external actor. The lowest level of support that comes from an external actor ranges from \$0 to \$399 million, the next level of support ranges from \$400 million to \$799 million, and the highest level of support ranges from \$800 million to \$1 billion or greater.

3. Moral Support

In the international community, to become a state, it is imperative to have a majority of the world provide recognition. The probability of survival for a separatist group trying to establish legitimacy and independence depends on how the international community perceives their self-determination movement. In the case of the KLA, the U.S. and U.K. utilized their power and positions to pressure other states to recognize their independence. While for the LTTE, India used their influence to convince great powers to designate them as a terrorist group. Establishing “De Facto State” status does not exactly achieve the status of independence that the separatist group strives for because they are still under the control of the central state. Therefore, it is crucial for a separatist group to receive recognition from a majority of the world to gain the independence they have strived to achieve.

The moral support variable is measured on an index ranging from [0] to [4], with [0] showing no external recognition as the lowest level of support, [1] acknowledgement of the secessionist, [2] expression of solidarity with an external actor, [3] diplomatic/formal ties with the secessionist, and [4] recognition of independence as the highest level of support that a separatist group can receive.

All measurements for the three independent variables were run through a hierarchical multiple regression to determine the optimal model.

Hypotheses

In separatist wars, having resources is a crucial aspect for any side to improve their probability of survival. Secessionist groups receiving economic investment from external actors can improve their chances of surviving a war against governments. Groups receiving such support will also have the opportunity to buy food and textiles for their fighters, which could potentially boost the morale of their fighters. The lack of food and clothing is one of the biggest reasons why secessionist groups do not have enough fighters. Running out of food could lower morale and result in thousands of fighters joining the adversary's forces. Having food and proper clothing, could also help fighters endure rough climate conditions to continue fighting. Furthermore, the secessionist group can also use these funds to pay their fighters. Receiving payments may increase their fighters' resolve to stay and continue to carry on the fight against the government. The payments that their soldiers receive may also increase their support for the war because they may have grievances against the government for their lack of support that they did not receive as citizens.

Another way secessionist groups may use the economic funds from external actors is in the covert operations area. The group can use the funds to produce propaganda against the government with the goal of persuading the rest of the population to buy into their cause for fighting against the government. The external actor can help in this area by providing them with materials to buy handouts for the public. Also, they may have the chance to use the funds to buy radio or news stations to further express their ideology for why they fight, while using these stations to provide information on the war.

They can influence the population by showing that they are winning the war via these outlets. Lastly, secessionists can use the economic aid to fortify their defenses to ensure that they can maintain captured areas. The external actor, depending on the state, can give the secessionist group a greater amount of economic funding that will allow them to continue the fighting which improves their probability of survival, which leads to the first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *As an external actor's economic aid increases the secessionist group's probability of survival improves.*

Although external actors may be able to provide economic support to secessionist groups, they can also provide military aid in various ways. The secessionist groups are not able to provide enough or adequate weapons for their fighters when they are engaged in combat. The lack of equipment hurts the separatist's chances of winning the war and they may seek assistance elsewhere. Therefore, it seems that the government forces are able to outlast separatists when they encounter each other on the battlefield. However, external actors can step in and provide support to separatist groups to improve their probability of survival.

External actors can provide secessionist groups weapons, ammunition, or troops to aid them in their fight against the government. Giving them more modern weapons than they could otherwise access can improve their chances of surviving fights against government forces. Having new weapons can also improve the morale of the soldiers who are fighting because it gives them the sense that they are fighting for a just cause

against the central government. The external actor takes their rebellion seriously, giving the fighters a greater sense of self-worth and respect. Also, the improved accuracy of these weapons can lead to more favorable combat outcomes for separatist forces, which could turn the tide of war in their favor.

Furthermore, external actors' military aid can provide training to separatist soldiers. Receiving the proper training can improve the secessionist fighters' physical health, improving their performance in combat with government forces or when enduring difficult climate conditions. The training can also give the secessionist groups an opportunity to have more effective strategies when engaging the government forces by using the external actor's combat methods. Another key component for training secessionist forces is giving them a chance to extend their lives and continue to fight for longer periods.

External actors can also provide support by sending in special forces who can provide combat strategies to the groups. Generals, or special forces can give secessionist groups firsthand assistance in planning a strategy when going into battle. Sometimes leaders in these groups may not have proper education on battle tactics and can therefore hurt their sides chances of surviving the war. Furthermore, having special forces fighting alongside the secessionist fighters can improve the probability of secessionist survival because the special forces can guide them through the battle and provide them with the necessary support. Lastly, the external actor can send in their military to reinforce the separatist group and provide stability for the occupy area.

Secessionist groups that receive military aid from external actors improve their probability of surviving the war. However, even though there is a chance of them not

winning the war, there still is a chance that their fighting will intensify over time. The weapons and ammunition that they receive could allow them to confidently face more substantial government forces. The weapons and training will improve their chances of survival and allow them to fight with more intensity. Also, having generals or special forces that have proper education and training only further improves their chances of taking strategic areas from government forces. Finally, the external actor may send in their military to reinforce and maintain stability for the separatist forces and their area of interest. The secessionist fighters may become inspired by receiving aid, therefore, they will continue to fight with more intensity which could improve their probability of survival. This discussion provides the second hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: *As an external actor's military aid increases, the secessionist group's probability of survival improves.*

Furthermore, after the external actor provides secessionist groups with economic and military aid, the external actor may use moral support to appeal to the secessionists, and the ethnic population that reside within the region. The external actor may use speeches to call for unity and cooperation from both sides. Also, external actors may discuss historical connections to the region which they believe rightfully belongs to them and thus that they have a right to protect. The moral support may also motivate the secessionist fighters to continue to pursue their cause. Also, this may encourage the secessionist fighters to fight with more intensity because they believe that they are not

only fighting for their region, but for the country that supports them. This discussion leads us to the third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: *As an external actor's moral support increases, the secessionist group's probability of survival improves.*

Finally, all three types of aid are inextricably correlated to the probability of survival for separatists. However, military aid offers the highest probability of survival for any separatist group because of the impact it has on the conflict. Military aid allows separatists to maximize their chances of survival by using weapons, armed forces, and military advisors from the external actor to challenge the central political authority. Essentially, the argument is made here that economic aid provides the highest probability of survival for separatists because of the investments that are made by the external actor. However, it is military aid that triumphs over economic aid because it is the fundamental resources like weapons, armed forces, and military advisors that increase the probability of survival for separatists. Therefore, this discussion leads to the final hypothesis:

Hypothesis 4: *Military aid increases a secessionist group's probability of survival more than economic aid or moral support.*

VI. Results and Discussion

In Table 6.1, the variables perform as follows:

Table 1:

	All 3 supp	Military Aid	Moral Supp	Econ Aid
(Intercept)	0.80 *	0.80 *	0.88 *	1.00 *
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.12)
MilitaryAid	0.12	0.18 *		
	(0.09)	(0.07)		
EconomicAid	-0.00			0.00
	(0.00)			(0.00)
MoralSupport	0.14		0.26 *	
	(0.15)		(0.11)	
<i>N</i>	75	75	75	75
<i>R</i> ²	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.00
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.06	0.07	0.06	-0.01
Resid. sd	1.00	0.99	1.00	1.03

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

In the first model, all three variables are present and have not reached to 1.96 threshold to achieve statistical significance, most likely because of the limited number of cases. Since none of the variables achieved statistical significance, each variable was run separately to see if they have any significant impact. All variables should be run simultaneously but this is not possible. When running each variable separately, in Model 2, Military Aid does have statistical significance at 2.57. In Model 3, Moral Support has statistical significance at 2.36. Finally, in Model 4, Economic Aid does not have any statistical significance because it has a 0 and is thus disregarded in the ensuing models.

It was expected that Military Aid would have the most significance, followed by Economic Aid. Moral Support was expected to have the least significance. However, the results show otherwise. The mixed results from these models demand further research as there seems to be unexpected significance to these variables. Military Aid is the most significant variable, yet Moral Support is the second-most significant while Economic Aid is the least impactful variable. Economic Aid may be the least significant because of the limited evidence of external actors supporting separatist groups economically. Further research may reveal how an external actor's economic aid impacts separatist groups.

Table 6.2

	Table 2:		
	EA: China	EA: USA	EA: Russia
(Intercept)	0.77 *	0.81 *	0.83 *
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
MilitaryAid	0.18 *	0.18 *	0.10
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.09)
EA.China	1.05		
	(0.70)		
EA.USA		-0.49	
		(0.71)	
EA.Russia			0.91
			(0.56)
<i>N</i>	75	75	75
<i>R</i> ²	0.11	0.09	0.11
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.08	0.06	0.09
Resid. sd	0.98	0.99	0.98

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

There is evidence that Military Aid and Moral Support have statistical significance. This begs the question, does military aid from the three major powers have a stronger impact? In Table 6.2, we further break down the variable of Military Aid, and analyze the three major powers of the world, namely, The People’s Republic of China (PRC), The United States of America (USA), and Russian Federation (RF). These nations are classified as the three world major powers because they are widely considered to control the world’s most powerful militaries. Remarkably, even though these three countries are the top three, In Models 5-7, Military Aid for all three powers does not achieve statistical significance. These findings intimate that it does not matter where military aid originates, so countries like Senegal or Nigeria can have just as much of an impact as the PRC or the USA.

Table 6.3

Table 3:			
	Moral/EACHina	Moral/EAUSA	Moral/EARussia
(Intercept)	0.85 * (0.13)	0.89 * (0.13)	0.85 * (0.12)
MoralSupport	0.27 * (0.11)	0.28 * (0.11)	0.18 (0.11)
EA.China	1.16* (0.71)		
EA.USA		-0.82 (0.72)	
EA.Russia			1.03 * (0.48)
<i>N</i>	75	75	75
<i>R</i> ²	0.11	0.09	0.13
adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.08	0.06	0.11
Resid. sd	0.98	0.99	0.97

Standard errors in parentheses

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$

In Table 6.3, Moral Support is examined in a similar manner as Military Aid and statistical significance is achieved. When combining tables 2 and 3, it was expected that receiving support from the PRC and RF is the best option for a separatist group to survive, yet these findings contradict that assumption. The instability of this data causes the contrast in statistical significance between Moral Support and Military Aid and explains why there is an increase in Moral Support.

Ultimately, the PRC's Moral Support is more important than the USA's. The findings here express that the PRC has a larger impact than the USA. If the PRC shows support, perhaps it has a stronger impact on the probability of separatist survival because they listen to the PRC's strategies. There are various explanations for why this may be the case; for example, separatist groups that receive support from the PRC may be exclusively located within the Asian region, where the PRC has regional hegemony status. The host country could feel pressure from the resources that the PRC could provide for the separatist, which may embolden the separatist group to continue to fight and increase their probability of survival. Although in Model 10 Russia's Moral Support variable does achieve statistical significance, the combined variable "Moral Support" does not achieve statistical significance, either. The instability of this data may be the cause of this failure to achieve statistical significance for the Russia Moral Support variable.

VII. Conclusion

The recent Russian intervention in Georgia (2008) and Eastern Ukraine (2014) has shown the relevance of an external actor's support for a separatist movement. The prevalence of these conflicts emphasizes the need for continued research into external actor support for separatist groups, and its impact on their survivability. The variables analyzed here shed new light on how external aid improves the probability of survival for separatist groups. The crucial part of this research is understanding which type of aid gives the separatist groups the greatest chance of survival. Further research is needed before conclusive arguments can be extrapolated from this research.

The literature on separatist survival is broad; however, there are limitations to how previous scholars have analyzed which type of aid impacts survival. For this research, the variables were chosen logically, based on what was most crucial for what improves the probability of survival for a separatist group. Military aid and moral support were found to be most relevant in the majority of the observations, yet economic aid's impact was difficult to confirm. The KLA and LTTE case studies provided further emphasis for the impact of military aid on the survivability of a separatist group.

It should be noted that there is a clear distinction between the type of military aid that was provided to the KLA and that provided to the LTTE. The military aid the KLA received included NATO air support that targeted central government positions and helped push back government forces. NATO's support allowed the KLA to maintain

control of their limited territory. On the other hand, the LTTE only received weapons and battlefield strategy training from India. The critically important air support and strategic targeting provided to the KLA was denied to the LTTE. It is obvious that one type of support made a larger impact than the other, which made be the difference in how it impacts the survivability of a separatist group.

Future research is still needed in this area. The lack of economic aid data is still essential to the overall understanding of its impact on separatist survival. Although this research failed to find extensive data on economic aid for the 75 cases observed, future research may have the capability to establish the impact of this variable. Another avenue for future research is looking at the likelihood for why certain separatist groups are provided aid and others are not. Some separatist groups may not feel it is necessary to accept foreign aid for fear that it may hurt their legitimacy. Furthermore, external actors may not feel that there are any benefits to supporting certain groups. Finding this evidence could provide stronger insight into the survival of separatist groups. Finally, because of the lack of cases for this research, future new detailed data from sources like Uppsala Conflict Data Program could benefit this research. Adding more data could provide greater insight into this research and stronger analysis which could further our understanding of separatist survival.

This article finds that military aid and moral support improve the probability of survival for a separatist group. A deeper analysis reveals that military aid among the three major powers (PRC, USA, RF) does not have a greater impact than from other sources. Thus, any country providing aid can have just as much of an impact as them. Further, we find that Moral Support from the PRC has more of an impact than the other two powers

(USA and RF), which is perhaps decided by the effectiveness and location. The distinction between the PRC's Moral Support and the USA's Moral Support could stem from the lack of stability from the USA's executive branch. Stability plays a crucial role for separatist because it provides security and reassurances that the external actor may never withdraw their support. The USA's inconsistent leadership may create mistrust from the separatist group because although the current President may support them, the future President may not have the same interest to support them. The PRC's consistent leadership could appeal to the separatists accepting their support because as oppose to the USA's ever-changing executive branch, the PRC can maintain support for a longer period. However, it should be noted that the majority of the PRC's Moral Support in this research occurred at the beginning years because we know that it is unlikely that the PRC would support any modern separatists; therefore, some caution should be taken when considering this impact.

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