What Makes States Comply with Their Environmental Treaty Commitments: A Comparative Case Analysis of Australia and Canada during the Kyoto Protocol

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WHAT MAKES STATES COMPLY WITH THEIR ENVIRONMENTAL TREATY COMMITMENTS: A COMPARATIVE CASE ANALYSIS OF AUSTRALIA AND CANADA DURING THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

A Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT


Climate change, or global warming at the time, made a significant public outcry in the 1970s. Two major international treaties, the Montreal Protocol of 1987 and the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, were created from the spark of international demand for action. Why is it that after such a movement, the global community still fails to cooperate on climate change action? What makes a state comply with its international environmental treaty commitments, like the Kyoto Protocol?

This thesis’ research findings indicate that neither public opinion, elite framing of climate change as a threat, nor a state's capacity impact a state's compliance path. Further research shows evidence of the influence of economic development but was only evident in the case of Australia. These findings indicate that the compliance schools that dominate the literature and the Copenhagen school have less significant empirical validity. Research on state capacity, governmental structure, and through speech coding provides the emergence of one potential foundation that could shed further light on this research question. That is the area of political ideology and affiliation.

Arguably, climate change is one of our most serious global issues, even with the increased intensity of erratic and intense weather patterns. Based on this research, it is believed far more by the scientific community than the average citizen and politician. It is more paramount now than ever to help understand what truly makes a state comply with global commitments on climate action. The time is ticking away.

Compliance, Kyoto Protocol, Securitization Theory, Environmental Regimes, Risk Perception
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Climate change is not a new term for one to hear; it is a term we hear more of in this new era. Climate change was previously known as Global Warming, which was later seen as too narrow because it seemed to claim that the warming of the earth was the only effect on the earth’s climate due to Co2 buildup. However, despite all the scientific evidence and increasing climatic events, this climate change phenomenon is still being denied. For many people, the threats described by climate change are too far into the future to worry about now. Plus, many states argue about who is responsible for putting out this ever-growing fire. However, Garrett Hardin quickly throws the blame onto all of humanity. In his famous article "Tragedy of the Commons," he claims that greed, fear, and common laws of society are leading to the destruction of the public commons, which he describes as Earth (Hardin 1968). As everyone tries to claim their piece of land, resources, and capital, the environment tends to suffer. It is a familiar idea that this world is a finite resource and, if not protected, our actions will soon destroy it. The key is ensuring regulation of the commons and finding a solution to what Hardin calls "The Double Blindness." This concept invokes anxiety in people, complicating the exploitation of the commons or the natural environment (Hardin 1968). In recent decades, the global community has enacted various treaties to help regulate the environment,
including the Montreal Protocol, Kyoto Protocol, and Paris Accords. These solutions show varied results, and progress could be faster.

Nevertheless, what makes these treaties differ in their success? One could have had a more significant political risk attached to complying rather than ignoring the treaty. Another point usually made is that one could have been too expensive and was not worth the economic burden for such a long-term turnaround. Many studies have examined environmental treaty compliance, mainly at the state level. This level of analysis creates only two dominant schools of compliance, Managerial, and Enforcement, that govern the literature. Only a few have looked at individual actors as potential influencers of a state's compliance path. This thesis proposes to investigate the question of what makes states comply with their international environmental treaty commitments. A comparative case study of Australia and Canada will serve as the subjects of this investigation. Through a comparative case study analysis, this research will investigate how each case frames climate change as a dominant and present security issue by public elites and how this perception influences individuals’ decisions to protect the commons. These questions will be investigated under the theory of Securitization through its Copenhagen school. Not only will this provide a different theoretical perspective when it comes to the compliance literature. This research will also test some of the main assumptions of the previous schools to test their validity and the theories that back them. The main two assumptions to be investigated are whether or not state capacity (Managerial school) and economic development (Enforcement school) impact the path of Australia and Canada's compliance. Although this will not be a quantitative research study, the evidence will not be statistically significant. Instead, this study will rely on an in-depth analysis of each
case. The analysis will provide structural and historical context to understand better the findings and more substantial validity in influencing the state's compliance path.

This thesis is broken up into multiple chapters. Chapter two will provide a background and knowledge of previous international environmental treaties. Following this will be an in-depth look at compliance literature and what theories dominate the current studies. Next, the reader will gain an understanding of the core theoretical framework of this study, followed by a section on framing as it relates to climate change and a political tool. The job of these first four sections will provide the research study's basic knowledge, gaps, and purpose. After this, a brief discussion of bureaucratic politics and how it can apply to this study as a possible alternative path to compliance for each case. Finally, a brief overview of the primary studies that provided the critical foundations of this thesis is recognized. Chapter three discusses the methodology and applications.

Simply put, it is the roadmap on how the research will be conducted and will provide information for anyone wanting to recreate this study. The thesis sections are as follows: the case selection and why Australia and Canada were selected, each of the four hypotheses and a description of why these hypotheses were applicable, and the measures on how each variable, dependent and independent, will be operationalized. Chapters four and five are the meat and potatoes of this study, representing the case chapters, where four presents the findings about Australia and five presents findings about Canada. Each of these chapters will follow the same format. First, the state's government structure discussion defines the branches from the legislative branch to the bureaucracy. Next, a historical summary of the case's environmental movement will help bring light to past
public concerns, organization creation, political battles, and legislation related to environmental protection. Then, the reader will dive into an in-depth analysis of whether or not each case fully complied with its Kyoto Protocol commitments under a set of criteria. Finally, the discussion will focus on each hypothesis's findings. Chapter six aims to provide a comparative analysis of the two cases while connecting the context with the findings. Within chapter six, readers can find the research question, a discussion of research limitations, and open areas for future research.
Chapter 2

Background of International Treaties and Compliance

2.1 Introduction

This chapter helps lay the groundwork for the upcoming research study. First, to fully understand the reason behind investigating international environmental treaty compliance. One must have a basic understanding of what drives international cooperation regarding the environment and its past successes and failures. The Montreal Protocol was a success, while this treaty's counterpart, the Kyoto, was viewed as a failed treaty. Next, a knowledge of the literature on international treaty compliance will help paint a clearer picture of previous research and theories of what drives states to comply. The Managerial and Enforcement Schools are the two primary schools leading the compliance literature. Each school has its roadmap to compliance. However, the gaps and holes in this literature form the foundation of this research study. This study tests the assumptions of the Theory of Securitization. There are many schools within this theory. This chapter helps explain the theory as a whole and focuses on the school, which will be investigated later in the study. This study holds its foundations from four academic sources and can influence the theory in question and the methodology used to conduct this investigation. Finally, the research study is only partially new and original work, credit to the core research studies that inspired this study.
2.2 From Montreal to Kyoto

Regarding security, there are many issues that one state cannot defend from through individual actions. These issues range from nuclear proliferation, pandemics, and a changing global climate. Such global political issues require the cooperative action of all states. The most effective way to coordinate international cooperation, according to liberals, is through the creation of international institutions. States share similar societal norms through these institutions, which are the building blocks of future international regimes. The rest of this section focuses on international environmental regimes such as the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols. What made these regimes a necessity? What were their core purposes? Finally, were they considered successful regimes?

Since the 1960s, environmental issues have spurred debate amongst states; from depleting ozone to a warming and changing climate, no state was the sole culprit, nor could it be the sole repairman. Therefore, environmental protection is considered a global political issue, and this plague will leave no state untouched by its destruction. However, many environmental impacts and events are long-term events. The effects of consuming and producing harmful actions, as well as the effects of the solutions, will not be felt for years to come. So, what pushed the immediate environmental international call to action in the 1980s, which continues to this day? Some scholars claim it is the notion of state survival and relative gains. Others mention the notion of shared institutionalized social norms. However, we might find a whole other momentum by taking a deeper look at these international environmental regimes.

In the 1970s, two chemists, Molina and Rowland, discovered that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were causing the depletion of the earth’s ozone. This new
finding did not push governments to act primarily within the U.S. and Europe (Peloso 2010). Corporations acted much like we see today with climate change. With new scientific findings threatening their control over capital and consumer markets, they try to shut it down. That is precisely what corporations like DuPont did, calling the science “speculative…. with no concrete evidence” (Peloso 2010). However, the public outcry in America, with the help of the media and boycottng CFC products, started to spark political interests (Gareau 2010; Peloso 2010). These findings provide some objective evidence that environmental action began to spring from domestic actors, not the unitary state actors, focused on survival, as assumed under realist theory. One possible reason for increased attention is the health effects of a depleted Ozone. A decrease in ozone causes an increase in UV rays, increasing skin cancer risk. This direct effect could have pushed domestic actors to frame the depletion of the ozone as a national threat. In 1985, U.S. President Reagan pushed for international negotiations that led to the Vienna Convention for Protection of the Ozone Layer (Plein 2007; Peloso 2010). Although, think of this convention purely as just a promise. Much like the current United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), this convention had no legally binding commitments but mainly set forth environmental goals. These goals of ozone protection set forth the groundwork for the 1987 adoption of the Montreal Protocol and the targeting of ozone-depleting substances (ODSs) with the main target on CFCs.

Over the decades, the Montreal Protocol has successfully become known by many scholars as a novelty in international environmental action (Plein 2007; Murase, Lang 1995; Peloso 2010; Gareau 2010; Daniel, Solomon, Sanford, et al. 2012). It phased out most Class I controlled chemicals in 1996 and reached nearly 95% phase-out of all
controlled chemicals in 2005 (Plein 2007). In addition, it set the groundwork for international equity. Developing states suffer many environmental problems from producing ODSs or Green House Gasses (GHGs). Why should upcoming states such as the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) suffer economic hardship and development constraints for the neglect of Westernized industrial development? For this reason, Hunter et al. (2002, pg. 402) discuss the Montreal Protocol’s “common but differentiated responsibility” clause (Gareau 2010). This clause indicated that the phasing holds all party members out of all controlled chemicals, but developing states are allowed an additional ten years. These conditions and more have helped the Montreal Protocol survive and have its most recent Kigali amendment for phasing out of Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) by 2047 adopted in 2019. Furthermore, to think this golden child of international environmental regimes all started with the outcry of domestic actors.

Despite the success of the Montreal Protocol, its successor, the Kyoto Protocol, has received dissimilar fame and glory. Compared to Montreal, Kyoto did not accomplish its goals of global GHG reductions. Could Kyoto’s creation play an answer in its failure? Much like Montreal, Kyoto is through an international convention, the UNFCCC, adopted in 1992. According to Plein (2010), public opinion had no place in pushing states’ actions toward a warming climate. Instead, it was scientific evidence that led to international meetings. Five years later, in 1997, Kyoto was adopted, and it was not until 2005 that it took effect. In addition, Kyoto did not emulate the international equity shown in the Montreal Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol only required 36 industrial states (Annex I) to bind GHG reductions to their 1990 emission levels legally. Developing states (Annex
II) were not responsible for reducing their emissions but could partake in the mechanisms to help voluntarily reduce them. This clause opened up a huge loophole that allowed many states to free ride on the backs of others.

Some scholars claim this is why the U.S. Senate denied ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, which left one of the world's largest emitters to leave the regime (Plein 2007; Gareau 2010). Finally, Kyoto, like Montreal, had mechanisms and funds to help states comply with their commitments. For example, Montreal had the Multilateral Development Fund to help developing states. Kyoto's prominent mechanism was Carbon Emission Trading. This allowed Annex I states to pollute more by buying the carbon emissions of a state that emits far less. Carbon Emission Trading essentially turns environmental protection into a capitalist market, which is ironic because unregulated capitalism is responsible for this environmental problem in the first place.

In the end, what resulted in Kyoto's failure? Was it the source of environmental concern? Was it the need for an influential state? How was compliance measured and implemented? Plein (2007) claims it was the inability to regulate GHGs, which are synthetic and natural and are the lifeblood of every state. Montreal has also neglected certain chemicals such as Methyl Bromide (MrBe), Dichloromethane (DCMs), and in the past, HFC-134a. Despite its ongoing success, substantial evidence supports that these chemicals increase ozone depletion and climate change (Liang, Strahan, and Fleming 2017; Gareau 2010; Fortems-Cheiney, Saunois, Pison, et al. 2015). This thesis attempts to raise questions through a constructivist lens on state compliance. What makes a state comply with its environmental treaty commitments? Do relative gains or institutionalized social norms drive states, or is it from domestic actors and how they perceive a national
threat? The following section discusses the current literature and building blocks of state compliance and includes the literature on threat perception and the perception of climate change as a threat.

2.3 Literature Review

This literature review first covers research on climate as a security threat. What do different scholars claim about the potential impacts of climate change, and are their positive writings get lost behind those of crisis? Then, the review digs into the literature on compliance. Two schools of thought dominate the literature; this will also look at the potential of how constructivism fits into this realm. Finally, to review people's perception of climate change. Do people perceive it as a threat, and what drives these perceptions? These questions will be an important area when it comes to the methodology.

Climate as a Security Threat

Climate change has always been a clear and present threat mainly to the scientific community but a threat of the distant future to many politicians around the globe. Many governments think of short-term policies, and drastic environmental change usually does not make it because of huge costs in the present for benefits in the future, which seems like it could be more politically sensitive. However, according to an ever-growing literature investigating climate change, it is not as much of a distant threat as we once thought. Scholars and scientists believe that climate change is, in fact, a very high-security issue to states now and will lead to more and more devastation and conflict (Busby 2008; La Shier & Stanish 2019; Davis 2018; Müller, Waha, Bondeau, and Heinke 2014; Burrows and Kinney 2016; Stripple 2012). Some scholars highlight that climate change will not directly cause conflict but what they see as a threat multiplier (La Shier &
Stanish 2019, Burrows and Kinney 2016; Busby 2008). As climatic events increase in intensity, they will only exacerbate the already existing social, economic, and environmental problems states face. For example, a massive drought that increased tensions between society and the government exacerbated the Syrian Revolution.

According to Blank (2011), the Artic holds 13% of the global oil reserve, the equivalent of 90 billion barrels, making states like Russia push their dominance. On the other hand, many scholars discuss the numerous benefits states will receive as climate change progresses, especially economic boosts (Blank 2011; Perelet, Pegov, and Yulkin 2008; Reilly, Hohmann, and Kane 1994; Stoddart and Smith 2016; Morozov 2012). As the Arctic melts, new shipping lanes and fossil fuel deposits will open up. These new lanes and fuel deposits would increase the revenue of the Artic states like Norway, the U.S., Russia, and Canada and decrease global oil prices, which could potentially pack a blow to OPEC. Regarding shipping lanes, this will also provide revenue for the states whose Exclusive Economic Zones are in the lanes. For this purpose, Russia and Canada are working on claims in the hopes of controlling portions of the Northwest passages and the Northern Sea Route (Blank 2011; Perelet, Pegov, and Yulkin 2008; Stoddart and Smith 2016; Morozov 2012). Stoddart and Smith (2016) even show that looking at Canadian media headlines on framing the future of the Artic in two studies between 1997-2010 resulted in economic opportunity as the third top frame. Although, the melting ice caps could also bring international conflict as states fight for these economic claims. Therefore, the Arctic Council and the Law of the Sea need to be at the forefront of this timeline.
Research shows that climate change will not leave any state untouched. Numerous studies claim that developing states, especially in Africa, will suffer the most (Davis 2018; Müller, Waha, Bondeau, and Heinke 2014; Burrows and Kinney 2016; La Shier & Stanish 2019). Davis (2018) highlights that drought and water scarcity will decrease crop yields, and entire societies that depend on agriculture for survival will suffer massive income loss and security. When people can no longer feed themselves and lose their livelihoods, they either become involved in conflict or migrate. Müller, Waha, Bondeau, and Heinke (2014) reiterate this idea; their studies have shown that arid areas and river basins in Sub-Saharan Africa will suffer from increased water shortages, and all the regions will suffer from dry periods. These are known as hotspots (areas of multiple simultaneous climatic events).

Additionally, multiple scholars have shown that climate change can bring crop yields to multiple areas of the world (Perelet, Pegov, and Yulkin 2008; Singh, Nedumaran, Ntare, et al. 2014; Tesfaye, Kruseman, Cairns, et al. 2018; Yang, Chen, Lin, et al. 2015). For instance, in China, as global temperatures rise, it is seen that the growing environment that favors a Triple-Cropping System (TCS) has increased northward and will continue to shift between 90-900 km throughout the next decade (Yang, Chen, Lin, et al. 2015). TCS will not only bring food security for the largest populated state in the world, but it could also provide revenue in exports as other states’ crop yields decline. Although, there is a way to fight this decline through genetically altering current crops. A study conducted in Africa and Asia showed that typical maize yields declined due to climate events such as heat waves and drought. However, genetically tolerant maize increased the yields between 2-99% in all study sites (Tesfaye, Kruseman, Cairns, et al. 2018).
These findings show that despite the increased effects of climate change on states' agriculture and water supplies, it is still possible to fight this. Although, one must remember that genetic alteration is not cheap and fast, so this cannot be our primary defense.

As climatic events increase in intensity and occurrence, posing a potentially heightened risk to developed and developing states, it will place massive stress on governments. As a result, this could increase civil war and even terrorism because when governments fail to provide, citizens turn to other help. For example, this happened in Egypt when many citizens turned to the Muslim Brotherhood due to the government's inability to provide. There is no proof that this represents a climate problem, but it provides an example of societies turning to alternative groups when the government lacks legitimacy. Although some scholars say there is no positive connection between climate migration and conflict, they claim that climate change and migration are too broad a factor to pinpoint deep connections (Burrows and Kinney 2016). The massive impact of migration on societies is worldwide, significantly increasing conflicts arising over illegal migrants in the U.S. and Europe. In addition, many ethnic and religious conflicts impact MENA and Southeast Asia. Any development that places heavy stress and change on traditional societal practices and norms will result in contentions, especially since climatic migration will probably not be temporary. Finally, some scholars have highlighted the impacts of climate change on the security of developed nations, especially in the U.S. (La Shier & Stanish 2019; Busby 2008). As climate change challenges these states' status quo through increased immigration, economic hardships, and domestic conflict, it will also strain military and defense abilities and resources (La Shier &
Stanish 2019). These strains, in turn, would decrease a state's global influence and increase its vulnerability to other states. So, climate change will leave no state untouched and increase security risks through heterogeneous ways.

As noted above, environmental destruction caused by climatic events usually imposes many stresses on state domestic societies and economic development (Müller, Waha, Bondeau, and Heinke 2014). As states try to reduce climatic events, these changes are not free of consequence and usually impact state development. The transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy creates much debate in states of all development levels, but more so for developing states and those known as rentier states. The debate of environmental imperialism comes to play because the developing states feel their development should not be infringed for the mistakes of the developed world, mainly when the developed world still depends on cheap products. Some scholars have concluded that globalization increases the tension of effective environmental governance as market forces through higher demand for raw goods, push operations and investment overseas (Lemos and Agrawal 2006; Marson and Subramaniam 2019; Koengkan, Fuinhas, and Marques 2018; Hogenboom 2012). In order to meet rising demands, extractive production increases, but in turn, decreases the environmental quality within the state and even its neighbors. As noted above, this increase in degradation increases climatic events and strengthens domestic conflicts. Some scholars of this literature reinforce that extractive expansion, enforced by corruption, increases existing inequalities among the different economic classes, where the rich get richer and continue to carry the power (Hogenboom 2012; Cushing, Morello-Frosch, Wander, et al. 2015; Ridzuan 2019; Castro, Hogenboom, and Baud 2016). Acceptance of an increase in degradation and
inequality leads to speculation. Societies accept this expansion through elite reframing and social programs, where survival is more important than improving environmental quality (Castro, Hogenboom, and Baud 2013; Cushing, Morello-Frosch, Wander, et al. 2015; Satterthwaite 2003; Hogenboom 2012; Marson and Subramaniam 2019).

Here, we see Hardin's belief that climate change and the security of the commons are influenced more through subjective means, which drives state decisions. Societies suffering from poverty and inequality do not have the means to purchase or influence environmentally friendly goods. Regulations imposed through domestic legislation or private incentive and innovation is one way to reverse these inequalities. One can see this start in the U.S. with new sustainable products, but the price tags remain relatively high for the ordinary consumer. This connection between poverty, survival and environmental degradation are highlighted in the literature by many scholars as a cyclical relationship, which leads to an increase in socioenvironmental conflicts (Ridzuan 2019, Khan and Ali Khan 2016; Satterthwaite 2003; Cushing, Morello-Frosch, Wander, et al. 2015; Marson and Subramaniam 2019). This cycle of poverty, survival and environmental degradation in high-urbanization areas is the highest because of the low quality of living, increased environmental risks, dependence on cheap resources, and lack of political influence. This cycle leads to the notion of false consciousness. With this idea, people believe these policies and actions are helping reduce inequality and improve their living standards (Satterthwaite 2003). However, many scholars conclude that as environmental degradation continues due to this cycle, the effects of climate change will significantly affect impoverished and urban communities (Spikin, Hernandez, Stoller, et al. 2016; Hernandez and Brena 2016; Lemos and Agrawal 2006). The literature highlights studies,
as seen above, that the ever-increasing threat of climate change is not one of distance but one that is impacting states right now through internal or external means. Climate change is not only a state security issue but a threat of global proportions. No longer is climate change just an increase in hurricane intensity or severe drought but a threat multiplier; it can now cause an increase in poverty and inequality in societies.

Theories of Treaty Compliance

This world is experiencing an ever-increasing problem that no one state can alleviate on its own. The rising impacts of global climate change require a global response to provide a sustainable future. In the past decades, global cooperation has increased, as represented in the hundreds of bilateral and multilateral treaties. However, the larger the problem, the higher the cost a state can expect to see for the public good. This result leads to the questionability of treaty compliance amongst states and how to form regimes to ensure all states are treated on equal grounds when dealing with this crisis.

Scholars have debated this question of the effects of compliance and noncompliance with international treaties for decades. This debate has divided most of the literature on treaty compliance into the two contemporary schools of thought on treaty formulation and compliance. In addition, it discusses the third perspective on compliance, individual-driven, and applies a deeper lens into the workings within states and other non-state actors. The first school, known as the Managerial School, assumes that states comply based on institutionalized norms and interests, and for that noncompliance are actions taken beyond the state’s control, such as treaty ambiguity and economic downturns (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Chayes and Chayes 1995; Sugiyama 2001;
Fischhendler 2008). There is this substantial belief that a state should comply with a treaty for the overall public good regardless of how other states benefit relative to themselves. Chayes and Chayes highlight the importance of norms, which they claim is the formal acceptance to obey international law and "becomes an independent basis for conforming behavior" (Chayes and Chayes 1995, 8-9). This belief of absolute gains through collective norms is then institutionalized into a regime and becomes the legal basis of compliance. For example, the shared belief and reasoning of the immanent transnational destruction brought by climate change acts as a compliance mechanism amongst states. The managerial school claims the only reasons for a state to take actions of noncompliance are unpredicted events. These events include economic crises, pandemics, social change, state incapacity, or through inefficiencies of the treaty, such as ambiguity (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Fischhendler 2008; Von Stein 2008; Hovi, Froyn, and Bang 2007; Aakre, Helland, and Hovi 2016; Sugiyama 2001).

The managerial school does not believe in stringent enforcement through sanctions or other fierce power tactics (Sugiyama 2001). This notion of national sovereignty is the driver of the managerial compliance system. A state will not sign a treaty that locks it in strict enforcement because no state wants to bear the costs and be in an ultimatum agreement. For this reason, scholars have emphasized and added to the literature studies on how the managerial school focuses on returning states to compliance through flexibility measures, social pressure, consultation, and monetary and technical support (Huang 2002; McEvoy 2009; Von Stein 2008; Chayes and Chayes 1993; Yoshida 2001; Carraro, Marchiori, and Oreffice 2009).
The other side of the debate takes the side of the Enforcement School. This side of the compliance literature starts with the assumptions that the state's political, economic, and material interest drive compliance (Young 1979; Findley, Nielson, and Sharman 2015; Espinola-Arredondo and Munoz-Garcia 2011; Lupu 2016; Aakre, Helland, and Hovi 2016). This school aligns with rationalist and neo-realist perspectives. For neo-realists, using international institutions by states is ideal but not for the cooperation of shared norms (Mearsheimer 1994). Scholars explain that realism sees compliance only through the eyes of cost-benefit analysis (Seaman 2015; Cole 2009; Simmons 1998; Baradaran, Findley, Nielson, and Sharman 2012). For realist states only act in the notion of self-interests to increase their material gain over other states. This belief highlights power, the fundamental concept that drives realist theory.

Seaman (2015) reinforces that states are unlikely to enter or comply with international regimes that decrease their sovereignty, security, and economic statuses. The notion of relative gains applies because realists do not say treaties are useless but should only be agreed to if one's relative gains are higher than their competitors. According to Simmons (1998), states mainly enter regimes cynically, which means they are waiting to break agreements that do not serve their national interests. For scholars of the enforcement school, relative gains can be seen as what drives a state’s actions. Oran Young claims that partial compliance theory engulfs the real world, where "behavioral prescriptions are sometimes violated even by those who acknowledge their validity" (Young 1979). Despite the legitimacy the states have in the treaty regime, the fear of relative gains, known as free riding, dictates compliance with a treaty. Some scholars have emphasized stricter enforcement measures to be applied to international treaties to
reduce the attractiveness of free riding. Such measures include stricter participation enforcement rules to deter states (Carraro, Marchiori, and Oreffice 2009; Aakre, Helland, and Hovi 2016) and increased compliance enforcement measures. These measures do not rely on self-punishment and social pressure for enforcement (Tveit 2018; Espinola-Arredondo and Munoz-Garcia 2011; Hovi, Froyn, and Bang 2007). The notion that states should rely mainly on their drive and international social pressure to return to compliance or choose compliance is absurd to a scholar of the enforcement school. According to the enforcement school, stringent sanction enforcement is the only way to ensure the return to compliance. Using flexibility measures is merely a loophole meant to be abused (Sugiyama 2001). This school of compliance sees most of the motivations to comply/not comply in the eyes of realism but tries to mitigate and entice states through stricter intuitional enforcement measures.

A third perspective in the literature defines compliance with international treaties through a domestic level of analysis. The scholars representing this Domestic Politics perspective view compliance and noncompliance through the actions of domestic political actors and nonstate actors, such as domestic firms and the citizens (Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff 1998; Hovi, Froyn, and Bang 2007; Huang 2002; Bernstein 2002; Findley, Nielson, and Sharman 2015; Young 1979). When it comes to many treaties, the process of coming into effect is very long. Each state must sign the treaty, but more importantly, domestic institutions must ratify and politically agree to the terms. The U.S. Senate not ratifying the Kyoto Protocol despite the U.S. being a signatory is an example. Among the leading scholars of this literature, there is a strong belief that domestic implementation is key to measuring a state's proper compliance with a treaty.
commitment (Bernstein 2002; Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff 1998; Young 1979). Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff (1988) argue that a state can be compliant at the international and national levels but need to effectively implement the regulations at the domestic level for the intended targeted actors.

States can easily manipulate greenhouse gas data to comply with national emissions compliance. Many events (pandemics, economic downturn, poverty) can reduce a state's fossil fuel usage without ever implementing the internationally agreed regulations. Bernstein adds to this literature through the aspect of norms. He claims that the collective norms of the international regime must successfully merge with the norms held by domestic society (Bernstein 2002). To add evidence to this idea, Bernstein looks at how domestic and normative constraints (domestic and economic context, institutional constrain, and foreign policy) led Canada not to comply and eventually withdraw from the Kyoto protocol (Bernstein 2002). However, he is not the only scholar to support the strength of economic interests and emotional choices of individuals on state compliance (Hovi, Froyn, and Bang 2007; Huang 2002; Bernstein 2002; Findley, Nielson, and Sharman 2015; Young 1979).

Scholars claim that states will not implement compliance with international environmental treaties if there is a lack of equal representation of society, government, and firms, termed effective environmental governance. (Baud, Castro, and Hogenboom 2011; Lemos and Agrawal 2006). Some in this school of thought add the aspect of poverty to the question of treaty compliance. Corruption occurs in developing states when those with more incredible wealth have no oversight without social pressure and the norms created by the society of the state. This idea of unequal societies is further
enforced by Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff (1998), concluding that non-liberal states are worse at implementing treaty commitments.

A state's compliance with treaties, driven by the norms and beliefs upheld by the state and its societies reflected in the treaty, demonstrates the closest alignment with the theory of constructivism (Seaman 2015; Cole 2009; Baradaran, Findley, Nielson, and Sharman 2012). States will only comply with treaties that reflect their social beliefs. If the state does not culturally agree, then there is no need to enter the regime. However, it was Roberts, Parks, and Vasquez (2004) that claimed it is the historical colonial legacies and structuralism to explain treaty ratification. Many of the current developing states have economies dependent on the West. The world capitalist economy motivated the creation of the world systems theory. Many of these states are authoritarian or democratically corrupt regimes where civil society is weak or oppressed. Therefore, ratification and compliance with an environmental treaty depends on civil society and public opinion. A state's narrowness and colonial economy can sway these opinions (Roberts, Parks, and Vasquez 2004). Baradaran, Findley, Nielson, and Sharman (2012) claim that a state's interests are socially constructed and can be influenced and changed to comply through state interactions that modify national interests and social norms. Due to these influences and socially constructed interests the notion of reputation and assimilation is why some states sign treaties that are not advantageous to them.

Throughout this literature, most studies investigate compliance and noncompliance in a generalized view of international treaties. Few scholars conduct in-depth studies on what drives states to comply with or violate concerning environmental treaties such as the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols (Sugiyama 2001; Fischhendler 2008;
Yoshida 2001; Von Stein 2008; Hovi, Froyn, and Bang 2007; Aakre, Helland, and Hovi 2016; Tveit 2018; Clulow 2018). It is surprising due to the massive destructive impact climate change will have on all states based on a consensus of scientific evidence. Current literature on these protocols pertains to how compliance is affected by the legalization and flexibility measures of the treaty (Von Stein 2008), the enforcement of noncompliance systems, and participation measures (Hovi, Froyn, and Bang 2007; Aakre, Helland, and Hovi 2016), and in-depth analysis of the noncompliance systems (Sugiyama 2001; Yoshida 2001). These studies conclude that the managerial school, for better or for worse, prevails when it comes to the formulation of international environmental treaties and its noncompliance systems. However, most of these environmental compliance studies neglected the need for looking at and measuring state compliance through a constructivist lens in the way of normative threat perception of climate change. In other words, how a state reacts to climate regimes does not reflect only material gains but also if the state perceives climate change as a security threat. As stated above, states choose to comply with treaties based on the accepted norms of their societies and leaders. This perspective deserves more attention, especially when studying why states decided to comply with one environmental treaty and not the other. For example, Montreal Protocol had great success amongst the international community with the phase-out of greenhouse gases such as chlorine and fluorine. Just in 1996, most Class I chemicals was eliminated. However, just ten years later, Kyoto failed as many countries failed to meet their CO2 reduction commitments, or some states refused to ratify the protocol. What caused this massive divide between the two protocols? Could it have to do with how each state’s societies and leaders viewed the threat of climate change and environmental impacts that
drove their compliance actions? In looking into this question, this thesis will be looking at the literature on what drives an individual's threat perception of climate change.

*How One Perceives Climate Change*

As previously noted, the core assumptions of the securitization theory are the creation of a threat and the acceptance by an audience. The question remains of how individuals and societies perceive an issue like climate change as a threat to accept it as a national or even global security threat. Many scholars answer this question by investigating the cognitive and subjective attributes of individuals when determining between a threat and a careless issue (Rousseau 2006; Schlenker, Bonoma, Tedeschi, et al. 1970; Linden 2015; Schwaller, Kelmenson, BenDor, et al. 2020; Bostrom, Böhnm, Hayes, et al. 2020; Gifford and Comeau 2011; Weber 2006). As a primary assumption of the constructivist viewpoint, issues and terms do not have meaning until they are given that meaning by individual and even societal understanding through communication and interaction. The first notion mainly highlighted throughout the literature is the connection between personal experience and one's perception of a threat (Linden 2015; Schwaller, Kelmenson, BenDor, et al. 2020; Weber 2006, Inglehart 1995). Humans, to make decisions, have to come into contact with some interaction that helps shape our worldview. Linden (2015) states that risk and threat perception is a mental construct. In a way, it means that climate change is in the eyes of the beholder. A threat is created based on the information and knowledge an individual has. Therefore, a security threat is not so black and white as seen by the IR school of realism. Climate change as a mental construct comes from what scholars call visceral responses, which means that emotions and fear guide individuals choices more than anything (Linden 2015; Weber 2006). Weber (2006)
even went further to say that the associative process of information (personal knowledge gained from experiences) even trumps evidence gained (statistical process) from data provided by epistemic communities. This distinction could explain why the general public still feels hesitant about its actual impacts despite the overwhelming acceptance of climate change in the scientific community. In a recent study highlighting the associative process of information, a scholars' survey from a North Carolina coastal area showed that when faced with substantial impacts such as flooding, people were more likely to adopt policies to change their ways to reduce further impacts. This study supports the associative process of information (Schwaller, Kelmenson, BenDor, et al. 2020). These results highlight an assumption found within the materialist vs. post-materialist debate.

According to Inglehart (1981 and 1995), individuals, and therefore states, will only worry about climate change if there is an objective problem or if one has the financial means. People are more likely to respond to a situation as a threat when exposed to it or know of others through interaction. People that live on an island nation in the Caribbean are more likely to perceive climate change as a threat than those living in landlocked Switzerland. The key to compliance is the requirements for survival. Climate change is not a threat if it does not cost one's survival, which means food, shelter, money, and other means should come first (Inglehart 1981; Inglehart 1995; Mostafa 2016; Mostafa 2016; Dunlap and Mertig 1997). Therefore, climate change is considered a post-material issue for those with the time and money to spend on it. Post-materialist values are within social democratic states, such as equality, LGBTQ rights, and racial justice (Inglehart 1981; Inglehart 1995; Mostafa 2016; Mostafa 2016; Dunlap and Mertig 1997). These values occur after material survival is not a requirement. Although according to
Inglehart (1981), post-materialist values do not automatically change but are adopted slowly through socialization. In other words, post-materialist values are learned from childhood to adulthood and do not just switch on after one is financially stable. If this is the case, are some people bound to perceive climate change as a threat? Other scholars negate Inglehart's claims, showing a negative correlation between state GDP and individuals' threat perceptions of climate change (Mostafa 2016; Mostafa 2016; Dunlap and Mertig 1997). In fact, during Mostafa's 40-state analysis, he finds a stronger correlation between one's political ideology and internal locus of control (Mostafa 2016). Now locus of control can be developed throughout one's life regardless of socialization. Viewing climate change as an objective threat or that of subjective beliefs and personal responsibility brings to question the presentation of climate change to the communities and states.

There appears to be a growing consensus that climate change is abstract, which in turn shuts down people's idea of it being a threat (Linden 2015; Schwaller, Kelmenson, BenDor, et al. 2020; Bostrom, Böhm, Hayes et al. 2020; Gifford and Comeau 2011; Weber 2006). The general idea amongst many people right now is that climate change is a distant threat. Why should one care about it now and make sacrifices they will not even be around to see? This question is especially true regarding the U.S. and the great divide between the liberal and conservative parties (Scott 2012; Schwaller, Kelmenson, BenDor, et al. 2020; Linden 2015; Goldberg, Linden, Leiserowitz, et al. 2020; Mildenberger and Leiserowitz 2017). This statement has some truth, and Weber (2010) claimed that it is, for the most part, largely invisible (Linden 2015). However, as seen above, climate change is no longer a distant threat but one that is making massive impacts now. One
must look at the vigorous intensity of hurricanes and cyclones globally, the ever-increasing devastation of wildfires, and islands losing landmass, not to mention the indirect destruction within the state's domestic societies.

Scholars have shown that presenting climate change in terms of concrete impacts instead of abstract (distant threat) triggers a personal psychological experience. This experience, in turn, heightens acceptance of climate change as a local and even national threat (Gifford and Comeau 2011; Weber 2006; Schwaller, Kelmenson, BenDor, et al. 2020; Bostrom, Böhm, Hayes et al. 2020). An example of personal experience is many of the pacific island states; these states are personally experiencing sea level rising and trying to make a case to the UN to increase climate change solutions. However, when making decisions, people get lost in the consumption costs they must give up for future benefits (Weber 2006; Inglehart 1981; Inglehart 1995). The economic tie to the perception of climate change described by Gifford and Comeau (2011) states that most of the current rhetoric on climate change adaptation is based on sacrifice. When people usually hear that they must give up something (such as work, living styles, and money), especially those who cannot afford other means, it pushes them away from seeing climate change as a threat. Fear is a powerful subjective tactic and can result in devastating solutions. As a result, these scholars showed through a survey based in Ontario, Canada, that discussing climate change through a motivational framework (including positive visions, solutions, and support) will increase the education and understanding of the individuals (Gifford and Comeau 2011). Climate change is not a complex problem to understand but will take time, and individuals must have a sense of security and comfort when solving these massive life changes. A message framed in a more accommodation
framework versus exploitative measures will have a better chance of providing better cooperation results (Schlenker, Bonoma, Tedeschi, et al. 1970). However, familiarity with risks through personal experience does not always guarantee a change in threat perception (Weber 2006). Instead, one must look outside the realm of just the individual.

Many scholars agree that personal beliefs and cultural and social norms are significant motivators in threat perception (Rousseau 2006; Gifford and Comeau 2011; Weber 2006; Linden 2015; Mildenberger and Leiserowitz 2019; Kellstedt, Zahran, and Vedlitz 2008; Cleveland, Kalamas, and Laroche 2012). Everyone differs in emotions, character, culture, and goals. Some scholars find that one's internal locus of control, which means outcomes are the result of one's actions, is more potent in determining environmental perception and policy motivation (Cleveland, Kalamas, and Laroche 2012). Others look at one's efficacy, which is the belief in one's skills to take action to tackle climate change (Kellstedt, Zahran, and Vedlitz 2008). Self-efficacy is when a person is confident in their ability to rally others through public speaking to sign a petition or volunteer to pick up litter. However, a thought brought by Rousseau (2006) is that individuals rarely make opinions or perceptions in isolation. Individuals constantly interact with one another through work discussions, education, family, and even random conversations. These social interactions turn threat perception from a subjective notion to an intersubjective meaning. Mildenberger and Leiserowitz (2019) enforce this belief when they find a strong correlation between one's climate change perception and to social consensus of close family and friends. People always want to find a place of belonging and usually find it in groups or societies that share similar characteristics, values, and beliefs as them. In this sense, individuals affect group beliefs by creating groups,
influencing how an individual sees the world (Rousseau 2006). This process is what some scholars call the cultural theory of risk, where depending on the type of group/culture (Hierarchal, Individualist, Egalitarian, Fatalist, and Hermitic) an individual is a part of depends on what sort of issues they will see as a threat (Linden 2015 and Weber 2006). Here, the literature dives into the role of norms in threat perception. Rousseau (2006) claims that norms greatly influence threat perception because they are negotiated or commonly accepted beliefs on how one should act and see the world within a group. For example, Europe is more accepting of climate change as a social threat because they have a greater sense of social protection than the U.S., which privileges individualism. However, this aspect of group identity can also impede many solutions needed to create effective climate change solutions. Littman and Paluck (2015) discuss the danger of group identity, where different groups shun, shame, and at times physically harm out groups because they go against the group's beliefs. The violence of this behavior can easily persuade our group members to ignore threats or even change their minds to avoid persecution. The example of group persecution helps paint a picture of why states join climate regimes because the reputation of being included is more significant than compliance intentions.

As seen throughout this literature, climate change, despite its room for agricultural advancements, is viewed by many scholars as a threat multiplier. Studies have shown that developed states will also see the economic and social impacts of direct and indirect climate change catastrophes without climate solutions. How can a global solution maintain the attention and commitment of the global community? A regime must adhere to a state's notion to comply with its commitments, but what drives compliance? Is
it the notion of economic wealth and fear of relative gains? Could temporal situations require states to rely on the aid of the global community? What if it is more on the cultural norms and individual actors of the state that impact the domestic makeup? Many scholars claim that how one perceives climate change is more psychological and driven by the objective experience. As other international theories claim, security and threat issues recognized by a state cannot be premade beliefs. Threats to a state start from the smallest of actors (individuals) and move up. Threats are subjective rather than material/objective and formed in many ways, such as personal experiences, social interaction, framing of issues, and even group inclusion. As climate change continues to be a massive debate in the international system, states will continue to clash between climate solutions resulting in violation of environmental treaties. To understand a state's reason for treaty compliance, one must bring a new theoretical framework that investigates the intersubjective concept of climate security. Securitization theory adaptation acts as a lens for this framework.

2.4 A Theory of Securitization

This section covers the theory that will form the foundation of this Thesis. First, the foundations of securitization theory, followed by the selection and discussion of testing the Copenhagen School on its ability to help explain state compliance. Finally, an alternative path of state decision-making as it provides this research with an alternative lens of compliance if the leading theory is not supported by empirical evidence.

The Strength of the Copenhagen School

The theory for this research is drawn on the constructivist theory of securitization. There appears to be a division between subjective and objective notions regarding
security issues and what is deemed a security issue by a state. Realism has dominated the notion of security as an essence of power. They see security issues as material and what they call high politics. These are mainly seen as economic and military threats by other states but exclude anything of low politics, such as environmental degradation and climate change. Alternative to the realist approach is the securitization theory, a constructivist approach to understanding security in IR. According to Ingrid Boas (2015), multiple schools (Copenhagen school, Paris School, Critical security studies, and the Risk school) exist within this theory that all differ in mechanisms and conceptualization. The Paris school understands that securitization comes from unease, originates anywhere in everyday life, and is determined by those who manage security threats (Boas 2015). Under this school, the manager of an anti-money laundering firm can sense insecurity and solve it through technology. Security and its solutions are placed in the hands of domestic actors, not political elites. According to Boas, this risk school is new and underdeveloped and tries to redefine security from a negative connotation to a positive one (Boas 2015).

When one thinks of a security issue facing a state, such as immigration or public health, it is an emergency and, at times, creates internal and external conflicts. The risk school tries to eliminate these conflicts by claiming security issues as a risk and not a threat, which will incorporate dialogue and not fear (Boas 2015). The Copenhagen school focused on in this thesis study is seen as the primary school. It is based on the subjective meaning of security and claims that anything (even low politics) can be considered a security issue based on the perceptions of leaders through speech acts (Balzacq 2019; Balzacq 2005; Waever 2011; Corry 2012; Sahu 2011; Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka 2016; Boas 2015).

When a state leader or political elites believe an issue is a security threat to the state, all
they must do is voice it, and a security issue is born. The Copenhagen school and the
critical security studies differ because the latter school of thought extends the speech acts
to civil protests and marches (Boas 2015). According to Boas (2015, pg. 32), "not all
actors, especially the more vulnerable ones, have the means or ability to speak in wider
circles." This quote completely contradicts the realist belief. For example, when Trump
voices that immigration is a security threat to the U.S., that issue is born, which is not
based on objective meaning. Balzacq (2005) claims that words hold much meaning and
action; he highlights Austin's (1962) three criteria of speech act to include locutionary,
illocutionary, and perlocutionary. Words are not only concepts said in a speech but have
action behind them, especially based on how they were voiced (Balzacq 2005; Austin
1962). This idea is through many charismatic leaders in history. A more recent example
is President Trump's speech of electoral defiance on January 6th, 2021. According to
many scholars in the Copenhagen school, securitization does not just stop at the notion of
a speech act but must gain an audience's acceptance (Balzacq 2019; Balzacq 2005;
Waever 2011; Corry 2012; Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka 2016). An audience is a broad
term that can describe any group within a state. Depending on a state's regime could also
affect the type of audience required for the consent to securitize a state issue. Sahu (2011)
claims that in India, securitization theory through the recent National Action Plan on
Climate Change (NAPCC) is a form of democratic deficit. The article highlights that
political leaders are the main actors in securitization theory. However, the author says
that the roles of securitization should be from the bottom up and start with the public,
which is why they do not see the NAPCC as a securitization solution but only a tool for
elites (Sahu 2011). Audience acceptance has gained traction in securitization studies.
Balzacq, in agreement with Sahu, states that the primary actor is the audience and that securitization is not just a theory of subjective construction but also intersubjective construction (Balzacq 2019; Balzacq 2005; Waever 2011; Corry 2012; Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka 2016; Sahu 2011). Having elites highlight an issue through a speech does not automatically mean it is a security threat. According to Waever (2011 pg. 468), "securitization is an action that relies on others' actions before it generates some result." Balzacq reinforces Waever's ideas when he pushes to redefine securitization theory as a strategic practice, where the creation of a security issue also includes the context, cultural beliefs of the audience, and leader and audience interaction (Balzacq 2005; Corry 2012).

Going back to the example of President Trump, what made his January 6th speech was the great acceptance of his call to action by his audience. However, who is the "enabling audience," which are the key pushers of an elite's securitization move, is yet to be answered in the literature (Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka 2016 pg. 500). This is what I would like to help answer concerning a state's security perception of climate change. Does the audience type (fellow elites, legislators, the public, epistemic community, or NGOs) determine climate change securitization success in a state and, with it, its possible compliance with climate regimes? What happens to the framing of policies and the importance of public acceptance if elites are not the real actors pulling the strings regarding climate change policy and compliance?

*The Bureaucratic Path of Decision-Making*

On the other hand, regarding the core theories of international relations (IR), realism and neoliberalism, both see the state as a unitary policy actor. Each theory believes that the state is the principal decision-maker at the core of decision-making
analysis. Through this thinking, analysts apply the Rational Actor Model (RAM) when investigating international events. This model action is a calculated solution chosen through a ranked list of alternatives based on the actor's utility of function (Allison and Zelikow 1999). This way of thinking believes that every principal decision-maker has access to all the relevant data, intelligence, and information to make an accurate decision. However, according to Herbert Simon (1990), humans are constrained by a term known as bounded rationality. Constant time constraints and other environmental factors give us information that could be better and complete. The rational choice, then, is a decision that best applies to the actor's constraints. The critical IR theory of constructivism views policy decisions as having an intersubjective meaning. "Interests are produced, reproduced, and transformed through the discursive practices of actors. More specifically, interests emerge from the representations that define for actors the situations and events they face" (Weldes 1998 pg. 218; Fisher and Forester 1993). Two assumptions emerge; (1) the decision-making process consists of more than just one unitary state actor, and (2) policy decisions are based on how these actors personally perceive and interpret an issue. Allison and Zelikow (1999) call this type of analytical framework bureaucratic politics, which helps explain the personal values in the decision-making process.

As policy issues require more defined and elaborate solutions, principal state actors like presidents and prime ministers look toward bureaucrats. These agents can range from cabinet members to parliamentarians to scientists. Ogunrotifa Ayodeji Bayo (2013 pg. 544) reiterates Max Weber's core belief that "bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization" (Weber 1946). Weber's interpretation goes further, where Sager and Rosser (2009) describe
Weber's belief that the bureaucracy symbolizes its modernization and potentially its superiority in a modern state, thus demonstrating bureaucratic efficiency. As noted before, individuals need more information to make rational decisions. However, bureaucracy, through its division of labor, helps bring together all the relevant information and alternatives to result in the best policy action. Eckhard (2019 pg. 310) calls this "knowledge linkage" he claims that "bureaucrats that possess specialized knowledge of a social environment which is affected by a policy share this information and broker relations between the organization and the environment." An example of this bureaucratic representation is in the U.S. Council of Economic Advisers, which consist of high-level economists. These bureaucrats advise the president on economic issues through their specialized knowledge of economic theories, models, and experience. However, despite the efficiency of the bureaucratic representation, it also has a dark side.

Now, everyone has their ideas and interpretations of how issues should be solved and the policy actions one should take. Despite Weber's love of bureaucratic representation and efficiency, he also warned against its potential to overwhelm the system, which "limits individual human freedom" (Bayo 2013 pg. 545). Individuals given the power to influence important policy decisions deviate from the policy issue towards a purely personal or organizational interest. According to Weldes (1998, pg. 218), all actors approach policy issues with their own "preexisting interests." Bureaucracy efficacy then turns to a type of corruption, which could lead to a democratic deficit. According to David Bayley (1966 pg. 720), corruption is the "misuse of authority as a result of consideration of personal gain, which need not be monetary" (Mbaku 1996 pg. 101). Is it justified to label bureaucratic politics as corrupt? In short, yes, when decisions no longer
serve the national society and only the agents and organizations in the room. Governmental legitimacy and transparency are then in trouble. Now, bureaucratic representation already slightly limits the influence of the national public.

Governmental institutions, such as the executive and legislative branches, are prone to this kind of bias decision making. This is what happens when bureaucrats no longer provide decision makers with bipartisan information. When political ideology starts to push policy and law instead of concrete facts, there is a problem in the works. Where is society left when issues such as climate change are so contentious that fossil fuel corporations influence them? Fossil fuel corporations can "lobby" and "donate" to political officials and bureaucrats. Behind these doors, bureaucrats and the principal decision maker bargain and haggle policy action (Allison and Zelikow 1999). In reality, does it really come down to who is elected? Once politicization starts to become the main source of information, then a decision maker will only listen to information that pushes his own political agenda. In turn, groupthink can turn a bad situation into a worse one. Agents usually want to impress the principal actor, and dissent members are usually ignored or even ousted from the process. For example, during George H.W. Bush's Administration, Colin Powel was ignored for his disagreement with the discussions of invading Iraq. In the words of Aesop, it is possible to have too much of a good thing. This dark notion of bureaucratic politics investigates the potential null hypothesis of this research, bringing the concept that compliance with a state's international treaty commitments results from the haggling of bureaucrats. All this despite the threat rhetoric of political officials and the opinions of the national public. The next step is to investigate the subjective creation of a threat and the framing of climate change as an issue. In what
ways do individuals create and see their perception of threats and security issues related to climate change? How does the tool of framing advance the political elite's climate messages? In addition, how does this notion affect how leaders and different societies hold climate change to more vital importance than other state issues?

2.5 The Importance of Framing

Framing an issue to an audience holds as much value or more than the issue itself concerning the power of securitization theory. Homar and Cvelbar (2021) utilize Levin et al.'s (1998 pg.150) definition of framing that "decision-makers respond differently to different but objectively equivalent descriptions of the same problem." The wording and highlights of the messages can significantly affect how individuals respond. Chong and Druckman (2007 pg. 105-06) identify two types of frames; one is called "frame in thought" and the other frame in communication." The former is seen as the individual's cognition that affects information processing and discussed in the following section. The latter frame, which is the focus of this thesis study, looks at how "elites highlight certain features of a policy such as its likely effects and relationship to important values" of a target audience (Chong and Druckman 2007 pg. 106). Framing is a way for a political elite or the media to help persuade and change an audience's perceptions to favor a policy that highlights specific values. Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) emphasize this in their experiment testing the framing effects on welfare opinions. While statistical significance was low (p=.06), their study showed that framing welfare as "impoverished people should not get special treatment" increased an individual's attitude against welfare, despite one's previous claims that poverty is caused by external, not internal forces (Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). More recently, during the nationwide black lives
matter (BLM) protests following the death of George Floyd, many news outlets and political leaders described the individuals as protestors or rioters. Each of these frames highlighted a similar situation in either a positive or negative connotation to influence audiences' opinions.

What makes frames effective in persuasion is their ability to counter the cognitive rationality of an individual, which Chong and Druckman (2007) called frame in thought. According to Evans (2003), individuals have a dual cognitive thinking process known as system I and system II. System II deals with more of a rational approach to decision-making, whereas system I deal with the subconscious information stored in one's memory. This information is salient and can change based on certain words that an individual hears or an event they witness (Rousseau and Garcia-Retamero 2007). System I leads to the decision-making psychologists know as heuristics. Think of it as a cognitive shortcut to develop an opinion or decision because individuals need more information to make a rational choice. According to Chong and Druckman (2007), frames influence one's subconscious mind and make available precise dimensions that impact attitudes through heuristic decision-making.

For example, most people describe climate change when asked to describe melting ice caps and rising sea levels. These constant rhetorics and images have been attached and primed over time to the phenomenon seen in one's subconscious. This processing of information from a framed message to an individual's creation and response is known as a framing effect (Druckman 2001). What if an individual requires more information or previous knowledge about a framed message? According to Chong and Druckman (2007, pg. 110), "in order for a framing effect to occur, a given consideration
needs to be stored in memory to be available for retrieval." What information is needed, and how much? As mentioned before, framed messages are said to highlight distinct values to incite persuasion. Information required does not have to be directly cited in the message but can also indirectly highlight values within an individual. Think of when a media outlet claims the importance of climate mitigation policies is to ensure a future for upcoming generations. This message can trigger one's dimension of morality, collectivism, and humanity.

Despite the importance of framing when it comes to influencing public opinion, there are some limitations and negative impacts of its usage. For this reason, some scholars debate if education and knowledge impact the effectiveness of framing effects on public attitudes (Hiscox 2006; Ardanaz, Murillo, and Pinto 2013; Druckman and Nelson 2003). Hiscox (2006) found that the lower the audience's education level, the more vulnerable people were to frame trade messages. Druckman and Nelson (2003) found that the more knowledge one has, the more extensive one's system I memory bank, which can increase one's ability to be affected by a framed message. Any framed message should be geared towards a particular audience and involve the process of priming, which will pre-expose the audience to pointed issues, values, and phrases over time and increase their susceptibility to framing.

Nothing is ever what it seems, and in today's electronic information and social media world, it is easy to create and disperse idiosyncratic versions of a story. According to Chong and Druckman (2007 pg. 111), "Strong frames should not be confused with intellectually or morally superior arguments…. They can be built on exaggerations and outright lies." In politics, one must get their policy or plan approved, which means, at
times, demonizing the other side's arguments and values. In U.S. conservative media outlets, liberal reforms and policies are framed as pure socialist and communist, when in reality, many of the policies still strongly favor a capitalistic economy but through a social democratic system. As well, the demonization of sides occurs in the marketing of sustainable goods. Certain cat litters claim to be "sustainable" by donating to rainforest conservation, but their ingredients cause deforestation in certain areas. This effect is significant in academia through the concept of elite manipulation theory. According to Ngugi (2013), elite manipulation theory describes elites' usage of ethnic violence to maintain political power. Although the issue of climate change and ethnic violence are dissimilar, the same general concept can be applied when it comes to framing political messages of climate change and other issues. Pushing a strategy of manipulation, it is not uncommon for an elite's usage of emotions to be applied when framing their messages (Clifford 2019; Jin and Atkinson 2021). Clifford (2019) found that perceptions of support for food regulations increased when framed using the emotions of anger. Emotions can significantly affect one's cognitive ability despite previous knowledge or rationality. Instead, individuals subconsciously decide what they think is right based on their perception of vulnerability and try to bring a sense of positivity and security. Additionally, people find it more challenging to forget adverse events and emotions, which can explain why elites favor this strategy (Cameron 2013).

Finally, an important limitation of the usage of framing effects is that of subconscious cultural core values. According to Cameron (2013), when inciting a policy change to an audience, one must never frame a message that attacks one's core values. Americans might be against climate change policies that ensure higher taxes because this
frame threatens the U.S.'s core value of individualism. When framed messages attack one's core values, they retreat to what they know and ignore any incongruent information. This framing leads to the application of confirmation and disconfirmation biases among individuals (Chong and Druckman 2007; Jones and Song 2014). Like before, people hate to feel stressed and vulnerable, so they refute any information that does not agree with their prior beliefs. The development of messages needs care and contemplation; a message could see backlash amongst an audience. A framed message usually has the opposite result intended because individuals retreated to their prior beliefs that held stronger in their subconscious mind (Cann 2019; Stanley, Klas, Clarke, et al. 2021).

Despite its limitations, framing is still the top strategy used by elites, media outlets, marketing, and even ordinary citizens. Influence from framing affects political discussions on topics such as immigration and welfare. However, the implications of this strategy are most evident in the rising political issue of climate change. How exactly do framing and framing effects influence perceptions of climate change? Climate change globally and within the U.S. is a very debated topic, from those who support climate mitigation policies to climate change deniers. Debates have demonstrated devastating results regarding progress and policies to reduce the impacts of global warming and changing climate. This thesis's primary focus is how the elite's framing of climate change as a threat influences public opinions within their states—first, laying the foundations of framing and its effect on climate politics and threat creation.
2.6 The Utilization of Framing in Climate Politics

Climate change has been a growing issue since the 1970s but has yet to make political progress despite overwhelming scientific evidence. Despite messages of protecting biodiversity, reducing greenhouse emissions, and the ever-increasing climatic events, states still seem polarized on this issue. Scholars must look at the framing of these messages to the general public. Remember, framing a message can significantly influence an individual's perception of how they understand and process an issue. Climate change is a global threat, and many policies deal with phasing out oil and gas, changing eating habits, and purchasing more sustainable goods. To many, this is a massive sacrifice for those considering climate change a distant threat. However, try framing these changes as not mutually exclusive. Scholars have looked at how public attitudes would differ on climate policy under the influence of either sacrifice or motivational frames (Gifford and Comeau 2011; Schlenker, Bonoma, Tedeschi, et al. 1970). Gifford and Comeau (2011) conducted a survey in Ontario, Canada. They showed that when it came to framing climate change policies through a motivational frame rather than one of sacrifice, people significantly (p<.001) increased their perceived competence towards climate change and support for policies. When leaders want to gain support for climate policies or even compliance with an environmental treaty, framed messages that highlight positive visions and solutions rather than a sacrifice of money and lifestyle increased correspondence. Some scholars disagree with this notion; for example, Homar and Cvelbar (2021) analyzed 47 articles related to framing and pro-environmental behavior, and they found that 30 articles (49%) in the studies found loss-framing rather than gain-framing (18 articles) lead to pro-environmental decisions. Although, what if one could combine these two findings? One can easily frame climate change through a motivational and loss
framework. For instance, to reduce the ongoing extinction of our earth's biodiversity, we as a community can purchase greener energy and invest in plastic alternatives. Individuals must have a sense of security and comfort when solving these massive life changes. Fear and manipulation framing and the absence of motivational framing increase the polarization of climate politics and pose an obstacle to substantial progress.

Linden (2015) states that a specific issue's risk and threat perception is a mental construct. Meaning the threat of climate change is in the eyes of the beholder. Remember, when faced with a framed message, a threat is created based on what information and knowledge an individual has at their disposal. Stein, Swan, and Sarraf (2021) conducted two experiments to measure the effects of intuition and its correlation to the belief in scientific evidence and a scientist's evaluations of a climate change rejector between liberals and conservatives. Findings show that those of conservative ideology rely more heavily on intuition and heuristics than liberals when it comes to decision-making, which makes them see climate rejectors of similar legitimacy than, say, a climate scientist, but favor the rejector more (Stein, Swan, and Sarraf 2021). Now, individuals of conservative ideology tend to dismiss climate change more than liberals; this could be seen as conservative values focus more on individualism, limited government, and deregulation. According to a pew research survey in 2019, 45% of U.S. conservative republicans believed humans had nothing to do with climate change, whereas 59% believed it was all natural (Funk and Hefferon 2019).

Climate policies and actions attempting to combat threats challenge the core values. Climate action requires environmental regulation, progressive change in energy sources, increased taxes, and a sacrifice for society; this could be why conservatives deny
the science. Challenging core values through elite framing, individuals tend to retreat to their prior beliefs (Cameron 2013; Chong and Druckman 2007; Bertolotti and Catellani 2014). The reasons why conservatives do not view climate change as a threat is probably not because they do not believe in the notion of scientific evidence but because elites frame climate change through a loss of these values. According to Smith (2006), elites need to appear as the protectorate of a vulnerable ethnicity when it comes to elite manipulation. In this case, elites of conservative ideology try to appear as protecting the traditions of conservative ideals, which can explain Trump’s campaign slogan of Make America Great Again, followed by his dedicated base. Make no mistake that this ideological divide between liberals and conservatives is not just limited to U.S. domestic politics but globally.

Although, the main question remains how to bridge this partisan divide on the threat of climate change? Some scholars tried to turn to the framing of values and personal experiences. Stanley, Klas, Clarke, et al. (2021) conducted a study where they tested temporal framing effects on climate change. They tried to see if implementing past-focused frames with the present negative impacts of climate change would increase conservative support; however, this showed no significant results and instead decreased liberal beliefs in the climate change threat (Stanley, Klas, Clarke, et al. 2021). Their study counteracts its purpose because by framing support for one ideology, they indirectly challenge the values of another. Throughout their study, they conclude that there is no one solution. There is no right way to frame support for combating the threat of climate change because every situation has multiple compounding variables. A threat always comes down to accepting one's hidden and unforeseeable memories and past experiences.
Accepted are the power and the importance of the individual through one's core values, heuristics, biases, and ideology that make every individual different concerning the influence of framing. Therefore, elites should pay closer attention to their target audience's preferences and values despite the effects of manipulation.

2.7 Foundations of Research

"What Makes States Comply to their International Environmental Treaty Commitments" has its foundations in four pieces of academic research. These pieces consist of one thesis, one research article, and two published books. The scope of the research contends that the state's compliance with an international environmental regime is based on the minds of domestic actors and the notion of threat perception. Compliance is not only seen as completed by a unitary state actor, but a process of perception and language exchanged and accepted between political elites and the public. Although, it is also not impossible for states to experience a democratic deficit through the formation of bureaucratic politics. It is here that this alteration in the policy decision-making process can help shed more light on a state's compliance.

First, Balzacq (2005) highlights that a security threat is never predetermined but something that can be intersubjectively created. He discusses that the theory of securitization seen through the Copenhagen school emphasizes that any issue is a security issue, but it depends on two requirements. First, a political elite raises an issue through language in a "Speech Act." Secondly, the issue is only partially a security issue until broad acceptance by an audience, which in the scope of this research is the national public.
Second, Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff (1999) highlight a new domestic perspective to measure the compliance of a state's environmental treaty commitments. The authors investigate the compliance systems of five international regimes, such as the Montreal Protocol and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITIES). When looking at the implementation review systems, the reader can analyze the level of an international effort to maintain compliance with the members. Next, they look at the domestic level of implementation certain states have taken towards certain treaties. To them, compliance is unattainable unless the state has implemented national action reflecting the treaty's provisions. In this sense, implementing domestic legislation is the first step to compliance.

Third, Hunt (2014) provides a constructivist analytical framework to investigate if global climate change rhetoric and grammar exist in national policies and the implementation of said climate policies. She uses the framework built by Buzan (1998) and applies it to her two case studies, the U.S. and India. Hunt (2014) finds that when looking at the mitigation policies of the two states, along with climate reports and assessments. She finds that neither state perceives climate change as a threat and does not require immediate action. This analytical framework was remodeled in this research to analyze the notion of Speech Acts of climate change amongst political elites.

Fourth, Allison and Zelikow (1999) highlight that policy decision-making is not solely conducted by a unitary state actor. As issues become more prominent, more knowledge and perception are required. The authors claim that a principal decision-maker enlists the services of agents (bureaucrats), who are engulfed purely in their personal and organizational goals, leading to competition and bargaining of policy decisions between
agents. The authors explain this through political elites' political events and decisions during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Here, elites can lose ties to their national constituents and could help explain why policies and public opinion do not reflect on one another.

This research combines elements of all of these academic works. A comparative case study analysis will allow for testing the key hypotheses and a deeper dive into specific areas such as bureaucracy, social protests, and ideological differences through an analysis of political speeches and public opinion surveys, application, and analysis of the theoretical framework of securitization against state compliance. To test this, the performance of an in-depth coding analysis of different speeches utilizing Hunt's (2014) grammar and rhetoric methodology. She claims that two categories will represent the different descriptions of climate change, where consequences, impact, effect, and implication consist of Impact and Threat, which consists of issues, challenges, problems, risks, and threats (Hunt 2014). By borrowing her scale, insights will be gained on the usage of framing effects on the issue of climate change as it is utilized by leading public elites as a source of securitization and policy priority to influence the public's perception. The usage of public surveys will measure these effects. With the knowledge that framing effects and bureaucratic politics can affect policy creation, an investigation into areas that can highlight objective conditions and potentially personal values, such as social protests and signed climate petitions. In addition, an analysis of the governmental structures and the presence of bureaucratic representation in the decision circles of the political elites for each case study. This research will provide a new look, which could enforce the hypotheses or explain their rejection. This research will provide additional answers on the
possible correlation between society and public elites when it comes to an understanding of the international issue of compliance via international environmental regimes.

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter sets the groundwork for the investigation, which will be in the following chapters of this thesis. As previously noted, climate change became a global concern around the 1980s. This concern was solely through the scientific community, followed by public outcry. Through this, the UNFCCC was created, followed by the Montreal Protocol. Deemed a success, global usage and production of the banned chemical decreased. However, the Kyoto Protocol created in 1997 saw different achievements. What drove the state to not comply with Kyoto as it did with Montreal? According to scholars of compliance studies, there are two primary schools of thought. First, the Managerial School, which assumes state compliance, is based on temporal dimensions and events outside the control of the state.

The second perspective is the Enforcement School, which assumes states will comply based on individual needs and the fear of being cheated. Some scholars connect state compliance to domestic actors such as corporations. This gap in the literature pushed this research study to test the strength of the securitization theory on state compliance regarding climate change as a state security threat. Securitization theory comes from the IR theory of constructivism. It assumes that any problem can be deemed a security threat to a state but created through an intersubjective belief. According to the Copenhagen school of securitization theory, acceptance starts with a public elite speech act and acceptance by an audience. Only then will a state appear to act on said created threat. This theory not only considers actors at the domestic level but also looks at the
framing of messages to an audience and how the audience perceives these messages. Is this true for how states acted differently on climate change solutions about the Montreal and Kyoto Protocol or was compliance mainly due to the structure and corruption of the public bureaucrats? The next chapter will take the following steps in laying out the hypotheses and methodology, which will help test the securitization theory and the strengths of the other two leading compliance schools. Only then can we gather enough information to make a stronger connection on what drives states to comply with international environmental treaty commitments.
Chapter 3

Research Methodology and Applications

3.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces and lays out the methodology of this research study. It proceeds with a discussion of case selection. In order to test compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. One must first find sufficient cases that differ in their overall compliance. These cases must be similar in certain control variables. These similarities help eliminate the risk of confounding variables and help draw a better connection between the dependent and independent variables during analysis. Following is the presentation of this study’s hypotheses in order to test the assumptions of the Copenhagen school under Securitization theory, but also the other two dominant compliance schools as seen in the literature review. Continuing on this research study consists of four hypotheses. Two hypotheses measure securitization theory, one managerial and the other enforcement. Finally, this chapter highlights how each dependent and independent variable will be measured, providing a standard on how to collect the data and analyze it through a comparative analysis between the two chosen cases. After this chapter, one should understand the foundations and applications of this research study. This chapter will also provide guidelines if one chooses to recreate or modify this investigation.
3.2 Case Selection

Despite many states failing to meet their CO2 emission requirements under the Kyoto agreement, that did not stop most of them from signing and ratifying the international treaty regime. However, this was different in Canada. Canada ratified the treaty in 2002 (United Nations Treaty Collection: Chapter 17 Environment 7a 2022). Although, it pulled out of the agreement in 2011, only one year before the end of the first commitment period (Bernstein 2002). Why is it that a prosperous, democratic Anglo-Saxon state abandoned the Kyoto protocol when another profitable, democratic Anglo-Saxon state (Australia) maintained membership in the regime? Some scholars claim states violate treaties due to national self-interest, power, and the fear of free riders through relative gains (Young 1979; Findley, Nielson, and Sharman 2015; Espinola-Arredondo and Munoz-Garcia 2011; Lupu 2016; Aakre, Helland, and Hovi 2016; Mearsheimer 1994). Other scholars claim states violate treaties due to inabilities of the state, such as state capacity, treaty ambiguity, and temporal dimensions (Chayes and Chayes 1993; Fischhendler 2008; Von Stein 2008; Hovi, Froyn, and Bang 2007; Aakre, Helland, and Hovi 2016; Sugiyama 2001). This research looks at one comparative case analysis using Mill’s method of agreement, which will be conducted by looking at these two states. Each case has similar democratic regime types according to Polity IV database, averaged between 2008-2012 (Center for Systemic Peace: INCSR Data Page, 2022; Center for Systemic Peace: Polity5 Annual Time-Series 1946-2018 Dataset, 2018). These cases will also allow an addition to the ongoing debate between democratic and non-democratic regimes and their correlations to treaty compliance (Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff 1998; Neumayer 2002; Chyzh 2014; Pohjolainen, Kukkonen, Jokinen, et al. 2021; Risse-Kappen 1991; Dia 2005; Dia 2006).
The case study will comparatively analyze Australia and Canada, each having different outcomes of maintaining their Kyoto membership. Now, in order to effectively measure the correlation of public opinion and elite framing on treaty compliance, the cases have close similarities between the control variables of power, corruption, total population, and gross national income (GNI) per capita (Morales, 2022; OECD Data GNI 1996-2021 Indicator, 2022b; Transparency International CPI Database 2008-2012, 2022; World Bank Data Population Total Australia and Canada, 2022; Center for Systemic Peace Polity5 Annual Time-Series 1946-2018, 2018). Table 1 provides the data of case parallels for each state. For example, Australia and Canada have only a .03 variance in their world power index scores. These parallels allow for control of any spurious relationships between the hypotheses and dependent variable and to control and test the assumptions behind the enforcement and managerial schools of compliance. Suppose one state violated and left the Kyoto agreement, but both are similar in power and corruption rates. In that case, there must be some other variable causing their different outcomes. Therefore, concluding if the assumptions of Securitization theory through the IR theory of constructivism is a better predictor of state compliance through domestic legislation regarding environmental treaties.

A within-case analysis of each case provides an in-depth look at each case’s bureaucratic system, electoral process, legislation process, and party polarity, to name a few. This analysis will reinforce a possible correlation between compliance, public opinion, and elite framing but also allow a closer look at whether the null hypotheses are correlated in any of the cases. Therefore, if public opinion and political framing were not the reason for (non)compliance and each case varied in the other variables, what might be
responsible for causing the cases to react towards the treaty similarly? As discussed above, organizations are very complex and can have overlapping subunits with different goals (Allison and Zelikow, 1999). This process in decision-making is an implementation gap or democratic deficit, known as bureaucratic politics, resulting in complete ignorance of the state’s constituency by elites and bureaucrats, which are more in line with internal goals and conflicts. Therefore, a closer look at the cases’ governmental processes and investigation of possible implementation gaps between public opinion and a state’s legislative process might shed additional light on this investigation.

Table 1 Control Variable Averages Between the Cases of Australia and Canada 2008-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (million)</th>
<th>Corruption Rate</th>
<th>Polity IV</th>
<th>World Power Index</th>
<th>GNI per Capita (US Thousand)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Sources: Morales, 2022; OECD Data GNI 1996-2021 Indicator, 2022b; World Bank Data Population Total Australia and Canada, 2022; Center for Systemic Peace Polity5 Annual Time-Series 1946-2018, 2018; Corruption Perception Index (2008-2012) by Transparency International is licensed under CC By 4.0.

3.3 Hypotheses

In the literature reviewed, several theories exist on why states will opt in and out of compliance even after the ratification of an environmental treaty. The enforcement school, engrained in neo-realism, claims that states comply based on their self-interests through cost-benefit analysis. States will comply with environmental treaties, but the fear of relative gain loss due to free riders is a causation for noncompliance. On the other hand, the managerial school, engrained in liberal institutionalism, claims that states comply because of a set of shared institutionalized norms. States care more about the overall public good and preservation of the climate, absolute gains, rather than their self-
interests. Any noncompliance is accidental through state capacity, treaty ambiguity, and forces out of a state's control. Finally, the third school of compliance is seen through the analysis of domestic actors. The ratification of environmental treaties requires the domestic legislative implementation to be fully compliant. Perceptions and norms held by the international regime must parallel that of the state's domestic actors. Here, how a problem is framed and perceived among domestic actors, such as political elites and the public, will determine legislation that equates to international compliance. The main question remains as to which compliance theory holds more water regarding why states choose noncompliance with their environmental treaty commitments.

This study explores factors determining a state's noncompliance with its international environmental treaty commitments. Improvement of states' cooperation is impossible if one does not know what drives them to not comply in the first place. This research investigates the validity of the three theories of state compliance regarding environmental compliance to the Kyoto Protocol to see which theory better explains a state's compliant actions. This research investigates the variables of public opinion, the rhetoric of public officials (speech acts), state capacity, and economic development. All these variables correspond to the main arguments made by each theory referenced within the literature which identifies their key indicators. A comparison study of domestic legislation passed within a state's system for measuring compliance corresponds to their Kyoto protocol commitments. Kyoto is the latest treaty that completed its emission reduction commitment period in 2012. This treaty also represents the population of states cooperating in the public good of reducing emissions because it has ratification by 192 states and is legally binding to approximately 37 states. The Paris Accord is not studied
here due to the incompletion of its first commitment period to date. However, the results of this study hopefully shed insights into compliance with the Paris Accords.

_Speech Acts and Public Opinion_

The variables of speech acts and public opinion affecting a state's compliance with its environmental treaty commitments help define the third analysis or school of compliance theory. As mentioned above, many scholars study the effects that domestic actors, usually ignored by the other schools, have on state compliance. Findley, Nielson, and Sharman (2015) emphasize that compliance should be investigated at the individual level analysis and indicators rather than through the national level. Huang (2002) confirms this, claiming that emotional, rational choice and a state's belief in a moral and ethical obligation dictate their compliance. This increase in moral and ethical obligation must come from domestic state actors because a state cannot just think on ethical terms on its own, nor are they just magically present, highlighting what constructivism calls intersubjectivness. Intersubjectiveness entails many individuals sharing the same perceptions, norms, interests, and values, which usually form the basis of political regimes or even treaty compliance. According to securitization theory, those intersubjective beliefs must originate from the populace and public officials. This subject is seen within democratic regimes because authoritarian regimes tend to be more autocratic in governance. Some scholars claim democratic regimes are more likely to (non)comply with environmental treaties because of their transparency to the voters (Risse-Kappen 1991; Dia 2005; Dia 2006).

One way to measure the domestic support of climate change is through the study of speech acts, which is the main criterion of the Copenhagen school and critical security
studies under securitization theory. Words can substantially impact policy, primarily when delivered by charismatic and influential leaders (Balzacq 2005; Austin 1962; Boas 2015). Therefore, through this process, any issue can turn into a security issue for the state. It is taking that subjective mindset and opinion and shifting it from the low to the high political field. Sadly, this delivery system can also work against the scope of climate change and its solutions. Different populist world leaders such as U.S. President Trump and Brazil President Bolsonaro exude this delivery. However, one must understand how speech acts influence state compliance by understanding how public opinion favors said speech acts.

For a speech act to be successful, it must gain acceptance from the audience, which in this study is the state's population. The audience must turn the subjective speech act into an intersubjective norm and belief through domestic state policies leading to compliance due to a new ethical belief. Scholars highlight this requirement by studying the success of the securitization theory (Balzacq 2005; Waever 2011; Corry 2012; Boas 2015). Division subsists between scholars on what explicitly drives an individual's threat perception and policy support toward climate change. Some claim it is a sense of responsibility, personal efficacy, and locus of control (Cleveland, Kalamas, and Laroche 2012; Kellstedt, Zahran, and Veldt 2008; Lee, Markowitz, Howe, et al. 2015). Some claim threat perception is based on political cues, objective environmental hazards, affluence, and survival (Inglehart 1995; Dunlap and Mertig 1997; Inglehart 1981; Pohjolainen, Kukkonen, Jokinen et al. 2021; Mildenberger and Leiserowitz 2017). This study aims to add to the growing debate on the influence of speech acts and the public's threat perception and policy support towards climate change. These variables will help
the literature understand what drives public perception and if an intersubjective action such as securitization theory can better explain compliance theory as it relates to environmental treaties and climate change solutions. The context leads to the first and second testable hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1**: States that exhibit strong support for the impending threat of climate change and the solutions needed for mitigation through speech acts made by its leading public officials are more likely to comply with environmental treaty commitments.

**Hypothesis 2**: States with higher threat perception and responsibility for climate mitigation through public opinion are more likely to comply with environmental treaty commitments.

**State Capacity**

The noncompliance factor of state capacity is one of the leading explanations of state deviation from their treaty commitments by the managerial school. However, within the literature, what defines state capacity has not received a consensus (Chayes and Chayes 1995; Börzel, Hofmann, Panke, et al. 2010, Tveit 2021). This study will use the broader term Sikkink (1991) used, where state capacity is the ability of a state's institutions to implement official goals (Hanson and Sigman 2013) effectively. A state government should effectively have the resources to accomplish needed domestic development and security tasks. Consequently, the strength of a state's national institutions and bureaucracy determine its international compliance (Hanson, Sigman 2013; Mbaye 2001; Chayes and Chayes 1995; Börzel, Hofmann, Panke, and Sprungk 2010; Tveit 2021). Remember, some claim the actual compliance of an international treaty is not from the state itself but from those nonstate actors involved in the day-to-day
activities (Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff 1998; Brandi, Blümer, and Morin 2019). However, individuals are more than likely not to change their ways unless there is a strong incentive to do so or a higher power changes the game's rules. Here, effective governmental regulations come into play, especially when controlling the actions of large Multinational Corporations (MNCs) and those of the current energy industry. According to scholars, corporations' main goal is to turn a profit and will not deviate from that course regardless (Findley, Nielson, and Sharman 2015). Therefore, many companies ship their production overseas to developing states because there is less regulation due to weaker governments and the necessary need for economic development, which results in cheaper costs and more significant profitable gains.

Emphasized by the managerial school, the international community understands this predicament. Therefore, treaties include flexible measures and economic and technical support like the Kyoto Protocol. These mechanisms will help a weakened state to enhance the resources necessary to implement effective regulations and provide the required financial outputs. As a result, this will achieve the needed commitment the state has sworn to uphold and not compromise its economic development. This commitment will allow developed states to refrain from cheating on their emission productions, as developing states will become unexploitable. For these reasons and to test the strength of the managerial school, state capacity will be one of the principal independent variables in this study. The context leads to the third testable hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 3**: States that lack the state capacity to implement environmental domestic policy change effectively are more likely to violate their commitments under the environmental treaty.
Economic Development

Economic development affecting a state's compliance to a treaty commitment is one of the most used variables, especially within the enforcement school formed under rationalism and neo-realism. When it comes to hard power, military and economic power are the main concerns of states. According to the enforcement school, as seen above, states only comply with and violate treaties based on self-interests (Young 1979; Findley, Nielson, and Sharman 2015; Lupu 2016; Aakre, Helland, and Hovi 2016). According to this logic, states do what they need to survive a hostile world system and will not take any chances of having their power and status results in a disadvantage relative to others. This notion of relative gains is reinforced by Seaman (2015) and Simmons (1998), who believe states are unlikely to enter or comply with international regimes that decrease their sovereignty and economic status.

One should view the economy as the bloodline of a state, and any alteration to this bloodline will come down with heavy scrutiny. However, the main requirement of the Kyoto Protocol and other treaties is that CO2 reduction commitments require this bloodline to be changed, resulting in a shift in jobs, infrastructure, energy production, and consumer goods. States and even individuals are only willing to give up their economic advantage to induce these required changes if security and status can be upheld. Inglehart (1981; 1995) highlights this through his studies of materialism and post-materialism that only the wealthy states can afford the transition and act on environmental policies and commitments. The wealthier and more financially secure a state's public feels, the more likely one will engage in environmental actions and policy. Ridzuan (2019) supports this belief through an environmental Kuznets curve. The Kuznets curve claims that as
individuals and states increase their wealth through economic development after a certain point, environmental conservation will be achievable (Ridzuan 2019). Since economic development significantly degrades the environment, once a state has enough money, it can help fix what it previously destroyed. However, why are wealthy states like the U.S. and Canada ignoring the Kyoto protocol if this was the case? Why do wealthy corporations continue to pollute? Many scholars contradict the importance of economic status and national wealth as it affects environmental policy and an individual's environmental threat perception (Dunlap and Mertig 1997; Lee, Markowitz, Howe, et al. 2015; Mostafa 2013; Mildenberger and Leiserowitz 2017; Mostafa 2016). Environmental policy taken up by a state should pertain to the elites' thoughts and the public's perception. A few scholars claim that political cues and officials' beliefs drive individual perceptions of climate change (Mildenberger and Leiserowitz 2017). Whereas Mostafa (2016) supports that political ideology and a person's internal locus of control affect individuals' environmental perception.

This debate regarding the importance of economic development and national wealth is ongoing in the compliance literature. With this study, the researcher wishes to add to this growing debate by testing this variable as it relates to compliance with a state's implementation of domestic environmental legislation. Under neo-realism, testing of the enforcement school will determine if it is a better predictor of compliance theory. The context leads to the fourth testable hypothesis:

**Hypothesis 4**: States that have higher economic development are more likely to comply with their environmental treaty commitments.
3.4 Operationalization of Dependent Variable

Many scholars in and outside the literature tend to measure environmental policy success through the total amount of CO2 emissions (Koengkan, Fuinhas, and Marques 2018; Khan and Ali Khan 2016; Marson and Subramaniam 2019; Ridzuan 2019; Tveit 2018; Von stein 2008). There are several ways to manipulate these numbers. For example, during the recent COVID-19 pandemic, CO2 emissions dropped in many countries, and renewable energy increased. However, nothing changed from a policy standpoint, except the carbon footprint that people and businesses reduced from the lockdown orders. In addition, measuring compliance through total CO2 emissions can also be a poor measure concerning poverty. Most impoverished people are not excessive polluters because they tend to rely on public transit and do not live extravagant lifestyles. Therefore, when it comes to operationalizing a state's compliance with its environmental commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, the investigation focuses on domestic legislation. As stated above, the absolute compliance of an international treaty is not from the state itself but from those nonstate actors involved in the day-to-day activities (Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff 1998; Brandi, Blümer, and Morin 2019). In each of these cases, an in-depth examination was conducted of the state's domestic legislation for 2012. 2012 was the official end of Kyoto's commitment period, giving the state government four to five years to implement a successful policy. Operationalization of domestic legislation will be done using the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations database known as FAOLEX, demonstrated by prior scholars (Brandi, Blümer, and Morin 2019). FAOLEX is an "up-to-date" legislative and policy database of national laws and regulations on various environmental topics, from food and land to forestry and wild species (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2022). If the state
successfully implements domestic environmental legislation that corresponds with its treaty commitment goals, it complies with its commitments. Even though this seems simple, one must remember that international treaties are mainly not self-enforcing because international institutions do not have the required enforcement power. A state and its public do not have to comply due to a lack of international punishment. Forced compliance comes into play when laws are implemented within the state to reflect the treaty's regulations and commitments.

### 3.5 Operationalization of Independent Variables

This section will provide how each independent variable will be measured and analyzed when it comes to each case analysis.

**Public Opinion**

First, when it comes to measuring public opinion, a survey analysis regarding these case studies was conducted. A third-party national public opinion survey measures how individuals perceive climate change and its threat to their state. Many scholars have previously utilized this method (Leiserowitz 2006; Lee, Markowitz, Howe, et al. 2015; Mostafa 2016; Inglehart 1995).

This research study uses this method and data from multiple national and international public opinion surveys for each case. Each case study analyzes a minimum of three public surveys, which measure the viewpoints of each case's general public's perception of climate change. Each case's survey data collection incorporates a times series factor. Each of the cases' public surveys will be broken up between the years 2009-2011.

These surveys will better understand how public opinion shifted within the cases during Kyoto. It will also explain why each case chose a particular pathway to
(non)compliance. It could be that public opinion within a state pushed its elites to sign and ratify the Kyoto Protocol. However, as time passed and elections took place, public opinion could have shifted, which resulted in low domestic legislation and a path of non-compliance. In addition, analyzing public opinion surveys through a time series could show that shifting public viewpoints could also provide some answers on a potential transition in the climate rhetoric of political elites. Although this does not represent the Copenhagen school of securitization theory, it does represent that of the Critical Security Studies of Securitization, as seen in the previous chapter. This information could provide a possible alternative to domestic climate change policy and compliance within states through the possible acceptance of the null hypotheses.

When it comes to the data collection of each public survey, this research study will borrow the methods of public risk perception analysis by Dr. Joseph Reser, Dr. Graham Bradley of Applied Psychology at Griffith University, and their colleagues (Reser, Bradley, Glendon, et al., 2012a; Reser, Bradley, Glendon, et al., 2012b). Within these surveys, four variables stood out for analysis: Belief, Concern, Responsibility, and Self-Efficacy. Four variables were prominent because each attained a similar expression in all surveys across each year and case. When it came to analysis of climate change perspective, they provided a more wholesome perspective on how an individual not only believes in climate change but even if they genuinely believe their actions can make a difference.

First, general knowledge of climate change was assessed through the belief category. Next, concern was utilized to measure one's fear and acknowledgment of climate change's impacts. Responsibility measured one's willingness and sense of
responsibility regarding climate change solutions. These include paying higher consumer costs. Finally, self-efficacy, different from responsibility, measures one's perception that personal choices and behavior could make a difference and empower others. A Likert scale (1-5) decided each case's public survey. This scale ensures that all questions for each category are weighted equally when creating the composite score. The recoding scheme came from Dr. Joseph, Dr. Bradly, and colleagues' research, refer to Appendix I, and was used to recode the surveys used for the case of Canada. Climate change perception surveys were just on the rise during the years covered in this research, and every survey differs from state to state and organization to organization. In order to stay consistent, each Australian national survey recorded between 3,000-4,000 participants, which was vital to ensuring a valid comparison between the years analyzed.

Alternatively, each Canadian survey recorded between 1,000-2,000 people. Although the surveys are similar in sample sizes within the case, there will be slight differences when analyzing these surveys cross-nationally. The public surveys utilized in this analysis are but are not limited to 2010 Public Risk Perceptions, Understandings, and Responses to Climate Change and Natural Disasters in Australia and Great Britain, 2010 and 2011 Public Risk Perceptions, Understandings, and Responses to Climate Change and Natural Disasters in Australia, 2009 Canadian Environmental Barometer: Tracking public opinion intelligence on climate change and the environment, International Social Survey Programme: Environment III - ISSP 2010 (Reser, Bradley, Glendon, et al., 2012a; Reser, Bradley, Glendon, et al., 2012b; ISSP Research Group, 2019; Environics Research Group, 2009). For a complete list of all the public surveys utilized in this study and for each case represented, please see Appendix I.
Second, using an in-depth rhetoric coding analysis for each case, this research measures speech acts presented by publicly elected officials and government heads. The coding was conducted by the author, which invites its own limitations. When using human coding there are certain errors that could happen, because the human eye is not as perceptive say as a computer program. When scrolling through countless pages of text, words can be missed and descriptions can be misinterpreted. To prevent this from happening, each document that was coded was put through a search to determine how many times “climate change” was claimed. However, one can never eliminate all limits, but can help manage them.

For this study, the legislative chambers analyzed are the house of representatives or house of commons, depending on the case. Chosen are the floor discussions of the house of representatives or house of commons because they stand firm for the ideals of the party that a good portion of the public stand behind through their elections. When any of these political officials speak about potential threats and changes to domestic policy, the public listens and, at times, is heavily influenced by such rhetoric. The head of government will be analyzed because they heavily influence domestic policy and negotiate international treaties, much like the Kyoto and Montreal Protocols. This study utilizes Hunt's (2014) rhetoric coding method. She conducts a content analysis of different domestic policy initiatives for references to climate change which then divides the highlighted content into two categories of Impact or Threat (Hunt 2014). Hunt (2014) claims that these two categories will represent the different descriptions found regarding climate change. However, there is no category for an introductory discussion of policy,
international treaties, or the everyday political conversation seen in many legislative debates. Therefore, adding a third category of general climate change will account for these frames. This new category will not only ensure that every climate change reference is recorded, but it will also help paint a clearer picture of how public officials frame climate change. The three categories used are as follows:

1. Consequences, impact, effect, and implication consist of impact

2. Issues, challenges, problems, risks, and threats consist of the threat

3. Domestic and International Policy, Titles, and Political Discourse consist of General Climate Change

Using this scale gains insight into the usage and rhetoric of the issue of climate change as it is utilized by leading public officials as a source of securitization and policy priority to influence the public.

For each case, 55 documents between prime minister speeches and House floor discussions will be coded and analyzed. When it comes to the House floor debates, Hansards were gathered by the author, and then selected by a third party based on how many were needed for each case, this was to eliminate bias. Then only the section of each Hansard that provided the most public debates were selected for coding analysis. Therefore, Matters of Public Importance section was chosen for Australia, where the Business Supply and Adjournment Proceedings were chosen for Canada. The purpose of splitting the 55 documents for each case between the PM and the House accounts for the difficulty of getting a public official to speak. A researcher cannot force an elite to speak about climate change. One head of government might not speak as much on climate
change as another would. All documents will also be collected evenly between the years of 2009-2011. Each year will start from January 1st to December 31st. This period will provide answers on the possible correlation between speech acts and a state’s compliance with its environmental treaty commitments. This period will provide the most significant data to strengthen the analysis. At this point, states have already chosen to ratify and turn in commitment goals to the conference of parties.

State Capacity

Third, the Fragile State Index (FSI) is employed in measuring state capacity. This index is used based on how previous scholars have defined state capacity as a failure in bureaucracy, finances, and other national institutions, which impede it from conducting successful domestic regulations and policies. The FSI looks at indicators of fractionalized elites, uneven economic development, state legitimacy, public service, and demographic pressures (Fragile State Index Indicators 2022). These all are suitable dimensions that represent the weakness of a state's capability to create and enforce effective law, unlike other indicators such as GDP per capita and the World Bank's Government Effectiveness Indicator (GEI) (Tveit 2018; Tveit 2021). The GDP measurement would only look at monetary restriction and income and ignore the insufficiencies of the institutions. The GEI only looks at the quality of public and civil service, their independence from pressure, the quality of policy formulation, and the government's commitment to said policies (Tveit 2021). Neither indicator combines both dimensions like the FSI. One could argue that it’s because of the FSI’s inclusion of 12 different indicators from economics and state legitimacy to human rights and public services, which make it one of the best measures of a State’s overall capacity to date. This is why this measure was
included in this study. The FSI data is scaled from 0-120, with 0 being the most stable state and 120 being the most unstable state (Fragile State Index and CAST Framework Methodology, 2017). This scale represents a form of interval data to measure the capacity of a state. Data will be collected for each case within the study for each year during the commitment period. This data will help provide variance as different variables can affect state capacity, which can affect compliance.

*Economic Development*

Finally, this thesis will use the GNI per capita indicator to measure economic development. This indicator is uncommon in the literature. The most common measurement of national wealth and economic development per a multitude of scholars is GDP per capita (Clulow 2018; Von Stein 2008; Dunlap and Mertig 1997; Lee, Markowitz, Howe, et al. 2015; Pohjolainen, Kukkonen, Jokinen, et al. 2021; Mostafa 2016). However, GDP only accounts for the total value of the goods and services within the state, eliminating all nationals, assets, and businesses overseas. GNI, on the other hand, is the total amount of income a state receives through its citizens and businesses at home and abroad, which can lead to a state's GNIs being lower than its GDP, which means values from foreign-owned companies do not count (Cheng and Rathburn, 2021; Investopedia Team 2021). Therefore, the focus is on collecting the GNI per capita for each case during each year of the Kyoto commitment period. Using the GNI per capita allows for determining the correlation between national wealth and economic development on treaty compliance. It will also provide possible variance of the state's economic development throughout the commitment period to its compliance.
3.6 Conclusion

This study explores factors determining a state's non-compliance regarding its international environmental treaty commitments. Does a state choose its compliance path based on self-interests, institutional norms, or a socially created and accepted security threat? It is this question; this research study will investigate. Testing the empirical evidence of two cases forming one in-depth comparative analysis study (Australia: Canada) allows for a theoretical perspective. The theoretical perspective to be tested is that of the IR paradigm of constructivism through the Securitization Theory of the Copenhagen school. Political elite speeches and legislative floor discussions are coded, as well as public opinion surveys to help determine if the Securitization theory holds any merit in domestic legislation. Through this process, this thesis aims to reinforce the literature of compliance studies via the domestic analysis level. A case study requires an in-depth analysis of each state. This study will gather information on various topics, including elections, bureaucracy, public demonstrations, lobbying, and governmental structure. The data collected will support the leading hypotheses or offer insight into the null hypotheses and present an alternative perspective on state compliance. Remember, something can only be done to improve the way states cooperate in combating climate change if one knows what drives them to potentially not comply in the first place. Investigating the validity of the three theories of state compliance, each engrained in their respective IR paradigms involving environmental compliance to the Kyoto Protocol, aims to clarify which theory better explains a state's compliant actions.
Chapter 4

Case One: Australia

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents and discusses the research findings for the case of Australia. The first section takes a deep dive into the structure of the Australian government. Understanding the structure of the government helps paint a picture of how public officials are elected and the creation of domestic legislation. One of the main criteria for compliance, seen in the operationalization of the compliance variable, is the creation of domestic legislation. Understanding how the Australian bureaucratic system works helps one see who controls legislation. This understanding also allows an opening for the null hypotheses. Next, the section discussion on Australia's environmental movement helps us understand the history of environmental legislation and public perceptions and actions towards climate change. Has Australia's public always been concerned about climate change, or have previous protests influenced legislation? We must understand the past in order to understand the future. This necessary history helps provide context on the public opinion perceptions observed and how it relates to the lack of climate legislation. Finally, the last two sections present the research findings for the dependent and independent variables. First, based on observed data, these sections inform us if Australia complied with the Kyoto Protocol based on the two criteria set up in chapter two. Second, it provides all the empirical evidence about Australia's speech rhetoric, public opinion, state
capacity, and economic development between 2099-2011. Following this chapter, one can see small connections between compliance and our hypotheses. Although, this chapter is only here to present the findings. Dialogue on this data and Canada's data is included in the discussion and conclusion.

4.2 Governmental Structure

Australia's system of government consists of a constitutional monarchy. This system still highlights the importance of a sovereign as the head of state, but s/he has no legal powers. The three formal branches of government, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial, hold the majority of the power. Australia is officially a commonwealth of the United Kingdom (U.K.) and constitutionally adopted the Westminster system of government. Constitutionally most of the power is in the hands of the sovereign or her appointed commonwealth governor-general (Australian Parliamentary Education Office, Australian Government Solicitor, 2020). Like many other British commonwealths, the sovereign of Australia is Queen Elizabeth II of the U.K. However, like the U.K., Australia's governmental system is designed by conventions rather than written constitutional law. Conventions are traditions and accepted rules of practice or unwritten laws. In the U.S., written law is valued more strictly. One main convention for the Westminster system, and Australia, is that the Prime Minister is seen as the head of government and is similar to the U.S. President. Despite Australia's system of government, it is still considered a representative democracy and a federation. The Commonwealth of Australia is divided into six states and two official territories. Like the United States, Australia's capital city, Canberra, is its territory but not an official state. This section will discuss the process and structure of Australia's executive and legislative
branches, bureaucratic structure, and legislation creation. This paper skims the Australian judicial system as it is out of the scope of this study.

**Legislative Structure**

The Australian legislative branch consists of a two-chamber parliamentary system. The upper House is the Senate, whereas the lower House is the House of Representatives. These titles differ from the U.K. Each chamber is responsible for the legislation process. Restrictions on the Senate inhibit its ability to introduce, create and amend proposed bills of appropriation or impose taxation (Australian Parliamentary Education Office, Australian Government Solicitor, 2020, pg. 17). Direct and impactful financial decisions should be left to the more directly elected House members of parliament (MPs).

According to the Constitution, "no Original State shall have less than six senators" (Australian Parliamentary Education Office, Australian Government Solicitor, 2020 pg. 8-9). This statement ensures equal representation but did not initially state that territories required any representation. Today, the Senate seats 76 senators, from which 12 represent each state and two from each territory. Each seat is elected through a proportional representation (P.R.) method (Australian Parliamentary Education Office, Australian Government Solicitor, 2020; Parliament of Australia House of Representatives, 2019a). Each senator is elected for a six-year term (Parliament of Australia House of Representatives, 2019a).

P.R. voting is when electors vote based on the party and not a candidate. It also sets a specific national percentage quota that a party must reach to be awarded seats. In Germany, the P.R. quota for the Bundestag is 5%. In contrast, if the Social Democratic
Party of Germany receives 23% of the national vote, the party receives 23% of the vacant seats. The party or the people determine the candidates who occupy those seats through the first vote preference. However, Australia does not follow this line of P.R. voting. According to the Australian electoral commission (AEC), filling out ballots has changed, but determining the senate quota has not (AEC 2022b). P.R. voting is represented in determining a senate quota for each state. In an AEC document, the P.R. quota is the number of formal ballots divided by the number of vacancies plus one, then adding one to the result (AEC 2022a). The ballots are then marked and counted in the preferential voting method and transferred in the proportional method (AEC 2022a). This method allows every vote to count even though their first choice did not win or receive enough votes to proceed. This method also eliminates the possibility of corruption based on a pure P.R. system where the party chooses the candidates.

The House of Representatives is the largest chamber and, like the U.S., bases its membership on population districts. Currently, there are 151 districts within the commonwealth, which result in 151 House M.P.s serving three years terms. It makes sense that New South Wales has more districts than Tasmania because of the greater population density of that state. The Constitution does not allow any state, regardless of the population, to go below five House M.P.s (Australian Parliamentary Education Office, Australian Government Solicitor, 2020 pg. 11). When it comes to the election of House M.P.s, a preferential voting system is used (Parliament of Australia House of Representatives, 2022a). The process is different from the Senate's because no quota is required. According to Infosheet 8 of the House of Representatives, electors' first preferences are counted in an election. Following this count, transferable second
preferences are counted depending on the number of candidates (Parliament of Australia House of Representatives, 2022a). Preferential voting systems ensure every vote counts and the candidate has the full support of their electors rather than the majority of votes. A House MP is elected when they gain more than 50% of the total votes. However, this voting method is not only crucial for legislative procedures and debates. In Australia and like most states with the Westminster system, when society directly elects the House, they indirectly elect the executive. The House of Representatives is the crucial body that creates the Australian governmental structure. Seemingly, the only connection between the House and Executive branch within the Constitution reads, "no Minister of State shall hold office for a longer period than three months unless he is or becomes a senator or a member of the House of Representatives" (Australian Parliamentary Education Office, Australian Government Solicitor, 2020 pg. 19). In reality, the structural design of the Executive government relies on the makeup of the House. These are just one of the many conventions within Australian law. Some might claim this is a massive infringement of democracy and creates a democratic deficit. Why should the legislative branch and the executive branch be so interconnected? However, checks and balances are in place to maintain a well-oiled functioning democracy. These processes are discussed in the following sub-sections.

**Executive Structure**

The Australian executive branch operates differently than what is inscribed in the Constitution of the Commonwealth. The original text proclaims its power in two important sections,
Section 61: “The Executive power of the Commonwealth is vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General as the Queen’s representative”

Section 70: “In respect of matters which, under this Constitution, pass to the Executive Government of the Commonwealth, all powers, and functions which at the establishment of the Commonwealth are vested in..., the Governor-General, or in the Governor-General in Council, or in the authority exercising similar powers under the Commonwealth, as the case requires” (Australian Parliamentary Education Office, Australian Government Solicitor, 2020 pg. 19-20).

In reality, the Queen has no power within the operations of the government except the informal appointing of the Governor-General. However, the Governor-General has no formal role in the current executive system but functions more strategically. The executive branch's power lies with the Australian Prime Minister (PM) and his cabinet, much like that of the U.K. and Canada. These roles are not mentioned in the Australian Constitution but gain responsibility from its wordings. For example, the PM and the cabinet are considered members of the Governor-General's Executive Council, which advise him or her on matters of policy and military decisions. They are also directly elected as House M.P.s, which makes them responsible to the people. By convention, the PM is elected from the largest party or the major party in a coalition, which holds the House of Representatives. In Australia, the PM has been from one of three parties: the Australian Labour Party, The Liberal Party of Australia, or the Nationals ((Parliament of Australia House of Representatives, 2022b). These three parties are the largest in Australia.

The Australian PM has many responsibilities, such as: appointing and dismissing Ministers, acting indirectly as Commander in chief, initiating government expenditure by recommending appropriations, and ensuring party policies are represented in Legislation (Hamer, 2004; Parliament of Australia House of Representatives, 2020; Parliament of
Australia House of Representatives, 2019b). However, their most important responsibility is maintaining confidence within their cabinet and the House of Representatives. This confidence is at the core of Australia’s governmental system, known as "Responsible and Representative Government" (Australian Parliamentary Education Office, Australian Government Solicitor, 2020 pg. iv). Without the support of the people through their elected officials, the PM has limited powers. First, the PM must appoint his or her Ministers, which lead the multiple governmental departments. These Ministers push the PM’s policy and propose bills in their respective fields (Hamer, 2004). According to current legislation, a PM can have up to 30 Ministers and must ensure representation of all federal states and sufficient women and Senate representation (Hamer, 2004; Parliament of Australia House of Representatives, 2019b). A PM can appoint, dismiss, promote, and demote Ministers depending on loyalty and job performance. However, that will be discussed further in the following sub-section regarding bureaucratic politics. As mentioned before, confidence is vital. According to David Hamer (2004), the essential task of the PM is to get the consensus of the cabinet; if not, then they cannot reasonably ask for loyalty and collective responsibility. This is precisely what happened to former Prime Minster Kevin Rudd when he failed to pass his Carbon Tax Bill and showed the lack of confidence of the current government. After losing the confidence of his cabinet and the party, Julia Gillard replaced him as PM of Australia. Julia Gillard then formed her government after the 2010 federal election and was internally replaced as PM by Kevin Rudd in 2013 (Rourke 2013). Even Prime Ministers cannot always go unchecked.

Besides requiring the confidence of the Cabinet and the House, the government also has a few other checks and balances through conventions and constitutional law.
First is the creation of the Shadow government, as exemplified by the governments of the U.K. and Canada. The shadow government is part of the coalition of parties with the most significant number of non-government M.P.s (Parliament of Australia House of Representatives, 2020). The shadow government or opposition is the group that would be in government if their party won the majority of the House, which could happen in future elections. The opposition has the same setup as the government; it has a leader (PM), Ministers, whips, and backbenchers. For example, Tony Abbot served as opposition leader to PM Kevin Rudd and PM Julia Gillard until he became PM after the 2013 federal election. The primary purpose of the opposition is to hold the government responsible to the people. It does this through public chamber debates, questioning and poking holes in government policy and legislation, and providing the people with an alternative governmental option (Parliament of Australia House of Representatives, 2020). This way, the people of Australia can see both sides of policy issues and change votes next election. Lastly, the primary check to the Prime Minister's power is by the Governor-General. According to the Constitution, the Governor-General has reserve powers, which allows him to dissolve the House or, at times, both chambers, also known as a double dissolution (Australian Parliamentary Education Office, Australian Government Solicitor, 2020). This power is too great for someone who needs to be democratically elected. However, the constant gridlock does not represent a responsible and representative government when Parliament is at a complete standstill, and neither chamber can agree on legislation. When neither chamber has the trust of the other, the next step is to let the Australian people decide and break the potential gridlock. This idea would be completely unheard of in the United States, but it does provide democracy to keep thriving even in the wake of
Despite the interconnectedness of the legislative and executive branches, some proper checks and balances uphold the measure of democracy. The close connection between these branches has genuinely made a government responsible to the people of Australia.

The Legislation Process

The 1901 Australian Constitution establishes Australia as a federation of six states, two territories, and the Commonwealth government. Throughout this subsection, the term Commonwealth will describe the Parliament, and the term government refers to the executive. Much like many federations, the legislative power is shared between the Federal and state governments. Australia's Constitution needs to identify state governments' legislative powers. It only preserves the states' constitutions, their previous state power unless in conflict with the Commonwealth, and state laws unless in conflict (Australian Parliamentary Education Office, Australian Government Solicitor, 2020).

States can regulate more than the Commonwealth, which the Constitution limits. Comparatively to how legislation is split between the federal government and states in the U.S. For example, the Australian Constitution needs to mention permitting the Commonwealth to create legislation on environmental matters. The area of the environment is technically up to the state governments to regulate. However, there is a clause that the Commonwealth can use, which is the power to legislate on "external affairs" (Australian Parliamentary Education Office, Australian Government Solicitor, 2020 pg. v). International environmental treaties like the UNFCCC and Kyoto are under foreign affairs. In other words, this allows the Commonwealth to create legislation concerning environmental protection based only on the commitments of an international
treaty concerning the state's foreign relations. With climate change now becoming a more significant international problem, one could argue that this has shifted environmental policy into the hands of the Commonwealth and mainly no longer under the state's control without a constitutional amendment.

In areas of legislation given to the Commonwealth, required bills must pass both the House and the Senate before becoming Acts. The Constitution gives both chambers similar legislation procedures, except in appropriations and taxation, which the Senate cannot create or directly amend. Unlike the U.S., both Australian chambers have mainly equal weight, whereas, in the U.S., the Senate holds more legislative powers, such as the filibuster. However, before a bill can go through the legislative process, it must be drafted and introduced. Any member of Parliament can propose a bill. Still, it is usually the government, through its cabinet Ministers, that introduces the majority of bills into the House; however, any M.P. can propose private members' or senators' bills in any chamber (Parliament of Australia House of Representatives, 2022c). Now any bill proposed by the government must go through its approval process. First, it must be agreed to by the PM and Cabinet; next, the Minister and their department must draft it, then it should pass a party committee before presenting it before the House (Parliament of Australia House of Representatives, 2022c). For a bill to become an Act of Parliament, it must go through several stages in each chamber, as shown in Figure 1.
The Legislative Process of the Australian Parliament

Source: Parliament of Australia House of Representatives Infosheet 7, May 2022c

The Senate legislation process is similar to the House, so that process will not be discussed at length. Figure 1 shows that each bill has to go through three readings and a day of detail in the House before a vote. This entire process can take up to multiple sitting days, spreading over multiple weeks depending on when the bill is introduced in the sitting cycle (Parliament of Australia House of Representatives, 2022c). Out of the four stages, the Second reading and detailed consideration are the most important. The First reading is mainly the introduction by the appropriate MP.

In contrast, the Third reading is where the motion to vote on the final bill is taken (Parliament of Australia House of Representatives, 2022c). According to Figure 1, the
Second reading is where much debate occurs between the government and the opposition. Members can question the bill and the Minister on its purpose and even possible alternative measures. Here the Australian public can see the opposition at work checking the standing government. After the great debate in the House, the bill is open for amendments. This stage is where government members and opposition members engage in bipartisanship. The House goes through the bill section by section, and every amendment proposed is voted on to ensure complete understanding by all members (Parliament of Australia House of Representatives, 2022c). Finally, after the Third reading and a positive vote, the bill goes to the Senate. Suppose the bill is lucky enough not to return to the House and passes the Senate. The bill then goes to the Governor-General, who must provide his assent (signature) for the bill to become an official Act of Parliament (Parliament of Australia House of Representatives, 2022c). Legislation can effortlessly go back and forth between both chambers with amendments. Now, there are two other options in the early stages of the bill, which can help debate its purpose.

For this paper, the focus is solely on the committee reference as it relates to directly bringing epistemic communities and the public into the debates. The House can refer the bill to an appropriate committee to conduct an advisory report, where it gathers external information to help inform the House of the best path for the bill (Parliament of Australia House of Representatives, 2022c). In terms of environmental legislation, this path allows scientists and non-profits to provide evidence and reasoning on the importance of environmental protection and economists to discuss the potential economic impacts. Policymakers know more about the legislative process and could know about specific issue topics. Although, they are incomplete experts and should listen to those
who have the knowledge and study or experience these issues or topics first-hand. Only then can legislation represent reality, not just the political game of competing ideologies. Like a legislation process, the process of a bill becoming an Act is lengthy and must go through multiple stages of debates, potential committees, and reconstruction. However, through these stages, external forces can easily manipulate the public officials that introduce or oppose said legislation. In turn, bills are manipulated to be voted down or made into Acts, with the sole purpose of benefiting a few more than Australia as a whole. The environment can be an apparent victim of this process. One of the reasons for voting down PM Kevin Rudd's Carbon Tax was due to intense lobbying from the Fossil Fuel industry (Knaus, 2019; Drury, 2022). There is only so much a public debate can achieve when fighting against corporations with blank paychecks for massive public relations strategies and funding of public officials. Much of this is described in the next section, which discusses the advancement of the environmental movement in Australia. Nevertheless, let us first look into the forces influencing policy formation, which can significantly impact legislation.

_Bureaucratic Involvement_

As mentioned in chapter two, behind closed doors, bureaucrats and the principal decision-maker bargain and haggle on policy action (Allison and Zelikow 1999). Bureaucrats help influence policy and legislation but are not elected, directly or indirectly, nor responsible to society. These actors can range from cabinet members to parliamentarians to scientists. In Australia, most bureaucrats are within the governmental departments known as the Australian Public Service (APS) (Australian Public Service Commission, 2021). Unlike the U.S. presidential cabinet, which is comprised of non-
elected officials. The Australian Ministers must be elected MPs. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that bureaucratic politics are represented at a much higher and more substantial level in the U.S. The U.S President can maintain the confidence of his cabinet in a different way than that of the Australian PM. As mentioned, legislation and policy require the cabinet's agreement and usually party committees. However, this is not to say that Australia is free from external and internal bureaucratic influence in the governmental policy-making process. It happens at different levels and degrees than in other states like the U.S.

In Australia, the APS serves as the main body of bureaucracy in the government. Each governmental department is comprised of these public servants alongside ministerial staff. According to the Public Service Act 1999, employees of the APS are held to a high standard and a set of core values. One value is impartiality; it is here that the Act claims, "the APS is apolitical and provides the Government with advice that is frank, honest, timely and based on the best available evidence" (Public Services Act of 1999, 2019, pg. 8). The sole purpose of the bureaucracy is not to play politics but to support any government in its goals to serve the people of Australia. Politicizing facts and evidence to help determine policy issues and solutions is a violation. This notion of neutrality is collaborated by the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984. This Act ensures that all levels of public servants, from seniors to entry-level, should be free from the constant shift of governmental politics.

Although, many scholars have claimed that the time of neutrality of the APS is coming to an end due to the politicization of the upper bureaucrats such as ministerial staff, assistant Ministers, and parliamentary secretaries (Mulgan 2007; Mulgan 1999;
McAllister 2014; Spry 2000). The parliamentary secretary of a department is the leading bureaucrat and second to the Minister and is appointed from either chamber by the PM (Parliament of Australia House of Representatives 2019b). For any party, its primary goal is to push its policies, and finding supporters who agree with their thinking is becoming ever so popular. This push could result in the parliamentary secretaries excluding or arguing against information from the APS or simply changing the APS. According to Richard Mulgan (1999), if parliamentary secretaries can employ and terminate APS staff, then politicization will toxify the once-neutral bureaucratic body. His fear became a reality, as the Public Service Act 1999 allows parliamentary secretaries to employ and terminate APS staff, but not in a discriminatory manner but of merit (Spry 2000).

Although, discriminating against political beliefs is difficult to prove, especially when certain beliefs about policy issues are required for the job. A political official could use a loophole known as the "inherent requirement" rule (Spry 2000 pg. 96). This means that an APS staff member that questions neoliberal solutions regarding environmental policy could be dismissed. The main legal reason is that employees must have needed knowledge and understanding and previous work with neoliberal environmental policies as it is an inherent requirement for employment. This path can lead to a slippery slope of the institutionalization of politicization at all levels of the Australian bureaucratic system. As a result, policies and legislation will no longer be rational but bounded by rationality and group thinking.

Craig Matheson (1997) claims that this type of policy decision-making is already underway from a more technical approach to a more political one. As politicization takes hold of the decision-making process, only a select few individuals will have much say in
creating policy and drafting legislation. For example, the PM pushes to subsidize fossil fuel industries for voluntarily transitioning to clean energy based on lobbyist interests. He appoints a Minister and parliamentary secretary that support his neoliberal views to run the department of Climate Change, Energy, Environmental, and Water. The departmental secretary, in turn, ensures that public servants share similar policy beliefs through an inherent requirement. This results in a handful of people pushing for this environmental policy while eliminating any possible alternatives or dissent. It appears that, especially in environmental politics, corporations are the actual bureaucrats that determine policy and even indirectly government appointments. According to Lindblom (1977), big businesses appear to be privileged in contemporary society and within policy creation, which can also be called corporate socialism (Marsh, Lewis, Chesters, 2014). Governments will easily bend to their willpower because they are the primary source of money and jobs for the economy. Examples of this are in the following section regarding previous governmental action on the environment.

All this reveals the dark side of bureaucratic politics, which is the increased corruption and elimination of public opinion and epistemic knowledge regarding policy formation. Ian McAllister (2014) conducted a national public opinion survey on corruption in 2012; he discovered that out of 1,488 Australians, they are likely to believe that politicians are more likely to look out for themselves and their interests. Moreover, this type of corruption continues to grow in Australia. Australia, as of 2021, has dropped seven ranks in its corruption index score. COVID-19 response funds went to political party donors such as Aspen Medical (Dela Rama, Lester, Staples, 2022). Mulgan was right, and the period of an impartial APS in Australia is over. Policy creation is inching
towards no longer being based on fact and truth but instead on political gains and lobbying interests. Is public opinion excluded in this process? What does the increased politicization of the APS and inclusion of lobbying interests mean for Australia's Kyoto Protocol commitments? This question will be looked at in depth in the following sections of this chapter.

**4.3 Influence of an Environmental Movement**

From the 1960s to the 1980s, a modern environmental movement was taking shape. Students and young activists worldwide appeared to have had enough of the continuous air pollution, land degradation, and nuclear destruction. However, possibly unknown to many at the time, this movement would change domestic and international politics forever. As we have seen in Chapter Two, countless states came together to form the Montreal Protocol after increasing domestic and international pressure to ensure environmental protection for public health. However, this is just one of the many examples that resulted from the Environmental movement.

Another considerable achievement was the politicization of the principles and goals of the movement into what is known as the Green Parties (McBride 2021). The foundations of these new upcoming parties were enshrined in four pillars “ecological sustainability, grassroots democracy, social justice, and nonviolence” (McBride 2021 p.2). Moreover, nowhere is more explicit about the modern movement’s creation, political struggle, and influential change than in the state of Australia, as it is reviewed in this Chapter.

For Australia, the modern environmental movement started in the 1960s and continued through the 1970s. Unlike in the U.S. regarding air pollution, this movement
was built on the foundation of Australia’s natural environment and ecosystems. In the late 1960s, the Great Barrier Reef (GBR) was soon the result of mining for limestone and drilling for oil (McGregor 2014; Foxwell-Norton and Lester 2017). As seen today, fossil fuel companies are looking to domestically strip mines for minerals and oil in remote wilderness areas. A present example is the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, in which U.S. President Biden has suspended all oil and gas drilling permits provided by his predecessor President Trump. In Australia, the Queensland Wildlife Preservation Society and the Queensland Littoral Society led a massive national campaign to “Save the Reef” (Foxwell-Norton and Lester 2017, pg. 572-73). This campaign would create the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park in 1974 and light the fire of public support against environmental degradation. In the following years, Australia saw one of the first domestic green political parties, the United Tasmania Group of 1972, form in response to the flooding of Lake Pedder (McBride 2021; Milne 2006). Finally, 11 years later, the state of Tasmania received its environmental win. National protests consisting of hundreds of Australians successfully stopped the damming of the Franklin River and federally protected massive areas of Tasmania (McGregor 2014; Walker 2018). Despite this, these environmental protection campaigns all ended in federal action. This summary is not the entire picture of Australia’s past environmental policy.

At first glance, these actions appear that the Australian government, Labour or Liberal-National coalition, had environmental protection at heart or just listened to their constituents. However, in the following years, from the 1980s to 1990s, it will be seen that Australian environmental policy, especially climate and emission policy, served as lip service. According to Kate Crowley (2013 pg. 603), the years from the late 1980s to
the Federal election of 2007 saw more of a “political cartel” on insufficient climate change and emission policies. Neither side of the political spectrum gave climate change policies much president despite the growing public and international support during these times. As history has shown us, one of the most prominent issues that halt any sufficient governmental action on climate change is that of the national economy. According to Joan Staples (2009), Australia’s Environment Minister, Graham Richardson, in 1989, pushed for a 20% decrease in Greenhouse gas emissions by 2005, but the Economic and Resource ministers rejected it.

Unfortunately, this request was just two years after the implications of the global 1987 recession. Pushing policies that required drastic changes in domestic infrastructure, jobs, and funding was not a priority. However, the 20% emission reduction was established by Prime Minster Hawke in 1990 but “would not be at the expense of the economy” (Staples 2009 pg. 116), as one can realize as this neo-liberal thinking that destroyed this commitment before it even began. Australia was also plagued with yet another obstacle, the fossil fuel industry. Australia has always been a mining state. According to Greg O’Brien (2018), the mining industry counted for about 9% of Australia’s GDP in 2018, with an annual growth of about four percent. It was this vital connection that made climate policy difficult till 2010. Like in the U.S., industries will use the funding to create ad campaigns and influence political elites to vote against anti-fossil fuel policies. Many claim politicians are in bed with the fossil fuel industry and others, such as pharmaceutical companies. This industry-elite relationship plagued the Howard government, which mainly made emission reductions voluntary (Crowley 2013). These policies were mainly seen as symbolic. This meant they had no real value in
advancing climate policy in Australia, but it was to make it look to the public that the Howard government was responding to their interests.

However, as stated before, corporations, especially resource extraction, have one purpose: to gain a profit most cheaply. If given the ability to do this under good faith, only a few corporations will raise costs to combat climate change and reduce emissions. Finally, around the 2007 general election, the actual side of the Howard government was leaked by a former policy adviser, who showed that Prime Minister Howard’s climate policies were driven by the “greenhouse mafia” (Crowley 2013 pg. 605). It was here that the coalition government lost all hope of reelection despite countless attempts to sway the public. Not only did Kevin Rudd, the Labour party leader, ratify the Kyoto Protocol, but he also pushed on a platform of listening to the public and finally bringing their concerns to action. According to Crowley (2013), polls suggested that 74% of Australians in 2007 favored the idea of a carbon tax. It was this policy, along with other international and domestic commitments and actions, that the Labour party, with the help of the green party, from 2007-2013, turned the tide on climate policy in Australia.

4.4 The Avenue of Compliance

As mentioned in chapter three, compliance with the Kyoto Protocol should measure the degree states take to combat climate change locally, regionally, and internationally. Meaning there is no complete definite yes or no to compliance. Reducing emissions is wonderful, but did the actions represent a more innovative and long-lasting approach? Was introducing climate and emission policies seen more as lip service? When measuring a state's compliance with the Kyoto protocol, these are the questions one must ask. The Kyoto Protocol is not legally binding but should be more of an environmental
tool in a politician's toolbox. This research asks to what extent the power of rhetoric from
the Australian public and political elites influenced the state's ability to successfully use
the Kyoto tool to combat climate change and environmental issues domestically. For this
reason, this thesis will restate the two criteria that drive the view of compliance in this
study.

Criterion one: Did the state comply with its greenhouse gas emission reduction
established in the Kyoto Protocol under Article 3 Paragraph 1?

Criterion two: Did the state successfully implement domestic legislation and
regulations to ensure the state meets its emissions reduction commitments?

If Australia meets these two criteria, it could be complying to the degree of not only
meeting an objective emissions reduction goal. They would also show the state's initiative
in using their international commitments to meet domestic climate action. Now we
understand what goes into the core compliance of the Kyoto Protocol and how one should
measure Australia's progress. Let us turn to interpret criteria one.

The assigned amount by Australia is determined using the base year of 1990,
where Australia produced 553,773.80 gigagrams (Gg) of GHGs yearly (Australian
Government DOCC, 2008a). It is calculated by the emissions target agreed by the Parties,
which was +8% from its base year. According to this, Australia was allowed to pollute
more under the Kyoto Protocol, which defeats the commitment to GHG reductions.
However, the Kyoto Protocols' targets are meant to stabilize and reduce global emissions
while keeping in mind state economies. A couple of possible reasons Australia was
allowed to pollute more was its highly extractive and agricultural export-based economy.
It also appeared to have a small overall impact on global GHGs, unlike the developed countries of Europe and the United States. Originally Australia's initial assigned yearly amount was calculated at 598,075.71 Gg (Australian Government DOCC, 2008a). Although, this changed after Australia's initial report was reviewed and required a resubmission. All reports by parties are subject to review initiated by the UNFCCC Secretariat via an expert review team, which led to Australia's base year being revised to 547,699.841 Gg of GHG (Australian Government DOCC, 2008b). As per the revised base year, Australia would have a new yearly assigned amount of 591,515.828 Gg and a commitment period assigned amount of 2,957,579.14 Gg. If Australia were to exceed the total commitment period assigned by 2012, it would fail to comply with the Kyoto Protocol via its core commitment and our first criteria.

Table 2 shows Australia's overall GHG emissions recorded per year of the commitment period, along with its LULUCF activities per paragraph 3 (UNFCCC, 2015). At first glance, the table shows that Australia's total yearly emissions fluctuate greatly depending on if LULUCF activities are (non)recorded. The UNFCCC requires more stringent documentation and transparency of LULUCF than Kyoto. This requirement is why the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 2008a) excluded the UNFCCC LULUCF activities. The Kyoto requirements are documented in the second row of the table marked KP-LULUCF. When adding the Total (without LULUCF) and Total (3.3) yearly emissions amounts, Australia is within its yearly commitment assigned amount of 591,515.828 Gg. For example, in 2009, it only produced 574,725.29 Gg, and in 2012 the amount decreased to 564,947.18 Gg. According to the table and the equation below, Australia met its objective emission commitments under Kyoto Protocol and criteria one.
This determination is also reinforced by multiple concluding documents of the UNFCCC, such as the True-up period information report by the Secretariat, Australia’s True-up period review report, and the final compilation and accounting report for Australia in Kyoto’s first period (UNFCCC 13, 14, 15, 2016a, 2016b). For example, the expert review team concluded as of December 2015 that Australia fulfilled compliance, where the aggregate anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions were below or equal to assigned amounts.

In addition to total emissions, Table 2 shows an annual decrease in Australia’s KP-LULUCF emissions. These decreases are especially true when it comes to their...
deforestation pollution. Deforestation Pollution decrease could be about the domestic environmental policies passed by current administrations and parliaments. To help answer this question and determine Australia’s compliance with criteria two. A review of domestic environmental policies is necessary to determine if emission reductions were made by collaborating state Kyoto commitments and domestic policy and not just confounding variables. As of 2011, three significant Acts of Parliament have passed to integrate Kyoto emission commitments into Australian domestic law.

*The Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011* was the first significant law passed by the Gillard government. The Act had three core objectives to implement obligations that Australia has under Kyoto and Climate Change Convention, create incentives for people to carry on specific offset projects, and increase carbon abatement (*Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011, 2011*). The preceding conservative government has not repealed the law, which is still in effect today. However, the Act has received amendments and has yet to have Kyoto Offset Projects within the document (*Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011, 2022*). The goal of the offset projects was to create carbon sinks, especially important in the agricultural sector. According to the Act is considered a Kyoto offset project if,
(i) to the extent to which the project is a project to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere—the removal can be used to meet Australia’s climate change targets under the Kyoto Protocol or an international agreement (if any) that is the successor (whether immediate or otherwise) to the Kyoto Protocol; and

(ii) to the extent (if any) to which the project is a project to avoid emissions of greenhouse gases—the avoidance can be used to meet Australia’s climate change targets under the Kyoto Protocol or an international agreement (if any) that is the successor (whether immediate or otherwise) to the Kyoto Protocol (Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011, 2011 pg.79).

Agriculture is one of the most significant contributors to global climate change, as it causes deforestation for livestock and crops. Livestock also takes up large amounts of water and feed and gives off large amounts of CO2 and Methane. This Act would allow sustainable practices such as crop rotations, planting cover crops, livestock and plant integration, and agroforestry practices. These practices can reduce pasture deforestation and supplement already lost forests with crops that increase carbon sinkage and profit diversity. As per Table 4.4, Australia’s deforestation was significantly reduced from 56,746.90 Gg in 2008 to 32,805.46 Gg in 2012. It is difficult to conclude that The Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011 influenced the reduction since it did not take effect until the end of 2011 (Carbon Credits (Carbon Farming Initiative) Act 2011, 2011 pg. 1). Although, one could see a possible correlation to the decrease in deforestation pollution by 5,719.57 Gg between 2011-2012.

The Clean Energy Act 2011 was the most significant victory for the Gillard government in environmental policy, despite former Prime Minster Rudd’s folding. The Act had four objectives, but two were at its core of development. First, it was to give effect to Australia’s commitments under Kyoto and the UNFCCC; then, it placed a price on GHGs to encourage clean energy investment, increase jobs, increase economic
growth, and decrease emissions (Clean Energy Act 2011, 2012). Unlike the first Act, which created a domestic carbon trading system, this Act taxed corporations for toxifying and damaging Australia’s natural environment. The debate of choosing economic growth and a clean environment has always focused on the former goal. The coalition’s policy objective was to provide tax incentives and subsidies for companies to volunteer to invest in clean energy and push internal environmental changes (Clean Energy Act 2011, 2012). The Labour government took a more direct approach and did not wait for neoliberalist mindsets to self-adapt.

The Act granted full Royal Assent as of November 2011, which the tax mechanism took into effect on July 1, 2012, at a fixed tax rate (Clean Energy Act 2011, 2012 pg. 146-148). Table 4.2 shows the tax scheme worked from 2012-2018, where the first three years were fixed charges and the last three were flexible/market-driven charges. According to the Australian government, an entity was liable to purchase carbon units if it polluted 25,000 tonnes or more of CO2 annually or if it supplied either natural gas, imported petroleum, or a landfill (Clean Energy Act 2011, 2012). According to table 3, an Australian mining company that pollutes 100,000 tonnes of CO2 must provide 100,000 carbon units equaling $2,300,000 by the end of the 2012 financial year. It is no wonder the proceeding coalition government repealed this Act in 2014. This Act placed the consequences of pollution in the hands of the polluters instead of taxpayer money through governmental subsidies and incentives. It also tried to speed up the process of research and development of cleaner energy options. Why would a company want to pay $2,300,000 in pollution fees? Instead, it would place that amount of money towards R&D. Lenore Taylor (2014), political editor for the Guardian, claims national emissions
dropped by 0.8% in a year. The Guardian called this “the largest fall in 24 years of records.” The cost of repeal will be around 7 billion dollars to the federal budget over a projected four years. Despite the repeal of the Act, it was passed in the heat of a massive political debate and showed the government’s ability to enshrine its Kyoto commitments into domestic policy. Due to these findings, it is concluded that this Act indicated policy compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.

**Table 3 The Carbon Tax Scheme Under the Clean Energy Act of 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Vintage year</th>
<th>Charge per unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>the eligible financial year beginning on 1 July 2012</td>
<td>$23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>the eligible financial year beginning on 1 July 2013</td>
<td>$24.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>the eligible financial year beginning on 1 July 2014</td>
<td>$25.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>the eligible financial year beginning on 1 July 2015</td>
<td>the amount prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this table item</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>the eligible financial year beginning on 1 July 2016</td>
<td>the amount obtained by multiplying the per unit charge applicable under item 7 by 1.07625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>the eligible financial year beginning on 1 July 2017</td>
<td>the amount obtained by multiplying the per unit charge applicable under item 8 by 1.07625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Finally, the Greenhouse and Energy Minimum Standards Act 2012 received its Royal Assent in September 2012. The sole purpose of this Act is to establish greenhouse and energy minimum standards (GEMS) for products that use energy or affect energy used by another product (Greenhouse and Energy Minimum Standards Act 2012, 2013). The commonwealth officially gains the ability to determine and control the amount of energy and to ensure its sustainable efficiency for a greener future. Much like the Clean
Energy Act 2011, this GEMS Act 2012 further pushes the government's direct involvement in forcing corporations to shift to cleaner energy standards. Although this Act has been amended four times since its original passage, it still states that,

“A product (a GEMS product) covered by a GEMS determination can only be supplied or offered for supply, or used for a commercial purpose, if:

(a) the model of the product is registered under this Act against the determination; and
(b) the product complies with the determination; and
(c) the supply, offer or use complies with the determination” (Greenhouse and Energy Minimum Standards Act 2012, 2013 pg. 3).

As stated, suppliers and commercial users of products that do not comply with GEMS are subject to penalties and could face criminal charges. This type of government action is familiar to combating climate change. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) took a similar approach in 1975, where it can enforce energy and water conservation standards for consumer and commercial products (U.S. DOE 2022). It is difficult to see if the U.S. actions were taken only for domestic health rather than combating climate change. However, seeing that the UNFCCC existed in 1992. One could conclude that Australia’s Act was more of a policy set up to combat climate change, unlike its U.S. equivalent.

Throughout this section, Australia’s national commitment to combating climate change through the Kyoto Protocol appears to be a success. Multiple UN documents and statements have shown repeated compliance regarding reducing GHG emissions even below their allocated 8% increase. In addition, multiple legislative documents have shown the ability of Australia to implement its international commitments into domestic action despite serious political debates. Some of these Acts were repealed soon after implantation, but it is not the scope of this paper to investigate policy post-2012. With
that in mind, it is fair to assess that Australia has successfully complied with the Kyoto Protocol, following both criteria in measuring state compliance.

4.5 Findings

This section discusses the findings and results observed in the case of Australia. Each subsection will highlight one of the four independent variables observed in this research study, as mentioned in chapter two. First presented are the data findings of elite speech rhetoric through the documents of Australian public officials. Next, this section will present the data observed and recorded regarding how Australian public opinion perceives climate change based on national surveys. Finally, presentation of data collected on Australia’s state capacity and economic development as they relate to the current dominant international compliance schools. The purpose of this section is only to state the findings observed in Australia. The analysis of this data will take part in chapter six, the discussion and conclusion chapter.

Elite Rhetoric

According to the first hypothesis, a state that exhibits strong support for the impending threat of climate change and the solutions needed for mitigation through speech acts by its leading public officials is more likely to comply with environmental treaty commitments. The previous section brings to notice Australia’s compliance through its implementation of domestic legislation. How much of this success could have been influenced by elite rhetoric of an impending threat? Of the 55 documents that were analyzed, 37 Prime Minster speeches and interviews, and sections of 18 Parliamentary Hansards, climate change was directly mentioned or descriptively mentioned 567 times. The latter indication is for times when elites either described weather events known to be
increased by climate change, mentioned global warming, or deemed climate change a national interest. From the total amount of times climate change was mentioned, only roughly 26% of the rhetoric fell under the threat category. About 11% fell under the impact category, whereas around 62% fell under the general climate change category of policy talk, political discourse, job titles, and scientific belief. Table 4 shows the descriptive statistical measures of each category, including the total sum of climate change as a term used in speeches and debates by public elites.

Table 4 Descriptive Stats of Australian Elite Speech Rhetoric on Per Climate Change Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Threat Category</th>
<th>Impact Category</th>
<th>Climate Change Category</th>
<th>Total Sum of the Usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2.727</td>
<td>1.163</td>
<td>6.418</td>
<td>10.309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Reference Appendix II

This information helps us draw some interesting findings among the sample of elite rhetoric on climate change. The descriptive mean for the usage of threat framing was 2.7, which means that, on average, elites framed climate change as a threat twice in a document. Where the general climate change terminology had a mean of 6.4. Here, a public elite was more than two times more likely to discuss political discourse or mention global policy referencing climate change than discussing it as a threat or challenge. These findings could have to do with Australia's political culture and the structure of the legislative debate. Although climate change is not being framed as a threat, these findings do tell us that climate change was discussed frequently amongst public elites. On average, a political document had the potential to mention climate change roughly ten
times, which should not come as a surprise. This coverage period was at the height of Kyoto, which led to intense domestic and international debates. A list of all the PM speeches and House of Representative Hansards used in this analysis can be found in Appendix II.

Now, the threat framework only received 26% of climate change terminology. However, when it comes to framing climate change as a threat, public officials mainly used the sub-frames challenge, mentioned 48 times, or issue, mentioned 36 times. Although the sub-frame threat was equal in usage compared to the term issue, it is not recognized because it holds many indirect terms, such as national interest. Interestingly, the term challenge was mainly used by the Prime Ministers, mentioning 36 of the 48 times. Observably, Prime Minister Rudd uses the term more than his successor Julia Gillard. In a 2009 speech with the President of Malta, Rudd said, "you choose to be an active participant and fellow contributor with Europe and Australia in dealing with…challenges of climate change" (Rudd 2009 pg. 2). In 2010, when discussing his administrative achievements for his first two years in office, he said one achievement was "by acting on the great intergenerational challenges of climate change and water" (Rudd 2010 pg. 1). Throughout the prime ministerial speeches and interviews they term climate change as not just an Australian problem but a global problem. For example, Gillard, in a 2011 doorstop press interview, states, "we know climate change is real, we know we have to act now, or we will end up putting all of the burdens on the shoulders of future generations" (Gillard 2011 pg. 1). The role of a prime minister is partly to negotiate international treaties, ensure diplomatic ties, and cooperate with other states. They must also sell the public on critical global issues to ensure their state's support. These formal
requirements could explain why climate change is framed as a challenge and is used more times in the context of a global climate change threat. The data shows the term issue was coded more in the parliamentary Hansards 32 of the 26 times. For example, MP Tony Zappia said, "when it comes to the issue of climate change. If you look at their track record on this issue...it changes day by day" (Zappia 2009 pg. 2302). These findings raise a good question about why MPs use certain words in their speech acts, where PMs appear to use another. The term issue is common because MPs are discussing climate change only in the context of Australia and not a global issue, unlike what we saw with the PMs. Why the sharp change in framing? According to the Cambridge Dictionary, the term issue means "a subject or problem that people are thinking and talking about" (Cambridge Dictionary, 2022). Discussion must focus on the components of a task, crisis, or challenge to determine an issue. Now, discussing policy and critical problems of the state is the whole purpose of the legislative branch. This could explain the dramatic shift in framing from the PMs, who address the threat, and the MPs, who must debate the solutions. As the MP Ed Husic claimed, "we are pressed to do something of paramount importance, and that is to tackle the influence of climate change-an issue...they grappled with for years" (Husic 2011 pg. 5297). During data collection, it was also noticed that the framing of an issue seems to appear when tied in the context of domestic policy or followed by political discourse, which could reinforce this analysis.

The second framework category, general climate change, not recorded in Hunt's previous work, was observed the most amongst the climate change terminology. However, political discourse, mentioned 133 times, and policy, mentioned 142 times, are the most commonly used sub-frames amongst observed elites. The policy was discussed
equally amongst MPs and PMs, where expected political discourse would occur in parliamentary sessions. Could the large outputs of debates and policy discussions be an alternative reason Australia complied with the Kyoto Protocol and provide evidence for the null hypothesis? According to Almond and Powell (1966), political culture determines the stability of democracy (Lijphart 1968). Lijphart (1968) goes on further, claiming that the political fragmentation of political systems and culture, as seen in the Westminster system and other continental European parliaments, is the cause of instability. Based on this interpretation of democratic stability, those of a multi-party system is bound to fail to represent and aggregate to create swift and necessary laws. Remember, the purpose of a parliamentary system is the role of the shadow government to check against the ruling party or coalition. This is why debates are more frequent and can lead to courser judgment against those in office, unlike those seen on the floors of the U.S congress. For example, MP Bruce Billson in 2010 claimed, "I do not know how those geniuses in the Rudd Labour government could have done a better job of nobbling small businesses through some kind of action on climate change than by coming up with flawed and friendless ETS" (Billson 2010 pg. 274). Could we see little evidence against Almond and Lijphart that majoritarian democracies are considered inferior, especially if a coalition is needed to form a government? In Australia in 2010, the democracies demonstrated this idea, requiring more people to engage and compromise in decision-making.

With this evidence, we can accept the null hypothesis that an increase in threat framing through elite speech acts did not influence Australia's compliance. As far as we have observed, Australian public elites do not require the framing of climate change as a
threat to potentially impact the state's compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. That being said, is it more that Australian public officials held vigorous and detailed debates and messages on climate change that potentially led to its compliance? Could it have been the serious political debate, governmental checks by the opposition, and observed political structures that created a path for compliance?

Next, we examine public opinion when trying to answer this question. Since the public elected the public elites, it might be possible that public opinion could have influenced what was observed in the general climate change category and helped us better understand Australia's choice of compliance.

Public Opinion

According to the second hypothesis, a state with a higher threat perception and responsibility for climate mitigation through public opinion is more likely to comply with environmental treaty commitments. As observed, Australia had intense parliamentary debates, which could have influenced the passage of domestic environmental legislation. How much of this success could have been influenced by public opinion favoring climate action? In the case of Australia, three national public surveys were analyzed, one from 2009, 2010, and 2011. Each survey description can be found in Appendix I. Each survey recorded 3,000-4,000 participants, which was vital to ensure a valid comparison between the years analyzed. Within these surveys, four variables were selected for analysis: Belief, Concern, Responsibility, and Self-Efficacy. As noted in chapter two, these perception variables were borrowed from Dr. Joseph Reser, Dr. Graham Bradley of Applied Psychology at Griffith University, and their colleagues (Reser, Bradley, Glendon, et al., 2012a; Reser, Bradley, Glendon, et al., 2012b).
They used Belief to see what general knowledge one has regarding climate change. Next, concern was used to measure one's fear and acknowledgment of climate change's impacts. Responsibility was used to measure one's willingness and sense of responsibility regarding climate change solutions. These include paying higher consumer costs. Finally, self-efficacy, different from responsibility, measures one's perception that personal choices and behavior could make a difference and empower others. These specific variables were chosen because they best represent how an individual views climate change as an event and personal risk and threat. Understanding how individuals think about climate change would provide more valuable results when determining national public opinion on climate change. It is easy to say that climate change is a problem, but it is challenging to admit responsibility. Figure 2 provides a cross-annual analysis of the averages for each variable's composite scores, which were created by combining two questions per variable. Each question was recoded on a scale of 1-5. In the public surveys of 2010 and 2011, a score of one relates to a low perception and belief of climate change, whereas a five shows great concern. However, the 2009 survey was based on how the questions were asked. All variables were recoded where a score of one showed high concern and responsibility for climate change, and five showed low support. The scale was reversed for the belief variable.
Through the three years covered in this analysis, public opinion stayed on average towards the middle ground on climate change. Some might say it is based on the recoding scheme, which can be found in Appendix I. The scheme places anyone who answered 'Do not Know' or 'No Opinion' with the neutral category, a code of usually 3 or 3.5. As a result, the recoding scheme could skew averages of composite scores in some questions for the 2010 and 2011 surveys. Although, in some cases, the neutral observations only represent roughly 3 percent of the total population sampled. However, out of 4,347 participants in a survey, that is still around 130 results. However, it has nothing to do with the recoding scheme. Each composite score takes the mean of each participant's answers to the variable's two questions. The finalized score gives us a better understanding of the public's perception of climate change.
understanding of each person’s beliefs based on weighing each choice. Let us dive deeper into understanding what each variable tells about public opinion of climate change.

We will start by taking a look at the belief variable. In 2010 close to 46 percent of Australians claimed that climate change was partly caused by natural processes and humans, coded as a 3 (Reser, Bradley, Glendon, et al., 2012a pg. 239). Nevertheless, the same participants claimed that climate change is already being felt by 54 percent, coded as a 5 (Reser, Bradley, Glendon, et al., 2012a pg. 241). When we combine those two answers, it provides us with a 3.5. Australians believe in climate change but must be more aware of its origins. If we look at Figure 2, 2009 and 2011 show similar trends. Although 2009 phrased one statement differently, "Climate change is not happening," where a large majority of 64 percent disagreed to strongly disagreed (Sweeney Research 2009 pg.7). This confirms that from 2009 to 2011, most Australians sampled believed climate change is happening as we speak and is real. However, many were unsure of its origins but did admit that humans are partially to blame.

Next, we will look at the variable of concern. According to City Futures Climate Change Survey, about 76 percent of Australians sampled strongly disagree to disagree that climate change "is not worth worrying about now" (Sweeney Research 2009 pg.7). Similarly, about 26 percent of Australians sampled by NCCARF in 2010 are very concerned about general societal impacts by climate change, where almost 43 percent are fairly concerned (Reser, Bradley, Glendon, et al., 2012a pg. 243). These observations provide that almost 69 percent of those sampled are generally concerned about the impacts of climate change on their state. In 2011, observed was a 5-point drop from 2010, but still, a majority hold on that climate change is a concern. In Figure 2, these trends are...
reinforced. From 2009-2010 the average concern about climate change ranges close to 4, which means Australians are fairly concerned about the essence of climate change. It is a concern they do not only see impacting their society and state but also them personally.

In 2011, the composite average dropped closer to 3, but the 'Do not Know' and 'No Opinion' increased by about half to one percentage point, but there is still a fairly concerned range. Issues play a larger role when we finally see them through an objective lens, which makes one feel more vulnerable. Just think how one feels in Sydney due to increasing floods compared to someone living in Melbourne.

Our next variable is that of one's sense of responsibility when it comes to thinking of climate change. Are Australians willing to make personal sacrifices, such as wealth, to decrease their carbon footprint and help influence others? Though Australians claim responsibility for tackling climate change, only some are willing to take necessary action. According to Figure 2, in 2009, Australians sampled tended to help tackle climate change as long as it did not cost much monetarily. For example, when asked if one would reduce their impact on the environment "only if it does not cost me any money," about 20 percent agreed, whereas 29 percent was neutral (Sweeney Research 2009 pg. 7). This neutrality trend tends to continue into 2010 and 2011. NCCARF in 2010 asked, "are you prepared to greatly reduce one's energy use to help tackle climate change" where 64 percent agreed to strongly agree (Reser, Bradley, Glendon, et al., 2012a pg. 244). Similar was the data for 2011, but for each survey, the range changed when money came into question. About 54 percent of respondents chose to disagree to strongly disagree (Reser, Bradley, Glendon, et al., 2012b pg. 183). However, these surveys only looked at
monetary action, which is not a good representation of opinions on the willingness to act through organizations, protests, and legislation.

Finally, we look at how Australians view climate change through the lens of self-efficacy. People not only feel a responsibility to tackle climate change but also believe that their personal choices and behaviors can make a difference. It is the difference between objective thinking and more of a psychological drive and mindset. Just because there is commitment; does not mean there is drive. An example of this objective thinking and psychological drive is a willingness to pay 5 percent more in taxes to enhance greener technology, compared to the belief that specific actions can make a dent in the issue of climate change. In 2009, the composite score average was around 3.5, which means that amongst those sampled, self-efficacy towards climate change appears high, but there appears to be some doubt in its effectiveness. Participants were asked, "I do not believe that changing my behaviour and everyday lifestyle can make a difference" around 61 percent disagreed (Sweeney Research 2009 pg.7). Whereas when asked no matter what one does, climate change is unstoppable around a quarter went neutral and about 38 percent agreed. The pattern is also seen between respondents in 2010 and 2011. Most respondents agreed when asked if they can "personally help reduce climate change by changing their behaviour" (Reser, Bradley, Glendon, et al., 2012a pg. 241; Reser, Bradley, Glendon, et al., 2012b pg. 179). When the second question was phrased about their drive for combating climate change, there was a decrease between 14-15 percentage points of those that agreed. There is a stable yearly trend amongst Australians where they believe they can help reduce the impact of climate change. At the same time, many Australians believe that just their actions cannot make a large enough difference. To
many, climate change is an unstoppable force. Despite not being measured, it is also possible that people think this issue requires more than just them to combat this, which might also dampen their drive.

After analyzing the four public opinion variables throughout three years, where does this leave our main question? First, a majority of Australians appear to believe in climate change and that it is partly human-created. Second, many appear to share a concern for climate change and its impact not only on their state but also on them personally. Third, public opinion was high towards the felt responsibility to act on climate change, but many shied from monetary sacrifices. Finally, Australians believe they can help make a difference in combating climate change through behavioral changes.

Conversely, public opinion tends to decrease when faced with the belief that one person can make a change. Through this analysis, there is clear evidence that Australian public opinion during 2009-2011 viewed climate change as a concerning threat and showed a willingness to act. Therefore, it is accepted that public opinion influences Australia's compliance. Accepting this hypothesis can also provide an alternative explanation of hypothesis one and a closer tie to the observed usage of climate change in policy and political discourse framing.

State Capacity

The purpose of testing for state capacity is to test the validity of the Managerial school of compliance. Remember, Chayes and Chayes believe that noncompliance is not based on fear of cheating but on things outside the state's control. Temporal dimensions like pandemics, economic recessions, natural disasters, and external or internal conflict
can easily shift a state's capacity. Herein is the reasoning for testing the third hypothesis, where states that cannot effectively implement environmental domestic policy change are more likely to violate their commitments under the environmental treaty. This reasoning was an important variable because, between 2009 and 2011, Australia was in the midst of the global recession of 2008. This economic downturn could easily decrease Australia's capacity to uphold its treaty commitments while ensuring economic recovery. As noted in chapter two, the FSI score was used to measure Australia's state capacity. It is a score that is created by combining the scores of each category: Cohesion, Economics, Political, Social, and External. Now, each category score is made up of multiple subcategories.

Table 5 shows the cross-annual data for the aggregated FSI score for Australia, the state's scores by subcategory, and the descriptive stats. Remember, each subcategory is ranked from a 0-10 scale, which means the aggregated FSI score is 0-120.

**Table 5 Australia’s Fragile State Index Score by Subcategory, 2009-2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cohesion</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Crosscut</th>
<th>Aggregate FSI Score</th>
<th>Stats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C1</td>
<td>C2</td>
<td>C3</td>
<td>E1</td>
<td>E2</td>
<td>E3</td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fragile State Index Global Data- FSI 2009-11, 2022

According to this data set, it is clear that the state capacity of Australia, as measured by Fragile State Index, increases every year. Remember, an increase in FSI scores means a loss of stability for the designated state. Table 5 shows three criteria that saw an overall increase of .5 or higher. These measures include Security Apparatus (C1), Human Flight and Brain Drain (E3), and Refugees and IDPs (S2) (Fragile State Index...
and CAST Framework Methodology, 2017). Australia also appeared to decrease in Public Services, State Legitimacy, and others.

Australia is in the heart of the pacific theater and can be impacted by many external threats, such as China and North Korea, but it is also not immune from internal events. C1 considers citizens' perceived trust in their domestic security and the state's ability to provide (Fragile State Index and CAST Framework Methodology, 2017). When looking through recorded crime rates, from homicide to car theft, there appeared to be no massive increase that might explain a hike in distrust. One of the major crimes that increased was Assault, only in the Northern Territories, where it increased by about 100 offenses from 2009 but then went back down by 2011 (ABS 2020). Another explanation could be that of terrorism. According to the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, Australian agencies foiled a terror attack in 2009, which was planned for a military base in Sydney (Zammit 2012). To many, the knowledge of terror cells present in the country can create mass fear. A few unstable states, such as Burma and North Korea, surround Australia. In 2009, North Korea tested a nuclear blast along with missile tests. This testing could impact state security measures, as North Korea is only about 5,000 miles from the continental island.

Every state must deal with immigration and emigration, and Australia is no exception. E3 considers the number of people leaving one's state for economic and political reasons (Fragile State Index and CAST Framework Methodology, 2017). According to the Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship, there was a decrease in Australia's Net Overseas Migration, which dropped by 13% from 200-2010 to 2010-2011 (ABS 2012b). Australia's population did suffer, as migration did not make up
for those emigrating. However, were these departures for a better life or other less critical reasons? In 2009-2010, most of the departures from Australia were only temporary visas and not permanent, which only comprised around 3 percent (ABS 2012b). Though this period was challenging for everyone economically, the stats do not help bring an apparent reason for the decrease in the E3 score. This data does not mean that the global recession did not cause temporary departures. People may have gone to find temporary jobs elsewhere while the economy settled, but most states were feeling the pain.

One of the increasing problems facing our world is the massive refugee crisis. Many people get displaced based on internal conflicts in their home state or by warcraft. We see the effects of the latter since Russia invaded Ukraine and the former at the start of the Syrian war. The upcoming climate change issue will increase this problem, which can be tied to the Syrian crisis. Though, how do Australians view immigration? Their S2 score shows Australians have a lower credible track record with refugees and displaced people (Fragile State Index and CAST Framework Methodology, 2017). According to a 2010 ANU Poll, around 16 percent of Australians polled want population increases through immigration (McAllister, Martin, Pietsch 2010). In addition, refugees are seen as less desirable than skilled labor if immigration was to take place (McAllister, Martin, Pietsch 2010). The data provides a reality of a state that is not too keen on immigration, much like the United States. Although, despite public opinion, can Australia handle possible influxes of refugees? According to a Scanlon Foundation Survey in 2010, around 62 percent of polled Australians claimed that the government has a poor record for improving infrastructure needed for population growth (Markus 2014). It is not only that it appears that Australians are not fans of immigration, especially refugees, but the
government commits little effort to increase the needed infrastructure. For these reasons Australia possibly increased by .6 points for the S2 category.

The analysis of Australia's increasing FSI score through 2009-2011 brings some interesting points when looking at its potential to influence state compliance. Despite state capacity decreasing, most of the highly impacted measures do not reflect that government failure. What this decrease does reflect is the impact of the global recession. Economic global collapse spreads fear, distrust, and for some, a reason to leave. These effects can be shown through the increased emigration of Australian professionals between 2009-2011 based on governmental data. How can the recession cause state security threats? Fear can easily lead to distrust of not only corporations and politicians but also of the future. Hardships increase crime, where we saw little evidence leading to increased assault incidents. Though, hardships and increased international threats such as nuclear weapons can make one feel that their state is more vulnerable than before. All this evidence helps us accept the null hypothesis, which will help shed some light on rejecting the managerial school of compliance in the case of Australia. With a decrease in state capacity and impacted by economic hardships, the state still managed to comply with its Kyoto commitments.

*Economic Development*

The enforcement school of compliance is based on state survival and rationalism. States will not comply with international treaties for fear of cheating and through the logic of relative gains. They push for more robust and stringent penalties for free riders. To realists, economic survival should take precedence over mere environmental problems. All this leads to the test of the fourth hypothesis, which claims that states with
higher economic development are more likely to comply with their environmental treaty commitments. Remember, the essence of this hypothesis is to test the potential validity of the enforcement school when it comes to its nationalist roots. Much like hypothesis three, it is essential to look into this because of the temporal dimension of the Great Recession. Now, economic development was observed by recording Australia's Real Gross National Income from the Bureau of Statistics and recorded in Table 6. GNI considers all funds from a state's nationals and businesses at home and abroad, which is why foreign aid is counted where it is outside of GDP. Given the economic crisis, one would expect economic development to decrease, but the data shows another picture. Australia significantly increased its wealth despite the global crisis. From 2009-2010, Australia's wealth increased by almost 30 billion dollars, but it only doubled by half that by 2011, roughly 18 billion.

**Table 6 Australia’s Gross National Income by Year, 2009-2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GNI ($m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>296,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>327,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>345,963</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This data demonstrates that Australia was not in financial trouble when domestic environmental legislation was discussed or passed. It was ultimately the opposite. According to the Reserve Bank of Australia, despite slightly slowed growth and increased unemployment, the overall economy was not damaged (RBA 2022). It could help that Australia relies heavily on exports, and one of its trading partners is China, which did not get significantly impacted by the Great Recession. The government also pushed a comprehensive expansionary fiscal policy by guaranteeing deposits and bonds
during the crash (RBA 2022). Not only did the government push for an increase in economic spending, but they also pushed for environmental legislation. According to a rationalist, environmental concerns should not have been cut during the crisis. A state scrambling for economic stability still made time for climate change debates. Some could say it could be a different story if they were impacted much like Europe and the U.S. However, the evidence gears to rejection when it comes to accepting or rejecting the null hypothesis. Therefore, based on the data observed and analyzed, the enforcement school's hypothesis holds ground in Australia's case.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter presented a picture of Australia’s government and environmental past, followed by empirical evidence to help draw connections between Australia’s elite rhetoric, public opinion, state capacity, and economic development to their compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. Regarding Australian elite speech rhetoric, only 26% of climate change framing was via threat, but general climate change, especially political discourse, was almost triple. Public opinion shows a different story, where most Australians during 2009-2011 viewed climate change as a concerning threat and showed a willingness to act. Yet, as the surveys show, this willingness was reduced as monetary sacrifices were in question. Regarding state capacity, the aggregate FSI score continued to increase, which meant that state capacity decreased—demonstrated not through the physical failure of the government but more by temporal events such as the Great Recession, North Korean nuclear threats, and domestic resentment of immigration. Finally, through this decrease in capacity and the recession, Australia appeared to experience economic growth, as its GNI
continued to increase between 2009-2011. In short, state capacity and speech rhetoric apparently had little influence on Australia’s compliance.

On the other hand, a positive public opinion on climate change perception and economic growth could hold some answers. This is why a qualitative analysis is required to help provide a deeper context into the data. Australia’s government is structured under the Constitutional Monarchy and Westminster style. The people directly elect the parliament, unlike the Prime Minster, which his party appoints. In Australia, the monarch has no legal authority, whose powers shifted to that of the Prime Minister through legal conventions. As seen above, this can lead to political partisanship and a democratic deficit regarding public service selection in the executive branch. The government is the number one proposer of Bills regarding the Legislative Process. With the largest party in the House, directly elected Senate, and partisan ministerial bureaucrats, one could see why it would be easy or hard for a government to pass climate legislation. This appears reinforced by its environmental past. Despite seeing significant wins for land and ocean conservation through massive public protests. Not all policies are intended to change, but only to put a fake Band-Aid on the public demand. For example, during the years of the Kyoto Protocol, Australia passed three significant climate change Acts. The main of these, The Clean Energy Act of 2011, taxed corporations for their carbon emission outputs. As soon as the House shifted parties, the Act was appealed in 2014. One can see how governmental structure, bureaucracy, and an environmental past could provide a closer look at how the data observed relates to compliance.
Chapter 5

Case Two: Canada

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a similar structure and purpose to the previous Australia case chapter. It will present and discuss the research findings for the case of Canada. The first section takes a deep dive into the structure of the Canadian government. Knowing the structure of the government helps paint a picture of how public officials are elected. It also helps understand the creation of domestic legislation and the main actors involved. One essential addition is that one will see slight differences between the governmental structures of the two cases. Here, the reader can see just how vital this information is, making connections between legislation and state compliance with Kyoto—followed by an explanation of how the Canadian bureaucratic system works. Understanding this system helps one see who controls legislation but also allows an opening for the null hypotheses. Next, the section on Canada’s environmental movement is discussed to help understand the history of environmental legislation and public perceptions and actions toward climate change. Has the Canadian public always been concerned about climate change, or have previous protests influenced legislation? History is necessary to provide context on the public opinion perceptions observed and how it relates to the lack of climate legislation. Finally, the last two sections present the research findings for the dependent and independent variables, like in the last chapter. First, based on observed
data, these sections inform us if Canada complied with the Kyoto Protocol based on the two criteria set up in chapter two. Second, it provides all the empirical evidence about Canada’s speech rhetoric, public opinion, state capacity, and economic development between 2099 and 2011. After this chapter, one can start conducting a comparative analysis between the two cases.

5.2 Governmental Structure

When it comes to Canada's system of government, it shares many similarities with its western Australian ally. It, too, consists of a constitutional monarchy. Much like in Australia, the main power is within the three formal branches of government, the legislative, the executive, and the judicial. The Monarch is mainly a formality and holds no real power, nor do her representatives. Canada, also formally known as the Dominion of Canada, is a commonwealth of the United Kingdom (U.K.) due to its close political and historical ties. However, much like Australia, it chooses to keep its historic British ties and is not directly tied to the British Parliament. Canada similarly adopted the Westminster system of government. Through the Constitutional Act of 1867, the original British Canadian Provinces united to form a federation. However, most powers were left in the hands of the sovereign or her appointed commonwealth governor-general (A Consolidation of The Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982, 2021). Like many other British commonwealths, the sovereign of Canada is King Charles the II of the U.K. In reality, Canada's governmental system is designed similarly to Australia and the U.K., where conventions than written constitutional law drive it. Conventions are traditions and accepted rules of practice or unwritten laws. Despite Canada's system of government, it is still considered a representative democracy and a federation. Today, the Dominion of
Canada is divided into ten provinces and three official territories. Unlike its southern neighbor, the Canadian capital is located within a Province, Ontario, and is not a separate entity. As of January 2000, The City of Ottawa was created, which dissolved all previous lower municipalities and established Ottawa as a single-tier municipality that does not have county or regional municipal governments below or above it (City of Ottawa Act 1999, 2021). Think of it as an independent city but still under the authority of the provincial government. As the Canadian governmental structure is similar to Australia's, the rest of this section will highlight the main structural differences in Canada. This will be highlighted through Canada's Constitution, the process and structure of Canada's executive and legislative branches, bureaucratic structure, and legislation creation. The Canadian judicial system is outside the scope of this study, so, therefore, this will only skim this topic.

Constitutional Differences

Much like the United Kingdom and Australia, Canada has a written constitution but is mainly governed by conventions. Many of these conventions are about the transition of power from the Monarch to an elective parliamentary assembly. Despite being a Westminster-style government, there are some distinct differences between these two case studies. The following subsections will discuss the differences between the legislative branch and the legislative process. However, one of the main differences in Canada's Constitution is the inclusion of a Bill of Rights. Originally when the Dominion of Canada was formed in 1867, the state was still under close control of the British Crown and Parliament. From another perspective, until 1926, the autonomy of the Dominion of Canada was not a practice. However, this change came from a Monarch's
letter of Patent in 1947 and not a constitutional amendment (House of Commons Canada, 2017a). It was officially in 1982 that the Canadian government passed the Constitutional Act of 1982, which enshrined the protection of individual rights for all Canadians, citizens and permanent residents, and Indigenous peoples (Government of Canada 2022a). This is one area in which Canada did not live up to Westminster tradition but could be seen as greatly influenced by that of the United States. The Charter of Rights and Freedoms was an amendment, like the U.S. Bill of Rights, which laid the groundwork for all future legislation for the Dominion of Canada.

In contrast, as we learned in the previous chapter, individual rights are not directly inscribed in Australia's Constitution. Individual rights in Australia are more indirect and through conventions. The Australian Constitution has never been amended, but those amendments were based on governmental procedures (Australian Parliamentary Education Office, Australian Government Solicitor, 2020). Here we can see how Canada is blending governmental overwatch and the Westminster style of government. For Australia, we saw this in its choice of directly electing its Senate chamber, which appears far more representative and transparent than that of Canada, as we will soon see below.

**Legislative Structure**

The Canadian legislative branch consists of a two-chamber parliamentary system. The upper House is the Senate, whereas the lower House is the House of Commons. Each chamber has the responsibility for the legislation process. Much like in Australia, the Senate is restricted in its ability to introduce, create, and amend proposed appropriation bills or impose taxation (House of Commons Canada, 2017a). Direct financial decisions that will greatly impact the lives of Canadians should be left to the House of Commons.
One large difference between Canada and Australia is that the people do not elect Canada's upper House directly.

According to the original Constitution Act of 1867, "the Senate shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, consist of Seventy-two Members, who shall be styled Senators" (A Consolidation of The Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982, 2021 pg. 71). This was to ensure equal representation, but also did not originally state that territories required any representation. One could see how this completely misrepresented the indigenous populations of Canada. Despite the recent passage of the Canadian Rights of Freedom. It was only in multiple constitutional amendments, the latest in 1999, that the configuration of the Senate changed (A Consolidation of The Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982, 2021 pg. 71). Today, the Senate seats 105 senators. The current representation is as follows, where each division, which is a group of provinces except for Ontario and Quebec, is represented by twenty-four senators each, Newfoundland is represented by six, and one from each territory (Forsey 2022 pg. 33). Now much like the U.K.'s House of Lords, the Canadian Senate is not elected but appointed by the Governor General through the advice of his council. Different from Australia's Senate, which is directly elected via the proportional representation (P.R.) method. Some might see this as an undemocratic representation and put way too much power into the hands of the executive. Remember, the PM represents the largest party directly elected to the House of Commons, a tradition in many Westminster-style governments. In other words, the appointments of the Senate can be democratic, but that is not to say there is no room for political patronage and partisan arguments. Now, Senators do serve a near lifetime sentence, which is until the age of 75 or until their seat becomes vacant (Forsey 2022 pg.
33). This can ensure that as Canada's government changes, the Senate is not directly impacted by the possible political instability of the House. This also ensures that the Senate is diverse from appointments of multiple previous governments, which are not worried about reelection and can focus on the matter. One argument could be made that this system does not allow for new ideas and changing society. There is some truth to this. Consider this from an environmental policy standpoint if a Senator was appointed and believed in environmental protection and conservation. They could share their expertise and ensure environmental protection is accounted for despite the continuous political changes in the House. That way, Canadians who still care about the environment, who might lose seats in the House, are continuously represented in the Senate. This method not only allows to eliminate the possibility of misrepresentation but also helps eliminate a polarized Senate, much like we see in the current U.S. Senate. No system is perfect, but each has its pros and cons.

The House of Commons, like Australia, is the largest chamber of the two. Much like the U.S., its membership is based on population districts. Currently, there are 338 districts within the commonwealth, resulting in 338 House M.P.s serving five years terms. The makeup of the House is done by dividing the population of each province or territory by 111,116, which is the national electoral quotient determined by the 2011 census (The Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982, 2021 pg. 11). This is why the Northwest Territories increased their representation from one to two M.P.s. The Constitution does not allow any state, regardless of the population, to go below its predetermined quotient as prescribed in the Constitution Act (The Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982, 2021). When it comes to the election of House M.P.s, a first-past-the-post voting system is used
(House of Commons Canada, 2017c). The process is different from Australia's because the vote only counts for one candidate and is not based on one's voting preferences. Like the U.S. electoral system, the M.P., who receives the plurality of the votes in a district, returns to the House. Australia's House M.P.s must receive more than 50% of the vote, but voters' choices are restructured based on candidate-received thresholds. In Canada, similar to Australia, when the society directly elects the House, they indirectly elect the executive. The House of Representatives is the key body that creates the Canadian governmental structure. These are just one of the many conventions within many states that uphold a Westminster law style.

**Executive Structure**

The Canadian executive branch operates much more differently than what is inscribed in the Constitution of the Dominion of Canada. The original text proclaims its power in two important sections,

*Section 9:* “The Executive Government and Authority of and over Canada is hereby declared to continue and be vested in the Queen”

*Section 12:* “All Powers, Authorities, and Functions which under any Act of the Parliament of Great Britain, or of the Parliament of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, or of the Legislature of Upper Canada, Lower Canada, Canada, Nova Scotia, or New Brunswick, are at the Union vested in or exerciseable by the respective Governors or Lieutenant Governors of those Provinces, with the Advice, or with the Advice and Consent, of the respective Executive Councils thereof…” *(The Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982, 2021 pg. 2-3).*

In reality, the Queen has no power within the operations of the government except the informal appointing of the Governor-General. However, the Governor-General also has no formal role in the current executive system but functions more strategically. The true power of the Executive branch lies with the Canadian Prime Minister (PM) and his
cabinets, like the UK and Australia. These roles are not mentioned in the Canadian Constitution but gain responsibility from its wordings, much like we saw in interpreting Australia’s constitutional text. By convention, the PM is elected from the largest party or the major party in a coalition, which holds the House of Commons. In Canada, the PM has been from one of four parties: the Conservative Party of Canada, The Liberal Party of Canada, the Bloc Québécois, or the New Democratic Party. These four parties are currently the largest in Canada.

The Canadian PM has many responsibilities: appointing and dismissing Ministers, acting indirectly as Commander in chief, initiating government expenditure by recommending appropriations, and ensuring party policies are represented in legislation. However, their most important responsibility is to maintain confidence within their cabinet and the House of Commons. This is at the core of Canada’s governmental system, known as “Responsible Governmental Practice and Ministerial Responsibility” (House of Commons Canada, 2017a). Without the support of the people through their elected officials, the PM has limited powers. First, the PM must appoint his or her Ministers, which lead the multiple governmental ministries. These Ministers are in charge of pushing the PM’s policy and proposing Bills in their respective fields. Unlike in Australia, no formal legislation determines the number of cabinet ministers. However, according to Eugene Forsey (2022), it is by convention that each province must have one cabinet minister, and usually, Ontario and Quebec have ten each. A P.M. can appoint, dismiss, promote, and demote Ministers depending on loyalty and job performance. However, that will be discussed further in the following sub-section regarding bureaucratic politics.
The Canadian government, like Australia, requires a shadow government to question the current ministry on its transparency. The shadow government or opposition would be the group in government if their party won the majority of the House. This could likely happen come upcoming elections. The opposition has the same setup as the government; it has a leader (PM), Ministers, whips, and backbenchers. It checks the government through public chamber debates, questioning and poking holes in government policy and legislation, and provides the people with an alternative governmental option (House of Commons Canada, 2017a). This way, the people of Canada can see both sides of policy issues and change votes next election. Lastly, the primary check to the Prime Minister’s power is by the Governor-General. The Governor-General can dissolve the House, but mainly on the advice of P.M. However, the Governor-General can deny this request in exceptional circumstances, such as the PM is of a minority party or the new parliament has not met yet (Forsey 2022). Despite the interconnectedness of the legislative and executive branches, some proper checks and balances uphold the measure of democracy. Some may even say the close connection these branches have genuinely made a government responsible to the people of Canada.

**The Legislative Process**

The Constitution Act of 1867 set up Canada as a federation of four provinces originally under the Dominion of Canada. It was not until legislative Acts, such as The Yukon Territory Act, the Constitution Act of 1867, and The Newfoundland Act, that Canada now has ten provinces and three territories (The Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982, 2021 pg. 2-3). Throughout this subsection, when referenced, the Dominion will be a reference to the Parliament and Government of Canada. Being a federation, legislative
power is shared between the Dominion and the Provinces. The Constitution of Canada identifies what legislative powers should be given to the provincial governments.

“Section 92: In each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say,
2. Direct Taxation within the Province in order to the raising of a Revenue for Provincial Purposes.
3. The borrowing of Money on the sole Credit of the Province.
4. The Establishment and Tenure of Provincial Offices and the Appointment and Payment of Provincial Officers.
5. The Management and Sale of the Public Lands belonging to the Province and of the Timber and Wood thereon.
Including
And
Section 93: In and for each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Education, subject and according to the following Provisions...”

Much like in Australia and the U.S., the provinces hold more power regarding legislation unless said legislation violates a law of the Dominion. What does this mean when it comes to environmental legislation? Recall from the previous chapter that, in Australia, there is no mention of permitting the Commonwealth to create legislation on environmental matters. The area of the environment is technically up to the state governments to regulate. However, the Constitution Act of 1867 does give the Dominion the right to legislate on the matter of Fisheries, where Provinces have designated the right to legislate on the sale and management of public lands and timber within the province (The Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982, 2021 pg. 20-24). The Dominion does not have the power to technically legislate the use of public lands that belong to a Province. For example, the Constitution Act of 1867 claims that,
“Section: 92A (1) In each province, the legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to

- (a) exploration for non-renewable natural resources in the province;
- (b) development, conservation and management of non-renewable natural resources and forestry resources in the province, including laws in relation to the rate of primary production therefrom; and
- (c) development, conservation and management of sites and facilities in the province for the generation and production of electrical energy.” (The Constitution Acts 1867 to 1982, 2021 pg. 23-24).

A Province can exploit their resources as they see fit. So, if Alberta wants to extract oil from their sand deposits, the Dominion according to the constitution, could not deny said action. But what if those exploits are not just damaging to the Province but the entire Dominion at large? What happens when the health of Canadians is impacted? What can the Dominion do about it? According to the Government of Canada’s website, there have been multiple Supreme Court rulings that have increased the Dominion’s power to legislate the environment based on its constitutional powers (Government of Canada 2022b). First, in the case R. v. Hydro-Québec the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that,

“The protection of the environment, through prohibitions against toxic substances, constitutes a wholly legitimate public objective in the exercise of the criminal law power. Protection of the environment is an international problem that requires action by governments at all levels” (R. v. Hydro-Québec, 24652 AG of Quebec 213, 1997).

The Dominion can make dumping of certain chemicals and substances illegal through their power of Criminal Law creation. They are not legislating on environmental protection in general, but they are making a cause of destruction a punishable offense. Finally, in the case R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd. the Courts ruled that,
“Section 4(1) of the Ocean Dumping Control Act, however, is constitutionally valid as enacted in relation to a matter falling within the national concern doctrine of the peace, order and good government power of the Parliament of Canada. The national concern doctrine, which is separate and distinct from the national emergency doctrine, applies to both new matters which did not exist at Confederation and to matters which, although originally matters of a local or private nature in a province, have since, in the absence of national emergency, become matters of national concern” (R. v. Crown Zellerback Canada Ltd, 18526 AG of Quebec and AG of British Columbia 401, 1988).

The Justices claimed that environmental protection is justified under the title of national concern through the Peace, order, and Good Government power prescribed to the Parliament of the Dominion. This would make sense in terms of air, ground, or water pollution. What one Province does can impact that of the other through indirect means. So, in this case, one can see the allowance of environmental protection not as a means of conservation but in the best interest of protecting Canadians and their health.

For the areas of legislation and protection given to the Dominion, bills must pass both the House and the Senate before becoming Acts. The constitution gives both chambers similar legislation procedures, except in appropriations and taxation, which the Senate cannot create or directly amend (House of Commons 2017a). Much like in Australia, both Canadian chambers have mainly equal weight. However, before a bill can go through the legislative process, it must be drafted and introduced. Any member of parliament can propose a bill, but it is usually the government, through its cabinet Ministers, that introduces the majority of bills into the House; any MP can propose, however, private members’ or senators’ bills in any chamber (House of Commons 2017d). Now any bill proposed by the government must go through its approval process. For a bill to become an Act of Parliament, it must go through several stages in each chamber, as shown in Figure 3. First, it must be agreed to by the PM and Cabinet; next, it must be drafted by the Minister and their
department, then it should pass a party committee before presenting it before the House (House of Commons 2017d).

Figure 3 The Legislative Process of the Canadian Government

When it comes to the legislative process in Canada, it shares many similarities with the processes seen in the Australian case chapter. For this reason, the main differences will be highlighted when comparing the two states’ procedures.

The first main difference that one can see in the Canadian legislative procedure is regarding the committee stage. If one recalls, in Australia, a Bill goes from second reading to consider in detail. According to Figure 3, Canada replaces consideration of detail with what is known as the Committee Stage. In this stage, all bills, after the second reading, are referred to a House Committee, which specializes in the subject of the bill (House of Commons 2017d). Where Australia allows bills to be mainly amended at the MP level, Canada prefers amendments from the specialized committee. This process makes sense on an epistemic level but can be indirectly eliminating the public's voice on a particular bill's main amendments. This is where experts and different organizations can speak on behalf of or against the proposed bill based on their expertise in the field of concern. When it comes to environmental policy, this required stage can help because it ensures the voices of the scientific community and even local community leaders, unlike the stages of the Australian process, which leave the committee review as an alternative option, which silences much-needed external advice. When in committee, the bill is looked over clause by clause, and information is gathered, such as through hearings, and interpreted, then the information is turned into a report and sent back to the House (House of Commons 2017d). Next, Canada adds a new stage to the process known as the Report Stage, which combines areas of the Australian Consideration of Detail stage in terms of the MP debate. At this stage, MPs can propose debates based on the committee report before the next sitting day (House of Commons 2017d). However, the main distinction
between these two case studies is that the Speaker of the House in Canada can decide which bill amendments to debate during the reporting stage (House of Commons 2017d). At first glance, this sounds like way too much power. But the Speaker does not make these choices based on partisanship and bias. Instead, they make the selections based on the bill as a whole and the admissibility of the amendments (House of Commons 2017d). After the reporting stage debate, the bill goes into its third reading, which is when the House votes on its passage. Once the bill passes the House, it moves to the Senate, which has a similar stage to that of the House. If the bill is lucky enough, it will not return to the House and get passed by the Senate. Once both chambers of Parliament pass the bill, it is sent to the Governor-General for their royal assent, where the bill becomes an Act of Parliament. Now that one understands the legislative process, what about the process that happens behind closed doors? Canada, like Australia, has a vast network of bureaucracy which starts with Public Service. The following subsection aims to highlight the workings of these agents and investigate just how influential they are on proposed governmental legislation.

*Bureaucratic Involvement*

Canada’s bureaucratic system is much like that of Australia. Prime Ministers elect cabinet members, who must be elected MPs. The appointment of these ministers can usually be a political move. Ministers can be those the PM owes favors to or can be a political ally to help push specific legislation through Parliament. In addition, the PM decides how many departments are necessary to have but must stay within a specific convention limit. This leads us to those that help create and influence policy through research and policy interpretations, which are sent to the higher levels of the appropriate
departments. In Canada, public service has a set of core values that make them different from the political realm. These core values consist of merit, excellence, non-partisanship, and representativeness (Government of Canada PSC Legislation 2007). Public service agents are expected to be held to higher standards and to serve the interest of Canada as a whole and not just the government at the time. In 2003, the Public Service Employment Act was created to ensure the independence of the Public Service, which leaves the independent agency the sole power to hire and fire public service members (Public Service Employment Act 2003, 2021). Political partisanship and corruption have very little influence on the choices of the bureaucrats below those of ministerial staff. This enforces and ensures that all levels of public servants, from seniors to entry-level, should be free from the constant shift of governmental politics. In Canada, the Parliamentary Secretary cannot pick and choose those public services they prefer based on political motives, which is not the case in Australia. Could this structure decrease the democratic deficit and negative impacts of bureaucratic politics? Or is politicization something no one can escape from?

Research shows us that despite the independence of the PSC in Canada, politicization still plagues policymakers and analysts. According to Wellstead and Stedman (2010 pg. 896), "the politicization of policy has been fostered by the increasingly decentralized policy-making process. As a result, policymakers have increasingly rationalized policy decisions based on political and ideological preferences rather than formal analysis." Politicians never want to play the long game, which can be clear regarding climate change action. This short game requires policy to be completed fast, which gives little time for proper non-partisan analysis of issues and solutions. The
purpose of bureaucrats is not only to get policy passed but also to ensure that specific departments have more success than others (Desrosiers and Lagassé 2009). Instead, what is created is a policy that will gain acceptance and rapid passage based on the ruling party's leading political ideology. Remember, the leading party has control of the House of Commons and the Executive and rolls out the majority of proposed bills. Wellstead and Stedman (2010) even looked if regional-focused street-level bureaucrats influence the policy capacity of departments because they are more integrated into the communities. However, their hypothesis was rejected, which shows that even locality expertise in decision-making cannot win against the increasing politicization. What does this mean for environmental policy in Canada? According to this research, environmental policies could be ignored because they could be deemed unnecessary or provide a short-term result. Perhaps the following section will help shed some light on Canada's possible success in environmental protection.

5.3 Environmental Movement

From the 1960s to the 1990s, Canada was experiencing the same global modern environmental movement gripping Australia. Students and young activists worldwide appeared to have had enough of the continuous air pollution, land degradation, and nuclear destruction. Like it did for many states, this movement brewing inside Canada would push it to be an example of environmental conservation and protection. As recognized in Chapter Two, countless states formed the Montreal Protocol after increasing domestic and international pressure to ensure environmental protection for public health. However, just like McBride (2021) discussed, this movement made the creation of Green Parties possible, which shifted environmental protection from
epistemic communities and NGOs to the realm of politics. It was politicization that pushed Canada not only into signing but also ratified the Kyoto Protocol. For this reason, investigating the emergence and path of Canada's environmental movement could help answer questions regarding public opinion, elite beliefs, and rhetoric, as well as overall compliance with the Kyoto Protocol.

As the environmental movement swept through the Dominion of Canada, it impacted the provinces in different ways and even at different periods. Canada has always been known for its natural resources, such as mining, oil, and lumber. This explains why their exploitation and protection were enshrined in their constitution at the Dominion's birth. The constant exploitation of the mining and industrial sector pushed the province of British Columbia to be one of the first to fight environmental issues. According to Lee Thiessen (2017), in 1952, with the birth of the Air Pollution Control Society (APCS), the city of Vancouver started to bring light to the destruction caused by air pollution. Remember, what appears to drive environmental protection is the impact on not only health but of the local and even national economies. This exactly occurred in British Columbia as interest groups lobbied the government. Thiessen (2017) said, "the interests of industries and businesses highly dependent on local economic conditions and those with a broader market diverged on air pollution." What has stayed the same is British Columbia's heavy resilience in its tourism sector as well as its aquatic life. Therefore, it is not surprising that the environmental movement started so early in this province. As the movement increased throughout the decades, it is not surprising that Vancouver was the birthplace of one of the most important international environmental groups known as Greenpeace in 1971. The 1970s also was when the environmental
movement finally hit a province in eastern Canada. According to Jane Barr (1995), Quebec saw a growing resistance to the dominant culture of fossil fuels and needless environmental desecration through the 70s and 80s. The dominant culture was one of neoliberalism, which still impairs environmental progress today. It is a culture based on increased profit-making and hyper-consumerism.

How does a company make more money? They reduce production costs, which usually means the usage of fossil fuels and unsustainable resources. In Quebec, the youth pushed for more sustainable practices such as gardening, recycling, and other self-sustaining practices (Barr 1995). The province also saw a massive increase in environmental organizations, much like in British Columbia and Australia. Research shows that environmental nongovernmental organizations saw a boom in Canada between the 1960s and 1980s (Barr 1995). It was due to this influx of groups that helped push political change within Quebec. As the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 shocked the global energy market, many states had to find domestic solutions. Unfortunately, this was at the height of the environmental movement, and groups did not back down. This was the case in the late 1970s when groups testified against Hydro-Quebec's creation of dams along the St. Lawrence River (Barr 1995). Despite all this activity in Quebec, the movement needed to be more time to shift to its neighbor of Newfoundland. According to Leah Fusco (2007), the province picked up in the late 1980s to mid-1990s when environmental groups started to organize against the issues of forestry, mining, and even garbage dumping. It is common for states to purchase other states' trash. Currently, such states as Indonesia, China, and Vietnam purchase other states' recyclable materials.
However, as consumerism continues to increase, these states are plagued with a massive garbage problem.

As seen, the environmental movement spread like wildfire throughout the Dominion of Canada, starting from its west coast and ending in the east. The issues that drove this outcry ranged from mining and logging to garbage dumping. However, a deeper look discovered that the rise of these issues shows an increasing influence by foreign states pushing the extraction of Canada's natural resources. Not only did this unite environmental groups but even the local indigenous peoples to protect the natural environment of Canada. This is highlighted in one major case during the 1970s at the height of the oil crises. Canada is currently one of the main exporters of natural gas and crude oil to the United States. The U.S. Energy Information Association (EIA) claims that 99% of all natural gas imports are from pipelines linked to Canada (U.S. EIA 2022). According to EIA data, 1973 and 1979 saw the largest increase in natural gas imports, where the former year resulted in .96 trillion cubic feet, and the latter resulted in 1.2 trillion cubic feet (U.S. EIA 2022). The spikes during these years explain the U.S. government's need to find more alternative and cheaper energy sources as oil prices increased due to OPEC doubling its prices. However, the U.S. continued. According to U.S. Department of Energy (DoE) data in Figure 4, U.S. oil imports from Canada were also high during these times.
In 1973, the U.S. imported around 1.3 million barrels of oil daily, which dropped significantly until a spike occurred in 1979 (U.S. DOE Alternative Fuels Data Center 2022). According to Nevcihan Ozbilge (2020), this foreign pressure pushed an agreement to create a pipeline that would go through the Mackenzie Delta in Canada's Northwest Territories. Although, when cheap resources are required, nature and society suffer. This is a big key to the current path of environmental justice, which seeks to educate on the basis that environmental degradation harms those of lower economic status the most. This was the case when it came to the territory's indigenous people. Canada made a smear campaign against the indigenous complaints about the pipeline and called for Canadian unity (Ozbilge 2020). The work of economic nationalism can be a potent tool,
primarily when used against a minority culture within a state. It perceives non-dominant cultures as anti-Canadian and not having the state's best interest in mind. This can increase day-to-day backlash but also possible political repercussions against the group. In terms of the indigenous people, it could mean the loss of their lands by the Dominion of Canada. However, the attacks did not stop the criticism. Canadian Justice Thomas Berger suggested a ten-year-moratorium on the project through his three-year inquiry into the pipeline's social, economic, and environmental impacts (Ozbek 2020). This was seen as a significant blow to the government. As of 2017, Imperial Oil decided that the Makenzie pipeline project was no longer profitable and canceled it together (Nelis 2019). This is just one example of how Canada's environmental movement helped push environmental consciousness and protection not only through public criticisms of environmental destruction but also through the means of political institutions.

Being a massive natural resource exporter to the global market, Canada was struck by its environmental movement from the 1950s to the 1990s. Many provinces saw an increase in environmental organizations combating pollution from refineries to land degradation due to the construction of new energy projects. However, the people of this movement saw attacks from the government and firms, but that did not stop them. This push put Canada on the path to incorporate environmental issues into the realm of politics and its institutions. Canada was also the second country to create a federal department of the Environment in 1971 (Government of Canada 2021). In addition, due to their persistence Canada created its first national Green party in 1983, which, in 2011, won its first seat in the Canadian Parliament (Green Party of Canada 2022). Canada continued to increase its environmental protection by passing many domestic Acts in the years
following the height of the environmental movement and ratifying the UNFCCC, the Montreal Protocol, and the Kyoto Protocol. Canada and Australia are seen as highly reliant on their natural resource industry. Canada saw earlier and more positive impacts from its movement than we saw in Australia. However, as chapter four showed, despite its past, Australia strongly complied with its international commitments to reducing its GHG emissions regardless of domestic backlash. Will Canada be seen doing the same? Despite their departure from the Kyoto Protocol, can Canada still push for environmental protection and climate security?

5.4 The Avenue of Compliance

As mentioned in the Australian chapter, the compliance to the Kyoto Protocol should be seen as measuring the degree a state takes to combat climate change. We saw that under the criteria mentioned in the methodology section of this Thesis. Australia is seen as complying with the Kyoto Protocol. Will their ally to the West hold a similar rank? As seen in the previous sections, Canada and Australia share many similarities from a Westminster governmental structure to a thriving past in the environmental movement. However, much like its southern neighbor, the United States. Canada gave up on the mission of Kyoto. In this section we look at to what lengths did Canada non-comply with Kyoto, and what possibly drove the state towards this non-environmental path. One of the main differences between Canada and Australia during this period was the government's leadership. Although, political ideology is not the purview of this Thesis. It is something to note as we investigate Canada’s compliance and look into the hypotheses later in this chapter.
Canada officially abandoned their Kyoto Protocol commitments and withdrew from the protocol in December 2011, which took effect in December 2012. From this information, it is clear that Canada did not meet the first Criteria of measuring state compliance as defined in this Thesis.

Criterion one: Did the state comply with its greenhouse gas emission reduction established in the Kyoto Protocol under Article 3 Paragraph 1.

Although, it is still important to see by how much did they over or under pollute given their initial commitments. This might provide some explanation on their withdrawal. Since Canada ratified the Kyoto Protocol, it did have an emissions target and assigned amount of GHGs it was allowed to pollute over the first commitment period. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Canada was instructed to reduce its emissions by 6 percent per Annex B (UNFCCC 1997). This was based on their initial report sent to the UNFCCC. According to the initial report, revised measures, and the initial review report, Canada was allowed to pollute 2,791,792.771 Gg CO2 eq. of GHGs (UNFCCC 2008b). This meant that over the 5 years commitment period, Canada is only allowed to pollute 558,358.554 Gg CO2 eq. each year. The assigned amount was determined using the revised base year of 1990, where Canada produced 593,998.462 gigagrams (Gg) of GHGs (UNFCCC 2008b). This is about 48,000 Gg CO2 eq. less than that of Australia’s pollution amount. How do two developed natural resource driven states have such different emission commitments? According to each states’ expert review report, they did not differ much in emission outputs of their industrial sector, which only varied by around 2 percent (DOCC 2008; Environment Canada 2006). The big difference was in the energy output. Where Australia contributed around 71% of its emission to energy in the base year, Canada
contributed around 82%, which is an 11% increase (DOCC 2008; Environment Canada 2006). Keep in mind that the Kyoto Protocol’s targets are meant to stabilize and reduce global emissions while keeping state economies in mind. This is why the industrial process outputs between Canada and Australia appear to make no difference on their emissions targets. For example, Australia contributed around 80,800 Gg CO2 eq when calculating its base year emissions due to transportation, where Canada contributed 190,000 Gg CO2 eq due to transportation (DOCC 2008; Environment Canada 2006). That is a two-fold increase in GHG emissions.

Similarly, Canada appears to have contributed around a 5,000 Gg CO2 eq increase in their Manufacturing and Construction energy subsector than Australia when calculating their base years (DOCC 2008; Environment Canada 2006). For these reasons, Canada could have been given a much lower GHG target output than Australia. One thing to note, is that Canada’s numbers were taken from 2004, where Australia’s was 2005. These numbers were recorded, because they were the original data that each state and the United Nations used to create the targets. The next question was how close was Canada to meet their commitment.

Table 7 shows Canada’s overall GHG emissions recorded per year of the commitment period and its LULUCF activities per Article 3.3 and 3.4 (Environmental Canada 2010; Environmental Canada 2012; Environmental Canada 201; Environmental Canada 2014). Note, documentation was retrieved from Canada’s annual National Inventory Report to the UNFCCC. Due to its withdrawal emission figures for the years of the commitment period were unavailable under the Kyoto Protocol documentation like it was for Australia. Note that the data for 2011 was not able to be collected via the UNFCC
database. So, a dummy was created using the data provided from 2010-2012. Finally, since withdrawal from the Protocol, KP LULUCF measurements, were not recorded by Canada during 2011 and 2012.

Table 7 Canada’s GHG Emissions Including Kyoto LUUCF Targets, 2008-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GHG Emissions (Gg)</td>
<td>734,000</td>
<td>689,000</td>
<td>692,000</td>
<td>702,000</td>
<td>699,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>KP LULUCF Emissions (Gg)</td>
<td>2,403</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Emissions (Gg)</td>
<td>736,403</td>
<td>690,490</td>
<td>692,890</td>
<td>702,000</td>
<td>699,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: Environmental Canada 2010; Environmental Canada 2012; Environmental Canada 201; Environmental Canada 2014

At first glance, the table shows that Canada’s total yearly emissions decreased dramatically from 2008 to 2009. Where it stayed consistent and averaged in the higher 690,000 Ggs for the rest of the commitment period, even when one adds the recorded KP LULUCF emissions, the total emissions are not changed except for 2009. However, without 2011 and 2012 data, we cannot be sure of this stagnation. From this data, it is clear that Canada did not meet its Kyoto Protocol yearly commitments, even during the years 2008-2010 when they were an active member. Remember, Canada was allowed only to emit 543,958.554 Gg CO2 eq. Despite their drastic reduction of 45,913 Gg CO2 eq from 2008-2009. Canada still polluted around 150,000 Gg Co2 eq each year from 2009-2012. According to the table, it is with confidence to say that with the available data, Canada did not meet their objective emission commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and, therefore, criteria one of compliance. This determination is also reinforced by one document sent to the Compliance Committee of the Kyoto Protocol. It reads, “On 15 December 2011, Canada informed the Depository that it had decided to withdraw
from the Kyoto Protocol” (United Nations Compliance Committee 2014 pg. 1). However, the withdrawal did not take effect till 2012. The enforcement branch of the Kyoto Protocol brought up some legal questions if Canada that should have been reported under the year 2011 (United Nations Compliance Committee 2014). This was later dismissed. Remember, international treaties do not have enforcement powers besides cutting off the benefits of being a part of that treaty. Seeing that Canada would not receive economic sanctions and was not utilizing Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, there was not much the enforcement branch could do. The document also claims that the Facilitative branch of the Kyoto Protocol concluded after a letter from Canada. This letter claimed that measurements were not required because it was no longer being assessed for compliance (United Nations Compliance Committee 2014 pg. 11). For all these reasons, the case was dropped.

After reviewing Canada’s noncompliance via criteria one, how does the state fare with criteria two? Despite the withdrawal, did Canada pass domestic legislation that would have made turned their initial international emission commitments into law? Per the FAOLEX database search, Canada did not appear to pass national/territorial legislation specifically regarding climate change, unlike Australia. However, a deeper dive shows two types of legislation passed between 2008 and 2009. There would have been three. According to the Canadian Government, The Environmental Enforcement Act was passed in 2010, but the Justice Department section of consolidated Acts does not mention it. Therefore, that Act will not be included. It is to be clear that these Acts have no direct significance to implementing their emission requirements, much like seen in
Australia via the Clean Energy Act. The first Act is the Federal Sustainable Development Act of 2008. Its purpose reads,

“to provide the legal framework for developing and implementing a Federal Sustainable Development Strategy that makes decision making...more transparent and subject to accountability to Parliament...respects Canada’s domestic and international obligations relating to sustainable development...with a view to improving the quality of life of Canadians” (Federal Sustainable Act 2008, 2020 pg. 2).

Simply put, it will allow the government of Canada to better oversee and implement sustainable developmental projects that not only protect the environment but also encourage economic and social adherence.

The second Act is the Environmental Violations Administrative Monetary Penalties Act of 2009. This purpose reads,

“to establish, as an alternative to the existing penal system and as a supplement to existing enforcement measures, a fair and efficient administrative monetary penalty system for the enforcement of Environmental Acts” (Environmental Violations Administrative Monetary Penalties Act 2009 pg.3).

This basically provides an extra barrier to help penalize violations of the multiple Canadian Environmental Acts. The Act also protects violators by stating,

“Proceeding with any act or omission as a violation under this Act precludes proceeding with it as an offence under an Environmental Act, and proceeding with it as an offence under an Environmental Act precludes proceeding with it as
This ensures no one can be double prosecuted under both Acts. But ensures there is little legal escape from one’s said violation. This Act does help ensure environmental protection and pollution dumping. However, it is not directly related in reducing the overall GHG emissions of Canada as initially committed to via the Kyoto Protocol.

Throughout this section, Canada’s national commitment to combating climate change through the Kyoto Protocol appears to be a failure. First, they withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol in 2011, which took effect in 2012. They overpolluted by an average of 150,000 Gg CO2 eq each year during the commitment period, despite a drastic reduction from 2008-2009. In addition, very few national legislations were passed to implement Canada’s initial emissions targets. The ones mainly dealt with heightened penalties or increased transparency on sustainable development projects. With that in mind, it is fair to assess that Canada did not comply with the Kyoto Protocol by failing to achieve success status via the criteria set out in measuring state compliance.

5.5 Findings

This section discusses the findings and results observed in the case of Canada. Each subsection will highlight the four independent variables observed in this research study. First, the data findings of elite speech rhetoric through the documents of Canadian public officials will be presented. Next, this section will present the data observed and recorded regarding how Canadian public opinion perceives climate change based on national surveys. Finally, data collected on Canada’s state capacity and economic development will be presented as they represent the two dominant international
compliance schools. The purpose of this section is only to state the findings observed in Canada. The analysis of this data will take part in the next chapter, the discussion and conclusion chapter.

*Elite Rhetoric*

It was knowing that Canada did not comply with their Kyoto Protocol commitments even before the withdrawal, to what extent did elite public rhetoric possibly influence this path of noncompliance? According to the first hypothesis, a state that exhibits strong support for the impending threat of climate change and the solutions needed for mitigation through speech acts made by its leading public officials is more likely to comply with environmental treaty commitments. Based on the hypothesis in Canada, one would expect little framing of climate change as a threat from public elites. Of the 55 documents that were analyzed, 25 Prime Minster speeches and interviews, and sections of 30 Parliamentary Hansards, climate change was directly mentioned or descriptively mentioned 651 times. Due to the lack of available Prime Ministerial speeches for the Harper Administration, 12 extra sections of Hansards were analyzed to maintain the 55 documents standard. From the total amount of times climate change was mentioned, only roughly 18% of the rhetoric fell under the threat category. About 12% fell under the impact category, whereas around 70% fell under the general climate change category of policy talk, political discourse, job titles, and scientific belief.

In comparison, these percentages are quite close to those seen in Australia. All besides the impact category, each of the others saw an 8-point decrease. Table 8 shows the descriptive statistical measures of each category, including the total sum of climate change as a term used in speeches and debates by public elites. A list of all the PM
speeches and House of Representative Hansards used in this analysis can be found in
Appendix II.

Table 8 Descriptive Stats of Canadian Elite Speech Rhetoric Per Climate Change Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Threat Category</th>
<th>Impact Category</th>
<th>Climate Change Category</th>
<th>Total Sum of the Usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean</strong></td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>5.57</td>
<td>9.77</td>
<td>9.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mode</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mode</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Reference Appendix II*

This information helps us draw some interesting findings among the sample of elite rhetoric on climate change. The descriptive mean for the use of threat framing was 3.7, meaning that, on average, elites framed climate change as a threat close to three times in a document. Where the general climate change terminology had a mean of 9.8. Here, a public elite is slightly less than three times more likely to discuss political discourse or mention global policy referencing climate change than discussing it as a threat or challenge. This could have to do with Canada's political culture and structure of the legislative debate. Within the Canadian House of Commons Standing Orders, the shadow government receives 22 days within the annual supply cycle of the Canadian government, where it can debate motions of economic importance (House of Commons 2017e). From the Hansards sampled in this analysis, the ones with the most heated debates regarding climate change were those of supply days. Although climate change was not framed as a threat, these findings tell us it was discussed frequently amongst public elites. On average, a political document had the potential to mention climate change roughly ten times, which should not come as a surprise. This coverage period was at the height of
Kyoto, which led to intense domestic and international debates. In addition, Canada was also at the height of the Great Recession, which makes sense that most of the heightened climate change debates were discussed in Supply motions. But the main question is whether framing climate change as a threat or lack thereof influences Canada's compliance.

The threat framework only received 18% of climate change terminology. However, when framing climate change as a threat, public officials mainly used the sub-frames issue, mentioned 38 times, or challenge, mentioned 19 times. The data does show that the sub-frame threat was equal in usage compared to the term challenge. But as we saw amongst Australian elites, the subframe needs to be fully recognized because it holds many indirect terms, such as national interest. In contrast to Australia, the data shows that the Canadian Prime Minister only referenced the threat framework 12 times between 25 speeches. Unlike the Australian PM Rudd and PM Gilliard, Canadian PM Harper is the conservative party leader. This party runs on a platform of small government, economic prosperity, and austerity measures. With the Great Recession looming, it is understandable why Canada's PM would not focus on the environment as a national threat. Although, this was the opposite of what we saw in Australia. The data shows that 7 out of the 12 times PM Harper referenced climate change as a threat at an international event. This shows that the PM is far more relaxed in messaging the Canadian people than world leaders. In a welcome speech to the Chinese President, PM Harper said, "in a world concerned about climate change, we must also be a clean energy superpower" (Harper 2010 pg. 1-2). Even when the PM brought climate change to light, he still pushed economic priority. He also informed the House of Commons in 2009 that "if there is a
meeting of all major leaders involving climate change, I will, of course, attend" (Canadian House of Commons Debates 2009b pg. 7196). So, is PM Harper mainly using the threat framework more of a rouse to push an economic agenda? Or is he appealing to other states to make successful international environmental agreements? According to Krawchenko and Stoney (2015), the main course of the Harper government was to cut government spending and install austerity policies, which would reduce the Canadian debt. His tax policies are very clear, which will be discussed later. PM Harper's speeches in the House confirm this idea of economic nationalism rather than international cooperation. In 2010 Harper claimed that "on the issue of climate change, we are trying to get an agreement with all the world's major emitters" (Canadian House of Commons Debates 2010b pg. 6309). He also said a month before that,

“With regard to climate change, our government's position is clear and very different than that of the opposition. The opposition wants to implement the Kyoto protocol, which excludes two-thirds of greenhouse gas emissions, whereas we are looking for a binding, effective international agreement that includes all the major emitters in the world.” (Canadian House of Commons Debates 2010c pg. 6951).

These examples not only show PM Harpers fear of other states taking advantage of Canada, but also why Canada most likely left the Kyoto Protocol. It is clear that PM Harper was not a fan of the Kyoto Protocol, and why our date shows him even barley referencing climate change as a threat not just domestically but internationally.

When it comes to the House of Commons, the data shows a slightly different story. The data shows the term issue was coded more in the parliamentary Hansards 32 of
the 38 times. The rhetoric was also far more urgent and concerning than what was noticed by the PM. For example, MP Kristy Duncan said, “Climate change is not just an environmental issue; it is also a human rights issue: the right to live. Climate change is also an international security issue and a justice issue” (Canadian House of Commons Debates 2010a pg. 5144). These findings raise a good question as to why MPs use certain words in their speech acts, whereas PMs appear to use another type of framing. As seen, PM Harper appeared to have his political agenda influence his climate change rhetoric when discussing policy and critical problems of the state, the whole purpose of the House of Commons. This could explain the dramatic shift in framing from the PM, who acknowledges climate change, and the MPs, who must debate the solutions based on their constituents. As previously mentioned, most of the climate change rhetoric was during the debates, where the opposition would debate a government policy or financial proposal. As the MP Larry Bagnell claimed, “New funds are required to support the continuation of high-quality research aimed at federal policy needs to address the new and ongoing challenges related to the impact of changing climate conditions in Canadian society” (Canadian House of Commons Debates 2009a pg. 1490). During data collection, it was also noticed that the framing of an issue seems to appear when tied in the context of domestic policy or followed by political discourse, which could reinforce this analysis.

The second framework category, general climate change, was observed the most among the climate change terminology. However, political discourse, mentioned 211 times, and policy, mentioned 120 times, are the most commonly used sub-frames amongst observed elites. The policy was discussed equally amongst MPs and PMs, where political discourse would be expected to occur more in parliamentary sessions. However,
despite the heated debates in the House of Commons, little to no legislation was created to enforce Canada’s Kyoto commitments. Remember, according to Ljiphart (1968), the political fragmentation of political systems and culture, as seen in the Westminster system and other continental European parliaments, is the cause of instability. Based on this interpretation of democratic stability, those of a multi-party system is bound to fail to represent and aggregate to create swift and necessary laws. This can be seen in the case of Canada. A heightened sense of debates and a PM with a different agenda. Could it be that political ideology caused compliance, which was reflected in the speech acts we observed? The 40th Parliament, which served from 2008-2011, consisted of a conservative party majority of 143 seats, whereas the liberal party held only 77, according to the election map (Elections Canada 2008). This means that despite the increase in the observed parliamentary debate on climate change, it would be very difficult for the liberal party to pass any environmental legislation. And the struggle for the environment did not end after the general election of 2011, as 166 conservative members were elected, as opposed to only 34 liberal MPs (Elections Canada 2011). Could this ideological makeup show some evidence towards Almond and Lijphart that majoritarian democracies are seen as inferior, especially regarding legislation creation?

With this evidence, we can accept the hypothesis that a decrease in threat framing through elite speech acts did influence Canada’s compliance. As far as we have observed, Canadian public elites are split when framing climate change as a threat. However, does this new information show an alternative path of what pushes state compliance? Is it more that Canadian public officials held strong and detailed debates, and the PM showed less emphasis on climate change as a threat? Or, could it have been driven by a deeper
political, ideological divide that ultimately led to certain rhetoric framing and the withdrawal of Kyoto altogether? Next, we look at public opinion when trying to answer this question since the public elites observed were elected by the public. It might be possible that public opinion could have influenced what was observed in the general climate change category and helped us better understand Canada’s choice of compliance.

Public Opinion

Now that we have analyzed the rhetoric of public officials’ speech acts, let us analyze the second requirement of securitization theory. According to my second hypothesis, a state with a higher threat perception and responsibility for climate mitigation through public opinion is more likely to comply with environmental treaty commitments. As recently just seen, Canada witnessed selected heated parliamentary debates on the topic of climate change. Now the big question is, how much were the frequency and intensity of the debates influenced by public opinion favoring climate action? Knowing that Canada did not comply with Kyoto despite parliamentary debates. Did the public, the audience, accept elite rhetoric, or was it the audience that influenced the lack of legislation, which appeared as a possible avenue when it came to the analysis of Australia? For the case of Canada, four national public surveys were observed, two from 2009 and one for 2010 and 2011. Two surveys were used in Canada for 2009 because each survey better represented certain variables better than the other. Each survey description can be found in Appendix II. Each survey recorded 1,000-2,000 participants, which was key to ensuring a valid comparison between the years analyzed. The same four variables were selected for analysis within these surveys, as we saw in the Australian case chapter. As a reminder, they are Belief, Concern, Responsibility, and
Self-Efficacy. Figure 5 provides a cross-annual analysis of the averages for each variable’s composite scores, which were created by combining two questions per variable, except for the Belief Composite score for 2009. The survey used only had one question that met this category's requirements. Each question was recoded on a scale of 1-5. In all of the public surveys from 2009-2011, a score of one relates to a low perception and belief of climate change, whereas a five shows serious concern and support for climate action.

![Figure 5 Canadian Public Opinion Composite Score Averages Per Climate Change Perception Variable, Time Series Analysis 2009-2011](image)

Source: (Simpson and Chalifoux 2009; Environics Research Group 2009; Environics Research Group 2010; ISSP Research Group 2019)

At a glance, the Canadian public, through this three-year analysis, stayed more neutral regarding climate change. When creating the recoding scheme, all questions had to be placed in a 1-5 code. This would not only allow it to be equally comparable to Australia
but make it possible to create a composite score for each variable. Some might say that this recoding scheme, found in Appendix I, pushes this neutral inference of climate change by the Canadian public. The recoding scheme, much like the one created for Australia, places the 'Do not Know,' 'N/A,' or 'No Opinion' near or with the neutral category, a neutral score usually of either 3 or 2.33, depending on the number of options via a question. This could skew the individual means and overall composite scores.

Similarly seen in the Australian case, each composite score takes the mean of each participant's answers to the variable's two questions. The finalized score gives us a better understanding of each person's beliefs based on weighing each choice. Let us dive deeper into understanding what each variable tells about public opinion of climate change.

Starting with a look at the belief variable, in 2009, about 56 percent of Canadians believed that the science is conclusive that global warming is happening and is caused by human activity (Environics Research Group 2009 pg. 10). Though, the percentage is slightly higher than what we saw in Australia, which saw only 54 percent. However, the same survey sampled people in 2007, where the percentage was 10 points higher (Environics Research Group 2009 pg. 10). Showing that belief in climate change among the Australian public has shown a decent decrease. This same question was asked in the 2010 survey, which showed that 51 percent of participants believe that global warming and caused by human activity, which is another 5-point drop from a year prior (Environics Research Group 2010 pg. 36). However, the same participants seemed to favor the economics of oil sand development before the environment, with 49 percent in favor (Environics Research Group 2010 pg. 41). When we combine these scores, it provides us a mean of 3.33. This neutral composite score means that Canadians believe in...
climate change but are not willing to risk economic development. This could make sense in the minds of a society that just dealt with an economic crisis. The data from 2011 confirms these trends. Where only about 54 percent of Canadians sampled disagree that climate change has been exaggerated (ISSP Research Group 2019 pg. 9). Now, the largest trend, 88 percent, is seen when Canadians are asked, "do you think that a rise in the world's temperature caused by climate change" is dangerous (ISSP Research Group 2019 pg. 11). The only overwhelming margin was when the survey reframed its question to not just 'belief' but included the words climate change and danger. All of this evidence confirms that many Canadians believe in climate change and its human causation. But these divides were by narrow margins.

Next, we will look at the variable of concern. According to Ipsos Reid's survey on Canadians' views on Climate Change and the Economic Crisis, about 69 percent of Canadians sampled strongly disagree somewhat that they are less worried about climate change today than a year ago (Simpson and Chalifoux 2009 pg. 13). Similarly, the sample was split equally in the Canadian Environmental Barometer 2010 survey. When asked if "changes in our climate due to global warming" are concerning, where each option from extremely concerned to somewhat concerned was around a quarter of the sample size (Environics Research Group 2010 pg. 34). This means that 80 percent of the 1,003 Canadians surveyed showed concern for climate change impacting their state. In 2011, this showed a small decrease of a 6-point drop when participants were asked, "how concerned are you about environmental issues" (ISSP Research Group 2019 pg. 5). However, despite the drop in 2011. From 2009-2011, Canadians have shown concern for climate change. Figure 5 helps confirm these trends. In 2009 the mean was close to 3.5,
which shows an average to strong concern for climate change. When asked, "serious action on climate change should wait until the recession is behind us," only 45 percent agreed to strongly agreed (Simpson and Chalifoux 2009 pg. 2). Though, through all this evidence of growing concern amongst Canadians, one question posed an outlier, which reflected in the mean drop of 2010 as seen in Figure 5.3. When asked, "in your opinion, what is the most important problem facing Canadians today?" only 3 percent highlighted the environment, but 44 percent highlighted the economy (Environics Research Group 2010 pg. 31). Much like we saw in the variable of belief. Many Canadians are concerned about climate change, and that much is clear from the analyzed surveys. However, Canadians are further divided on what should come first when it comes to the economy.

Our next variable is that of one's sense of responsibility when it comes to thinking of climate change. Are Canadians willing to make personal sacrifices, such as wealth, to decrease their carbon footprint and help influence others? According to Figure 5, in 2009, on average, Canadians sampled would tend to help tackle climate change even if it meant costing them. When asked if "setting limits on carbon dioxide emissions and making companies pay for their emissions, even if such limits may mean higher energy prices," around 76 percent of Canadians were between 'favor' and 'strongly in favor' (Environics Research Group 2009 pg. 13). This responsibility trend only appears to increase in 2010, where the question was asked again, around 80 percent were in favor (Environics Research Group 2010 pg. 37). This makes it look like, contrary to previous data from previous variables, Canadians are willing to sacrifice wealth for environmental regulations personally. But this trend appeared to end in 2011. If we look at Figure 5, the mean is 2.84. The average Canadian is still determining if increasing monetary costs is
worth combating climate change. For example, when asked, "how willing would you be to pay much higher prices in order to protect the environment" 32 percent answered unwilling, whereas 42 percent answered willing (ISSP Research Group 2019 pg. 8). This is much different from the 76-80 percent we noticed in previous years. How was the question framed? When asking someone their opinion by framing such as "even if it means" as opposed to "how willing would you be to pay," the former sounds like it is a possibility, but the latter is more direct. The directness of paying higher costs during a recession could have pushed for many accurate answers from participants. This tells us that though Canadians claim responsibility for tackling climate change, society is evenly divided on making monetary sacrifices. However, it was seen in Australia that those sampled disagreed on the action via 54 percent in 2011, whereas in Canada, it was only 32 percent in disagreement. This shows that Canadians might be more prepared to take further responsibility and action to combat climate change. But much like the Australian surveys, these Canadian surveys only looked at monetary action, which is not a good representation of opinions on the willingness to act through organizations, protests, and legislation.

Finally, we look at how Canadians view climate change through the lens of self-efficacy, which is much different from a sense of personal responsibility. It is when people personally believe that their personal choices and behaviors can make a difference. It is the difference between objective thinking and more of a psychological drive and mindset. Just because a commitment is made; does not mean there is a drive. Before starting, please note that data for the year 2010 needs to be included. First, the usage of climate change public opinion surveys was growing at this time. Second, the
survey found for 2010 did not include any questions related to the variable in question.

That being said, in 2009, the composite score average for Self-Efficacy was around 3.67, which means that amongst those sampled, self-efficacy towards climate change appears to be high. However, some participants need clarification on their actions. For example, participants were asked, "I am doing my fair share to fight climate change," where 86 percent chose to agree to strongly agree (Simpson and Chalifoux 2009 pg. 9). Now, to some, this might appear very subjective because what is a 'fair share'? The fair share could mean either transitioning to diesel fuel vehicles, but to others, it is recycling. But these questions, though very subjective, let us know that the participants are thinking about actions they take personally to combat climate change. This personal responsibility and positive behavior trend continued into 2011, as seen in Figure 5, where the mean composite score is 3.59. This means that a good portion of Canadians sampled realize their actions can make a difference. When asked about the statement, "there is no point in doing what I can for the environment unless others do the same," about 65 percent of those sampled disagreed to strongly disagree with the statement (ISSP Research Group 2019 pg. 9). This shows that of those sampled, Canadians believe that even the littlest person can make a difference even if it is just recycling your plastic and glass waste. This is a far better mentality than the normal belief of, 'why should I do this if the corporations do not do anything.'

After analyzing the four public opinion variables throughout three years, where does this leave our main question? First, most Canadians believe in climate change and that its causes are rooted in human activity. Although at first glance, many Canadians are unwilling to give up their natural resource wealth for the sake of the environment.
Second, many Canadians share a concern for climate change. As noticed in the surveys of both 2010 and 2011, Canadians polled between 74 to 80 percent concerned about climate change. What was also seen was that some Canadians polled do place economic priority before the environment. Third, public opinion appeared higher towards the felt responsibility to act on climate change, especially in 2009-2010. There is evidence that Canadians are more evenly split when it comes to directly asking for monetary sacrifices. Finally, Canadians believe that their personal choices and actions can make a difference in combating climate change.

In contrast to their Australian neighbors, Canadians have a greater sense that one person can make a change, despite the lack of action that others take. Through this analysis, there is clear evidence that Canadian public opinion during the years 2009-2011 viewed climate change as a concerning threat and showed a willingness to act. Although, as some evidence showed, it was clear that when directly asking Canadians to protect the environment in lieu of the economy, a majority chose economic prosperity. Based on this analysis, the Canadian public opinion belief and concern about climate change did not influence Canada's failure and withdrawal of the Kyoto Protocol. This leads us to the acceptance of the null hypothesis, where an increase in public opinion toward climate change does not appear to influence the state's compliance with its environmental treaty commitments. In addition, accepting the null could lead us to alternative reasoning on who controls the decision-making and legislation process in the Dominion of Canada.

State Capacity

One of the important factors in the Managerial School theory is that Temporal dimensions like pandemics, economic recessions, natural disasters, and even external or
internal conflict can easily shift a state's capacity. Remember, the policy usually chooses the former when it comes to the economy or the environment. Canada, much like Australia, dealt with the Great Recession of 2008. Could the economic crisis have decreased the state's capacity to uphold its commitments? Canada does rely on a large resource export industry, which could have dealt them a large blow in domestic funding. Seeing that Canada did not end up complying with its commitments under Kyoto, could it be said that the Managerial School of compliance, when it comes to the case of Canada, holds some validity? This is why a test of the third hypothesis is done. To see where States that lack the level of state capacity to implement environmental domestic policy change effectively are more likely to violate their commitments under the environmental treaty. Table 9 shows the cross-annual data for the aggregated FSI score for Canada, the state's scores by subcategory, and the descriptive stats. Each subcategory is ranked from a 0-10 scale, which means the aggregated FSI score is 0-120. The table does exclude the mode, which would have been non-applicable for this data set.

Table 9 Canada’s Fragile State Index Score by Subcategory, 2009-2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cohesion</th>
<th>Economic</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Crosscut</th>
<th>FSI Score</th>
<th>Stats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C1</td>
<td>C2</td>
<td>C3</td>
<td>E1</td>
<td>E2</td>
<td>E3</td>
<td>P1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fragile State Index Global Data- FSI 2009-11, 2022

What one can see from the data displayed in Table 9 is that Canada’s state capacity appeared to be reasonably stagnant between the years 2009-2011. Between the two years,
there was only an increase of .2 from 2009-2010. Though this increase shows a slight loss of state stability, it is not much to say that Canada lost state capacity during these years, unlike what we saw for Australia. Table 9 shows one criterion that saw an overall increase of .5 or higher. This measure is Public Services (P2) (Fragile State Index and CAST Framework Methodology, 2017). They also decreased in Economic Decline, Human Flight and Brain Drain, Group Grievance, and others.

When a country faces an economic recession, decreasing public spending through services is most states' last option. P2 considers a state's ability to provide fundamental functions for its people, which may include healthcare, protection from terrorism, or even infrastructure (Fragile State Index and CAST Framework Methodology, 2017). During an economic recession, many states try to increase government spending in order to help stabilize the economy. Where during an inflationary period, they try to cut spending. So, what made Canada decrease its public services to the extent of reflecting almost an entire FSI point lost between 2009-2011? According to Krawchenko and Stoney (2015), the Harper Government provided stimulus during 2008-2009, much like many other states did during this time of global crisis. Although being a conservative government, its overall goal was always to cut taxes and reduce government spending. Figure 6 provides data on the tax cuts and revenues of the Harper government from 2000-2013 (Krawchenko and Stoney 2015 pg. 283).
Figure 6 Federal Government Revenues and Fiscal Transactions as a Percentage of GDP, 2003-2013

Source: Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives 2015 pg. 283; Krawchenko and Stoney 2015 pg. 283

According to Figure 6, the corporate tax cut fell much lower than any other cuts the Harper government made after the stimulus period. On the other hand, personal income tax decreased by .01 percent of GDP, whereas contributions to employment insurance decreased by .7 percent from 2000-2013 (Krawchenko and Stoney 2015 pg. 284). This means that corporate taxes contributed to the least amount of government revenue, whereas employment and personal taxes did not see as much reduction. In addition, as national defense spending continued to increase over the years, departments like Western Economic Diversification, which ensures economic equity and growth in Western Canada, saw an almost 50 percent reduction in the budget from 2006-2013, and the environment saw almost no increase (Krawchenko and Stoney 2015 pg. 285-86). These spending cuts appear to be supported by Les Whittington (2015) of the Toronto Star, who reported that the Environmental Department’s budget was cut along with multiple others
post the 2009 government stimulus. This means that the increase in the FSI score of public services shows us that the government was on the rise to reduce spending and cut taxes, but not in areas that appeared to benefit the majority of Canadians.

The analysis of Canada’s stable FSI score through 2009-2011 brings some interesting points when looking at its potential to influence state compliance. Despite state capacity staying stable, the one decrease in stability was that of government control. The government coming out of the global economic recession decided to limit and cut spending but not taxes. The environmental sector of the government saw no budget increase (Krawchenko and Stoney 2015; Healy and Trew 2015). What this decrease does reflect is not that of an economic recession but the implication of austerity politics. It makes sense that a government would end up not complying with its environmental treaty commitments if they do not even provide sufficient government funding. However, this does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis. State capacity was measured via the composite score, which showed stability from 2009 to 2011. All this evidence helps us accept the null hypothesis, which will help shed some light on rejecting the managerial school of compliance in the case of Canada. Although, it could also bring some answers on how we could better measure state capacity and its potential relation to international environmental compliance.

Economic Development

In the previous subsection, advice shows that the Managerial School’s notion of state compliance, as measured using the FSI, shows little to no relation to Canada’s compliance. This leads us to test the next dominant compliance theory, the Enforcement School. In the case of Australia, the state saw economic growth through GNI increases
from 2009-2011. This led us to conclude that some evidence links compliance to economic development. Now, is this the same for Canada? Seeing that Canada did not comply with its commitments under Kyoto, if the enforcement school should hold, one would expect to see an economic decline in Canada. Remember, the essence of this hypothesis is to test the potential validity of the enforcement school when it comes to its nationalist roots. Much like hypothesis three, it is important to look into this because of the temporal dimension of the Great Recession. Canada is also a large exporter of natural resources. For this case, economic development was observed by recording Canada’s Real Gross National Income from Statistics Canada and recorded in Table 10.

Given the economic crisis, one would expect economic development to decrease, but the data shows another picture. Canada greatly increased their wealth despite the global crisis. From 2009-2010, Australia’s wealth increased by almost 191 billion dollars, which almost doubled by half that by 2011, roughly 91 billion.

**Table 10 Canada’s Gross National Income by Year, 2009-2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GNI (CA$m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,583,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,674,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,774,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Canada. Table 36-10-0122-01 Gross domestic income, gross national income and net national income, Canada, quarterly (x 1,000,000)

This data provides evidence that Canada was not in financial trouble when Canada decided to withdraw from Kyoto and continuously surpass their assigned GHG emissions amount. Was this increase in wealth the culprit of the oil and gas industries? As we saw earlier, the oil and natural gas exports to the U.S. only increased from 2009-2011,
according to EIA and DoE data (U.S. DOE Alternative Fuels Data Center 2022; U.S. EIA 2022). Statistics Canada shows another story. Also, a report by the OECD confirms that between 2009 and 2011, oil import prices around the world increased from around 60 dollars per barrel in 2009 to around 110 dollars per barrel in 2011 (OECD 2022a). Canada’s oil and gas industry could reflect the increase in GNI. So, what else can explain this growth seen in Canada? For Australia, we saw that despite growth slowing and an increase in unemployment, the overall economy was not damaged due to the economic crisis, unlike Canada. Statistics Canada claims that the construction sector increased growth, contributing to around 8 percent of GDP in 2010 and that the natural resource sector also saw the fastest increase in employment (Statistics Canada 2018). It is not completely clear if Canada’s economic recovery through increased GNI was due to its reliance on its natural resources and export sector. It is clear that Canada continued to grow its manufacturing, natural resources, and construction sectors while significantly increasing their GHG emissions between 2009-2011. During economic growth, it failed to pass successful environmental legislation to comply with the Kyoto Protocol and even cut environmental funding. All this evidence helps us accept the null hypothesis, which will help shed some light on rejecting the enforcement school of compliance in the case of Canada.

5.6 Conclusion

This chapter presented a picture of Canada’s government and environmental past, followed by empirical evidence to help draw connections between Canada’s elite rhetoric, public opinion, state capacity, and economic development to their compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. Canadian elite speech rhetoric seems not to apply the threat
framework; only 18% of climate change framing was via threat but general climate change, especially political discourse, was almost four times more likely. Public opinion shows a different story, where most Canadians during 2009-2011 viewed climate change as a concerning threat and showed a willingness to act. But, as the surveys show, this willingness reduced as monetary sacrifices were in question. This was very similar to what was seen in Australia. When it comes to state capacity, the aggregate FSI score stayed stable, which meant that the state capacity of Canada did not shift in any alarming way. The only minor decrease was the reduction in public service spending. However, a closer look showed that political ideology had more to do with the cuts than government resources and ability. Finally, as Canada witnessed a stable state capacity, it also saw an increase in economic growth, as its GNI continued to increase between 2009-2011. In short, economic growth, state capacity, and positive public opinion of climate change as a threat all appeared to have little influence on Canada’s compliance.

On the other hand, having a low count of framing climate change as a threat could hold some answers, as a lack of speech acts influenced no domestic legislation on climate action. A more qualitative look at Canada may help shed some light. First, its governmental structure is much like that of Australia. The main difference is that the Senate is appointed till the age of 75, allowing MPs who believe in environmental action to be safe from the constant shifts between governments. Secondly, Canada has a diverse and strong history when it comes to the environmental movement. Not only did public opinion push hard against needed energy projects, but activists also even overcame political persecution. Regarding the Senate's independence and a rich and continuous positive perception of climate action, Canada could have done better in its compliance
goals through only minor environmental legislation. Could this gap be related to bureaucratic partisanship and corruption? Canada’s public service is set up and holds the same values as the APS. It is possible that politicization, like in most states, is cutting the people out of the legislation process. However, another potential reason could be the political ideology of the party in charge, as they rule half the legislative and the executive. For example, Canada’s state capacity decreased slightly due to public service cuts based on a conservative agenda. In addition, Australian elites from the Labour party framed climate change as a threat more than the Conservative Canadian elites in power. In the following chapter, these interpretations and those found in Australia will help shed light on the overall research question. A clearer picture of what assumptions and theories have a greater influence on state compliance as it relates to the compliance of the Kyoto protocol will finally be answered after months of research.
Chapter 6

Discussion and Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

The combating of climate change has been an increasing global issue since the 1970s. With the climate drastically changing people are starting to see the intense storms, fires, and heatwaves that scientists have warned about years earlier. States have come together to combat this global issue from the creation of the UNFCCC to the current Paris Accords agreement. However, the recent ICCP report stated that unless states take immediate action to curb their GHG emissions, we will hit an irreversible period (UN News Global Perspective Human Stories 2022). According to the ICCP Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change Summary for Policymakers (2022 p. 27) claims that,

“The level of peak warming depends on cumulative CO2 emissions until the time of net zero CO2 and the change in non-CO2 climate forcers by the time of peaking. Deep GHG emissions reductions by 2030 and 2040, particularly reductions of methane emissions, lower peak warming, reduce the likelihood of overshooting warming limits and lead to less reliance on net negative CO2 emissions that reverse warming in the latter half of the century.”

This means that unless serious action is taken in the next few years, we will no longer be able to change the temperature exceeding 1.5-2 degrees Celsius by 2100. Based on this
report, what drives states to push environmental policy? This led to the research question, and throughout this research study, we explored what factors determine a state's noncompliance with its international environmental treaty commitments. Four hypotheses were investigated, each looking at different aspects of state compliance. Hypotheses one and two tested the theory of securitization through the notion of elite speech acts and public acceptance of climate change as a threat. Hypothesis three tested the managerial school of compliance by investigating the correlation between compliance and state capacity.

Moreover, hypothesis four tested the enforcement school of compliance by investigating the correlation between economic growth and compliance. A comparative in-depth case study was conducted between Canada and Australia to test the inquiry. An in-depth look at each state's governmental structure and environmental past were conducted for each case. Speeches and debates from prime ministers and members of parliament were coded and analyzed, along with Fragile State Index scores and Gross National incomes from 2009-2011. Through these means, it helped provide a much clearer picture of the action taken by each state regarding their compliance paths under that of the Kyoto Protocol. Unlike the Findings sections in each case chapter, this chapter breaks down and interprets the data and discusses how it relates to the overall question. What possible connections can we see between the variables, and how do institutional structure and historical pasts help influence these results? The core of this Thesis is to test the ability of constructivism's securitization theory to hold up to the compliance literature, which two schools of thought mainly dominate. In the following sections, an overview of the key findings will provide a foundation for their interpretation. Next,
comparative analysis and investigation will be conducted to help interpret the results, test the theory's strength, and help answer the overall question. Finally, this chapter will go over the limitations of the research conducted. Every research project is always flawed and even opens questions for new research.

6.2 Overview of Key Findings

As mentioned above, this research study conducted a comparative in-depth case study between Australia and Canada. The purpose was to compare what made these two rich, powerful, equivalent, and democratic states take two different compliance paths via the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, what international school of compliance represented the actions observed by the state? Was it the managerial school, the enforcement school, or the Copenhagen school bound in securitization theory? This task was done by investigating and collecting data on four independent variables, elite speech rhetoric, public opinion, state capacity, and economic growth, which covered the period of 2009-2011. Each variable was tied to a compliance school; the latter two represented the two dominant compliance schools, whereas the former are tied to the theory in question. Figure 7 presents the major findings of each variable per case.
Comparative Overview of Key Findings

- Elite rhetoric is shown by the percentage of usage per framework.
- Public opinion is shown by the aggregate mean of each year’s average per category.
- State capacity is shown as the total increase between the three years.
- Economic development is shown by the percentage increase from 2009 to 2011.

In short, for elite rhetoric of framing climate change as a threat, both cases had low percentages compared to the general framework. However, the results could have a positive connection to noncompliance regarding Canada. Public opinion for each case showed a moderate to high acceptance of perceiving climate change as a threat, per the average means of all years per category, as seen in Figure 7. As noted, the means are lowered due to decreased responsibility regarding monetary sacrifices. This data allows us to draw a possible connection to public opinion and compliance via Australia, but not that of Canada. Next, state capacity saw a stable score in Canada but witnessed an increase over the three years in Australia. For both of these cases, state capacity showed little evidence of compliance. Finally, economic development saw a yearly increase in each case. Again, this can highlight a possible connection to Australia’s compliance, but
not in the case of Canada, which saw growth but even left the Kyoto Protocol. Taking note of these key findings, what real conclusions can one interpret when answering our overall research question? To accomplish this, we conduct a comparative analysis, including historical and structural context, to see if the securitization theory is better than the Managerial and Enforcement schools regarding compliance.

6.3 Interpretation

This section on interpretation will tie the key findings from this research study to the overall question of compliance theories. It will also provide a comparative analysis between the two cases as it discusses each hypothesis. First, the question of compliance will be briefly discussed to set the groundwork to answer our research question. After this, each tested compliance school will be analyzed and discussed. Here, the context gained from this qualitative research study will be applied to help bring a more conclusive view on the influence of the independent variables towards the cases’ path of compliance.

Compliance

Compliance and noncompliance are never a black-and-white distinction, especially in the context of international treaties. It is important to note that treaties can change throughout their implementation. According to the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 39 claims, "A treaty may be amended by agreement between the parties. The rules laid down in Part II apply to such an agreement except insofar as the treaty may otherwise provide" (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 p. 14). All parties subject to the treaty must agree on its proposed amendment. This means that different behavior taken by states can only sometimes be seen as noncompliance,
especially if one factor in possible technical changes to the treaty. This is why treaty ambiguity is so difficult to measure because terms and phrases can be interpreted differently based on who is reading them. However, this was different regarding the Kyoto Protocol. The only official amendment was done in 2012, known as the Doha amendment, which was implemented in Kyoto's second commitment period.

One of the main tasks of this research study was to investigate whether Canada and Australia complied with their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and what factors influenced their path. When it came to UN supporting documents, it was clear that one did not follow through, even despite ratifying the protocol. Australia controlled its emissions during the years observed and utilized them to ensure its representation in domestic laws and regulations. As one can see in chapter four, the success of multiple laws, including a carbon price for corporations, made it stand out to Canada. On the other side of the world, Canada even failed to reduce its emissions based on their assigned amount when they were still a member. In 2011 they made their withdrawal known, effective that following year. When it came to legislation, very little had any reference to their treaty commitments and relevance to combatting climate change. Now, being both heavily industrial states and rely on natural resource extraction. Why did one comply with their international environmental treaty commitments and the other did not? With all control variables held at a constant, it could be related to society's disapproval of an action. Maybe the Great Recession crippled their ability to take such action. Alternatively, it could have been the political party's power. The next few subsections will help bring light to this question.
Copenhagen School

This research study looks at the effects of the Copenhagen school under the securitization theory. A national threat must be created via a speech act by an elite and then accepted by an audience. When it came to the two theoretical hypotheses, what was observed was completely the opposite. This means that when it came to public opinion (hypothesis two), Australia showed its acceptance, whereas Canada rejected and accepted then null. The data gathered from three years of Australian public opinion polls showed a majority of concern, belief, and responsibility for climate change. The same can be said for Canada as well. Figure 7 confirms this interpretation. The aggregate means for both belief and concern categories stayed between 3.4-3.6 for each case. The responsibility and self-efficacy categories' aggregate means show a decrease, but mainly due to some caution when economic gains were sacrificed. Also, Canada did not have a self-efficacy rating for 2010, bringing down the mean for that case.

Although, the high positivity towards perceiving climate change as a concern and supporting climate change action connects with each of these cases' environmental history. Each case showed increased public concern and action throughout the 1960s-1990s regarding environmental protection. One can see this through Australia's success of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park in 1974 and Canada's halting of the James Bay Hydro Electric Dams in 1994. Each of these projects was a success because of stark national public concern campaigns that also, in the case of Canada, gained international attention and respect. Both of these states also have seen a great organization of environmental protection groups. In the case of Australia plays host to one of the largest international groups, Green Peace. This concluded that the audience support was there for
climate action, which Australia certainly showed through success. It is this history where one can see why climate change remains a priority of concern and action for most Canadians and Australians, especially as the impacts of climate change become more of a reality for many people.

However, the first requirement of the Copenhagen school showed little evidence within these two cases. This means that when it came to elite rhetoric of framing climate change as a threat (hypothesis one), Australia and Canada showed their rejection and acceptance of the null. When it came to Speech, Acts were observed through elite speech rhetoric. The frame category largely used by elites was that of general climate change terminology, specifically political discourse and policy discussion. Figure 7 shows that this category made up 62-70 percent of all mentions of the term climate change in each case. The hypothesized threat framework did not receive the lowest representation. However, it was about three times less likely to be used compared to Australia and Canada's general climate change category.

Although, it should be mentioned that between the two, Australian elites framed climate change as a threat with an eight-point increase compared to Canada. One of the main differences was in their Prime Ministers. Where Australian Prime Ministers referenced climate change a total of 158 times in the first 24 documents, the Canadian Prime Minister referenced it only 42 times. These results could be due to the type of speeches acquired for each PM, but they could relate to the political ideology and goals of the party each PM represented. Previously mentioned Prime Ministers Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard were part of the Australian Labour Party, whereas Prime Minister Stephen Harper was part of the Canadian Conservative Party. Both parties have different
assumptions and ideals regarding policy and especially the priority of the environment over other areas, such as the economy. Australia and Canada both have a parliamentary system, where the House is elected directly by the people, but the executive is elected and appointed out of the House. With both branches being run either by a leading coalition or the largest party elected, this could explain why Australia and not Canada saw domestic legislation passed on climate change. According to research, each state has seen an increase in the politicization of its public service, which provides apolitical information to key decision-makers. These actors help propose policy and conduct data, amongst other things. Not only does the public have no direct say in those that propose most of the bills in parliament, but the one agency that should serve as a bipartisan defense is now diminishing. The government has always been worried about short-term and political wins, so partisan influence and "yes men" could become more frequent in each state's bureaucracy.

In conclusion, the data and context show that elite framing had little sway, if not any, on public opinion in either case. These results reject the influence of the Copenhagen school, which requires elite speech acts of threats to be accepted by the public, which then leads to legislation. Unfortunately, the data shows elites used little threat framing, where both publics showed moderate to high concern and belief regarding climate change.

The main question is, with little threat framing from the elites in both states despite their parties, what ensured the passage of legislation in Australia and not Canada? Could this be a result of the political ideology of the key decision makers, as observed between the different PMs, and an increasing politicization of the public service sectors?
As was evident, the two political ideologies did make a difference regarding elite framing used by the Prime Ministers. Nevertheless, who elects these officials into power? The Copenhagen school holds little ground on state compliance, but this does not completely rule out the impact of the securitization theory. The Critical Security school views the creation of a threat via a speech act but claims anyone can initiate it. Based on Australia's results for hypothesis two and compliance, public opinion could have influenced the actions and framing of the elites. Public opinion was moderately high in Canada, but that still resulted in little elite framing climate change as a threat. Although, one Canadian survey did show a very low preference for climate change when asked about using personal wealth sacrifice. Canadians may take economic issues more seriously than the environment. For example, the Australian Labour Party and Canadian Conservative Party both won most of their Houses, except in 2010, when Australian Labour won by a Labour coalition. The Critical Security school does not emphasize public influence based on political affiliation. But if the public is to initiate speech acts, one would assume they would interpret their message based on how they politically view the issue. Given what the data revealed, further testing the Critical Security school of securitization theory could be interesting.

Managerial School

Regarding hypothesis three regarding state capacity, Australia and Canada, like many states at this time, were dealing with an unexpected temporal dimension, the Great Recession. Figure 7 shows Australia experienced an increase of 2.2 over the three years. In contrast, Canada witnessed only .2. With this global event looming, the data shows that Australia's FSI score was increasing but not due to direct economic failures. The
three subcategories were state security, human flight, and refugee treatment. There was some decline due to economic status, but that was too low to make an impact. Though, none of these scores were directly related to the recession. The belief in state security could range from fear of external states, as seen at the same time North Korea was testing its missile capabilities. However, it could also be due to crime, which can increase during economic downturns. The same can be said for human flight, as people look for other jobs, but as research shows us, emigration decreased between 2009-2010. In addition, an influx of more people at a time of economic hurt usually does not sit well with the local population if the population is already not too fond of immigration.

On the contrary, Canada, which did not comply with Kyoto, had a relatively stable FSI score. Canada's increased score, much like Australia's, could be an indirect effect of the recession, as it saw a cut in public services. As we read in chapter five, Canada's conservative government made it a clear policy goal to cut costs after the immediate results of the recession. This data shows that hypothesis four did not appear to show influential evidence in either state's compliance path. According to the hypothesis, Australia should not have complied, whereas Canada should have shown compliance. These were the opposite results, making one of the main assumptions of the Managerial School appear weaker in the face of these two cases under the Kyoto Protocol. Could these results be a failure of the measurement used under this hypothesis? This could be a possibility. Although, this score was chosen because it considers multiple areas of state legitimacy, economic stability, and social justice. The other assumption under the Managerial school was the ambiguity of the treaty itself, which is much harder to test due to its subjectiveness over 192 different states.
Enforcement School

The Enforcement school was represented by economic development, witnessed by a state's economic growth. Much previous research has used GDP as a measure but excludes national businesses abroad and includes foreign assets and firms. For this study, GNI was used because it accounts for only the economic growth of the nation of that particular state, domestic and abroad. This would allow a more accurate read of the state's economic growth and development. For hypothesis four, the data showed Australia and Canada witnessing an increase in GNI over three years. Figure 7 shows that Australia saw a 117 percent GNI growth from 2009-2011, whereas Canada saw a 112 percent increase. It was seen that Australia was still able to increase trade with China, as the recession did not impact it as most of its other western trading partners. We saw Canada's bounce due to its reliance on natural resources and the construction industry. Now, did economic growth help Australia comply? Wealth security is possible because that usually happens when states choose economic growth over the environment. Although, this would require further investigation. It could have also been the political party in power. For Canada, economic growth was the reason for poor environmental protection. As one increases its construction and natural resource collection, the environment is the one that pays. In the case of Australia, economic growth and stability did potentially allow for the path of compliance to be open. This was different for Canada, which shows a rejection of the hypothesis. Therefore, the influence of the Enforcement school, unlike that of the other schools, is inconclusive between these two cases and will require further investigations.
Which School is Sufficient Towards Compliance?

So, what can be taken away from the cases of Australia and Canada? The Copenhagen school tested under Securitization Theory did not have empirical backing. But the evidence does provide for further testing of this theory as it relates to compliance under the Critical Security school. It also provides the foundations to look at another alternative to political and ideological affiliations. Throughout multiple hypotheses, we noticed the impact political ideology has on the differences in elite speech rhetoric to the decrease of a state’s capacity through their policies on public services and the economy. We even see it heavily influencing an independent and neural government agencies in both states. Regarding the Managerial school, empirical evidence also needs to be improved. The compliance paths chosen by each case need to reflect the levels of state capacity observed. This might have different results via other states, but as far as this study, it was rejected. The Management school does not appear to provide evidence of compliance with the Kyoto protocol as far as these two cases are concerned. The Enforcement school was the one school that showed empirical evidence of compliance, but it is divided between the cases. Only in Australia did the school show influence. However, even this influence could have been due to other compounding variables, such as stable economic trading partners and political parties in power.

In conclusion, this study shows that under each of the three compliance schools tested. Through the assumptions of economic growth and relative gains, the Enforcement school shows the most evidence of a state complying with its commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. This is not a generalization because the evidence was found within only
one of the two cases, which means more research on these different schools is needed to make any generalized conclusions.

6.4 Research Limitation

Like all research, this study experienced a few limitations, which could have impacted the results. Like most qualitative studies, it is limited to the amount of data available at the time of collection. For this study, this was the case for Prime Minister Speeches and National Survey Polls regarding climate change. According to Canadian and Australian laws. They are not allowed to publicly release the public papers of a PM until after 20 years from the date the PM left office. This is very different from the U.S. This makes both speeches for both states complicated to acquire since they will not be released until years later. Archival data of speeches was an option but difficult because not all pages were archived, limiting access. For example, more Hansards had to help fill in the required documents for Canada since there were very few speeches by PM Harper in 2009-2011. In the realm of surveys, this cover period was when surveys just started to take off, not to mention ones that looked at the perception of climate change. With a small pool of surveys, finding ones that fully embraced the question being asked took work. This is why Canada needed to include information on the Self-Efficacy category, which explains why their overall composite score appeared lower.
6.5 Further Research

The purpose of social science is to add to the literature and allow us to keep researching and finding new avenues to investigate. It is never to make a solid conclusion on questions because that is impossible. One of the main ways this research could be enhanced is to broaden the scope of cases through a quantitative methodology, which will allow a sample size of more states under the Kyoto Protocol. This research study did end up showing the rejection of the Copenhagen school under the Securitization Theory. However, as the public opinion polls showed, maybe the Critical Security school might provide a better understanding of compliance since it looks at speech acts originating from any actor, not just public elites. In addition to this path, one could also look more into the influence of political ideology as it relates to elite rhetoric, public opinion, and the path of a state’s bureaucracy. How much did political affiliation influence compliance through the passage of domestic legislation, or in Canada’s case, withdrawal from Kyoto? Because one could claim that with public opinion as high as it was, it made no sense to leave the treaty. Was that purely a conservative political movement, and would a Labour government have done the same thing?

Regarding state capacity, currently, the FSI score is the most comprehensive measurement we have. However, that is not to say that in the next few years, something else will come along which might show better results. Finally, the Kyoto Protocol was used since the Paris Accords will be completed in 2025. The Paris Accords would provide a new platform to retest these theories because of how far climate consciousness and action have come since the days of Kyoto. With Paris, all states have commitments under this treaty, not just developed states, which helps eliminate the fear of cheating and
buck-passing, as seen in the Kyoto Protocol. However, the paths of further research are endless because there is always an area that could open up a new perspective. Hopefully, this section inspired some new ideas to help understand the area of compliance and environmental policy.

6.6 Conclusion

This research study aimed to test the strength of three different international theories based on determining international environmental treaty compliance between Australia and Canada.

The central question for this research was as follows:

1. What makes states comply with their international environmental treaty commitments?

Through a comparative analysis of elite rhetoric, public opinion, state capacity, and economic development between 2009-2011. A total of fifty-five documents were coded, analyzing three to four national surveys per case study and collecting state capacity and gross national income data. As a result, this Thesis needs to show more empirical evidence of the strengths of the Copenhagen School and the Managerial school in influencing Australian or Canadian state compliance under the Kyoto Protocol. As for the Enforcement school, there was evidence seen in the case of Australia suggesting that an increase in economic development could influence state compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. Some might see the need for more evidence as a loss of research. It is certainly not; every study should be seen as a stepping stone. Throughout the literature on compliance, only two primary schools ruled the studies, which provide the leading way to
investigate the compliance of treaties like Montreal and Kyoto. Before this investigation, there was no mention of Securitization Theory being applied to state compliance, let alone environmental treaty compliance. This theory helped add a name to the previous studies looking at domestic actors as compliance influencers. Evidence was also provided to help falsify the Managerial school under the theory of neoliberalism, as it might not carry the best roadmap for guiding state compliance based on state capacity. Not to mention the new areas of focus that have been opened due to this research, such as investigating the potential influence of political ideology on state compliance. These additions to the compliance literature on environmental treaties and policy are considered the real success of this Thesis. It was a pleasure investigating this question and crafting this Thesis. As a global community, it is imperative that we not only find an improvement to global cooperation in general but also how find a way to ensure that future international environmental treaties are designed to succeed and not be pushed behind economic power. Only then can we ensure a closer global solution to combating climate change. However, the time is ticking on this solution.
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### APPENDIX I
Surveys used for Public Opinion Analysis

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Date of Collection</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Sampling Method</th>
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APPENDIX II
Rhetoric Files from Speeches and Transcripts from Australian and Canadian Prime Ministers 2009-2011

| Australia          | AUT1636109; AUT1642609; AUT1647109; AUT1650109; AUT1653309; AUT1663609; AUT1666109; AUT1675909; AUT1682309; AUT1688209; AUT1692009; AUT1698709; AUUNA64409; AUT1701910; AUT1703510; AUT1715710; AUT1724510; AUT1731110; AUT1733310; AUT1741210; AUT1741410; AUT1753810; AUT1752810; AUT1750510; AUT1776310; AUT1761611; AUT1767711; AUT1773511; AUT1780711; AUT1789111; AUT1789811; AUT1800611; AUT1803911; AUT1812611; AUT1820411; AUT1825311; AUT1831111 |
| Canada             | CA HC Hansard 14 09; CA HC Hansard 17 09; CA HC Hansard 21 09; CA HC Hansard 81 09; CA HC Hansard 117 09; CA Jamacia Speech 09; CA China Speech 09; CA Canadian BUSN Council Speech 09; CA Copenhagen UN Speech 09; CA North America Speech 09; CA U.S-CA Speech 2009 pt 1 09; CA U.S-CA Speech 2009 pt 2 09; CA HC Hansard 45 10; CA HC Hansard 60 10; CA HC Hansard 63 10; CA HC Hansard 65 10; CA HC Hansard 93 10; CA HC Hansard 102 10; CA HC Hansard 113 10; CA Remarks at G8 Summit 10; CA UN Speech 65th Session 10; CA Chinese Welcome Speech 10; CA 40th Chinese Anniversary Speech 10; CA World Economic Forum Speech 10; CA HC Hansard 66 11 |

### Rhetoric Files from Australian and Canadian House Debates 2009-2011

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<th>Australia</th>
<th>AUHR102209; AUHR091709; AUHR112409; AUHR081109; AUHR031809; AUHR031109; AUHR031710; AUHR020410; AUHR020310; AUHR111610; AUHR102110; AUHR092910; AUHR101111; AUHR081611; AUHR030111; AUHR032211; AUHR053111; AUHR070611</th>
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<td>Canada</td>
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*Note: All files can be found either at [https://www.ourcommons.ca/publicationsearch/en/](https://www.ourcommons.ca/publicationsearch/en/) (Canada) or [https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Search](https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard/Search) (Australia)