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Multicultural Public Policy and Homegrown Terrorism in the European Union

Macklin Keith Everly
Wright State University

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MULTICULTURAL PUBLIC POLICY AND HOMEGROWN TERRORISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

By

MACKLIN KEITH EVERLY
B.A., Wright State University, 2011

2014
Wright State University

Liam Anderson, Ph.D.
Thesis Director

Laura M. Luehrmann, Ph.D.
Director, Master of Arts Program in International and Comparative Politics

Committee on Final Examination:

Liam Anderson, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science

Vaughn Shannon, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science

Carlos Costa, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science

Robert E.W. Fyffe, Ph.D.
Vice President for Research and Dean of the Graduate School
Abstract


From the 1970s to the 1990s, Western European democracies embraced multiculturalist public policy (MCPP). This was in an effort to address and accommodate the minority rights of immigrants who found their way to Europe during its post-WWII labor force recovery. By the mid-1990s, there was a backlash against such policy and movement towards integrationist values. This has been exacerbated in the wake of radical Islamist terror attacks like those of 9/11, the London 7/7 bombing, and the Paris Metro Bombings of 1995. Attention has been focused on the threat, incidence, and causal factors of homegrown jihadism within Europe. The research presented here will analyze the degree of MCPP adopted in specific European Union member states and their incidence of radicalization in an effort to determine the strength of the relationship between the two.
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Dedication

To Christ, the glory, for he gave me life, purpose, and second chances.

To my parents, pride, for I am their legacy.

To my brothers, love, for they gave me friendship.

To my mentors, gratitude, for they gave me the tools to search for Truth.

“No one can make the journey to Truth for us.”

~A.G. Sertillanges, The Intellectual Life
INTRODUCTION

This study examines the relationship between Islamic radicalization and the policies adopted by Western European states aimed at integrating their Muslim populations. While hard data on radicalization is hard to obtain, the available evidence suggests that as the immigrant and indigenous Muslim population of Europe grows, the frequency of successful, failed and foiled attacks by Islamic radicals is also growing. This growing population is apparent through demographic data collected by scholars, which estimates that “we are likely to see a Western Europe in 2025 in which Muslims comprise a similar proportion of the population as they do in contemporary France” due to immigration and the falling fertility rates of Europeans (Kauffman 2008, p. 27).

In many European countries and cities, “there are distinct cultural enclaves where people apparently choose not to integrate into their adopted countries: rather, they live their lives within ethnic enclaves that have the linguistic, cultural, and social norms of their states of origin” (Thachuk et al 2008, p. 5). Scholars are calling attention to the serious integration issues that have arisen as a result of the policies adopted by European governments. Germany and France have no official state policy of multiculturalism, while Great Britain and the Netherlands do. Multiculturalist policy embraces the vision of "society [as] the continued existence of a variety of cultural communities within a broader societal structure" (Rex 1994). It ultimately seeks to promote societal harmony by cultivating the simultaneous existence of multiple cultures within one society. In much of the debate between scholars over the theory and practice of multiculturalism, the primary concern is that of “a doctrine of immigrant integration… [in which] the
integration of immigrant minorities should proceed by means of ‘recognizing’ the ‘culture’ that constitutes a minority as a distinct group” (Joppke 2004, p. 239, 238).

As current policy and popular focus stands, EU member states can generally be placed on a policy scale between multicultural public policy (MCPP) and public policy aimed at assimilation (APP) with Great Britain and its multiculturalism on one end of the spectrum, France and its assimilationist tendencies on the other, and the rest of the EU member states in between. For example, the Netherlands leans closer to Britain’s multicultural policies and Germany closer to France’s assimilationist policies, but both fall in between each end of the policy spectrum.

Great Britain has an official policy of multiculturalism and offers inclusive citizenship to its immigrants, both refugee and former-colony-resident alike. However, there are still large Muslim enclaves in the larger cities, most notably in London. The “Muslims who live [there] feel excluded from British society; they live in poor, isolated communities with no intersection with British mainstream culture” (Hinze 2007, p. 4, emphasis added). Post-9/11 anti-terror policies of the British government also helped British Muslims to feel targeted and isolated. This triggered a withdrawal from British culture altogether and a trend in British Muslims finding Islam as their primary source of identity, rather than their Britishness (Hinze 2007). In fact, by 2011, a study by Thomas and Sanderson found that 93% of young British Muslims believe “Islam/faith …[is] the most important form of identification for virtually all Pakistani/Bangladeshi-origin young people surveyed… in strong contrast to all other ethnic/faith backgrounds” (Thomas and Sanderson 2011, p. 1033).
The Netherlands also has an official policy of multiculturalism towards its immigrants, although recently it has been moving further to the assimilationist end of the spectrum as far as its policies of integration go. The Dutch implemented workforce enlargement programs in the 1960s and 1970s from Morocco and Turkey and the former Dutch colony of Indonesia. Immigration from these regions was limited by the government, but they were still quite liberal with their citizenship laws. They took a markedly liberal approach towards immigrant culture by supporting them through welfare and education programs, allowing separate media broadcasts, and even providing state funding for the religious education of immigrant children. Despite these efforts to accommodate minorities, “the Dutch recently discovered that their policy of multiculturalism [has] led to a parallel Muslim society, which [has] no connection with Dutch mainstream society” (Hinze 2007, p. 5). Additionally, a cross-national survey of the Netherlands immigrant population in comparison with other European countries on both the MC and APP sides of the public policy spectrum shows some interesting results concerning its performance under MCPP. The study found that, “Combined, the results on the labor market, education, segregation, and crime show that it is no coincidence that the Dutch experiment with multiculturalism” may be failing and “[s]ince there is no indication that the size and composition of the immigrant population are a sufficient explanation… Dutch integration policies, namely its strong facilitation of cultural differences, becomes a serious candidate” for explaining the Netherlands not only poor, but altogether worse, performance in comparison to other EU countries (Koopmans 2006, pp. 19, 23).
Although Germany’s workforce programs invited immigrants to live and work only temporarily in Germany, many of those immigrants (primarily of Turkish origin) never left, because the new economic conditions were better than they were back home. This created a tension between their desire to continue living there and Germany’s stringent *jus sanguinis*, citizenship by blood-right, laws, which remained unchanged until 1999 when Germany also adopted a law to allow citizenship through *jus soli*, citizenship by the soil. This gave children born by Turkish parents on German soil eligibility to become German citizens. However, the Turks living in Germany between the era of the guestworker programs and the implementation of *jus soli* were not protected by the state, nor did they receive any benefits from it. Regardless of the change in citizenship requirements, the damage had “taken its toll on Germany’s Turks, whose legal exclusion has led to a withdrawal from German culture and lifestyle on their part” and the formation of large Muslim enclaves in the larger cities (Hinze 2007, p.3). Radicalization in these enclaves is also an issue to German officials, especially in light of their increasing awareness of violent Salafi groups. German surveillance has noted that there are approximately 42,550 radical Islamists in Germany as of 2012 and that of those, “the number of Salafists… within the movement grew to 4,500 from 3,800 in a year” (Newsdesk 2013, p.1). Although Germany does not view each individual radical or Salafi Islamist a potential terrorist, the growing numbers are concerning since German intelligence sees “Salafism [as] an essential step towards *jihadism* or [readiness] to conduct terrorist attacks” (Newsdesk 2013, p.1).

France, has more open citizenship regulations than Germany because it granted immigrants from its former colonies *jus soli* French citizenship, but has never had an
official policy of multiculturalism and in fact is sometimes referred to as an assimilationist nation. This is due to the high value that the French place on Gallicizing other cultures and lifestyles, which resulted in severe underrepresentation of French Muslims in the public sphere due to the strong atmosphere of laïcité in French society. The concept of laïcité is one of absolute separation of religion from the public arena. In France, Muslims “are expected to be ‘good Frenchmen’ and completely assimilate to French culture and the ideals of secularism if they want to live [there]” (Hinze 2007, p.4). The laïcité tension has also resulted in strong segregation between Muslim minorities and the rest of the French population, due in part to immigrant Muslim resistance to secularization. In Paris, most minority Muslims live in the poor suburbs surrounding the city, most of which exist in ghetto-like conditions with high unemployment and a significant amount of social anger among Muslim youth towards the French state, evidence of which can be seen in the infamous 2005 riots referred to at the time as the “French Intifada” (Hinze 2007; Leiken 2012).

A common thread emerges from the examination of these four countries: parallel societies in the form of large, poor, and “angry” Muslim enclaves (Leiken 2012). The literature available on the topic of multicultural policy in Western Europe acknowledges this phenomenon and attempts to reconcile its occurrence in one of two broad claims: (1) that multiculturalism has been improperly applied or stubbornly resisted; (2) or through the claim that multiculturalist policies cannot succeed and that their implementation has actually exacerbated the problem of Muslim self-segregation and subsequently the issue of second- and third-generation Muslim radicalization.
Given the growing level of disenfranchisement among second- and third-generation (hereafter referred to as 2/3Gen) Muslim youth in Europe in tandem with their growing numbers and parallel societies, it is thus prudent to examine possible contributing factors that are conducive to Muslim radicalization to minimize the threat that radicalized indigenous Europeans can pose to international security within the EU and abroad (Leiken 2012). The goal of this thesis is to examine the relationship between the policy adopted by a state (whether MCPP, APP, or something in between) and the radicalization of the state’s Muslim population.
CHAPTER ONE: CORE CONCEPTS AND THE LINK BETWEEN MULTICULTURALISM AND RADICALIZATION

Radicalization

There is an overarching theme throughout the literature that 2/3Gen Muslim Europeans are especially susceptible to radicalization and that this is a very dangerous trend. As the children of the first-wave, now permanent, Muslim residents in the EU, these individuals make ideal recruits for Islamist terror organizations, because they “speak European languages, handle computers, surf the internet, exchange e-mail… are familiar with post-industrial infrastructures and customs… [and are] unlikely to be watchlisted” (Leiken 2005). Many scholars commonly agree on two aspects of radicalization – relative deprivation and personal identity crisis – as the primary causes of radicalization (King and Taylor 2011: Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010).

The focus of European nations on identifying and combating the problem of homegrown terrorism – especially since the World Trade Center bombing on September 11, 2001, the Madrid bombing on March 11, 2004, and the London bus bombing on July 7, 2005 – has become an issue not only for security analysts, but for scholars of the social sciences as well. Although there has not been a particular rash of Islamist attacks throughout the last decade, European governments continue to identify, stop, and capture a significant amount of homegrown *jihadists*. Scholars have noticed that there is something unique about the process of individual radicalization, in this case 2/3Gen Muslim Europeans, and that understanding even just one of the major factors in the process may lead to concrete developments in countering, as peacefully as possible, the
increasing tension between sovereign governments and the parallel Muslim societies that have formed within their borders. Scholars have also sought to better understand the nature of the jihad that is claimed by radical Islamists and have analyzed the circumstances and various aspects required for successful radicalization of 2/3Gen Muslims (Sendagorta 2005; Nesser 2011; King and Taylor 2011; Ganor 2011; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Bartlett and Miller 2012). It is important to continue research on the radicalization process and the factors that influence it, because even just one successful attack can be devastating, as 9/11 clearly demonstrated. As more 2/3Gen youth are radicalized and/or recruited towards jihadism, the odds of that one devastating attack occurring increases as well.

Analysis of the available literature confirms that the motivations of relative deprivation and personal identity crisis are primary steps in radicalization. Research also indicates that there is some evidence of Islamist terrorist organizations utilizing Muslim enclaves, despite discrepancies among scholars as to the specific role – passive or active – of terrorist groups in the radicalization of 2/3Gen Muslims (Brown 2010; Sendagorta 2005).

After surveying the literature, there seems to be a core “identity crisis” to individual radicalization among, but not exclusive to, 2/3Gen Muslims. Although there are “innumerable people [who] experience identity-related crises [and] do not radicalize,” there is empirical evidence that “radicalization may stem from a burden shared by… managing a dual identity” (King and Taylor 2011, pp. 612, 611; Stroink 2006). However,

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1 These scholars have provided background and foundational research on the psychological and sociological factors that contribute to a person’s radicalization both in general and specifically in regards to Islamism.
since identity crisis does not often exclusively lead to radicalization, its interactions with other variables in the radicalization process begin to come into play. Individual radicalization can culminate in “a blending of personal and group grievance, a blending in which personal grievance means hostility or negative identification with a group seen as perpetrators of injustice, and in which group grievance means positive identification with a group seen as the victims of this injustice” (McCauley and Moskalenko 2011, p. 32). These concepts are intimately intertwined and almost always turn into political grievance and sometimes even political violence. There are a variety of theories as to why individuals radicalize, but the factor of a 2/3Gen identity crisis seems to be the one that is generally agreed upon in the radicalization literature. These are people who feel they don’t belong anywhere. They are forced to manage both their own ethnic identities – placed on them by their parents – and a Western identity, which often directly contradicts their ethnic or religious culture (King and Taylor 2011).

Academics, however, seem to be unable to determine the primary variable at work that increases the incidence of homegrown jihadists in the EU. Recent studies have even shown that contingents of foreign fighters are coming from European countries to fight in the Middle East – particularly in Syria (Jones 2013; Mulrine 2013). Scholars have put forth a great many ideas like the Islamist narrative of the West, socioeconomic disadvantage, Islamophobia, perceptions of Muslim immigration among Europeans, racism, counterterrorist policies, and multiculturalism– just to name a few (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; Fekete 2004; Leiken 2012). There appears to be little to no effort to determine the degree to which MCPP (or APP) is contributing to the trend of homegrown jihadism, especially from Muslim enclave communities.
Literature about the process of radicalization has some commonalities (relative deprivation and personal identity crisis) and some discrepancies (the role of terrorist organizations and the role of individual characteristics). This study will focus on the commonalities that are most pertinent to this research. The social-psychological factors of relative deprivation and identity crisis, according to scholarship on the subject, appear to occur most consistently among the population of 2/3Gen Muslim Europeans (King and Taylor 2011; Ganor 2011; Dalgaard-Neilsen 2010; Leiken 2005; Leiken 2012; Kaufmann 2008; Brown 2010).

The conclusions reached by researchers of radicalization with respect to Muslim Europeans agree that 2/3Gens feel that they are a separate society from that of the indigenous – whether this is of their own doing or the result of a negative cultural interaction with Europeans is still of great debate – which leads to perceptions of relative socioeconomic deprivation and to struggles of dual national identity (King and Taylor 2011; Ganor 2011; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010). Based on the literature, there is evidently a scholarly consensus that social context plays a crucial role in the process of radicalization and that the geographic and social concentration of Muslim Europeans can exacerbate the feelings of enmity between them and indigenous Europeans (Leiken 2012; McCauley and Moskalenka 2011; Steyn 2006; Hinze 2007; Tebble 2006; Phillips 2006). In the study of terrorist recruitment in Europe, there has been much analysis and little disagreement. Some of the literature places emphasis on their recruitment strategies and venues that are commonly used for pulling in candidates (Nesser 2011; Sendagorta 2005) However, it is important to remember that not all radicalized Islamists are recruited by or even seek to join a transnational or local organization. They can spontaneously form into new
independent Islamist cells as well, which Sageman refers to as the “bunch of guys theory” or the “echo chamber” effect (King and Taylor 2011; Sageman 2008, p. 69, 116). This is an indicator that the common conception of top-down recruitment does not always hold to be true. With this in mind, the issue of 2/3Gen Muslim radicalization becomes even less predictable and even more dangerous.

**Multiculturalism/Anti-Integrationism**

Stemming from the intense debate over the utility of multiculturalism as public policy, there have been many re-conceptualizations and theories that have arisen to defend, amend, or replace it. Those supporting multiculturalist democracy, contend that the employment of generic multiculturalism, as well as the creation of specific approaches like “critical multiculturalism” and deliberative democracy, which both promote the core characteristics of accommodation of cultural minorities within Western democratic society, are the key to creating cross-cutting cleavages necessary to societal harmony (Awad 2011; Habermas 1998; Triadafilopoulos 2011). Those supporting the assimilationist side of the discussion, put forth other solutions such as “civic integrationism”, “identity liberalism”, and “Schmittian liberalism”, which are all intended to be more compatible with democratic regimes than traditional policies of multiculturalism (Joppke 2004; Tebble 2006; Schmitt 1996; Triadafilopoulos 2011). Both camps are similar in that they seek to further the creation of harmonious cross-cutting
cleavages, but each accuses the other of actually creating destabilizing coinciding cleavages.² (Triadafilopoulos 2011; Fekete 2006; Joppke 2009).

One of the most cited authors in multiculturalist literature is Will Kymlicka. Although he is a proponent of multiculturalism, his work has been used to refute, defend, and amend arguments on multiculturalist policy throughout scholarly literature. In his work, he acknowledges that most of the debate and anxiety arising over multiculturalism and the troubles affiliated with its implementation concern immigrants more than national minorities. Since ethnic Muslims make up a significant portion of EU immigration, it is logical to apply his arguments concerning immigrant integration to the integration of Muslim immigrants as well. Kymlicka is a champion of multiculturalism within liberal democracies and often cites its compatibility with core liberal-democratic values. As such, much of his literature attributes any failed multiculturalist policies to poor or wrongful implementation or to societal prejudice. Thus, he believes that “reports of multiculturalism’s death are very much exaggerated” by post-multiculturalists (Kymlicka 2010b, p. 104).

In this camp, multiculturalism is generally seen to be part of a larger human rights revolution with a focus on ethnic, racial, and religious differences. It becomes an ideology that influences public policy which, at its core, “attempts to redefine the relationship between ethno-cultural minorities and the State through the adoption of new laws, policies, or institutions” (Kymlicka 2010b, p. 99). Ultimately, the general goal for

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² Coinciding cleavages are groups of people or ethnicities that are piled on top of one another without proper integration, thus weakening a society. This is in comparison to cross-cutting cleavages which bring groups together and integrate them with one another in a way that strengthens a society. (Green and Luehrmann 2011).
multiculturalism that is presented throughout the literature is to provide universal human rights and principles and liberal-democratic constitutional values to minority groups within the state through accommodation. To test these general characteristics of multiculturalism and the effects of its implementation, there have been a few small-\( n \) cross-national survey studies comparing nations who publicly adopt policies of multiculturalism and those who explicitly or unintentionally do not. These survey studies found that there was outperformance of certain multicultural nations – like Sweden – over non-multicultural nations – like Germany – in the areas of migrant integration and lower levels of xenophobia (Kymlicka 2010a).

**Critical Multiculturalism**

The available literature on this topic also demonstrates some subtle evolutions of multiculturalist ideology in response to attacks on it which claim it is an illiberal notion by nature and is thus incompatible with democratic society. One of these evolutions is the proposition of “critical multiculturalism” (Awad 2011). This version seeks to ultimately redefine the notion of multiculturalism within its structural contexts and in relational terms. It rejects the traditional constraints that are placed on multiculturalism by traditional liberal and republican models of democracy as well as explicitly assimilationist models of citizenship – e.g. requiring immigrants to learn the official language and/or adapt to the culture of the host country.

Those who argue that multiculturalism is incompatible with democratic society see it “as a source of divisiveness and exclusion… [and accuse it] of harming not only
minority groups, but also democracy itself” (Awad 2011, p. 40). Therefore, government must find other ways to discover the role of cultural diversity in democratic society such as discarding multiculturalism altogether in favor of a return to assimilation of migrants making adaptation a requirement for social inclusion. Critical multiculturalism rejects a return to assimilationism and argues for viewing multiculturalism from a structuralist point of view in conjunction with Jürgen Habermas’ conception of deliberative democracy. Critical multiculturalism primarily “criticizes… ‘the ideological apparatuses that distribute power and resources unevenly among the different constituencies of multicultural society’” and promotes its own structuralist and non-essentialist approach to culture enabling a democratic appreciation of cultural difference (Awad 2011, p. 41). Its goal is to create a democratic society in which the different are not marginalized, but rather included in the civic processes of citizenry.

Deliberative democracy is seen as a middle ground between liberal and republican democracies, because it focuses on procedure, like the liberal ideal of rule of law, and on community building and reinforcement via civic participation (Awad 2011). However, unlike liberalism and republicanism, deliberative democracy operates under the theory of discourse ethics and lacks a predefined ethos under which a society commits to living. This is intended to trigger a dialog in society in order to reach a common understanding among the entire population that is free from the influence of power or money. The goal is to create “a correctly understood theory of rights [which] requires a politics of recognition that protects the integrity of the individual in the life contexts in which his or her identity is formed” (Habermas 1998). These “life contexts” are in direct reference to culture.
Whether scholars in this camp acknowledge or reject the existence of parallel and near-autonomous Muslim enclaves in European democracies, they still argue that any segregation that has occurred is due to poor or improper implementation of multiculturalist policies, a lack of true multiculturalist principles within the society, or simple racism and prejudice on the part of the majority and national minority populations towards immigrant minorities – specifically in this case, Muslim immigrant minorities (Fekete 2006; Givens 2007; Fekete 2004; Yegenoglu 2012). In fact, some of the literature argues that not only is “white European” racism to blame for the perpetuation of these ghetto-esque enclaves, but that “historically Europe has defined itself by producing the incompatible space, its ghettos, enclaves within or spaces outside of Europe” (Stehle 2006, p.61). Thus, to the multiculturalist, it is not any characteristic, attribute, or tendency of the immigrant minority culture that is responsible for segregation into parallel and/or ghetto communities, but rather it is the fault of the culture of the host population. It is the fault of those factors, rather than any fault with the practicality of the theory of multiculturalism itself, that is blamed for “the new drive across Europe towards assimilation… [which includes] the recasting of citizenship laws according to security considerations,” language requirements, and civics examinations (Fekete 2004, p. 4). A common buzzword in pro-multiculturalism literature to represent this prejudice is “Islamophobia” and its use and incidence has increased simultaneously with the presence of extreme-Right groups in many EU countries since the tragic events of 9/11 (Fekete 2004; Stehle 2012; Mahajan 2007).
Integrationism/Anti-Multiculturalism

Civic Integrationism

On the other side of the debate in the literature are the notions of integrationism which generally promote the idea that the leftist theories and ideology of multiculturalism are not compatible with a liberal democracy. One popular approach to the issues of integration that have been growing in Europe since the 1970s is that of civic integrationism through the strategy of privatization. Scholars in this camp don’t see anything wrong with the traditional system of “the liberal, difference-blind state with its universal citizenship, which… had exactly emerged as a peacemaker to a hyper-diverse society torn by religious wars in the seventeenth century Europe” (Joppke 2004, p.239). The combination of liberal democracy with the strategy of privatization enables the creation of certain rules of civic participation for people who are free to operate as they see fit within the constraints of those societal rules. Thus, diversity and equality are embraced through the universal application of one set of rules. It encourages pluralism within society, which “is emphatically not multicultural… [because] pluralism requires voluntary group memberships, [cross-cutting cleavages], and ‘a reciprocal recognition’ between conflict parties” (Joppke 2004, p.238). These requirements are not possible within the multicultural political sphere, which operates on “involuntary and mutually exclusive statuses” and makes recognition something to be done only by the majority population (Joppke 2004, p.238). Proponents of multiculturalism say there must be policies in place to ensure that groups who don’t see themselves as part of the ethnic/national majority group feel that they have equal status. Civic integrationists see this as a faulty position in that most cultural conflicts tend to be religious in nature and
the real problem is those cultures whose religious beliefs are unable “to acknowledge the private-public distinction” of liberal democracy – e.g. France’s political philosophy of laïcité (Joppke 2004, p.241; Hinze 2007). Thus, civic integrationists are “less willing to see [their liberal principles] violated under the cloak of ‘multicultural toleration’” (Triadafilopoulos 2011, p.869).

Integrationists additionally believe that “it is logically impossible to recognize all cultures as equal… [because] cultures have… ‘propositional content’ [that] they distinguish between true and false, right and wrong, beautiful and ugly,” which cannot all be simultaneously accommodated (Joppke 2004, p. 242). The application of multiculturalist theory consists only of one-way cultural recognition from the majority towards the minorities, never to be reciprocated. Those scholars who oppose multiculturalism as a public policy understand that its goal is to attain a level of equal recognition between each culture in a society, but that that tolerance does not equal recognition, especially when minorities aren’t returning the favor. Instead, it breeds enmity between the host culture and immigrant cultures, arguably resulting in the furthering of cultural segregation and marginalization and the presence of Muslim enclaves and ghettos that are becoming targets for fundamentalist Islamist infiltration (Brown 2010; Tebble 2006; Haddad and Balz 2008; Leiken 2005).

Furthering the logical impossibility of multiculturalism, pro-integrationists view MCPP as a contradictory movement of the left with both modern and anti-modern characteristics of the extreme right. It is a modern theory in that it promotes the collapse of social hierarchies and the melting away of identity in an individualized social
structure. However, it is also considered anti-modern, because at the same time it promotes the elevation of “ethnic heritage, racial features, or sexual orientation… into exclusive master statuses that totally fix an individual’s identity and interests…” The world of multiculturalism is populated not by individuals with a multitude of [cross-cutting cleavages], but by groups or ‘communities’ that are inert, homogenous, and mutually exclusive, such as gays, Latinos, or Muslims” (Joppke 1996, p.449). Additionally, undermining the individualism of a society is seen to make it more susceptible to fundamentalist extremes like those who subscribe to Islamist ideology, which is incompatible with any ideology of accommodation. Islamism does not serve to flavor a homogenous society, but rather seeks to carry the meaning of “Islam” (submission) to its fullest extent through transformation, subjugation, and conquest of “all those political and material powers which stand between people and Islam, which force one people to bow before another people and prevent them from accepting the sovereignty of God” (Bawer 2002, 2006; Qutb 2005). The combination of contradictory principles within multiculturalist theory manifests its primeval nature “as the liberal plea for tolerance and mutual understanding in the multiethnic immigrant societies of today, but also as a separatist quest for ‘black power’ or militant attack on ‘Western imperialism’” along with a right-wing nationalist abhorrence for “the ‘assimilation’ of foreigners” (Joppke 1996, pp. 450, 469).

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References to radical Islamism and Islamists refer to those individuals and groups who subscribe to politically revolutionary and violent movements like those instigated by radicals such as Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian radical who had “a massive influence on modern-day Islamist extremism” (Jenkins 2007, p.129). The use of the term refers to the minority of Muslims who adopt this ideology and not to Islam or Muslims as a whole.
Identity and Schmittian Liberalism

Another camp within the assimilationist side of the debate, are identity liberals who offer a more assimilationist viewpoint than others who oppose multiculturalism. Where multiculturalists argue that they seek to guarantee that minorities are included in society and not marginalized, identity liberals call “for assimilation without which, it is claimed, minorities will be ill-equipped to operate effectively within and thus will be excluded by wider society” (Tebble 2006, p. 472). Thus, identity liberal literature is very much similar to assimilationist literature in that they both believe multiculturalism, despite its altruistic intentions, to be a dangerous marginalizing theory of public policy and should be challenged. Once again, we see similar ideology to identity liberalism encased in the French political philosophy of laïcité and their policies towards religious symbolism in public schools. Assimilation not only serves “to include minority communities… it is also claimed that it protects marginalized subgroups within minority communities from social pressure to conform to traditional behaviors that marginalize them within their own community” and are incompatible with the liberal-democratic attributes of the host society (Tebble 2006, p. 473).

Identity liberal literature also claims that the marginalizing effects of multiculturalism are not exclusive only to those effects, but can also play a significant role in societal domination by minorities over the host culture. Examples are given of the London municipal authority of Tower Hamlets and the renaming of certain districts. They elected to change the name of the Spitalfields electoral ward to “Spitalfields Banglatown” and, a year later, to rename part of the district of Wapping as ‘Surma Town’
after a river in the region of Bangladesh where the majority of immigrants in the area come from” (Tebble 2006, p. 475; Wainwright 1999).

The literature in this area of integrationism also shares certain basic attributes with a concept of liberalism put forth by the German legal theorist Carl Schmitt: Schmittian Liberalism. Schmittian liberalism is “based on the identity-constituting process of distinguishing between friends and enemies… [in which] the political enemy need not be morally evil or aesthetically ugly…but he is nevertheless, the other, the stranger” (Triadafilopoulos 2011, p. 871; Schmitt 1996, p. 27). This is not to say that minorities, particularly immigrants, are the “enemy”, but rather that arguing against public policies of their integration into society, as multiculturalism does, is the disposal of a powerful weapon against enemies that would threaten the security of liberal-democratic society – e.g. fundamentalist Islam (Bawer 2002; Triadafilopoulos 2011; Phillips 2006; Carr 2006).

Themes, Omissions, and Justifications

The theme of the literature available on radicalization is increasingly identifying 2/3Gen Muslims as vulnerable to radicalization, especially in light of the agreed upon factors of identity crises and relative deprivation (King and Taylor 2011; Ganor 2011; Dalgaard-Neilsen 2010; Leiken 2005; Leiken 2012; Kaufmann 2008; Brown 2010).

There is an overarching theme throughout the MC literature about the best way to ensure that the benefits of the universal attributes of liberal-democratic societies – e.g. protections for religion, speech, and equality; neutrality of the state; civic participation,
etc. – are received by immigrant minorities as well as national majority citizens. Over the past half-century, Europe has seen a popular rise and decline in the subscription to multiculturalist policy, which was intended to create “a cultural utopia of cultures co-existing and interacting in a peaceful manner of mutual understanding” and preserve the guarantees of liberal-democratic society at the same time (Hinze 2007, p. 1; Kymlicka 2010a; Joppke 2004; Triadafilopoulos 2011).

As far as what is missing from the literature, there has been little to no agreement or empirical analysis of the relationship between these radicalization processes and the public policies that create the social context in which 2/3Gs live. Scholarship has speculated on the effects of MC on immigrant communities in political, social, and socioeconomic issues areas, such as education performance, labor market integration, local area segregation, crime, and societal attitudes towards ethnic and religious minorities (Koopmans 2006; Joppke 2009; Thomas Huddleston et al, Migrant Integration Policy Index 2011). The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) research project, in particular, finds statistical correlations between the different policies that it examines, but only insofar as it relates to the access or existence of the policies themselves; not in relation to further potential variables that could be affected like radicalization. For instance, there is a correlation between labor market mobility and multiculturalist family reunification policies, which implies that “immigrant families can better reunite and participate in countries that help all new comers find the right jobs” (MIPEX 2011, p.10).

Outside of factors such as feelings of relative deprivation and identity crises, not much is put forth in the literature specifically concerning the radicalization of 2/3G
Muslims. Trajectories of radicalization processes are laid out by some studies, but they serve mostly for observatory process tracing purposes rather than identification of causal mechanisms in the wider social context that MC occupies (see King and Taylor 2011). Other scholars have attempted to identify education and wealth levels as indicators for radicalization as well as acute local community variables instead of more deeply examining the effect that national public policy may have in the creation of those cofactors in radicalization. Likewise, much research has been focused on looking for abnormal or “deviant” factors and variations to lead to radicalization when trying to identify causal mechanisms to the process (e.g. criminal behavior or psychological disposition), as illustrated by Pisoiu (2013). The research presented here will aim to examine a non-deviant variable as a potentially powerful factor in the radicalization of 2/3G Muslims: Multiculturalist Public Policy – a variable that is for the most part outside of the 2/3G control.

It is also clear that there is one very important item that has been omitted from MC literature. There are plenty of political and philosophical debates about the nature of multiculturalism and how it fits or does not fit or must be modified to fit into a liberal-democratic society, and there are plenty of arguments about whether it will, can, or is incapable of generating the stabilizing cross-cutting cleavages that every democratic society seeks. However, the glaring omission presented here is that of real empirical evidence as to the effectiveness of multiculturalism as a public policy and its relationship w/the phenomena of homegrown jihadism. Scholars on both sides present some empirical evidence as to multiculturalism’s effect on immigrant communities living in Europe, the incidence of xenophobia within certain countries, and bilateral comparisons between non-
and-multicultural nations or small-n cross national surveys. Examples include surveys of Muslim and Muslim youth identities in specific countries (Thomas and Sanderson 2011; Pew Research Global Attitudes Project 2006; Mythen 2012), surveys of media coverage and reactions concerning significant terror events (Shaw 2012; Rubin et al 2005), as well as more qualitative theoretical comparisons of nations and their multiculturalist policies (Joppke 1996; Joppke 2004; Kymlicka 2011).

These studies are anecdotal at best and lack a firmer empirical foundation if they were based on harder empirical evidence. Koopmans (2013) has perhaps provided the closest version of a desirable small-n cross national empirical study of multiculturalism and immigrant communities, but his study only considers factors of integration and their socioeconomic and sociocultural outcomes. The study presented here will go a step further and attempt to show empirical results for a relationship between multiculturalist public policy and the incidence of Islamist radicalization in Western Europe. Regardless of the empirical quality of these referenced studies, none of them provide a comprehensive look at the true effectiveness of multiculturalist public policy versus those of assimilationist public policy (APP) and how one or the other affects radicalization within Western European democracies. The purpose of this research is to provide an empirical analysis of this issue.
CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY AND VARIABLE MEASUREMENT

Methodology

For the purposes of this research, the dependent variable (DV) will be the incidence of terrorism and the independent variable (IV) will be MCPP measured through the Multiculturalism Policy Index (MPI). These variables will be operationalized using data and information gathered by the MPI and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) for the DV.

The question to be answered here is whether the use of MCPP versus APP results in an increase of radicalization among 2/3Gs in the EU. Based on the theory presented, the working hypothesis here is that as a state adopts higher degrees of MCPP it will demonstrate an increase in radicalization, and therefore, terrorist activity. The research here isolates cases of Islamist terrorism, because it is there are only certain minorities that can generally be adversely affected by MCPP. Caucasian minorities like those from Romania or Bulgaria, may come from other cultures, but aspects of their cultures are not restricted or enhanced by MCPP. Rather, it is primarily ethno-religious minorities that are targeted by MCPP and are thus more affected by it. Islamist terrorism has been an issue of popular examination and with an increasing Muslim population in Europe, Islamic minorities are a good starting point for examination on the effects of MCPP on radicalization levels (Kaufmann 2008).
In order to examine the relationship between the adoption of MCPP versus APP and the radicalization of 2/3G Muslims, a difference of means test will be conducted. The MPI has already provided scores for the 14 EU member states and analysis of the GTD database will yield data on Islamist terrorist activity in each of those nations. A typology will be developed to filter the relevance of cases provided in the GTD and purify the data. Based on the data from these sources, a difference of means test will determine whether or not there is a statistically significant difference between countries which adopt MCPP (high level) and those who adopt APP (low level) and the incidence of Islamic terrorist activity. This test will not be able to pinpoint a specific causal mechanism between MCPP or APP and radicalization; it will, however, determine whether a relationship exists. The difference of means test basically allows the analysis to see whether there is a higher or lower mean in the number of terrorist attacks that an MCPP country experiences versus that of an APP country and the reliability of those results at a 90% confidence interval.

To examine the causal relationship between the IV and DV, the statistical part of the thesis will be supplemented with comparative case study evidence from Britain and France using a most different systems design. A basic glance at the raw number of terrorist attacks in each of these countries shows that there are significant differences in the incidence of terrorist attacks from 1980 – 2010 in some countries as well as notable comparative differences between their policies towards immigrants across those time periods as well. The case studies will detail the evolution of and differences in

4 The difference of means test was selected because of its unique ability to analyze the means of small-\(n\) groups and still determine whether there are statistically significant differences between the examined populations.
immigration and integration policy for each state and will focus especially on these topics in regards to trends of radicalization of 2/3Gen Muslims. Additionally, these cases will help to identify whether it is the underlying principle of MCPP that is flawed or whether it is poor implementation. This is necessary to address, because the statistics that will be shown cannot demonstrate the reasons behind policy failure – only whether or not it fails. Case studies will help to demonstrate exactly where the failure lies.

The Variables

Although radicalization (the DV) can be defined and conceptualized, it is one of the more difficult concepts to operationalize. It is impossible to gauge empirically the mental condition of any individual and determine their status of “radical” or “non-radical” without obtaining psychological evaluations for a large enough sample of the population being examined. Unfortunately, due to resource and time constraints, that is not a viable option for this study. Therefore, radicalization has been operationalized into a form of data that can be counted and measured: Terrorist incidents recorded in the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).

Multiculturalism (the IV), is easier to operationalize thanks to the Multiculturalism Policy Index (MPI) published by Keith Banning and Will Kymlicka of the Queen’s University School of Policy Studies. They have analyzed and organized policy information from 21 nations and scored them on a scale of multiculturalism. This policy information, although it is totaled in an overall score, is gathered from eight
specific areas of policy: Affirmation of Policy, School Curriculum, Media Inclusion, Dress Code Exemption, Dual Citizenship Provision, Funding for Ethnic Groups, Funding for Bilingual Education, and Affirmative Action. When the MPI was being developed, these policy areas were categorized and scored into one of three categories for the examined time periods of 1980, 2000, and 2010. The codes assigned to each state by the MPI indicate the degree of existence of multicultural public policy in that state as “Yes” = 1, “Limited/Partial” = 0.5, and “No” = 0. The MPI adds up these scores for each country in each time period to a total score in the range of zero to eight.

The following descriptions of the policy areas will help to clarify how they were evaluated by the MPI and what characteristics go into assigning the categories of Yes, Limited/Partial, and No.

**Affirmation of Policy**

There is “constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism at the central and/or regional and municipal levels and the existence of a government ministry, secretariat, or advisory board to implement this policy in consultation with ethnic communities” (Multiculturalism Policy Index project, School of Policy Studies 2011, p.5). In short, for a country to be assigned a code of 1, it must have official government affirmation of multiculturalism as well as an implementing body to

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5 Policy descriptions and example information concerning their scoring are taken from the Multiculturalism Policy Index project, School of Policy Studies. 
enforce it. For example, Sweden, examined at in the aggregate statistical analysis here, incorporates the principles of MC into its constitution in Chapter 1 Article 3 of its Constitution’s section on “the Instrument of Government” adopted in 1974, which explicitly call for all public institutions to “combat discrimination of persons on grounds of gender, colour, national or ethnic origin, linguistic or religious affiliation, functional disability, sexual orientation, age or other circumstance affecting the private person” (Multiculturalism Policy Index project, School of Policy Studies 2011, p.91).

For a country to be categorized with 0.5, there must be evidence that the government has not explicitly or officially affirmed MC as a public policy or goal, but still has a relevant implementing body that operates under the principles of MC. Portugal, for example, has not constitutionally recognized MC, but there is still evidence of institutional implementation of MC within official government legislation. In 2001, the Portuguese government “passed Estabelece o estatuto legal do mediador sócio-cultural, which established the legal status of sociocultural mediators whose function it is to promote social cohesion, intercultural dialogue, inclusion and respect for cultural diversity” (Multiculturalism Policy Index project, School of Policy Studies 2011, p.81).

Lastly, and quite intuitively, countries placed in the 0 category have demonstrated neither official government endorsement of MC nor is an implementing government body present. In Austria, there is no federal recognition of the principles of MC and also no agency to unofficially enforce it. In fact, the state extends rights to only ethnic minorities who fall into a group of native ethnicities known as the Volksgruppen. These include the Solvenes, Croats, Hungarians, Czechs, Slavaks, and Roma. Outside of the Volksgruppen,
minority rights extended by the state are not provided for other minority groups. However, there is “some recognition of cultural diversity… at the municipal level” in Vienna, which is trying to shift societal attitude from viewing migrants as guest workers through certain municipal integration policies and programs (Multiculturalism Policy Index project, School of Policy Studies 2011, p.15).

**School Curriculum**

The coding for this policy area is determined by whether or not MC or its principles are explicitly adopted in school curriculum. Sweden, for instance, earned a score of 1 in the MPI because the government has explicitly integrated MC into its curriculum with a unique focus on the learning and maintenance of heritage languages.

A score of 0.5 is assigned when a state “has not formally or extensively adopted [MC] in its curriculum, but has engaged in rhetoric that supports such inclusion, implemented it in some districts, or developed intercultural or anti-racism education initiatives” (Multiculturalism Policy Index project, School of Policy Studies 2011, p.5). The United Kingdom demonstrates this. Within the UK School Curriculum, there has been MC rhetoric present since the 1970s and the government showed explicit support for it later through the National Curriculum Council, born out of the 1988 *Education Reform Act*, which “recommended multicultural and citizenship education [to] be developed as part of the wider curriculum” and it became integrated into school curriculum by the early 90s (Multiculturalism Policy Index project, School of Policy...
Studies 2011, p.101). However, those same policies that were sought by the government and espoused by public officials during that period began disappearing in the later 90s.

Scores of 0 demonstrate that there is no government sponsored presence of MC in school curriculum and that the state has not satisfied any of the requirements for partial adoption either. France is a classic illustration that has been brought into the limelight due to its heavy restrictions on religious symbols in schools, but further examination of its curriculum provisions show that although the authorities do provide “references to recognizing and respecting other cultures, the guidelines do not incorporate MC or interculturalism” (p.39).

**Media Inclusion**

For a country to be considered as having MC media policy, it must provide for “ethnic representation, inclusion, sensitivity or diversity… in the mandate of public broadcaster or media licensing” (Multiculturalism Policy Index project, School of Policy Studies 2011, p.5). The UK was coded as having MC media policy during the examined 2000 and 2010 time periods. However, during the 1980s the Commission for Racial Equality began pressing British networks “to look more seriously at media content so that it may ‘help to reflect our multi-racial society’” (Multiculturalism Policy Index project, School of Policy Studies 2011, p.101). Since that time, further government actions have increased the influence of MC principles on public broadcasting and media requirements.

Nations that earn a partial score in this policy area mainly do so based on their strength of commitment to MC in the media. For example, in the Netherlands, while there
are no government requirements towards public broadcasters and media licensers to explicitly include ethnic representation or sensitivity in their mandates, various religious and ideological groups are allocated broadcast hours on the national public broadcaster (Multiculturalism Policy Index project, School of Policy Studies 2011, p.70). This includes groups such as Muslims, Jews, and Hindus. Thus, although there is not explicit MC government policy in Dutch media, there is still a demonstrated strength of commitment to diversity.

Scores of 0 here illustrate that there is little to no commitment to MC in a given country’s media policy. Denmark is a good example, because studies analyzed by the MPI claimed that Danish “public service broadcasting companies, [and] especially the TV stations, have marginalized diasporic minorities in the media to a level of complete exclusion” (Multiculturalism Policy Index project, School of Policy Studies 2011, p.29).

Exemptions from Dress Codes (Either by Statute or Court Cases)

This area of policy concerns the exemption of minorities from public dress codes on religious grounds. To be coded as having MC exemption policy, there must be substantive evidence that a country has granted exemptions or accommodations to minorities on religious grounds. The UK again serves as a prime example with a “fairly long history of granting exemptions to dress codes” dating back to the Race Relations Act of 1976 (Multiculturalism Policy Index project, School of Policy Studies 2011, p.102). Sikhs for example have been exempted from public requirements to wear safety helmets in construction zones or on motorcycles and are allowed to wear a turban in place of the
helmet. Likewise, the hijab has been approved as a uniform option for Muslim women of the Metropolitan Police Service.

Countries that are placed in the partial category were found to have granted uneven exemptions in that some had been provided for religious minorities, while others are still explicitly denied. Germany is one of these in that certain court cases have resulted in the uneven provisions for religious exemptions from public dress code, particularly in regards to Muslim women. Despite these exemptions at the federal level, however, some local governments still prohibit certain styles of dress for teachers, such as the hijab.

The obvious illustrator for coding a nation without exemption from public dress codes is France, which has been present in the media for some time in regards to its rather stringent prohibitions on the wearing of religious symbols of any kind in the public sphere, but especially in public schools. In France, “categorization on the basis of identity is not permitted and, ‘specifically, no circumstances are considered to justify differential treatment on grounds of ‘race’ or origin’” (p.40).

**Dual Citizenship**

Nations that allow for dual citizenship and also allow foreign nationals to retain their original citizenship are categorized as having fully MC compatible citizenship laws and are coded with 1. Belgium is a case that allows its immigrants to retain their prior citizenship even after being naturalized.

To be coded as a partial 0.5, a nation demonstrates in its policy that dual citizenship is officially prohibited, but still tolerated in actual practice. For instance, the
Netherlands have a “basic rule [that upon] naturalization, [an immigrant] must give up his old nationality”, but exceptions are still granted in the cases of refugees or marriage of a foreign national to a Dutch citizen.

Countries coded with a 0 do not legally allow for dual citizenship nor do they tolerate it in exception or practice. The Germans are exceptionally intolerant of dual citizenship and require naturalized citizens to choose between retaining their prior citizenship or renouncing it in favor of German citizenship.

**Funding for Ethnic Groups**

Only countries whose government provide core- or project-based support to ethnic groups are coded as a 1. France is an example that falls into this category. In 1901 the *Law of Association* was passed which gave French citizens the right to freely establish associations among themselves. In 1981, that law was extended to the immigrant communities to include naturalized citizens and foreign-born residents. As long as they “respect the constitution and, in particular, the principles of secularism, equality and freedom of conscience” they, too, can establish their own associations (Multiculturalism Policy Index project, School of Policy Studies 2011, p.41). Also, following the 2005 riots, the Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunities (ACSE) has been providing direct financial support to programs meant to promote diversity, integration, and anti-discrimination among immigrant communities.

Countries coded as 0.5, like Ireland, are more restrictive in their provisions for ethnic group funding. Even though some groups will receive funding from the state, it tends to be “restricted to supporting the delivery of integration and settlement programs”
The Irish government through the Ministry of Integration provides money to a program called the Fund for Initiatives for the Integration of Legally Resident Immigrants. Although it is primarily more of a mainstream government program, “ethno specific agencies can apply” and will receive funding as long as they meet certain eligibility requirements.

Countries that provide no funding for ethnic groups are coded 0. In Denmark, for example, the government provide no financial support for ethnic groups whatsoever, although they do provide political advice and support to certain ethnic minority organizations.

**Funding for Bilingual Education**

Countries that provide state-sponsored funding and/or programs for bilingual education and mother-tongue maintenance and instruction for children and adults are coded as 1. Finland is the most illustrative example of one of these countries. The *Basic Education Act* of 1998 allows for state provision of mother-tongue instruction to immigrant and minority students. In fact, “municipalities are provided with a state subsidy to cover two and a half hours of instruction per week” if it satisfies certain eligibility requirements (Multiculturalism Policy Index project, School of Policy Studies 2011, p.36). These programs are available in approximately 50 languages.

A partial provision code of 0.5 is earned if a country provides only limited or regional services. Germany, for example, does offer state subsidized bilingual education and mother-tongue instruction for immigrants, but “this measure is conceived of as
preparatory… with the learning of adequate German the goal” (Multiculturalism Policy Index project, School of Policy Studies 2011, p.47).

Once again, a country coded 0 provides none of these services even in a limited capacity. Surprisingly, the UK falls into this category. The British educational system is “predominantly monolingual and unicultural” and what few provisions are subsidized by the state are for the express purpose of “enhancing pupils’ English language ability, rather than for an important part of mother tongue maintenance” (Multiculturalism Policy Index project, School of Policy Studies 2011, pp.103-104).

**Affirmative Action**

If a nation has government or privately sponsored affirmative action policies specifically intended to target immigrant minorities, it is coded with 1. These policies will often implement action either removing discriminatory obstacles or through proactive measures like quota systems or preferential hiring. Since the *Race Relations Act* of 1976, the UK has sponsored such provisions with official purpose of “eliminate[ing] unlawful racial discrimination; and promote equality of opportunity and good relations between people of different racial groups” (Multiculturalism Policy Index project, School of Policy Studies 2011, p.104). As amendments to the *Race Relations Act* were passed and other legislation came into practice, these programs have only gained strength.

Nations with coded 0.5, like other policy areas, indicate that there are at least limited or specific affirmative action programs present. Greece, for instance, has “supported [such programs] in principle by constitutional provisions and case law,” but it
only provides limited, regional provisions that target women and Muslim minorities (Multiculturalism Policy Index project, School of Policy Studies 2011, p.53).

Finally, nations without any affirmative action programs, public or private, are coded with 0. Although a government may have an agency capable of implementing such programs, some exist only in name and serve no true purpose. Italy is one example of this. In Italy, there is the National Office for Promoting Equal Treatment and Removal of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination, but it was created as, and only serves the purpose of, an investigatory body in matters of anti-discrimination.

*Dependent Variable: Measuring Terrorist Attacks*

I began by collecting data on the terrorist attacks in the EU countries in question. The MPI only records scores from 14 of the 27 EU member states so my data only concerns those countries. I do not have the time or resources to follow the methodology of the MPI and assign scores for the missing member states, so my study is confined to these 14: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Terrorist data was extracted from the GTD by first filtering the Excel spreadsheet to show terror incidents for the aforementioned countries with “unknown”, “individual”, and “youth” perpetrators. The spreadsheet was also filtered to accommodate the 1980, 2000, and 2010 MPI scores. I included 1978-1984 to approximate the 1980 time frame, 1998-2005 for 2000, and 2006-2011 for 2010. Once the data was filtered to these parameters, a total of 1422 terrorist incidents were shown.
Within the GTD, each incident is assigned an event ID number. For each of the 1422 incidents, I entered that ID into the online GTD database and analyzed them for keywords detailing, target, date, victims, type of attack (e.g. arson, bomb, etc.), and/or city, and then used that information to search online news databases for records of the incident. Lexis Nexis was the primary database that I used.\textsuperscript{7} When no results were found in Lexis Nexis, Google searches were conducted utilizing the same keywords and phrases.\textsuperscript{8} If no significant leads were found for a given incident, I coded it as “unknown” and moved on.

When surveying a source, common considerations regarded factors like the response of officials concerning the incident; the nationalities, ethnicities, religions, victims/targets of the attack; cross references to other news stories about the incident; the existence of any unverified claims in the source that could be reasonably researched personally; and the temporal relationship of the article to the date of the incident.

After analyzing each article, it was coded into one of the following categories: Non-Muslim, Likely Non-Muslim, Unknown, Likely Muslim, Muslim.\textsuperscript{9} Once all the data was harvested and coded, I used an Excel formula to count the number of incidents in each category. When running the quantitative analysis, both the “Likely” categories were lumped into their respective sibling categories, however, the specific numbers for “Likely Muslim/Non-Muslim” are still reflected and noted for possible future use and reference.

\textsuperscript{7} The early stages of coding also included the World News Connection, but that service was discontinued and shut down during my research.

\textsuperscript{8} A list of specific common words outside of the categories of keywords provided cannot be provided due to the unique characteristics of each incident and the flexibility required to adequately research each of them.

\textsuperscript{9} The sources for those identified as Non-Muslim, Likely Non-Muslim, Likely Muslim, and Muslim are listed in Appendix D: GTD Unknown Case Sources.
After counting, the terrorism totals were matched with their corresponding countries, time periods, and MCP scores.

The following is an illustration of the coding of one specific an incident to help demonstrate the process. The first step was to filter the GTD for all terrorist attacks with “unknown”, “individual”, and “youth” perpetrators. Taking, for example, event #199806230002 from the exported database and inputting it into the online GTD system, the full profile of this incident is made available.\(^\text{10}\) This event occurred on 23 June 1998 in London at the Royal Borough of Kensington against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Embassy. The database indicates that the attack was a bombing, that it was successful, the type of weapon that was used, and fortunately provides a citation for a news story concerning the attack.\(^\text{11}\) That cited source confirms that embassy officials in the attack claimed that it “was the work of Muslim extremists”.\(^\text{12}\) This quite obviously allows for easy categorization into the “Muslim” category of attacks.

A further example illustrating a “Likely Non-Muslim” incident can be found in event #197908030006. Accessing its information on the GTD shows that it was a successful Facility/Infrastructure attack using an incendiary-type weapon against the home of Dutch millionaire Peter Menten in Waterford, Ireland by four unknown perpetrators.\(^\text{13}\) No incident sources are available since this attack happened prior to 1979. A simple Google search for Peter Menten brings up plenty of information confirming his

\(^{10}\) http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199806230002

\(^{11}\) Citations and source references were most common in attacks from 1998 onward in the GTD. The vast majority of examined incidents prior to 1998 provided only keyword information with no citations.


\(^{13}\) http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197908030006
settlement in Waterford in the late 1970s, his Dutch nationality, and also his history of involvement with the Third Reich as its “principal ‘roving collector’ who toured the museums and art galleries seizing valuables on behalf of the Reichsführer”. Based on this information, it is more likely that the attack on his mansion, although the perpetrators are ultimately unknown, was in relation to his history as a Nazi war criminal and unrelated to any Muslim extremism. Thus, this incident is classified as “Likely Non-Muslim”.

CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Initially, the overall MPI score, which ranges zero to eight, was used to sort data points into low MPI scorers, [0, 3.49] and high MPI scorers, [3.5, 7], and the Difference of Means (DofM) test was conducted on the number of terror incidents recorded. First, this was done separately according to decade and there was no significant difference found between high and low scorers. Next, all the datapoints, regardless of decade, were examined together in another DofM test. There was still no significant difference found between the means of MCPP and APP countries.

Analysis of the Metadata

After testing at the aggregate level and finding no significant difference between the means, it seemed prudent to break them down into the eight policy areas mentioned above and run DofM tests for each of them. Doing this would allow for a higher resolution test of my hypothesis and would also control for any interactions that the policy areas themselves may have had with one another. It should be noted that this new DofM test of the metadata was conducted before hypotheses could be formulated for the relation of each specific policy area to radicalization, therefore, no statistical claims can be made. Rather, there was obviously still more that could at least be learned from the data, so these new DofM tests serve more as an exploratory tool than a theoretical test.

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15 No score ever exceeds 7, however, so the observed range is [0, 7].
By looking at each area separately, some of the bias of interaction is removed, thus, provides a truer picture of what degree of policy matters most in regards to the number of terrorist attacks. As discussed above, the MPI assigns codes indicating the degree of multicultural public policy (MCPP) in a given state as “Yes” = 1, “Limited” = 0.5, and “No” = 0. For these tests, since a DofM test is not possible for 3 variables at once, tests were conducted on each policy area in the following pairs: No Policy vs. Limited Policy, No Policy vs. Existing (Yes) Policy, and Limited Policy vs. Existing Policy.

This is relevant to the DV here because it introduces a new possibility that the amount of MCPP that is adopted (using the scale from None to Limited to Existing) could have an effect on radicalization rather than being a high or low overall scorer in the MPI. For example, it would not be illogical to suppose that a more balanced, limited, or partial implementation of MCPP would help to decrease the number of terrorist attacks in a given state, because 2/3Gs may likewise experience a more balanced identity between heritage and country.

Results of Metadata: Difference of Means

In each tested pair, there were outlier datapoints that needed to be adjusted. These outliers were chosen as such based on their extreme number of terrorist attacks in comparison to the rest of their category.\textsuperscript{16} Their deviation from the norm of scores indicates that there are other factors at work in those cases impacting the number of

terrorist incidents. To adjust the outliers, I reduced their number of attacks down to the second highest value in their category rather than washing away their impact on the numbers by adjusting them to the mean. Adjustment by this method allows the study to keep the presence of the datapoint in the dataset without losing their overall impact on the study. Reducing outliers to their mean is another method that could have been utilized, but it is really a method of tricking the data into narrowing its confidence interval and removing the impact outlying datapoints on the results, thus compromising the integrity of the statistical analysis. This option of adjusting down to the second highest value allows for my tests to maintain the impact of the outlying datapoints and narrows the confidence interval without compromising the integrity of the results.

Each test showed differing results in support of the working hypothesis, in contradiction to the working hypothesis, or in favor of the null hypothesis. The results for my quantitative analysis concerning whether states which adopt a higher degree of MCPP will demonstrate an increase in Islamist terrorist activity are as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Area</th>
<th>Significant Difference?(^{17, 18})</th>
<th>+/- /null Hypothesis?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affirmation</td>
<td>N v. L: Yes</td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L v. E: No</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N v. E: Yes</td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Curriculum</td>
<td>N v. L: Yes</td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L v. E: No</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N v. E: No</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>N v. L: Yes</td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L v. E: No</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N v. E: No</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemptions</td>
<td>N v. L: Yes</td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L v. E: Yes</td>
<td>In Favor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N v. E: Yes</td>
<td>In Favor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual Cit #1</td>
<td>N v. L: N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE2000 and NL2010 as NoPolicy</td>
<td>L v. E: N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N v. E: No</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dual Cit #2</td>
<td>N v. L: N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE2000 and NL 2010 as ExistingPolicy</td>
<td>L v. E: N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N v. E: No</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>N v. L: Yes</td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L v. E: Yes</td>
<td>In Favor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N v. E: No</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilingual Ed</td>
<td>N v. L: Yes</td>
<td>In Favor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L v. E: No</td>
<td>Inconclusive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N v. E: Yes</td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affirmative Action</td>
<td>N v. L: Yes</td>
<td>In Favor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>L v. E: Yes</td>
<td>In Favor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N v. E: Yes</td>
<td>Against</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{17}\) T-tests for 90% certainty were conducted on all pairs.

\(^{18}\) Dual Citizenship was split, because only DE2000 and NL2010 fell into the Limited Policy category. Two DoF tests were conducted with those two datapoints in the categories of No Policy and Existing Policy. Thus, N v. L and L v. E were not conducted for Dual Citizenship.
These results indicate that European MCPP at the aggregate level may not have a significant relationship to the incidence of Islamist radicalization, however, the results also indicate that specific types of MCPP do. As illustrated above, these relationships both happen in congruence with my hypothesis and also in direct contradiction to it. Affirmation of Policy, for example, mostly works in contradiction to my hypothesis, that is to say that it demonstrates radicalization goes down as MCPP increases, however I am forced to accept the null hypothesis concerning the comparison of Limited Policy vs. Existing Policy. This compromises the relevance of this policy area here. Similarly, this occurred with most of the policy types that were examined and in fact the entirety of Dual Citizenship policy was thrown out since no significant differences were found at all. Interestingly enough, though, two policy areas were found to hold some significance: Exemption from Dress Codes and Affirmative Action.

It is also important to note that this statistical analysis produced two common outliers in every instance of testing: the United Kingdom and France. In each area of policy either the UK, France, or both were outliers that needed to be adjusted. Due to their commonality, it stands to reason that something different is happening in these countries and they deserve further examination through a comparative case study.

At the aggregate level, the results were not compelling, but the generation of these two outliers suggests the need for a more nuanced view of radicalization within each case and what it is that makes them more susceptible to terrorism/radicalization than other nations. Also, despite the general lack of significant relationships in favor of or against my hypothesis, there were still two policy areas in which, the null hypothesis was
completely rejected: Exemptions and Affirmative Action. It follows then that there is a significant relationship between these two policy areas and the incidence of radicalization in the universe of cases included for analysis. For dress code exemption policies, it appears that as a greater degree of MCPP is present, radicalization levels increase. The opposite is the case for MCPP affirmative action implementation; as more affirmative action measures are taken, radicalization appears to fall.

**Discussion of Results: Exemption**

Theoretically speaking, the effect of having more of those policies on dress code exemption could be explained by their potential to strengthen the social identity of immigrant offspring as “foreign” to the host society, thus increasing the probability of being ostracized or feeling alienated. Allowing for these cultural-religious exemptions could conceivably lead to an exacerbation of coinciding cleavages between immigrant communities and the indigenous population. On the other hand, however, having no policies of exemptions would also seem to have an exacerbating effect on those same cleavages perhaps due to a heavier feeling of infringement on religious freedom in a democratic society. Partial or limited adoption might abate these feelings of being the “other” or infringement and allow 2/3G Muslims a structure to aim for integration into without feeling forced to compromise their beliefs or heritage.

Another notable observation of the analysis is that France and the UK were polar opposites on exemption policy, meaning that France does not provide any official cultural or religious dress codes exemptions for government workers – i.e. military, police, etc. –
while the UK has been providing such exemptions since the *Race Relations Act 1979* (Multiculturalism Policy Index Project 2011). It is interesting to note however, that these two outliers with different, in fact opposite, dress code exemption systems still experience the same outcome of high levels of radicalization.

The potential relationship between radicalization and dress code exemption policy could possibly stem from internal and external identities of 2/3G Muslims. Internal identities are characteristics that individuals use to define themselves, but cannot be used by outside parties to define individuals. External identities are expressions of internal identities that can be used by outside parties to categorize and define individuals. Dress code exemption policy could conceivably have an effect here in that for many Muslims, their identity as followers of Islam are religiously required to be externalized, thus making them more identifiable and more easily categorized by other groups. It is conceivable that in Britain, where dress code exemptions are prevalent and Muslims are allowed to express their religious identities through dress, it could be easier for indigenous Britons to identify and possibly ostracize them making 2/3Gs feel different, and alienated leading towards radicalization. On the other side of the coin, in France, restrictions on dress code exemptions could cause enmity towards the State among 2/3G Muslims, because they are not allowed to freely or fully express their internal identities in the public sphere.
Discussion of Results: Affirmative Action

Affirmative Action also illustrates the strong probability that there is a different kind of relationship than my original hypothesis proposed in that although there are more attacks in countries without affirmative action program than with, there still seems to be a spectrum of relationship between MCPP and radicalization. That is to say, there are less incidents of terrorism in countries that exhibit no affirmative action policies than in those that exhibit limited policies, which is favorable to my original aggregate hypothesis, but still more incidents of terrorism in countries that exhibit limited policies than in those that do have existing policies. This means that once limited policies are introduced, the number of attacks sharply increases and then sharply decreases once full implementation of affirmative action programs goes into effect. It would therefore seem that it is in a nation’s best interest to either fully adopt affirmative action programs or forgo them altogether. A possible theoretical explanation for this phenomenon could be that providing limited affirmative action to only certain minorities in particular public and private spheres or restricting it to regional areas causes envy among those who are theoretically eligible to receive it, but do not, thus exacerbating any sense of relative social deprivation and/or identity crisis leading to more radicalization. Whereas, if no affirmative action is provided to anyone, there would likely be less feeling of relative social deprivation to add to any already existing enmity between a 2/3G Muslim and his host country. Overall, however, the results illustrate that there are more incidents where there is no policy than where there is existing policy, which means that as far as the countries studied here are concerned, the adoption of affirmative action programs is a good route for addressing radicalization levels.
Like their relationship in the exemption policy area, France and the UK also never shared a policy degree category concerning affirmative action. In fact, France wholly occupied the “No Policy” category while the UK occupied the categories of “Limited” and “Existing”. This once again demonstrates the contrasting nature of the French and British systems with still the same outcome of more terrorist attacks.

Further speculation of the overall “mixed bag” of results indicates that the relationship is likely not very strong between the variables, even regarding the policy areas that do work in favor of my hypothesis, and are thus more complex than my original hypothesis anticipated. Given this, case studies of particularly high profile terrorists attacks in the UK and France will allow a more in depth analysis of how radicalization appears to occur at high rates in both despite having nearly opposite approaches to 2/3G integration. The design of this case study research will conform to John Stuart Mill’s method of agreement, or most different systems design, with a combined element of process tracing. The structure of the most different systems design is such that it allows one to eliminate variables that cannot logically be the cause of the outcome in both cases. That is, any factors that are not shared between the proposed British and French cases cannot logically be the cause of radicalization. Any factor or condition in the two cases “that survives this method of elimination can be regarded as possibly associated with the case outcome… The design’s coupling with process tracing aids in allowing the study to “get closer to the mechanisms or microfoundations behind [the] observed phenomena” of radicalization and potentially further isolate its causal factor or factors (George and Bennett 2004, p.147).
It is conceivable to see two things arise out of these case studies in regards to the radicalization of French and UK 2/3Gs. Out of the gate, the scores and categorizations of each country indicate that there is a multiculturalist public policy structure in place for the UK that is largely opposite that of France. British 2/3G Muslims likely experience a great deal more leeway from the government and freedom in their integration and participation with British society. Their counterparts in France, however, are allotted less leeway in their integration into French society and a great deal more conformity to the secular public sphere is required. It is possible that these two very different systems of bringing this demographic into the fold of mainstream society could both bring about higher levels of radicalization, because they allow too much and too little freedom of integration. The UK’s official multicultural public policies could allow so much freedom of identity in integration, that immigrant communities actually end up deciding to create parallel societies (the existence of which is discussed in Chapter One), which inherently isolate those communities and their offspring from mainstream society thus causing them to feel alienated and more susceptible to the conditions of radicalization. On the other side of the coin, the French system requires much more stringent compliance to the secular public sphere in its integration policies resulting in a perceived oppression of freedom among 2/3Gs also increasing the prevalence of the conditions seen in incidents of radicalization.
CHAPTER FOUR: THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE 7/7 BOMBINGS

Introduction

During the morning commute in London on 7 July 2005, four concurrent blasts went off killing 52 people and injuring over 700 more: three on the London Underground and one on a bus in Tavistock Square. These bombings were a horrific tragedy that reignited counterterrorism efforts in nearly every Western nation and forced the UK to re-examine its own efforts in the prevention of any such attack occurring again. But understanding for the purposes of prevention requires a foundational knowledge of the context surrounding the attack itself.

The purpose of this case study is to obtain a more detailed picture of 2/3G radicalization in the UK. Given the results of the preceding statistical analysis, it is clear that there is a much more complex array of contributing factors to Islamist radicalization present here. It was not surprising to find the UK as an outlier in its number of terrorist attacks, given that my original hypothesis set forth the presumption that the more multicultural a state was, the more instances of radicalization it would see. However, as discussed previously, the overall results from that statistical analysis suggest that the relationship between MCPP and radicalization is more complex than originally hypothesized and other factors are obviously at work in influencing the radicalization of British 2/3Gs. Although the resulting data did produce favorable outcomes for my hypothesis in areas of public dress code exemption policy and affirmative action, it also produced contradictory outcomes as well as varying acceptance of the null hypothesis. Thus, although it is entirely plausible and likely true that there are relationships between
policies of exemption and affirmative action and the incidence of 2/3G radicalization, it would be unwise to consider them to be causal factors. Conducting the following qualitative case study over the notorious 7/7 Bombings, for which there is much available information, will provide the most effective means of getting into the more intimate details of Islamist radicalization in British society, which will hopefully in turn provide a clearer portrait of the complex network of factors that influence 2/3G radicalization in Western Europe.

Before embarking on a journey to grasp the political and social circumstances that likely contributed to the radicalization of the London Bombers, it is necessary to gain an understanding of the primary actors. Knowing details about the lives of these individuals may help to clarify why they radicalized in a land that subscribes to “multiculturalism” (MC), supposedly making it socially tolerant, diverse, and progressive and whether or not the examined policy areas were relevant. This trend of MC has been identified by critics of the ideology as “orthodoxy throughout all institutions of British public life… [that] it holds that Britain is now made up of many cultures that are all equal and therefore have to be treated in an identical fashion” (Phillips 2006, p.58). Any political or social pressure outside of this doctrine is sensed as an attempt to impose characteristics of the majority culture on a minority culture and is considered to be racially assimilationist. How is it, then, that individuals living in such a society could radicalize and turn against it?

There is debate among analysts and scholars as to whether the 7/7 attacks were really “homegrown”, which call into question the need to examine the home in which the radicalization of these bombers took place. This deliberation is based on their travels to
Pakistan to train and their moderate contact with Al-Qaeda (AQ) figures, both in the UK and the Middle East, and subscription to the teachings of immigrant imams (Klausen 2009). Investigations since the attacks have indeed revealed that important connections to AQ and Pakistan have caused the “picture… of a ‘home-grown’ threat [to be] cast into doubt”, but it is ignorant to cancel out the idea of homegrown terror simply based on international travel and contacts in an international organization (Klausen 2009, p.411). All four of these men spent their formative years in the UK, so it is not illogical to assume that there must have been something about their home that contributed to their desire to heed the teachings of Islamists like Abu Qatada, Abu Hamza, Omar Bakri, and Abdullah el Faisal. Something about their formative social contexts made them believe that it was worth the time and resources to travel to Pakistan, train in terrorist camps, and carry out such a large-scale attack. Therefore, it is unwise to dismiss the “homegrown” nature of these terrorists simply based on their extra-national connections. The aim of this case study is to try to identify at least some of the contributing social and political factors in the UK that could potentially still contribute to the radicalization of other individuals as well.

The Historical Context: Immigration from South Asia

For four centuries, the city of “Leeds stood at the forefront when little Britain bore the torch of modernization,” originally due to the centrality of the European textile industry in England (Leiken 2012, p.123; “Leeds” 2009; Mitchell 2000). Leeds was a major producer and exporter of textiles in the 1600s as its growth spurt began, and by the
1700s the city was handling approximately 30% of England’s wool trade (Wilson 1971). A large reason for this is the city’s convenient location on the Aire river which not only provided substantial waterpower for factories and mills, but also found its way to the North Sea and the rest of Europe perfect for the export of goods.

During World War I, there was a labor shortage as indigenous Brits abandoned their jobs and went to fight in the trenches. The positions that had once been closed to the South Asians were finally available regardless of ethnicity. The migrants who took these jobs had already been interacting with Britain as servants, sailors, and travelers due to the connection that had been established by British colonization (Ballard 2002). Even more found their way to British isles in the wake of India’s involvement in WWI as British Indian troops were sent to France to fight. Despite the difficulties South Asians endured in these jobs, as discrimination had not been eliminated by any means, some found success and “by the early 1930s they began to send word back home to their kinsmen, indicating that if they could find their way to Britain [they] would be able to earn and save far more than they ever could… back in Punjab” (Ballard 2002, p.4).

World War II added new blood to the workforce as more labor shortages resulted just as they had 30 years prior. Even more types of jobs opened up to migrants who had been barred from holding them, because of their physical appearance. During this time, many small-time merchants gained waged employment and the workforce’s numbers continued to swell with the additions of ex-sailors. After the war, some went back home – as a great deal had originally intended – with their abundant earnings, “[h]owever many others decided to stay on, in the hope of reaping yet more benefits from their British
environment” (Ballard 2002, p.4). The British economy continued to improve and enjoyed sustained growth up through the 1970s and all the while, migrants did their best to bring their families and friends from back home to Britain, thus establishing a powerful and “ever-expanding process of chain migration” (Ballard 2002, p.5).

The migrants consisted of four major people groups: Gujaratis, Sikh Punjabis, Mirpuri Punjabis (This is the largest category and the dominant British Pakistani heritage today), and Bangladeshis. In his account of the transnational connections between South Asia and the UK, Robert Ballard points out that “[s]ince the British Indian regiments posted to France during [WWI] were largely recruited in the Punjab, the peddler communities who provided foundation for mass migration after the end of [WWII] were largely composed of Punjabi Sikhs and Muslims” (Ballard 2002, p.6). That pattern of migration between Mirpur and Britain was further strengthened at the time of its establishment through the recruitment of Mirpuri lascars (sailors) to stoke coal on British steamships. The Mirpuri Muslims concentrated around Leeds as they arrived in even greater numbers during the 1960s due to a strong push from home. During the construction of the Mangla Dam across the Jhelum river in the 1960s, many Mirpuri Pakistanis were displaced as a result of the floods caused by its construction. As compensation, the Pakistani government promoted the migration of approximately 5000 people and it is argued that “[h]ad the Mirpur flood occurred where there was no previous pattern of migration probably very few refugees would have ended up in West Yorkshire” (Leiken 2012, p.128). In addition to these colonial connections, another mass migration was triggered in the 1960s when there was the looming threat of the British government introducing immigration controls. Mirpuris who had already settled in the
UK “advised their relatives not only of jobs… [in] West Yorkshire,” but of the immigration controls as well which caused them to “join the Pakistani rush to ‘beat the ban’ and catalyzed the principal period of mass migration from Pakistan to Britain” (Leiken 2012, p.129).

The connections between the UK and this region of the world remain strong, because the majority of the migrants have maintained the intention to return home just as much as the Brits expected them to leave once the labor crisis ended. Migrants simply expected to “make some money and then return [home] after a few years... So they remained umbilically connected to the culture of southern Asia” (Phillips 2006, p.9). However, the prosperity that Britain had to offer was, too enticing for a great many migrants, so they simply never left, yet maintained a myth of return (Hussain 2013; Leiken 2012; Anwar 1979). This connection to South Asia would prove to be significant for Britain’s migrant Muslim minority because it would allow a medium through which they could still be exposed to the radicalism that would spring up in that region of the world during the 1980s and 1990s as “Islam became crystallized as a political ideology” (Phillips 2006, p.10). Some particularly significant events that would contribute to this crystallization would be the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which would have significant religious and political impacts in the Middle East and South Asia; the Soviet War in Afghanistan, through which the West armed and enlightened the Islamic mujahideen for holy war; the Salman Rushdie affair, which sent riotous ripples around the Islamic world to include protests, book burnings, and religiously sanctioned death threats in Britain to which the government and society turned a blind eye; and the Bosnian War, during which “Britain and Europe were dragging their heels about doing anything to stop the
slaughter… of Bosnian Muslims being massacred by their Christian neighbors” (Phillips 2006; Rai 2006; Brighton 2007; Phillips 2006, p.12).

This chain of events that forged the tie between South Asia and the UK ultimately served to ensure the unique British exposure to radical Islam as well as to weave the framework for British MC. It demonstrates not only the complexity of the questions at hand: How is it that such violent fundamentalism could spring up and arguably thrive in “the home of liberty” (Foley 2013, p.56)? Where did it come from? Who or what was responsible? But it also serves to set the stage for understanding the society that the London bombers were raised in.

**The National Context: Britain**

**British Multiculturalism**

British MC, specifically, has evolved on its own apart from the development of European MC. That is not to say that the two are in conflict or opposition with one another, but rather that the British version has some unique characteristics and history behind it. There is debate as to exactly when MC began in the Britain as it “never had a dramatic turning-point, setting a clear ‘before’ and ‘after’ the turn to multiculturalism” (Joppke 2009, ch.4). Some scholars place its official conception in 1966 when Rt. Hon. Roy Jenkins, then Secretary of State for Home Affairs, delivered a speech to the Institute of Race Relations in London. He said that the British government “must aim, not at a flattening process of assimilation but at equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance” (Jenkins 1967, p.216). Joppke, a
prominent critic of MC, describes this moment as more of a meeting of British liberalism and racial pluralism, especially since of the resulting race-relations policies that followed were more liberal in nature, meaning they used the individual, not the group, “as a unit of integration and seeking to render irrelevant rather than to perpetuate ascriptive [sic] group membership” (Joppke 2009, ch.4). This critique of MC’s beginnings lead some scholars to believe more firmly that it was actually not until Tony Blair’s New Labour Party rose to power in 1997 that MC was officially espoused (Joppke 2009).

Consolidation of the definitions scholars have given to British MC allows us to see the core of its meaning: The co-existence and integration of minority cultures into a stew of society – as opposed to a melting pot (Jenkins 1967; Lester 2010; Bourne 2007; Joppke 2009; Phillips 2006; Leiken 2012). These cultures are “inserted, not assimilated, and granted a species of autonomy similar to [Britain’s former] colonies, almost as parallel nationalities, allowed to preserve their cultural identity” (Leiken 20120, p.106). Critics like Joppke find that British MC, born out of toleration liberalism, is a “variant of [British] liberalism that prioritizes private choice and non-interference over public ‘character building’” (Joppke 2009, ch.4). This perception is of particular importance because it helps to illustrate why Britain has become a sort of a European safe-haven for Islamists to sow the seeds of radicalism among 2Gs and why they are so susceptible to it.

The potential flaw in multiculturalism, at least in the British sense, is that although it “promote[s] equal treatment for all cultures…[t]here is [still] one culture that it does not treat equally at all, and that is the indigenous British culture” (Phillips 2006, p.62). As the British government has attempted to advocate for MC as public policy and
the primary aspect of its own national identification, it is not surprising that ethnic minorities are finding it difficult to find their place in British society and integrate, because there is no real, tangible British identity to integrate into anymore. This absence of national identity in Britain is a problem that has been recognized by multiple scholars and journalists. In a piece for the British newspaper, *The Guardian*, Mary Riddell states this problem bluntly enough: “Britain, dragging its jumble bag of statutes, from Manga Carta to the Act of Settlement, has a different identity crisis. We do not know who we are [and] being headscarf-friendly is not enough to fill that gap” (Riddell 2003, p.3). This is an excellent illustration of the void of identity that has opened up in the UK in regard to ethnically indigenous Britons as well 2G British Muslims.

British identity has historically found its roots at the founding of that nation of Great Britain in 1707 when the Act of Union brought together Scotland, England, and Wales. The British identity grew larger and stronger “with the rise of Protestantism and the establishment of the British Empire” (Baker 2011, p.41). However, since both of these primary aspects (the Church and international political power) of Britishness have been in steady decline as of late, especially post-WWII during the initial influxes of migrant workers to the UK, the entire notion of a British national identity has faced outright rejection. In 2000, the Runnymede Trust published a report that sought to drive Britain towards being a “multicultural post-nation” and a “community of communities” (Parekh 2000). It declared that Britishness “has systematic, largely unspoken, racial connotations”, which implies that Britons should avoid the explicit label of “British” as it is exclusionary and racist towards minority cultures in a pluralistic society (Parekh 2000, p.38; Joppke 2004; Phillips 2006; Baker 2011). This is an illustration of how
multiculturalists see the typical liberal model of a diverse society as fundamentally flawed, because it maintains a common public political culture and leaves issues of diversity to the private sphere alone. The diversity of liberal society’s private realm should actually be extended into the public. However, this results in the question of what happens when there is no umbrella definition of a society for subcultures to unite under. This failure of the British “to define national identity, particularly in the political arena, is unacceptable to communities expected to adhere to intangible values” and indeed emasculates the British ability to really integrate its immigrants and their children (Baker 2011, p.45).

Of particular interest here is how a lack of an indigenous national identity affects the identity crises of 2/3G Muslims in Britain. In his studies and travels, Leiken found that the multicultural identity that 2Gs are offered in Britain “can be the most destructive for the nation” (Leiken 2012, p.266). Public policy reinforced the inherent schisms that already exist between a host society and its post-migrant citizens. The multicultural “respect” that is espoused through British identity politics and the increasingly popular Western habit of individual definition through “diverse subnational identities – political, partisan, ideological, regional, ethnic, sexual, and religious – [actually] saps the power of transcendence of national identity” (Leiken 2012, p.65). Through this encouragement of creating a “community of communities” (as referenced above), Britain has exacerbated a crucial factor that drives personal identity and radicalization together. As a person establishes their own identity, they look to their cultural ingroup’s worldview to learn acceptable moralities and behaviors. When this worldview is threatened by “the presence of groups who hold different worldviews”, which is the inherent nature of a community
of communities, individuals may perceive that presence “as threats to the self and its symbolic immortality” (Stroink 2007). This is undoubtedly fertile ground for a 2G’s negative identification towards Britain, which has aided and abetted the oppression of Muslims all over the world, according to the propagated Islamist narrative and also as featured in Siddique Khan’s 7/7 goodbye message video. Further support for this is found in testimony of a former AQ recruiter who interviewed with Shiv Malik (2007) concerning the radicalization of Siddique Khan. He told Malik that European AQ recruiters specifically used the identity crises of 2Gs as recruitment tools (Malik 2007). It follows that should a 2G decide to radicalize beyond ideology and commit to action, Britain has provided an extremely “combustible amalgam of Pakistani provenance, an insular culture, identity politics, lenient courts, and shortsighted policy, [which transformed] British intervention in Iraq [into] the torch to ignite its explosive amalgam” (Leiken 2012, p.267; McCauley and Moskalenko 2011, p.32).

**British Security/Counterterrorism**

Security and counterterrorism policy are very much a part of British public policy that affects its citizens and immigrants regardless of their ethnicity or status. An analysis of it also allows us to see some illustration of how traditional norms and virtues of “being British” are carried out and contested against public policy as it relates to Islamist terrorism. The general notions of national security, liberty, and counterterrorism in the UK have been formulated under a unique set of historical and international circumstances and they must be understood in light of those to ensure a more accurate comprehension of how those notions stand in the UK today, specifically in reference to the Islamist threat
that it faces. These notions directly influence how British Muslims react towards the government positively or negatively and have undergone significant evolution and contestation following significant terrorism and national security events involving radical Islamist activity.

Britain traces its legacy of liberty back to the signing of the Magna Carta in 1215. Thus, despite the discussion of a weak national identity among Britons, we can see that at least the principles of liberty have been coursing strongly through their veins ever since. A significant characteristic of British character, in regards to its security policy, is “resiliency”. Reinforcing this trait are the facts that Britain has enjoyed general political stability since the 18th century and the UK was on the winning side of WWI and WWII without suffering a compromise of its geographical borders. These are significant factors that helped to develop “…self-conceptions of stability and resilience [which] can undermine the ‘security first’ principle. If Britain is a stable and resilient polity, there is no need to compromise its traditional liberties just because of terrorism” (Foley 2013, p.57).

Another significant period that has contributed to Britain’s current attitude towards Islamist terrorism is its past conflict in Northern Ireland with the IRA. The UK’s actions there landed her in the European Court of Human Rights, because of their “shoot to kill” policy, as well as their coercive interrogations in Northern Ireland (Foley 2013). Ever since, the UK has had a particular spotlight shining on it from the international community and has since felt the need to be tread carefully when trying to deal with the issue of terrorism in general, let alone foreign and 2G radical Islamists. Publicly, British
security organizations declare security to be their top priority, but despite this, they are quite often met with resistance by “other important political and societal actors, such as some political parties, NGOs and sections of the media and the legal profession that assert contradictory norms, such as liberty… which resonate[s] powerfully in British self-conceptions and contemporary discourse” (Foley 2013, p.61).

During the 1990s, scholars have noticed that the UK had a notably “tolerant attitude towards Islamist extremism” within its borders (Foley 2013, p.245; Leiken 2012; Phillips 2006; Johnston 2001). This has been attributed to an unofficial security covenant that was established between the British government and Islamic radicals who found the country’s “lax asylum laws, generous welfare benefits, permissive legal system, convivial multiculturalism, and its agglomeration of press outlets” to be an ideal haven for furthering their Islamist narrative and launching operations abroad (Leiken 2012, p.161; Phillips 2006; Foley 2013; O’Neill and McGrory 2006; Van Natta Jr 2005). That tolerance, the security covenant, and a impudent attitude that emanated from the UK during this period whenever other countries requested extradition of known terrorists found its manifestation in the dubbing of Britain’s capital – home to a significant number of radical preachers and known terrorists – as “Londonistan” (Phillips 2006; Leiken 2012; Foley 2013; Rai 2006; Ali 2010).

The covenant began to crumble, however, after the 9/11 attacks in the United States and especially during 2004 when MI5 and British police carried out two significant operations against terrorists residing in Britain: Operation Crevice and Operation Rhyme. Crevice was a police raid of 700 officers on 24 different premises resulting in the arrest
of 8 British Pakistanis and 1 Algerian-born Briton with 5 of those “convicted of conspiracy to cause explosions” (Foley 2013, p.252). Rhyme resulted in the surveillance and arrest of 13 Britons, including their leader, Dhiren Barot, and his “sleeper cell” as they plotted meticulous terror attacks in the UK – seven were convicted of terrorism (BBC 2007; Foley 2013).

It is argued that the 7/7 bombings were also a direct result of the security covenant being broken by the British government, not only because of their assistance in the invasion of Iraq, but also because of the reaction of British security organizations to 9/11 and their increasing awareness of the radical Islamist presence within their borders. The norms that guided public opinion and security policy before and after 9/11 may have illustrative attributes for this train of thought. Prior to 9/11, the norms of civil liberty, political asylum, and respect for communities were among those that were elevated above “security first” although they were in close competition with one another. After 9/11 occurred, there was a great deal more intensity added to the competition between the norms of proportionality – that “responses to terrorism [must] be proportionate, in order not to exacerbate the problem” – and security first – the sacrifice of certain civil liberties to attain a better level of security (Foley 2013, pp.56, 60).

Here we see elements of British concern for its image in both the international and domestic eye as a multicultural, liberal, democratic society throughout this analysis of its national security. During the Islamist tolerance of the 1990s, safety was the primary concern of British security officials, especially as its gaze was turned almost exclusively towards Northern Ireland. However irresponsible it proved to be in the future, it is clear
that their priority was to protect British national security. This is made explicitly apparent by an interview with Algerian journalist Reda Hussain, who stated that one of her MI5 contacts expressly told her that by providing these extremists “a roof over their heads, food, [and] free healthcare… the security of Britain will be very safe” (Phillips 2006, p.43). The logic behind this tolerance is quite simple, particularly given the context of The Troubles of Ireland during the early 90s. It is much easier to focus on a primary threat (the IRA) when simply appeasing another (radical Islamists), which were not currently perceived to be a threat to British interests, is an extremely attractive and viable option, although potentially short-sighted. Obviously, the consequences of the decision to allow the propagation of radical Islam within its borders has forced Britain and the scholarly community to re-examine how and if the British brand of MC is compatible with sound national security and perhaps consider the possibility that the two are mutually exclusive.

The Local Context: Leeds/Beeston Hill

Given that the London Bombers were raised in and around Leeds, it is important to provide an examination of a smaller social context in this case study as it adds another level of analysis to consider. It provides a more focused lens to examine the migrant culture that existed around the bombers during their formative years in Leeds. Beeston Hill is quite literally severed from the rest of Leeds by the M621 highway and as such has not been able to develop as rapidly as the center of Leeds (Malik 2007). The city is one of the poorest places in the UK so “it has always attracted immigrants – formerly Irish, more
recently Pakistanis” (Malik 2007). Beeston Hill was home to Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, the group’s two most ideologically driven members (Silber and Bhatt 2007; Kirby 2007). As previously mentioned, Beeston has a very important and very exclusive migrant connection to the city of Mirpur in Pakistan. This connection has been explained through the tendency of human migration to be connected to corresponding towns and cities in other countries, as seen in research done by Leiken 2005 and Sowell 1996.

Further exploration of this connection is required to understand the local context of the London Bombers. An interesting aspect and possible explanation to the strength of the connection between these two areas are the religious and cultural attributes of Mirpuri society. A great majority of Mirpuris follow a denomination of Sufi Islam called, Barelwi, which is one of the two major sects of Islam in Southern Asia – the other being the fundamentalist Deobandi (Bunting 2005). The two are in almost constant conflict primarily at the theological level, but there has been significant, and in some cases violent, persecution against the Barelwi on the part of the Deobandi (Roy 2004; Rashid 1996). As a branch of Sufi islam, Barelwi’s place a great deal of religious and sentimental value on the veneration of the dead, turning graves of significant religious figures into shrines, poetry, rituals, and devotional music, none of which have any direct foundation in the Qur’an. Thus, we can see how a community from this context would place such importance on physical locations and people, strengthening the myth of return (Hussain 2013; Leiken 2012). Sufi denominations are quite often “the basis of very lively Muslim cultures and also often of solidarity groups… which identify a village or district… with a pir, or… a saint” (Roy 2004, p.130-131).
Within the Mirpuri population of Leeds, there is an overarching ideal of *izzat* that is sought after, especially by the 1st generation. *Izzat* is Urdu for “honor” and it speaks to the accumulation and attainment of socially recognized “reputation, status or image, the *sine qua non* of traditional society” (Leiken 2012, p.119-120). As the first wave of migrants settled, they began to take or send the earnings they received in Britain and pour them into mansions, vacation homes, and land back in Mirpur where they could receive the local recognition of the villagers back home. These luxury buildings are lavishly decorated with intricate designs, porticoes and balconies, fences, and the list goes on as far as a full bank account and an imagination for architectural design can take it (Ballard 2002; Leiken 2012). The connection between Britain and Mirpur is so strong that the clustered areas containing these empty vacation homes, as their owners really live in Britain most of the year, have come to be known as “Little England” (Maqbool 2012).

The ideal of *izzat* and its illustration through Little England reinforces understanding of the desire of the 1st generation for 2/3Gs to maintain fealty to their family heritage and their faith (as it is a defining factor of their Mirpuri homeland). For what good is it if the *izzat* of the 1st generation is not passed down and carried on by those that follow? That family’s *izzat* will wither and die without 2/3Gs to take it and make it grow. This emphasis on *izzat* in Mirpur has actually proven problematic for Mirpuri integration of the 1st generation in Britain, but especially so in regards to 2/3Gs. It is the habit of the Barelwi to keep to a “particular locale through being focused around a Sufi shrine, [which] makes it difficult for its adherents to organize themselves on a national basis in Britain” (Geaves 1996, p.2). The umbilical connection between Beeston and Mirpur is strengthened as well by the continued practice of certain cultural customs like
“cousin marriage, seclusion of women, [and] the return of remains… [which weave the] fabric that bind the British Pakistani in general, and the Mirpuri in particular, to his family place of origin” (Leiken 2012, p.134). These practices have remained consistent over the past four decades when looking at the studies done by V.S. Khan (1977) of Bradford Pakistanis, Alison Shaw (2000) of Oxford Pakistanis, and up to the investigation of the Beeston Bombers by Shiv Malik (2007).

It has been acknowledged that Barelwi Islam has “struggled to translate itself effectively into British urban life” (Bunting 2005, p.2). This has resulted in difficulty for 2G British Barelwi Muslims to develop their identity as Brits or Muslims, let alone British Muslims. Madeleine Bunting, a reporter for the UK news outlet The Guardian, recounts the difficulties observed in the Barelwi community in Britain:

What has been obvious to thoughtful second-generation Barelwis themselves is that they are losing the young. The mosques are tightly controlled by the old patriarchal elders, who hire their Urdu-speaking imams from the home village. The kids come to prayers, don't understand much of what they see or hear and drift off to find an Islam that can answer their questions… A profound disconnection has opened up between the communal experience of political and economic dispossession and the pious, otherworldly Barelwi traditions. As one Yorkshireman from a Barelwi background, Azhar Hussain, said: "When I was 17 and got to university and began to take religion more seriously I went to hear all the Islamic groups to see which one made the most sense. The Barelwis are not on university campuses; they can't answer those questions." (Bunting 2005, p.2 [sic])

The Barelwi elders don’t have the answers that 2Gs are looking for in regards to their religious and cultural identities in the Western context and as such, they turn to other explanations of identity that are easier to understand – louder ones. Radical fundamentalist Islam is one of these and the literature demonstrates its attractiveness to 2Gs in general, but after looking at the cultural and religious climate of Mirpuri
Pakistanis in Beeston, it is plain to see that this phenomenon at work not just in general among Barelwi Beeston 2Gs, but also in our London Bombers. Robert Leiken observed in his research that “this prepackaged Islam is very attractive… particularly for those young Muslims who want to break out of the ‘biraderi’ [clan] politics which dominate the society of their parents” (Leiken 2012, p.167). Likewise, Geaves notes that, “Another factor which is bringing the [British] Barelwis together is their shared fears for the younger generation… not only in the context of children growing up in a non-Muslim environment, but in the anxiety that these children will be attracted towards the message of the better organized and more vocal reform organisations” (Greaves 1996, p.6).

Unfortunately, some of these more organized groups tend to be the more radical fundamentalist ones – e.g. Deobandi, Wahhabi fundamentalism, Tabligh-i Jamaat, Al Qaeda, and the like – that are propagated by prominent and persuasive extremist preachers like Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada, and Abdullah el Feisal, each of whom played a role in the radicalization of Siddique Khan and his crew.

*The London Bombers*

The 7/7 suicide bombers were part of a group known locally as “the Mullah Crew” and started out as an anti-drug gang in their neighborhood on Beeston Hill in Leeds. They were Mohammad Sidique Khan, 30; Shezhad Tanweer, 22; Hasib Hussein, 18; and Germaine Lindsey, 19. Only Lindsey can be considered a first generation immigrant since he first came to the UK with his mother at the age of five (Sapsted and Gardam 2005). The other three were all second generation British Muslims of Pakistani decent (Leiken 2012; Silber and Bhatt 2007).
None of these individuals was especially delinquent in the eyes of the community, nor did any of them fall into any stereotypical background and in fact there is a “relative diversity of personal backgrounds and personality profiles” present here (Kirby 2007, p.418). Khan, in particular, with his youthful Western characteristics and desires, along with his unremarkable social position, begs the question: What happened? How and why did this integrated Brit whose youth was populated with desires of being Western, passion for helping children succeed in school, and had who had no significant criminal history turn to Islamist Holy War?

Khan was the ringleader of the group and is a major focus of many studies concerning the people and contexts behind the 7/7 bombings as there has always been more information readily available concerning his life. This plethora of information is largely due to the strong presence he had in the Beeston community working with children. He was born and raised in England “to parents who wanted their son to be a literate, integrated Englishman but also to remain Mirpuri in faith and fealty” (Leiken 2012, p.215). In fact, many described Khan as well-integrated to Western life in general. He was a family man, he had a business degree from Leeds Metropolitan University, and he even spoke with a notable Yorkshire accent (Silber and Bhatt 2007; “Profile, Mohammad Sidique Khan” 2007). Even as a youth he sought to “shed his ethnic skin” and was generally referred to by the nickname, “Sid”, because “he was ‘the most English of Pakistanis” (Kirby 2007, p.417; Leiken 2012, p. 192). Classmates even reported that Khan was conspicuously not religious and didn’t even attend mosque with his parents as most Pakistani boys were forced to do by their families. Sid “didn’t even seem interested in Islam” to the point that one would “never really know what religion he was from”
(Leiken 2012, p.193). Investigators into Khan’s life were surprised to find that this man had even toyed with the idea of becoming an American after taking an extended trip there during his youth. Even following his adolescence, Khan never fell into a “ready sociological category – he was neither downwardly nor upwardly mobile, not a petty criminal nor a dropout yet not a success story either” (Leiken 2012, p.189).

Shezad Tanweer has a similar background to that of Khan. He was born in the UK – Bradford – and grew up with his Pakistani family in the Beeston Hill area. Thus we see Tanweer as a ready example of a 2G British Muslim. Economically, Tanweer was considered the most comfortable as his father was a successful restaurant businessman in the area and he drove a conspicuous Mercedes that “stood out in Beeston and was said to be the envy of his peers” (Kirby 2007, p.417). It is estimated that at the time of his death, Tanweer’s estate was worth approximately $200,000 (Silber and Bhatt 2007). In his younger years, he was never a notably delinquent boy with a criminal record, although he had been involved in a number of racially motivated tussles, which were likely unhelpful to dealing with the typical identity crisis among others in the 2G demographic. As the attacks drew nearer, he was described as having evolved to become quite ideologically driven, second only to Khan.

Hasib Hussain is the most unexceptional of the Mullah Crew involved in the bombings. Like Khan and Tanweer, he was also a 2G British Muslim born to a Pakistani family. During his time in secondary school, Hussain experienced and participated in some racial tension, but was mostly non-delinquent in that respect. However, he did go through a brief period of drug-use and his parents sent him to Pakistan “in hopes of
reacquainting him with traditional Islamic values” (Kirby 2007, p.417). While he was away, he also participated in the Hajj and it was following this that bystanders began to notice a change in his demeanor and religiosity. In fact, “[n]ot long after his return from the pilgrimage, someone noticed he had written ‘Al-Qaeda – No Limits’ on his religious education school book” (Profile: Hasib Hussain 2011, p.1).

Germaine Lindsay somewhat breaks the pattern for the London Bombers as he is not of Pakistani descent and immigrated with his mother to the UK at an extremely young age. Although he is not technically a 2G British Muslim, he did spend the majority of his formative years in the UK and could be considered an adopted 2G. Born in Jamaica, he and his mother settled close to Leeds in Huddersfield, West Yorkshire. He was “a bright child, successful academically at school, artistic, musically inclined, and good at sports” and at age 15 he converted to Islam along with his mother. Following his conversion, acquaintances reported that he “exuded a religious intensity and… that his personality had undergone a dramatic change” (Kirby 2007, p.417). Also around the time of his conversion, this polite, quiet boy began getting in trouble at school for passing out Al-Qaeda propaganda. Investigators believe “that [he] was influenced by extremist preacher Abdallah [el]-Faisal, a fellow Jamaican” and a connection has been shown to between Lindsay and Khan in this respect as Khan was “an ‘avid collector’ of el-Faisal’s taped sermons” (Profile: Germaine Linday 2006, p.1; Leiken 2012, p.165).
More information is available on Khan than any of the other bombers, thus his radicalization will be the primary focus of the four. His radicalizing process will be the primary vehicle for understanding why the other bombers may have radicalized as well. According to a set of interviews with Khan’s brother, Gultasab, his was a gradual change that began with his initial involvement in the Mullah Crew of Beeston, an anti-drug gang, in the 1990s. This was where Khan encountered Wahhabi Islam for the first time. Wahhabism is a fundamentalist sect that is in direct contradiction to the traditional Barelwi Islam that the Khans followed. He attended mosque with his family his entire life, and although he didn’t leave immediately, he eventually found in his late teens that the community mosque had nothing for him as it was run solely by traditional first generation immigrants who “spoke and wrote in Urdu, and the only time they interacted with the younger Muslims was when they taught them to recite the [Qur’an] by rote – in Arabic” (Malik 2007, p.7). Those who subscribe to Wahhabism realize the need, better than the Barelwi’s, to connect with the younger generations and they freely publish in English and other languages that are more easily accessible to 2Gs. This can be attributed to a stronger emphasis by Wahhabis and other fundamentalist sects on the Ummah, the global community of Islam. Additionally, some of Khan’s friends from the Mullah Crew were also beginning their conversions to Wahhabism. The famed Asch Experiment of group dynamics has demonstrated in human psychology, time after time, the propensity of approximately 32% of individuals to yield their views to that of the group for fear of ridicule (McCauley and Moskalenko 2011, p.93).
At some time during his youth, Khan fell into a deep hole of alcohol and drug addiction (Leiken 2012). This is believed to be a galvanizing period that motivated him so strongly to become more religious and eventually a leader of the Mullah Crew. The group was known for kidnapping drug users and forcibly detoxing them in a borrowed flat with the consent of their families. The gang was also known to have acted as a form of protection for the Beeston community from the surrounding white and black gangs of Leeds. During these years, “Siddique was changing again; he was exploring the [Islamic] religious identity he once ignored… he did not revert to the folk Islam of his parents. Instead he was becoming, if not yet a jihadi, a fundamentalist” (Leiken 2012, p.195; Profile: Mohammad Sidique Khan 2007).

Khan also began mosque-hopping during his radicalization. He attended his family’s community mosque on Hardy Street, Jamia Masjid Abu Huraira, the longest. This was also where the Mullah Crew established their “al Qaeda gym” in its basement and where Khan met the radical preacher, Abdullah el Faisal, who would prove to be a large Islamist influence in the life of Germaine Lindsay – the fourth bomber – and also a likely channel through which Khan and Lindsay were introduced to each other (Leiken 2012; Kirby 2007; Silber and Bhatt 2007; Malik 2007). Eventually he found that the more literal interpretations of the Qur’an at Masjid-e-Umar, a Deobandi mosque, were more in tune with his changing religious beliefs. Madjid-e-Umar has been documented to be controlled by the Tabligh Jama’at (TJ) – an organization that “also serves as a de facto conduit for Islamist extremists and for groups such as al Qaeda to recruit new members” (Burton and Stewart 2008, p.5). In 2002, Khan finally began visiting the infamous Finsbury Park Mosque in North London. This was home to Abu Hamza, one of the most
prominent and radical preachers in the UK. He openly “encouraged young people to take up violent *jihad*, [was] allegedly involved in recruiting them for the Afghan training camps”, and he was a wanted terrorist in Jordan and Yemen (Foley 2013, p.247).

Finsbury Park was also home to a number of known radical Islamist terrorists and activists. To name a few: Richard Ried, the Shoe-bomber; Zacaria Moussaoui, the alleged twentieth hijacker of the 9/11 attacks; Ahmed Ressam, the Millennium Bomber; Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, the murderer of American journalist, Daniel Pearl; and Earnest James Ujaama, a civil rights activist who was Abu Hamza’s site-inspector for a proposed terror camp in Klamath County, Oregon (Leiken 2012; Dean and Allen 2006).

During his mosque-hopping, Khan went to school to get his business degree and it was there that he met his Deobandi-Indian wife, Hasina, in 1997. This is an important event to note in his radicalization, because it signified a stronger commitment to his *jihad* and altogether complete severance from his family’s Barelwi heritage and their *izzat*. His wife’s Islam was directly opposed to that of his family and undoubtedly looked attractive to a maturing Wahhabi as the two sects, Wahhabi and Deobandi, are strongly linked.

Between meeting his wife and ending up at Finsbury Park, Khan made the leap from being a radical Wahhabi Muslim only in thought to becoming one in deed. In 2001, he was found to have gone to Manchester four times to attempt recruiting young Muslims for *jihad* abroad (Malik 2007). He worked “with Omar Sharif and Asif Hanif – the two Britons who travelled to Israel in 2003 to commit suicide attacks” (Malik 2007, p.7). Fortunately, their attempts in Manchester failed. However, Khan already had a very large and loyal group of community fans back on Beeston Hill, so he returned and became even more plugged into the community as a youth worker. It is suspected that he used
this influence and work with the youth in the Beeston community to identify and recruit possible *jihadis* and that it is a likely venue through which Khan and Tanweer met the third bomber, Hasib Hussain.

**Self-Radicalization**

An analysis of the Beeston Bombers indicates some interesting group and individual radicalization theories and patterns. Although the bombers were not all radicalized in one “batch” at the very same time at every stage of their respective processes, they did eventually converge on being a radicalized group. Khan and Tanweer are believed to have been childhood friends, while Hussain and Lindsay did not meet the childhood duo until later in life. The bombers did not necessarily follow any path of radicalization as they were not coerced into becoming radical. Rather, they appear to have self-radicalized through an “exhortative” mode of “re-education”, which says that “you *should* change – if you are a moral person – and become what we (in the name of a higher moral authority) tell you to become” (Rai 2006, p.53; Lifton 1967). Investigators have found that the bombers did this on their own, particularly Khan and Tanweer (eventually Hussain would join), in the Islamic Beeston bookshop, Iqra. The shop apparently resembles the left-wing bookshops of the 1970s and also hosts Islamic presentations, youth activities, and media services. As it turns out, the Mullah Crew were heavily involved in the shop and would have regular meetings there and help “customers navigate the labyrinth of wares and scouting for potential adherents” (Leiken 2012,
p.200). Khan was especially invested in the shop as his name was actually listed on “The Iqra Trust” declaration form that was submitted to the UK Charity Commission in 2002.

The Iqra bookstore was a haven for Islamist extremism. This is based on testimony from Martin Gilbertson, an IT specialist who worked at the bookstore for two years and claimed to have warned the police in 2003 of the extremist ideology that was running rampant there (Profile: Shehzad Tanweer 2006; Leiken 2012; Vulliamy 2006). One of these core pieces of extremism that was prominent in the shop was an obscure master’s thesis written at the University of Mecca called, *Al-Wala’ wa’l-Bara’* (AWWB), which means “Loyalty and Repudiation” (Leiken 2012, p.89). This literature espouses a message of Islamic superiority and segregation as an identity group and that “the only way to recover that [Muslim] civilization is through faith and *jihad*…Faith provides ‘honor and self-esteem’… [and] ‘as a believer you feel a sense of your own worth and dignity” (Leiken 2012, p.201). The message is preached as an Islamic obligation to Allah to restore that civilization and struggle against his enemies through *jihad*.

The infusion of this message through the Mullah Crew – and the minds of Khan, Tanweer, and Hussain – would most definitely support the exhortative aspect of their radicalization as it establishes what *should* be done as well as placing Allah as the higher moral authority in whose name it should be done. This message also reinforces Tajfel & Turner’s (1979, 1986) social identity theory as it is applied to the Muslim diaspora by Victoroff et al. (2012). This theory finds that ingroup bias is associated with “varying degrees of outgroup derogation and/or infrahumanization”, which is the direct message of
Islamic superiority that was absorbed by Khan and Tanweer from *AWWB* (Victoroff et al. 2012, p.794).

In addition to Iqra, the Mullah Crew met in the al Qaeda gym under the Hardy Street mosque regularly to workout. This is significant as it has been hypothesized that interest in martial arts, boxing, bodybuilding, and gym-culture in general are “typically part of… radical Islamist… grounding for *jihad*” (Leiken 2012, p.199; O’Neill 2006). They all also went on regular paintball outings as well, which had militaristic aspects about them. As well as in meetings, the group prepared for these paintball sessions by watching “videos that featured graphic scenes of Muslims being tortured in Chechnya or Bosnia balanced with beheadings of ‘infidels’ – *jihadi* videos… a common practice among budding *jihadis*” (Leiken 2012, p.206). Moreover, these outings proved to be an appropriate medium for networking and recruitment of likeminded and potential radicals – this is evidenced by the suspicion of some investigators that it was on one of these outing that Khan and Lindsay met.

**Concluding Remarks**

The initial question pursued here was whether or not there existed a connection between multicultural public policy in Britain and the radicalization of 2/3G Muslims, but this case study also sought the answer to how individuals living in a society espousing such a tolerant, diverse, progressive, and loud social policy of MC could turn against Queen and country. During the ascent through each level of analysis – historical, national, local, and individual – each higher resolution allowed for one to really see the
answer begin to surface in Britain’s national security actions during the 1990s and in the local context of the bombers on Beeston Hill. The historical context and social atmosphere of MC may have adequately prepared the environment, but it was the decisions and security policies that were implemented in the 1990s that allowed for the local level Islamist infection of Leeds (and other cities not examined here) to fester and grow. If Britain had not established the informal security covenant it had with radical Islamist preachers on its soil, it would have been less likely that the bombers would have been exposed first hand to the teachings of extremists like Abu Hamza and Abdullah el Faisal. Had the seeds of Islamist extremism not been sown by a security covenant of convenience and watered by erosions of national identity in favor of a “multicultural post-nation”, it would have been much more difficult for a crop of 2G Islamist radicals to grow. However, these factors cannot be solely responsible for the radicalization of the London Bombers, because although they do help to explain the circumstances that encouraged them to radicalize, they are much too broad to fully answer our question.

It is through the lens of the local and group/individual contexts that more specific answers and possible explanations can be examined. The primary factor for radicalization here is the interaction between the first generation Barelwi Muslims and the second generation. The immense pressure from the first generation on their children to maintain the cultural characteristics defining their heritage while striving for success in the West causes strife and confusion within a 2G identity. How can individuals integrate themselves into a questionably non-existent British identity while remaining wholly loyal to a heritage and izzat that really belongs to their parents and is inaccessible to them on generational, religious, and linguistic levels? The “prepackaged Islam” of the
fundamentalists, who are actively reaching out to the next generation, can look appealing to 2Gs in this situation, because it provides exactly what they are searching for: a single, understandable, accessible, coherent identity in the *Ummah* (Leiken 2012, p.167). Examination of Khan’s radicalization demonstrates just such an identity-driven dilemma and his embrace of the fundamentalist Wahhabi *Ummah* as well as quite literally adopting the Islam opposite that of his family and severing himself from all of their Barelwi customs.

In regard to the results of the statistical analysis discussed prior to this chapter, it does not appear that any specific policy related to any specifically tested policy area was a driving factor in the radicalization of the London Bombers. Rather, their radicalization appears to have been more of a culmination of the life contexts of each terrorist. Given the nature of the somewhat inconclusive statistical results, this case study was intended to analyze the contextual layers of the lives of the London Bombers and identify a common thread between each of them that could be attributed to their violent radicalization and whether that thread could be tied back to the quantitative results. By looking through this sequence of lenses, not only is a larger understanding of the factors influencing their radicalization processes gained, but it also becomes clear in the case of the 7/7 Bombings that the areas of public dress code exemptions and affirmative action – the two most significant policy areas in the statistical analysis – do not play a significant or at least obvious role here. Rather, it was “the media, the wider culture, and even government officials [that] regularly placed value not in Britain, but in one’s ‘roots’” that tilled the soil and watered the seeds of Islamism planted by 1990s British officials’ toleration of known, dangerous radicals behind British borders (Leiken 2012, p.215).
CHAPTER FIVE: FRANCE AND THE 1995 PARIS METRO BOMBINGS

Introduction

Between July and October of 1995, France experienced a resurgence of terror attacks, the likes of which it had not seen since the mid-1980s. Eight attacks were carried out or attempted by an Islamist terror group from Algeria, *Groupe Islamique Armé* (GIA), four of which fell under the responsibility of cells led by Khaled Kelkal, an Algerian who immigrated to France as a child and was raised in the immigrant *cité* Vaulx-en-Velin, outside of Lyon. Although these attacks were not on the scale of the 7/7 bombings, they were still quite significant in the story of French counterterrorism and social policy. Like the previous chapter’s case study, to which this one is a compliment, a qualitative case study of Kelkal and the people, policies, and events that touched his life will help to illuminate more of the intricacies of Islamist radicalization in Western Europe.

Like the preceding case study, the primary goal here is to gain a better understanding of 2/3G radicalization in France and the primary factor(s) that drive it. The context of France is unique to contrast against the context of the UK, because scholars on multicultural and integration policy and counterterrorism policy generally place the two of them opposite to one another. The UK tends to embrace multiculturalism as a societal attitude and as actual policy and is more discriminant in its counterterrorism policy application, while France, a decidedly assimilationist nation, seeks the total integration of its immigrant communities into French society and is less subtle in its counterterrorism policy. That is not to say that the French do not respect cultural differences or choices,
but that they look to gain complete French conformity in the public sphere and allow for and encourage every type of diversity in the private sphere. This concept is known as laïcité, referring to French secular society and especially “denoting the strict separation of church and state, especially the absence of religious involvement in politics or government” (Leiken 2012, p.331). This separation and its legislative enshrinement in 1905 will be discussed within the case study.

In regards to the statistical analysis, like the UK, France demonstrates that the connection between MCPP and Islamist radicalization is indeed complex. Although the two nations were on opposite ends of the policy spectrum where the working hypothesis was accepted, both were still outliers in that they had significantly more instances of terrorism than the other states in their categories. This is most relevant in reference to the tested policy areas of public dress code exemptions and affirmative action where the null hypothesis was rejected. However, as was discussed in the previous chapter, although there could be connections between the policies of exemption and affirmative action, or lack thereof, and the incidence of radicalization, this case study is justified in that it will tease out more information on how radicalization happens in France and better identify the vital strands in the web of variables contributing 2/3G radicalization.

There is considerable sociological and psychological information available on Khaled Kelkal, so he is therefore, the logical choice for a case study of Islamist radicalization in France. In 1992, fate crossed the paths of Kelkal and a German sociologist, Dietmar Loch, who was conducting field research for his book about North African youth and social exclusion. Two weeks after the death of Kelkal in 1995, the
interview transcript was published in French in *Le Monde*. The interview provides us with a look at the world through the radical’s own eyes during his transition from petty criminal to Islamism to *jihad* (Leiken 2012; Fraser 1998; Khosrokhavar 2008).

**The Historical Context: The French-Algerian Connection**

An understanding of the ties that bind France and Algeria together is necessary, partly because the majority of France’s immigrant heritage is Algerian, but also because it was the French relationship with Algeria that began the modern evolution of French counterterrorism and is often espoused as the root of Islamist terrorism in France (Engler 2007). French history over the latter half of the 20th century has equipped her with experience in dealing with almost every form of terrorism. The 1950s saw anti-colonial terrorism that sought independence for Algeria from its colonial power; the 60s were fraught with right-wing terror trying to prevent that independence; the 70s and 80s provided experience with left-wing terrorism against French capitalism; the 80s also exposed France to state-sponsored terrorism from the Middle East that was “aimed at French policy in Lebanon and Chad and toward the Iran-Iraq War”; and separatist terror reared its head for France in the 80s and 90s in Brittany, the Basque region, and Corsica” (Shapiro 2007; Shapiro 2007, p.135).

France’s connection to Algeria reach back to 1830 when it first colonized the country. During the French occupation, there were significant efforts “to magically transform a land that was foreign, that was ‘theirs’, into a land that is ‘ours’, that is French” (Hannoum 2008, p.92). This fact in itself is an excellent illustration of the
French concept of *laïcité* and the common cultural French desire to maintain what is French and Gaullicize anything under its control. The French quite literally sought to make the ethnographic Algerians, who had previously been able to identify themselves according to tribe and geography, into *French people*. The reason being that “only once Algeria was made culturally French could the French [truly] settle there” (Hannoum 2008, p.92). It was during the 1871 transition of French military rule in Algeria to French civilian rule that the general French attitude towards Algeria shifted from “colony” to “territory”, but it was also around this time that Algerian uprisings against the French administration began occurring (Hannoum 2008).

Aside from their relationship through colonization, during the Algerian War for independence and after the fact, a large number of Algerians immigrated to France during the late 1950s and the 1960s. Many were recruited into the French labor force, because they were inexpensive to hire and France needed more workers to do the jobs the native French no longer wanted. Moving into the 1970s, both France and Algeria attempted to implement immigration/emigration restrictions on the moving population, but a “relatively autonomous Algerian community [had already developed] in France” and only grew larger with the French implementation of family reunification in 1973 (Loyal 2009, p.419). The family reunification policy allowed legally settled immigrants to fetch their families from abroad and bring them to France to live. This policy is actually what brought Kelkal to France in the first place as he and his mother took advantage of this opportunity to reunite with his father. Unfortunately, the memory of the Algerian War was still fresh in both populations’ collective minds and did not help to till the soil of society for the arrival of new foreigners who were largely considered “to be inferior
and… second-class citizens” and likely viewed as traitors to France in some respects, since Algeria had been legally considered more than “a colonial possession but part of the Republic” (Beyler 2006, p.90; Engler 2006; Pargeter 2008, p.77). Many of the 1st generation Algerians in France were also fairly illiterate by French standards and were also distrustful of French institutions due to their historical memory of colonization. This contributed further to 2/3G French Muslims’ rejection of their family heritage.

Much of the modern angst between Algeria and France is contained in their colonial history and their relationship during the Algerian Civil War. Algerian-Islamist anger towards France was “first aroused… because of their colonial history in Algeria and support for the authoritarian regime that later took power there” (Foley 2013, p.25). The Algerian Civil War was responsible for the birth of the GIA, one of France’s most problematic terrorist groups. In 1990, the Algerian Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won the nation’s first municipal elections. This was not an ideal outcome for current government, so when the FIS was set to win again in 1992, the army cancelled the elections, martial law was instated, and the FIS was outlawed and officially dissolved (Kepel 2002). However, unofficially, the FIS proceeded to initiate an armed struggle against the Algerian government. During the conflict, the FIS splintered into two types of factions: Moderate factions that eventually came to seek reintegration into the electoral process and radical factions that demanded the creation of an Islamic state in Algeria. The GIA was formed out of the latter in December of 1992 by some mujahideen from the Soviet-Afghan War (Shapiro 2010; Shapiro 2007; Leiken 2012; Foley 2013; Kepel 2002).
By 1994, most Algerian Islamists were brought under the umbrella of the GIA, particularly the young and the poor, and support was also found in Tunisia, Libya, and Morocco (Shapiro 2007). The GIA had evolved into a creature different from that of the FIS. It no longer aimed simply “to seize political power in Algeria… Rather, the GIA adhered to a more extreme ideological doctrine that held that the Algerian people and their government exist in a pre-Islamic state… and must therefore submit themselves to the restoration of Islam or die” (Shapiro 2007, p.142).

Direct jihad was first waged against France by GIA member, Djamel Zitouni, when Air France Flight 8969 was hijacked by a group of GIA militants on Christmas Eve, 1994. This began a series of terrorist attacks – one assassination and eight bombings – on French soil that would continue through 1995. The holiday hijacking had awakened French authorities’ suspicion of further GIA attacks against and within France, so in June of 1995 “four hundred police officers were mobilized to arrest 131 people in Paris, Marseille, Perpignan, Tourcoin, and Orléans – dismantling a vast European network of support for the GIA and other Algerian groups” (Shapiro 2007, p.143). However, the same intelligence responsible for this operation managed to overlook networks in Lyon – the main city outside of which Kelkal’s banlieue of Vaulx-en-Velin was located, and in Lille. On July 11, Sheikh Abdelkader Sahraoui, one of the founding FIS party members and bridge between Algerian fundamentalists and the French government, was assassinated by Kelkal and his childhood friend Koussa, the murder weapon was found in Kelkal’s backpack after his death (Kepel 2002; Lia and Kjøk 2001). Sahraoui had spoken out against Algerian attacks on France and even demanded, in conjunction with the US-exiled Anwar Haddam, that Algerian militants release their French hostages. The day
before his murder, his name “appeared on a ‘death list’ issued by the GIA” (Leiken 2012, Shapiro 2007; Shapiro 2010; Pargeter 2008; Kepel 2002; Lia and Kjøk 2001, p.37). The second attack on July 25 at Saint-Michel station is the one most often focused on by scholars, as it was the first bombing conducted by Kelkal with the most casualties in the series. Analyses of the attack series often follow the July 25 bombing with the discovery of Kelkal’s failed explosive on the TGV train tracks north of Lyon, which yielded his fingerprints to authorities and “made Kelkal the ‘most wanted man in France’” and resulted in “a manhunt… involving eight hundred police officers and soldiers” (Leiken 2012, p.15). They found him camping with his accomplices in the forest outside of Lyon in September and shot him dead in a gunfight. Khaled Kelkal was directly involved in the first four 1995 attacks before he was forced to go on the run, but it wasn’t until the October arrest of Boualem Bensaid, leader of the GIA cell in Lille, that the bombings finally ceased.

The National Context: France

**French Laïcité**

The French notion of *laïcité* is the core principle that lies behind its assimilationist public policy. It embodies the ideal of French public secularism and “is usually defined as a system in which there is a separation between religion and the State” (Hunter-Henin 2012, p.617). *Laïcité* also has created a certain amount of disharmony between liberal individual rights and statist unity (Joppke 2009). This is a notably different kind of separation that practiced in America. While the US institutes religious liberty in the sense
that the government is not permitted to establish state-sponsored churches or infringe upon the free exercise of religious activities, the French version of separation was born out of much different circumstances.

In France, this separation was conceived instead to protect the people against the Catholic Church during the Third Republic. France already had experienced a “long history of religious violence [and was] wary of any mixing of religion and politics,” and thus sought to contain religious life to the private sphere and to the best of her ability never mix it into the public sphere (Laurence and Vaisse 2006, p.139). This notion of the private and public division of *laïcité* manifested itself in the 1905 Law on the Separation between Church and State, which officially established state secularism to “ensure the free exercise of religion by all citizens” (Hunter-Henin 2012, p.617).

In contrast to the UK, the French have a strong national identity and *laïcité* is very much intended to be one of the supporting pillars of its establishment. France places extreme importance on citizenship education in its schools and in terms of curricular priority it places “even before reading, writing, and literature” (Osler and Starkey 2001, p.289). There is nothing more important to the French than grooming strong republicans. On its surface, the principle of *laïcité* seems exclusionary, but in reality the premise of being French is inclusive in its logic. As far as French nationality is concerned, “[i]t does not recognize difference , but rather starts from the premise that, within the republic, all citizens are equal [and that inequalities]… stem from family background and therefore are irrelevant to… the public sphere” (Osler and Starkey 2001, p.290). Ultimately, bloodline is sufficient to be French, but not wholly necessary. What is necessary is
assimilation through “commitment to officially recognized share symbols and values” (Aggestam and Hill 2008).

While the implementation of the principle of laïcité has been practical in the French context since its enshrinement in 1905, it was done in a different France – one that had not yet seen the influx of millions of ethnically Muslim North Africans. Debate has stemmed from this over the question of “whether Islam is in conflict with [the] private-public divide, since many consider it to be an ‘all-encompassing’ religion that does not distinguish between the spiritual, social, and political spheres” (Laurence and Vaisse 2006, p.140; Joppke 2009). This debate has only been spurred further by Islam’s growing presence within France and has begun to challenge whether the public-private religious divide can really be maintained anymore.

There are two sides to the coin of laïcité, however. Scholars have debated over the correct interpretation of the 1905 legal principle as republican “combative” laïcité or liberal “pluralist” laïcité (Joppke 2009, ch.2). As it is seen through the combative lens, unity of the republic is the goal, and when it is seen through the pluralist lens, the defense of religious rights is the goal. So, in examining the national context of France and its surface level conflict between laïcité and Islam, another level of analysis is discovered in the form of an ongoing and evolving conflict within the ideal itself. Indeed, the resolution of Islam’s role in French society may very well rest in the resolution of the “conflict between two different understandings of [laïcité], which, in principle, was shared and consented to by all, but in reality was given two opposite meanings: liberal versus republican” – individualism versus institutionalism. Currently, the republican form has
come out on top as seen in the 2004 Law of Laicité “against ‘ostensible’ religious symbols in public schools”, but during the era of the Paris Metro bombings, the adaptation of laicité and Islam were still being argued by the courts, specifically in regards to the presence of Muslim headscarves in public schools (Joppke 2009, ch.1).

**French Security/Counterterrorism**

The analysis of France’s security and counterterrorist norms and infrastructures will be carried out in a fashion similar to that of Britain in the previous chapter. France has developed her national security under a very different set of historical circumstances than did the UK; but like the UK, French notions of security, liberty, and counterterrorism have been directly formulated by France’s own unique experiences. To understand how these principles stand today, it is necessary to trace their evolution through history. This will directly inform the national security context in which French Muslims live.

Also like Britain, France counts liberty among its most defining characteristics of national identity and thus uses its underlying principles to inform its security policy. Unfortunately, she has not been similar to Britain in the sense of political resiliency during her post-revolutionary existence. Due to this instability, France has since placed a much broader focus on maintaining public liberty and the unity of the republican State. This more volatile progression through history since the French Revolution of 1789 saw restorations of French monarchies and creation of new French democracies. This “progress through rupture” prevented France from seeing real political stability until 1958 with the rise of the Fifth Republic. Also illustrative of her unstable progress through
the years is the coming and going of thirteen French constitutions to date (Foley 2013, p. 58).

Additionally, France has to cope with the traumatic historical memory of WWI and WWII, both of which involved the Germans breaking through French borders, unlike Britain. Thus it is plain to see how these two nations have developed very differently in regard to their political stability and resiliency. The combination of France’s political instability, her border violations in the two World Wars, and her historical experience with internal threats of revolution have undoubtedly contributed to the French desire to maintain powerful security institutions for domestic intelligence. Former President Nicholas Sarkozy illustrates this rather blatantly, “Liberty… is not synonymous with lack of foresight, nor with weakness. The adversaries of democracy must know that she has decided to defend herself and return every blow with her own methods” (Foley 2013, p.59).

France has, however, had the luxury of staying out of the same spotlight that Britain attracted after its acknowledgements of brutality regarding IRA prisoners. The French were also brutal with the Algerians, but they were never forced to face the consequences of those actions in international court as Britain was in front of the European Court of Human Rights (Foley 2013). Thus, there has been little to no negative reinforcement from public debate and media scrutiny on the international scale to prevent France from developing more draconian measures to contain terrorist threats. In fact, the opposite has actually occurred: “Rather than highlighting the importance of more
proportionate responses to terrorism, the Algerian experience has more likely reinforced the importance of the ‘security first’ norm for French society” (Foley 2013, p.61).

In the 1960s, the Secret Army Organization (OAS) – a rightist group within the French military – threatened the stability of the Republic through attempts to assassinate President Charles de Gaulle. This threat was deemed to be “of sufficient magnitude to justify a dramatic response” (Shapiro 2007, p.135). The government established a centralized security system in the form of the State Security Court (La Cour de Sûreté de l’État) for the sole purpose of counterterrorism (Shapiro 2007; Shapiro 2010). The court was a totally separate entity outside of the established French justice system. Initially, the system was effective, but as time progressed, the new court turned into a political tool to be used against leftists within France. This presents a certain sense of irony since the court was born out of an attempt to control the right. Back and forth political struggles between the left and the right throughout the 70s and 80s only continued to sow “a deep level of distrust between the political authorities and the police and intelligence services” with each trying to undermine the other at every turn (Shapiro 2007, p.136). One example among many of this severe distrust is found in 1981, when the Interior Minister flatly refused to provide important terrorist intelligence to the French foreign intelligence agency (Direction Général de la Sécurité Extérieure) in the presence of the Prime Minister, because he claimed it was a “nest of Soviet Spies” (Shapiro 2007, p.137).

Waves of terror attacks on French soil during the 1980s by Middle Eastern terror groups began to greatly increase public demand for improved national security and counterterrorist measures. The attacks were mostly committed by groups who were angry
with France for her positions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or on Syrian affairs. An interesting turn of events that brings to mind the mysterious “Security Covenant” of the UK involved a series of attacks in 1986 that were carried out against France. The attacks resulted in 11 deaths and over 220 injuries and were found to have been orchestrated and carried out by Hizb’allah and an Islamist group called the Committee for Solidarity with Near Eastern Political Prisoners. This gave the attacks “an Islamist dimension, therefore, but [had] nothing to do with the Algerian and Al-Qaeda-linked terrorism that would later threaten France in the 1990s” (Foley 2013, p.17). Intel on these attacks led French authorities to the conclusion that they had been state-sponsored attacks by Iran, Syria, and Libya – none of whom were particularly fond of French foreign policy at that point in history. In response to this intelligence, France sent officials to Syria the September following the attacks and promised French “arms, economic aid and diplomatic support” in return for the withdrawal of Syrian terror support in France and the provision of Syrian intelligence (Foley 2013, p.17). Interestingly enough, France apparently did the same with the Iranian government during the summer of 1987. After these deals were made with Syria and Iran, “France remained largely free of transnational terrorist attacks on its home soil for the next eight years” (Foley 2013, p.17). This constitutes a strong reminder of the unofficial security covenant the UK established with Islamist terrorists during her conflict with the IRA. Additionally, this raises the possibility that foreign policy is a strong, direct influence on the amount of terrorism a state experiences.

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19 Some of these attacks “reflected the anger of splinter Palestinian movements at French support for Yasser Arafat’s control of the PLO... [and another attack] in the middle of Paris in 1982 was part of a Syrian-Iraqi dispute” (Shapiro 2003).
In response to the public demand for better security triggered by these attacks, France also implemented new anti-terror legislation in 1986 that produced a new system that centralized all criminal justice procedures relating to terrorism in an effort to increase the efficiency of coordination between the judicial sphere and the investigative sphere. However, the French had learned their lesson from the State Security Court debacle of 1963, and worked within the existing system’s infrastructure to create the new system. The legislation manifested in changes to procedures regarding terrorist crimes, which were “centralized within the existing Trial Court of Paris and left to normal judges the ultimate decision as to the outcome of the cases” (Shapiro 2007, p.138). By simply amending the current system, instead of creating a new one, French authorities ensured better cross-agency cooperation, trust, and efficiency in their counterterrorism efforts (Shapiro 2007).

However, these changes brought to the surface the dilemma of the two very different cultures of the judiciary and intelligence services. Where the judiciary naturally seeks to increase prosecutions and “ensure the swift application of justice” within established court procedures, the intelligence services naturally tend to operate with longer term goals and the maintenance of information sources (Shapiro 2007, p.140). To resolve this, two new services were created to function as a conduit of communication through official and personal relationships. These services were the Justice Ministry SCLAT (Service pour Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste) and the Interior Ministry UCLAT (Unité de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste). This amended system for dealing with terrorism in France in conjunction with her dealings to appease terrorist state sponsors (Syria and Iran) are argued to have kept terror attacks at bay until the spillover
from the Algerian Civil War came to France in the early 1990s (Shapiro 2007; Shapiro 2010; Foley 2013).

Looking at specific ways in which French security has responded to Islamist threats in reality helps us to understand the philosophies that guide their development and implementation. France is seen in marked contrast to Britain in its notably less tolerant attitude towards Islamist terrorism, especially in light of Islamist spillover from the Algerian Civil War. As time progressed through the 1990s, French authorities became more and more aware of that overflow as Islamist extremists continued to leave Algeria to set up in France. As terror threats to French interests began to escalate, authorities carried out Operation Chrysanthemum in November 1993 in response to the kidnapping of three French consular agents by GIA members. One of the hostages brought back intelligence of a significant threat to France and its citizens abroad in Algiers. In two days, Chrysanthemum had 110 people rounded up for questioning and 88 arrested. Of those 88, only three were incarcerated and placed under formal investigation (Foley 2013; Shapiro 2007; Shapiro 2010). More instances of mass arrests followed as French authorities dismantled the notorious Chalabi network, “the most important group in France supporting Algerian resistance against the government”, in November 1994 (Shapiro 2007, p.143). During this arrest, 93 people were taken into custody, 15 released, 78 held for trial, and by 1998 when the case finally reached the French courts, 138 people were suspected to have links to the network and were placed on trial – 51 of those were acquitted. These instances are demonstrative of France’s “wide net” method of dealing with Islamist terrorism.
The attacks of 1994 and 1995 greatly contributed to France’s extremely sensitive perception of the threat of Islamist terror and bolstered the intensity of the crackdown on terror organizations within her borders. Because of this increased pressure, many GIA militants left France to go hide in Britain (among other European nations) because of its more tolerant attitudes towards their presence. The French government was aware that terrorists were using Britain as a safe haven and the French foreign intelligence agency, Direction Général de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE), “[established] a team of undercover military operatives from its ‘Draco’ unit in London ready to assassinate leading suspected terrorists, if called upon” (Foley 2013, p.287).

Mass arrests and raids/checks by the government continued into the 2000s. This was due to the high priority that France places on targeting radical Islam as a general objective, instead of only those who engage/support terrorist activity. This broader focus logically results in the larger-scale operations France is known for. The continued use of this “wide net” method has demonstrated that “French security agencies have… a willingness and a capability to make a forceful tactical response to the threat” of Islamist terror (Foley 2013, p.291). This method is further solidified as a French style of counterterrorism when compared to Britain at a similar degree of threat level perception. When the UK was at its highest threat level in recent memory (post-7/7 bombings), her security forces were still being “targeted and discriminate” in their operations, while France at her highest threat level (the mid-1990s bombings) was conducting large scale operations and arresting many more people (Foley 2013, p.294). Even at a lower threat level perception, as in the mid-2000s, France was still utilizing the wide net method (Foley 2013; Shapiro 2007; Shapiro 2010).
Like fishing, casting the wide net of arrests inevitably results in the capture of many “little fish”, but also comes with a stronger possibility of catching some “big fish” as well. The goal of the system “is to catch the most possible; too bad for the little fish – but good, for the big fish [sic]” (Foley 2013, p.294). Even if significant targets aren’t caught, at the very least, French authorities look positively on the great amount of information that is gathered from the subsequent interrogations of those large operations. The “wide net” method is tolerated in France, because there is a “predominant view [among the populace] that the security of the Republic generally supersedes concerns about the liberty of individuals” (Foley 2013, p.296). There are still limits, however, to this style of counterterrorism. The Chalabi Network case enlightened French security to the possibility that their operations were getting too large, not because they were any kind of infringement on civil liberties, but rather because they tended to arrest more people than the system could efficiently prosecute. Nevertheless, all the mass arrests, raids, checks, deportations, and monitoring in France have “contributed to the muting of support for Islamist terrorists [there]” (Foley 2013, p.307).

These are important illustrations of the “security first” norm in France. It has remained unopposed by arguments of freedom of expression or respect for minority communities. In fact, as was made apparent in the discussion of laïcité, the “norm of respect for communities does not arise in the French context” (Foley 2013, p.307). The French model of integration instead “has been skeptical of giving official recognition to distinct immigrant ‘communities’ based on an ethnic or religious identity” (Foley 2013, p.309). Further bolstering the continuation of France’s style of counterterrorism is the
lack of domestic public and media scrutiny its security agencies have had to endure, in contrast to Britain.

_The Local Context: Culture and the Banlieues_

Despite France’s impressive counterterrorism record, there are still some policies that scholars claim give radical Islamists footholds to exploit amongst Muslim youth. Once family reunification was implemented, Algerian immigrants experienced severe culture shock. Their new lives in France directly challenged their traditional family dynamics, because the “father lost his ‘hegemonic position in the patriarchal edifice,’ often because he was unemployed”, which in some cases “prompted many men to reassert their status by becoming ‘religious models’ and adopting a more radicalized version of Islam” (Beyler 2006, p.91). Additionally, women became more active outside the home than they had been in Algeria, thus further challenging the traditional patriarchic family structure.

 Movements like the Tabligh Jama’at (TJ) have also found footholds within the immigrant community, much as it has amongst Pakistani immigrants and their offspring in the UK. These groups exploit the weaknesses of 2/3G French Muslims, which generally arise from their rejection of their parents’ culture. While the first generation immigrants maintained their cultural roots, the “younger generations [occupied] the more challenging territory that lies between their parents’ and grandparents’ traditional culture and French modernity” (Beyler 2006, p.91) This notion is not new, however, since “first-generation immigrants rarely assimilate fully… [and tend to] inhabit enclaves where the
sender-country language is still spoken” (Leiken 2012, p.42). Integration almost always takes place in the second generation, especially in public schools, but in France, the schools that once greatly aided in the integration of immigrants between WWI and WWII as well as afterward have lost much of their ability to do so, due to increasing social problems among their 2/3G students, as well as being severely underfunded and overcrowded (Laurence and Vaisse 2006; Leiken 2012). Being raised in a heavily secular French society led many 2/3Gs to reject their cultural heritage and look for a more accepting identity than what their parents or mainstream France could offer them – many found this within the ummah of universal Islam. They are driven even more so towards the adoption of an “Islamist” identity by the French referring to them as “Arabs”, not only because the term reminds 2/3Gs of their parents’ culture, but also because terms like “Islamist” and “Muslim” cause anxiety of the French and makes it attractive to the more rebellious 2/3Gs (Beyler 2006). Radical Islamists from TJ and the like appeal to these same identity crises, questions, and anxieties between French Muslim youth and mainstream French culture as a recruiting technique – much the same as recruitment of radical Wahhabs on Berelvi Muslims among UK Pakistanis.

Ultimately, 2/3Gs are faced with two choices in France: (1) “Being stigmatized as a delinquent by mainstream society” by refusing to integrate, or (2) “being branded a ‘traitor’” by their immigrant community for trying to integrate into French society (Beyler 2006, p.92). Quite obviously, neither of these choices is particularly appealing, but even so, some 2/3Gs refuse to integrate out of principle, since they consider themselves to be French citizens and should not have to change. They believe French society should consider them equally French by virtue of their birth on French soil
Radical fundamentalist Islam, however, offers a third choice of identity to troubled 2/3Gs that gives purpose and commands respect from their banlieue (Beyler 2006).

Radicalization scholarship has shown that violent radicalization resulting from some form of group identification is actually a very rare phenomenon, since “identification is cheap, and action is expensive” which is shown through evidence that very few group identifiers “are [actually] ready to accept the personal risks of illegal let alone violent action in support of [a] group” (McCauley and Moskalenko 2011, p.28). It is also apparent, however, that converts to Islamist fundamentalism are particularly susceptible to violent radicalization, regardless of its rarity. This phenomenon is known as “Copycat Radicalization” and has been shown to be common in terrorist cells – particularly in the major groups that France has encountered through the 1990s and the 2000s. Many conversions occur “when one member of a group converts, [and] the rest with whom he might share a background in petty crime or delinquency may sometimes convert out of solidarity or peer pressure, even though they may themselves have little predilection for religion to begin with” (Beyler 2006, p.92). These converts often try to prove themselves and their dedication to Islam by adopting the most extreme versions and carrying out actions in its name, thus demonstrating their willingness to adopt “expensive” action for their new group identity.

There are also significant economic factors behind 2/3G radicalization in France. Radical Islamist recruiters are fully aware of the economic difficulties that are faced by the immigrant communities in the banlieues and their cités and they exploit those
problems to the fullest. The *banlieues* are the low-income suburbs around the major cities of France, such as Paris, Lyon, Lille, and Marseilles. The *cités* are the ghetto-esque housing projects within the *banlieues*. Each of France’s *banlieues* has a significant Muslim population within it, but four centers are the most significant. The Marseilles *banlieue* Muslim population is 25%, Paris is 10-15%, Lyon is 8-12%, and although Lille’s cumulative percentage is only 5%, its suburb of Roubaix is nearly 50% Muslim (Laurence and Vaisse 2006). Each of these populations is also skewed towards youth and have high unemployment, violence, and crime rates over other areas. The crime eventually grew in “these neighborhoods to such an extent that some became known as ‘lawless zones’ (*zones de non droit*) where policemen were advised not to go” by the government (Beyler 2006, p.93). The ghetto phenomenon created by the problems in these *cités* is similar to the ones seen even in the United States. They are areas where economic misfortune, organized and petty crime, absent fathers, and single mothers are miserably common. Social and security problems also evolved to the point where municipal authorities thought the only way to solve the quandary of the *cités* by relying on “various local Islamist associations to help stop delinquency and drugs… [and] in exchange, these groups were given official recognition” (Beyler 2006, p.93).

Unfortunately, those same authorities realized the mistake they had made by doing so, because it reinforced the more rigid religious identities in those areas by giving the responsibility of reducing petty crime and drug delinquency to the more effective, neofundamentalist movements like TJ.²⁰

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²⁰ Neo-fundamentalism differs from traditional fundamentalism in that it “combines technical modernism, de-culturization, the rejection of both traditional Muslim and modern Western cultures, and
Unemployment is argued to be the largest barrier to French 2/3G Muslim integration. It has been shown that immigrants do experience higher unemployment than native Frenchmen and that “those problems have been reinforced by the economic situation in France, especially the stagnant job market… [as well as] negative stereotypes and racism” (Laurence and Vaisse 2006, p.31). It has become so difficult for immigrants, let alone Frenchmen, to enter the workforce in France, that cases of relative deprivation among 2/3G Muslims is only intensified. These negative reinforcements of their perceived isolation from French society serve only to drive them towards the arms of the radical ummah.

Kelkal’s Context

Prisoner Radicalization

Khaled Kelkal was re-Islamized and subsequently radicalized during his two stays in prison, where he was recruited to the GIA and groomed by Algerian-Islamist recruiters (Beyler 2006; Fighel 2008; Blanche 2009; Marret 2009; Leiken 2012). Islamist radicals are known to utilize the prison system as an excellent breeding ground for their violent ideology, because of primary aspects: (1) their audience of potential recruits is quite literally captive, (2) their recruiting environment is isolated from distractions, (3) and there are plenty of vulnerable, disillusioned young men. Within any prison population, but especially in Europe, Muslims constitute a very distinct group, because they tend to cluster for the purposes of “social support and protection and because they demand (and
often receive) special treatment by virtue of their religious affiliation” (Fighel 2008, p.2).

After individuals are radicalized in prison, they are usually directed into some sort of radical Islamist infrastructure to prevent a falling away from his new faith. Thus, the general path seen in radicalized prisoners, specifically for Kelkal, is an arrest for petty criminal activity, conversion or radicalization within the system via another inmate or an imam, and absorption into a radical Islamist group, organization or infrastructure upon release.

Muslims are significantly overrepresented within the European prison population, but especially so in France. It is extremely difficult to accurately gauge the proportion of Muslim inmates in the French penitentiary system as the French government forbids any of its institutions to gather data pertaining to race, religion, or ethnicity (Fighel 2008; Marret 2009). There are estimates, however, of the French prison population being as high as 80% Muslim, while Muslims within France itself constitute only somewhere between 5-10% of the entire country’s population (Rappaport, et al. 2012; Fighel 2008; Kern 2014). The sheer volume of Muslim inmates then poses a larger possibility of Islamic radicalization during incarceration, especially among those convicted of non-terrorist crimes, because they are afforded none of the security measures taken in regards to high-profile terrorist criminals.

Radical Islam, in particular, is also considered to be a relatively easy religion to convert to. Its message is simple, but it also provides answers to existential questions that generally arise in the vulnerable and frightening prison environment. The promise of religion offers “certainty, security and answers to some of the fundamental questions
which inmates are likely to ask themselves” as well as an opportunity to “break with the past” (Neumann 2008, p.25) A contributing factor to prison conversion/radicalization rates is that radical Islam is considered by some analysts and scholars as a popular “religion of rebels” and is seen as a “symbol of defiance” which would definitely make it an attractive choice for any disillusioned 2/3Gs going through any sort of ethno-religious identity crises, because of Islamism’s “cross-racial appeal” to a universal cause (Karagiannis 2012, p.102; Neumann 2008, p.25).

Radicalization scholarship shows two primary links to the jihad movement of Islamism from European prisons: Radical imams and Islamist inmates. The imams link prisoners to outside networks by infiltrating prisons under the guise of religious instruction for the rehabilitation of inmates. A solution has been suggested and carried out in some systems, France among them, to require a certification program to allow only vetted imams to provide Islamic religious instruction and services to prison inmates. Unfortunately, these programs take a significant amount of time to put into place, which effectively removes the possibility of guided, moderate religious instruction for inmates until the demand for vetted imams is met. This is a particular problem in France that opens up its prisoners to radicalization through the second link of Islamist inmates (Neumann 2008). Often, when new Islamist prisoners are brought into the system, their reputation precedes them. They immediately gain respect and notoriety among the prison population, thus making them more effective recruiters (Neumann 2008).

As the Muslim population within European prisons continues to grow, the problem of prison radicalization will only intensify. This has already manifested in
France as she is the only European state to have “had a significant Islamist militant prisoner population before 2001” due to her experience with Algeria and the GIA (Neumann 2008, p.27; Shapiro 2007; Shapiro 2010; Foley 2013). In fact, this seems to be the double-edged sword of France’s “wide-net” style of counterterrorism. When the French implemented their wide-net investigations, arrests, and raids against Islamist extremists – more specifically the GIA – “recruitment [in prisons] gained momentum [as] many GIA-activists were incarcerated” (Lia and Kjøk 2001, p.30).

**Khaled Kelkal**

Khaled Kelkal is the final layer of this case study. He represents the culmination of each examined context and will ideally provide a magnification of the social and political factors that can be identified as consistent in the French case of radicalization to provide a possible explanation for what it is that causes 2/3Gs to radicalize.

Kelkal arrived in France in 1973 with his mother under France’s newly implemented reunification policy as they rejoined his father who had arrived well before them to work. He was raised in a family of 12 in the banlieue of Vaulx-en-Velin outside of Lyon and his family subscribed to a “private and discrete” form of Sufi Islam (Leiken 2012). Although scholarship on Kelkal does not provide information on what specific sect of Sufism his family subscribed to, it is common knowledge in Islamology that Islamists of all fundamentalist sects consider forms of Sufism to be nothing more than “superstition and folklore” (Roy 2004, p.220). Thus, there is a similar religious struggle
as we did with Khan between Kelkal’s family’s Islam and the militant neofundamentalist
Islamism that he would eventually adopt.

He was also an excellent student. Where his brothers only earned vocational
diplomas, Kelkal was granted entrance into a top level French high school where he
“performed at the baccalaureate level in chemistry” (Leiken 2012, p.7). However, he was
also the only Arab student in his class. In his fateful interview with Dietmar Loch, Kelkal
described his struggles in school as one who could not ascribe to the French “‘melting
pot’ boiling away the residues of cultural identity”. He said that it made him feel he “had
no place because they insisted on total integration. It was impossible to forget my culture,
eat pork. I couldn’t do it” (Leiken 2012, p.7). He also noticed that the teachers and other
students at school had a certain amount of suspicion when dealing with him as well. It
made him feel estranged and accused, which played a direct role in starting him down his
path of petty crime. School became too difficult to deal with socially and
psychologically, so Kelkal started skipping class until he eventually dropped out of the
school altogether.

Dropping out caused a good deal of enmity between Kelkal and his parents, but
mostly his mother. She told him that he was a failure for dropping out of school, and he
knew that it was a mistake to have done so. Nevertheless, the guilt, shame, and
disapproval he received from his family was too much to bear, so he left. The familial
roots of those feelings that caused him to leave and travel further down the path that
would eventually radicalize him are the same ones that would motivate Khan. In fact, it
has been documented that “[i]n many instances of European Muslim radicalization, a
family rupture will precede or accompany the conversion to radical Islam” (Leiken 2012, p.8).

Even before Kelkal dropped out of school, skipping class took him to the streets where he fell in with a gang of thieves to pass the time. In his interview, he justified this new hobby through his resentment of the racial prejudice he experienced from the French school system, but also from economic disparity and political obligation. Kelkal estimated that “70 percent of the kids [in Vaulx-en-Velin] rob” because their parents, who often had more than one child to provide for, didn’t have enough money to buy them what they wanted (Fraser 1998, p.6; Leiken 2012). However, he also identified the addictive attributes of the rush of stealing: “When you steal, you feel freer because it’s all a game. As long as I’m not caught, I’ll be the winner. It’s a game” (Fraser 1998, p.6; Leiken 2012, p.10). Feeding into this interpretation of his own actions, still, was Kelkal’s quest for political vengeance against the French system of integration (Leiken 2012).

At eighteen years old, he was arrested for stealing a car and was sent to prison for four months where he was re-introduced to Islam. One of his cellmates there was a member of the Society of Muslim Brothers (a group whose members had dispersed seeking graduate education or under threat of the secular governments of Egypt, Syria, and Tunisia), who taught Kelkal how to read and write in Arabic. Prison also afforded him the experience of finally being part of “a tight-knit group” and having “a great opening of the spirit” through Islam (Leiken 2012, p.10). After this first stay, Kelkal told Loch that he was made to see that, “I’m neither Arab nor French… I’m Muslim” (Viorst 1996, p.90).
Between prison sentences, Kelkal reverted back to his life of crime and went astray from his newly gained religiosity. He was arrested again, but this time instead of just stealing cars, he was driving them into store windows to steal the goods inside. His new cellmate, Islamist militant Khelif B., was a known recruiter and proselytizer for the GIA in French prisons. Also during his second stay, Kelkal met Safé Bourada, another notable GIA member who was found to have been involved in Kelkal’s Paris metro bombings by helping the members plan the attacks and built his own terror cell in the mid-2000s that was dismantled by French authorities (Leiken 2012; Beyler 2006; Foley 2013). These Islamist GIA connections only lent more power to Kelkal’s radicalization, as he was known to have been renting the same Islamist scholar cassette tapes in prison “every three or four days” and indoctrinating himself with their message (Leiken 2012, p.14).

Loch’s interview with Kelkal opened up even more of the young radical’s fresh post-prison mindset. Kelkal said that he blamed the French State for the inequity and racism that he experienced and claimed that that was what forced him down his criminal path. He also expressed hostility towards an unfair justice system claiming, “The Justice system is no friend of ours. There is justice at two different velocities. The guys from Valux-en-Velin that are caught are guaranteed a year and a half more than others… What is called justice is injustice” (Leiken 2012, p.13). Ironically, however, Kelkal also revealed that his radicalization in prison, although he of course did not refer to it as such, had turned him into a sort of social activist against drug abuse. This is a notable similarity to Khan’s anti-drug dealings in the Mullah Crew, especially given that Kelkal would also take drug addicts, lock them up, and care for them through the forced detoxification.
Robert Leiken attributes this common act to “their religiosity… because their newfound militant Islam made recovery a spiritual event” (Leiken 2012, p.13).

Once Kelkal was released from prison the second time, he became an active member of the Bilal mosque in Vaulx-en-Velin. This is significant, because Bilal had very strong ties with the French branch of TJ, “a pietist movement that has played a decisive role in reaffirming an Islamic identity among the Muslim population of France” (Kepel 2000, p.188; Leiken 2012). TJ offers a simple Islam, but requires a high degree of faith and devotion and it is particularly attractive for those who are questioning who they are and seeking a new identity, because it “offers a discipline in life and thought, a spiritual direction that provides a sense of one’s existence completely oriented toward salvation” (Kepel 2000, p.188).

To complete Kelkal’s transition from Islamism to violent jihadism, he went to Algeria. He told Loch in his interview that getting out of France and going back to Algeria was all he wanted to do. So in the winter of 1994-95, Kelkal traveled to Algeria where he made a direct connection with the GIA and sought to join the resistance in Mostaghanem, Algeria with an uncle of his who was a senior Islamist militant there. However, his GIA handlers told him that he would be sent back to France where he would be of more use (Leiken 2012; Viorst 1996; Lia and Kjøk 2001). Interestingly, Khan experienced a similar assignment after going to Pakistan to complete his own violent radicalization. When Kelkal returned home to France, he started watching jihadî videos and training “in the hills surrounding Lyon with his childhood friend Karim Koussa, who had gone to Pakistan to fight the Soviets and was recruited there by the
“GIA” (Leiken 2012, p.15). Once again, this is extremely similar to the West Yorkshire training sessions of the London Bombers with their own *jihadi* videos and paintball matches in the hills.

*Concluding Remarks*

This case study has made clear that the policies found to be significant in the statistical analysis were not at the forefront of Kelkal’s radicalization. It did not occur as a result of feeling victimized or alienated by the denial of religious/cultural dress code exemptions or the lack of affirmative action programs. However, it would appear that the French integration system did play an influential role in his radicalization. Indeed, Kelkal was known to be an excellent student and got into a top rated high school based on his own merit regardless of his ethnicity. Likewise, the absence of both of these policy areas probably did not affect his actual socioeconomic situation and his ability to gain employment, but rather it is more likely that the kleptomania that landed him in prison twice was more to blame than racial discrimination. Still, in the background of that kleptomania is Leiken’s telling of Kelkal’s time in school, which presents a picture of an individual faced with a genuine identity crisis. The only Arab in his school, he was the sole target of the French public education system’s “all-or-nothing assimilation policy, one that, unlike the American [system], really does aspire to be a ‘melting-pot,’ boiling away the residues of cultural identity” (Leiken 2012, p. 7). Kelkal himself says that the pressure he experienced in that school drove him to his truancy, which eventually turned into thievery and finally led him to prison where the GIA found him.
In the case of Khaled Kelkal’s radicalization, there’s an abstract, but common, thread emerge through our layers of analysis that was not considered in the statistical analysis: foreign conflict. The colonial relationship between France and Algeria initially introduced Algerian anti-colonial terrorism into the French context, which only helped to sow the seeds of distrust and angst between the two countries. Moreover, French involvement in the Algerian Civil War only painted a larger target on France for the Islamist militants of the GIA, who saw French “financial and political support for the junta ruling Algeria [as a move] to reduce Algerian Muslims to slavery and to move Algeria away from religion” (Shapiro 2007, p.142). Had France not lent such interventionist support to the ruling power during the Civil War, it is likely that the GIA would not have sought to use and radicalize the North African immigrant population there to the same extent that they have. It is also just as likely that France would not have seen such a severe spillover of the conflict onto her own soil.

For concrete integration and counterterrorism policy recommendations to be made, the key lies in addressing the economic conditions of the *banlieues* and the phenomenon of prison radicalization, both of which were identified as significant points of leverage and utility in terrorist recruitment. In regards to the *banlieues*, it is commonplace to see French authorities raise the issues of tension there as primarily social ones that cause security problems. Oliver Roy, a prominent French scholar on radical Islam, has claimed that the government tends to ignore the economic challenges behind the ethnic segregation and radicalization of youth in the *banlieues* (Beyler 2006). For a long time, “French social-democracy [has used] secularism to conceal the economic debate” and explain the social tension and security problems in those areas (Beyler 2006,
Economic and security actors must be considered together, though, if France hopes to weaken the leverage of economic disparity that Islamist recruiters have over the 2/3Gs in those areas. How much more attractive, then, must the community of the ummah look to a young French Muslim trying to understand why it is that they are not afforded the same economic opportunities as indigenous Frenchmen? The ummah espoused by the radicals is a community without such disparity and offers purpose to those who feel they have none. The economic crisis of the banlieues is an extremely complex one, so it is difficult to make concrete policy recommendations in regards to it. However, scholarship on the subject suggests that the answer lies in addressing the distinctly greater unemployment rates of 2/3G youth in the banlieues (Leiken 2012; Laurence and Vaisse 2006).

Solid policy recommendations can be made, however, at the level which radicalized Kelkal: prison. As a known breeding ground for Islamist radicalism that is subject to a much higher level of federal control than policy nightmare of the banlieues, French authorities are in a much better position to prevent 2/3G radicalization in prisons than they are in open society. Within the acceptable boundaries of human rights, France’s prison population is highly observable and highly controllable by nature. Unfortunately, France is still falling short in its efforts to curb prison radicalization. Although efforts have been made to train prison staff on identifying potential radicals, the training has not yet disseminated well enough to ensure detection by staff (Marret 2009; Sage 2013). Even so, this method of detection is rather ineffective as scholars have found that radicalization tends not to be an overtly external process, thus more intimate methods of detection are required. French authorities have realized this and in addition to trying to
train staff in radical detection, they have established an internal prison intelligence unit, EMS-3, to fill this need and work with the French DCRI domestic security services. Unfortunately, the unit is controlled by the Justice Ministry (which, as discussed, has a distinctly different culture with different goals regarding terrorism than the Interior Ministry) and also “hold[s] no judicial power” (Sage 2013, p.2). This complicates the sharing and coordination of information between the EMS-3 and the DCRI. A final solution to prison radicalization that has begun to be addressed by French authorities and is not finding success in its implementation, although it shows great promise in theory, is the creation of vetted “‘made in France’ Imams” (Marret 2009, p.21). The French Imam initiative has been failing in part due to the growing prison population, which has increased by a third over the past ten years (Sage 2013). There are simply not enough Muslim chaplains (160 to the approximately 62,000 total inmates in French prisons) to counsel inmates and be effective as counter-radicalization agents (Sage 2013; Walmsley 2013).

With this information, it is clear that if the French government wants to effectively counter the radicalization movements within its prisons, it must take stronger initiatives to provide moderate ministry to its Muslim prisoners and increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its prison and domestic intelligence units. Detection is the first and most important step in prevention and is therefore one of the more important improvements that the French can make in timely and practical terms.
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS

Overall

The preceding chapters have sought to increase understanding of the relationship between multiculturalism as public policy and the incidence of Islamist radicalization among second- and third-generation European Muslims in the European Union. This section will further detail the conclusions of those chapters and interpret their results and implications for future research on the growing subject of multiculturalist public policy and its relationship to Islamist radicalization in the EU.

Chapters Two and Three details an attempt to yield empirical results to support or refute the hypothesized relationship between MCPP and 2/3G radicalization. Indeed, some results were found, and although they do offer some new information as to the how MCPP and 2/3G may be related, the “mixed bag” of results across the different areas of policy indicate that the relationships that do rise to the surface are not very strong and are thus more complex, meaning that there are very likely more factors than MCPP alone that influence the incidence of radicalization among 2/3G European Muslims. Although the statistical results were not as clean cut, they did yield some useful information regarding the selection of case studies for the United Kingdom and France in Chapters Four and Five. These two, chosen on the basis of being outliers with higher numbers of terrorist attacks, justified a most different systems case study design. This methodology was chosen based on the fact that the two nations are comparatively opposite in their systems of multiculturalism and immigrant integration and yet have the same outcome of higher levels of terrorism within their categories of policy adoption. The joint goal of the case
studies was to identify common factors between the two case studies that might inform why these two contrasting systems have a similar result.

Conclusions of the United Kingdom Case Study

The case study on the United Kingdom analyzed one of the most high-profile acts of terrorism in its history: the London 7/7 Bombings. This terrorist act, being the operationalized form of 2/3G radicalization, made 7/7 a primary candidate for analysis of its perpetrators and the possible links between MCPP and their own radicalization. The London Bombers were observed through a series of contextual lenses in order to gain a more accurate picture of their influential surroundings. First, the historical lens was used to provide understanding on the long-standing South Asian migratory connection between Leeds (the hometown to two out of the three bombers) and Mirpur, Pakistan. This level of analysis found a strengthening link between the two towns dating back to World War I and that that link resulted in a unique window of exposure of Britain and its immigrants to the radical Islam of the Middle East and South Asia. Additionally, the large influx of Pakistani immigrants to Britain contributed to the formation of British MCPP in response to discrimination against the incoming population.

The analysis was further focused through the lens of the national context to determine what kind of national environment the bombers were the product of and which they were subject to from a multicultural policy and national security perspective. Looking at the development, theory, and implementation behind the unique British brand of MC, it was found that its presence has effectively confused, if not eliminated, the
essence of the British national identity. The mutual respect and tolerance for other cultures that is so highly espoused and propagated by the British government that national and individual identity has been overtaken by “[e]thnic heritage, racial features, or sexual orientation [which] are elevated into exclusive master statuses that totally fix an individual’s identity… [into] groups or ‘communities’ that are inert, homogeneous, and mutually exclusive” (Joppke 1996, p.449). This British ideal of a “community of communities” has made it difficult for immigrants and their offspring to find a British identity to integrate into, thus exacerbating 2/3G issues of social deprivation and identity crisis. They don’t feel the same connection to the “homeland” that their parents do and their British citizenship offers them nothing in the way of what it means to be British, so they look elsewhere to louder, steadier voices of identity like radical Islam. The case study showed that this identity crisis is utilized specifically by Al-Qaeda recruiters, because they have realized that the British environment with its “insular culture, identity politics, lenient courts, and shortsighted policy” to be enough kindling to allow the British intervention in Iraq to light the fire of radicalization (Leiken 2012, p.267).

The national context lens also examined national security policy in the UK, which identified the historical memory informing her current national security policies. Having won two World Wars and enjoyed relative political stability for the past 300 or so years has built up an attitude of resiliency which has been seen to undermine “security first” principles in the development of national security policy. That historical memory in conjunction with more recent events from their conflict with the IRA that led to the unofficial security covenant between the UK and known Islamic radicals helped to propagate an atmosphere friendly to and conducive for Islamist radicalization.
The study was focused even further to the local context of the bombers – Leeds and its suburb of Beeston Hill – where they lived and worked to see if there might be a factor visible only at a higher resolution of analysis that contributed to their radicalization. Beeston Hill was seen to be unique in that it was severed from the rest of Leeds and has had a very exclusive migrant connection to Mirpur, Pakistan. That connection was explored, and the strength behind the connection, aside from the natural human tendency for immigrant communities to gather and settle in the same places, was found in the religious and cultural traditions that came with the Mirpuri to Beeston Hill. The unique religious and cultural attributes of the Sufi Barelwi Muslims, a Muslim sect which is followed by the majority of Mirpuri, were found to be suffering a unique struggle “to translate [themselves] effectively into British urban life”, because the first generation Barelwis, in an attempt to keep their ties to their homeland strong, maintain the same practices and traditions that no longer make sense to 2/3Gs born and exposed to Western life in Britain. Those younger generations tend to leave the faith of their parents and look for something stronger with more understandable and relatable answers to their questions about Islam and about themselves. The local context of Beeston Hill appears to be somewhat of a self-perpetuating environment for the personal psychological factors that can lead to radicalization: relative social deprivation due to the poor economic status of Beeston Hill and identity crisis due to the inherent conflicts of being a British citizen with a strong, overbearing Barelwi Mirpuri heritage.

Finally, the UK case study looked at the bombers themselves as a group and as individuals. None of them turned out to be negatively notable people as youngsters or as adults in the eyes of their community. Khan, Tanweer, and Hussain were all 2Gs of
Pakistani decent and their fourth member, although he was a first-generation immigrant, had lived almost his entire life in Britain. None of them was especially poor; in fact one of them was reasonably wealthy, and none of them had much, if any, trouble with the law. By the end of the examination of the Beeston Bombers, with particular focus on their leader, it became apparent that a great deal of self-radicalization was involved in the transformation of the group. This self-radicalization, however, was highly enabled by the existence of known Islamist hotspots in their neighborhood like the Iqra bookstore and the al-Qaeda gym. The existence of known radical Islamist mosques outside of Leeds were instrumental in their radicalization as well, because they allowed for direct contact with high profile preachers known to be dangerous radicals by the British government.

The main goal of the case study was to search for a possible connection between multicultural public policy and the radicalization of 2/3G Muslims in Britain and how four reasonably well-integrated, Westernized individuals could turn against their country. After focusing the analysis through the narrowing lenses a couple of useful answers became apparent and are excellent candidates for further research. The first is the direct consequences of the security policies that were implemented in the 1990s that allowed the Islamist infection of Britain to grow in the fertile environment of the historical and social context of British MC. The second is that the primary, identifiable factors that led to the radicalization of the bombers were found in their local and group/individual contexts because of the pressure of the first-generation Bareli Muslims of Beeston Hill upon the second generation to become fully successful in the Western world without compromising the cultural heritage and izzat [honor] of their families. Khan, in particular, demonstrated this identity-crisis-driven radicalization towards Wahhabi fundamentalism.
Conclusions of the French Case Study

The French case study sought to answer the same questions concerning radicalization and public policy as did the UK case study. The comparison of the two studies is particularly important because its aim was to try and identify common factors between the two that explain how it is that even though they operate their multicultural and integrative public policies on nearly opposite systems, they still observe high rates of terrorism. The terrorist event examined for this case was the 1995 Paris Metro Bombings committed for the GIA by Khaled Kelkal, an Algerian who came to France and lived there since he was a child. Like the UK case study, this one also observed its perpetrator through the sequentially focused lenses of historical context, national context, local context, and individual context in order to determine a possible common or causal factor in Kelkal’s eventual radicalization.

Historically, the study found the ties between France and Algeria to be quite intricate, just as they were for the ties between Britain and Pakistan. Algeria was colonized by France, and even after Algeria achieved independence, France still played a large role of perceived interference in the Algerian Civil War, which spawned the GIA. The GIA would prove to be one of France’s most notable and dangerous terrorist enemies, because its members not only resented the French for their colonial history with Algeria, but for their aid to the GIA’s political enemies in the Civil War. This enmity between the GIA and France eventually attracted Kelkal to their cause and led to his attack at the Paris Metro.
The national context, parallel to the UK case study, examined the policies that govern French government interactions with its immigrant communities to include social policies as well as security policies. French public relations with ethnic and religious minorities are governed by the legislated concept of laicité, which embodies the ideal of French secularism in the public sphere with a strict separation between religion and the state (Hunter-Henin 2012). This concept has become an ingrained characteristic in the French national identity, which “does not recognize difference, but rather starts from the premise that, within the republic, all citizens are equal [and that inequalities]... stem from family background and therefore are irrelevant to... the public sphere” (Osler and Starkey 2001, p.290). The French, through laicité, seek immigrant integration to French society through commitment to shared values and symbols considered to embody the French identity. It was found in this analysis of laicité, however, that there is debate among scholars between those who advocate a pluralist adoption of the concept – defense of religious rights – and those who advocate for a combative adoption of it – complete unity of the republic. Thus, the resolution of how Islam can be Gallicized enough to allow any expression in the public sphere rests on that debate between the pluralists and the combativists.

French security policy proved to be another level of difference with the UK, strengthening justification for the use of the Most Different Systems design used here. Their approach to national security and counterterrorism policies is nearly opposite to that of the UK, and yet there is still that same high level of terrorist incidents observed in Chapter Two. Their security policies, informed by a much more traumatic historical experience than those of Britain, are much stronger and allow for more power to be
allotted to French security agencies due to the fact that they prize the “security first”
principle above issues of liberty (although not on an officially exclusive basis). An
important observation about the French security and counterterrorism policy, however, is
its interaction with Syria and Iran during the 1980 in which a string of terrorist attacks
suffered by France were put to an end once “arms, economic aid, and diplomatic support”
were promised to Syria and Iran (Foley 2013, p.17). This demonstrates that foreign policy
is a very strong determinant for the amount of terrorism a state experiences. Future
research on this explicit connection between foreign policy and experience terrorism
would no doubt be beneficial in light of this observation.

Another important observation from the study of French security ties into findings
at Kelkal’s individual level concerning prison radicalization. Due to the “wide net”
method, discussed in the chapter, a significant number of mass arrests were conducted
resulting in excellent information gathering and “contribut[ing] to the muting of support
for Islamist terrorists” in France. Unfortunately, the “small fish” radicals who get arrested
and put in prison really end up being fed to the Islamist radicalization/recruitment
machine that exists within the French penal system. Kelkal himself recounted his two
stays in prison as extremely instrumental in his conversion to radical Islam. His
experience is reinforced by the statistical overrepresentation of Muslims in the French
prison population which significantly increases the possibility for Islamist radicalization
during incarceration for criminals convicted of either terrorist or non-terrorist crimes.

The local context of the *banlieues* and *cites*, the environment in which Kelkal
grew up, were similar to the local observations of Beeston Hill in the UK study with the
added significance of economic and employment disparity among 2/3Gs present in those areas. Algerian immigrants to these areas suffered severe culture shock, and the first generation did what it could to maintain its cultural roots for its children, but the “younger generations [occupied] the more challenging territory that lies between their parents’ and grandparents’ traditional culture and French modernity” (Beyler 2006, p.91). Once again, the pressure of the identity crisis for French 2/3G Muslims is increased by their elders, but also by their perceived inaccessibility to the French economy, no doubt worsened by living in the ghetto-esque banlieues. Neofundamentalist Islamist groups like the Tabligh Jama’at and radical groups like the GIA were noted to take advantage of these psychological weaknesses and poor economic conditions when recruiting young 2/3G Muslims to their causes. This opens yet another door for future research into the types of characteristics that terrorist recruiters look for an exploit.

Kelkal’s story demonstrated his radicalization against the background of the history of Algerians in France, the national social and security policies relevant to immigrant communities, and local socio-economic context. Although his radicalization towards Islamism did not occur until his time in prison, a similar tension to that of Khan and his family existed between Kelkal, and his own family’s “superstition and folklore” began the typical 2/3G identity crisis for him. Additionally, his bitterness towards French society can be traced back to his experience in the French school system, which places extreme importance on citizenship education (e.g. what it means to be a Frenchman). This made him feel like he “had no place because [the school] insisted on total integration”, so he began skipping school and found his way to juvenile delinquency,
which would eventually land him in prison and ultimately begin his radicalization (Leiken 2012, p.7).

The French case study sought to find a factor in Kelkal’s radicalization in common with that of the Beeston Bombers, ideally stemming from some kind of multicultural or integrative public policy on behalf of the state. However, after looking through each level of analysis, the French case concluded that it was his time in prison that triggered his radicalization. Still, he may not have ended up in prison so easily had he not felt unwelcome in his French school and felt the need to turn to delinquency. Additionally, that pressure was occurring in parallel to his struggle with his parents’ religion and finding his own identity.

As far as public policy is concerned, it is obvious that the assimilationist school system dominating the French public school system can indeed play a role, although the strength of its influence cannot be determined by this case alone in the radicalization of a troubled 2/3G Muslim – another direction for future research. However, this case also demonstrates certain shortcomings in how the French deal with the economic and unemployment problems of the banlieues, which exacerbate feelings of relative social deprivation and enmity between the offspring of immigrant communities and members of mainstream French society. Additionally, French security policy, although it is much more all-encompassing than its counterpart in Britain and more effective as far as its intelligence-gathering methodology is concerned, actually plays a significant role in contributing to the problem it is trying to prevent: violent radicalization of individuals to terrorism. If the French could improve their means of moderating the spread of Islam in
their prisons, it is far more likely that they could remove or at least greatly reduce the viability of a valuable recruitment tool used by a variety of Islamist terror organizations like the GIA and even al-Qaeda. By creating training programs for moderate imams to minister to Muslim inmates and through detection training programs for prison staff, many dangerous cases of radicalization could potentially be eliminated before they even became a threat. Policy recommendation in this area should center around gaining control of the French prison system. With the highly controllable nature of prison environments, the stemming of Islamist prison radicalization is actually a conceivably achievable endeavor. If the French government would sponsor more efforts to train moderate Muslim Imams as well as train prison staff to recognize signs of Islamist radicalization, then prison radicalization could rapidly become a thing of the past. The French have made efforts in this direction, but those efforts need to increase in conjunction with the growing prison population. Further research would be required to determine how the French could work towards developing specific measures on the implementation of those programs.

Common Conclusions and Future Research

Although the results from the statistical tests and comparative case study were not as compelling, certain trends and commonalities still rose to the surface that should be acknowledged (even if they are not ultimately decisive) because they are excellent starting points for future research in this area. The first point for future research lies in the fact that statistics did indeed turn some attention to potential relationships between the degree of MCPP adopted in a country and the incidence of radicalization that it sees,
especially concerning the policy areas of dress code exemption and affirmative action. Looking at the three categories of policy adoption examined in Chapter Two, it appears that the average number of terrorist attacks in the examined population are lowest in the Limited Policy category than the other two sides of the spectrum. This is true to varying degrees in every policy area except for Dual Citizenship, which had no Limited Policy category, and Affirmative Action, where the Limited Policy category actually has the highest average number of attacks. This realization should spur further research to examine the relationship between a nation’s incidence of Islamist radicalization and its adoption of more moderate MCPP. Britain and France occupy the two extremes of MCPP illustrating that the creation of permissive and oppressive environments are both catalysts for radicalization, while nations who adopt more limited policies, like Spain or Portugal or Germany all tend to see lower numbers of terrorist attacks. Therefore, further research could discover that moderation in the degree of adoption of MCPP could be the key to reducing radicalization levels.

Future research can also be born out of further case study analysis of the potentially causal factors for radicalization found in the UK and France chapters. Both identified domestic counterterrorism efforts as factors in the creation of the environments that radicalized the Beeston Bombers and Khaled Kelkal. The UK helped to create an ideal social environment for the radicalization 2/3Gs through its unlegislated decision to allow domestic security policy to ignore the Islamist threat and allow known radicals and terrorists to use the British Isles as their safe haven abroad. After 9/11, when UK security realized the threat they had been harboring and began to crack down on potential Islamist terrorists through practice and policy, British Muslims suddenly felt targeted and
undoubtedly some became more susceptible to belief in the Islamist narrative of Muslim oppression abroad and their message of Muslim superiority. This was certainly the case for Siddique Kahn, who left a suicide video explicitly claiming that his attack was in retaliation for his Muslim brothers and sisters abroad and the part that the UK was playing in their oppression. Regardless of Kahn’s reasoning for the attack, the potential still remains that had the UK used sounder judgment in its domestic counterterrorism efforts through the 1990s, her post-9/11 response may not have been perceived as so reactionary by British Muslims like Kahn and the other bombers.

French domestic counterterrorism, despite its strengths, appears only to be serving to feed the dragon it is trying to slay with its sweeping mass arrests and incarceration of a disproportionate number of Muslims in its prisons. Even if an arrested individual doesn’t go to prison where he is preyed upon by radical Islamists and terrorist organizations, his perceived unfair arrest could disillusion him to French society and cause him to seek out those organizations himself. Certainly, Kelkal’s time in school played a fundamental role in getting him to prison, but had the French government at least put into place the resources needed in their prisons to curb the spread of Islamist radicalization, Kelkal might never have found the GIA, his radicalization might not have turned violent, and the Paris Metro Bombing might never have happened. All this is to say that in both the French and British cases, domestic counterterrorism policy appears to have played a decisive role in creating environments for radicalization within their own borders. Undoubtedly future research that delved deeper into the effects of specific domestic counterterrorism policies on the radicalization of 2/3G Muslims would be extremely valuable.
One more point of possible future research could lie in the commonality of the foreign connections of the UK and France to Pakistan and Algeria respectively as well as their roles in foreign interventions: British involvement in the War on Terror and/or French involvement in the Algerian Civil War. Some scholars have attributed the British rash of Islamism to its involvement abroad, and that possibility has been alluded to previously in Chapter Three, but future research focusing more narrowly on the possible connection between the incidence of radicalization in Britain and its status in a given foreign intervention would definitely be valuable for informing future diplomatic policies for Britain with the potential for wider application. Likewise, France’s involvement in the Algerian Civil War has been shown to have birthed the GIA movement, but the relationship of that somewhat foreign intervention (for Algeria was once considered French) to the incidence of radicalization of 2/3G French Muslims is still somewhat unclear. Thus, more detailed future research into that relationship could be quite valuable in identifying other characteristics of a possible relation between foreign intervention and domestic radicalization.

Based on the statistics and case studies conducted in the previous chapters, to decisively claim concrete similarities that explain the sameness of outcome between these differing systems would inaccurate. The simple fact of the matter is that there are a great many variables, all of which would be impossible to capture in a single research project, that go into the radicalization process of 2/3G Muslims in the UK or in France. Like other social phenomena in this less than perfect world, its explanation is much more complex and its causations are even more difficult to definitively determine based on the proposition of a simple bivariate hypothesis. This messiness is the nature of the social
sciences, however, and is to be expected. Still, these inherent difficulties by no means prohibit the observation of certain commonalities, abstract or concrete, that can help to collect the knowledge necessary to move forward with improvements concerning current social problems like radicalization.
Appendix A: Multicultural Policy Data

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Directly based off the Multicultural Policy Index with the omission only of Non-EU Member states.
Appendix B: Tallied Terrorist Incidents – Unknown Perpetrators

Filtered and tallied from the Global Terrorism Database.
Appendix C: Tallied Terrorist Incidents – Known Islamist Perpetrators

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Filtered and tallied from the Global Terrorism Database
Appendix D: Global Terrorism Database Unknown Case Sources

Austria

198108290005 – Muslim - 
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=3S8G-F3H0-000B-Y0JH&csi=6742&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true

198207290001 – NM -

**Attackers left behind Anti-Semitic leaflets similar to those used by Nazis**

200901130001 – NM -

“... unknown gunmen shot and killed Umar Israilov, a Chechen dissident refugee, as he left a grocery store in Vienna. According to local human rights groups, the victim was targeted because of his public opposition to the pro-Moscow, Chechen president. No damage was reported and no group has claimed responsibility for this attack.”

Belgium

197803070003 – Likely NM –

**Ransom kidnapping of insurance exec Charles Bracht.**


198110200007 – NM -

**Member of “Direct Action, Belgium Section” claimed responsibility.**


**Denmark**


**Finland**


**France**

197803160003 – Non-Islamist - [http://www.keesings.com/search?kssp_selected_tab=article&kssp_a_id=30895n01fra](http://www.keesings.com/search?kssp_selected_tab=article&kssp_a_id=30895n01fra)


197907250003 – Non-Islamist - [http://www.un.int/wcm/content/site/palestine/pid/12345](http://www.un.int/wcm/content/site/palestine/pid/12345) **“Mr. Zohair Mohsen, its well-known leader, was assassinated in Cannes, France on 26 July 1979 by assassins widely suspected to be Israeli agents.”**


198010000003, 198010010005, 198010010006, 198010010007, 198010040002, 198010040010 – Non-Islamist -

198102030001 – Non-Islamist -
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version 1/getDocCui?lni=3S8G-CW60-000B-Y362&csi=6742&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true,


198305280001 – Non-Islamist -


198312310001, 198312310002 – Unknown, but likely Islamist -
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version 1/getDocCui?lni=3S8G-M000-0008-
200004010003 – Non-Islamist -
**Environmental terrorist group**

200010100006 – Islamist - Synagogues torched in France The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec) October 12, 2000, Thursday, FINAL,
http://edition.cnn.com/2000/WORLD/europe/france/10/11/jewish/index.html, **0003-
Muslim youths blamed/seen leaving the synagogue before it burned**

200010200007 – Non-Islamist -
**Corsican separatists blamed**

200011090002 – Non-Islamist - France: Gasoline Bomb Attack on Basque Post Office
Paris AFP (Domestic Service) in French 1015 GMT 10 Nov 00 AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE Friday, November 10, 2000 [WORLD NEWS CONNECTIONS] ***young Basque separatists” blamed**

200011240003 – Non-Islamist -
**Separatist militants blamed**

200109080003 – Non Islamist - Customs officer's home in French Basque country fire-bombed Paris AFP (Domestic Service) in French 1010 GMT 8 Sep 01 AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE Saturday, September 8, 2001 [WORLD NEWS CONNECTION] **Basque separatists blamed**

200112080005 - Non-Islamist - France: petrol bombs thrown at Basque nationalist's home
Paris AFP (Domestic Service) in French 1024 GMT 13 Dec 01 AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE Thursday, December 13, 2001 [WORLD NEWS CONNECTION] **Basque nationalist attacked = not an Islamist target
200202020003, 200202020005 – Non-Islamist - Radicals blamed as estate agents firebombed in French Basque Country Madrid EFE in Spanish 0854 GMT 2 Feb 02 EFE Saturday, February 2, 2002 [WORLD NEWS CONNECTION] **Basque nationalist radicals suspected**

200204040002 – Unknown, but likely Islamist -
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2002/Molotov-Cocktail-Attack-in-Paris/id-
Circumstances surrounding the incident lean towards a higher likelihood that this was an anti-Semitic, Muslim attack.

200205120004 – Non-Muslim -
**Neo-Nazi attack**

200206010003 – Unknown, but likely Muslim -
**Circumstances surrounding the incident lean towards 2/3gen activity: recent waves of anti-Semitism, tension between France’s Muslim and Jewish populations**

200301030001 – Muslim -

200301060002 – Muslim -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200301060002


200604140029 – non-muslim -
**Separatist sympathizer**

200604140030 – non-muslim
**separatist sympathizer**

200604140031 – non-muslim
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200604140031
**ibid**

200607030006 – non-muslim -

200707030006 – non-muslim -
**ETA blamed**
200806210011 – unknown, anti-semetic, likely Muslim - http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/world/europe/22iht-paris.4.13891143.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print

200812160004 – Muslim - http://web.ics.purdue.edu/~natt/copyediting/parisstore.htm


200901120004 – anti-semetic, likely Muslim - http://www.jpost.com/LandedPages/PrintArticle.aspx?id=129628


201101240015 – likely-Muslim - http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2011-01/25/c_13705246.htm **Media makes connection between threat to France by Osama bin Laden and this incident**

**Germany**


199905130002 – Non-Muslim - http://www.dw.de/germanys-greens-prepare-for-new-role/a-1723482-1 **Tension within the Green Party over anti-war and ecological sentiments**

199906300002, 199906300003, 199906300004 – Non-Muslim - http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/381936.stm **Kurds**
199907010005 – Non-Muslim -
**Kurdish sympathizers suspected**

200007270001 – Non-Muslim-
**Neo-Nazis suspected**


200108170001 – Non-Muslim-
**Neo-Nazis**

200209210001 – Non-Muslim -
**Democratic Iraqi Opposition group of Germany**

200402210002 – Non-Muslim-
**Neo-Nazis**

200804260005 – Likely non-muslim -
**4 arrested, police suspect generic xenophobic terrorist activity towards immigrants**

2009070600015 – likely non-Muslim -
**Suspected that the event could be related to Uighur tribe conflicts in China**

(WEST) Germany

1978021300008 – NM -
**Dieter Huber abducted by a group believed to support the Red Army.**
197905060001 – NM
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version
1/getDocCui?lni=3SJ4-K610-0011-30PG&csi=304478&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true
**Retaliation for police shooting of Red Army member, Elisabeth von Dyck.**

197905160001 – NM
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version
1/getDocCui?lni=4MBK-8HH0-TXJ2-N1C9&csi=303830&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true
**Assassination attempt on West German opposition leader Helmut Kohl.**

197909120007 – NM
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version
1/getDocCui?lni=3S8G-DY20-0009-N302&csi=8075&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true
**Lufthansa hijacker disturbed by poor children, militarism, etc. demands a meeting with Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.**

198005100004 – NM
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version
1/getDocCui?lni=4MBD-SGJ0-TXJ2-N133&csi=303830&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true;

**Target was prominent Romanian human rights campaigner Serban Orescu.**

198104150004 – Likely NM
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version
1/getDocCui?lni=3SJ4-FM80-0008-X4H4&csi=5774&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true
**General youth protests against “society”**

...a barrage of bombings... a 12-pound bomb planted in a fire extinguisher exploded... in the Max Planck Institute of the Free University."

United Press: “The bombings followed a clash between police and squatters in downtown West Berlin in the American sector.”**

Anti-U.S. West German terrorists**

A

Red Army Faction”

Possibly connected with deaths in 198201170007***
198206010005, …0006, …0007 – NM -


198212140001, …0002 – NM -
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version 1/getDocCui?lni=3SJ4-DB90-0011-50TX&csi=304478&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true **Blamed on Revolutionary Cells**

198212140001 – NM -
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version 1/getDocCui?lni=3SJ4-DB90-0011-50TX&csi=304478&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true **Blamed on Revolutionary Cells**

198212270002, …0003 – Likely NM -
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version 1/getDocCui?lni=3SJ4-D6T0-0011-51BT&csi=304478&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true **Yugoslav tourist office and grocery store attacked… generally perpetrated by Yugoslav separatist groups, but no group claimed responsibility.**

198402100003 – NM -
**Red Army Faction claimed responsibility**

**Great Britain**

**Casualties due to conflict between Libyan factions**

**LiBYAN terrorists**

**Blamed on ANC-South Africa conflict of the time**

**Red Army Faction claimed responsibility**
199803050001, 199803170002 – Non-Muslim/Islamist -
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/317132.stm **Mardi Gras Bomber**

199806230002 – Muslims/Islamist -

199807100001 – Likely Non-Muslim -
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=3T51-F1M0-00DS-B3MB&csi=163605&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true

**IRA-related terrorists suspected**


**Neo-Nazis claim responsibility, but there was no confirmation**

199912060005 – Non-Muslim -

Animal rights activists linked

200010170001 – Muslim - In England - leaders move to calm passions The Jerusalem Post October 19, 2000 Thursday

200010210005, 200010210006 – Non-Muslim -

**Animal Rights**

200604050015 – Non-Muslim -

**Environmentalists**

200702030013, 200702050006, 200702060026, 200702060031, 200702070001, 200702080008 – Likely Non-Muslim -
**Disgruntled Motorist or animal rights activist suspected**

2008042900025 – Non-Muslim -

**Isolated incident**

200805130013 – Likely Non-Muslim -

**Rwanadan genocide conflict fallout**

200809270020 – Muslim -
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/devon/7418317.stm

200901040009 – Likely Muslim -
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/129250 **Synagogue attack occurred on same day as high profile al-Qaeda trial**

201110190011 – Non-Muslim- 
http://www.thestar.co.uk/news/local/circus_attack_protest_over_animal_rights_1_3885402 **Animal rights activists**

**Greece**

19781217…. Series – Unknown – **There is a possible clerical error in the database dating these events in 1978. The article, http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version 1/getDocCui?lni=4MBD-TB00-TXJ2-N0PY&csi=303830&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true, indicates that this could possibly be the event the 19781217 series is referring to. If this is the case, then there is a possibility that these could be classified as “non-muslim”, however, there is still not definitive answer on the culprit. The series will remain classified as Unknown.**
197907270001 – Non-Muslim - https://linksunten.indymedia.org/node/70663 **Far Left ELA (Revolutionary Popular Struggle)**

**Owner of a rightist newspaper during a period of great tension between leftists and rightists in Greece**


199904150004 – Non-Muslim - http://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/rpt/23133.htm **Enraged Anarchists” group claimed responsibility**

199905070004 – Likely Non-Muslim - http://amarillo.com/stories/050899/usn_LA0750.001.shtml **Most likely tied in with common far-left/anarchist political terrorism of the period. No significant indicator of Muslim activity.**

**Police suspect attack was in support of Nikos Maziotis (on trial at the time). No significant indicator of Muslim activity.**

**More likely anti-Communist terrorism amidst the current political/ideological tensions in Greece. No significant indicator of Muslim activity.**

199911140001 – Likely Non-Muslim - "Greek police defuse bomb in Athens." Agence France Presse -- English. 592 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/11/06. **More likely related to anti-US sentiment in Greece leading up to a visit from President Clinton. No significant indicators of Muslim activity.**

**Anarchists take responsibility**

LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/11/06. **No claim of responsibility, but police say blast resembled attacks carried out by organized crime groups**

200202080002 – Non-Muslim -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200202080002
**Attributed to anarchists**


200312090002, …0003, …0005, …0006 – Non-Muslim -
**Unidentified anarchists**


200501110003 – Likely Non-Muslim -
**...may have been related to the victim’s job as a financial consultant for Eurobank in charge of foreclosures of property from debtors.**


200806090023 – Likely Non-Muslim - http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version 1/getDocCui?lni=4SV5-S0T0-TX4S-W1DC&csi=250053&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true **Kidnapping appears to be purely criminal in nature with no Muslim indicators**


200809260003, …0004, …0005, …0007, …0008, …0009 – Likely Non-Muslim - "Greek arsonists target bank, car dealership." Associated Press International. (September 26, 2008 Friday 9:43 AM GMT): 141 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/11/08. **Anarchist groups have been blamed for similar attacks over the past few years. They regularly target banks, government buildings, vehicles and car dealerships, as well as police stations.**


200902040018 – Non-Muslim - **“Investigators believe the far-left group Revolutionary Struggle (EA), which is on the European Union's list of terrorist organisations, is responsible for the attack in Korydallos.”**


**Related to aftermath of the riots triggered by the police shooting of 15 yr old Alexandros-Andreas Grigoropoulos**


200903310019 through …0029 – Likely Non-Muslim - **“Small anarchist groups frequently target symbols of state authority and wealth to protest government economic and social policies. Arrests are extremely rare. But the firebombings have increased since the fatal police shooting of a teenager [Alexandros Grigoropoulos] in December, which sparked the country's worst riots in decades.”**


201004020001 – Likely Non-Muslim - http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201004020001 **A Muslim Centre in Crete was set ablaze... It is unlikely that this is Islamist radical activity although it is not known for sure.**

201008120001 – Non-Muslim - http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-218823-firebomb-at-turkish-consulate-in-northern-greece.html **Greek on Turk violence. Relations are tense between the two nations.**

201102020018 – Non-Muslim - http://www.trust.org/item/?map=greek-guerrilla-group-claims-ministry-parcel-bomb/ **Conspiracy of Fire Cells (anarchist group) claimed responsibility**


201105140013 – Likely Non-Muslim - "Three hurt in Greek firebomb attack: police." Agence France Presse -- English. (May 14, 2011 Saturday 4:33 PM GMT): 230 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/11/12. **“The Exarchia police station has repeatedly come under attack from anarchist groups since a 15-year-old high school student was killed by a police officer in 2008, triggering weeks of urban riots.”**

Ireland

**Peter Menten was a Nazi war criminal. The attack on his home was more likely Holocaust related than radical Islamist**

198105020005 – Non-Muslim- [http://www.rte.ie/tv/scannal/aerlingushijack.html](http://www.rte.ie/tv/scannal/aerlingushijack.html) **Aer Lingus hijacking. Hijacker demanded the Third Secret of Fatimah to be released by the Vatican.**


**Drug related**


**Dissident republicans blamed**

200705200001 – Non-Muslim- [http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version 1/getDocCui?lni=4NSV-6HF0-TXJ4-N3DH&csi=304313&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version 1/getDocCui?lni=4NSV-6HF0-TXJ4-N3DH&csi=304313&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true)** “Detectives think the shooting was organised by a young drug dealer, who is the prime suspect for two murders.” **

200808220017 – Non-Muslim- [http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version 1/getDocCui?lni=4TDD-2PJ0-TX5B-913F&csi=234671&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true](http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version 1/getDocCui?lni=4TDD-2PJ0-TX5B-913F&csi=234671&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true)** “It is thought the rows are connected to an ongoing feud in the area.” **

the Battle of Boyne in 1690. Because of the sectarian nature of the holiday, celebrations have sometimes been marred by violence in the past” **

201007120012 – Non-Muslim - http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jul/12/northern-ireland-police-officers-shot  **“Police and Orangemen came under attack tonight as a controversial Twelfth of July parade was escorted through a notorious flashpoint in Belfast.” **

Dissident republicans suspected**

**Italy**

197801090005, …0006, …0007 – Non-Muslim - http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/77
**Considerable turmoil between the Red Brigades and the Christian Democratic Party in Italy during this period. It is very unlikely that this is an example of Islamist radicalism.**

197802240006 – Non-Muslim -
**Related to political turmoil, not Islamic radicalism**

197802280009, …0010, ..0011, ..0012, ..0013 – Likely Non-Muslim -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197802280012
**targets were all Christian Democratic Party offices. This is indicative of domestic political terrorism rather than Islamic radicalism. No definitive source was found, but the target indicates a higher likelihood of these attacks being Non-Muslim**

197803010002 – Likely Non-Muslim -
**Based on the Communist Party Office target and the political turmoil in Italy at this time, it is unlikely that this is an example of Islamic radicalism**

197803080002 – Likely Non-Muslim -
**Ibid**
197803090005 – Likely Non-Muslim -
**Based on Christian Democratic Party office target, this is more likely domestic political terrorism than it is Islamic radicalism**

197803100009 – Likely Non-Muslim -
**ibid**

197803210002 – Likely Non-Muslim -
**ibid**

197804000007 - Non-Muslim - http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/program.pl?ID=53395
**Red Brigade kidnapping of Angelo Appolloni**

197804010001 – Likely Non-Muslim -
**Movimento SociaIe Italiano (MSI) office target is a more likely demonstration of left vs right political violence of the period than it is Islamic radicalism**

197804050006 – Likely Non-Muslim - http://libcom.org/history/armed-struggle-italy-1976-1978 **Catholics were also subject to political violence of the time.**

197804050008 – Likely NM -
**Christian Dem Party Office target indicates that this is most likely not Islamist activity**

197804180002 – Likely NM -
**ibid**

197804190005 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197804190005
**ibid**

197804190010 – NM -
**Christian Democrat target**

**ibid**

197805120002 – Likely NM - http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197805120002, Armed Struggle in Italy, 1976-1978 **based on the govt target, it is more likely that this attack is related to the same political violence in 1976-1978 and not an example of Islamic radicalism.**

gade political violence**

197805120007 – Likely NM - http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197805120007, Armed Struggle in Italy, 1976-1978 **based on police target, it is more likely that this attack is related to political violence and not an example of Islamic radicalism.**

**Christian Dem target**

197807040005 – Likely NM - http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197807040005, Armed Struggle in Italy, 1976-1978 **based on the target and the latter source, it is more likely that this was related to the same political violence of 1976-1978 and is not an example of Islamic radicalism.**

197807200003 – Likely NM - http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197807200003, Armed Struggle in Italy, 1976-1978 **Based on the govt target and the latter source, it is unlikely that this is an example of Islamic radicalism.**

197807270002 – Likely NM - http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197807270002, Armed Struggle in Italy, 1976-1978 **based on the police target and the latter source, it is unlikely that this is an example of Islamic radicalism.**
197808100001 – NM -
**Francesco Sangiuliano kidnapped for ransom.**

197809120005 – Likely NM -
**Christian Dem target**

197809260001 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197809260001
**Socialist Party target**

197809260002 – Likely NM -
**Highly politicized target – Italy-China Anti-Fascist Anti-Imperialist Committee**

197809260003 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197809260003,
Armed Struggle in Italy, 1976-1978 **Police target. Based on that and the latter source, it is unlikely that this is an example of Islamic radicalism.**

197809300003 – Likely NM -
**MSI office target**

197809300005 – Likely NM -
**MSI office target**

197810250005 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197810250005,
Armed Struggle in Italy, 1976-1978 **Police target indicates this is likely political violence related to the latter source and is not an example of Islamic radicalism.**

197812230005 – Likely NM -
**Christian Dem target.**

197901070003 – Likely Non-Muslim -
**Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) office target is a more likely demonstration of left vs right political violence of the period than it is Islamic radicalism**

197901080003 – Likely Non-Muslim -

“…police sources said they believed the kidnappers were common criminals and not political terrorists.”**

197901180002, …0003, …0004, …0005 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197901180002, Armed Struggle in Italy, 1976-1978 **based on the target and latter source, it is more likely that related to the same political violence on 1976-1978 and not an example of Islamic radicalism**

197901190002 – Likely NM -

197901220008 – NM -

197902020002, …02030002 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197902020002, Armed Struggle in Italy, 1976-1978 ****based on the targets (police stations) and latter source, it is more likely that related to the same political violence on 1976-1978 and not an example of Islamic radicalism**

197902040008 – NM -

197902050006 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197902050006, Armed Struggle in Italy, 1976-1978 **based on the targets (police stations) and latter source, it is more likely that related to the same political violence on 1976-1978 and not an example of Islamic radicalism**
197902050008 – NM -
**Ransom kidnapping of Evelina Cattaneo**

1979021900033 – Likely NM -
**Attempted assassination of prosecutor in the trial of a neo-fascist**

197902280001 – NM -
**Ransom kidnapping of 11-year old Ettore Bernardi**

197903090001 – NM -
**Bombing of fascist senator Ettore Tolomei’s tomb by South Tyrolean extremists**

197903130002 - NM -
http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=SYVhAAAAIBAJ&sjid=nKAFAAAAIBAJ&pg =6282%2C2819762 **”Police blamed right-wingers”**

197903200001 – NM -
**murder of Mino Pecorelli, editor of rightist news paper**

197903210001 – NM -
**Attilio Duuto injured by Red Brigade car bomb**
**Italo Schettini killed in assassination. Schettini was a Christian Democratic member of Home’s provincial govt**

**son of Roman journalist/senior editor of pro-Communist paper is shot in the legs.**

**based on the target (Bob Kennedy Center of Christian Dem Party and Christian Dem offices) and latter source, it is more likely that these attacks are related to the same political violence in 1976-1978 and not an example of Islamic radicalism**

**Christian Dem office target**

**based on the target (Bob Kennedy Center of Christian Dem Party and Christian Dem offices) and latter source, it is more likely that these attacks are related to the same political violence in 1976-1978 and not an example of Islamic radicalism**
197904300016, …0017, ..0018 – Likely NM -

197905030007 – Likely NM -
**Christian Dem target, Benigno Zaccagnini**

197905050011 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197905050011, *Armed Struggle in Italy, 1976-1978** based on police target and latter source, it is more likely that this incident is related to the same political violence of 1976-1978 and is not an example of Islamic radicalism**

197905140004 – Likely NM -
**Christian Dem target**

197905170002 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197905170002
**Neo-Fascist Social Moment branch attacked – more likely right v left political violence than an example of Islamic radicalism**

197905180001 – Likely NM -
**Christian Dem office target**

197905210002 -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197905210002, *Armed Struggle in Italy, 1976-1978** Based on the govt target and the latter source, it is not very likely that this is an example of Islamic radicalism.**

197905220002 - Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197905220002
**Communist party target – more likely right v left political violence than an example of Islamic radicalism**

197905240003 – Likely NM -
**Christian Dem target**
197905290001, …0002 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197905290001,
**Christian Dem targets**

197905310001 – Likely NM -
**Christian Dem target**

197905310006 – NM -
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version
1/getDocCui?lni=3S8G-FDF0-0009-
N277&csi=8075&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true
**Red Brigades claimed responsibility**

197906190002 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197906190002,
Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the past. By Robert J. Art and Louise
**based on the govt target and the latter source, it is not likely that this is an example of
Islamic radicalism**

197906280001 - …0006 – Likely NM -
**Communist Party Offices attacked. It is more likely this is a result of right v left
political violence and not an example of Islamic radicalism**

198003010004 – Likely NM -
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version
1/getDocCui?lni=3S8G-DBS0-000B-
Y54W&csi=6742&hl=t&hv=t&hns=7&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true
Based on this source, although it does not detail this specific incident, it is more likely that
the Red Brigades were responsible for this attack than Islamic radicals.**

198003010005 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198003010005,
Institute of Peace, 2007. 25-62. Print. **based on these sources, it is more likely that this
is an incident related to the political violence of the Years of Lead and is not an example
of Islamic radicalism.**
Callers to an Italian news agency and newspaper claimed that Front Line terrorists were responsible for the "execution… Front Line is a close ideological ally of… the Red Brigades."

**mafia killing of Giovanni Losardo**

Mario Amato killed – rightist and leftist groups both claimed responsibility. No Islamic radicals involved.**

**Mafia killing of Pietro Cerulli**

**Police believe this incident to be related to political terrorism or to Mafia activity**
**Attempted assassination of Luciano Infelisi, “who has handled major cases ranging from the kidnapping of former Premier Aldo Moro in March 1978, who later was killed, to the initial investigation into the shooting of Pope John Paul II on May 13 [1981].” Given his past, it is more likely this incident is related to the crimes of political violence he investigated or those of the Mafia.**

**Christian Dem HQ attacked**
198110190005 – Likely NM -

198210110013 – Likely NM –

198310260004 – Possibly Muslim -
United Press International. (October 26, 1983 , Wednesday, PM cycle ): 473 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/11/20. **GTD lists perpetrators as the “Syrian Battle Front”, but the latter source identifies it as another “Arab terrorist attack” which “Rome has frequently been the scene of… in recent years. It is unclear whether this is an example of Islamic radicalism, but the possibility is there.**

198412140001 – Likely NM -
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxylibraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=3SJ4-DF80-0011-64Y8&csi=304478&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true**The victim was identified as a PLO member. The PLO blames the Israelis for his death. The Israelis claim it is nothing more than an internal conflict within the PLO and they are not responsible. It is likely this is not an example of Islamic radicalism, rather an example of the political violence born out of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

19981002001 – NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=19981002001**
“Officials further suspected that the Mafia was behind this attack; however a specific group was not identified.” **
200007060004, 200011000001 – Likely NM - "Pipe bomb wounds 79-year-old man."
http://www.scotsman.com/news/world/breakthrough-in-hunt-for-household-trap-terrorist-1-1133249 **both attacks performed by the Italian Unabomber, who made no outright political or economic demands. It is unlikely that this is an example of Islamic radicalism.**

200012220002 – NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200012220002,

200107160002 – NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200107160002,
Sealed city: Genoa bomb sparks security fears The Guardian (London) July 17, 2001 **Anti-Globalists most likely responsible.**

200111050003 – NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200111050003 **
“Police… have ruled out the possibility that the attack was perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists.”**

200205110003 – Muslim -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200205110003,
"Attempted bomb attack on Milan metro made: police." Agence France Presse -- English. (May 12, 2002 Sunday ) : 146 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/11/21. **Terrorists left a note that said ‘‘We are fighting for the cause of Allah and we will not stop until you worship one God’, and concluded in Arabic with the statement ‘God is greatest’.”
**Anarchists**

200403280002 – Likely Muslim - http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version1/getDocCui?lni=4C21-Y2W0-014V-R31D&csi=8200&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true **No conclusive evidence, but it is believed that this was possibly an Islamist terror attack given the background information on the individual.**

**Linked to Italian Unabombmer**

**Anarchists suspected**


**Unabomber suspected**

200910120039 - Possibly Muslim - http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hocCsYR5TOHdbmbDx2GRktpJ585w **Related to Italian presence in Afghanistan – could be purely political, but it could also be religious.**

**Mafia link suspected**

**More likely related to student political demonstrations**

A narchists claim responsibility

Netherlands

199902160008 – Likely NM -

200205060004 – NM – complicated --
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200205060004;
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/netherlands/1425944/Fortuyn-killed-to-protect-Muslims.html **Pim Fortuyn killed. Although the killing itself was not Islamist or immigrant activity, it was done “defend Dutch Muslims from persecution”. Left-wing activist Volkert van der Graaf, 33, a vegan animal rights campaigner, confessed to the shooting (latter source).

Portugal

197911030001 – Likely NM - http://www.lonelyplanet.com/portugal/history#216598,
197911130008 – NM -
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version 1/getDocCui?lni=3SJ4-H420-0011-349B&csi=304478&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true **International Militant Workers group claimed responsibility for attack on Israel’s ambassador to Portugal, Ephraim Eldar. They were “opposed to ‘capitalism and imperialism as represented by Zionists.’”**

Spain

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=PIrKmQ5Icz0;

**Based on these sources, any target that is classified as a government, public infrastructure, military, or political target (particularly between 1978-1984 and in Basque Country) should be classified as “Likely Non-Muslim”, if no evidence to the contrary can be found, as these targets were common to ETA/Separatist conflicts. This is especially true during the political violence of the democratic transition of Spanish government during that time period. It is highly unlikely that those incidents are examples of Islamic radicalism.**

197802050002 – NM -
ETA claimed responsibility and “has made the cause its own.”**

197901120001, …0001 – NM -
All injured/killed in same attack by political extremists, most likely ETA or Maoists.**

197903100037 – Likely NM -
Based on the French target and the large scale political violence during this period in Spain, it is more likely this is political extremist activity rather than Islamist radical activity.**

197906030004 – NM -
Civil guards killed in retaliation to the death of a woman during anti-nuclear protests in Madrid.**

1979070400010, …0011 – Likely NM –
**See NOTE.**

197907050004 – Likely NM -
**ibid**

197907090003 – Likely NM -
**ibid**

197907110001 – Likely NM -
**ibid**

197907190001, …0002, …0003 – NM -
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version
1/getDocCui?lni=4MBK-98G0-TXJ2-
N1J4&csi=303830&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true;
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197907190003 **All
attacks happened in Basque country following significant political events concerning
Basque nationalism.**

197907230002 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197907230002 **See
NOTE**

197907240002 – Likely NM -
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version
1/getDocCui?lni=3SJ4-J8T0-0011-
34PS&csi=304478&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true**
“ETA has been waging a campaign of assassination, bombing, kidnapping and robbery
for the independence of the four Basque provinces since 1968. It has killed more than 200
persons and recently began bombing hotels and bars at coastal resorts to hurt the
government by driving foreign tourists away.” **

197907280001 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197907280001
**Since this incident took place in the heart of Basque Country and given its position in time, this attack is more likely related to Basque separatism than Islamic radicalism.**

197907280002, …0004 – likely NM – 
**See NOTE**

197907290004 – Likely NM -  
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197907290004 **See NOTE**

197907300001 – Likely NM -  
**Committed in Basque Country. See NOTE.**

197908040026 – Likely NM -  
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197908040026 **See NOTE**

197908060003 – Likely NM -  
**see Note**

197908150009 – Likely NM -  
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197908150009 **See Note**

197909250005 – Likely NM -  
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197909250005 **See NOTE**

197909260004 – Likely NM -  
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197909260004 **See NOTE**

197909260005 – Likely NM -  
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197909260005 **See NOTE**

197910010012 – Likely NM -  
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197910010012 **See NOTE**
197910090001 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=197910090001 **See NOTE**

198003130001 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198003130001 **See NOTE**

198006060001 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198006060001 **See NOTE**…Govt target within Basque Country**

198007120003 – NM -
1/getDocCui?lni=3SJ4-FYR0-0011-40K0&csi=304478&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true
**ETA shootout**

198009110007 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198009110007 **See NOTE**


198012290008 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198012290008 **See NOTE**

198101200001 –NM -
**ETA claimed responsibility**

198102150010 – NM -
**Basque Nationalist target. See NOTE**

198103050002 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198103050002  **See NOTE**

198106050004 – NM -
**ETA blamed**

198206140002, …0003, …0004, …0009 – NM -
**Four bombs against Defense Ministry buildings in Madrid. ETA signatures found by police**

198209210001 – NM -
**Iraqi Democratic Front claimed responsibility. This is a non-Islamist group**

198210000004 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198210000004  **See NOTE**


198211190007 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198211190007  **See NOTE**
198301260002 – NM -
**Police blame ETA for grenades fired on civil guards post**

198301270003 – NM -
**Police blame ETA for grenades fired on civil guards post**


198306050002 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=198306050002 **See NOTE**

198309060007, …0008 – NM -
**ETA primary suspects**

198403260010 – Likely NM -

198405140025 – NM -

198408150005 – NM -
"Foreign News Briefs." United Press International. (August 15, 1984, Wednesday, AM cycle): 126 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/12/01. **“Basque separatist groups and their supporters are suspected of setting more than a dozen such bombs… to retaliate for increased police pressure on Spanish Basque separatists living in southern France.”**

"Engineer Nasser Abdul and Karim Ibrahim killed/injured. Arab extremist group Islamic Holy War took responsibility.**

"ETA responsible.**
Drug trafficking related crime

199803140001 – Likely NM

199808090001 – Likely NM

199808190002 – Likely NM

199903060002 – Likely NM

199903080005 –NM -

199903140001, …0002 –NM - 199903060002

199903190002 – Likely NM
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199903190002 **See NOTE**

199903280001 – Likely NM

199903280003 – Likely NM
199904100004 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199904100004 **See
NOTE**

199906170008 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199906170008 **See
Note and incident explanation**

199906220006 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199906220006 **See
NOTE: Basque Country**


199910040004 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199910040004 **See
NOTE: Basque Country**

199910040005 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199910040005 **See
NOTE: Basque Country**

199910090001 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199910090001 **See
NOTE: Basque Country**

199910160005 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199910160005 **See
NOTE: Basque Country**

199910230004 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199910230004 **See
NOTE: Basque Country**

199911190003 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=199911190003 **See
NOTE: Basque Country**
199911190004 – Likely NM -
**See NOTE: Basque Country**

200001010010 – NM -
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version
1/getDocCui?lni=3Y7P-2P10-009F-
R2J3&csi=304478&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true
**ETA attack on civil guard barracks**

200001010011 – Likely NM -
**See NOTE: Basque Country**

200001040001 – NM -
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezproxy.libraries.wright.edu:2048/lnacui2api/api/version
1/getDocCui?lni=47YG-DXC0-01DF-
W3N8&csi=250053&hl=t&hv=t&hnsd=f&hns=t&hgn=t&oc=00240&perma=true
**Basque radicals responsible**

200001050001 – Likely NM -
**See NOTE: Basque Country**

200001050003 – Likely NM -
**See NOTE: Basque Country**

200001080007 – NM -
“Graffiti messages against the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), the Popular
Party (PP), and the Basque regional government’s interior minister… were also sprayed
on the walls.”

200001260006 – NM -
“Hooded Basque Gang Firebombs Bilbao Banks”

200001290004 – Likely NM -
**See NOTE: Basque Country**
200001290005 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200001290005 **See
NOTE: Basque Country**

200001290007 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200001290007 **See
NOTE: Basque Country, Basque Socialist Party (PSE-EE) target**

200001300004 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200001300004 **See
NOTE: Basque Country, Basque target**

200003160001 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200003160001 **See
NOTE: Basque Country**

200003210001 – NM - "Explosion at home of senior Basque journalist's parents."
Agence France Presse -- English. 93 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed:
2013/12/04. **Spanish authorities generally attribute such attacks to armed independtists
close to the militant group ETA**

200003250004 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200003250004 **See
NOTE: Basque Country**

200004010002 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200004010002 **See
NOTE: Basque Country**

200006030001 – NM - "Basque government office burned in attack blamed on ETA

200006230001 - …0004 – NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200006230001 **
“suspected Basque radicals attacked three banks around Salvatierra.”**

200007130005 – NM -
**Attack on Spanish MP Lapazaran who is anti-Basque independence.**

200008130010 – NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200008130010 **
“The two youths [responsible for the attack] were close to the group Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA).” **

200008140005 - …0007 – NM -
“Sources indicate that the attack was perpetrated by youth close to the [ETA]”**

200008250005 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200008250005 **See
NOTE: Basque Country, National Police target**

200009030009 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200009030009 **See
NOTE: Basque Country**


200010240002 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200010240002 **See
NOTE: Basque Country, Basque target.**

200011250005 – NM - "Bomb hits Telefonica offices in Spanish Basque country.” Agence France Presse -- English. 157 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/12/05. **“Authorities often blame such attacks on Basque separatists…”**

200102180005 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200102180005 **See
NOTE: Basque Country**

200102220004 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200102220004 **
“Police arrested 10 people in connection to the attack, believing that at least one had connections to Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA)” **

200103090004 – NM -
"Basque policeman killed in booby-trap car-bomb blast." Associated Press International. (March 9, 2001 ; Friday ): 374 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/12/05. **“…politicians and media immediately blamed the bomb on ETA”**
**Suspected Basque militants**

200103110002 – NM - "Bomb explodes outside home of Basque policeman." Agence France Presse -- English. 134 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/12/05. **…police blamed on the Basque separatist group ETA**

200103240002 – Likely NM - **See NOTE: Basque Country, Basque police target**

200104070001 – Likely NM - **See NOTE: Basque Country**

200104210002 – Likely NM - **See NOTE: Basque Country, Basque target**

200108050010, …0011, …0012 – NM - "Two policemen seriously injured in petrol bomb attack." Agence France Presse -- English. 236 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/12/05. **…regularly targeted in attacks blamed on young radicals close to the armed Basque separatist movement ETA.**

200108080003 – Likely NM – "Two explosions in Barcelona leave one injured." Agence France Presse -- English. 176 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/12/05. **…police said they were probably the work of young anti-authority militants who are very active in Barcelona.**

200108100001, …0002 – Likely NM - **See NOTE: Basque Country. [Incident source = same]**

200108110001, …0002 – Likely NM - **See NOTE: Basque Country**

200108150005 – Likely NM - **See NOTE: Basque Country**
200108170015 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200108170015 **See
NOTE: Basque Country, Basque target**

200108210003 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200108210003 **See
NOTE: Basque Country, police target**

200108220011 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200108220011 **See
NOTE: Basque Country**

200108250015 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200108250015 **See
NOTE: Basque Country**

200108310004 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200108310004 **See
NOTE: Basque Country, police target**

200109240001 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200109240001 **See
NOTE: Basque Country – Driving school owned by Jose Anua, leader of conservative
party Alavese Unity, was attacked.**

200110120001 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200110120001 **See
NOTE: Basque Country, Popular Party target**

200111200003 – NM - "Assailants kill two Basque police officers; ETA blamed."
Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/12/06. ** “…two officers in Bilbao were injured
when a remote-controlled bomb exploded near them as they tried to remove a banner
with a slogan urging ETA to kill police.” **

200202070004 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200202070004 **See
NOTE: Basque Country**

200202100002 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200202100002 **See
NOTE: Basque Country**
“The group left racist graffiti such as swastikas around the town as well.”

**Basque youths**

“… authorities speculate that anarchists or left-wing extremists may have been responsible.”

**Reports said the attackers were thought to be criminals or activists of the Basque separatist group ETA.”**
200501250002 – Likely NM -

200504140005 – NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200504140005 **
“Suspected Basque militants set fire to a power substation in Lezo, Spain.”**

200506250001 – Likely NM -

200507120018 – NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200507120018 **
“Authorities suspect local members of Italian anarchist groups.”**


200609230008 – Likely NM -

200609280008 – Likely NM -

200610110003 – Likely NM -

200702020003 – Likely NM -

200702150021 – Likely NM -
20071129016 – Likely NM -
“An anti-independence group was suspected of blame.”**

200810150007 – NM -
“ETA arsonists targeted a private security man’s car.”**

200902090001 – NM -
“An hour and a half before the blast, the ETA placed a phone call to the Red Cross to warn of the attack.” **

200902100008 – NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=200902100008
“…a warning call to evacuate the area was received from the ETA…”**


200906200013 – NM - "Hooded group burns bus in Basque Country." Agence France Presse -- English. (June 20, 2009 Saturday 11:42 AM GMT ): 194 words. LexisNexis Academic. Web. Date Accessed: 2013/12/09. **“The Basque Country is regularly the scene of urban violence blamed on young radical separatists who are considered support groups of the armed pro-independence group ETA.”**


201006240011 – Likely NM -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201006240011
**See NOTE: Basque Country, police target**

**Mobutu Dongo Yema, Ambassador to Zaire and older brother to Mobutu Sese Seko, assassinated.**

200604010026 – NM -


**Headline: “Explosives Found on Train South of Stockholm Linked to Rightist Group.”**

201005140012 – Muslim -
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201005140012

**Lars Vilks was a repeat target of those offended by his cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed.**

201012110008, …0009 – Muslim -
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/world/europe/14sweden.html?ref=eu
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=201012110009 ** “A Yemeni Islamist website claimed "It is our brother, mujahid Taymour Abdel Wahab, who carried out the martyrdom operation in Stockholm." Abdilwahab sent an audio file to Swedish news agency TT shortly before the blasts.”**
BIBLIOGRAPHY


