Trust Management: Multimodal Data Perspective

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Trust Management: Multimodal Data Perspective

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Broad Outline

• Real-life Motivational Examples (Why?)
• Trust: Characteristics and Related Concepts (What?)
• Trust Ontology (What?)
  – Type, Value, Process, Scope
• Gleaning Trustworthiness (How?) + Robustness to Attack
  – Practical Examples of Trust Metrics
  – Comparative Analysis of Bayesian Approaches to Trust
• Research Challenges (Why-What-How?)
  – APPLICATIONS: E.g., Sensor Networks, Social Networks, Interpersonal
  – ISSUES: E.g., Credibility, Scalability, Resiliency (Distributed Consensus)
• Details of Bayesian Approach to Multi-level Trust
Real-life Motivational Examples

(Why track trust?)
Interpersonal

• With which neighbor should we leave our children over the weekend when we are required to be at the hospital?

• Who should be named as a guardian for our children in the Will?
Social

• To click or not to click a http://bit.ly-URL

• To rely or not to rely on a product review (when only a few reviews are present, or the reviews are conflicting)?
Sensors

• Weather sensor network predicts a potential tornado in the vicinity of a city.

• **Issue:** Should we mobilize emergency response teams ahead of time?

• Van’s TCS (Traction Control System) indicator light came on intermittently, while driving.

• **Issue:** Which is faulty: the indicator light or the traction control system?

• Van’s Check Engine light came on, while driving.

• **Issue:** Which is faulty: the indicator light or the transmission control system?
Man-Machine Hybrid Collaborative Systems

The 2002 Uberlingen Mid-air Collision (between Bashkirian Airlines Flight 2937 and DHL Flight 611) occurred because the pilot of one of the planes trusted the human air traffic controller (who was ill-informed about the unfolding situation), instead of the electronic TCAS system (which was providing conflicting but correct course of action to avoid collision).

Man-Machine Hybrid Collaborative Systems

In hybrid situations, artificial agents should reason about the trustworthiness and deceptive actions of their human counterparts. People and agents in virtual communities will deceive, and will be deceived.

Castelfranchi and Tan, 2002
Common Issues and Context

• Uncertainty
  – About the validity of a claim or assumption
• Vulnerability
  – Past Experience
• Need for action
  Critical decision with potential for loss
Why Track Trust?

• In Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), trust enables dynamic determination of secure routes.
  – *Efficiency*: To improve throughput
    • By avoiding nodes facing bad channel condition
  – *Robustness*: To detect malicious nodes
    • When attackers enter the network in spite of secure key distribution/authentication
Why Track Trust?

- In sensor networks, it allows detection of faults and transient bad behaviors due to environmental effects.

- In cognitive radio networks, it can enable selection of optimal channel (less noisy, less crowded channels).
Why Track Trust?

• In E-commerce:
  – To predict future behavior in a reliable manner.
  – To incentivize “good” behavior and discourage “bad” behavior.
  – To detect malicious entities.
The Two Sides of Trust

• *Trustor* assesses *trustee* for dependability.

• *Trustee* casts itself in positive light to *trustor*.

• *Trust* is a function of *trustee's* perceived trustworthiness and the *trustor's* propensity to trust.
Trust and Related Concepts

(What is trust?)
Trust Definition: Psychology slant

Trust is the psychological state comprising a willingness to be vulnerable in expectation of a valued result.

*Ontology of Trust*, Huang and Fox, 2006
Josang et al’s Decision Trust
Trust in a person is a commitment to an action based on a belief that the future actions of that person will lead to good outcome.

Golbeck and Hendler, 2006
Trust Definition: Probability slant

Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a level of subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent will perform a particular action, both before and independently of such an action being monitored ...

Can we Trust Trust?, Diego Gambetta, 2000
Josang et al’s Reliability Trust
Trustworthiness is a collection of qualities of an agent that leads them to be considered as deserving of trust from others (in one or more environments, under different conditions, and to different degrees).

http://www.iarpa.gov/rfi_trust.html
Trustworthiness is the objective probability that the trustee performs a particular action on which the interests of the trustor depend.
Trust vs Trustworthiness: My View

Trust Disposition
Depends on
Potentially Quantified Trustworthiness Qualities
+ Context-based Trust Threshold

E.g.*, In the context of trusting strangers, people in the West will trust for lower levels of trustworthiness than people in the Gulf.

*Bohnet et al, 5/2010
Reputation is **Overloaded**

Community-based Reputation

vs.

Temporal Reputation

(Cf. Community endorsement of merit, achievement, reliability, etc.)

(Cf. Sustained good behavior over time elicits *temporal reputation-based trust*.)
Trust vs. Reputation

Reputation can be a basis for trust. However, they are different notions*.

- I trust you because of your good reputation.
- I trust you despite your bad reputation.
- Do you still trust Toyota brand?

*Josang et al, 2007
Trust vs. (Community-based) Reputation

Trust :: Reputation

:::

Local :: Global

:::

Subjective :: Objective

(Cf. Security refers to resistance to attacks.)
Trust is well-known, but is not well-understood. The utility of a notion testifies not to its clarity but rather to the philosophical importance of clarifying it.

-- Nelson Goodman
(Fact, Fiction and Forecast, 1955)
Trust Ontology

(What is trust?)

Illustration of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Relating Semantics to Data Structures and Algorithms
Example Trust Network -
Different Trust Links with Local Order on out-links

• Alice trusts Bob *for recommending* good car mechanic.
• Bob trusts Dick *to be* a good car mechanic.
• Charlie *does not* trust Dick to be a good car mechanic.
• Alice trusts Bob *more than* Charlie, *for recommending* good car mechanic.
• Alice trusts Charlie *more than* Bob, *for recommending* good baby sitter.

*Thirunarayan et al, IICAI 2009*
Digression: Illustration of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning

• Abstract and encode clearly delineated “subarea” of knowledge in a formal language.
  – Trust Networks => node-labeled, edge-labeled directed graph (DATA STRUCTURES)

• Specify the meaning in terms of how “network elements” relate to or compose with each other.
  – Semantics of Trust, Trust Metrics => using logic or probabilistic basis, constraints, etc. (SEMANTICS)

• Develop efficient graph-based procedures
  – Trust value determination/querying (INFORMATION ALGORITHMS)
Trust Ontology*

6-tuple representing a trust relationship:

\{type, value, scope, process\}

**Type** — Represents the nature of trust relationship.

**Value** — Quantifies trustworthiness for comparison.

**Scope** — Represents applicable context for trust.

**Process** — Represents the method by which the value is created and maintained.

*Anantharam et al, NAECON 2010*
Trust Ontology:
Trust Type, Trust Value, and Trust Scope

- Trust Type*
  - Referral Trust – Agent a1 trusts agent a2’s ability to recommend another agent.
  - (Non-)Functional Trust – Agent a1 (dis)trusts agent a2’s ability to perform an action.
    - Cf. ** trust in belief vs. trust in performance
- Trust Value
  - E.g., Star rating, numeric rating, or partial ordering.
- Trust Scope*
  - E.g., Reliable forwarding of data.

*Thirunarayan et al, IICAI 2009
** Huang and Fox, 2006
Multidimensional Trust Scopes in Ecommerce

• Trust in a vendor to deliver on commitments.
• Trust in vendor's ethical use of consumer data.
• Trust in Internet communication being secure.

• Plus: Propensity/Disposition to trust
Trust Ontology:

Trust Process

- Represents the method by which the value is computed and maintained.
  - **Primitive (for functional and referral links)**
    - Reputation – based on past behavior (temporal) or community opinion.
    - Policy – based on explicitly stated constraints.
    - Evidence – based on seeking/verifying evidence.
    - Provenance – based on lineage information.
  - **Composite (for admissible paths)**
    - Propagation (Chaining and Aggregation)

*Anantharam et al, NAECON 2010
**Thirunarayan et al, IICAI 2009
A TRUST relationship can be represented as a six tuple:
{type, process, scope, value}

Trust Ontology
Unified Illustration of Trust Processes

Scenario: Hiring Web Search Engineer - An R&D Position

Various Processes:

- (Temporal-based) Reputation: Past job experiences
- (Community-based) Reputation: Multiple references
- Policy-based: Score cutoffs on screening test
- Provenance-based: Department/University of graduation
- Evidence-based: Multiple interviews (phone, on-site, R&D team)
Deception

• Deception is the betrayal of trust.

– Ironically, trust makes us prone to deception.

– Knowing what features are used to glean trustworthiness can also assist in avoiding detection while deceiving.
Gleaning Trustworthiness: Practical Examples

(How to determine trustworthiness?)
Trust Metrics and Trust Models

- **Trust Metric** => How is *primitive* trust represented and computed?
  - E.g., Real number, Finite levels, Partial Order.

- **Trust Model** => How is *composite* trust computed or propagated?

Y. L. Sun, et al, 2/2008
Trust Models: Ideal Approach

• Capture semantics of trust using
  – axioms for trust propagation, or
  – catalog of equivalent trust networks.

• Develop trust computation rules for propagation (that is, chaining and aggregation) that satisfy the axioms or equivalence relation.
Direct Trust : Functional and Referral Reputation-based Process

(Using large number of observations)
Using Large Number of Observations

• Over time (<= Referral + Functional) : Temporal Reputation-based Process
  – Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks
  – Sensor Networks
    • Quantitative information
      (Numeric data)

• Over agents (<= Referral + Functional) : Community Reputation-based Process
  – Product Rating Systems
    • Quantitative + Qualitative information
      (Numeric + text data)
Desiderata for Trustworthiness
Computation Function

- **Initialization Problem**: How do we get *initial* value?
- **Update Problem**: How do we reflect the *observed behavior* in the current value *dynamically*?
- **Trusting Trust** Issue: How do we mirror *uncertainty* in our estimates as a function of observations?
  - Law of Large Numbers: The *average* of the results obtained from a large number of trials should be close to the *expected value*.
- **Efficiency Problem**: How do we *store* and *update* values *efficiently*?

*Ken Thompson’s Turing Award Lecture: “Reflections on Trusting Trust”*
Mathematical Background

Beta PDF for Reputation
• Consider a (potentially unfair) coin that comes up HEADS with probability $p$ and TAILS with probability $(1 - p)$.
• Suppose we perform $(r + s)$ coin tosses and the coin turns up with HEADS $r$ times and with TAILS $s$ times.
• What is the best estimate of the distribution of the probability $p$ given these observations?

$\Rightarrow$ Beta-distribution with parameters $(r+1, s+1)$

$f(p; r+1, s+1)$
Beta Probability Density Function (PDF)

\[ f(x; \alpha, \beta) = \frac{x^{\alpha-1}(1-x)^{\beta-1}}{\int_0^1 u^{\alpha-1}(1-u)^{\beta-1} du} \]

\[ = \frac{\Gamma(\alpha + \beta)}{\Gamma(\alpha)\Gamma(\beta)} x^{\alpha-1}(1-x)^{\beta-1} \]

\[ = \frac{1}{B(\alpha, \beta)} x^{\alpha-1}(1-x)^{\beta-1} \]

\[ E(X) = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta} \]

\[ E(X^2) = \frac{\alpha(\alpha + 1)}{(\alpha + \beta)(\alpha + \beta + 1)} \]

\[ \text{Var}(X) = \frac{\alpha\beta}{(\alpha + \beta)^2(\alpha + \beta + 1)} \]

- \(x\) is a probability, so it ranges from 0-1
- If the prior distribution of \(x\) is uniform, then the beta distribution gives posterior distribution of \(x\) after observing \(\alpha-1\) occurrences of event with probability \(x\) and \(\beta-1\) occurrences of the complementary event with probability \((1-x)\).
\( \alpha = \beta \), so the PDF’s are symmetric w.r.t 0.5. Note that the graphs get narrower as \((\alpha + \beta)\) increases.
\( \alpha \neq \beta \), so the PDF’s are asymmetric w.r.t. 0.5. Note that the graphs get narrower as \((\alpha+\beta)\) increases.
Beta-distribution - Applicability

• Dynamic trustworthiness can be characterized using beta probability distribution function gleaned from total number of correct (supportive) $r = (\alpha - 1)$ and total number of erroneous (opposing) $s = (\beta - 1)$ observations so far.

• Overall trustworthiness (reputation) is its mean: $\frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \beta}$
Why Beta-distribution?

• Intuitively satisfactory, mathematically precise, and computationally tractable
  • Initialization Problem: Assumes that all probability values are equally likely.
  • Update Problem: Updates \((\alpha, \beta)\) by incrementing \(\alpha\) for every correct (supportive) observation and \(\beta\) for every erroneous (opposing) observation.
  • Trusting Trust Issue: The graph peaks around the mean, and the variance diminishes as the number of observations increase, if the agent is well-behaved.
  • Efficiency Problem: Only two numbers stored/updated.
• Intuitively, probability values of 0 and 1 imply certainty, while probability value of 0.5 implies a lot of uncertainty.

• This can be formalized by mapping probability in [0,1] to trust value in [−1,1], using information theoretic approach.

Y. L. Sun, et al, 2/2008
Information Theoretic Interpretation of Trustworthiness Probability

- $T(\text{trustee : trustor, action}) =$
  
  \text{if } 0.5 \leq p$
  
  \text{then } 1 - H(p)  
  
  \text{else } H(p) - 1$

  where

  \[ H(p) = -p \log_2(p) - (1 - p) \log_2(1 - p) \]
Plot of $T$\text{(trustee : trustor, action)} vs. $p$
Direct Trust: Functional Policy-based Process

(Using Trustworthiness Qualities)
General Approach to Trust Assessment

• Domain dependent qualities for determining trustworthiness
  – Based on Content / Data
  – Based on External Cues / Metadata

• Domain independent mapping to trust values or levels
  – Quantification through abstraction and classification
Example: Wikipedia Articles

• Quality (content-based)
  – Appraisal of information provenance
    • References to peer-reviewed publication
    • Proportion of paragraphs with citation
  – Article size

• Credibility (metadata-based)
  – Author connectivity
  – Edit pattern and development history
    • Revision count
    • Proportion of reverted edits - (i) normal (ii) due to vandalism
    • Mean time between edits
    • Mean edit length.

Sai Moturu, 8/2009
Quantification of Trustworthiness

– Based on Dispersion Degree Score
  (Extent of deviation from mean)

Evaluation Metric

– Ranking based on trust level (determined from trustworthiness scores), and compared to gold standard classification using Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain (NDCG)

  • RATINGS: featured, good, standard, cleanup, and stub.
  • NDCG: error penalty proportional to the rank.
Indirect Trust: Referral + Functional

Variety of Trust Metrics and Models

(Using Propagation – Chaining and Aggregation over Paths)
Trust Propagation Frameworks

- **Chaining, Aggregation, and Overriding**
  - Golbeck – Hendler, 2006
  - Massa-Avesani, 2005
  - Bintzios et al, 2006
  - Sun et al, 2006
  - Thirunarayan et al, 2009

- **Trust Management**
  - Abstract properties of operators
  - Richardson et al, 2003

- **Reasoning with trust**
  - Matrix-based trust propagation
  - Guha et al., 2004

- **The Beta-Reputation System**
  - Algebra on opinion = (belief, disbelief, uncertainty)
  - Josang and Ismail, 2002
Trust Propagation Algorithms

• Top-down

• 1: Extract trust DAG (eliminate cycles)
• 2: Predict trust score for a source in a target by aggregating trust scores in target inherited from source’s “trusted” parents weighted with trust value in the corresponding parent.
  — Computation is level-by-level
  — Alternatively, computation can be based on paths.

Golbeck – Hendler, 2006
Trust Propagation Algorithms

• Bottom-up
  • 1: Extract trust DAG (eliminate cycles)
  • 2: Predict trust score for a source in a target by aggregating trust scores in target inherited from target’s “trusted” neighbors weighted with trust value in the corresponding neighbor.
  — Computation is level-by-level
  — Alternatively, computation can be based on paths.

Massa-Avesani, 2005
Bintzios et al, 2006
Top-down vs Bottom-up (visualized)
Example: Comparative Analysis

Same Interpretation: q trusts s

Different Interpretation: q distrusts s \textit{(Bintzios et al.’s)}

\textbf{vs}

q has no information about the trustworthiness of s \textit{(our’s, Golbeck rounding algorithm)}

Same Interpretation: q distrusts s

\textbf{Thirunarayan and Verma, 2007}
Indirect Trust : Referral + Functional
Variety of Bayesian Trust Models

With Applications to Mobile Ad hoc Networks
Wireless Sensor Networks, etc.
Direct Trust : Functional and Referral

• Direct Trust for Packet Forwarding
  • $S =$ Number of packets forwarded
  • $F =$ Number of packets dropped
  • $S + F =$ Total number of requests for packet forwarding

• Direct Trust for Recommendations
  • $S =$ Number of times observed direct trust for packet forwarding *approximates* expected indirect trust for packet forwarding (trust over transit path : $r+f$)
  • $F =$ Number of times observed direct trust for packet forwarding *does not approximate* expected indirect trust for packet forwarding (trust over transit path : $r+f$)
Indirect Trust : Functional and Referral

• Indirect Trust for **Packet Forwarding**
  – Used when direct trust is not available
    » (overriding behavior)
  • Chain links for a path from a recommender to the target
    – Multiplicative
  • Aggregate over multiple (parallel) paths from recommenders to the target
    – Unclear, in general

• Indirect Trust for **Recommendations**
  • Obtained implicitly through computed referral trust
Trust Propagation Rules:
Axioms for Trust Models

Rule 1: Concatenation propagation does not increase trust.

\[ |T(A_1, C_1)| \leq \min(|R(A_1, B_1)|, |T(B_1, C_1)|) \]

Rule 2: Multipath propagation does not reduce trust.

\[ 0 \leq T(A_1, C_1) \leq T(A_2, C_2) \text{ for } R_1 > 0 \text{ and } T_2 \geq 0 \]
\[ 0 \geq T(A_1, C_1) \geq T(A_2, C_2) \text{ for } R_1 > 0 \text{ and } T_2 < 0 \]

Sun et al, 2006
Rule 3: Trust based on multiple referrals from a single source should not be higher than that from independent sources.

\[ 0 \leq T(A_1,C_1) \leq T(A_2,C_2) \text{ for } R_1, R_2, R_3 > 0 \text{ and } T_2 \geq 0 \]

\[ 0 \geq T(A_1,C_1) \geq T(A_2,C_2) \text{ for } R_1, R_2, R_3 > 0 \text{ and } T_2 < 0 \]

Sun et al, 2006
Trust Propagation Rules: Implementation

**Rule 1:** Concatenation propagation (reputation discounting)

\[ T(A_1, C_1) = R_1 \times T_2 \]

**Rule 2:** Multipath propagation (combining feedback)

\[ T(A_2, C_2) = \frac{R_1(R_1 \times T_2) + R_1(R_1 \times T_2)}{R_1 + R_1} \]
Trust Paths Visualized for Scalability: Semantics unclear based on Sun et al’s spec

Bottom-up computation reflects our needs better?
Trust: Functional and Referral

• **Direct Trust** for **Primitive Actions** based on
  - \( S = \) Number of success actions
  - \( F = \) Number of failed actions
  - \( S + F = \) Total number of actions

• **Indirect Trust via Recommendations** based on summing direct experiences of recommenders
  - \( S_k = \) Number of success actions for \( k^{th} \) recommender
  - \( F_k = \) Number of failed actions for \( k^{th} \) recommender

• No chaining for referrals

Denko-Sun 2008
Cumulative Trust using Direct Experience and Recommendations

- Cumulative Trust is obtained by using total number of success actions and failed actions from direct experience \((n_s, n_u)\) and from \(i\) (indirect experiences through) recommendations \((n_s^r, n_u^r)\).

\[
T_s(B) = \frac{n_s + n_s^r + 1}{(n_s + n_s^r + 1) + (n_u + n_u^r + 1)} = \frac{n_s + \sum_{k=1}^{i} n_s^k + 1}{n_s + n_u + \sum_{k=1}^{i} n_s^k + \sum_{j=1}^{i} n_u^j + 2}
\]
(α, β)-parameters to compute trust of i in j is obtained by combining direct observations (α_j, β_j) with indirect observations (α_j^k, β_j^k) from k weighted by (α_k, β_k) using [Josang-Ismail, 2002] chaining/discounting rule.

- Obtains cumulative trust by combining direct trust from a functional link and indirect trusts using paths containing one referral link and one functional link.
- However, it does not distinguish functional and referral trust.
Attacks

• Trust Management is an attractive target for malicious nodes.
  ▪ Bad mouthing attack (Defamation)
    ▪ Dishonest recommendations on good nodes (calling them bad)
  ▪ Ballot stuffing attack (Collusion)
    ▪ Dishonest recommendations on bad nodes (calling them good)
  ▪ Sybil attack
    ▪ Creating Fake Ids
  ▪ Newcomer attack
    ▪ Registering as new nodes
Attacks

• Inconsistency in time-domain
  ▪ On-Off attack
    ▪ Malicious node behaves good and bad alternatively to avoid detection
  ▪ Sleeper attack
    ▪ Malicious node acquires high trust by behaving good and then striking by behaving bad

• Inconsistency in node-domain
  ▪ Conflicting Behavior Attack
    ▪ Provide one recommendation to one set of peers and a conflicting recommendation to a disjoint set of peers
Security: Robustness w.r.t Attacks

- **Bad mouthing attack**
  - *Example*: Competent nodes downplay competitions.
  - *Example*: Can diminish throughput due to lost capacity.

- **Approach:**
  - Separate functional and referral trust, updating referral trust to track good recommendations.
  - Trust composition rules ensure that low or negative referral trust does not impact decision.
    - Low trust nodes can be branded as malicious and avoided. (Not viable if majority collude.)
Security : Robustness w.r.t Attacks

- Ballot stuffing attack
  - Example: Malicious nodes collude to recommend each other.
  - Example: Can cause unexpected loss of throughput.

- Approach:
  - Feedback: Cross-check actual functional performance with expected behavior via referral, and update (reward/penalize) referral trust (in parent) accordingly (in addition to updating functional trust (in target))
Security : Robustness w.r.t. Attacks

- **Sybil attack**
  - Create Fake Ids to take blame for malicious behavior (dropping packets)

- **Newcomer attack**
  - Register as new node to erase past history

- **Approach**
  - Requires separate (key-based or security token-based) authentication mechanism (with TTP) to overcome these attacks.
Security : Robustness w.r.t Attacks

- **On-Off attack**
- **Sleeper attack**
  - *Example*: Due to malice or environmental changes
- **Approach:**
  - Use forgetting factor \(0 \leq \beta \leq 1\):
    \[
    k \text{ good/bad actions at } t_1 = k \cdot \beta^{(t_2 - t_1)} \text{ good/bad actions at } t_2 (> t_1)
    \]
Forgetting Factor

\[ k \text{ good/bad actions at } t_1 = k \cdot \beta^{(t_2 - t_1)} \text{ good/bad actions at } t_2 (> t_1) \]

- High \( \beta \) value (0.9) enhances memorized time window, while low \( \beta \) value (0.001) reduces it.
  - High \( \beta \) enables *malicious* nodes (on-off/sleeper attackers) to use prior good actions to mask subsequent *intentional* bad actions.
    - Reduces reliability.
  - Low \( \beta \) forces *legitimate* nodes to be avoided due to short spurts of *unintentional* bad actions.
    - Reduces throughput.
### Adaptive Forgetting Factor

- **Intuition**: Bad actions are remembered for a longer duration than good actions.
- Actions performed with high trust forgotten quicker than actions performed with low trust.

Choose $\beta$ equal to $(1 - p)$

Choose $\beta = 0.01$ when $p$ in $[0.5, 1]$ else 0.9

- **Example**: Similar ideas used in Ushahidi

- **Note**: Effectively, more good actions are necessary to compensate for fewer bad actions, to recover trust.
Security : Robustness w.r.t. Attacks

- Conflicting Behavior Attack
  - Malicious node divide and conquer, by behaving differently (resp. by providing different recommendations) to different peers, causing peers to provide conflicting recommendations to source about the malicious node (resp. about some target), reducing source’s referral trust in some peers.
    - Eventually, this causes recommendations of some peers to be ignored incorrectly.
Example

- Peer Node Set 1: 1, 2, 3, and 4
- Peer Node Set 2: 5, 6, 7, and 8
- Malicious node 0 behaves well towards nodes in Set 1 but behaves badly towards nodes in Set 2.
- When node 9 seeks recommendations from nodes in Set 1 U Set 2 on node 0, node 9 receives conflicting recommendations on malicious node 0, causing referral trust in nodes in Set 1 or nodes in Set 2 to be lowered.
  => Eventually throughput lowered
Security: Robustness w.r.t. Attacks

- Conflicting Behavior Attack
  - Issue: Can recommenders get feedback to reduce trust in malicious node? Otherwise, referral trust cannot be relied upon for detecting malicious nodes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>APPROACH/ METRIC</th>
<th>Trust Type / Context</th>
<th>Trust Model / Foundation</th>
<th>Robustness to Attacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D[3] / Binary</td>
<td>Functional / One</td>
<td>Trivial chaining / Beta-PDF</td>
<td>Ballot-stuffing; Bad-mouthing</td>
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<td>Josang-Ismail discounting / Beta-PDF</td>
<td>Ballot-stuffing; Bad-mouthing; Sleeper and On-off</td>
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<td>No / Bayesian Ad Hoc</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Ours / Multi-level</td>
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Research Challenges

(What-Why-How of trust?)

HARD PROBLEMS
Generic Directions

• Finding **online substitutes** for traditional cues to **derive measures of trust**.

• Creating **efficient and secure** systems for managing and deriving trust, in order to **support decision making**.

Josang et al, 2007
You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time.

Abraham Lincoln,
16th president of US (1809 - 1865)
Trust : Social Networks vs Machine Networks

• In social networks such as Facebook, trust is often *subjective*, while in machine networks and social networks such as Twitter, trust can be given an *objective* basis and approximated by trustworthiness.

• *Reputation* is the perception that an agent creates through past actions about its intentions and norms.
  – Reputation can be a basis for trust.
Sensor Networks
Concrete Application

• Applied Beta-PDF to Mesowest Weather Data

  – Used quality flags (OK, CAUTION, SUSPECT) associated with observations from a sensor station over time to derive reputation of a sensor and trustworthiness of a perceptual theory that explains the observation.

  – Perception cycle used data from ~800 stations, collected for a blizzard during 4/1-6/03.
Concrete Application

• Perception Cycle

• Trusted Perception Cycle
  – [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lTxzghCjGgU](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lTxzghCjGgU)
Research Issues

• Outlier Detection
  – Homogeneous Networks
    • Statistical Techniques
  – Heterogeneous Networks (sensor + social)
    • Domain Models

• Distinguishing between abnormal phenomenon (observation), malfunction (of a sensor), and compromised behavior (of a sensor)
  – Abnormal situations
  – Faulty behaviors
  – Malicious attacks

Ganeriwal et al, 2008
Social Networks
Our Research

- Study semantic issues relevant to trust
- Proposed model of trust/trust metrics to formalize *indirect* trust
• Guha et al: While continuous-valued trusts are mathematically clean, from the standpoint of usability, most real-world systems will in fact use discrete values at which one user can rate another.

• E.g., Epinions, Ebay, Amazon, Facebook, etc all use small sets for (dis)trust/rating values.
Our Approach

- Trust formalized in terms of partial orders (with emphasis on *relative* magnitude)
- *Local* but realistic semantics
  - Distinguishes *functional* and *referral* trust
  - Distinguishes *direct* and *inferred* trust
    - Direct trust *overrides* conflicting inferred trust
  - Represents *ambiguity* explicitly
Formalizing the Framework

• Given a trust network (Nodes AN, Edges RL U PFL U NFL with Trust Scopes TSF, Local Orderings $\preceq_{AN \times AN}$), specify when a source can trust, distrust, or be ambiguous about a target, reflecting local semantics of:
  • *Functional* and *referral* trust links
  • *Direct* and *inferred* trust
  • *Locality*
Referral trust link

Functional trust link

Nonfunctional trust link

(In recommendations)

(For capacity to act)

(For lack of capacity to act)
Benefits of Formal Analysis

• Enables detecting and avoiding unintended consequences.
  – An earlier formalization preferred “certain” conclusion from a relatively less trustworthy source over “ambiguous” conclusion from a relatively more trustworthy source.

The whole problem with the world is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, but wiser people so full of doubts. — Betrand Russell
Research Issues

• Determination of trust / influence from social networks
  – Text analytics on communication
  – Analysis of network topology
    • E.g., follower relationship, friend relationship, etc.

• HOLY GRAIL: Direct Semantics in favor of Indirect Translations
Research Issues: Credibility and Tweets

- Social Media is a source of News, means for tracking Diseases, and coordination in Disaster Scenarios
- But is fraught with Rumors (e.g., during Mumbai Bombings), Lies (e.g., during Boston Marathon Bombing), and Fakes (e.g., during Hurricane Sandy)
Top 10 Credibility Indicators from Morris et al. [37]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Average Credibility Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tweet is a RT from a trusted source</td>
<td>4.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author is an expert on the topic</td>
<td>4.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author is someone you follow</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contains URL you followed</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author is someone you have heard of</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author’s account is verified</td>
<td>3.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author often tweets on topic</td>
<td>3.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author has many tweets with similar content</td>
<td>3.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author uses personal photo as avatar</td>
<td>3.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author often mentioned and retweeted</td>
<td>3.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Research Issues: Multimodal Integration

• Intelligent integration of mobile sensor and social data for situational awareness
  – To exploit corroborative and complementary evidence provided by them
  – To obtain qualitative and quantitative context
  – To improve robustness and completeness
Complementary and Corroborative Information

Sensors observe slow moving traffic

Complementary information from social networks
Corroborative Evidence

Evidence for reported observations

Lane Remains Closed Following I-77 Semi Accident

COPLEY TOWNSHIP, Ohio — A lane remains blocked to traffic on Interstate 77 southbound as crews clean up the mess left after a morning tractor-trailer accident, Fox 8 News reports.

The accident occurred Wednesday morning in the vicinity of Ridgewood Road in Copley Township near Akron. The jackknifed semi, which had its load of drywall scatter all over the road, forced officials to completely close a portion of the highway for a few hours.

Traffic in and around the impacted stretch of highway was sluggish during the Wednesday morning commute. Vehicles exited at Ridgewood and re-entered at Miller Road.

Kirsten Erickson, of the Ohio Department of Transportation, tells Fox 8 News that the left passing lane was reopened just before 8 a.m., allowing traffic to advance without being forced to take a detour. Erickson still cautions motorists to avoid the area if possible as crews continue the cleaning process.

A spokesperson for the Ohio State Highway Patrol tells Fox 8 News that no injuries were sustained.
Interpersonal and Ecommerce Networks
Research Issues

• Linguistic clues that betray trustworthiness

• Experiments for gauging interpersonal trust in real world situations
  – *Techniques and tools to detect and amplify useful signals in Self to more accurately predict trust and trustworthiness in Others

*IARPA-TRUST program*
Research Issues

• Other clues for gleaning trustworthiness
  – Face (in photo) can effect perceived trustworthiness and decision making
  – Trust-inducing features of e-commerce sites can impact buyers
  – Personal traits: religious beliefs, age, gullibility, benevolence, etc
  – Nature of dyadic relationship
Research Issues

• Study of cross-cultural differences in trustworthiness qualities and trust thresholds to better understand
  – Influence
    • What aspects improve influence?
  – Manipulation
    • What aspects flag manipulation?
Collaborative Systems: Grid and P2P Computing
Research Issues

• Trust-aware resource management and scheduling
  – Clients specify resource preferences/requirements/constraints

• Trust models for P2P systems
  – To detect bad domains
  – To detect bogus recommendations and attacks

Azzedin and Maheshwaran, 2002-2003
Azzedin and Ridha, 2010
Bessis et al, 2011
Research Issues : Resilience

• **Resiliency** is the ability to maintain an acceptable level of service even with faults and challenges to normal operation.

• Coping with failures in computer systems
  – Failed component stops working
  – Failed component sends conflicting information to different parts of a system. *(Byzantine Fault)*
• Agreement in the presence of faults.
Large Scale Graph Processing for Scalable Implementation
Pregel

- Scalable general-purpose graph processing system primarily designed for Google cluster.
- Inspired from Bulk Synchronous Parallel
Pregel: Anatomy of Superstep

- Read messages sent to vertex V in superstep S-1.
- Send messages to other vertices that will be delivered in superstep S+1.
- Modify the state of V and its outgoing edges.
- Can change the graph topology by adding, deleting or modifying edges as well as vertices.
Giraph

- Open source implementation of Pregel.
- Can be executed as a Hadoop job.
Giraph API

• Vertex Implementation:

```java
abstract class Vertex<I,V,E,M>
{
    abstract void compute(Iterable<M> messages);
    long superstep();
    I getVertexID();
    V getVertexValues();
    setVertexValue(V value);
    Iterable<Edge<I,E>> getEdges();
    void sendMessage(I,M);
    addEdge(Edge<I,E>);
    removeEdges(I);
    voteToHalt();
}
```
Bayesian Trust Management Framework: Multi-level Trust Metric

Illustrating a General Approach
Outline

• **Motivation**: Multi-level trust management
• **Mathematical Foundation**: Dirichlet Distribution
• **Implementation and Behavior Details**:  
  – Local Trust Data Structures  
  – Trust Formation  
  – Bayesian Trust Evolution
• **Analysis of Robustness to Attacks**: Security
• **Evaluation**: Example trace vs. experiment
Motivation

• Uses K-level discrete trust metric

– E.g., Amazon’s 5-star trust metric can be interpreted as signifying (very untrustworthy, untrustworthy, neutral, trustworthy, very trustworthy) or (very dissatisfied, dissatisfied, neutral, satisfied, very satisfied).
Approach

• **Multi-level trust management** approach formalizes a *distributed, robust, lightweight, computational trust* that takes into account *context, subjectivity, and time*.

• Applies **Dirichlet distribution**, a generalization of Beta-distribution.
Dirichlet Distribution
K-level Trust Metric

• K-level trust probability vector:

\[ x = (x_1, \ldots, x_K) \]

where \( x_1 + \ldots + x_K = 1 \).

• Example: If a 5-star rating system has 50 people giving 5-stars, 20 people giving 4-stars, 5 people giving 3-stars, 5 people giving 2-stars, and 20 people giving 1-star, then the 5-level trust metric probability vector is \((0.5, 0.2, 0.05, 0.05, 0.2)\).
• Experience is a realization of the latent trust, and helps predicting trust.
• Probability of an experience-level sequence, with $\alpha_1 - 1$ counts of level 1 experience, ..., $\alpha_K - 1$ counts of level K experience is:

$$\prod_{i=1}^{K} x_i^{\alpha_i-1} \times \left( (\alpha_1 + \ldots + \alpha_K - K) ! / (\alpha_1 - 1 ! \times \ldots \times \alpha_K - 1 !) \right)$$
Dirichlet Distribution

• The Dirichlet distribution is the probability density function for \( x = (x_1, \ldots, x_K) \) given \((\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_K)\):

\[
f(x_1, \ldots, x_{K-1}; \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_K) = \frac{1}{B(\alpha)} \prod_{i=1}^{K} x_i^{\alpha_i - 1}
\]

\[
B(\alpha) = \frac{\prod_{i=1}^{K} \Gamma(\alpha_i)}{\Gamma(\sum_{i=1}^{K} \alpha_i)}, \quad \alpha = (\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_K).
\]

\[
\Gamma(n) = (n-1)!
\]
Why use Dirichlet Distribution?

• If the prior distribution of $x$ is uniform, then the Dirichlet family of distribution shown below gives posterior distribution of $x$ after $\alpha_i - 1$ occurrences of level $i$ experience with probability $x_i$, for each $i$ in $[1, K]$:

$$f(x_1, \ldots, x_{K-1}; \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_K)$$
Why use Dirichlet Distribution?

• *Dirichlet distribution is a conjugate prior for multinomial distribution.*

• **Consequence:**
  – Estimated distribution updated for a new experience at level i, by just incrementing $\alpha_i$ parameter.
  – In contrast: If prior distribution is different from Dirichlet, then it is conceptually hard to comprehend and computationally inefficient to compute posterior distribution, in general.
  – Icing on the cake: Uniform distribution (signifying ignorance) is Dirichlet!
Dirichlet distribution is a conjugate prior for multinomial distribution.

\[
prob(x|c) = \frac{prob(c|x)prob(x)}{prob(c)}
\]

\[
f(x|c) \sim \text{Multinomial}(c|x) \ast \text{Dirichlet}(x|\alpha)
\]

\[
f(x|c) \sim \prod_{i=1}^{K} x^{c_i} \ast \prod_{i=1}^{K} x^{(\alpha_i-1)}
\]

\[
f(x|c) \sim \prod_{i=1}^{K} x^{(\alpha_i+c_i-1)}
\]

\[
f(x|c) \sim \text{Dirichlet}(x|\alpha + c)
\]
Visualizing Dirichlet Distribution (K=3): Color Density plot on 2D simplex
Dynamic Trustworthiness

• Best estimate of trust for $\text{Dir}(\alpha_1,\ldots,\alpha_K)$ (gleaned from $(\alpha_i-1)$ experiences at level $i$, for all $i$ in $[1,K]$) is the mean vector $(\alpha_1/\alpha_0,\ldots,\alpha_K/\alpha_0)$, and the associated confidence is the variance vector.

Define $\alpha_0 = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \alpha_i$.

\[
E[X_i] = \frac{\alpha_i}{\alpha_0},
\]

\[
\text{Var}[X_i] = \frac{\alpha_i(\alpha_0 - \alpha_i)}{\alpha_0^2(\alpha_0 + 1)} = \frac{E[X_i](1 - E[X_i])}{(\alpha_0 + 1)}.
\]
Implementation and Behavior Details
Local Data Structures

• To store relevant information to compute direct (functional) and indirect (referral) trust.

• Each node maintains locally, for each peer and each context, four vectors of length K.
Local Data Structures

- **Direct Trust Vector**: Peers X Contexts X Peers -> Probability-Vector-K
  \[ \text{dtv}(px,c,py) = (d_1,d_2,...,d_K) \]

- **Direct Experience Matrix**: Peers X Contexts X Peers -> Count-Vector-K
  \[ \text{dem}(px,c,py) = (ec_1, ec_2,...,ec_K) \]
Local Data Structures

- Recommended Trust Vector: $\text{Peers} \times \text{Contexts} \times \text{Peers} \rightarrow \text{Probability-Vector-K}$

- $\text{rtv}(p_x, c, p_y) = (r_1, r_2, \ldots, r_K)$

- Sent Recommendation Matrix: $\text{Peers} \times \text{Contexts} \times \text{Peers} \rightarrow \text{Count-Vector-K}$

- $\text{srm}(p_x, c, p_y) = (sr_1, sr_2, \ldots, sr_K)$
Local Data Structures

- **Initialization**: To reflect complete ignorance via uniform distribution, we set the probability vectors $d_{tv}$ and $r_{tv}$ to $(1/K, ..., 1/K)$, and the elements of the count vector $d_{em}$ and $s_{rm}$ to $(0, ..., 0)$.
- These are Dirichlet distributed in the limiting case where $\alpha_i$’s are 1.
Trust Formation

• Overall trust vector is *weighted* sum of direct trust vector and recommended trust vector.

• Weights determined using
  – *Objective* confidence values using variance (deviation from the mean)
  – *Subjective* relative preference for direct experience over recommendations
    • Dependence on recommended trust yet to be explored
• Assuming that trust-level scale is linear, the trust distribution vector \((d_1,d_2,\ldots,d_K)\) can be mapped to the closed interval \([0,1]\), or to consolidated trust level, in order to act.

• **Trust threshold** should be determined based on the context and risk tolerance.
Trust Evolution

- Direct/recommended trust vectors are updated for a new experience/received recommendation.
- Key Idea: Dirichlet distribution is the conjugate prior of the multinomial distribution. So it is adequate to maintain counts of direct experience and sent recommendations, to best estimate direct trust and recommended trust vectors respectively.
Trust Evolution

• Simple Scheme (Direct Trust)

For a new experience at level \(i\),

\[
\text{dem}(px,c,py) = (ec_1, ..., ec_K) \text{ becomes }
\]

\[
\text{dem}^{\text{new}}(px,c,py) = (ec_1, ..., ec_{i+1}, ..., ec_K)
\]

and \( \text{dtv}(px,c,py) \) becomes

\[
\text{dtv}^{\text{new}}(px,c,py) = (d_1, d_2, ..., d_K)
\]

where \( di = \frac{ec_{i+1}}{ec_1 + ... + ec_{K+1}} \) and

\[
 dj = \frac{ec_j}{ec_1 + ... + ec_{K+1}}
\]

for each \(j\) in \([1, K]\) and \(j \neq i\).
• Robust Scheme

To incorporate differential aging of experience counts as a function of their level (and to incorporate “long term memory for low-level experience and short term memory for high-level experience”), we use a decay vector $(\lambda_1, \ldots, \lambda_K)$, where $1 \geq \lambda_1 \geq \ldots \geq \lambda_K > 0$, that modifies update rule as:
Trust Evolution

- Robust Scheme (Direct Trust)

For a new experience at level $i$,

$$dem(\text{px}, \text{c}, \text{py}) = (ec_1, ..., ec_K)$$

becomes

$$dem^{\text{new}}(\text{px}, \text{c}, \text{py}) = (ec_1, ..., ec_i + 1, ..., ec_K).$$

For every clock tick (with context-based delay),

$$dem(\text{px}, \text{c}, \text{py}) = (ec_1, ..., ec_K)$$

becomes

$$dem^{\text{new}}(\text{px}, \text{c}, \text{py}) = (\lambda_1 \cdot ec_1, ..., \lambda_K \cdot ec_K)$$
Trust Evolution

• Robust Scheme (Direct Trust)

For every clock unit and new experience, 

\[ dtv(px,c,py) \] becomes \[ dtv^{new}(px,c,py) = (d_1,d_2,...,d_K) \]

where \[ d_i = ec_i / (ec_1 + ... + ec_k) \]

for each \( i \) in \([1,K]\).

• Subtlety: Experience counts should saturate at 1 rather than diminish to 0 with time. (See code)
## Trust Evolution Illustrated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience Sequence</th>
<th>Final Trust Distribution (Simple Scheme)</th>
<th>Final Trust Distribution (Robust Scheme)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[1,1,1]</td>
<td>(0.57,0.14,0.14,0.14)</td>
<td>(0.55,0.15,0.15,0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[1,4,1,4]</td>
<td>(0.375,0.125,0.125,0.375)</td>
<td>(0.42,0.14,0.14,0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[1,1,4,4,4,4,1,1,1]</td>
<td>(0.42,0.08,0.08,0.42)</td>
<td>(0.5,0.1,0.1,0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[1,1,4,4,4,4,1,1,1]</td>
<td>(0.53,0.07,0.07,0.33)</td>
<td>(0.64,0.1,0.1,0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[2,3,2,3]</td>
<td>(0.125,0.375,0.375,0.125)</td>
<td>(0.14,0.29,0.42,0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experience Sequence Value</td>
<td>Trust Distribution Trace (Simple Scheme)</td>
<td>Trust Distribution Trace (Robust Scheme)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25)</td>
<td>(0.25,0.25,0.25,0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2)</td>
<td>(0.4,0.2,0.2,0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0.5,0.17,0.17,0.17)</td>
<td>(0.53,0.165,0.155,0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0.57,0.14,0.14,0.14)</td>
<td>(0.55,0.15,0.15,0.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>(0.5,0.125,0.125,0.25)</td>
<td>(0.5,0.13,0.12,0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>(0.44,0.11,0.11,0.33)</td>
<td>(0.46,0.135,0.135,0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>(0.4,0.1,0.1,0.4)</td>
<td>(0.42,0.12,0.11,0.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>(0.36,0.1,0.1,0.45)</td>
<td>(0.37,0.12,0.12,0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0.42,0.08,0.08,0.41)</td>
<td>(0.47,0.11,0.11,0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0.46,0.08,0.08,0.38)</td>
<td>(0.53,0.11,0.11,0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0.5,0.07,0.07,0.35)</td>
<td>(0.6,0.1,0.1,0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0.53,0.07,0.07,0.33)</td>
<td>(0.65,0.1,0.1,0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>(0.5,0.0625,0.0625,0.375)</td>
<td>(0.6,0.1,0.1,0.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0.53,0.06,0.06,0.35)</td>
<td>(0.64,0.1,0.1,0.17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Evolving Trust Distribution (Robust)
Analysis and Robustness Issues
Salient Properties

• **Symmetry**
  
  – *Simple Scheme* is symmetric w.r.t. trust/experience levels while *Robust Scheme* is asymmetric because of non-uniform decay.

  – Experience levels are “preserved” in that extreme/controversial behavior (*credulous interpretation*) is treated differently from ignorance (*skeptical interpretation*).
Salient Properties

• Effect of Order of Experience
  
  – **Simple Scheme** is sensitive to the counts of various experience levels, but not to the order of experience.

  – **Robust Scheme** is sensitive to the order of experience.
Salient Properties

• Differential Aging of experience levels
  • It exhibits limited and selective memory.
    – It retains low-level experiences much longer than high-level experiences.

» Parameters: Decay rate and saturation
The described approach is similar to Dirichlet Reputation System [Josang-Haller, 2007].

Applications:

• Browser toolbar for clients to see the user ratings and for users to provide ratings (critical surfer model) [Josang-Haller, 2007]

• Evaluating partners in Collaborative Environments [Yang and Cemerlic, 2009]

• Formalizing Multi-Dimensional Contracts [Reece, et al, 2007]

• In Collaborative Intrusion Detection System [Fung et al, 2011 ]
Conclusion

• Provided simple examples of trust (Why?)
• Explained salient features of trust (What?)
• Showed examples of gleaning trustworthiness (How?)
• Touched upon research challenges in the context of sensor, social, and interpersonal networks.
• Described multi-level trust management in detail
Thank You!

(Collaborators: Pramod Anantharam, Dr. Cory Henson, Professor Amit Sheth, Dharan Kumar Althuru, Jacob Ross)


[Course: http://cecs.wright.edu/~tkprasad/courses/cs7600/cs7600.html]