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Understanding Paths Toward Strategic Success in NVR Campaigns: A Comparison of Palestinian and South African Resistance

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UNDERSTANDING PATHS TOWARDS STRATEGIC SUCCESS IN NVR CAMPAIGNS: A COMPARISON OF PALESTINIAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN RESISTANCE

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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ABSTRACT


The following paper fills a gap in the literature of nonviolent resistance (NVR) by investigating when and under what circumstances it is necessary for nonviolent resistance campaigns to enlist the support of outside actors in order to achieve strategic success.

Using Gene Sharp’s pillars of power theory as a comparative framework, the author pairs the method of process-tracing with a most-similar-systems design in order to fashion a time-series experiment measuring the strength of each pillar of power propping up the target regimes of South Africa and Israel. The results reveal that these variables are interacting. The paper also reveals that the U.S. played a key role in both conflicts due to the extent to which it helped prop up both regimes during the period of study and makes recommendations to help improve the chances for success of Palestinian nonviolence and other NVR campaigns.
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Chapter I: Introduction

The history of nonviolent resistance (NVR) is a long and rich tradition that crosses cultural, religious, and ethnic boundaries and has been used successfully throughout history to achieve political objectives. Massive NVR campaigns like the Indian independence movement against Great Britain and the civil rights movement in America demonstrate the fantastic opportunities for success that NVR is capable of achieving, while events like Tiananmen Square serve as reminders that it is not always successful. Conceptually, nonviolence has evolved over time and ranged from mere pacifism to Gandhi’s concept of satyagraha, which is characterized by an active, but nonviolent opposition to power, meeting violent force with nonviolent force. As Gandhi would argue, force is the constant, but non-violent force is more tactically effective. Gandhi went so far as to say that “[v]iolence is any day preferable to impotence . . . [because] there is hope for a violent man to become nonviolent. There is no such hope for the impotent.”¹

The goals and objectives of those individuals whom Gandhi labeled the “satyagrahi” (or those who practice nonviolence) are no less ambitious than those who pick up a gun in the hopes of achieving the same political outcomes. As NVR scholar Gene Sharp argues, “Nonviolent action is a means of combat, as is war. It involves the matching of forces and the waging of ‘battles,’ requires wise strategy and tactics, and demands of its ‘soldiers’ courage, discipline, and sacrifice.”²

But does NVR work as well as violence? In other words, is it more or less effective in meeting its goals? The purpose of this thesis is to undertake a deeper investigation of the factors

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that are predictive of NVR success through a focused, structured comparison NVR campaigns in South Africa and in Israel/Palestine. This chapter begins with an overview of nonviolence and a review of the current state of NVR literature. Chapter two moves to an examination of the specific puzzle my research design seeks to address, followed by hypothesis-testing of the two cases in question in chapters three and four, and ending with a discussion about which variables matter more (or most) and the policy implications of my findings in the final chapter.

Literature Review

Nonviolence has a rich history spanning millennia, perhaps most notably gaining adherents amongst those in the early Christian church. In his book on the history of nonviolence, historian Mark Kurlansky notes, “early Christians are the earliest known group that renounced warfare in all its forms and rejected all its institutions.” In the more recent past, NVR has been utilized by groups as disparate as the followers of Gandhi seeking to overthrow British rule in India, the Civil Rights Movement in the United States, and the recent uprisings in the Middle East against authoritarian regimes. Over the past forty years, comparative politics and international relations (IR) scholars have sought to understand what makes NVR successful.

One of the earliest political scientists to turn their attention to the study of NVR was Gene Sharp, whose first book on NVR, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, has contributed greatly to the understanding of the mechanisms through which NVR campaigns successfully achieve their political objectives. Sharp theorizes that by systematically removing the six “pillars” of support that underpin a regime’s sources of consent and from which rulers derive their power,

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NVR can successfully topple governments and rulers. These pillars are theorized as consisting of authority, human resources and the skills and knowledge of those human resources, intangible factors, material resources, and the ability to enact sanctions. The first pillar, authority, is characterized as “the right to command and direct, to be heard or obeyed by others.” Sharp defines the second pillar of human resources as “the number of persons who obey [the regime], cooperate with [it], or provide [it] with assistance as well as the proportion of such persons in the general population, and the extent and forms of their organizations.” The third pillar is composed of the skills and knowledge of those human resources. The fourth pillar is comprised of multiple intangible factors, which Sharp classifies as “psychological and ideological factors, such as habits and attitudes toward obedience and submission, and the presence or absence of a common faith, ideology, or sense of mission.” Sharp’s fifth pillar of material resources is defined as “the degree to which the [regime] controls property, natural resources, financial resources, the economic system, means of communication and transportation.” Finally, Sharp defines sanctions “an enforcement of obedience’ used by rulers against their subjects to supplement voluntary acceptance of their authority and to increase the degree of obedience to their commands.” Examining the relative strength of each of these pillars in each target regime will be the focus of this study.

Most recently NVR scholarship has shifted to assessing whether NVR campaigns are more successful than violent campaigns in achieving their respective political objectives.

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4 Sharp, Nonviolent Action Part One, 8-9.
5 Ibid., 11.
6 Ibid., 11.
7 Ibid., 11.
8 Ibid., 11.
9 Ibid., 11.
10 Ibid., 12.
Chenoweth and Stephan argue through a combination of quantitative analysis and a qualitative case-study approach that NVR is actually more successful than violence in comparing the two strategies’ success rates in the achievement of political objectives.\(^\text{11}\) Drilling down on the causal variables responsible for success in NVR movements is important, according to Chenoweth and Stephan, because “research regarding the successes and failures of nonviolent campaigns can provide insight into the most effective ways for external actors—governmental and nongovernmental—to aid such movements.”\(^\text{12}\) Additionally, the authors reveal that NVR campaigns are “more likely to establish democratic regimes with a lower probability of a relapse into civil war [than a country undergoing a violent transition]”\(^\text{13}\).

Chenoweth and Stephan argue that there are two broad reasons why NVR campaigns are more successful than their violent counterparts. The first has to do with the ability of NVR campaigns to attract higher numbers of participants by reducing the barriers of participation.\(^\text{14}\) One of the major reasons for attracting more participants is that NVR is physically easier. One does not necessarily need to be in peak physical condition in order to participate in a stay-home boycott as one would need to be in order to participate in guerrilla warfare. Additionally, many may find participation in NVR campaigns more ethically or religiously palatable than taking up arms.\(^\text{15}\) The second reason given by Chenoweth and Stephan for NVR campaigns’ higher success rate is that high levels of participation also “activate numerous mechanisms that improve the odds of success,”\(^\text{16}\) such as producing “loyalty shifts” (defections within the regime itself),\(^\text{17}\)

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12 Ibid., 27.
13 Ibid., 10.
14 Ibid., 30.
15 Ibid., 37.
16 Ibid., 30.
“backfiring” (shifting support away from the target regime due to the perception of an unjust crackdown on protestors), increasing the likelihood of international sanctions, and achieving greater tactical diversity and innovation. There are multiple reasons that these mechanisms take place, chief among them being the fact that the higher numbers and greater participation in NVR campaigns have a greater chance of making its participant population more diverse. Diversity is important because it is an indicator of success due to an increased level of difficulty for the target regime to isolate the participants. Higher level of participation also enhances the resilience of the campaign, makes tactical innovation more likely, expands the potential for civic disruption, and increases the likelihood of loyalty shifts (or defections) occurring within the target regime.

Their findings are significant, compelling, and exhaustive, given that have compiled an entirely new Nonviolent and Violent Conflict Outcomes (NAVCO) dataset that attempts to compile a comprehensive list of all violent and NVR campaigns from 1900-2006, yielding a list of 323 violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns. They found through statistical analysis that NVR campaigns were “nearly twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent counterparts,” with a combined success and partial success rate of over 70% for NVR campaigns. Their findings suggest that the opposite is true of violent conflict, which has a combined success and partial success rate of approximately 35%, with a failure rate of over 60%. Corroborating their findings, Max Abrahms has found that the success rate of terrorism

17 Ibid., 46.
18 Ibid., 50.
19 Ibid., 52.
20 Ibid., 55.
21 Ibid., 40.
22 Ibid., 10.
23 Ibid., 6.
24 Ibid., 7-9.
25 Ibid., 9.
among groups that are classified as terrorist groups on the U.S. State Department’s watch list is only 7%, although limiting his findings to U.S. enemies may conceal a hidden variable of great power support, which I will discuss below.

With strong evidence that NVR is more successful than violent political resistance, we still are left with the question of why it fails. Kurt Schock has built upon Sharp’s pillars of power theory by applying it to NVR movements in nondemocracies using a comparative case-method approach. In his analysis of the causal variables that are predictive of NVR campaign success, Schock has observed that the South African anti-apartheid movement’s success depended on “directly . . . undermining the states’ power derived from sources within society, and indirectly by severing the states from sources of power derived from external sources.” This suggests that the success of some NVR campaigns may depend on the effectiveness of each NVR campaign in attacking external pillars of power or severing them from the target regime. This question is important and timely in an age of many tumultuous hybrid regimes, which Hale classifies as regimes with elements of both democracy and authoritarianism.

The Puzzle

The current state of the literature on NVR presents us with unanswered puzzles of (1) when an “extension of the NVR battlefield” into the international arena is necessary and (2) what impact external players have on an NVR campaign’s success. These questions arise

because there are a number of failed NVR campaigns that are characterized by a high participation rate and a high level of campaign diversity that still failed to achieve strategic success (defined below). The case of the massacre against unarmed NVR protestors at Tiananmen Square is a prime example of a massive campaign that ended in failure, suggesting that there are more causal factors at work than just size. It becomes necessary, then, to understand why NVR is successful in some of these cases and not in others. In addressing this question, this paper builds on current NVR research to attempt to determine which variables of successful movements are more responsible for a successful achievement of a campaign’s objectives or which are more indicative of success by applying these questions to the cases of South Africa and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.

One of the most pressing topics of current NVR research is Palestinian NVR in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. To define the dependent variable of “campaign success” in this conflict, we turn to Mubarak Awad, who argues that success must include the goal of self-determination for the Palestinian people (whether through a one or two-state solution), a ratification of the legitimacy and singleness of representation of the Palestinian people through the PLO (which was achieved in Madrid), and a just and acceptable resolution of the issues of settlements, land expropriation, control of natural resources, and the right of refugees to return to their homeland. Palestinian NVR’s partial success during the time period under study is somewhat difficult to understand, because the NVR campaign met many of the predictors of success that Chenoweth and Stephan identify. In 1984, Awad argued that Palestinian NVR was

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30 Ibid., 39.
nothing new, beginning with the “six-month strike of 1936 and the Arab boycott of Israel.” He explains, “school and commercial strikes, petitions, protest telegrams, advertisements and condemnations in the daily papers, and the attempts to boycott Israeli goods are, in fact, manifestations of non-violent struggle.” Palestinian NVR continued in uneven fashion alongside violent struggle, and came into full force during the First Intifada. During this period of time, much of the coverage of Palestinian resistance focused on stone-throwing, however Chenoweth and Stephan cite Israeli Defense Force figures reported during the campaign, which demonstrate that “over 97% of campaign activities . . . were nonviolent, including mass demonstrations, strikes, boycotts, and other acts of defiance and civil disobedience.” The figures reported in 1988 included 23,053 unarmed protest incidents and only thirty eight shooting incidents, or in other words 0.16% of the incidents reported by the IDF were violent. In 1989 and 1990 this rose slightly to 0.24% in both years, then to 0.84% in 1991 and 1.36% in 1992. Due to the high degree of campaign diversity and unity, it is remarkable that Palestinian NVR did not result in more significant concessions from the Israeli regime.

This raises the question of why Palestinian NVR has never achieved full success. While Chenoweth and Stephan deal with the success rate of different NVR movements and examine the first Intifada in depth, they do not provide conclusive reasoning for why campaigns like the case of Palestinian NVR do not succeed, although they do identify a number of potentially causal

32 Ibid., 48.
33 Ibid., 48.
35 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 119.
36 Ibid., 120.
factors.\textsuperscript{37} In agreement with Schock, Chenoweth and Stephan point out that “‘extending the battlefield’ [by targeting pillars of support which reside outside the immediate zone of conflict] is sometimes necessary for opposition groups to enhance their leverage over the target.”\textsuperscript{38} For instance, the authors point out that in the case of South Africa, “the existence of [external] organized solidarity groups. . . that maintained steady pressure on governments allied with [South Africa] proved to be very helpful.”\textsuperscript{39} The question then becomes: When is it necessary to extend the NVR battlefield to other theaters by attacking the pillars of power propping up the target regime that may reside outside the immediate area of conflict? In other words, when does it become necessary to enlist the help of third parties, such as great powers, international solidarity groups, international organizations and NGOs, or other players who may be able to exert leverage against the target regime? It is for this comparison that South Africa and Israel have been selected, as South Africa had the support of great powers (including the United States) until sweeping sanctions were enacted against the apartheid regime by Europe and the United States in 1986, after which the NVR campaign was able to fully achieve its political goals.\textsuperscript{40} Conversely, Israel largely maintained great power support for the duration of the period under study, which will be examined below. This study seeks to address these puzzles and clarify when an NVR movement must extend the battlefield and enlist the support of external actors in order to achieve strategic success. We turn now to the research design and case selection in order to describe how this will be accomplished.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., 119-146.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid., 27.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 27.
\textsuperscript{40} Philip Levy. "Sanctions on South Africa: What Did They Do?" Yale University Economic Growth Center. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University, 1999), 6-7.
Chapter II: Research Design

Having examined the literature and established the questions driving my research, I turn now to the method and logic of comparison. This chapter is devoted to laying out the research design of my project and the conceptualization and operationalization of the variables that will be examined. A Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) will be utilized in this structured, focused comparison of South African and Palestinian Non-Violent Resistance (NVR) campaigns. According to George and Bennett, a MSSD allows for the majority of the independent variables under study to be held constant while helping determine the strength of key independent variables that differ, thus accounting for the difference in the dependent variable, which in this case is the success or partial success of a nonviolent campaign.\footnote{Alexander George and Andrew Bennett. \textit{Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.} (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 81.} By comparing the two cases it will be possible to determine when external support is necessary for NVR’s success if it is found that the international condemnation of the apartheid regime in South Africa was responsible for the success of the anti-apartheid movement while those same causal variables are absent in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Before operationalizing my independent variables, I will explain the rationale behind my decision to choose the cases of South African and Palestinian NVR.

Case Selection

The comparison of South Africa and Israel serves as a useful contrast whereby potential causal factors of successful NVR campaigns may be identified. According to current NVR literature, we would expect Palestinians to have been much more successful in achieving their political goals and objectives during the First Intifada due to their high levels of campaign diversity and participation, both of which contributed to their ability to generate security force
defections (loyalty shifts) in the target regime. In the end, however, their campaign was only partially successful, resulting in the formation of a political organization (the Palestinian Authority) which, ironically, “brought to power an outside leadership that had not stepped foot inside the territories for almost three decades, and which promised to end the popular struggle against the occupation rather than lead it.” In this section I will outline how comparing the Palestinian NVR case with the anti-apartheid movement’s NVR campaign allows us to examine the strategic path towards campaign success taken by South African NVR resistors and examine the degree to which the Palestinian case failed while controlling for a number of potentially confounding variables.

**Conceptualizing and Operationalizing NVR**

The central concept for my study is the concept of nonviolent resistance (NVR). In this study, I borrow from multiple theorists in defining NVR as an abstention from using violence in pursuit of the achievement of political goals while resisting oppression, domination, or any other form of injustice. It must be viewed as a conscious and active opposition to an adversary (or multiple adversaries) and, equally, against using violence in opposing that adversary. NVR is further characterized by a withdrawal of consent from the dominant power-holders through non-cooperation with and civil disobedience against unjust laws. Following Chenoweth and Stephen, I further classify a campaign as nonviolent if it is *predominantly* nonviolent, thereby allowing for the potential that some rogue actors in an NVR campaign may break with

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nonviolent tactics, as indeed happened with stone-throwing in the First Intifada. In the end, the Israeli Defense Force’s own reports at the time found that 97% of Palestinian acts of civil disobedience during the campaign were nonviolent.\textsuperscript{44} At the same time, NVR campaigns that are not 100% nonviolent will be distinguished from contemporaneous campaigns utilizing violence \textit{alongside} NVR campaigns, which are discussed below and are classified as violent radical flanks.\textsuperscript{45}

In order to further operationalize the concept of NVR, it is useful to outline potential examples of NVR that may be used. Without exhausting all 198 potential NVR methods outlined by Gene Sharp (or the myriad other examples that have not been listed), illustrative are some of the predominant ones that have occurred in these campaigns, including protests, divestment campaigns, marches, and refusal to pay rent or taxes.\textsuperscript{46} It is important to note, as do Chenoweth and Stephan, that NVR does not always manifest itself “in the form of mass protests in the streets . . . [but] is just as likely to take the form of stay-aways, sit-ins, occupations, economic boycotts, and other NVR tactics, in which the numbers of participants are extremely difficult to estimate.”\textsuperscript{47} It is important to remember the Palestinian slogan that “To Exist Is To Resist,” which is summed up in the Arabic word, \textit{sumoud}, which means “perseverance or steadfastness” and which Broning explains as “the physical act of living as Palestinians on occupied territory, the refusal to disappear as a national collective with a distinctly Palestinian identity, and the continuation of daily life despite seemingly insurmountable obstacles constitutes a quiet but

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{44} Chenoweth and Stephan, \textit{Why Civil Resistance Works}, 119.
  \item \textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{46} Sharp, \textit{Nonviolent Action Part One}.
  \item \textsuperscript{47} Chenoweth and Stephan, \textit{Why Civil Resistance Works}, 32.
\end{itemize}
politically powerful tool of resistance.”  

Similarly, South Africans migrating to large (and illegal) squatter settlements in defiance of South African Homeland laws represented a similarly powerful tool of resistance.

With an understanding of what success looks like and what characterizes an NVR campaign, we turn to the concept of power, which will be adopted from Gene Sharp’s work on this concept. In terms of practical application, Sharp and other theoreticians of nonviolence maintain that every regime (whether liberal or illiberal) rests upon the obedience and consent of those governed by it. By comparing each of the pillars of power in a side-by-side comparison for the two case studies, it will become possible to determine in what ways South African and Palestinian NVR are able to attack their respective target regimes in order to determine whether or not each campaign has enough leverage to make the regime respond to its demands. Therefore a framework is needed to conceptualize and operationalize power, and there are six pillars of power that Sharp identifies, which are outlined in the following section.

Independent Variables

In order to draw meaningful comparisons between the two cases, it is necessary to understand the conceptualization of Sharp’s pillars of power and then operationalize them in such a way that the pillars’ relative levels of strength can be measured at key times throughout the duration of the respective NVR campaigns. Ideally we would have one strong key indicator for each pillar that could be easily observed and measured. However, due to the many possible ways in which concepts like “authority” may be made manifest in the data generating process,

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49 Sharp, Nonviolent Action Part One; Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works; Schock, People Power Movements, 2005
the strength of these pillars must be discerned through careful observation of the historical record and then interpreted into some type of measurable and replicable language. The numbers that are generated from this process, therefore, are heuristics which are an attempt to represent their respective concepts as if they were ordinal-scale quantified data.

Due to the difficulty of measuring these concepts, it is important to keep in mind Sharp’s observation that “both the relative power and absolute power of each of the contending groups are subject to constant and rapid alterations.” Additionally, in the footsteps of the famous theorist, Robert Dahl, Sharp’s theory of power is not monolithic, as if it is a single variable that one could easily observe, but rather is pluralistic and derived from the consent of the governed, whether that be through democratic or undemocratic means. Dahl’s concept of power (which he uses interchangeably with “influence”) is conceptualized by the observation that “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that he would otherwise not do.”

Before moving to operationalize these variables, however, a discussion on the use of the term “power” is necessary. Barnett and Duvall argue that, since 1964, “the discipline of international relations has tended to treat power as the exclusive realm of realism.” In light of this, my study will seek to build upon their charge to “employ multiple conceptions of power . . . in order to generate a more robust understanding of how power works in international politics.”

While realism looks at power primarily as “the ability of states to use material resources to get others to do what they otherwise would not,” Sharp’s conceptualization is much more robust, and the realist’s lens of seeing material resources as the sole source of power is corrected by

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50 Sharp, Nonviolent Action Part One, 69.
53 Ibid., 39.
54 Ibid., 40.
viewing material support as only one of the six pillars upon which a regime’s power rests. What follows is a recounting of the conceptualization of Sharp’s pillars of power and an attempt to operationalize these pillars for the purposes of comparison of these two cases.

**Pillar I: Authority**

The first pillar is authority, which Sharp characterizes as “the right to command and direct, to be heard or obeyed by others.” In attempting to understand this pillar more fully, I also borrow from Hurd, who argues that “legitimacy . . . refers to the normative belief by an actor that a rule of institution ought to be obeyed.” The rationale for this pillar’s importance is best articulated by Hurd, who maintains that states do not exist in a state of anarchy in the international system because “to the extent that a state accepts some international rule or body as legitimate, that rule or body becomes an ‘authority.’” Consequently, this concept will be operationalized internally as the degree to which the country’s population (or areas over which the target regime claims to exercise authority) recognizes the regime’s legitimacy and externally as the extent to which other countries and international organizations recognize the target regime’s sovereignty and authority in international relations between states. When one regime exists whose legitimacy to speak for and enact sanctions against its citizens, this pillar is at one hundred percent capacity. Complete lack of recognition exists when no citizens or other powers recognize a target regime as a legitimate source of authority, which by definition means it has collapsed. This pillar will be translated into a numerical score (as will all other pillars) in order to help better visualize the degree to which the target regime is viewed as legitimate and examine

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this pillar at separate intervals across time. Borrowing from Dahl’s idea of operationalizing
power, I have chosen a simple measure of power as ranging from 0 to 1, which has the advantage
of allowing us to more easily understand the idea of “0” representing “no support” and “full
support” being expressed with the value of “1”. Dahl explains the convenience of using such a
simple measure in that it can be easily ranked and stacked up against other measures.57 By
borrowing from these two prominent Power theorists, we can craft an index that can be used to
draw comparisons across cases in an easy to understand and conceptually intuitive manner.

To operationalize this first pillar according to this scheme, a score of ‘1’ represents a
target regime which is recognized as the sole legitimate source of authority, whereas a ‘.75’
represents one whose legitimacy is in question, a ‘.5’ represents a regime whose right to rule is in
competition with an opposing source (or sources) of authority, and a ‘.25’ represents a regime
whose right to rule is not only challenged by an opposing authority, but is viewed as illigimate
and/or unable to effectively govern. A score of ‘0’ represents regime collapse. This pillar should
not be confused with moral legitimacy (although the perceived immorality of the target regime
may affect and influence the degree to which they are viewed as authoritative by others), nor is
the concept of authority jeopardized solely by the fact that the regime is being targeted by an
NVR campaign. In fact, recognition of the target regime as the political enemy, including its
bureaucratic and military apparatus, is a signal that the regime is the authority with which
opponents must do battle. External authority is strengthened by recognition from great powers
and international organizations.

57 Dahl. "The Concept of Power."
Pillars II & III: Human Resources and Skills & Knowledge

The second pillar is human resources, which Sharp defines as “the number of persons who obey [the regime], cooperate with [it], or provide [it] with assistance as well as the proportion of such persons in the general population, and the extent and forms of their organizations.” For the purposes of this study it can, and should, be merged with the third pillar: skills and knowledge of those human resources. In this manner, property space compression of these independent variables is possible and pragmatic, given that separating the pillar of human resources from the skills and knowledge level of those human resources “serves no useful theoretical purpose.”

The first part of this tandem pillar will be operationalized as the number and strength of persons (both individually and collectively) within and outside of the country who help the regime in maintaining their monopoly on power vis-à-vis their opponents. Evidence of this type of power can be found in the aptitude of capable military leaders and politicians, effective lobbyists in other countries, the degree and strength of support from the general population, level of education of supporters, or (today) even the prevalence of savvy social media activists or propagandists. In terms of units of analysis we will look at powerful individuals, collectives (such as NGOs, faith-based organizations, trade unions), and countries. It is important to note that individuals or groups who obey a system to which they are ideologically opposed are nonetheless classified as human resources propping up the target regime, therefore black South

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58 Sharp, Nonviolent Action Part One, 11.
59 Ibid., 11.
African laborers and leaders of bantustans who were complicit in supporting the segregationist policies of the apartheid regime would be classified as human resources supporting it.

Any attempt to measure this pillar of power quantitatively or qualitatively is difficult, so in order to operationalize this pillar for numerical comparison, it will be helpful to define the two extremes that are possible. A score of ‘1’ will represent a situation in which 100% of the human resources who have a stake in the conflict are actively working (whether coerced or uncoerced and regardless of their level of contentedness) to maintain the political, social, and economic arrangement which keeps the target regime in its position of power and are highly knowledgeable and skilled in achieving that goal. A score of ‘0’ will represent a situation in which no individuals, groups, or institutions who actively work to support the target regime, and all of the individuals, groups, and institutions are actively working against it, which would represent a state in which the regime no longer ceases to function and therefore collapses. Myriad combinations exist between these two extremes, and (although admittedly imperfect in terms of measurement), a rationale for the scores received by each of the target regimes during the periods under study will be made during the examination of the results in the next two chapters.

**Pillar IV: Cohesion and Collective Purpose**

The fourth pillar is comprised of multiple intangible factors, which Sharp classifies as “psychological and ideological factors, such as habits and attitudes toward obedience and submission, and the presence or absence of a common faith, ideology, or sense of mission.”

Given the vagueness of Sharp’s original classificatory scheme, however, my examination of this

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pillar borrows from the work of Pearlman’s concepts of “cohesion” and “collective purpose,” which she defines respectively as “the cooperation among individuals that enables unified action”\textsuperscript{62} and “the extent to which a population agrees on clear objectives . . . [across] social, economic, and other cleavages,” which she argues is “the ultimate guarantor of a movement’s cohesion because it guarantees the movement itself.”\textsuperscript{63} For the cases under study, the pillar of cohesion will be operationalized as the extent to which the supporters of the target regime remain unified by a shared faith, ideology, personality traits, or beliefs in relation to the cohesion and collective purpose of those who are aligned against it. This may be measured by using survey and census data regarding the beliefs and attitudes of the supporters of the target regime or decisions made by groups and institutions that reflect shifting beliefs and opinions about the target regime’s policies. An example of this type of power would be the degree of unity within Israeli society about the future of the occupied territories. Pearlman explains how this translates into power by arguing that “leaders can explicitly invoke ideas that resonate with people’s shared identities and interests, and thereby bolster unity in the struggle for goals that they hold in common,” which allows them to “leverage popular backing to isolate and thwart rivals, which may consolidate their authority and control.”\textsuperscript{64} Statements from faith-based organizations or institutions outside the country (such as the Anglican Church’s opposition to apartheid or institutional investors creating policies barring investments in South African companies) would also serve as evidence of the level of support for these intangible factors that prop up the target regime. Similar to the other pillars, a score of ‘1’ will represent a situation in which the psychological and ideological beliefs underpinning the target regime’s authority are completely

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 10.
in harmony with those of their supporters and there exists strong cohesion and collective sense of purpose, while a ‘0’ represents a situation in which a target regime’s legitimacy is completely bankrupt and the cohesion and collective purpose is entirely on the side of those who are aligned against the target regime.

Pillar V: Material Resources

Material resources make up the fifth pillar, which Sharp defines as “the degree to which the [regime] controls property, natural resources, financial resources, the economic system, means of communication, and transportation.” Using this definition, this pillar will be operationalized as the relative levels of property ownership, ownership of natural resources, military and defense equipment, levels of income and shares of GDP, control of communications technologies like radio, television networks, and internet access, and access to roads and control over freedom of movement, respectively. Externally, the degree to which material and monetary support flows into the country through investments, loans, weapons sales, and technological support (such as IBM computers utilized in implementing South Africa’s Pass Laws) to the target regime by international businesses and institutions also represent material resources. By necessity, the strength of this pillar is relative to the strength of those who are opposed to the regime, and therefore a score of ‘1’ would represent a situation in which 100% of the control of material resources is in the hands of the target regime and its supporters, while a score of ‘0’ would represent a situation in which 100% of the control of material resources is in the hands of its opponents. It is important to distinguish here that shifts in the levels of intangible factors underpinning the target regime’s sources of power may result in a shift in the levels of material

65 Sharp, Nonviolent Action Part One, 11.
resources at its disposal, as in the case of South Africa’s inability to gain access to the international bond market after many institutional investors caved to the demands of the anti-apartheid movement and divested from the country. The loss of the loans necessary to maintain South Africa’s ability to repay its debts is a loss of material support, but demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between the intangible factors and material support for the target regime.

**Pillar VI: Sanctions**

Finally, sanctions make up the sixth potential source of power, which Sharp explains are “an enforcement of obedience used by rulers against their subjects to supplement voluntary acceptance of their authority and to increase the degree of obedience to their commands.”

These sanctions may be used against the regime’s own population or other countries/powers. To the degree that other countries and institutions are complicit in these sanctions or help to enforce them, we can operationalize this pillar by providing examples of the types of sanctions that may be utilized, which Sharp explains include “the breaking of diplomatic relations, economic embargoes, military invasions and bombings. . . . imprisonment or execution, . . . conventional war, strikes, political noncooperation and boycotts.” A score of ‘1’ would represent a situation in which there is complete enforcement of compliance with the sanctions enacted or put in place by the target regime, and a score of ‘0’ would represent total noncompliance with the sanctions it enacts, both by those NVR opponents of the target regime and by those responsible for carrying out the target regime’s sanctions. A ‘0’ may also represent a complete lack of willingness on the part of the target regime to use sanctions in enforcing obedience. As an example, complete obedience of South African Pass Laws on the part of whites and blacks within South Africa (both

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66 Ibid., 12.
67 Ibid., 12.
in enforcing the laws on the part of the military and police and in carrying passes at all times on the part of all South African non-whites) would represent 100% internal adherence to sanctions, while the total refusal to obey with these sanctions (regardless of the resulting punishments) on the part of blacks would represent leverage exercised against those sanctions, or partial leverage exerted against the target regime. However, only when institutions like the police and military defect and refuse to enforce the sanctions of the target regime do we see what Chenoweth and Stephan term “loyalty shifts,” which represent “systematic breakdowns in the execution of a regime’s orders.”68 Additionally, they argue that “harsh crackdowns against nonviolent campaigns may backfire, a process that occurs when an action is counterproductive for the perpetrator. . . . [and] creates a situation in which the resistance leverages the miscalculations of the regime to its own advantage, as domestic and international actors that support the regime shift their support to the opposition because of specific actions taken by the regime.”69 In this way, enforcement of sanctions that are viewed as illegitimate or at odds with the ideological beliefs of the target regime’s supporters (domestically and internationally) may, in turn, influence the pillars of intangible factors and authority propping up the target regime internally and/or externally.

Before moving to a summary of each of these pillars, it is worth pausing to note that while other countries may issue sanctions against the target regime, it is the effect of those sanctions which matter in determining how they undercut the regime’s pillars of power. For instance, economic sanctions against South Africa actually targets the apartheid regime’s pillar of material support. However, the U.S. providing cover for Israel on the U.N. Security Council actually helps prop up that country’s ability to enact sanctions by shielding it from penalties.

68 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 46.
69 Ibid., 50.
Because of the potential for confusion in terminology, I will be using the terms “coercion” and “coercive techniques” to refer to what Gene Sharp labels “sanctions” for the duration of the paper. We turn now to a summary of our independent variables and their operationalization.
Summary of Independent Variables

Having operationalized each of the independent variables, it is helpful to see them together with their corresponding values and the coding method I will use in examining each of the cases.

Table 1. Operationalization and coding of independent variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillar of Power</th>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Level of Support</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>• Sole source of legitimate authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>• Regime legitimacy in question</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>• Authority in competition with competing source of authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>• Challenged and viewed as unable to govern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>• Regime collapse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources &amp; Skills and Knowledge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>• 100% of population actively working to maintain the political, social,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>and economic arrangement keeping regime in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>• 75% working to keep regime in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>• 50% working to keep regime in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>• 25% working to keep regime in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Regime collapse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohesion and Collective Purpose</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>• Psychological and ideological beliefs underpinning regime authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>100% in harmony with its supporters/fully cohesive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>• 75% in harmony with its supporters/strong cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>• 50% in harmony with its supporters/partial cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>• 25% in harmony with its supporters/weak cohesion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Target regime’s legitimacy completely bankrupt and cohesion and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>collective purpose is 100% on the side of those against it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>• 100% of material resources in the hands of target regime and its</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>• 75% of material resources in the hands of target regime/supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>• 50% of material resources in the hands of target regime/supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>• 25% of material resources in the hands of target regime/supporters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• 100% of material resources on side of target regime’s opponents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Full</td>
<td>• Total enforcement of compliance with coercive techniques enacted by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>target regime and those responsible for enforcing it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>Partial</td>
<td>• High enforcement of compliance, but lessening of coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>• Complete noncompliance coupled with inability to enforce coercion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>• Total noncompliance coupled with significant backfiring on the part of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>those responsible for carrying out coercion OR the non-use of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>coercive techniques against opponents (as in S.A.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having operationalized our independent variables, we turn now to an examination of the dependent variable of campaign success.
Dependent Variables

We must also conceptualize and operationalize the dependent variable — NVR Success — and its three component values: complete success, partial success, and failure. Following Chenoweth and Stephan, I classify “success” as consisting of “the full achievement of [a campaign’s] stated goals (regime change, antioccupation, or secession) within a year of the peak of activities,” with the necessity that the campaign have a “discernible effect on the outcome.”

It is important to note that a campaign may last days, months, or even years. In the case of South Africa, those goals would be the ones that were identified very early on and, in 1955, written into the ANC’s Freedom Charter, which articulated in very clear language a vision for South Africa of total political equality for all races and the right to vote “for every man and woman” in the country. Massie argues that this key event served as a way to bring together “a politically, racially, and economically diverse group of South Africans and [unite] them in their opposition to the National government’s program of apartheid,” which, he explains, “became a sort of creed for the next generation of anti-apartheid activists.” As previously stated, the goal for Palestinians would be some form of self-determination and/or equal representation for the Palestinian people (whether through a two or one-state solution) and a just and acceptable resolution of the issues of settlements, land expropriation, control of natural resources, and the right of refugees to return to their homeland. Partial success is defined as the achievement of some of the stated goals of the NVR campaign within a year of the peak of activities, and failure is the inability to achieve any of the stated goals of the NVR campaign.

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72 Massie, *Loosing the Bonds*, 44.
Additionally, I believe that an NVR campaign must either have leverage against the
target regime’s pillars of power or enlist the help of external actors in targeting those pillars in
order for it to achieve strategic success, which I will articulate below in my hypotheses. Schock
defines leverage as “the ability of contentious actors to mobilize the withdrawal of support from
opponents or invoke pressure against them through the networks upon which opponents depend
for their power.”74 For this study, leverage is conceptualized as the ability of the NVR campaign
to do battle against the individual pillars of power upon which the target regime rests. The puzzle
can best be understood as a challenge in determining what combination of leverage applied
against pillars of power internally and externally lead to the possible changes in outcomes in the
dependent variable: NVR campaign success. If an NVR campaign were able to apply leverage
against each of the target regime’s pillars of power simultaneously, there would exist ten
independent variables, outlined below in Figure 2.

74 Schock, People Power Movements, 142.
Having defined my independent and dependent variables, I will now explain my hypotheses for how I believe these variables interact.

Hypotheses

In attempting to understand the role of external support (or lack thereof) for the target regime as an independent variable (IV) impacting the success or failure of NVR campaigns as a dependent variable (DV), the following hypotheses will guide my study:

*Hypothesis 1: The less great power external support for the target regime, the greater strategic success of an NVR campaign.*
Hypothesis 2: The increased external pressure/costs on the target regime, the greater strategic success of an NVR campaign.

These hypotheses will be tested by examining the degree to which external support exists for each of the target regimes in both of the cases and examining each of the pillars and measuring the effect this support has (if any) on the ability of each respective NVR campaigns to achieve strategic success. It may be found that the null hypothesis is true (that is, that external support or lack thereof has no bearing on the outcome of an NVR campaign). These hypotheses are falsifiable; as it may be determined that South African NVR was successful solely because of the external leverage applied against the apartheid regime. On the other hand, an analysis of South African NVR which reveals that internal NVR withdrawals of support from the human resources of the target regime through internal and international boycotts, work stoppages, and similar tactics were more responsible for the collapse of the apartheid regime would mean that Palestinian NVR would be even more dependent upon the withdrawal of international support for the target regime and international sanctions against the Israeli government in order to achieve strategic success due to the Palestinians’ lack of leverage against the human resources pillar of Israeli power due to the fact that the Israeli regime does not depend upon Palestinian labor in the same way that the apartheid regime depended upon the labor of black South Africans.

The distance between the imposition of international sanctions and corresponding changes (or lack thereof) in regime behavior in addition to historical and autobiographical analysis will aid in the understanding of what pillars matter more (or most) when an NVR campaign attempts to do battle.

Having outlined the hypothesized causal relationship between variables, we turn now to an examination of elements of control that the selection of these two cases provides.
Control Variables

As George and Bennett maintain, the problem of “too many variables and too few cases” may be resolved by finding “sufficiently comparable cases that provide the functional equivalent of experimental control.” Due to the strong existence of control mechanisms between these two cases and the use of process-tracing in the research it will be possible to guard against underdetermination. South Africa and Israel/Palestine provide a very clear comparison of most similar cases that vary on the dependent variable (success versus partial success) and control for a variety of other potentially confounding variables. Both are former British settler colonies (with elements of British common law present in each) with a history of colonization by an external minority that became the dominant oppressive group (Afrikaners of Dutch descent in South Africa and Jews in Israel). Both conflicts are nativist versus settler conflicts as both groups (Afrikaner whites in South Africa and Zionist Jews in Israel) fought for the ability to control their respective countries to the exclusion of other ethnic and racial groups, citing divine right as justification. The two cases differ somewhat in terms of how the regimes were established, however, in that in the case of South Africa, whites fought a war with the British (the Boer War) and reluctantly accepted British rule after having already fought a colonization war with the local inhabitants. In the case of Israel, Zionism had the initial support of the British government from the beginning of what leading Zionists at the time explicitly labeled their “colonization” of Palestine. However, due to the desire of the Dutch and Jewish settler

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75 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory*, 156.
76 Ibid., 81.
77 Ibid., 30.
79 Ibid., 3.
80 Ibid., 5.
81 Ibid., 8.
communities in South Africa and Israel, respectively, British support for both regimes was unable to continue long past World War II, and both became newly independent former British colonies after this period of time.\footnote{Ibid., 9.}

In both cases, Afrikaners and Israelis quickly consolidated power and established their autonomy after becoming independent from their colonial powers while simultaneously denying those same rights of self-determination for many of the inhabitants of those countries, which they came to dominate politically, economically, and socially.\footnote{Ibid., 16-17.} In the case of both countries, British decolonization played a role in allowing the minority to assume control in the absence of British oversight, however guerilla tactics were used more successfully by the Israelis to gain independence, while South Africa was a case of a less violent devolution of power from Britain to the white minority government.\footnote{Ibid., 10.} Both groups pursued a similar path of denying rights to the new “minority” groups (non-whites and Palestinians), although to different degrees. Whites and Israelis also share a common fear of allowing equal representation of the entire population; both cite(d) the likelihood that they would become marginalized and that reverse oppression and discrimination would take place.\footnote{Ibid., 15.}

Another commonality is the presence of radical flanks. Scholars are divided over the effects of radical flanks, which are defined as contemporaneous violent actors who have the same or similar political objectives as their nonviolent counterparts.\footnote{Che noweth and Stephan, \textit{Why Civil Resistance Works}, 43.} In the case of South Africa, resistance took the form of both nonviolent and violent methods to subvert control of the majority power (i.e. apartheid regime) via the African National Congress (ANC) and its armed
wing, the Umkhonto we Sizwe (or MK). While the MK limited their campaigns to acts of sabotage against material resources of the apartheid regime, Poqo (the armed wing of the Pan-African Congress) was much more militant and directed its efforts towards terrorizing those in the white community. Similar developments occurred in Palestine with regard to the PLO and subordinate paramilitary organizations, particularly modern-day terrorist groups like Hamas. These parallel cases will therefore allow us to control for the effects of violent radical flanks using terrorism to achieve their goals and objectives.

Nonviolence was used unsuccessfully (for long periods of time) in both countries as well before the NVR campaigns achieved strategic success. This is important because time is a potentially confounding variable that can be controlled by comparing both cases. In South Africa, the Defiance campaign of the 1950s preceded armed resistance against the apartheid regime, but ultimately failed until NVR efforts were revived to similar levels much later in the 1980s. Similarly, Michael Broning points out that, contrary to popular opinion, Palestinian NVR has a long tradition in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as “[d]ecades of oppression have been countered not first and foremost by violent responses but by a struggle that for most Palestinians for most of the time has been largely free of violence.”

Perhaps most significantly, both cases have been framed as antiapartheid struggles by their respective NVR campaigns, providing a unique opportunity for comparison whereby two groups with the same idiosyncratic goals can be compared. In the case of South Africa, the system of racial inequality and separation allowed the apartheid regime to maintain power and deny black South Africans self-determination by denying them voting rights and attempting to

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87 Ibid., 40-41.
88 Ibid., 5.
silence political dissent. The AAM arose to counter these policies and is an example of a successful NVR campaign that achieved its political goals.\(^9^0\)

 Israeli policies have increasingly paralleled South Africa’s, most notably the building of the separation barrier walling off settlements in the West Bank and allowing for special access to certain regions of the territory for Israeli citizens while restricting or denying the same access to Palestinians. Israel has also curtailed many of the rights of Palestinian people, including the withholding of state funding for education in the absence of adopting Israeli standards of bilingualism or due to the inclusion of a Palestinian national narrative, immigration quotas (which are exclusively given to Jewish immigrants and denied to Palestinians), continued settlement construction (at the expense of Palestinian private property), and the inability to vote.\(^9^1\) Ending this type of separation was the explicit goal of South Africans and has been cited by Palestinian leaders Edward Said and Mustafa Barghouthi as the explicit goal of their own struggle, however it must be admitted that the South African goal of accomplishing this through creating a fully democratic state and a change in regime throughout the entire country does differ from the Palestinian goal of “shaking off” Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip and establishing a state, a potential alternative hypothesis which I will also investigate.\(^9^2\)

 Another key variable that the conflicts share is a support for the target regime by great powers. In the case of South Africa, U.S. support for the apartheid regime existed for a long time after racial norms of equality had come into force in the U.S. but changed dramatically in a short


period of time. In the case of Israel, U.S. support during the period of time under examination remained strong, and provides a key test for the question of whether, and/or when, external support for the NVR campaign or withdrawal of support from the target regime are, in fact, key independent variables that play a role in determining the success, partial success, or failure of NVR campaigns. It must be noted, however, that two key potentially confounding independent variables may exist given that these cases differ regionally (Middle East versus Sub-Saharan Africa) and culturally (including racial/ethnic groups and religious beliefs), which may mean that different strategic interests of the U.S. come into play that are not observed by this comparison.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we will control for the effects of time. Each case will be examined during the same time period, beginning with the point in time where U.S. policy began its divergence in terms of its attitude towards the two respective cases. The best starting point for this is with the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy, whose “four-pronged approach” to Africa included supporting Africans’ push for freedom and independence for African nations, but essentially exempted South African blacks. The Kennedy Administration is an appropriate starting point for both cases, given that his administration set the tone in both instances, in many ways, for the duration of each case. At one point, Kennedy demonstrated clearly the degree to which he understood the interplay of domestic and international affairs by asking his informal African advisor, Barbara Ward Jackson, “whether Africa could become an issue in American politics on par with the Israeli issue with the Jewish vote.” The time period under investigation, then, will be from 1961 through 1994. This will allow for a greater degree of control given that the same decision-makers are in power, therefore

94 Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 113.
95 Ibid., 130.
controlling as much as possible for any variation in the international geopolitical landscape or the individual personalities of world leaders during this time. Additionally, this time period includes the height of activities for both NVR campaigns as well as the successful and partial achievement of both campaigns’ stated objectives. This time period also allows time for an examination of the aftermath of both cases. Process-tracing of all external variables (e.g. U.N. Security Council Resolutions, BDS campaign activities, economic sanctions, diplomatic support for NVR campaigns or against target regime, etc.) during this time period will help paint a picture of the cause and effect of the external leverage applied to each target regime and examine the resulting change (or lack thereof) in the target regime’s behavior. Having established the rationale and logic of comparison, we turn now to the methodology.

Methodology

Due to the complex interplay of a plethora of individuals, groups, institutions, states, and international organizations, process-tracing through a historical analysis of the events leading up to the end of the apartheid regime’s rule in South Africa and the partial achievement of Palestinian political objectives in the First Intifada is the most useful comparative tool to explore these two cases. Process-tracing is a process whereby historical research is examined in order to determine “whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evidence in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.”96 This method is valuable because it allows us to “get closer to the mechanisms or microfoundations behind observed phenomena”97 and can be used to “focus on whether the variable of interest was causally linked to any change in outcome and to assess whether other independent variables that

96 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory, 6.
97 Ibid., 147.
change over time might have been causal,” making it the most appropriate tool to use for this comparison. In this way it will be possible to determine why South African NVR was able to fully achieve that movement’s stated objectives and why Palestinian NVR fell short, as well as gain insight into what variables are potentially causal or interacting (e.g. international economic pressure coupled with loss of great power support) in predicting NVR success.

Process-tracing will be used to fashion a “natural” time-series experiment, which Chris Fife-Schaw explains consists of “taking measurements of the dependent variable on three or more occasions.” The dependent variables in question would be the fully successful achievement of the political objectives sought by the South African NVR campaign and the partial achievement of the Palestinian NVR campaign’s stated objectives. In order to fashion a time-series that will illuminate the effects of leverage applied against each of the target regimes during the period under study, it is necessary to investigate the strength of the target regime’s pillars of power at multiple points during the period under study. Each pillar will be examined at four points (1961, 1971, 1981 and 1991) to determine the effects of internal and external leverage applied to the target regime on the strength of the regime’s individual pillars of power at identically spaced intervals in each case. While these are necessarily estimates of the strength of the regime’s power, visual approximations and ratings will be created to help understand the degree to which the NVR campaign is able to attack or undercut the pillars of power of both regimes and tell the story of how the mix of independent variables eventually led to the successful achievement (or partial achievement in the case of Israel/Palestine) of the dependent variable. Through this historical analysis, we will also examine the decision-making process of

98 Ibid., 221.
those in power in the respective target regimes. By analyzing the target regimes and its leaders within a given period of time, holding the internal independent variables constant, and examining the external independent variables, it will be possible to determine the key causal variable(s) that are responsible for changes, or lack thereof, in the target regime’s behavior.

Inferring causality, then, becomes a question of investigating the degree to which external factors simultaneously withdrawing support for the South African regime’s pillars of power contributed to the collapse of that country’s apartheid regime and comparing the result to the degree to which external factors played a role in the partial achievement of the Palestinian NVR campaign’s stated objectives. By examining which variables are present and which are lacking, it will be possible to draw conclusions about the potential causality of those variables and how they interact with one another.

The bulk of the comparison, therefore, lies in the relationship of great powers to the target regimes. While Palestine continues to be recognized by a significant number of countries around the world, these countries have little to no impact on Israeli policy. While South Africa’s apartheid regime was tolerated for a long while (diplomatically speaking), Israel benefits from its “special relationship” to the United States, which has its roots in Kennedy’s wooing of Jewish voters in his first (successful) bid for the presidency in 1960. In contrast with South Africa, Mearsheimer and Walt point out that, prior to the Israel lobby, “no lobby has managed to divert U.S. foreign policy as far from what the American national interest would otherwise suggest, while simultaneously convincing Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially

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identical.”¹⁰¹ This provides us with a clear divergence of great power support between the two cases that we can examine to determine the effect it has on the dependent variable. Finally, the unique situation in Palestine as an opposition that is more dependent on the State of Israel than Israel is on the Palestinians make this case worthy of comparison with South African NVR. Chenoweth and Stephan argue that “in situations in which there is an inverse economic dependency relationship . . . it may be difficult for a civil resistance campaign to achieve significant leverage without working through parties with closer political and economic ties to the state,” a situation which they apply to the case of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories.¹⁰²

The comparison of these two cases is useful because, before economic sanctions were enacted, South Africa was uniquely positioned as an “economic hegemony, despite almost universal non-recognition of their legitimacy. It was a pariah of international diplomacy, yet economically . . . was well integrated into the Western system.”¹⁰³ It remains to be seen, however, whether the true causal variable is economic. Because the NVR campaign in South Africa was eventually able to achieve full integration and peacefully take over the military and political apparatus left over by the apartheid regime in 1994, the bulk of the decision to yield to the demands of the black community (and international community) lie principally in the minds of the decision-makers. In order to determine which variable was primarily responsible, it will be necessary to determine what drove their decision-making process, meaning that the overarching question for each case will be what leaders did in response to the withdrawal of support for their regimes and the leverage applied against them and an examination of their reasoning behind those actions. Historical and autobiographical literature will therefore be examined to determine

¹⁰² Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 45.
the extent to which individuals attribute their reasoning to internal and external situations. Both examinations will also utilize the methodology of qualitative historical analysis to inform the process-tracing examination by analyzing historical primary and secondary source materials to fashion a time-series analysis that examines each independent variable’s impact on the trajectory of the NVR campaign’s ability to achieve its political goals.

The primary units of analysis of each target regime’s decision-making process will merge the bureaucratic, sociological, and psychological lenses in order to capture as complete of a picture as possible, thus illuminating how NVR alters the decision-making process of target regimes in other cases of NVR. Moreover, as Bar-Tal argues, changes in societal beliefs for countries locked in what he classifies as “intractable conflicts” requires a change of beliefs, most often brought about by “changes perceived in the conflict situation,” such as shifting “geopolitical or economic” conditions. Additionally, alternative hypotheses (such as the presence or absence of charismatic leadership) will be examined to determine what impact (if any) they had on the target regime’s behavior.

Goals of this study

What follows is a focused, structured comparison of the two cases in question, beginning with an outline of each NVR campaign’s political goals and objectives, a summary of the

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political landscape, an examination of any potentially confounding variables that could yield substantial differences in dependent variable outcomes, and then a detailed timeline of each case that focuses on each external independent variable and the impact it has on the NVR campaign’s strategic success, partial success, or failure. What I seek to contribute to the field of research is an analytical explanation of the causal factors at work in order to empirically determine when it is necessary to enlarge the NVR battlefield and seek out third-party engagement. George and Bennet classify an analytic explanation approach to process-tracing as one which “converts a historical narrative into an analytical causal explanation couched in explicit theoretical forms.”108 This is useful because each of these variables are interacting variables, in that they are not independent of each other, therefore this approach provides an opportunity “to inductively identify complex interaction effects.”109 This goal of this study, then, is to provide a stepping stone towards better understanding of the role external players can have in helping NVR campaigns achieve their political goals and objectives both in the abstract and in a current, ongoing conflict in which the U.S. plays a key role. An examination of the potential implications for U.S. policy will follow in the conclusion.

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108 George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory*, 211.
109 Ibid., 212.
Chapter III: The Case of the South African NVR Campaign

This chapter analyzes the NVR campaign in South Africa, beginning with the Defiance Campaign in 1952, and which eventually was successful in bringing about the end of apartheid and culminated in the election of the first democratically-elected President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, in 1994. Before exploring each of the individual pillars, it is important to recall the dependent variable established by the NVR campaign. For the South African anti-apartheid movement (or AAM), the dependent variable was established very early on by the African National Congress (ANC) at Kliptown, where on June 26, 1955, over three thousand delegates representing a diverse cross-section of South Africans gathered to establish a vision of a South Africa that was diametrically opposed to the apartheid regime’s goal of a racist, white-dominated state. Their Freedom Charter preamble states that “We, the people of South Africa, declare for all our country and the world to know that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of the people.” Most importantly, this charter set forth a vision in which “every citizen had one vote, regardless of color, and where complete political equality existed regardless of race, color, or creed.”

This vision remained the unwavering goal of the ANC, which became the primary opposition to the apartheid regime, but also of other organizations and NVR movements both inside and outside of South Africa. Outside South Africa, organizations such as churches, institutions of higher education, and state and local governments saw the debate over apartheid

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as one in which they had both a stake and a role in effecting change largely due to the efforts of NVR activists outside of the country of South Africa. It is often true in the case of South Africa that changes in one pillar do not occur in isolation, and one example of the type of chain reaction that NVR activism can (and did) take place in this conflict would be the increase in the spread of NVR demonstrations on college campuses. This led to discomfort on the part of higher education boards of directors, which in turn led to a shift in the attitudes of institutional investors and therefore a weakening of the material strength of the apartheid regime through the withdrawal of companies who were previously doing business in South Africa, thus weakening the target regime’s pillar of material resources. For this reason it is best to trace the impact of NVR activism within each pillar internally and externally in order to determine whether or not there was any change in the individual strength of each pillar. Then we will look at the presence or absence of the dependent variable (achievement of the NVR movement’s goals and objectives) at each point in time in order to get an idea of which pillar proves to be more (or most) causal.

Pillar I: Authority

Authority, as stated in chapter two, is operationalized internally as the degree to which the country’s population (or areas over which the target regime claims to exercise authority) recognizes the regime’s legitimacy and externally as the extent to which other countries and international organizations recognize the target regime’s sovereignty and authority in international relations between states. A score of ‘1’ represents a regime that is viewed as the sole source of legitimate power in the country, or “full support,” while a score of ‘0’ represents regime collapse (no support). The analysis of the apartheid regime in Pretoria suggests that this
pillar remained at “partial support” internally and “high support” externally until both dropped in 1991 to “low support” in the final period of analysis (see Figure 2, below).

![Graph showing levels of internal and external support for South Africa’s pillar of authority.](image)

**Fig. 2.** Levels of internal and external support for South Africa’s pillar of authority.

Internally, the apartheid regime was always operating with rivalled authority. The ANC as an organization actually pre-dated the National Party and had fought for equality since its inception, representing vastly more South Africans than the apartheid regime. In terms of political representation, blacks in South Africa had but one voice for many years in Parliament, and that person was Helen Gavrasnky, a Jewish woman who became, in 1961, the sole member of the liberal opposition to National Party rule, a status she claimed for the next thirteen years.\(^{114}\) Even her die-hard opponents, such as the pro-Nationalist editor of *Die Burger* (a right-wing paper in South Africa), acknowledged that “for one person alone to state her party’s viewpoint on every major item of legislation is crippling work . . . and she is doing it well.”\(^{115}\) This fact underlines, however, the complete lack of legitimate political authority that the white apartheid government could claim to have over the vast majority of its population, with the ANC being viewed by many disenfranchised South Africans as a far more legitimate regime, meaning that

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\(^{114}\) Massie, *Loosing the Bonds*, 173.

\(^{115}\) Ibid., 173.
during the entire period of time under study the apartheid regime would never achieve an internal authority score under this pillar greater than partial support.

The primary reason for the downgrading of the apartheid regime’s score from partial to low support in the last time-series measurement is that the apartheid regime had become illegitimate in the eyes of many of those in the white population it claimed to represent as well as not being able to effectively govern, both of which are indicators that I have outlined in the methodology section as indicators representing the near-collapse of the target regime. The regime’s widespread use of torture, particularly against white anti-apartheid activists, began to produce internal backfiring within the white community. By 1982 this led to “a dramatic surge in the number of suspicious deaths in detention . . . and at least twenty-eight [suspicious deaths] . . . while under the care of [South African] police.”116 This produced a significant amount of backfiring against the apartheid regime both internally and externally as “more than ten thousand people of all races” showed up for the funeral of Dr. Neil Aggett, a “twenty-eight-year-old white medical doctor who served as the Transvaal regional secretary of the Food and Canning Workers Union,” who, “according to reliable accounts… [was] so severely tortured that he became mentally unhinged.”117

More tangible evidence of this decrease in authority can be found in the apartheid regime’s own recognition of its need to be more inclusive of coloureds (those of mixed race) and the large Indian population living in South Africa. This led President Botha’s President’s Council to put forth a new constitutional plan in 1982 which would do away with the all-white Senate and add a House of Representatives for Coloureds and a House of Delegates for Indians, with each racial group theoretically being able to handle its own affairs domestically, although

116 Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 502
117 Ibid., 502.
reserving foreign policy, defense, and sports for an interracial council in which whites had a “distinct majority.” This went into effect in 1984 after “prolonged debate” in the President’s Council and all-white Parliament, followed by a referendum where passage was secured overwhelmingly by a margin of two to one amongst the all-white voting populace. However, it would not prove lasting, and the 1980s saw a continual decline in the authority of the National Party’s rule as President Botha increasingly was seen by white South Africans as illegitimate, particularly with the rise of the televised debates between he and Desmond Tutu during Ted Koppel’s Nightline debates in 1985 and the subsequent state of emergency declaration in the same year. The latter half of 1985 proved fatal to Botha’s presidency, with internal opposition uniting against him within the religious community, the labor and business communities, and even in his own National Party. Like many other events in South African history, churches led the way, particularly after the so-called “Kairos Document,” a statement released by the South African Council of Churches which “provided theological reflection on such thorny questions as . . . illegitimate government.” Politically, hard-liners on the pro-apartheid side became increasingly upset at what they viewed as his “soft” approach against protestors, with one neo-Nazi member of the Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging party threatening that his own party would take matters into its own hands if “police failed to maintain law and order.” On the other side, the Afrikaner academic community published a document “decrying the government’s ‘inaccurate perceptions’ of South Africa’s problems” that they believed Botha’s infamous “Rubicon speech” had portrayed, in which Botha had declared South Africa government “had

119 Ibid., 225.
120 Massie, *Loosing the Bonds*, 599.
121 Ibid., 600.
122 Ibid., 600.
‘crossed the Rubicon of reform’ by accepting the permanence of Africans in the urban areas,” but that the “homelands [AKA Bantustans] would remain; a fourth chamber of parliament [for blacks] would not be ‘practical’; and Mandela would not be released unless he agreed to a set of restrictive conditions.”

In the business community, fear for the loss of profit was the ultimate impetus behind grocery store executive Raymond Ackerman’s decision to travel with a group of business leaders to meet with leaders of the still-illegal ANC in Zambia in order to “demonstrate to the business world that South African business did not agree with apartheid.”

Blacks were also beginning to flout the apartheid regime’s authority through the development of “alternative institutions,” such as the Organisation for Appropriate Social Services in South Africa (OASSA), which “effectively created a situation of dual power in South Africa.”

Many of these alternative power bases united as well, including the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which united all unions in South Africa, as well as the United Democratic Front (UDF), which united all anti-apartheid organizations under one umbrella organization, officially adopting the Freedom Charter as its guide. COSATU even adopted the political goals and objectives of the anti-apartheid movement, openly calling for divestment and disinvestment in spite of the recognition that its membership would suffer. Never before had so many internal forces arrayed against the apartheid regime been so united both in their goals and objectives.

All of this led to Botha’s 1986 address at the opening of Parliament which was in direct contradiction to his previously stated positions as he called for the “rescission of the pass laws, the elimination of whites-only immigration rules, and the release of all pass law violators” along

123 Ibid., 588.
124 Ibid., 600-601.
126 Pearlman, Palestinian National Movement, 197.
127 Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 598.
with the release of Mandela in exchange for the release of Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov and other South African soldiers being held by Angola. In 1989 Botha’s grip on power continued to wane. Realizing he had lost support of his own party, he announced that he would resign as leader of the National Party but remain in the office of state president. After the 1989 elections, which resulted in a fracturing of the National Party and a growth in the number of seats for the Conservative Party (the new official opposition party) and the more liberal Democratic Party’s addition of twelve seats, the new leader of the National Party, F. W. de Klerk, “interpreted the results as a general shift to the left” demonstrating “massive support for change [in the apartheid regime’s policies].” He immediately went about correcting what he viewed as the “excesses” of the Botha era by ordering police to stop using whips on protestors, granting legal permission for protests for the first time in decades, and releasing all of the remaining prisoners of the infamous Rivonia trial, with the notable exception of Nelson Mandela (although he met with him in person on December 13th). He also announced the end of the Separate Amenities Act, which was the primary tool by which the apartheid regime had enforced racial segregation since its inception in 1953.

While these were momentous changes, they had the effect of merely affirming the dramatic loss of internal authority that the apartheid regime had experienced, and by 1991, our final year of measurement, the apartheid regime had to deal with the (now legal) ANC’s competing claims to exercise legitimate rule within the country, a newly released and extremely politically active Nelson Mandela, and widespread recognition that the apartheid regime’s days were numbered. Towards the end of 1991, the need to recognize its own illigitimacy was

128 Thompson, A History of South Africa, 246.
129 Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 649.
130 Ibid., 657.
131 Ibid., 657.
confirmed by the apartheid regime when de Klerk signed the National Peace Accord with Mandela and Buthelezi, the leader of the KwaZulu “bantustan,” making apparent his need to negotiate with these competing sources of authority within South Africa, one of whom would take his over his office as President of a democratic South Africa in just three short years.\footnote{Thompson, \textit{A History of South Africa}, 251.}

In terms of external authority, the apartheid regime slowly lost international support as increasing numbers of governments around the world began to question their right to rule, dropping to low support in the final year under analysis. Perhaps the most potent contrast of this waning external recognition of the apartheid regime comes can be seen in the U.S. government’s complete reversal of course in their treatment of the anti-apartheid movement’s most visible symbol: Nelson Mandela. In 1962, under President Kennedy, “an undercover agent working for the American CIA, who knew where Mandela was having a secret dinner with his ANC colleagues and who provided the South African police with his itinerary for the following day” led to the arrest and imprisonment of Nelson Mandela.\footnote{Massie, \textit{Loosing the Bonds}, 94.} In marked contrast, on June 26\textsuperscript{th} of 1990, one year before our final year in the time period under investigation, “he became the first African and only the third private citizen in the history of the United States to speak before a joint session of Congress” after a formal greeting and reception at President Bush’s White House during which he felt confident enough of his position to rebuke a sitting President during a joint press conference.\footnote{Ibid., 669.} This event intentionally (and controversially) took place before President Bush formally received the newly elected President de Klerk, a clear example of the President’s recognition of the illigitimacy of the apartheid regime’s authority.
International loss of external recognition of the target regime’s authority was very incremental and varied widely over time, but there is a clear and observable trend that can be seen at multiple levels of analysis and across a diverse set of external players. At the beginning of the period under study, I have scored the external pillar of authority at “high support” due to the fact that external non-recognition of the apartheid regime was mostly limited to smaller countries, particularly “newly independent African nations.” At its early stages, the U.S. helped prop up the apartheid regime’s international legitimacy and recognition in spite of these criticisms, and the Kennedy administration (and others that followed) “opposed . . . the expulsion of South Africa or any other nation on the grounds that it would set a bad precedent and undermine the functioning of the international body.” The U.S. even weathered criticism from the U.S.S.R. over this stance, who accused them of ignoring human rights for the sake of the high return on U.S. investments in the country, which was by and large the case. At one point this even meant sending five Navy ships on a goodwill visit and allowing South Africa to enforce apartheid laws against American sailors during the sailors’ short time on shore.

In sharp contrast, African nations repeatedly called for the apartheid regime to be banned, but after losing the battle to remove South Africa from the U.N., they “surprised the West with [their] aggressive parliamentary tactics that led to the successful passage of limited sanctions . . . [and] the creation of the U.N. Special Committee on Apartheid to oversee implementation of the sanctions,” a clear sign of the apartheid regime’s precarious situation with regard to internationally recognized legitimate authority. U.S. support for the apartheid regime’s recognition lasted through the Reagan administration and only began to change under the Bush

135 Ibid., 149.
136 Ibid., 149.
137 Ibid., 134.
138 Ibid., 125.
administration. Reagan provided the most concise rationale for South Africa’s ability to maintain its external authority by maintaining its relationship with the most powerful nation in the world when he answered a question about South Africa within weeks of his inauguration by explaining (through a realist’s lens) that the country was one that “has stood by us in every war we have fought,” and which “strategically is essential to the free world in its production of minerals that we all must have.”

While international criticism was heaped upon South Africa from a variety of sources, official policy remained largely unchanged in the realm of official recognition (authority) under a series of presidents (with some notable exceptions during the Carter administration), even during Reagan’s era of “constructive engagement” policy change under Crocker in the 1980s. It is worth noting here that the belief that the ANC’s increasing number of Communists in leadership positions, coupled with the lack of any kind of domestic lobby until the late 1980s against the apartheid regime, allowed for the U.S. to rationalize this stance of supporting the apartheid regime in spite of its opposition to the regime’s racist and segregationist policies. Committees within Congress would at times pass legislation against the apartheid regime, but they would die on the floor. One Republican staff director for the Senate subcommittee on Africa explained that representatives felt no compulsion to support legislation due to lack of any “significant lobby” on the “South Africa question,” even going on to conclude that the “efforts of the activist community to influence the debate . . . ‘[was] nil.’” This lends support to the argument that the intangible factors, discussed below, perhaps played a very significant role in

139 Ibid., 486.
141 Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests,” 467-468.
142 Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 493.
143 Ibid., 498.
forcing the one nation upon whom South Africa’s apartheid regime relied to act as domestic opinion began to shift, which of course it did (albeit slowly) over time. While these steps represent an important shift towards the eventual score change from “high support” to “low support” under the pillar of external authority, it is still important to note that these calls for change were still aimed at attempting to change the apartheid regime’s behavior, not in recognizing the ANC’s authority.

The seismic change in domestic policy that began to come about as a result of domestic pressure became apparent when Reagan’s own Senate Republicans (Bob Dole and Charles Matthias) passed a bill through the Senate calling for sanctions within two years if apartheid “did not disappear,” which was followed up by a vote in the House of Representatives (against the urging of Secretary of State George Shultz) which passed 295 to 127. 144 U.S. policy slowly began its eventual move towards partial recognition of the apartheid regime’s authority by “abstaining on a French Security Council resolution calling for an end to the state of emergency” within South Africa (as opposed to its standard practice of vetoing such measures). 145 Noticeable changes in tone came from embattled President Reagan, who tried appointing black ambassador Terrence Todman as his delegate to South Africa in 1986 when it became clear that Congress had lost faith in his leadership over the South African issue, but Congress responded with the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, which it passed twice, the second time with a veto-proof majority. 146 While there may be debate about the sincerity of the measure on the part of some congressmen (given its exclusions of strategic minerals from the sanctions list), there is little doubt that the intended message was to signal Congress’ loss of their recognition of the authority

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144 Ibid., 583.
145 Ibid., 585.
of the apartheid regime in Pretoria. Consequently, President Bush’s White House visit from Mandela and his address to a joint session of Congress in 1990 must be understood as the loss of South Africa’s apartheid regime’s last great power defender by the time of our final time-series analysis date of 1991. At a minimum, it certainly signals the that the regime’s right to rule was not only challenged by an opposing internal source of authority, the ANC, who openly attacked the target regime’s legitimacy, but was viewed as illigitimate and/or unable to effectively govern by a key part of the pillar of that regime’s external source of authority, the U.S. It is also worth noting that the same political party remains in power to this day within South Africa, and its grip on power has varied little since South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994.

An examination of the apartheid regime’s internal and external authority shows a pillar of authority which was always on shaky ground, but which was bolstered by the support of great powers (most notably the United States), which helped prop up the target regime for three fourths of the period of time under study, after which this pillar was close to collapsing. In support of my hypothesis, this analysis demonstrates convincing evidence for the importance of external recognition of authority of target regimes (particularly from international great powers like the U.S.), making this pillar a likely contributor to regime collapse when targeted effectively by external NVR movements. Next, we will apply the same analysis to the second and third (combined) pillars of human resources and the skills and knowledge of those human resources.

Pillars II & III: Human Resources and Skills/Knowledge of Human Resources

This pillar examines the power of the human resources propping up the target regime as well as the skills and knowledge of those individuals and groups. A score of “full support” represents a situation in which the human resources and skills/knowledge of those groups and
individuals propping up the target regime are actively working towards the achievement of the goals and policies of the target regime (whether coerced or uncoerced) and/or are helping increase the skills and knowledge of those who are doing so. A score of “no support” represents a situation in which the human resources (and the skills and knowledge of those groups and individuals) are completely aligned against the goals and policies of the target regime. Scores in the middle of these two extremes represent varying levels of external support (or lack thereof) for the goals and policies of the target regime in question. The picture of internal and external support is surprisingly similar both within and outside of the country until the final period of analysis as outlined in Figure 3, below.

![Figure 3](image)

**Fig. 3.** Levels of internal and external support for South Africa’s pillars of human resources/skills and knowledge.

Zunes explains that the situation in South Africa was one in which the white minority population of 2.8 million (composing roughly 15% of the population) “depended upon the submission of the 80% non-white majority to reinforce its power sources,” a power dynamic that was solidified by the high levels of whites in the military, which by the early 1980s consisted of 180,000 men and over 300,000 more who could be mobilized “within a few hours”

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due to universal (white) male conscription.\textsuperscript{148} Additionally, all white men and women were required to learn marksmanship at an early age.\textsuperscript{149} By 1973, these forces were led by a new army chief, Magnus Malan, who had graduated from the American Command and General Staff College in Leavenworth, Kansas in 1963, “an elite military finishing school that had trained everyone from Dwight D. Eisenhower and George Patton to the leaders of countless Latin American coups.” Just ten years later he was in Israel visiting an “old friend,” Israeli General Yonah Efrat (whom he had befriended during his training in Kansas) in the wake of that country’s most recent war, the Yom Kippur War. It was there, Polakow-Suransky explains, “that Malan learned the counter-insurgency techniques that helped shape his handling of the conflict in Southern Africa.\textsuperscript{150}

In sharp contrast, South Africa’s black educational system was stripped from missionary organizations and re-designed (with the passage of the Bantu Education Bill in 1959) as a “strictly controlled curriculum more suitable to the requirements of a permanent underclass. . . . aimed at producing useful hands: there was to be no place for the black in the European community above the level of certain forms of labor.”\textsuperscript{151} Shortly afterwards, the Extension of University Education Bill banned blacks from multi-racial (but predominantly white) universities, which were the best ones.\textsuperscript{152} Even as late as 1986, as the government began changing some discriminatory policies, “school education remained strictly segregated, and in 1986 the

\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., 140.
\textsuperscript{149} Ibid., 140.
\textsuperscript{150} Sasha Polakow-Suransky, \textit{The Unspoken Alliance: Israel’s Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa}. (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010), 75.
\textsuperscript{151} Welsh, \textit{A History of South Africa}, 446-447.
\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 447.
government was still spending more than seven times as much to educate a white child as to educate an African child.”\textsuperscript{153}

Importantly, South Africa was also supported by nearly four million blacks who lived in white rural areas, “labouring primarily as farm hands, [who] were so utterly dependent on their white overlords and geographically separated, that there was little reason to think that they would engage in nonviolent [or violent] resistance.”\textsuperscript{154} For this reason, internal withdrawal of the human resources (and the skills and knowledge of those resources) from the apartheid regime could be most acutely felt through strikes and work stoppages. It is worth noting here that the Defiance Campaign of the 1950s had ended in failure due in large part to the existence of a small, violent, radical flank, which (at the instigation of \textit{agents provocateurs}) injected violence into otherwise peaceful protests, thus uniting whites against the black resistance movement.\textsuperscript{155}

The internal support for this pillar of power varied little from the beginning of our period of analysis until the 1980s. After the failure of the Defiance Campaign, the apartheid regime was able to effectively utilize coercive techniques (with the help of the Bureau of State Security, or “BOSS”\textsuperscript{156}) to keep work stoppages from seriously crippling the economy (with a few notable exceptions), so the pillar remains at a level of high support for the period of time up to the 1970s, after which there was a marked increase in resistance efforts seeking to withdraw human support (and the skills and knowledge of those individuals) from the target regime, which became even more pronounced in the 1980s.

By 1979 the government had already realized its increasing dependence on the black population and the danger of a higher number of strikes, which had become increasingly

\textsuperscript{153} Thompson, \textit{A History of South Africa}, 227.  
\textsuperscript{154} Zunes, \textit{The Role of Non-Violent Action}, 143.  
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 151.  
\textsuperscript{156} Massie, \textit{Loosing the Bonds}, 246.
commonplace since the Durban strikes of 1973.\textsuperscript{157} In a white paper in 1979 government officials admitted that “black labour represents by far the largest proportion of the total labour force . . . in the so-called ‘White area,’” and, perhaps more troubling to the apartheid regime, the paper “projected a far greater increase in the black population than for the whites.”\textsuperscript{158} The increasing number of strikes had a crippling effect on the South African economy, with a strike in August of 1989 “essentially shutting down commerce in Pretoria, Johnnesberg, Durban, and East London, and severely crippling industry in the Western Cape.”\textsuperscript{159} The primary reason for the drop in the score from partial support to low support from 1981 to 1991 is the dramatic increase in the number of strikes and work stoppages in South Africa during the 1980s. The year of 1984, for example, saw the “largest of its kind” general strike in South African history, with over 800,000 people staying home from work, which “terrified the government.”\textsuperscript{160} Similarly, in 1987, “over 20,000 railway workers struck for over two months, and 340,000 mineworkers struck the Chamber of Mines for three weeks . . . [and] over 3 million person-days were lost from labour disputes in South Africa” in 1989.\textsuperscript{161} The strikes are most visible in the International Labor Organization’s (ILO) “days not worked” statistic, which takes the total number of days that a country loses to work stoppages and strikes that it would otherwise have been carried out by each worker had there been no stoppage. Going back as far as the ILO tracks this statistic to the year after our period of analysis yields a dramatic increase in the final years of our analysis in the number of work days lost due to labor shortages, as Figure 4 demonstrates.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{157} Zunes, \textit{The Role of Non-Violent Action}, 150.
\item \textsuperscript{158} Ibid., 149.
\item \textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 156.
\item \textsuperscript{160} Ibid., 155.
\item \textsuperscript{161} Ibid., 155.
\end{itemize}
The picture that emerges, then, is one in which there was an acute withdrawal of human resources in the final period of time under analysis, the vast majority of which came from black South African laborers, particularly those working in the mining and manufacturing, which were South Africa’s most important industries.¹⁶²

Loyalty shifts within the white community were becoming more pronounced during this period of time as well. Perhaps most notably, the End Conscription Campaign (in which whites refused to serve in the S.A. military) experienced “dramatic growth” in the 1980s after its founding in 1983, particularly when “the regular armed forces moved into the black townships.” Zunes recounts that “as many as 1,000 new open resisters surfaced in 1989 alone, and thousands more evaded the draft in less public ways,” with an average of 4,000 men failing to enter the

service every year throughout the 1980s. Given the increasing reliance upon coercive techniques on the part of the apartheid regime in enforcing its other pillars of power, this was a pillar whose erosion was felt severely by the target regime, which is why the deputy defense minister at the time (falsely) accused it of collaboration with the ANC. In the end, this pillar has proven to be, perhaps, one of the most causal, both internally and externally, to the collapse of the target regime.

Pillar IV: Cohesion and Collective Purpose

The pillar of cohesion and collective purpose examines the degree to which intangible factors, such as psychological and moral support for the target regime, allow it to continue its policies unabated and the extent to which there is cohesion and collective purpose on the side of the target regime or its opponents. Most easily summarized as “opinion,” shifts in intangible factors can be viewed as the degree to which the attitudes and beliefs of those supporting the regime are in agreement or opposition, particularly in relation to its policy objectives. Again, we can fashion a time-series with two extremes. Having “full support” for this pillar would indicate a strong degree of cohesion and collective purpose on the side of the target regime, while “no support” represents a total opposition to the belief system underpinning the target regime’s policies. The picture that emerges is a steady loss of the external pillar of support for the cohesion and collective purpose behind the target regime and a sharp decline internally in the final years under analysis. Figure 5 illustrates this below.

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164 Massie, *Loosing the Bonds*, 599.
Externally speaking, many countries around the world were figuring out where they stood on their own racial issues for the entire period under study, so in 1961, South Africa was by no means a glaring outlier regarding the treatment of its black population. Massie captures the sentiment of many whites at the time who “drew from the still harrowing experience of the Congo and from deep psychic fears whites have always harbored about unleashed black rage.”\(^\text{165}\) President Kennedy’s own approach has been described as two-pronged, whereby the United States would oppose apartheid in principle, but continue normal relationships with the country. In terms of political opinion, Kennedy was able to ignore the inconsistencies of such a position owing to the lack of “an organized domestic constituency to reward him for courage or punish him for duplicity.”\(^\text{166}\) It is discomfort with this cognitive dissonance, however, which began to slowly change the minds of those within bureaucratic institutions from attitudes of tacit approval of the apartheid regime’s rationale for its policies of “separate development” as being necessary to maintain stability within South Africa, to outright calls for change as a result of activists’

\(^\text{165}\) Ibid., 127.
\(^\text{166}\) Ibid., 129.
NVR efforts. This situation is responsible for the steady reduction of this pillar’s score for each period under study, which is outlined below.

Internally, the picture is much more nuanced, particularly on the anti-apartheid side, as the degree to which Verwoerd (the first South African Prime Minster after South Africa’s “independence” from Great Britain and a sociology professor) had socially constructed an equally convincing and fallaciously misleading rationale for his policy of “separate development” of the races within the country were persistent and hard to reverse. On the white side, Thompson explains that:

the impact of the Nationlist regime on the mentality of Afrikaners was profound. Their language was unique, and most Afrikaners experienced little but the Nationalist world perspective from cradle to grave: at home, in Afrikaans-language schools and universities, in Dutch Reformed churches, in social groups, on radio and television, and in books and newspapers. In particular, their schools imbued them with a political mythology derived from a historiography that distorted the past for nationalist purpose. For example, it . . . associated God with the victory of the Afrikaner commando over the Zulu at the battle of Blood River on December 16, 1838.167

This mythology provided the apartheid regime with a very high degree of cohesion and collective purpose.

The fragmentation that existed on the black South African side is perhaps most apparent in what Massie refers to as “the enigma of Buthelezi,” the Zulu leader of the KwaZulu nation who had gained power through acquiescence to the apartheid regime and who continued to accept support for the government from the beginning of his leadership of the newly created KwaZulu Legislative Authority in 1972 throughout the period under study.168 In 1985, support for the apartheid regime’s logic of keeping the races separate came increasingly from black bantu leaders like Buthelezi, who decried the Congress of South African Trade Union’s support for

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disinvestment from South Africa (who knew it would harm their membership until apartheid was gone) and even formed his own opposing union through his Inkatha party (called the United Workers Union of South Africa) to oppose international sanctions against South Africa.\textsuperscript{169} His opposition allowed many outside South Africa to rightfully claim that many blacks within South Africa opposed economic sanctions on the grounds that they would lose jobs as companies left. Even in 1991, Massie points out, “it was revealed that Inkatha had received hundreds of thousands of dollars of government money to help organize antidivestment rallies,” and in direct opposition to the ANC’s vision of a united South Africa, Buthelezi continued to “exploit Zulu ethnic pride and fear with a fervor that would have pleased Verwoerd” in his attempt to maintain the power structure from which he had greatly benefited under many years as the recipient of the apartheid regime’s aid and conferral of power. His views became increasingly marginalized, but were the cause of much of violence between black communities within South Africa in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Internally, the anti-apartheid movement began to fragment after the failure of the Defiance Campaign to achieve its goals in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{170} The ANC struggled to maintain its vision of unity not only because of bantu leaders like Buthelezi, but also in its competition with other organizations like the Pan-African Congress (which took a much more militant stance in its non-acceptance of whites in a future South Africa) and particularly with student organizations. The Black Consciousness movement, which is attributed to medical student turned activist, Steve Biko, whose organization, the South African Students’ Organization (SASO) began as “an exclusively black body opposed to the non-racial National Union of South African Students.”\textsuperscript{171}

\textsuperscript{169} Ibid., 598.
\textsuperscript{170} Zunes, The Role of Non-Violent Action, 151.
\textsuperscript{171} Welsh, A History of South Africa, 475.
Biko “insisted on the absolute necessity for black South Africans to act for themselves, not relying on any support from white sympathizers who had proved ineffective allies, and to develop society on the basis of their own African traditions.”\(^{172}\) Biko and leaders of SASO were heavily influenced by black American thinkers, particularly Malcolm X, and as a result began to refer to all “nonwhites” as “blacks,” including Africans, Coloureds, and Asians who “were denied privileges on the basis of race under the pseudonym “Frank Talk” in his writings.\(^{173}\)

This pattern of disintegration and fracturing of the anti-apartheid movement (AAM) internally slowly reversed, and its strength was multiplied with the creation in the 1980s of the United Democratic Front (UDF), an umbrella organization that sought to bring together all AAM activists to oppose apartheid.\(^{174}\) Under the slogan of “The UDF Unites, Apartheid Divides,” the UDF was “a federation of regionally based fronts of affiliated groups,” whose “organizational structure made [it], in the words of its leaders, ‘more than the sum of its parts.’”\(^{175}\) Churches within South Africa, too, were reawakening to their moral obligation to speak authoritatively on the topic of apartheid. The greatest example of this came in the 1980s with the Harare Declaration, the result of a meeting between the South African Council of Churches and the ANC (organized by the World Council of Churches) where leaders “listened to a stirring oration by Desmond Tutu” and then spent the next three days discussing then approving the Harare Declaration. This document called upon the international community to “prevent the extension . . . or renewal of bank loans” to South Africa and “urged the application of

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\(^{175}\) Ibid., 196.
‘immediate and comprehensive sanctions [against South Africa].’”\textsuperscript{176} By 1991 the majority of the forces who had attacked the belief system underpinning the apartheid regime’s policies were experiencing a renewed sense of purpose and were largely united in opposition to apartheid on moral and philosophical grounds, even agreeing to a large extent in the justness of civil disobedience and importance of economic sanctions against South Africa in achieving their goals, no doubt pricking the consciences of those who continued to support the regime.

The shifting of white opinion within South Africa was also becoming increasingly apparent by 1989, when even those in the Afrikaner press began to openly ask whether a discussion about South Africa’s future with the leadership of the ANC and a free Nelson Mandela was “really so unthinkable,” and in an editorial in \textit{Beeld}, a leading pro-government newspaper columnist opined that the peace “dividends, both political and economic, such a discussion could deliver for our country and its whole population” were convincing reasons for the country to change course and talk with those whom the government had labeled “terrorists” for many years.\textsuperscript{177} By our final period of analysis in 1991, black and white support for the intangible pillars underpinning the apartheid regime were at their lowest points ever, but important minority groups on both sides continued to believe in them, hence the internal pillars of apartheid never dip below the level of low support for the period of time under study.

Outside South Africa, the level of cohesion and collective purpose propping up apartheid charted a much more straightforward trajectory. Early on, few external actors were both aware of or concerned about the policies of apartheid. Martin Luther King, Jr. was one of the few voices calling for action early on, linking the struggle for civil rights within the U.S. explicitly with the struggle blacks faced around the world and, specifically, within South Africa. He argued as early

\textsuperscript{176} Massie, \textit{Loosing the Bonds}, 599.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid., 649.
as 1965 that South Africa was not immune to international pressure, but there simply was not any pressure to speak of, claiming that “American ‘protest is so muted . . . that it merely disturbs the sensibilities of the segregationists, while our trade and investments substantially stimulate their economy to greater heights . . . [arguing that] to ‘list the extensive economic relations of the great powers with South Africa is to suggest a potent non-violent path . . . a massive international boycott.’”

Attitudes in the U.S., however, were continually shaped by that country’s own struggle with racial equality, even within the Democratic Party. Emblematic of the degree to which U.S. opinion was at odds with the rest of the world at this time, the winter of 1962/63 saw the International Court of Justice agree to hear charges brought by Ethiopia and Liberia against the system of apartheid within South West Africa, while later that spring U.S. Democratic Senator Allen J. Ellender traveled to Rhodesia and explained it was a “great mistake for the European colonialists to have given up control of their territories, because black Africans were completely incompetent,” a visit which nearly destroyed Kennedy’s African policy.

Typical of company attitudes during this time period, the spokesperson for GM admitted that he had “not given the racial situation any thought whatsoever, either in its short-term or its long-term planning.” It would take many years, however, before many began to recognize the link that MLK Jr. saw and, simultaneously, to trust black South Africans to lead the country effectively. In spite of the emergence in 1971 of three, new at the time, socially responsible investment funds, direct and indirect investment continued over the course of the next decade. By 1979, however, the divestment movement began to pick up steam internationally, particularly after Desmond Tutu (then the President of the South African Council of Churches) was asked in the

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178 Ibid., 193-194.
179 Ibid., 135.
180 Ibid., 169.
181 Ibid., 331.
same year while on a trip to Denmark whether he opposed foreign investment in South Africa in order to weaken the regime, to which he responded affirmatively and passionately that he did. Organizations like MassDivest and the Connecticut Anti-Apartheid Committee sprang up over the next decade to push through divestment measures at the state and local levels. Massie traces the pattern of divestment from South Africa on the part of churches, universities, private and public institutional investors from 1971 to 1987, with Stage 0 representing “no position” on South African investments (which equates to no support for any type of economic sanctions against the apartheid regime) to Stage 10, representing “no nonequity ties or foreign firms” doing business with South Africa (the strictest policy approach taken by any institutional investors at the time), which yields the following investment pattern, summarized here in Table 2:

Table 2. Table depicting the investment patterns of institutional investors. Reproduced from Massie.\(^{183}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Churches</th>
<th>Universities</th>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Public</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987 (final year of data)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The picture that emerges is one in which institutional investors increasingly came to understand both the importance of their moral and ethical responsibilities as investors as well as the degree to which South Africa’s apartheid regime was out of sync with those values.

This happened very slowly and incrementally, but the fact that most churches, universities, private and public institutional investors all came to support high levels of sanctions against the target regime represents a true shift in the opinions of the high-level decision makers in the U.S. as a result of the NVR movement’s external anti-apartheid measures. Numerous

\(^{182}\) Ibid., 512.

\(^{183}\) Source: Massie, *Loosing the Bonds*, 703.
examples of these efforts can be found throughout the period under study, including the emergence of organizations designed to put increasing pressure on these companies to fulfill MLK Jr.’s vision of a massive international boycott. It was churches, in fact, which began to pick up on MLK’s vision of international boycott, and one of the earliest groups advocating change was founded by an Ohio Methodist minister, George Houser, who became the first executive director of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), which was committed to using NVR to bring about racial justice. House later went on to start the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), designed to bring together anti-apartheid leaders all across the U.S. to “educate the American public about the importance of ending colonialism and white supremacy in Africa.”

Churches were some of the earliest advocates of the principles of ethical investing, particularly after the mainstream denominations of the National Council of Churches (composed of representatives from Methodist, Episcopal, Presbyterian and Lutheran churches) formed the Committee of Conscience against Apartheid in response to increasing demands from ministerial students to develop a moral and ethical investment policy towards South Africa. Much of the push came from U.S. activists led by Tim Smith’s organization, the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, which filed “a relentless stream of shareholder resolutions.” It is no accident, then, that churches were at the forefront of the divestment movement for the entire period under study.

Another early and notable leader who was, in many ways, ahead of his time, was Robert Kennedy, who delivered a speech in South Africa (later resulting in his permanent disinvitation

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184 Ibid., 191-192.
185 Ibid., 217.
186 Ibid., 431.
to the country)\textsuperscript{187} where he argued against support for the apartheid regime on the basis of their strategic importance as an anti-communist ally by explaining that “the way of opposition to communism is not to imitate its dictatorship but to enlarge individual human freedom – in our country and around the globe. . . . The denial of communism only strengthens the very communism it claims to oppose.”\textsuperscript{188} In time, others would come around to this position as well.

Institutional investment activists could be found in other settings as well, including the universities, non-profits, and in the public sector. The shift in thinking came also from elites, and the ethos, pathos, and logos of this alternative vision of corporate responsibility can be found in a book entitled \textit{The Ethical Investor}, which argued that “investment policies can reflect an institution’s mission and that the ownership implied by holding stock carries with it certain duties . . . [among those being] a moral and legal duty to scrutinize the actions of American companies in South Africa.”\textsuperscript{189} The strategy of the NVR activists was designed to force these highly bureaucratic organizations to take institutional positions, and by the time of our final period of study, no major institutions wanted to be perceived as propping up what the vast majority of their congregants, students, clients, or citizens perceived as an unjust regime. Some of the most notable efforts included the efforts of Leon Sullivan, the first black member of the General Motors Board of Directors, whose “Sullivan Principles” sought to pressure companies to put in place minimum standards for treatment of workers and equality in the workplace.\textsuperscript{190} Intersecting the public and nonprofit sector, the Ford Foundation became much more socially active during the 1960s and eventually began to set the precedent for using proxy voting on

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{187} Ibid., 203. \\
\textsuperscript{188} Ibid., 201. \\
\textsuperscript{189} Ibid., 430. \\
\textsuperscript{190} Klotz, "Norms Reconstituting Interests,"464.
\end{flushright}
issues over everything from tobacco and alcohol products to racial policy in South Africa.\textsuperscript{191} They also provided a grant to the South African Institute of Race Relations to help collect statistics on the effects of apartheid.\textsuperscript{192}

Student protests flourished throughout the 1970s and 1980s, with organizations like the South African Solidarity Committee at Harvard\textsuperscript{193} springing up on the frontlines to attack the bureaucracies for what the students perceived as moral complacency and profiteering off of what they believed to be an obvious injustice. Typical of this pattern of protest was the 1978 “twenty-seven-hour sit-in at Nassau Hall [at Princeton], the University’s chief administration building,” which led to punishment of the protestors, though they continued attacking the president, who, they discovered, “was moonlighting as one of the principal financial advisors to the Rockefeller fortune, whose holdings included more than $550 million – sixty three percent of the total – in companies invested in South Africa.”\textsuperscript{194} The students continued to protest and the leader of the student movement, Adhimu Chunga, testified before the U.N. Special Committee on apartheid, after which he was recognized by his peers with an annual award honoring those who had made the “greatest contribution to the life of the school,” which, Massie argues, “added to the impression that the time had come for nonprofit institutions to take new steps on South Africa.”\textsuperscript{195} Other nonprofits sprang up as well, such as the International Council for Equality of Opportunity Principles in 1978.

By the end of our period of study, even the most vocal external proponents of the apartheid regime were silenced by the leading moral authority figures on the opposing side. This

\textsuperscript{191} Massie, \textit{Loosing the Bonds}, 321.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid., 319.
\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., 438.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid., 433.
\textsuperscript{195} Ibid., 433.
was most visibly demonstrated when the right-wing head of the Moral Majority, Reverend Jerry Falwell, returned from a visit to South Africa promising to “throw the resources of the Moral Majority into opposing sanctions and divestment,” and claimed that he had “not met a single South African who favored sanctions,” even doubling down in his criticism of black South Africans who did favor sanctions by responding to a journalist’s question about Desmond Tutu that “if Bishop Tutu maintains that he speaks for the black people of South Africa, he is a phony.”

Emblematic of the degree to which even the fiercest apologists of the apartheid regime had failed to understand how far American opinion had turned against apartheid, Falwell issued an apology within three days after “an avalanche of criticism.” As a result, external intangible factors decreased dramatically from high support to no support during the period of time under study. Much of this debate obviously played a role in the level of support for other pillars, but this shifting of opinion is perhaps the greatest indicator and its effect on all of the other pillars is hard to overestimate. A critique from de Klerk, however, is particularly relevant to this discussion, who argued that sanctions (particularly those against the academic community) “did more harm than good” by cutting off “universities, students, artists, and scientists” at a time when they were “ripe to become proponents of change within our own society.”

His critique that these university boycotts strengthened the hand of apartheid hardliners who played up white resentment against the international community must be taken seriously, particularly given the extent to which loyalty shifts of populations supporting the target regime are more likely to lead to achievement of NVR goals and objectives. It is a

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196 Ibid., 589.
197 Ibid., 589.
198 de Klerk, The Last Trek, 71.
199 Ibid., 71.
critique well worth taking into consideration given similar complaints from Israeli academics who view the BDS (Boycott, Divest, and Sanction) movement as bigoted and anti-Semitic.

In the final analysis, Pearlman argues that this strengthening of cohesion on the side of the anti-apartheid movement both internally and externally had the effect of fragmenting those on the side of the apartheid regime as “exhausted by unrest and financial losses, more white citizens turned away from apartheid.”

Pillar V: Material Resources

Material resources are those non-human resources that enable a regime to function and survive, sustain itself, and carry out its policies. It includes economic strength, weapons, and other tools the regime has at its disposal which allow it to carry out its policies. Internally these material resources may be threatened by external economic sanctions or prohibitions against the target regime which make it difficult to secure the resources it needs for its survival. However, it is the relative level of material resources that the regime has at its disposal in order to maintain its position of power which matters. It is worth remembering that the degree to which material and monetary support flows into the country through investments, loans, weapons sales, and technological support also represent external material resources, and under this pillar, “full support” would represent a situation in which 100% of the control of material resources is in the hands of the target regime and its supporters, while “no support” would represent a situation in which 100% of the control of material resources is in the hands of its opponents internally. An analysis of South Africa’s material resources is depicted in Figure 6, below.

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200 Pearlman, Palestinian National Movement, 198.
Stephen Zunes paints a concise picture of the state of South Africa’s internal level of material resources during the period under study, explaining that:

In terms of military equipment, South Africa had an even greater advantage. The South African air force possessed over 875 aircraft, including over 500 combat aircraft and more than 200 helicopters; the army owned over 260 tanks, 1,300 armoured cars, over 110 armoured personnel carriers, and a large number of self-propelled medium and heavy artillery guns.201

In terms of external support for this pillar of the target regime’s power, Zunes explains that:

Until November 1977, when the mandatory United Nations embargo went into effect, South Africa was the recipient of highly sophisticated weaponry from Israel, France and other countries. The embargo did not significantly alter the strategic balance, since a large amount of outside arms were getting into the country anyway, and, more importantly, South Africa had by that time become almost self-sufficient militarily.202

This support came largely due to the effective argument that South Africa was on the “right” side of the Cold War and that, according to South African Ambassador Naude, the country “required the same help that the United States was giving to Israel, since it too was a ‘little nation which needed support for its survival.’”203 Internally, white South Africans were also highly armed,

201 Zunes, The Role of Non-Violent Action, 140.
202 Ibid., 141.
203 Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 149.
with the per capita number of guns “among the highest in the world.”\textsuperscript{204} It is important to note that the ANC recognized that the preponderance of material power lay on the side of the apartheid regime, which was the rationale for Mandela’s Umkhonto We Sizwe (violent) sabotage program, which was “designed to put material pressure on the government without killing people.”\textsuperscript{205}

Economically speaking, South Africa’s apartheid regime also possessed “some of the world’s richest mineral deposits, including one-third of the earth’s known gold reserves.”\textsuperscript{206} It was also the only African nation with “major iron and steel industries, advanced engineering facilities, and petrochemical plants,” all of which “were intrinsically linked to the military establishment.”\textsuperscript{207} In terms of external economic support, investment in South Africa during the Commonwealth period increased steadily, particularly from the U.S. after World War II, nearly tripling to $140 million in the five years after the war ended, then jumping to $475 million in direct U.S. investment by 1960, the year before our period under study.\textsuperscript{208} This direct investment increased to nearly $1 billion by 1969, with companies like Mobil, GM, and others building factories in South Africa at an increasingly high rate.\textsuperscript{209} This only expanded in the years leading up to the imposition of sanctions in the mid-1980s, eventually amounting to:

\begin{itemize}
  \item over $13 billion worth of annual trade between South Africa and the West, which combined with $30 billion in foreign investment, supplied the country with the vast majority of such basic commodities as transportation equipment, electrical equipment and machinery, nuclear technology, telecommunications facilities and services, computer technology, chemicals and related products, paper and manufactures, and other goods essential to the maintenance of South Africa as a modern industrialised state."
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{204} Zunes, \textit{The Role of Non-Violent Action}, 140.
\textsuperscript{205} Massie, \textit{Loosing the Bonds}, 165.
\textsuperscript{206} Zunes, \textit{The Role of Non-Violent Action}, 137.
\textsuperscript{207} Ibid., 143.
\textsuperscript{208} Massie, \textit{Loosing the Bonds}, 76-77.
\textsuperscript{209} Ibid., 169.
South Africa was also dominant regionally in a material sense. In the words of one
historian, their “economic leverage over the region was formidable.” Through the South African
Customs Union, they were able to integrate Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana into their
economy, while their railroads and ports “dominated commodity transport throughout the
region.”210 Their military dominance also allowed them to “restrain neighboring governments
from pursuing antiapartheid policies,” carrying out commando operations “against every one of
its neighbors,” occupying Namibia, and carrying on its civil war in Angola.211

In the last two decades under study, a dramatic shift in the regime’s pillar of material
resources occurred internally and externally. Within the country, boycotts and cessation of rent
payments had economically devastating effects.212 In 1973, for example, “150 firms were struck,”
and in the 1980s rent boycotts led to “an estimated 60% of the black population not paying rent,”
and by September of 1986, “forcing the government to negotiate” with local (black) township
authorities.213 In the same year, external pressure was being placed on South Africa’s economy
by “several major corporations [who] disinvested,” while “the U.S., Japan, Canada, and several
European countries enacted economic sanctions against the country,” which, when coupled with
“international bankers [refusal] to roll over new loans . . . led South Africa into the economic
crisis which forced many of the country’s elites to advocate change.”214 This period of time was
formative for the country’s future (and final) president during the apartheid regime, F.W. de
Klerk, whose ministerial career coincided with the height of the AAM’s efforts to withdraw

211 Ibid., 231-232.
212 Boycotts and rent boycotts are included under the material pillar of power
because they represent a withdrawal of material resources from the target regime and its
supporters, unlike strikes, which represent a withdrawal of human power.
213 Zunes, The Role of Non-Violent Action, 156.
214 Ibid., 160.
pillars internally and externally from the target regime during the 1980s. It is telling how he
downplays the impact of external sanctions designed to undercut the apartheid regime’s material
sources of power in his biography. In discussing the impact of these sanctions imposed
externally, he explains that, ironically, they often had the opposite intended impact because “for
the most part South Africa succeeded in circumventing sanctions, either through import
substitution or the adoption of sophisticated sanctions-busting strategies,” pointing to the arms
embargo as the impetus for South Africa’s armaments industry, the oil embargo leading to the
“most effective oil from coal industry,” and stockpiling which he claims would keep South
Africa afloat during a boycott for up to four years.²¹⁵ De Klerk also downplays the effect of
“disinvestment by foreign multinational companies,” arguing that, “more often than not,
[disinvestment] enabled white South African managers to buy out the local subsidiaries at
bargain prices.” These managers, who were “no longer constrained by American and European
employer codes of conduct . . . continued to produce exactly the same products, sometimes on a
more profitable basis,” which he argues is probably not what the AAM “had had in mind” when
advocating divestment.²¹⁶

Agreeing with de Klerk, economists Teoh, Welch, and Wazzan argue that the boycott of
South Africa’s apartheid regime “had no discernible effect on the valuation of banks and
corporations with South African operations or on the South African financial markets.”²¹⁷ Their
argument, however, fails to take into the broader macroeconomic considerations of the impact of
the movement on South Africa’s financial system. They explain that their article “attempts to

²¹⁵ de Klerk, The Last Trek, 70.
²¹⁶ Ibid., 70.
²¹⁷ Siew Hong Teoh, Ivo Welch, and Paul Wazzan. "The Effect of Socially Activist
quantify only the financial markets’ responses to the political pressure, not the ‘real’ macroeconomic responses,” which were considerable. As a result they fallaciously conclude that “evidence from both individual and legislative actions, taken together, suggests that the South African boycott had little valuation effect on the financial sector.”

Massie’s method of process-tracing the broader macroeconomic impact of activist investment policies is more convincing. He describes the tenuous position of the South African macroeconomy in 1985, which was dogged by high inflation, low exports and consumer spending, and a growing recessionary trend, all of which required increasingly higher loans (whose term lengths international lenders were slowly but steadily decreasing) until it had racked up “thirty-four billion rand in short-term obligations, making up 57% of its total foreign debt.”

Two weeks before the infamous “Rubicon speech,” a crisis emerged when Chase Manhattan (after pressure from New York City and activists to cut off South Africa’s loans) decided it “would not roll over its $500 million loan to South Africa, but instead ask for repayment,” leading to “global equivalent of a bank run” on the South African financial system as other banks did the same, causing the Rand to plummet to thirty-four cents to the dollar.

Concurring with his macroanalysis, Thompson explains that “the government’s problems were compounded by a deteriorating economic situation, engendered in large part by the political uncertainty and the withdrawal of foreign investment. . . . [as a result] inflation rose from 11 percent in 1983 . . . to 18.6 percent in 1986 . . . [while] real growth per capita declined in 1985 and 1986. . . . [while] unemployment was rising continuously.”

Unlike in 1982, when Reagan’s intervention at the IMF led them to continue loans to South Africa over U.N. objections, this time pressure brought

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218 Ibid., 83.
219 Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 591.
220 Ibid., 592.
221 Thompson, A History of South Africa, 234.
to bear on the central bankers themselves made them resist helping South Africa out of this most recent economic crisis. As the chairman of the South Africa Reserve Bank explained after an emergency meeting of South African creditors met and failed to reach an agreement to extend loans, “the banks can’t be seen as helping South Africa because it would be seen as propping up apartheid.”\textsuperscript{222} There is possibly no clearer admission of the extent to which South African leaders understood that their position in the international system depended on speeding up the degree to which they phased out apartheid. It is this crisis which led, in fact, to the change in leadership brought about by the financial crisis and ushered de Klerk into power within the Nationalist Party and, eventually, to occupy the office of president.

While the extent to which leaders felt pressure from external withdrawal of material resources is disputed, de Klerk readily admits the effectiveness of internal withdrawals of support, explaining that “the black share of personal income increased from 19.8% to over 37% between 1970 and 1995,” with black South Africans playing a “dominant role” in South Africa’s consumer market and informal markets.\textsuperscript{223} Not only were material resources being withdrawn from the target regime during this time, but by the end of the period under analysis, resources were flooding into the coffers of the apartheid regime’s most formidable opponent, the ANC, due largely to Mandela’s successful overseas diplomacy and fundraising trip in 1990. The trip included many fundraising events, including a $2,500-a-head cocktail party in Manhattan with celebrities like Robert De Niro and Eddie Murphy lining up to pay tribute to Mandela, efforts which brought in a total of $7 million U.S.D, “a huge amount when translated into rand.”\textsuperscript{224} This outflow of capital and investments and material resources from the target regime at the exact

\textsuperscript{222} Massie, \textit{Loosing the Bonds}, 595.
\textsuperscript{223} de Klerk, \textit{The Last Trek}, 73.
\textsuperscript{224} Massie, \textit{Loosing the Bonds}, 667-669.
time of an influx of capital into the regime’s primary opponents is the reason this pillar drops to the level of “low support” in the final measurement period.

Pillar VI: Coercion

The ability to enforce obedience (whether through law or through force) allows the regime to persuade or coerce its opponents into compliance with its policies. Externally, this is more difficult to outline, but the effects of external actors on the target regime’s ability to carry out coercive techniques is what must be observed here. Therefore “full support” under this pillar would represent a situation in which external actors (particularly great powers, like the United States) completely support the target regime’s ability to carry out sanctions against their NVR opponents and shield them from any limits on power within this domain. A score of “no support” would represent a situation in which the target regime’s ability to enact sanctions against NVR opponents is completely curtailed by internal and external actors, whether through the imposition of sanctions on the target regime (e.g. through U.N. Security Council Resolutions) or the withdrawal of the means necessary to carry out sanctions against its opponents (e.g. through the withdrawal of support or cooperation in helping the target regime target its opponents). Due to the decreasing willingness of the U.S. and other world powers to enable South Africa to exercise the use of sanctions against the NVR activists and the target regime’s dramatic reversal of using sanctions against its black population, this pillar represents one of the most dramatic changes during our period of study, going from full support to low support internally and from high support to no support externally, as demonstrated in Figure 7, below.
The use of coercive techniques against those who challenged the apartheid regime was one of the primary tools that the apartheid regime used with abandon for the duration of the period of time under study until the last five to six years (1985/86), when they began to slowly respond to internal and external pressure to treat their critics more humanely while simultaneously recognizing that coercion was untenable. For example, in 1984 alone, “officials arrested 238,894 Africans for pass law offenses.”

Accordingly, in that year the apartheid regime repealed “no fewer than thirty four legislative enactments that had constituted the pass laws.”

The breadth and scope of coercive techniques used by the apartheid regime over the course of its rule are myriad, although it is worth examining a few in depth to illustrate how they were able to enforce obedience for so long. It should be noted, too, that often exerting pressure against the other pillars of power of the apartheid regime included violating laws that the apartheid regime had put in place, such as boycotts, which materially impacted the wallets of those in the target regime while also breaking laws against such efforts.

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225 Thompson, A History of South Africa, 226.
226 Ibid., 226.
The apartheid regime had realized after the Defiance Campaign of the 1950s that coercion would be necessary in order to combat the threat of nonviolence against its position of power. Resultantly, after the 1950s the regime employed a wide array of factors explicitly and implicitly designed to ensure NVR tactics would fail in the future, including “arrests of certain leaders, harsh new penalties against civil disobedience,”227 and even anti-reporting provisions such as the Prisons Act, “which made it illegal to take photographs in a prison, of a prison, near a prison, or of a prisoner.”228 It should be noted that the press’ compliance with these laws internally made it much easier for the government to silence any potentially troublesome leaders who may have challenged these laws. Importantly, many in the opposition opted to flee the country rather than live under these laws, effectively bolstering the external level of knowledge about and opposition to the AAM outside of South Africa, particularly during the 1960s, as “scores of young white radicals, demoralized after a decade of fruitless battles, faced with the likelihood of imprisonment, left for England, Canada, and the United States to pursue new lives as doctors, lawyers, professors, and businesspeople,” leaving those who remained to face the regime’s “unfettered brutality” against the dwindling apartheid movement, resulting in an early loss of leverage against the target regime during the initial years under study.229

The most profound example of coercion, however, was the ever-evolving policy known as “separate development,” which was established through the Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959230 and solidified by the Bantu Homelands Acts of 1970.231 The leaders of these bantustans were always local chiefs, “selected [by the apartheid regime] for being reliably conservative and

227 Zunes, The Role of Non-Violent Action, 151.
228 Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 245.
229 Ibid., 169.
obedient to Pretoria’s instructions.” In 1972, the government used the homelands to further restrict the movement of blacks within South Africa through a provision known as “Section 10,” a law which stipulated that “no African could remain in a proclaimed [white] area for more than seventy-two hours unless he had fulfilled certain strict requirements, including lawful residence in the same area for fifteen years, service with the same employer for ten years, or special permission from the labor bureau . . . [having the effect of] giving [white employers] tremendous power over their African employees.” From very early on, acquiescent black leaders who were “prepared to cooperate could expect influential posts, substantial rewards and the possibility of developing their own power-base.” Gradually, however, the policy of separate development was undermined by increasing numbers of illegal squatter settlements of blacks, which Zunes classifies as not only an example of the “Third World phenomenon of rural poor desperately seeking work in the cities, but an act of civil disobedience against the one of the fundamental pillars of apartheid, [separate development].” By 1988, the number of illegal squatters were estimated to amount to over 7 million. The internal use of coercive techniques remained largely unchanged until backfiring against the regime became too great and, with new leadership under de Klerk, policies were relaxed, eventually resulting in the unbanning of the ANC and allowing protests. By 1988, the remaining pillars of apartheid, according to de Klerk, included “the continued classification of the population according to race; the lack of full black participation in political decision-making processes; and the maintenance of separate residential

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233 Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 394.
235 Zunes, The Role of Non-Violent Action, 149.
236 Ibid., 149.
areas, schools, and hospitals for the difference races.” All fell under the internal pillar of coercion.

Having recognized that continued use of these coercive techniques would be impossible, the freeing of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC in 1990 signaled the end of the apartheid regime’s willingness to use these laws to enforce their system of apartheid, and one of the target regime’s strongest and most durable pillars of power had finally collapsed by the final year of our analysis. It is clear that this was on the mind of de Klerk during his world tour, which he embarked on shortly after these events, as he explains that his goal was to report to the rest of the world that he “had found understanding for [South Africa’s] need to find a formula which would ensure a fully democratic system of government for all South Africans and would also protect all the various components of [their] society.” Notably, he recognized that his country was not yet there, and “emphasized that [he] had not ventured overseas with a begging list to get sanctions . . . lifted,” but rather to “request the international community to re-evaluate South Africa’s position in the light of the changed circumstances in [his] country.”

Externaly speaking, this pillar provides perhaps one of the most interesting examples of the power of NVR solidarity externally to effect change in the target regime. The U.S. developed a “two-pronged approach” in its dealings with South Africa under the Kennedy administration, which essentially meant “object[ing] to apartheid but [continuing] a normal relationship with the country,” which included supplying them with the material and military support necessary to “fight Communists,” but with the stipulation that weapons must not be used against

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238 de Klerk, The Last Trek, 111.
239 de Klerk, The Last Trek, 185.
240 Ibid., 185.
“nationalists.” As a result, the apartheid regime learned early on to attribute all domestic disturbances to Communist forces acting within the country, and as early as 1950 (with the Suppression of Communism Act) “conveniently described communism as any effort to bring about any political, industrial, social, or economic change . . . by the promotion of disturbances or disorder.” The U.S. did try to limit sales of weapons that could be used on South Africa’s domestic population, such as Johnson’s broad interpretation of Kennedy’s unilateral ban on weapons sales to South Africa to include “heavy-duty capital goods such as metalworking machines and precision drills” and “grey area items . . . like Cessna airplanes that could be converted to military use by the S.A. Defence Force (SADF),” but took “no official position” on American investment. South Africa was able to ensure their ability to use coercion with the help of great powers on the vague assurances that they only be used to “fight communism,” while the U.S. benefited from missile tracking stations within the country. South African officials also interpreted Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s secret suggestion to Ambassador Naude of a complete “redraw[ing] of boundaries [of Southern Africa] to create six or eight largely black states and two or three white ones . . . joined in a confederation whose central authority would care only about external defense” as a U.S. endorsement of and support for the idea of separate development, an idea to which “Naude happily agreed.”

Early efforts aimed at providing any teeth to measures designed to curtail this pillar of power within South Africa at the United Nations were dismissed, as evidenced by South African Foreign Minister Louw in 1962, who argued that the “restrictions would fail because more than

241 Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 128.
243 Massie, Loosing the Bonds, 196.
244 Ibid., 133.
245 Ibid., 152.
three-fifths of South Africa’s imports came from countries that had opposed the measure.\textsuperscript{246} Even during the beginning of the final years of analysis in the 1980s, the U.S. actively shielded South Africa from the need to curtail its use of coercive techniques, most notably during the Reagan administration’s intervention in 1982 in support of South Africa’s loan from the IMF for $1.1 billion, in spite of U.N. General Assembly opposition (121 to 3), which the IMF made two weeks after the vote.\textsuperscript{247}

One notable exception of early (and strategically successful) international dissent and withdrawal of support for the key apartheid feature of segregation of the races arose within the world of sports. In 1964, the Olympic Committee (IOC) refused to allow South Africa to compete due to Verwoerd’s refusal to allow blacks to compete, and due to increased activism in an effort led largely by Jackie Robinson, again pressured the IOC to do so in 1968.\textsuperscript{248} In a country where the white population deeply valued sports, this was no small matter, and protests like the ones experienced in the U.K. during a 1969 tour by the South African rugby team, the Springboks (which even included the Queen’s refusal to attend any matches) stung deeply. This led to an early victory when in 1970, white South African athletes “called for a national conference to discuss the future of sports and to ease the apartheid restrictions to combat South Africa’s growing isolation,” leading the government to consider “a range of concessions” and American columnist Anthony Lewis to note that “outside pressure, when consistently applied, worked.”\textsuperscript{249}

The primary reason for the decrease in this pillar’s external score from partial support to none during the final period of analysis was the ratcheting up of NVR activity and the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., 134.
\textsuperscript{247} Massie, \textit{Loosing the Bonds}, 497.
\textsuperscript{248} Ibid., 248.
\textsuperscript{249} Ibid., 249.
\end{flushright}
corresponding loss of support for those pillars externally. The best example of this came in 1984. In a strategically effective and highly visible external NVR campaign, activists in Washington D.C. began following the lead of high-profile activist and, at the time, head of the TransAfrica organization, Randall Robinson, by staging sit-ins at the South African Embassy in D.C. These protests were aimed at demonstrating solidarity with South African union and political leaders and were brilliantly simple. Channeling MLK Jr., Robinson went into the embassy with D.C. Representative Walter Fauntroy and U.S. Civil Rights Commission Member Mary Frances Berry on November 21, 1984, demanded the immediate release of over 100 United Democratic Front leaders held in South African prisons, and refused to leave until their demands were met.\(^{250}\) It made headlines when Fauntroy waived his congressional immunity and the others refused bail, all of them spending the night in jail and setting a pattern which would be followed over the course of the next year by “union leaders, college students, congressional representatives, musicians, professors, mayors, movie stars, and clergy,” and notables like Jimmy Carter’s daughter, Martin Luther King Jr.’s children, and Coretta Scott King, who “presented herself for arrest for the first time in her life” after years of staying home to watch her children during her husband’s years of activism.\(^ {251}\) This “Free South Africa Movement,” as it came to be known, eventually spread to other cities in which South Africa had an embassy presence, and thanks in large part to the “size of the demonstrations, the number of arrests, and the rapid diffusion to other cities it captured the attention of Congress and threw the Reagan administration on the defensive.”\(^{252}\) This produced a dramatic shift in tone from even the “most ardent conservatives” in the House, including Newt Gingrich, many of who signed onto a formal letter from over thirty

\(^{250}\) Ibid., 558-559.  
\(^{251}\) Ibid., 560.  
\(^{252}\) Ibid., 560.
U.S. Representatives just a little over a month after the protests had begun “cautioning [South African] Ambassador Fourie not to take their support for granted,” and threatening that if the regime continued to use the Reagan administration’s policy of constructive engagement “as an excuse for maintaining the unacceptable status quo” they would in turn “recommend the implementation of restrictions on investment and of other international and diplomatic and economic sanctions against South Africa.”

This event perhaps better than any other most visibly demonstrates the “extension of the South African NVR battlefield” into the heart of the country that could do the most to change the trajectory of the campaign’s future path, the U.S., and lends much support to my hypothesis.

Discussion of Findings

By compiling all of the data and merging the internal and external pillars, it is possible to construct a visual representation of the strength of each individual pillar of power over time to better visualize the degree to which the apartheid regime lost support over time by the final period of analysis in 1991, which can be found below in Figure 8.

\[253\] Ibid., 561.
What is revealed is that the target regime experienced significant losses in each pillar of power internally and externally, although by the end of the period of study coercion and cohesion/collective purpose were the lowest, followed by the pillars of authority and human resources/skills and knowledge, and followed finally by material resources, representing the greatest source of power at the end of our period of study. None of these were particularly strong, but it is clear that by 1991 the target regime was no longer willing to use sanctions against NVR activists, due in large part to its concern about world opinion and the desire to restore a favorable economic climate. In order to determine the degree to which external forces played a role in this phenomenon, we can look at the final year under analysis, which includes the period of time that experienced the most intense NVR activity as depicted below in Figure 9.
Fig. 9. South African internal/external pillars of power in 1991.

The picture that emerges in the final year of the time-series analysis is one in which the apartheid regime’s “roof” was collapsing under the weight of apartheid, which was becoming increasingly out-of-sync with individuals’ values within the country and had by this time become completely at odds with world opinion. By 1991 only a few key coercive laws remained, but there was broad recognition by those in positions of power on both sides that these would be shortly removed, and the unbanning of political parties by this time signalled that the remaining laws would soon be gone. Authority is perhaps one of the most important ways in which the apartheid regime still benefited from external support, although it was clear to de Klerk and others in the target regime that this would not last if dramatic changes did not come about very quickly, and signs that international actors were losing their patience with the regime could be found everywhere. Similarly, by this time many companies had divested and a resulting loss in the human resources propping up the regime and the skills and knowledge of those resources had been severely felt. Material resources, too, remained, but had been severely reduced.
In support of my hypothesis that the withdrawal of external support for the target regime increases the strategic success of an NVR campaign, it is clear that a loss of external support in all pillars was experienced by the apartheid regime. This had an impact on the regime’s eventual agreement to the constitutional reforms demanded by the AAM, which eventually led to Nelson Mandela’s presidency after South Africa’s first truly democratic election. Additionally, what is perhaps most telling is the sustained effort with which NVR activists put into challenging one of the target regime’s biggest supporters, the U.S., through a solidarity campaign designed to highlight both the injustices of the target regime and U.S. complicity in providing cover to this regime, literally “extending the battlefield” through a massive sit-in campaign in which scores of high-profile figures were arrested in the nation’s capital. While strategically targeted, it also represents the degree to which external intangible factors had changed dramatically since the 1960s, when JFK (and, to a lesser degree, his successors) could ignore their hypocritical approach towards South Africa due to the lack of any domestic pressure. By the mid 1980s, that pressure had arrived, and politicians of all stripes took note and chose sides, the vast majority of whom eventually ended up opposing the apartheid regime. In a telling interview that highlights the extent of this shift in public opinion and the ways in which these variables interact, Robert Walker, a Republican from Pennsylvania and drafter of the threatening letter to Ambassador Fourie in 1984, explained his reasoning as follows:

We were disturbed to see all conservatives lumped together as supporters of, or at least acquiescing to, apartheid. We decided to take steps to break this stereotype by taking a public step to show our disapproval. . . . This, we felt, would send a signal to the South African government that it cannot count on all conservatives to ‘look the other way.’ We hoped this move would change the tenor of the debate not only in this country, but in South Africa as well.254

With some translation, this explanation can easily be seen as an explanation of the interaction of variables that were perhaps most causal in bringing about change within South Africa. As Klotz rightly points out, new norms of racial equality were changing the debate here in the United States, but these new norms represent a shift in the cohesion and collective purpose of the anti-apartheid movement and its effects on individuals within the U.S. This withdrawal of support from the cohesion pillar of power led this group of Senators to publicly threaten to withdraw material support from South Africa if certain laws were not changed (i.e. those which kept apartheid in place), thus fragmenting the external pillar of support for the apartheid regime (at the time primarily consisting of the Republican Congress and President). This shift in opinion is perhaps most causal, as without it no massive and sustained action would have taken place to undercut any of the other external pillars of power which had allowed the apartheid regime to ignore calls for decades to change course and allow full representation. Further analysis in chapter five will compare this case with the case of Palestinian resistance to more fully understand the interplay of this pillar of power on the other pillars.

It is worthwhile to pause here and discuss one notable explanation of why U.S. policy changed so dramatically during the period of study, which is the role of international norms in reconstituting states’ interests. Klotz’ attributes this dramatic change in U.S. policy to the “global norm of racial equality in reconstituting U.S. interests.” Klotz is right to call for an examination of “the underemphasized constitutive role” of norms and the “global process of state interest formation,” and she gives the anti-apartheid movement its much-deserved praise for bringing this about. Her theory is incomplete, however, without this broader understanding of the non-unitary nature of power, which realism also places into the “black box” of decision-making.

and ignores. What is further ignored is that U.N. Resolution 3379 explicitly linked Zionism and apartheid together as racist policies,\textsuperscript{256} suggesting that “global norms” in and of themselves are not enough to reconstitute the interests of Great Powers like the U.S.

Having thoroughly examined the case of South African resistance, we turn now to an examination of the case of Palestinian NVR and an examination of the strength of the pillars of the Israeli government during our period under analysis in chapter four.

Chapter IV: The Case of the Palestinian NVR Campaign

We turn now to our second case, which is that of Palestinian NVR against the target regime of the State of Israel. While the nonviolent resistance (NVR) campaign only took place in the final period of analysis in a meaningful, sustained effort, for comparative purposes I will be analyzing the strength of all of the pillars for the same time period of time as I did for South Africa in order to provide a better understanding of the trajectory of Israel’s pillars of power under this period of time in the absence of an NVR campaign against it. There is another reason I am examining the entire period, which is that the concept of nonviolence has been utilized throughout the history of the conflict by Palestinians to varying degrees. A notable early example of NVR can be found in the 1936 general strike organized by the Higher Arab Committee under the British Mandatory period, calling for an end to Jewish immigration, land sales, and the establishment of an Arab government.\(^\text{257}\) While more difficult to observe and analyze, the Palestinian concept of \textit{sumoud}, translated as “perseverance or steadfastness,” is another concept that Broning calls “uniquely Palestinian,” and which is characterized as “continuation of daily life even in the face of military occupation and oppression.”\(^\text{258}\) In terms of observation, however, \textit{sumoud} is difficult to distinguish from mere pacifism, and hence for the purposes of analysis we will only attribute the dependent variable results of the NVR efforts of the First Intifada, which began in December of 1987 and ended in 1990.\(^\text{259}\)

In analyzing the strength of these pillars over time, the Palestinian disadvantage is most concisely summarized by the observation that “the Zionist movement had greater human, material, political, and international resources than those available to Palestine’s indigenous

\(^{257}\) Broning, \textit{The Politics of Change}, 134.  
\(^{258}\) Ibid., 135.  
\(^{259}\) Chenoweth and Stephan, \textit{Why Civil Resistance Works}, 119.
Arab population” from the outset. As I will demonstrate, this dynamic remained largely true for the entire period under observation.260

Pillar I: Authority

To revisit this concept briefly, authority is operationalized internally as the degree to which the country’s population (or areas over which the target regime claims to exercise authority) recognizes the regime’s legitimacy and, externally, as the extent to which other countries and international organizations recognize the target regime’s sovereignty and authority in international relations between states. In the analysis that follows, we will see that this first pillar’s trajectory took a clear downward path, going from the level of “high support” to “low support” in the final year under analysis. The trend is more U-shaped externally, and as Israel began to gain international legitimacy it went up to a level of “high support” during the middle of our study, but dropped down to partial support during the final year of analysis as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) emerged as a contender for legitimate authority within the occupied territories. The picture that emerges can be seen in Figure 10, below.

Fig. 10. Levels of internal and external support for Israeli pillar of authority.

The first pillar of authority largely mirrors South Africa’s, given Israel’s internally divided population of Jews and Arabs, roughly half of whom despised the target regime and consisted of many individuals and groups who did not recognize its legitimacy. Similarly, Israel had many neighbors who had gone to war to prevent its establishment in 1948, clearly demonstrating the degree to which it was viewed as illegitimate by surrounding Arab nations. Indeed, even after the truce that was reached in 1949, Smith explains that, “in principle, a state of war still existed; only a cessation of hostilities had been achieved.”\(^{261}\) Despite non-recognition and outright hostility, however, Israel’s establishment had been secured through a U.N. Resolution and on November 29, 1947, “the General Assembly voted thirty-three to thirteen, with ten abstentions, to approve partition; the Soviets surprised many by backing the Zionist cause. The right of Jews to an independent state in part of Palestine had been recognized by the international community, giving legitimacy to Jewish claims for self-rule.”\(^{262}\) Similarly, Israel had “inherited the proto-state institutions that had been developing since the start of the Mandate” after the British withdrew from Palestine, and as a result, “Martin Van Creveld writes, ‘Man for man, the Jews were better armed, better led, and something that proved decisive, possessed countrywide organization, both political and military.’”\(^{263}\)

The biggest difference between Palestinian resistance and South African opposition was organization. Until the formation of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 1960s, the Palestinians utterly lacked anything resembling the ANC, which was able to rival Israeli claims to legitimacy. In terms of opposition, the Palestinian authority had been dismantled successfully by the start of World War II. One observer has noted that “Palestinians entered

\(^{261}\) Charles Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Sixth Edition.* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2007), 207.  
\(^{262}\) Smith, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 198.  
World War II in effect headless – without even the semblance of a unified leadership. . . . The crippling defeat they had suffered in 1936-39 was among the main reasons they failed to overcome [the dissolution of Arab Palestine].”

In fact, 1928 was the last time that the Palestinian Arab Congress had convened.

In marked contrast to the South African regime, the Israelis gained international legitimacy throughout the entire period under analysis until the final period, during which it decreased only slightly. Under President Eisenhower, the United States had attempted to balance U.S. interests in the region by maintaining a strategic alliance with Israel, but with an eye towards courting the Arab world as well, becoming one of the last U.S. Presidents during our period of analysis to engage in a “public scorning” of Israel, telling them in a live TV address to withdraw from Sinai and Gaza in 1957, which they did.

His most notable attempt at resolving the conflict sought to strike this balance and achieve a settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem that was created by the displacement of Palestinians after the 1948 War (which by 1956 exceeded a half million) through Project Alpha, which would have attempted to fix the borders of the region and finance the resettlement of the Palestinian population, but it did not succeed.

After Eisenhower, however, U.S. Presidents viewed Israel much more favorably and through a lens that involved a significantly higher degree of domestic political calculus (whether out of choice or through perceived political pressures), beginning with the election of President John F. Kennedy, who “was the first to talk of a ‘special relationship’ with Israel.”

This special relationship endured throughout multiple presidencies, and in the last decade under analysis the

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267 Ibid., 246.

U.S. and Israel cemented ties through a number of ways, with Congress declaring Israel a “major non-NATO ally” in 1986.\textsuperscript{269}

Increasing recognition from former enemies of the state of Israel, notably from Egypt, is another reason for its increasing gains in its external strength under the pillar of authority. In an insightful analysis of the Khartoum Conference and subsequent resolution, Meital argues that, contrary to the beliefs that positions were hardened at Khartoum, the resolution which came from this meeting of Arab countries actually represented a shift in thinking from one of intransigence against the idea of an Israeli state to one of acceptance and realization that “obtaining Israeli withdrawal from all the Arabs (sic) lands conquered in June 1967, with a readiness to employ political means to achieve this goal” was the prevailing undercurrent of the conference.\textsuperscript{270}

Notably, “although lip service was paid to Palestinian rights, Palestinian leaders were not invited to the meeting, nor were their concerns high on the agenda.”\textsuperscript{271}

Palestinian resurgence after the 1967 War was hard-fought, and while the PLO was admitted to the United Nations General Assembly as an observer in 1974\textsuperscript{272}, the Palestinian people received little else in the way of international recognition or substantive representation until 1991, hence the Israeli pillar of external authority remains relatively high until 1991, the final year under analysis, when it drops to the level of partial support. Another reason for the relative strength of the Israeli pillar during this time is that for the entire life of the PLO, its ability to speak on behalf of the entire Palestinian population was curtailed by its fractious nature. Smith explains that one of the reasons that Arafat was unable to openly court Kissinger during

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Ibid., 79.}
\footnote{Smith, \textit{The Arab-Israeli Conflict}, 333.}
\end{footnotes}
his shuttle diplomacy in the 1970s was that, “despite his influence, he still had to take into account the attitudes of various factions; to splinter the organization over such a debate could cause him and the PLO to lose credibility as representatives of the Palestinian cause.”

Palestinians had managed a small coup in terms of international recognition; however, in the 1980s two members of Fatah were publicly invited by Margaret Thatcher to London in a move that was a “calculated gesture designed to distance Britain from both the U.S. and Israel.” Still, inviting two members of a political organization that was part of a fledgling Palestinian assembly was hardly a declaration of Israel’s unfitness to rule. However, one of the primary goals that were achieved by the Palestinians was Palestinian inclusion at the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, with delegates selected by residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip who “made it clear that they looked to PLO headquarters in Tunis for their instructions.”

The Israeli external pillar of authority remained relatively strong until the PLO declared Palestinian independence in 1988 and Jordan relinquished its claims to the West Bank, leaving Israel as the sole occupier with over fifty countries recognizing Palestine as a sovereign country within three weeks of their declaration. This meant that Israel now had a competing source of authority within the Occupied Territories with which it had to deal that was recognized by a significant minority of other countries as legitimate.

Internally, while Israel was always viewed by Palestinians as illegitimate, this pillar faced its most serious challenge during the final years under analysis as the Intifada saw an explosion of committees in the Occupied Territories as “the neighborhood became the basic unit of social

\[273\] Ibid., 335.
\[274\] Ibid., 409-410.
\[275\] Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 152.
and political organization.”

These organizations gained legitimacy “nearly immediately,” as representatives of the DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine], Fateh, the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine], and the Communist Party formed the United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU).” These committees formed alternative institutions to decrease their dependence on the State of Israel, including “organizing banking, mail, and other services.” This marks the lowest point of Israeli claims to authority as lack of recognition by the Palestinians resulted in alternative institutions within areas under Israeli control that actively competed with its claims of legitimacy, represented here by a score of “low support.”

The final analysis paints a picture of consistently decreasing levels of internal support and recognition of Israeli authority, with the lowest point occurring during the final period of analysis. We can see a clear downward trend of decreasing Israeli internal authority and a U-shaped curve of Israeli authority externally, suggesting that while Israel’s attempts at bolstering their international credibility were highly effective, so was the Palestinian resistance during the Intifada. As Chenoweth and Stephan have noted, “the intifada shifted the battlefield to Israel’s doorstep and shattered the popular myth that Israel could annex the West Bank and Gaza Strip without significant resistance.”

This establishment of an alternative authority (aptly named the “Palestinian Authority”) within the Occupied Territories is perhaps the single greatest change in the conflict during the period of time under study, as the Palestinian rejectionist camp took a back seat to those seeking to establish a state alongside and in peaceful coexistence with Israel. Despite numerous rejectionist critics and problems of corruption, “Palestinians have been

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278 Ibid., 103.
engaged in institution-building within the framework of the Oslo Accords” since 1994, a lasting testament to the power of the NVR campaign that Palestinians undertook. Still, the Palestinians were unable to achieve anything on par with the warm reception granted to Nelson Mandela in the same year, and their official exclusion from the Madrid conference provides a stark contrast with the Israeli maintenance of external recognition of legitimate authority.

With the pillar of authority thoroughly examined, we turn now to the next two pillars, Human Resources and the Skills and Knowledge of those supporters.

**Pillars II & III: Human Resources and Skills/Knowledge of Human Resources**

This merged pillar examines the power of the human resources propping up the target regime as well as the skills and knowledge of those individuals and groups. A score of “full support” represents a situation in which the human resources and skills/knowledge of those groups and individuals propping up the target regime are actively working towards the achievement of the goals and policies of the target regime (whether coerced or uncoerced) and/or are helping increase the skills and knowledge of those who are doing so, while a score of “no support” represents a situation in which the human resources (and the skills and knowledge of those groups and individuals) are completely aligned against the goals and policies of the target regime. Scores in the middle of these two extremes represent varying levels of external support (or lack thereof) for the goals and policies of the target regime in question. The levels of support internally and externally are outlined below in Figure 11.

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During our period of study, the Israelis were by far the greater recipient of external exchanges of human resources and skills, particularly from the United States and especially in the areas of scientific and business cooperation. Sharp recounts that “in the early 1970s, Israeli academics and businessmen began looking for ways to expand investment in Israel’s high technology sector,” resulting in the founding of the U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation in 1972, the Israel-U.S. Binational Research & Development Foundation in 1977, and the Binational Agriculture and Research Development fund in 1978, all of which sought to strengthen U.S.-Israeli ties and which received U.S. Congressional funding.\(^{281}\)

In marked contrast and from early on in the conflict, the Palestinians were at a distinct disadvantage economically, forcing many Palestinians into situations similar to that of black South Africans, and “by 1930 nearly 30 percent of Arab peasants were landless and another third had plots too small for subsistence. Tens of thousands of indebted farmers were forced to leave the fields that they had worked for generations . . . [and having moved] to shanties on the

outskirts of Palestine’s budding towns, they worked as cheap laborers.” 282 This situation of Palestinian dependence upon access to Israeli markets remained true for the entire period under analysis. Smith explains that upon the beginning of the First Intifada, Palestinians were in a state of “total dependence on employment in Israel,” despite “early warnings by Israeli and other experts that ‘Palestinian anger is stoked by poverty’” and arguments “by Israeli economists that ‘for growth the Palestinians must have open borders with Israel . . . [because] if you separate them [the two economies], one of them will die and it is obvious that that one will be the Palestinian economy.’” 283 In terms of Israel’s internal pillar of human power and skills and knowledge, then, Palestinians not only helped prop up the Israeli regime, but were unable to effectively withdraw support due to their dependence upon the target regime for key provision of services and economic growth. One noteworthy example comes from the height of NVR activities during the First Intifada, whereby male Gazans had been forbidden from entering Israel without a magnetized identity card, which could only be obtained through “demonstrating a flawless security and tax record,” which Intifada leaders in Gaza forbade. However, “after several weeks, the UNLU recognized that blocking work in Israel was creating excessive hardship. It thereupon returned the cards and ceased to mention the issue.” 284 The Israelis could argue with a straight face that, in “twenty years of occupation . . . income and consumption levels had improved enormously in the West Bank and Gaza since 1967; a 1987 government report claimed that the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Judea and Samaria [the West Bank] had risen 400 percent, and the GDP of Gaza 430 percent, in this time.” 285

The second prong of this two-pronged pillar measures the skills and knowledge of those either supporting or working against the target regime, and here we do find areas in which Palestinians were able to effectively target the regime, albeit in a limited way and particularly during the 1970s, the “establishment of Palestinian universities . . . brought young people from different backgrounds together in an activist student movement.”286 This development bore fruit in the years to come in the First Intifada as “a new and distinctive Palestinian leadership – university educated, nationalistic, and more democratic minded than the older generation – shifted the locus of power.”287 At the same time, organizations on both sides of the Green Line rose up to combat the target regime’s policies in relation to the Palestinian struggle. Perhaps most notable among them was the Birzeit Solidarity Committee (BSC), “a group formed in 1981 to protest Israel’s closure of Birzeit University in the West Bank,” which was “the first Israeli peace group to physically move its activities to the occupied territories.”288 Chenoweth and Stephan recount that, “by mid-February 1988 there were more than thirty different organizations active in Israel to protest Israel’s violent repression of the uprising,” including Peace Now, which “mobilized thousands of Israelis for rallies demanding a negotiated settlement to the Israeli-Arab conflict.”289 This highly educated group of leaders were the ones responsible for the highly-organized nature of the First Intifada, which issued communiqus, known as Bayans, that called on different social sectors to contribute in defined ways [to the NVR campaign]. For example, Bayan no. 3 encouraged academics to write poems, songs, and slogans; Bayan no. 27 urged lawyers to organize press conferences; Bayan no. 36 appealed to accountants to refrain from preparing tax reports; and bayan no. 48 asked students to do their patriotic duty by behaving responsibly during exams.290

288 Ibid., 130.
289 Ibid., 130.
Finally, within Israel there were loyalty shifts, although they were relatively small and did not impede the government from carrying out its policies. Most notable was the civil disobedience of 500 reservists who signed a petition expressing their refusal to serve in the occupied territories in June of 1988. In the end, though, one of the reasons for failure that Chenoweth and Stephan point to is the failure of the Intifada to “extend the nonviolent battlefield” within Israel or other key countries, particularly the United States, even Palestinians within Israel. Mubarak Awad, a leading Palestinian NVR proponent, explained that “the PLO could have encouraged Palestinian citizens of Israel to launch a nonviolent movement for equal citizen rights inside Israel in order to support the Palestinian struggle for self-determination inside the occupied territories,” a fact with which former Knesset member and Palestinian, Azmi Bishara, agrees, explaining that “there was no strategic cooperation between the UNLU and leaders of the Arab-Israeli community.”

Most notably, the Palestinians had no significant organizations to lobby on their behalf externally. While news reports of the Intifada gained some media attention, the Palestinians were unable to capitalize on the media outcry against perceived Israeli brutality because they had never established any significant external presence in key countries, particularly the United States. The lobbying organization American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is perhaps the best example of an effective lobbying organization. It was founded in 1951 “to appeal directly to Congress for support,” and “from 1978-2000 . . . . Israeli Political Action Committees (PACS) outspent Arab/Muslim PACS 99 to 1 in Congressional contributions.” This key difference between Palestinians and black South Africans of having sympathetic individuals and

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292 Ibid., 143-144.
organizations outside the zone of conflict working on their behalf is a key difference between the two cases that will be further explored in the final chapter in order to understand how the extension of the NVR battlefield enabled the NVR movement within South Africa to secure victory while the Palestinians had to content themselves with only partial recognition.

Pillar IV: Cohesion & Collective Purpose

The fourth pillar measures the extent to which the target regime’s supporters within and outside of the zone of conflict are unified by a collective purpose. Full support under this pillar represents a situation in which the psychological and ideological beliefs underpinning the target regime’s authority are completely in harmony, while no support represents a situation in which the target regime’s legitimacy is completely bankrupt and there is (nearly) complete condemnation for the ideas it represents. Below, Figure 12 depicts the levels of support for the target regime during the period of study.

![Fig. 12. Levels of internal and external support for Israel’s pillar of cohesion/collective purpose.](image)

The internal level of support for this pillar remains at the level of “partial support” for the entire period under study until the final year due to the fact that both sides held strong beliefs about the opponent that only began to shift as a result of the NVR campaign. Externally speaking,
the preponderance of cohesion and unity in support of the target regime was relatively strong and on the Israeli side until the final years as well, and the drop from “high support” to “partial support” is directly attributable to the Palestinian NVR campaign as well. We will now turn to an explanation of the rationale behind these scores.

Internally speaking, the battle lines were clearly drawn early on in the conflict. Pearlman recounts how the *Nakba* (the Palestinian term for the Israeli Declaration of Independence, which is translated as “the catastrophe”) provided the Palestinians with united feelings of “historical injustice, exile, and alienation [which] became the basis for a renewed sense of collective purpose,” which “increasingly transcended the religious, class, and clan cleavages that had been destructive in prior eras.”294 On the Israeli side, Bar-Tal argues that the psychological factor of fear has been the driving force since the founding of the country, explaining that “a collective fear orientation cuts deeply into the fabric of society members and becomes linked with a societal ethos of conflict.”295 He goes on to explain that, for societies locked in intractable conflicts, fear leads to a phenomenon whereby a society tends to “stick to its beliefs about the causes of threats, about the conflict, about the adversary, and about ways of coping with the dangers.” This was certainly true for Israel, and after the 1967 War, Dowty explains that what the capturing of the West Bank and Gaza Strip accomplished was to “salvage from oblivion the twin ghosts of Jewish maximalism and Palestinian particularism,” meaning, respectively, the desire to enlarge the Jewish presence in the former land of ancient Israel and the idea of

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Palestinians being a distinct population rather than merely Arabs who happened to live in Palestine.296

On the Israeli side, the positions of the “doves” generally was to use the West Bank and Gaza Strip as bargaining chips to secure peace. The doves were slowly but surely being supplanted, however, by the hawks who wished to retain what they saw as the ancient lands of Judea and Samaria. The man who provided the “intellectual underpinnings” for this view was Rabbi Avraham Kook, one of the Chief Rabbis in Palestine, who breathed new life into Jewish maximalism as “a religious vision thus became a radical political program to carry out the sacred task of reclaiming Judea and Samaria by intensive Jewish settlement in all areas of the historic homeland.”297 This created a shift in policies on the part of the Israeli government, and this can be found in the Galili Document, which articulated the Labor Government’s plans for the occupied territories, which would be settled by Russian immigrants. By articulating plans for occupied territory that had been declared off limits by United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, the Labor Government “effectively nullified its previous declarations regarding Resolution 242 and the territories it would be willing to return in exchange for peace.”298 In this way, what had been a political calculation on the part of Golda Meir designed to keep her government from collapsing became a decision that would unify Palestinian opposition and was seen by Palestinians as “evidence of intent to incorporate the West Bank and Gaza into Israel, and thus as rejection of the basic principle of partition.”299 At the same time, Bar-Tal recounts years of survey data since the 1970s that recount how Israelis have also expressed security concerns, which at no point fell below 50%, and only briefly reaching that percentage after

296 Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 119-121.
297 Ibid., 131.
298 Smith, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 327-328.
299 Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, 121.
Sadat’s 1979 visit to Jerusalem. However, in the final years of our last period of analysis, beginning in 1986, Bar-Tal reports a period of “dovization” whereby Israelis believed more strongly in the possibility of achieving peace, which seems to be mirrored in the relative lack of cohesion on the Israeli side as evidenced by the softening of the maximalist position, with a survey in 1986 reporting only 43% of Israelis willing to return territories taken in the 1967 War to 60% in 1993, and support for negotiations with the PLO going from 43% in September of 1986 to 58% by March 1989.

This weakening of cohesion on the Israeli side occurred precisely at the point in time when Palestinian unity was at its height, hence the Israeli pillar of cohesion and collective purpose is at its lowest point in our final period of analysis while the Palestinian unity was at its highest.

For the Palestinians, the figure who best exemplified Palestinian particularism was Yasir Arafat, who took over the PLO in 1967 after establishing his Fateh organization in 1964, declaring Palestine an “an indivisible territorial unit” and aiming to secure “total liberation of Palestine” through “armed struggle.” Arafat’s early maximalist positions are essentially the mirror image of the Israeli trajectory, going from maximalist to favoring partition by the end of our period of analysis. Palestinian fragmentation is a phenomenon that is well-documented. As Pearlman explains, “the PLO stood as a source of leadership and institutions, as well as a focal point for the collective purpose of the Palestinian people. Nevertheless, it remained fragmented.”

In terms of structure, she explains that “the PLO was not a political organization as much as a political system. It was the umbrella under which Palestinian organizations, as well

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301 Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 147.
302 Ibid., 133.
303 Pearlman, Palestinian National Movement, 70.
as the states that stood behind them, bargained over least-common-denominator goals.”

Still, the re-building of a Palestinian identity in the 1970s came along with the rise of pro-PLO newspapers and media and the co-mingling of Palestinian students at universities. The height of Palestinian unity, however, occurred during the First Intifada, which witnessed “youths directing their elders, the poor setting an agenda for the well-to-do, the occupied territories moving ahead of the PLO in Tunis, and political aspirants shunting the traditional elite to the sidelines,” and “what prevented social tensions from becoming an engine of strife . . . was the Palestinian movement’s more cohesive organizational structure.” It is precisely this unity and sense of collective purpose on the Palestinian side that was responsible for the fragmentation on the Israeli side, as Pearlman explains that “during the Intifada, activists followed the Israeli press. They recognized that that their use of nonlethal strategies fueled disagreements among Israelis regarding whether to remain in the territories. . . . Some Palestinians had long advocated nonviolent protest on those very grounds.”

Recognizing the popularity of the movement, even the newly-formed Hamas (which was created just three days after the uprising began) recognized the need to cooperate, and “neither Hamas nor Islamic Jihad carried out armed attacks during the Intifada’s first year” with the exception of the stabbing of a soldier in October of 1988 and the nonlethal detonation of two roadside explosives.

The external strength of this pillar is similar, but markedly higher, particularly given the degree to which the U.S. has helped strengthen this Israeli pillar of power. Arguably Israel’s greatest benefactor, the U.S. bias towards Israel is due in no small part to the American political

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304 Ibid., 70.
305 Ibid., 90.
307 Ibid., 111.
308 Ibid., 112.
system that pressures elected officials to support Israel while “no comparable counter-pressure has existed for the Palestinians,” a development which began with the election of John F. Kennedy and was cemented over time, resulting in a procedural bias towards Israel in negotiations and the adoption of the Israeli view on many key issues.\textsuperscript{309} The strength of this pillar is, of course, far from universal. The 1975 heated debate and subsequent passage of U.N. Resolution 3379 (XXX) condemning Zionism as “a form of racism and racial discrimination” on par with South African racism demonstrates the degree to which world opinion was divided over the issue.\textsuperscript{310}

The U.S. stance towards Israel deserves special attention given the degree to which the U.S. veto in the U.N. Security Council is “often all that stands between Palestinian independence, and is often all that separates Israel from the enforcement power of the U.N. amidst worldwide condemnation of ongoing violations of numerous international norms and laws of war.”\textsuperscript{311} Concurring, two prominent realists explain that, in spite of pledges to “halt settlement construction and to refrain from ‘targeted assassinations’ of Palestinian leaders,” Israeli leaders “frequently ignore U.S. requests and renege on promises made to top U.S. leaders.”\textsuperscript{312} They attribute this strong degree of unity between individuals, groups, and leaders in the United States to the strength of the Israeli lobby in Washington, the “pro-Israeli” stance of the majority of U.S. media institutions, Washington think tanks, and the “charge of antisemitism” against “anyone who criticizes Israeli actions or says that pro-Israel groups have significant influence over U.S.

\textsuperscript{309} Shannon, \textit{Balancing Act}, 130.
\textsuperscript{311} Shannon, \textit{Balancing Act}, 31.
\textsuperscript{312} John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy." \textit{Middle East Policy} 13, no. 3 (2006): 34.
Middle East policy.”313 One scholar explains the religious history of this support, concluding that “widespread gentile support for Israel is one of the most potent political forces in U.S. foreign policy.”314 There is, of course, a strongly religious element to this support, and Mead recounts that “making amends for past sins [of Christianity] has long been an important religious test for many (although by no means all) American Protestants.” Conversely, “most American Christians have felt little or no guilt about their communities’ historical relations with the Muslim world.”315

This U.S. support for Israel remains strong and relatively muted with regard to the demands of the Palestinians until the end of our final year of analysis, whereby the shifting opinion of even those in the United States was evident with regard to the issue of the plight of the Palestinians, which is the area in which we are interested given the goals of the Palestinian NVR campaign. Demonstrating this shift in opinion from Reagan to George H.W. Bush, the new president “was viscerally opposed to new Israeli settlements in the territories” and the new Secretary of State, James Baker, told AIPAC that Israel “must stop building settlements” and “reach out to Palestinians,” echoing calls from Senator Bob Dole for the U.S. to cut its foreign aid to Israel.316 What is interesting to note is that one individual who saw that the Palestinians were winning this battle over public opinion was none other than Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, who saw the First Intifada not as a “spontaneous venting of frustration” or “civil disobedience,” but as “a form of warfare against Israel and against the Arabs who want to live in peace with us,” the ultimate goal of which was “to push [Israel] back to the 1967 lines and to establish another

313 Ibid., 34-48.
316 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 133.
Palestinian state in the areas we leave.”\textsuperscript{317} Underscoring his understanding of the ways in which the Palestinians were attacking Israel through their efforts to change the perceptions of outsiders, Shamir states that

\begin{quote}
no one in Israel was more aware of the moral and physical dilemmas involved than the young soldier patrolling the alleys of camps, interrogating frightened inhabitants, subduing rioters, helping to haul thousands off to detention, shooting only when he had to, and facing trial himself if he erred and shot too soon. But he also knew that in this draining way he was protecting his country no less than on a border facing rockets and tanks.\textsuperscript{318}
\end{quote}

This shift in opinion was not limited to American elites, and Dr. Mark Lance explains that,

\begin{quote}
The intifada was very successful in that for the first time inside the U.S., Palestinians were viewed as victims of aggression. The intifada was presented by the U.S. media as a positive shift away from terrorism and towards nonviolent resistance. . . . [and] peace and justice groups began to build a coalition around a two-state solution.\textsuperscript{319}
\end{quote}

In the end, however, Chenoweth and Stephan conclude that “Palestinian-led civilian resistance was ended prematurely and replaced by a less-participatory form of resistance,” with the signing of the Oslo Accords and the ushering in of the Palestinian Authority to power inside the territories. The failure of the Palestinians to foster a “global grassroots movement in support of Palestinian rights” was a strategic failure, and one that will be re-examined in chapter five.

Concluding, Lance explains bluntly that, “The PLO was no ANC.”\textsuperscript{320}

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Pillar V: Material
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Perhaps one of the easiest pillars to chart, the preponderance of material power clearly was on the Israeli side, both internally and externally, for the entire duration of our study,

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\textsuperscript{317} Shamir, \textit{Summing Up}, 180.
\textsuperscript{318} Shamir, \textit{Summing Up}, 182.
\textsuperscript{319} Chenoweth and Stephan, \textit{Why Civil Resistance Works}, 144.
\textsuperscript{320} Ibid., 145.
\end{flushright}
resulting in one of only two unchanging pillars of power in our study. It is worth revisiting the
definition of material resources, which are those non-human resources that enable a regime to
function and survive, sustain itself, and carry out its policies. It includes economic strength,
weapons, and other tools the regime has at its disposal which allow it to carry out its policies.
Internally, these material resources may be threatened by external economic sanctions or
prohibitions against the target regime which make it difficult to secure the resources it needs for
its survival, but it is the relative level of material resources that the regime has at its disposal in
order to maintain its position of power which matters. It is worth remembering that the degree to
which material and monetary support flows into the country through investments, loans, weapons
sales, and technological support also represent external material resources, and that “full support”
would represent a situation in which 100% of the control of material resources is in the hands of
the target regime and its supporters, while “no support” would represent a situation in which
100% of the control of material resources is in the hands of its opponents internally. An analysis
of Israel’s material resources is depicted below in Figure 13.

![Graph showing levels of internal and external support for the pillar of material support.]

Fig. 13. Levels of internal and external support for the pillar of material support.

The overwhelming strength of the material resources at the disposal of the Israelis comes
from the level of support it received both from new immigrants and from foreign aid. Pearlman
explains that “waves of immigrants brought human and material resources [while] effective champions outside Palestine offered both funding and lobbying with foreign governments,” while in stark contrast, “the Arabs of Palestine neither received such outside support nor experienced such internal institution building.” The only real infusion of material support to the Palestinians came with transfers to the PLO, particularly after 1978, when “Arab states pledged $250 million per year to the PLO, in addition to $150 million for a joint PLO-Jordanian committee to distribute to the occupied territories. . . . [which] rendered the PLO something of a rentier national liberation movement,” and which in no way rivaled Israeli aid during the same periods of time, which always dwarfed aid to the Palestinians.

Conversely, the seedlings of Israeli dominance in the region began in 1948, when Israel purchased “twenty Auster planes” in January of 1948 from the British and “24,500 rifles, 5,200 machine guns, and 54 million rounds of ammunition” from Czechoslovakia. Israel became adept at securing aid from 1948 and onwards, and in the 1950s sought to bolster their military power. In 1954, Shimon Peres (at the time the Israeli envoy to France from the Israeli Defense Ministry) was able to secure an arms agreement which “provided jets, tanks, and radar equipment, shipped under great secrecy” during official American neutrality. This neutrality changed during the 1960s, however, and while France “refused to continue in [the role of supplying offensive weapons to Israel]”, the Johnson administration “accelerated a U.S. commitment to arm Israel” by granting “Israel’s request for tanks, a major step, since these were the first truly offensive weapons the United States had authorized for that country.” Indeed,

322 Ibid., 72.
325 Ibid., 284.
before 1967, “U.S. aid to Israel had been almost entirely non-military and only once exceeded $100 million in a given year. After the war the total jumped to $160 million in 1969 and to $643 million in 1971, most of it in military loans.”326 By the end of the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Israel had realized, as had South Africa, that it must develop its own arms industry in order to secure its future survival, and in the 1970s it quickly became the country’s “biggest export earner,” and “brought in much needed foreign currency, helped redress the country’s severe trade imbalance, and provided work for countless engineers and scientists returning from overseas with advanced degrees.”327 One of their first large (and eager) customers was South Africa, which “seemed like the ideal customer: a developing country with a defense-conscious, right-wing government that did not have close ties to the Arab-Muslim bloc. It was a perfect match.”328

In terms of monetary support, the Israeli economy has benefited from a far greater influx of support over the years, particularly from the United States. From 1949-1994, U.S. aid to Israel amounted to over $68 billion,329 while aid to Palestinians (primarily through aid channeled through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees) has amounted to a little under $2 billion during the same period of time.330 While it is true that the Palestinians received some aid from other Arab countries, in general, until the 1990s “Arab governments refrained from contributing to UNRWA’s budget in an effort to keep the Palestinian refugee issue on the international agenda and to press Israel to accept responsibility for their plight.”331

326 Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 124.
327 Polakow-Suransky, The Unspoken Alliance, 76-77.
328 Ibid., 78.
329 Sharp, Foreign Aid to Israel, 26.
331 Ibid., 20.
In terms of relative internal economic power, the Israelis again possess the clear advantage. Figure 14, below, graphs the Gross Domestic Product per capita of each country and illustrates the strength of the Israeli and Palestinian economies:

While there was no tracking of the Palestinian economy by the World Bank until 1994, the West Bank and Gaza Strip combined had a GDP per capita of just $1,201 in 1994, just three years after our final period of analysis. This amount is lower than Israel’s GDP per capita for the entire period under analysis. At the same time, the Israeli economy had reached nearly ten times that amount in 1991, with a GDP per capita of $11,956.333

To conclude the analysis of Israel and Palestine’s relative levels of material support, it is clear that Israel maintained a complete and total advantage throughout the period of analysis, as

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evidenced by its economic and military strength. This internal pillar was bolstered by external support through different countries in each of the periods of time under study, and was matched by the support that it received from external sources, helping to subsidize its struggling economy during its early years. This, again, stands in marked contrast to the South African economy’s collapse under external pressure during its final years, another area that will be examined more closely during the final chapter. We turn now to our final area of analysis, which is that of the use of coercion by the Israeli government.

Pillar VI: Coercion

Internally, the ability to enforce obedience (whether through law or through force) allows the regime to persuade or coerce its opponents into compliance with its policies. Externally, this is more difficult to outline, but the effects of external actors on the target regime’s ability to use coercion is what must be observed. Full support under this pillar would represent a situation in which external actors (particularly great powers, like the United States) completely support the target regime’s ability to carry out coercive techniques against their NVR opponents and shield them from any limits on power within this domain. “No support” would represent a situation in which the target regime’s ability to use coercion against NVR opponents is completely curtailed by internal and external actors, whether through the imposition of sanctions on the target regime (e.g. through U.N. Security Council Resolutions) or the withdrawal of the means necessary to coerce its opponents (e.g. through the withdrawal of support or cooperation in helping the target regime target its opponents). Due to the unfettered ability and willingness of the State of Israel to use coercion against the entire Palestinian population during the entire period under analysis, this
pillar, too, remains at the level of “full support” internally and externally from 1961 to 1991, as depicted in Figure 15, below.

Internally speaking, the Israeli pillar of coercion started and ended strong during our period of analysis. The list of coercive techniques used by the Israelis against the Palestinians is long, but worth recounting, beginning before 1961, when Israel defied U.N. Resolution 194 (which affirmed the right of displaced Palestinians to return to their homes in the new State of Israel) and “sealed the borders.” Additionally, Israel responded to attempts made by Palestinians to return to their homes inside the State of Israel through “harsh reprisal raids causing deaths in the thousands” against those who sought to “return to their homes, harvest crops, or smuggle goods.” After Israel gained control over East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip following the 1967 War, protests erupted and many “prominent individuals issued manifestos condemning the occupation. Lawyers and teachers went on strike, and local elites formed committees to launch a campaign of civil disobedience.” In what would become a pattern of Israeli occupation, nonviolent and violent threats were treated similarly, and “Israeli authorities

Fig. 15. Levels of internal and external support for the Israeli pillar of coercion.

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335 Ibid., 62.
336 Ibid., 94.
suppressed this activity by deporting, imprisoning, or harassing those who spearheaded it.”

Through the army and (after 1981) the Civil Administration, the Israelis:


governed Palestinian life through some twelve hundred military orders that served as law under occupation. Israel punished political activism with such measures as house demolitions, imprisonment, curfew, travel restrictions, and ‘administrative detention’ without charge or trial. From 1967 to 1978 it deported more than one thousand Palestinians.

The Israeli government ratcheted up these policies under Prime Minister Begin’s government in 1981 by beginning the “Iron Fist,” which consisted of “a series of policies that expanded curfew and restrictions on political activity, universities, and the press, as well as more forceful military repression.” Often times this military repression came in the form of policies which were at odds with international norms, particularly with regard to interrogation techniques, which included “sleep and food deprivation, verbal abuse and threats, intense noise, hooding, forced standing, binding in painful positions, solitary confinement, enclosure in tight spaces, exposure to extreme temperates, denial of access to toilets, genital abuse, shakings, and beatings.” In the face of increased violence in the territories, Rabin “revived the Iron Fist policy with such countermeasures as administrative detention, censorship, school closures, and deportations.”

The height of NVR leverage exerted against this Israeli pillar of power was during the First Intifada, which saw Palestinians creatively and persistently disregard Israeli coercion as “people of all walks of life sought ‘to create a daily series of acts of defiance’ that would assert their nationalist will, demonstrate the unsustainability of military rule, and compel Israel to reach

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337 Ibid., 94-95.
338 Ibid., 95.
339 Ibid., 99.
340 Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 143.
an agreement with the PLO.”

In one sense defying Israeli laws at the time was not hard to do, given that “terrorist acitivites included everything from painting slogans and graffiti to singing national songs to making the victory sign, displaying the Palestinian flag, throwing stones, burning tires, demonstrating, and forming political gatherings,” and “authorities arrested or detained close to half a million Palestinians for these reasons prior to and during the First Intifada.”

While the Israeli government began to experience backfiring for their harsh reprisals during the Intifada, it simply responded by ratcheting up the use of coercive techniques. Upon realizing that media coverage of events inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, such as 1988 CBS coverage of Israeli soldiers “breaking the limbs of four Palestinian youths with rocks and clubs” or the “live burial of Palestinian youths,” the government responded simply by limiting media coverage in the occupied territories through extreme forms of censorship, including “revoking the visas of foreign journalists . . . declaring military closures, and arbitrarily denying access to the occupied territories.”

Underscoring the degree to which the Israelis viewed the NVR campaign as an existential threat was the “Ship of Return” episode whereby the PLO attempted to “transport 130 Palestinians who had been deported since 1948 from Cyprus to Haifa” in order to “raise international awareness about the plight of Palestinian deportees,” which was deemed a “declaration of war” by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and subsequently bombed by the Israeli Mossad a day before it was scheduled to depart.

The Israeli government was able to maintain its internally high levels of coercion due in no small part to the cover provided by the United States, its strongest benefactor, whose “special

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342 Ibid., 102.
343 Chenoweth and Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works, 120-121.
344 Ibid., 130.
345 Ibid., 127-128.
relationship” began in the first year of our analysis under President John F. Kennedy. Since then, the U.S. has shielded Israel from many potentially curtailing resolutions, particularly after the 1967 War with the intense negotiations surrounding Security Council Resolution 242, which was “the result of hard bargaining among the permanent members of the Security Council: the Soviet Union demanded immediate Israeli withdrawal, the United States sought to secure Arab acceptance of Israel and a final settlement.”346 In the same decade, the U.S. also sought to shield Israel from having to reveal its nuclear program, allowing them not to go public or forcing them to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.347 Mearsheimer and Walt have argued that “Washington provides Israel with consistent diplomatic support. Since 1982, the United States has vetoed 33 United Nations Security Council resolutions that were critical of Israel, a number greater than the combined total of vetoes cast by all the other Security Council members.”348 This cover for the use of coercion extends to coercive techniques enacted outside the strict zones of conflict, and in 1985 U.S. President Ronald Reagan made excuses for Israel after they bombed the PLO headquarters in Tunis in 1985, calling it a “legitimate response” to a Palestinian assassination squad killing three Israelis in Cyprus.349 This response was particularly upsetting to the Tunisians given that “Tunis had agreed to house the PLO in 1982 at Washington’s request” in 1982, and Reagan later backtracked, calling the incident “understandable but unfortunate.”350

The only time in our period of analysis that the United States was unwilling to shield Israel with regard to their treatment of Palestinians was a U.N. Security Council Resolution “denouncing Israel’s disproportionate use of force against Palestinian civilians,” which passed in

346 Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 123.
347 Ibid., 125.
349 Smith, The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 410.
350 Ibid., 410.
December of 1987 when the United States abstained.\textsuperscript{351} Still, the resolution did nothing concrete to force Israel to stop the crackdown against protesting Palestinians, and their continued arrest of UNLU members during the Intifada was ultimately successful in ending the uprising. While leaders on the ground were initially replaced steadily and “again and again, Israel arrested UNLU members, and factions replaced them,” however this “could not be sustained indefinitely,” and “by March 1990, Israel’s imprisonment of consecutive UNLU coalitions had ended its operation as a coherent entity,” allowing Israel to essentially fragment the leadership of the NVR campaign through its use of coercion.\textsuperscript{352} In the end, one activist claimed that “the PLO ‘hijacked’ the uprising,” and the end of the Intifada was accompanied by “diverging interests, loss of vision, and factional power struggles.”\textsuperscript{353}

Having outlined each pillar of power’s strength over time, we turn to a discussion of the findings before analyzing the key differences between the two cases.

Discussion of Findings

By compiling all of the data and merging the internal and external pillars, we can again construct a visual representation of the strength of each individual pillar of power over time to better visualize the degree to which the Israeli regime lost support over time by the final period of analysis in 1991, which is pictured below in Figure 16.

\textsuperscript{351} Chenoweth and Stephan, \textit{Why Civil Resistance Works}, 129.
\textsuperscript{353} Ibid., 117.
This analysis demonstrates that the Israeli regime was much stronger than the apartheid regime throughout the entire period under study. Their ability to maintain their material superiority and use of coercion unfettered is perhaps the biggest contrast, but at its lowest point in 1991, the Israeli government still had relatively strong pillars of support for their regime internally and externally, and the two lowest pillars are at the same strength as South Africa’s material pillar of power in 1991, which was its highest. While the coercion and material pillars remain unchanged, this does not mean that the Palestinians did not seek to undercut them. However, their efforts were unsuccessful, and the target regime was able to withstand and fight back against their attempts successfully, particularly with outside help. While the South African regime was facing increasing amounts of pressure, particularly from a growing overseas base of human support which was helping to sever U.S. ties to the apartheid regime, Israel’s trajectory was the exact opposite, with an increasingly strong domestic constituency operating virtually
unopposed in the political arena. This failure to extend the NVR battlefield is most clearly visible in the final year of analysis, which reveals the greatest gains that the NVR campaign achieved as evidenced in Figure 17, below.

![Graph showing Israeli internal/external pillars of power in 1991.](image)

Fig. 17. Israeli internal/external pillars of power in 1991.

What is revealed is that by 1991, the Israeli government was astutely battling a large, tactically innovative and diverse NVR campaign by maintaining their use of coercive techniques even in the face of international criticism. The two most serious threats to their power came from the pillars of cohesion and authority, but the dip in the pillar of cohesion was short-lived and most pronounced during 1991, after which the Israeli government was able to successfully dismantle the NVR campaign’s leadership, resulting in Palestinian fragmentation and a resumption of violence on the Palestinian side, while a more united Israeli public rallied around their leaders as a new government formed in 1992.\(^{354}\)

In support of my hypothesis, the finding that Israel was able to fully maintain their use of coercive techniques while being shielded from external intervention into the conflict by other countries and international organizations provides strong evidence for the argument that great power support in NVR campaigns plays a decisive role, particularly in cases where the target regime does not depend upon the human or material resources of the NVR resistors, as was the case for the Palestinian population. Similarly, the lack of external pressure on the target regime lends support to the second hypothesis, given that Palestinian successes were limited to an acknowledgement by Jordan that the Palestinians were the only group who could claim legitimate control over the West Bank, Israeli and U.S. recognition of the PLO, limited regime change (with the end of fifteen years of Likud dominance in the Knesset), and the willingness of the Israeli government under Yitzhak Shamir to participate in the Madrid talks, which “one noted Israeli scholar concludes, ‘… is impossible to understand . . . without understanding the effect of [the First Intifada]’” and which eventually culminated in the Oslo Accords.\footnote{Ibid., 131-140.} In the final analysis, however, the Israeli pillars remained strong and the Palestinian gains were limited and tenuous, with many of the gains being reversed as the death of Yitzhak Rabin paved the way for a new era of Likud-party dominance that, in the years since the Oslo Accords were signed, has expanded the segregated road system, more than doubled the number of Jewish settlements, and continued the occupation policies.\footnote{Ibid., 136-137.} In the final analysis, the process-tracing method reveals that both the lack of external support for the NVR campaign and lack of external pressure on the target regime were key missing variables which enabled the Israeli regime to effectively blunt the uprising. Having examined both cases, we turn now to our final chapter and examine which external actors matter most and what policy implications can be drawn from this study.
Chapter V: Conclusion and Discussion

In this case study, I have used the method of process-tracing to design a tool that can measure the strength of individual pillars of power propping up regimes to measure the respective strength of these pillars for two regimes during the same period of time in order to better understand how NVR campaigns can be successful in toppling them. In this chapter I will summarize my findings and the results of my analysis, explain which causal factors I believe to be most important in achieving strategic success in NVR campaigns based on those findings, and then explain what policy implications this research has for the United States, particularly as the use of NVR becomes more prevalent in the wake of the Arab Spring.

Summary of Findings

The most helpful approach to analyzing these results is to compare the two target regimes side by side in the final year of analysis, then analyze the relative strength of the independent variables across these two cases and then move to an analysis of the strategies employed by each NVR campaign to examine their impact upon those pillars of power. We can begin to explore this by looking at each of them side by side in Figure 18, below.
Analysis of Strategic Paths to Success (or Lack Thereof)

What this side-by-side comparison reveals first is the much greater effectiveness of the anti-apartheid movement (AAM) in undercutting the apartheid regime’s pillars of power. Each of the South African pillars is lower than those of the Israeli regime in 1991, although some are significantly lower. We will now analyze the strategies of each NVR campaign in order to determine their strategic paths towards success (in the case of the AAM) and partial success (for the Palestinian campaign) and how I believe each case demonstrates support for both of my hypotheses.

AAM’s Strategic Path to Success

In South Africa, as U.S. support for the apartheid regime decreased, the NVR campaign’s strength grew. The AAM was able to unify opposition to the apartheid regime internally and
externally and clearly define its goals (a potential alternative hypothesis I will examine below) early on in the movement, most notably through the slogan “One Man, One Vote,” which provided a clear goal and defined the campaign’s objectives. By also providing a clear alternative source of authority (most notably through the ANC at the national level and through local committees at the grassroots level), the campaign was successfully able to undercut the internal sources of authority while demonstrating to external actors that they would have an alternative authority with which they could deal in the event that the apartheid regime crumbled. Additionally, this cohesion allowed for the AAM to withdraw human and material resources from the apartheid regime. The loss of external material support through the enactment of sanctions against the apartheid regime resulted in the apartheid regime significantly curtailing its use of coercive techniques, thus strengthening the collective purpose and cohesion of the AAM while the apartheid regime’s supporters fragmented. Most notably, the NVR activists were able to successfully and creatively extend the NVR battlefield, particularly through undercutting international support for the apartheid regime’s use of coercion. When Americans saw other Americans (particularly famous artists and politicians) being arrested for protesting in the nation’s capital, it truly helped to “arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice,” thus fragmenting those in the U.S. who supported the maintenance of the status quo with regard to South Africa (whether on economic or diplomatic grounds, or both) and bringing about greater cohesion and collective purpose to the opponents of apartheid outside the immediate zone of conflict. By making these crucial concessions with regard to coercive techniques, the apartheid regime caved to international pressure, eventually allowing the NVR campaign to strengthen and

eventually topple the regime through peaceful means. Figure 19 depicts this strategic path to success, below.

![Diagram of strategic path to success](unnamed.png)

**Palestinian NVR Campaign’s Strategic Path to Partial Success**

While still confirming my hypotheses, the opposite scenario happened in Israel/Palestine, where U.S. support for the target regime remained strong throughout the period under study. While the Palestinian campaign was successful (for a while) at unifying opposition internally and defying coercive techniques for a significant period of time, there was no opportunity to apply leverage against the material sources of power internally (although some notable attempts are prevalent), and the withdrawal of human support had no effect on the target regime because, simply put, it did not depend upon Palestinian human support for its maintenance of power. The campaign was most successful in providing alternative institutions at the local level to withdraw support from Israel’s pillar of authority, and it is notable that this is the area in which they achieved partial success through the recognition of the PLO as their legitimate representatives.
and the cessation of Jordanian claims to control of the region. However, Palestinians never effectively extended the battlefield into other countries, and certainly not into the U.S. The only examples of the lack of cohesion and collective purpose that came about from this campaign was through news reports that, at times, shocked the American conscience, but these did not translate into substantive policy changes because the Palestinians were at a complete disadvantage when it came to external human support given the strength of the Israeli lobby within the U.S. and the corresponding weakness (even nonexistence) of a Palestinian lobby. This had a direct effect on the inability of the NVR campaign to achieve full strategic success, as the continual use of coercion by the Israeli government against the NVR campaign was ultimately successful in curtailing NVR activities and fragmenting the Palestinians. Counterfactually, had the U.S. refused to shield Israel from U.N. sanctions, withdrew its funding unless Israel agreed to withdraw from the occupied territories, and condemned the Israeli crackdown on protestors and sided with the Palestinians by passing legislation similar to the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, the results in Israel would likely have been much different. However, this would have depended upon the ability to mobilize key actors within the U.S., actors which the AAM had been had been focusing on for years leading up to this point in time and which, conversely, the Palestinians had completely failed to develop. This lack of pressure on those in government is largely (if not exclusively) due to the nonexistence of any groups within the U.S. pressuring elected officials to act or drawing attention to the policies of the Israeli government with regard to Palestine, policies that Americans may find objectionable. Hence, the inability of the Palestinian NVR campaign to extend the battlefield into the U.S. and similarly undercut the American pillars of support for the Israeli government can reasonably be said to have played a decisive role in the campaign’s failure. Figure 20 depicts this path to partial success.
Fig. 20. Palestinian NVR Campaign’s strategic path to partial success against Israel.

Key Differences

Key differences between the independent variables at work in these cases are outlined in Figure 21, below.

AAM

- Unified opposition internally and externally
- Developed base of supporters outside zone of conflict
- Withdrew human/skills & knowledge support internally and externally
- Withdrew material support internally and externally
- Successfully noncooperated and achieved international condemnation of regime’s coercive techniques

Palestinian NVR

- Unified opposition internally
- Failed to develop base of supporters outside zone of conflict
- Failed to withdraw human/skills & knowledge support
- Failed to withdraw material support
- Noncooperated, but failed to sustain noncooperation and failed to achieve universal condemnation of regime’s coercive techniques

Fig. 21. Key differences between AAM and Palestinian NVR campaign.
What this analysis reveals is that an extension of the NVR battlefield against those individuals, groups, institutions, and countries which helped prop up the target regime did help increase the strategic success of the South African NVR campaign, while the failure of Palestinian NVR to extend the battlefield significantly contributed to its failure to achieve its political goals. I also found in the case of Israel that a target regime that is determined to continue its use of coercion will ultimately be successful against an NVR campaign. Palestinians cannot be faulted for not targeting these coercive techniques and demonstrated remarkable creativity in opposing them, but Israel faced no real pressure to discontinue their use and eventually fragmented the NVR campaign’s leadership in the absence of external pressure, whereas the apartheid regime faced a very real threat to their continued use of coercive techniques if they did not change course significantly, which they did.

Similarly, South Africa depended to a large extent on the human resource of black labor within their country. Given the lack of Palestinians’ ability to apply leverage against this pillar internally, they were even more dependent on the material withdrawal of support that international sanctions were able to apply against the apartheid regime, underscoring the importance of how each of these pillars interact with one another internally and externally and the fact that no two countries maintain their grip on power in exactly the same ways.

**Alternative Hypotheses**

Two potential alternative hypotheses remain which may prove causal. The first is the presence of charismatic leadership, perhaps the most famous examples of which are Gandhi’s leadership against the British in India and Martin Luther King, Jr.’s leadership in the civil rights movement in the U.S. While a common belief is that charismatic leaders are responsible for a
campaign’s strategic success, this is not what my analysis reveals. In South Africa, the figure who united and inspired many NVR activists was behind prison for most of the NVR campaign and still clung to a belief in the legitimacy of violence, even after his release. Similarly, the First Intifada was led by a large and diverse group of leaders who were not tied to the traditional Palestinian leadership structure of the PLO. In fact, Palestine has had a number of individuals who could convincingly become a “Palestinian Gandhi,” but many were effectively coerced, as Mubarak Awad’s story illustrates. As “the leading Palestinian advocate of nonviolent struggle,” Awad had long called for “total resistance to the occupation,” but was deported to the United States.\textsuperscript{358} However, the UNLU (the primary Palestinian NVR coordinating body during the First Intifada) for a long time seemed to have a never-ending supply of leaders and, “for two years, every time authorities identified and arrested UNLU members, their factions replaced them with new representatives.”\textsuperscript{359} What is revealed by this analysis, then, is that unfettered use of coercive techniques can, and will, effectively exhaust those in leadership positions, and by “the end of 1988, about ten thousand Palestinians were held without charge or trial in administrative detention, a six-month incarceration eligible for renewal.”\textsuperscript{360} Concurring with this conclusion, Arens and Kaufman have found that “the recent uprisings in the Arab world confirm the widely shared opinion – [Gene] Sharp included – that a leader is not a necessary condition for success in a nonviolent struggle.”\textsuperscript{361} What this does mean, however, is that attempts to utilize coercive techniques must be condemned internationally along with threats of withdrawal of support if they are to be successful and allow a campaign to maintain a minimum level of leadership.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Chenoweth and Stephan, \textit{Why Civil Resistance Works}, 131.
\item Pearlman, \textit{Palestinian National Movement}, 108.
\item Ibid., 114.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
A second alternative hypothesis is the lack of clear goals and objectives. While the former hypothesis is easier to explain, this one is not. Whereas the AAM had a clear objective in “One Person, One Vote,” one Palestinian leader noted that “the main obstacle we face in our struggle is that we have no one strategy or vision. We have different factions and fractions within factions pursuing different strategies.” While we could place this alternative hypothesis under the pillar of cohesion and collective purpose, it is worth separate examination as a potential separate confounding variable because a clear purpose and vision provided internal and external actors a banner behind which they could rally behind the AAM, even if it was scoffed at in the 1950s. In marked contrast, the lack of a clearly articulated goal for Palestinian NVR allowed foreign actors to dictate events and allowed the PLO to “hijack” the NVR campaign and impose upon it the leadership’s vision for what it should help accomplish, providing an important lesson for future NVR campaigns and demonstrating that “shaking off” may not provide enough vision or clarity for a campaign to sustain itself in the face of relentless coercion.

Which Actors Matter Most?

While the answer to the question of which actors matter most may seem obvious, the reason is not. My research suggests that the U.S. truly is an important deciding factor in both cases, but not in a realist sense. What my case study reveals is that the U.S. is a great power because of the large role it played in both conflicts in propping up both target regimes. Furthermore, in keeping with the non-unitary nature of power, it is important to understand that the U.S. is not a monolith, but that individuals, groups, businesses, and institutions (as well as various levels of and branches of government within the U.S.) all played decisive roles in the process of redefining the relationship with the target regimes of both cases. The U.S. federal

government was able to influence events in both countries in such a dominant way (whether on the side of the target regime or its opponents) precisely because it helps to prop up so many external pillars of power of regimes it supports. In terms of authority, for example, U.S. recognition of authority through formal and informal means confers upon regimes much more legitimacy than many small countries banding together to accept or reject a particular regime’s sovereignty. Similarly, given the position the U.S. holds as the world’s largest economy, investments and favorable trade deals with businesses within the U.S. have an enormous effect on the country’s economy, and institutional investors for various types of institutions played a decisive role in crippling South Africa’s material sources of power. At the international level, the permanent member status that the U.S. holds on the U.N. Security Council also allows it to provide a great deal of cover for a country’s use of coercive techniques against NVR resisters or, conversely, to allow intervention into that country’s affairs or the imposition of sanctions when it disagrees with the target regime’s course of action. In these ways and others, individuals, groups, and institutions all played key role in shaping the course of events in both cases.

On a deeper level of analysis, what this case study reveals is that any country or individuals, groups, and institutions which help prop up a regime through externally supporting it can and should be effectively targeted by NVR campaigns to the degree that that country (or those businesses and institutions inside the country which support the target regime) exerts influence inside the zone of conflict and through the means that it exercises that support. For example, if NVR activists are targeting a regime that is able to maintain high levels of coercion because of the material support that the country receives through oil sales to surrounding countries, thus enabling it to pay for troops to enforce its rule, those NVR resisters must undercut that material source of power that the regime derives from oil sales by extending the battlefield
to countries outside the immediate zone of conflict to push for economic sanctions on the target regime. The imposition of economic sanctions on the target regime, then, effectively undercuts the regime’s pillar of material support, thus “turning off the spigot,” so to speak, and allows NVR resistors to more effectively attack those pillars that fall within the immediate zone of conflict, such as poorly paid soldiers utilizing coercive techniques.

Implications for U.S. Policy in Israel/Palestine

As of this writing, U.S. policy is in flux with regard to our stance in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. The Second Intifada did not follow in the steps of the First Intifada and took a much more violent course. However, Palestinian NVR campaigns continue and are strategically targeted, such as the Bil’in weekly demonstration against the separation barrier, where demonstrations against the barrier center on the separation of the villagers from their agricultural lands, demonstrations which continue to the present. Other instances of NVR include the tax resistance at Bayt Sahur, Druze resistance in the Golan Heights, and the efforts of members of the target regime’s base of supporters like Rabbis for Human Rights. There are also international movements, such as the International Solidarity Movement, which now has support groups in 35 countries, paralleling the largely external Anti-Apartheid Movement

(AAM) of South Africa. Palestinian NVR is also increasingly using the tools of new media to reach a wider audience, and Websites like the “Electronic Intifada” seek to bring about greater awareness of Palestinian NVR efforts in other countries. However, the story remains largely the same, with Israeli coercion and lack of awareness in the U.S. contributing to the status quo, even despite clear fissures between President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu. For example, in a weekly demonstration in Bil’in on September 6 of 2009, the Israeli army attacked Al Jazeera reporters during a live broadcast and in February 2010 “raided the offices of the Stop the Wall Campaign in Ramallah and confiscated computers and files,” and shortly thereafter “several activists of the International Solidarity Movement were arrested in night-raids and expelled on charges of violating immigration procedures.” In a recent op-ed article, Noam Chomsky, an outspoken critic of Israeli policies, put it succinctly how these two cases differ, positing that in the case of South Africa, “activism had created such overwhelming international opposition to apartheid that individual states and the U.N. had imposed sanctions decades before the 1980s, when BD [boycott and divestment] tactics began to be used extensively in the United States,” while in sharp contrast, “U.S. investment is flowing into Israel. When Warren Buffett bought an Israeli tool-making firm for $2 billion last year, he described Israel as the most promising country for investors outside the United States itself.”

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Chomsky’s critique of the current strategy of the Palestinian NVR movement could easily be reframed into the language of our study. His observation is simply a recognition of one of the crucial differences between the South Africa and Israeli governments as target regimes with differently constituted internal and external sources of power. In South Africa the extension of the NVR battlefield many years before into the U.S. (one of South Africa’s primary external pillars of power) allowed them to effectively push for international sanctions and undercut the regime’s material pillar of power at a crucial period in that country’s history, effectively toppling the regime. In Israel, however, the U.S. government and leading individuals within the U.S. business community continue to support Israel through material investment into that country, and Chomsky notes that while many in the BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions) movement continue to call for all three, the movement should “more accurately” be labeled “BD”, “since sanctions, or state actions, are not on the horizon—one of the many significant differences from South Africa.”

A second oft-overlooked pillar whose importance should not be understated is the pillar of authority, which is relatively inexpensive to exercise, assuming one does not count political currency as a cost. Whereas the tangible nature of material power is costly in a material sense, conferral of authority is economically inexpensive, but can pay big dividends. As I have outlined, inviting Mandela to speak to a joint session of Congress and a meeting at the White House (while he continued to advocate for violent resistance against the apartheid regime) demonstrates the power of the bully pulpit and underscores the fact that public U.S. support is just as (if not more) important than other means of support. Arens and Kaufmann argue that: “there is a potential for an increasing role for foreign diplomats and world media, as well as solidarity from

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372 Noam Chomsky, "On Israel-Palestine and BDS."
Israeli civil society in the city and elsewhere. Unfortunately, there is no such combative spirit left among Palestinians in the city, left without a legitimated leadership since the death of Faisal Husseini, and fear of Israeli reprisals that can damage them as individuals with a relatively better position than the rest of their brethren in the Occupied Palestinian Territories.”

Recognizing Palestinian sovereignty on the U.N. Security Council is something the U.S. could do quickly and which would have the effect of leveling the playing field between the two countries, allowing Palestinians to negotiate their future on more authoritative footing and increasing Palestinian cohesion and collective purpose, thus breathing new life into the NVR movement and undercutting the violent violent radical flanks who are pursuing similar or competing political goals. U.S. policy as conducted now seems to convey a belief that negotiations must occur before any recognition of Palestinian authority can be conferred, seemingly oblivious to the fact that official U.S. recognition of Palestinian sovereignty would not only bolster current NVR attempts, but would significantly undercut those violent radical flanks who charge that nonviolent efforts will not work and that Israel only understands force.

Finally, perhaps the greatest difference (and potentially most troubling for future policy concerns) is that my analysis reveals that Israel simply does not need the Palestinian population. Chomsky rightly points out that “In sharp contrast, Israel wants to rid itself of the Palestinian burden. The road ahead is not toward South Africa, as commonly alleged, but toward something much worse.” What my case study reveals was the importance of the withdrawal of human support from the apartheid regime, which was a crucial component of that NVR campaign’s tactical diversity. What is also revealed, however, is that it was not the only thing that mattered, and that it was much more effective when strategies inside and outside the immediate zone of

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374 Noam Chomsky, "On Israel-Palestine and BDS."
conflict finally merged in an interactive way. This is demonstrated by the unlikely partners of businesses in the U.S. and black unions in South Africa agreeing on the necessity of undercutting the apartheid regime’s material pillar of power by boycotting South African goods in order to topple the regime. For the Palestinians, this internal option of withdrawing human or material support is not available, thus making their dependence upon external withdrawal of support even more crucial. Consequently, the outlook for a grand NVR strategy remains bleak, or as Broning puts it, “a monolithic NVR strategy is as unlikely as it is perhaps desirable,”\(^\text{375}\) underscoring the importance of U.S. policy reframing the debate as either supporting or not supporting a two-state solution and hashing out the details after this decision is made on the international level without allowing the Israeli government to intervene and stop it.

### Conclusion and Future Research

Through this study I have concluded that external support for regimes that are targeted by NVR campaigns can be the deciding factor in whether or not those campaigns succeed to the extent that the target regime derives its power from those sources. I have also concluded that the higher the costs the target regime faces for its actions, the less likely it is to continue them. I have also described the complexity of these interacting variables and how the pillars propping up target regimes must be strategically targeted within and outside of the immediate zones of conflict if NVR campaigns wish to achieve strategic success. Given the importance of coercion in enforcing the rule of the apartheid regime in South Africa and Israeli policies in the occupied territories, this study suggests that external actors do matter and must be effectively targeted to the extent that they provide cover or help to prop up the target regime. While definitive causality

is not possible given the small number of cases, I believe there is convincing evidence that better understanding of how these key variables interact with one another has been achieved.

While my approach to studying nonviolent movements by comparing the relative strength of individual pillars of power is unique, it is also an approach in its infancy, and further research is needed to provide greater operational clarity to each of the pillars. I would liken this study to looking at the moon through a telescope, which is useful and provides for much greater analysis than the naked eye, but is not as good as actually going there and studying on its surface. However, in the words of Barnett and Duvall, “power exists at the surface, and also well below.” I concur with their assessment that “if international relations scholars have erred in their past attempts to understand power, it is by trying to identify and rely on a single conception.” What is needed instead is a comprehensive comparative tool, building upon idea of the Correlates of War (COW) index, but which measures the other pillars through which countries maintain their grip on power. Such an index could be used to study this alternative theory of power across countries and would be useful not only for comparative purposes, but for activists who need information in real time in order to understand how to most effectively target regimes and whether their pillars of support lie predominantly within or outside of the immediate zone of conflict. Future research efforts should focus on analyzing the explosion of NVR movements during the Arab Spring to determine whether these findings are consistent, particularly given U.S. involvement in many of them. Given the large amounts of data that are available now and the various controlling factors for many of these movements (such as religion, and ethnic group) that are not accounted for in my study, there is a huge natural experiment

377 Ibid., 67.
which has just dropped into the collective lap of NVR researchers, and not mining it for all it’s
worth would be a tremendous missed opportunity.


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