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I Saw Something, Do I Say Something? The Role of the Organization, Supervisor, and Coworkers in Encouraging Workers to Peer Report Others’ Counterproductive Work Behavior

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I SAW SOMETHING, DO I SAY SOMETHING? THE ROLE OF THE
ORGANIZATION, SUPERVISOR, AND COWORKERS IN ENCOURAGING
WORKERS TO PEER REPORT OTHERS’ COUNTERPRODUCTIVE WORK
BEHAVIOR

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By

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ABSTRACT


Counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs) harm organizations and their members (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Niehoff & Paul, 2000). CWBs, however, often go unnoticed by management. Peer reporting, which refers to employees notifying organizational authorities of their peers’ CWBs, can help the organization detect CWBs. Employees, however, are generally hesitant to peer report (Bowling & Lyons, 2015; Treviño & Victor, 1992). The purpose of the current study was to investigate the mechanisms by which the organization, supervisor, and the workgroup might each facilitate employees’ peer reporting of CWBs. Drawing from situational strength theory, I argue that the organizational peer reporting policies, supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, and workgroup norms regarding peer reporting each create a “strong” peer reporting situation in which employees are more likely to peer report. Furthermore, I argue that commitment to the organization, supervisor, and workgroup moderates the respective relationships of organizational policies, supervisors’ encouragement, and workgroup norms with employees’ peer reporting of CWBs. Using a sample of workers from...
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk; \( N = 450 \)), I found that organizational commitment moderates the relationship between organizational peer reporting policies and peer reporting of CWBs targeted at the organization. My findings have important practical and theoretical implications for the peer reporting literature.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs) are voluntary employee behaviors that harm the organization and can lead to significant performance and monetary losses (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Niehoff & Paul, 2000). Workers, however, often commit CWBs covertly, thereby making it difficult for management to detect such behavior and thus causing further harm to the organization (Berry, Carpenter, & Barrett, 2012). The difficulty in CWB detection has prompted researchers to investigate the causes of peer reporting, a behavior that may facilitate the detection of CWBs (Treviño & Victor, 1992). Peer reporting occurs when employees notifying organizational authorities (e.g., supervisors or representatives of the human resources department) of their peers’ CWBs (Treviño & Victor, 1992).

Prior research has demonstrated that employees are generally hesitant to peer report; thus it is important to investigate the ways in which organizations can facilitate employees’ peer reporting behavior (Bowling & Lyons, 2015; Curphy et al., 1998; Treviño & Victor, 1992). Researchers, unfortunately, have typically used hypothetical scenarios instead of actual work settings to study peer reporting (e.g., Curphy et al., 1998; Treviño & Victor, 1992; Study 2) and have not examined the mechanisms by which the organization, supervisor, and workgroup facilitate employees’ peer reporting behavior. Drawing from situational strength theory (Meyer, Dalal, & Hermida, 2010; Mischel, 1977, I argue that the organization and its constituencies (i.e., supervisors and...
workgroups) may behave in ways that either encourage or discourage peer reporting of CWBs. More specifically, organizational policies regarding peer reporting, supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, and workgroup norms regarding peer reporting might each create a strong “peer reporting situation” in which peer reporting is more likely to occur.

Furthermore, following Mowday, Steers, and Porter’s (1979) conceptualization of work commitment, the effects of commitment to the organization, to one’s supervisor, and one’s work group might further facilitate peer reporting of CWBs. Thus, the purpose of my study is to (a) examine the main effects of organizational peer reporting policies, supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, and workgroup norms regarding peer reporting on workers’ peer reporting of CWBs, and (b) examine how commitment to the organization, supervisor, and workgroup might moderate these effects. In the next subsection, I briefly review the CWB literature. I then provide a detailed review of the peer reporting literature.

**Summary of the CWB Literature**

Counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs) include a variety of employee behaviors that result in harm to the organization or its members (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Spector & Fox, 2005; Spector, Fox, Penney, Bruursema, Goh, & Kessler, 2006). Examples of CWBs include theft of company property, arriving late to work, harassing one’s coworkers, and sabotaging one’s own work or that of others. Prior research regarding the causes of CWBs has found that workers with low levels of conscientiousness, agreeableness, emotional stability, and job satisfaction are more likely to commit CWBs than are workers who are high in these variables (Berry, Ones, &
Sackett, 2007; Penney & Spector, 2002; Spector & Fox, 2005).

The outcomes of CWBs are negative for the organization in two primary ways:

(a) CWBs cause significant financial loss to the organization (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Niehoff & Paul, 2000) and (b) employees in the organization are adversely affected when they are the target of CWBs (Ayoko, Callan, & Härtel, 2003; Meier & Spector, 2013).

Prior research, for example, indicates that CWBs cost organizations billions of dollars in lost revenue every year (National Retail Security Survey [NRSS], 2008; Niehoff & Paul, 2000). Furthermore, employees who are the target of CWBs experience feelings of anxiety at work, decreased well-being, and may even commit CWBs themselves (Ayoko et al., 2003; Bowling & Beehr, 2006; Spector & Jex, 1998). However, because workers commit many CWBs covertly with the intention of hiding their misbehavior, it is difficult for organizations to determine when CWBs occur, which thereby thwarts organizational efforts to prevent them (Berry et al., 2012). Peer reporting, fortunately, may allow management to detect CWBs that would otherwise be overlooked.

Summary of Peer Reporting Literature

Distinguishing peer reporting from whistle-blowing. Before reviewing the peer reporting literature, it is important to make a key distinction between peer reporting and another behavior that facilitates the detection of employee misbehavior: whistle-blowing. Whistle-blowing refers to an employee metaphorically “blowing the whistle” on some activity within the organization that is interpreted as detrimental to the organization’s external reputation (Miceli & Near, 1984). As outlined by Curphy et al. (1998), whistle-blowing refers to employees reporting unethical acts to some external
party (e.g., government regulators) that can identify the legality of certain organizational actions and then take appropriate action to punish the organization. Peer reporting, on the other hand, refers to an employee reporting coworkers’ misbehavior to a party internal to the organization, such as a direct supervisor. Thus, whistle-blowing and peer reporting differ based on (a) who is harmed by the misbehavior (i.e., society vs. the organization, respectively), (b) the perpetrator of the misbehavior (i.e., the organization as a whole vs. individual employees), and (c) the party receiving reports of misbehavior (i.e., an external party vs. an internal party). The key differences between peer reporting and whistle-blowing are displayed in Table 1.

Prior Research on Peer Reporting

Prior research has examined many predictors of peer reporting. As I review in the following sections, the predictor variables examined by prior peer reporting studies can each be placed into one of the following six general categories: (a) characteristics of the organization, (b) characteristics of the occupation, (c) characteristics of the workgroup, (d) witness individual differences, (e) witness job attitudes, and (f) characteristics of the perpetrator. It is important to note that many studies have examined the hypothetical peer reporting behavior of students in an academic setting (e.g., McCabe, Treviño, & Butterfield, 2001; Mihelić & Culiberg, 2014; Treviño & Victor, 1992). These studies are not included in my review due to my focus on organizational rather than academic settings.

Characteristics of the organization. Prior peer reporting studies have demonstrated that organizations can either facilitate or hinder employees’ peer reporting
behavior. King and Hermodson (2000) surveyed registered nurses on their peer reporting of unethical acts committed by their colleagues. Their results suggested that ambiguous feedback from the organization on appropriate behaviors to report was associated with less peer reporting. Similar research in the medical field has also found that a bureaucratic structure may exhaust potential peer reporters, which prevents employees from peer reporting (Orbe & King, 2000).

Additionally, prior studies in the peer reporting literature have demonstrated that the organizations’ holding its employees accountable for peer reporting, and in turn, organization-wide “following through” on ethics policies are likely to facilitate employees’ peer reporting behavior (Hor, Iedema, Williams, White, Kennedy, & Day, 2010; Treviño & Weaver, 2001). Thus, although organizations can facilitate their employees’ peer reporting behavior by enacting and enforcing ethics policies, organizations can also hinder peer reporting through unclear feedback regarding which behaviors should be reported and bureaucratic structures that make it difficult for issues to be addressed.

**Characteristics of the occupation.** Prior peer reporting studies have demonstrated that occupational differences can affect employees’ peer reporting behavior. Many of these prior studies have used samples from occupations with strict honor codes. King and Hermodson (2000), for example, surveyed registered nurses on their peer reporting of unethical acts and found that most nurses reported ethical issues because of the strict honor code the nurses had accepted when entering their occupation. Similarly, Orbe and King (2010) found that upholding the ideals of the medical
profession was a common reason for medical professionals’ peer reporting behavior. This suggests that one’s occupation can hold workers responsible for peer reporting misbehavior even when their organization does not.

Prior research has also examined peer reporting within the military, another work setting with strict honor codes. Curphy et al. (1998), for example, found that most United States Air Force Academy cadets were likely to report honor code violations. Ellis and Arieli (1999), however, found that despite the strong, formal military system in the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), actual reporting of illegal activity was relatively rare because of the organizational culture common in turbulent military units (i.e., peer reporting impedes efficiency of organizational goals).

**Characteristics of the workgroup.** Prior research has identified several mechanisms by which workgroups either facilitate or hinder their members’ peer reporting behavior. Treviño and Victor (1992), for example, found that when peer reporting was defined as a role responsibility of group members in a fast-food scenario, group members were more likely to report coworker theft. Therefore, social systems within workgroups can exert pressures that make peer reporting either a proscribed or discouraged behavior. De Graaf (2010), on the other hand, posited that workers have to balance their workgroup loyalty with a sense of justice for peer reporting. An exploration of archives from integrity bureaus revealed that the fear of consequences for violating workgroup loyalty was associated with less peer reporting of integrity violations. Thus, whereas the role responsibility to peer report facilitates the peer reporting behavior of workgroups, the perception that peer reporting violates workgroup loyalty often prevents
workers from peer reporting.

**Witness individual differences.** Research examining the effects of individual differences on peer reporting behavior has found mixed support. Gruys, Stewart, and Bowling (2010), for example, examined the effects of locus of control on the reporting of coworkers’ drug and alcohol use at work. Their results demonstrated that internal work locus of control was negatively associated with peer reporting behavior in one of three occupational samples. Bowling and Lyons (2015), on the other hand, examined the effects of extraversion, emotional stability, conscientiousness, and agreeableness on the relationship between observing and reporting CWBs. Those traits, however, failed to significantly predict the reporting of CWBs. Perhaps witness individual differences may not affect peer reporting behavior due to their relatively distal relationship with peer reporting.

**Witness job attitudes.** Whereas previous research in the peer reporting literature investigating witness individual differences has found mixed results, effects for witness job attitudes have been more consistent. Research, for example, has found that attitudes toward revenge are negatively associated with peer reporting of coworkers’ alcohol and drug use (Gruys et al., 2010). Similarly, Bowling and Lyons (2015) found that organizational commitment was positively related to peer reporting.

Treviño and Weaver (2001) similarly found that employees’ perceptions of general organizational justice were positively related to peer reporting behavior. Finally, prior research has demonstrated that the fear of consequences from the organization for the peer reporting of integrity violations in the workplace is a common reason for not
peer reporting (De Graaf, 2010). Therefore, when employees hold positive attitudes toward their job or organizations, they are more likely to peer report the misbehavior they witness because they know that the organization will act in response to their peer reporting behavior. However, other witness job attitudes, such as the fear of consequences from the organization, prevent employees from peer reporting because the organization’s response to peer reporting behavior is undetermined or perceived as negative.

**Characteristics of the perpetrator.** Finally, prior research has suggested that characteristics of CWB perpetrators can impact witnesses’ peer reporting behavior. Curphy et al. (1998), for example, investigated the effects of a potential reporter’s emotional closeness to the perpetrator on the witnesses’ peer reporting of honor code violations. The results indicated that emotional closeness predicted the intention to peer report, but this was not the case when the misconduct was perceived as very severe. This suggests that the severity of egregious forms of misbehavior can trump the positive attitudes a witness may hold toward a perpetrator.

Additional research suggests that the perceived similarity between witnesses and perpetrators significantly affects the witnesses’ subsequent behavior (Miller & Thomas, 2005; Schmidtke, 2007). More specifically, witnesses are less likely to report misbehavior (a) when the social norm consensus regarding theft from the workplace is low, and (b) the perpetrator is perceived to be similar to the witness (Schmidtke, 2007). Schmidtke (2007) posits that having social norms regarding misbehavior communicates to workers that such misbehavior is acceptable and occurs without consequence.
Furthermore, workers often look to their coworkers as a guide for work-related behavior. Thus, witnessing coworkers commit misbehavior might make workers less likely to report and more likely to mimic such misbehavior. Lastly, when employees have a close relationship with their supervisors and team members are the perpetrators, employees are far less likely to report any wrongdoing than when the employees do not have a close relationship with the perpetrators (Miller & Thomas, 2005). In sum, these findings suggest that the emotional closeness between witnesses and perpetrators as well as a witness’s perceived similarity to a perpetrator both prevent workers from peer reporting.

**Limitations of Prior Research on Peer Reporting**

Much of the research in the peer reporting literature has three notable limitations: (a) the reliance on hypothetical scenario studies, (b) the failure to control for the number of CWBs observed, and (c) the failure to simultaneously consider multiple forms of CWB. I discuss each of these below.

**Reliance on Hypothetical Scenarios.** Much of the prior research on peer reporting has used hypothetical work scenarios (e.g., Curphy et al., 1998; King, 2001; Treviño & Victor, 1992; Study 2), which have consequences for the generalizability of their findings. In these studies, participants are presented with a hypothetical work scenario in which a coworker has committed some form of misbehavior and the participant is asked how he or she would respond. Treviño and Victor (1992), for example, examined peer reporting behavior in two scenarios: an academic scenario and a fast-food scenario.

Although prior studies using hypothetical work scenarios intended to measure
workers’ likelihood to peer report, the generalizability of these findings must be questioned because participants are generally incapable of predicting and anticipating their own behavior (Diekmann, 2008; Sherman, 1980). Workers, for example, may be more likely to engage in impression management in studies using hypothetical work scenarios (Bowling & Lyons, 2015; Sherman, 1980). Thus, in regards to peer reporting CWBs, workers may not accurately estimate their likelihood to peer report, thereby threatening the generalizability of such results to workers in actual work settings.

**Failure to Control for Number of CWB Observed.** A second limitation is that previous studies have generally not controlled for the total number of CWBs witnesses have observed. It is unlikely that workers report every CWB they witness (see Bowling & Lyons, 2015). Therefore, workers who witness the greatest amounts of coworker CWBs have the greatest opportunities to engage in peer reporting. Thus, given the varying rates of CWBs in different workplaces, it is necessary to control for the number of CWBs workers observe. In the current study, I will control for the total number of CWBs observed.

**Failure to Simultaneously Consider Multiple Forms of CWB.** Finally, prior peer reporting research has generally focused on a single form of CWBs rather than on CWBs in general (e.g., Gruys et al., 2010; Victor et al., 1993). Gruys et al. (2010), for instance, focused specifically on alcohol and drug use in the workplace, whereas Victor et al. (1993) focused on employee theft. The current study, however, will investigate a broader range of CWBs—those identified by Bennett and Robinson (2000)—which allows the current research to generalize across multiple types of CWB.
The Current Study

In the current study, I used situational strength theory as the theoretical basis for examining the effects of organizations, supervisors, and workgroups on the peer reporting of CWBs. According to situational strength theory, situations vary from each other in how strong they are (Mischel, 1973). Meyer, Dalal, and Hermida (2010) posited that there are four facets to situational strength theory: (a) clarity, (b) consequences, (c) consistency, and (d) constraints. Clarity refers to the extent to which cues regarding responsibilities are available and easily understood. A situation with high clarity, for example, might refer to official, organizational policies informing employees of their responsibilities or strong organizational norms influencing employee behavior. The consequences dimension of situational strength refers to the extent to which decisions or actions have significant implications. An occupation in which job-related errors are related to negative outcomes (e.g., brain surgeon), for example, would impose a strong situation in which employee actions are strongly associated with significant implications (Meyer, Dalal, & Bonaccio, 2009). Consistency refers to the extent to which cues regarding responsibilities are compatible with each other. Maintaining consistency between the content of organizational policies regarding a particular behavior and the content of supervisors’ orders, for example, is expected to strengthen a given situation. Finally, the constraints facet refers to the extent to which individual’s decision making is limited by external forces. Withey, Gellatly, and Annett (2005), for example, demonstrated that the transferability of skills and job market favorability (i.e., conceptualizations of the constraints facet) predicted employee behavior to a greater
extent than did personality variables.

In the current study, I posit that workers’ general hesitancies to peer report can be counteracted by strong peer reporting situations created by either the organization, supervisor, or workgroup. The organization, supervisor, and workgroup might each behave in ways that create strong peer reporting situations in which workers are encouraged to peer report their coworkers’ CWBs. More specifically, the presence of organizational peer reporting policies, supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, and workgroup norms regarding peer reporting might each create strong situations in which peer reporting is more likely to occur.

I will also examine the moderating effects of commitment to the organization, supervisor, and workgroup on the relationships that the organization, supervisor, and workgroup each respectively have on workers’ peer reporting behavior. These hypothesized moderator effects are based on the idea that people are more compliant with sources of influence that they are personally committed to (Lavelle, Rupp, & Brockner, 2007; Morin et al., 2011). In the following sections I first discuss the effects of the organization, supervisor, and workgroup on peer reporting behavior and present my first hypotheses. I then discuss commitment as a hypothesized moderator of these effects.

**Organizational peer reporting policies.** Although prior research has investigated the effects of the organization on workers’ peer reporting behavior, few studies have investigated the effects of official, organizational policies regarding peer reporting (for an exception, see Lyons, Bowling, Gibson, & Zimmerlin, 2015). Examining organizational peer reporting policies as a predictor of peer reporting of
CWBs is important because such research could help inform the content of such policies. Drawing from situational strength theory, organizational policies regarding peer reporting might strengthen the peer reporting situation in two ways: (a) responsibilities regarding peer reporting are clarified, and (b) consequences are associated with peer reporting or failing to peer report. Furthermore, organizational policies might counteract workers’ hesitancy to report (see Bowling & Lyons, 2015; Curphy et al., 1998; Treviño & Victor, 1992). Therefore, the presence of official organizational policies should facilitate peer reporting by creating a strong situation in which peer reporting of CWB-Os is encouraged.

Hypothesis 1: The presence of an organizational peer reporting policy is positively associated with peer reporting of counterproductive work behaviors.

Supervisors’ encouragement to peer report. Although prior research has established many predictors of peer reporting, it has not investigated the effects of supervisor behavior on subordinates’ peer reporting behavior. It is important to examine the effects of supervisors on their subordinates’ peer reporting behavior because, in addition to the organization, supervisors use many formal influence tactics (e.g., reward and coercive power, legitimate power, and expert power) to encourage their subordinates to behave in certain ways (French & Raven, 1959). Furthermore, subordinates are unlikely to go against their supervisors’ directions because such behavior may result in role conflict and incompatible expectations (Chonko & Burnett, 1983; Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek, & Rosenthan, 1964). Given that supervisors have a certain level of control over their subordinates, supervisors likely influence their subordinates’ peer reporting
behavior.

Due to their powerful influence over subordinates, supervisors might be able to create strong peer reporting situations in which their subordinates are more likely to peer report CWBs that specifically harm their supervisors. Although supervisors might not enact official peer reporting policies to the same extent that organizations enact official peer reporting policies, supervisors might informally encourage their subordinates to peer report in ways that are aligned with organizational peer reporting policies. Drawing from situational strength theory, supervisors’ encouragement to peer report might create strong peer reporting situations by (a) clarifying their subordinates’ responsibilities regarding peer reporting, (b) associating consequences with peer reporting or failing to peer report, and (c) remaining consistent in their subordinates’ responsibilities regarding peer reporting. Thus, according to situational strength theory (Mischel, 1973) and the many ways supervisors exert control over their subordinates, supervisors might encourage their subordinates to peer report CWBs directed at supervisors by creating strong peer reporting situations.

Hypothesis 2: The extent to which one’s supervisor encourages peer reporting is positively associated with peer reporting behavior of counterproductive work behaviors.

Workgroup norms regarding peer reporting. Prior research in the peer reporting literature has examined the effects that workgroups have on group members’ peer reporting of ethical violations and workplace theft (e.g., De Graaf, 2010; Treviño & Victor, 1992). However, researchers have not specifically examined the effects of
workgroup norms regarding peer reporting on group members’ peer reporting of CWBs in general. Furthermore, researchers have not used Meyer et al.’s conceptualization of situational strength as the basis for hypotheses involving workgroup culture regarding CWBs. Previous research in the CWB literature, on the other hand, has demonstrated that workgroup norms affect the occurrence of CWBs (Bachrach, Bamberger, & Sonnenstuhl, 2002; Martocchio, 1994; Sliter, Jex, & Grubb, 2013). Bachrach et al. (2002), for example, found that permissive drinking norms in the workplace was the strongest predictor of problem drinking among employees. Similarly, permissive norms regarding absence from work were positively associated with employee absenteeism (Martocchio, 1994). Therefore, norms regarding CWBs in the workplace can have strong effects over employees’ perceptions of acceptable behavior in the workplace. The degree to which members of a work group perceive CWBs as being acceptable may, in turn, influence whether those members believe that the occurrence of CWBs ought to be reported to organizational authorities.

Furthermore, prior research has demonstrated that workgroups create norms that are independent of those of the organization and which influence group member behavior to a greater extent than does the organization (Barker, 1993). Workgroups also informally control group member deviant behavior in a manner that often renders organizational rules for deviant behavior ineffective (Hollinger & Clark, 1982). Therefore, workgroups play an important role in group member behavior, perhaps to a greater extent than does the organization. Due to this level of influence over group members, workgroups might create strong peer reporting situations through norms
regarding peer reporting behavior. More specifically, workgroup norms regarding peer reporting might facilitate group members’ peer reporting behavior by (a) clarifying peer reporting as an acceptable group member behavior, (b) associating consequences with peer reporting or failing to peer report, and (c) remaining consistent in the acceptability of peer reporting behavior. Thus, workgroup norms regarding peer reporting might create strong peer reporting situations in which group members’ peer reporting behavior is more likely to occur.

_Hypothesis 3:_ The extent to which one perceives their workgroup as holding positive norms regarding peer reporting is positively associated with higher peer reporting behavior of counterproductive behaviors.

**Work commitment.** Although the organization, supervisor, and workgroup might create strong situations in which workers are more likely to peer report CWBs, some workers in these situations might be more willing to peer report than others. More specifically, workers who are committed might be more willing to help their organization, supervisor, and workgroup by peer reporting the CWBs they witness. Thus, commitment to the organization, supervisor, and workgroup might further facilitate workers’ peer reporting behavior. I discuss each of these effects below. First, however, I briefly review the relevant work commitment literature.

Mowday, Steers, and Porter (1979) defined organizational commitment as the extent to which employees have an active relationship with their employing organization such that they are willing to contribute a significant amount of their own resources to the organization. Mowday et al. further posited that organizational commitment is
characterized by three related factors: (a) employees have a strong desire to stay with their organization, (b) employees share and accept the organization’s goals and values, and (c) employees are willing to exert considerable effort to benefit the organization. Prior research has demonstrated that Mowday et al.’s conceptualization provides a reliable theoretical framework for investigating the effects of organizational commitment on many organizational outcomes (O’Reilly & Chatman, 1986; Porter, Steers, & Mowday, 1974; Steers, 1977). Porter et al. (1974), for example, found that high levels of organizational commitment were associated with low levels of turnover and high levels of job satisfaction. Porter et al. suggested that employees with high levels of commitment will place a high value on the goals of the organization, which outweighs the effects of liking or disliking the present tasks. Furthermore, Steers (1977) found that organizational commitment was positively related to the intent and desire to remain with the organization.

**Commitment dimensions.** Following Mowday et al.’s (1979) conceptualization of organizational commitment, Meyer and Allen (1991, 1997) provided support for a three component model of organizational commitment: affective, continuance, and normative. Affective commitment refers to employees’ attachment to the employing organization. Employees with high levels of affective commitment stay with the organization because they have a desire to do so. Continuance commitment refers to employees’ maintaining their employment with their organization because of a lack of alternative job opportunities. Employees with high levels of continuance commitment remain with their organization because they must. Normative commitment refers to employees’ feelings of
obligation towards the employing organization. Employees with high levels of normative commitment stay with their organization because they feel obligated to do so. Prior research, however, has found that affective commitment is generally more predictive of organizational variables than are the other two dimensions of commitment (Becker, 1992; Vandenberghe et al., 2004). Therefore, I will measure affective commitment to the organization, supervisor, and workgroup in the current study rather than measure all three components of commitment.

Commitment foci. Previous research has demonstrated that there are many types of commitment directed at different subgroups or foci within the organization (Becker, 1992; Reichers, 1985). Reichers (1985) proposed that the conceptualization of organizational commitment as a global, encompassing concept was deficient in explaining many organizational outcomes. A multiple commitments perspective may be more meaningful because of the different commitments employees have to the goals and values of many groups to which they belong. The workplace consists of several constituencies, each of which contains its own set of values and goals that may be in conflict or exist separately from those of other constituencies. It then follows that organizational members are committed, to different extents, to many sets of goals and values. Furthermore, the organization is a broad abstraction for most employees, due in part to the many constituencies that make up the organization. Becker (1992) provided support for the multiple foci model of commitment by demonstrating that employee commitment in the workplace is multidimensional, thereby making organizational
commitment insufficient in explaining employees’ commitment in the workplace.

Following the multiple foci model of commitment, previous research has shown that commitment to the organization, supervisor, and workgroup are related to different antecedents and outcomes. Vandenberghe et al. (2004), for example, demonstrated that affective commitment to the organization, the supervisor, and the work group represented distinct factors and that each related differentially to their theorized antecedents. Therefore, organizational commitment, commitment to the supervisor, and commitment to the workgroup might be distinctly related to workers’ peer reporting behavior. Furthermore, Morin et al. (2011) found that affective commitment to the organization and to coworkers were uniquely related to different organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs), which suggests that the multiple foci model of commitment includes commitment to more local constituencies, such as coworkers and workgroups.

Mowday et al.’s (1979)’s conceptualization of organizational commitment can be used to explain the potential moderating effects of commitment on the relationship between factors that encourage peer reporting (i.e., organizational policies, supervisor encouragement, and workgroup norms) and peer reporting behavior. Following Mowday et al.’s (1979) conceptualization of commitment, committed workers are likely to do what they are told regarding peer reporting for three reasons. First, committed workers are likely to behave in a way that aligns with the wishes of the given constituency because they hope to avoid damaging a relationship that they intend to maintain over a long period of time. Second, committed workers share the same values as the constituency. Thus, when the organization, supervisor, or workgroup values peer reporting (or devalues
peer reporting), committed workers will be more likely to value peer reporting (or
devalue peer reporting). Third, despite the risk associated with peer reporting, committed
workers might be willing to exert the effort to peer report in order to benefit the
organization, supervisor, or workgroup. Thus, when organizations, supervisors, or work
groups encourage peer reporting (i.e., peer reporting is valued), highly committed
workers will be more likely to peer report CWBs than will poorly committed workers.

_Hypothesis 4:_ The presence of an organizational peer reporting policy is more
likely to be positively associated with peer reporting behavior among workers
high in organizational commitment than among workers low in organizational
commitment.

_Hypothesis 5:_ The extent to which one’s supervisor encourages peer reporting is
more likely to be positively associated with peer reporting behavior among
workers high in commitment to the supervisor than among workers low in
commitment to the supervisor.

_Hypothesis 6:_ The extent to which one perceives their workgroup to hold positive
norms regarding peer reporting is more likely to be positively associated with
higher peer reporting behavior among workers high in commitment to the
workgroup than among workers low in commitment to the workgroup.
II. METHOD

Pilot Study

Participants. I conducted a pilot study in which seven different scales were constructed and tested before being used in my primary study. Items for each scale were piloted using employed undergraduate students from a large Midwestern university. The participants were presented with a cover letter describing the purpose of the pilot study (see Appendix A). The employed undergraduate students ($N = 118$, $62\%$ women, $58\%$ White) were recruited using SONA, the university’s research participation platform. Most of the participants were employed in an non-managerial role ($93\%$ non-managerial), were employed on a part-time basis ($93\%$ part-time, $M_{\text{hours}} = 21$ hours, $SD_{\text{hours}} = 8.21$ hours), and had an average tenure of about one year ($M_{\text{tenure}} = 1.15$ years, $SD_{\text{tenure}} = 1.02$ years).

Creating the supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, workgroup norms regarding peer reporting, occupational norms regarding peer reporting, and workgroup discussion of CWBs scales. I created four new scales for the current study: (a) supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, (b) workgroup norms regarding peer reporting, (c) occupational norms regarding peer reporting, and (d) workgroup discussion of CWBs. I wrote these items to measure the influence of the supervisor, workgroup, and occupation on workers’ peer reporting of CWBs. These scales are not adaptations of previous scales. I describe the procedures I used for writing these items in the following
paragraphs. Given the effects of the occupation on workers’ peer reporting behavior (Curphy et al., 1998; King & Hermodson, 2000; Orbe & King, 2010), occupational norms regarding peer reporting will be used as a control variable in the primary study.

I constructed the items by first referring to the constituency of interest using variations of an item stem. For the supervisors’ encouragement scale, each item began with the stem “my supervisor.” The workgroup norms scale generally began with “members of my workgroup,” and the occupational norms scale with “people who work in my career field.” The exception to the item stem pattern occurred with the workgroup discussion of CWBs scale. I wrote items for each scale such that the items were as parallel as possible between scales. On the supervisors’ encouragement scale, I specifically asked participants about the extent to which supervisors encourage them to peer report and the content of such encouragement. Sample items include “my supervisor encourages me to report any co-worker misbehavior that I witness,” and “my supervisor encourages his/her subordinates to report any co-worker misbehavior.” On the workgroup norms scale, I asked participants about the behaviors and attitudes their workgroups have regarding peer reporting. Sample items include “members of my workgroup encourage me to report any co-worker misbehavior that I witness,” and “my workgroup encourages its members to report co-worker misbehavior.” On the occupational norms scale, I asked participants about the perceived and actual expectations their occupations have regarding peer reporting. Sample items include “the norms of my career field encourage me to report any co-worker behavior that I witness,” and “people who work in my career field are encouraged to report co-worker
Finally, prior research has found many mechanisms by which workgroups might influence the peer reporting of group members, including informal discussion that might supplement a formal reporting procedure (De Graaf, 2010; Treviño & Victor, 1992). In the current study, I controlled for the influence of workgroup discussion of CWBs on the relationship between workgroup norms regarding peer reporting and peer reporting of CWBs directed at the workgroup. On the workgroup discussion of CWBs scale, I asked participants to think of times in which they discussed CWBs with their workgroup. Sample items include “I often discuss co-worker misbehavior that I’ve witnessed with members of my workgroup,” and “I am encouraged to discuss co-worker misbehavior with my workgroup.”

Responses to each item were made on 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Higher average scores indicate a great extent of encouragement to peer report, positive norms regarding peer reporting, or much discussion of CWBs, whereas lower average scores indicate little encouragement to peer report, negative norms regarding peer reporting, or little discussion of CWBs. The piloted items for supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, workgroup norms regarding peer reporting, occupational norms regarding peer reporting, and workgroup discussion of CWBs are respectively shown in Appendices B, C, D, and E.

Following pilot testing of the items, I conducted an item analysis to examine the item difficulty, item discrimination, and reliability coefficients for each scale. Due to the small sample size, a factor analysis was not conducted. After examining item difficulty
and item discrimination for the items on each scale, I removed items that yielded poor item discrimination. Also, I removed reverse-scored items on each scale for a few reasons. First, the reverse-scored items on each scale had lower inter-item correlations and item-total correlations. Second, prior research has indicated that although the justification for using reverse-scored items is the attenuation of response bias, the inclusion of reverse-scored items actually reduces the internal consistency of the scale, might introduce measurement error, and can cause respondent confusion or carelessness which can further reduce scale reliability (Bradley, Royal, & Bradley, 2008; Merritt, 2012; Roszkowski & Soven, 2010; van Sonderen, Sanderman, & Coyne, 2013). The final scales each consist of at least three items.

Creating the revised peer reporting scales. I also created two revised scales of Bowling and Lyons’s (2015) peer reporting scale for the current study: (a) peer reporting of CWBs directed at the organization and (b) peer reporting of CWBs directed at the workgroup. I adapted the items from Bowling and Lyons’s (2015) scale of CWBs observed and CWBs reported. The original Bowling and Lyons (2015) scale consists of CWB-Os and CWB-Is. Participants are then asked whether they have observed each behavior over the past year, and if so, whether they reported that behavior.

To measure the peer reporting of CWBs directed at the organization, the items specifically addressing CWB-Os were separated from those addressing CWB-Is. Sample items include “a co-worker littered the work environment,” and “a co-worker took property from work without permission.” The scale consists of eight items. There are three response options for each item (1 = “I have NOT witnessed this behavior in my
workplace;” 2 = “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, but I did NOT report it;” and 3 = “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, and I did report it.”) The number of CWBs observed and CWBs reported were calculated for each participant. Those participants who have not observed any CWB-Os in the past year were removed from the analyses pertaining to the organizational hypotheses. Items are shown in Appendix F.

It is important to note that each peer reporting subscale mentioned here has both a CWBs observed and a CWBs reported total. For example, if a worker responds to a particular item with response option 1 (i.e., “I have NOT witnessed this behavior in my workplace”), then this worker has an observed “score” of zero for this item and a reported “score” of zero as well. If for the next item the worker responds with response option 2 (i.e., “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, but I did NOT report it”), then this worker has an observed score of one, but a reported score of zero. As a final example, if the worker then responds to the next item with response option 3 (i.e., “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, and I did report it”), then the worker gets an observed score of one and a reported score of one. The observed and reported scores for all items on each scale are then counted and summed for each participant. The final result is the total number of observed CWBs and reported CWBs for that participant on that particular subscale. The number of observed CWBs is used as a control variable in the current study, whereas the number of reported CWBs is used as the outcome variable (see Bowling & Lyons, 2015).

To measure the peer reporting of CWBs directed at the workgroup, the items from
Bowling and Lyons’s (2015) scale specifically addressing CWB-Is were separated from those addressing CWB-Os. Then, I rewrote each item by asking participants whether they have witnessed such CWBs being committed against members of their workgroup. Sample items include “a co-worker embarrassed a member of my workgroup,” and “a co-worker cursed at someone in my workgroup.” The scale consists of eight items. There are three response options for each item: (a) “I have NOT witnessed this behavior in my workplace,” (b) “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, but I did NOT report it,” and (c) “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, and I did report it.” The number of CWBs observed and CWBs reported will be calculated for each participant. Those participants who have not observed any CWBs directed at the workgroup in the past year were removed from the analyses pertaining to the workgroup hypotheses. Items are shown in Appendix G.

To measure the peer reporting of CWBs directed at the supervisor, I adapted items from Mitchell and Ambrose’s (2007) scale of supervisor-directed deviance. This scale is an adaptation of Bennett and Robinson’s (2000) CWB measure. Mitchell and Ambrose’s (2007) scale consists of eight items, each of which asks participants whether they have committed deviant behaviors against their supervisor. I rewrote each item by asking participants whether they have witnessed their co-workers commit deviant behaviors against their supervisors and whether they reported such behavior. Similar to Bowling and Lyons’s (2015) items, each item starts with a similar stem. Sample items include “a co-worker made fun of my supervisor at work,” and “a co-worker gossiped about my supervisor.” The scale consists of 10 items. There are three response options for each
item: (a) “I have NOT witnessed this behavior in my workplace,” (b) “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, but I did NOT report it,” and (c) “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, and I did report it.” The number of CWBs observed and CWBs reported were calculated for each participant. Those participants who have not observed any CWBs directed at the supervisor in the past year were removed from the analyses pertaining to the supervisor hypotheses. Items are shown in Appendix H.

Following pilot testing of the items, I examined whether there is sufficient variability on the measures and whether the measure correlates with the other variables included in the pilot study. Due to the small sample size, a factor analysis was not conducted. Rather, I conducted an item analysis to examine the item difficulty, item discrimination, and inter-item correlations for each scale. Internal consistency reliability coefficients were not calculated for the revised peer reporting scales (see Bowling & Lyons, 2015). All three scales were left intact and used in the primary study.

I removed participants who have not observed CWBs (i.e., observed CWB totals on each subscale equaled zero) because I am interested in examining whether workers who observed CWBs reported such CWBs (see Bowling & Lyons, 2015). As previously mentioned, observed CWBs will be counted and summed for each participant on each subscale. CWBs that were observed and reported were counted and summed and acted as a measure of peer reporting behavior. Observed CWBs were entered on the first step of each hierarchical regression model to control for the total number of CWBs observed.

**Primary Study**

**Participants.** I conducted a two-tailed power analysis using G*Power to
determine the required sample size to detect the interaction effects in my study (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). I conducted the analysis by setting the desired power at $\beta = 0.80$, $\alpha = 0.10$, and I assumed a small effect size of $f^2 = 0.02$. The required sample size is 444 participants. However, due to the removal of participants who have not observed CWBs over the past year, I recruited 500 participants in order to maintain sufficient power. My goal in the current study was to examine the behavior of people who are witnesses of CWBs. Thus, participants who have not observed CWBs in the last year were removed from the dataset (see Bowling & Lyons, 2015). The current study used employed adults recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk; Casler, Bickel, & Hackett, 2013). MTurk is a crowdsourcing service that allows researchers to recruit employed survey respondents for research projects (Landers & Behrend, 2015). I used MTurk data in the current study in order to examine peer reporting in actual works settings. Previous research has demonstrated that Amazon’s MTurk provides quality samples to organizational researchers and, because of the anonymity it provides, is particularly useful for the study of sensitive topics, such as the peer reporting of CWB (Landers & Behrend, 2015; Woo, Keith, & Thornton, 2015). Survey respondents were compensated 50 cents for their participation.

The participants ($N = 501$) were presented with a cover letter describing the purpose of the study (see Appendix M). A majority of the participants were women and identified as White, Non-Hispanic (55% women, 62% White). Most of the participants were employed in an non-managerial role (71% non-managerial), were employed on a
full-time basis (86% full-time, $M_{\text{hours}} = 39.4$ hours, $SD_{\text{hours}} = 9.71$ hours), and held post-secondary degrees (44% Bachelor’s degree holders, 15% Master’s degree holders). A majority of participants were employed in the United States of America (84% American employed).

Measures.

Peer reporting policies. To measure the presence of an organizational peer reporting policy, participants were asked whether or not their organization has such a policy. This item was used by Lyons et al. (2015). The question regarding peer reporting policies was presented as follows: “does your organization have a policy encouraging or requiring you to report the misbehaviors of co-workers?” Participants will be provided with three response options (1 = Yes, 2 = No, 3 = I don’t know). I removed participants who were unsure of their organization’s peer reporting policy.

Commitment to the organization, supervisor, and workgroup. Prior research by Meyer and Allen (1991) has demonstrated that the best fitting model of organizational commitment consists of three factors: affective, normative, and continuance commitment. Affective commitment refers to workers’ emotional attachment to and level of involvement with the organization, normative commitment refers to a feeling of obligation to remain with the organization, and continuance commitment refers to an awareness of the negative consequences associated with leaving the organization (Meyer & Allen, 1997, p. 11). Stinglhamber, Bentein, and Vandenberghe’s (2002) adapted Meyer and Allen’s (1991) scales of affective, normative, and continuance organizational commitment to measure each of the three types of commitment to supervisors and
workgroups. Prior research, however, has demonstrated that affective commitment to the organization, supervisor, and workgroup show the strongest relationships with many organizational outcomes (Meyer & Maltin, 2010; Morin et al., 2011; Stinglhamber et al., 2002). Thus, in the current study, I used the affective organizational commitment scale and its adaptations to other foci of commitment. Scores on each affective commitment scale were separately calculated and averaged for each foci of commitment.

Affective organizational commitment. Affective organizational commitment was measured using Meyer and Allen’s (1991) scale of affective organizational commitment (α = 0.85). The scale consists of eight items, three of which are reverse-coded. Sample items include “I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career at this organization,” and “this organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me.” Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). Higher average scores indicate high levels of affective organizational commitment, whereas lower average scores indicate low levels of affective organizational commitment. Items are shown in Appendix I.

Affective commitment to the supervisor. Affective commitment to the supervisor was measured using Stinglhamber et al.’s (2002) scale of affective commitment to the supervisor (α = 0.88). Stinglhamber et al.’s (2002) scales of work commitment are adaptations of Meyer and Allen’s (1991) scales of organizational commitment. The scale consists of six items. Sample items are “I feel respect for my supervisor,” and “I feel proud to work with my supervisor.” Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). Higher average
scores indicate high levels of affective commitment to the supervisor, whereas lower average scores indicate low levels of affective commitment to the supervisor. Items are shown in Appendix J.

**Affective commitment to the workgroup.** Affective commitment to the workgroup was measured using Stinglhamber et al.’s (2002) scale of affective commitment to the workgroup ($\alpha = 0.89$). The scale consists of six items. Sample items are “my workgroup means a lot to me,” and “I feel proud to be a member of this work group.” Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). Higher average scores indicate high levels of affective commitment to the workgroup, whereas lower average scores indicate low levels of affective commitment to the workgroup. Items are shown in Appendix K.

**Affective commitment to the occupation.** Affective commitment to the occupation was measured using Stinglhamber et al.’s (2002) scale of affective commitment to the occupation ($\alpha = 0.88$). The scale consists of six items. Sample item are “my occupation means a lot to me,” and “I am enthusiastic about my occupation.” Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). Higher average scores indicate high levels of affective commitment to the occupation, whereas lower average scores indicate low levels of affective commitment to the occupation. It is important to note that I am including these items in order to run analyses unrelated to the current project. Items are shown in Appendix L.

**Peer reporting.** Peer reporting will be measured using Bowling and Lyons’s (2015) scale of CWBs observed and CWBs reported. This scale is an adapted version of
Bennett and Robinson’s (2000) CWB measure. Bowling and Lyons (2015) scale consists of 16 items. I adapted Bowling and Lyons’s (2015) scale to separately measure the peer reporting of CWBs that target the organization and workgroup. Mitchell and Ambrose’s (2007) scale of CWBs directed at the supervisor was adapted to measure the peer reporting behavior of witnesses to CWBs directed at their supervisors. The development of these scales and piloting procedure are discussed in the pilot study section above.

Control variables.

CWBs observed. It is important to account for all CWBs that workers observe because failing to account for differences between workers in different organizations can act as a confounding variable on peer reporting behavior. For example, some organizational settings are permissive of CWBs, in which case more CWBs will be observed. In a different organizational setting, CWBs may not be tolerated, thus fewer CWBs will be observed. Thus, I controlled for the total number of CWBs that workers observed. Workers who indicated that they had observed at least one CWB, regardless of whether reporting occurred, were included in the dataset; those who indicated that they had not observed CWBs were excluded all analyses.

Occupational norms regarding peer reporting. Prior research has demonstrated that characteristics of the occupation can significantly affect employees’ peer reporting behavior (Curphy et al., 1998; King & Hermodson, 2000; Orbe & King, 2010). In the current study, I controlled for occupational characteristics by measuring occupational norms regarding peer reporting. Occupational norms regarding peer reporting were measured using the aforementioned scale created for the current study.
Managerial status. It is possible that managerial status affects peer reporting behavior. More specifically, workers in managerial positions are probably more familiar with rules regarding CWBs and peer reporting of CWBs (Gruys et al., 2010). Furthermore, managers might peer report more often because they might view peer reporting as an official part of their job. Thus, managerial status (1 = non-managerial; 2 = managerial) was controlled for when testing each hypothesis (Bowling & Lyons, 2015).

Additional demographic information was collected from participants. Participants were asked to report their gender (1 = female; 2 = male), race (1 = African American; 2 = American Indian or Alaska Native; 3 = Asian; 4 = Hispanic; 5 = Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; 6 = White, Non-Hispanic; 7 = Some other race; 8 = Two or more races), level of education (1 = high school diploma; 2 = some college; 3 = associate’s degree; 4 = bachelor’s degree; 5 = master’s degree; 6 = doctoral degree), status of their employment (1 = full-time; 2 = part-time), average numbers of hours worked per week, and country of employment (1 = United States; 2 = not United States).

Procedure

Participants completed each survey online using Qualtrics-generated surveys. First, they were asked to read a cover letter discussing the purpose of the study and the nature of the surveys they were administered (see Appendix M). They then indicated that they had read the cover letter and the administration of surveys began. The measures of organizational peer reporting policies, supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, workgroup norms regarding peer reporting, peer reporting, and each of the commitment scales were then administered. Following these measures, all measures of control and
alternative variables were administered. Participants finally answered demographic questions before completing the survey. Participants were finally thanked for their participation in the present study, and 50 cents was deposited into their MTurk user accounts.
III. RESULTS

Pilot Study

The purpose of the current pilot study was to examine the characteristics (i.e., item difficulty and item-total correlations) of seven new scales created for the primary study. I created scales to measure supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, workgroup norms regarding peer reporting, occupational norms regarding peer reporting, workgroup discussion of CWBs, peer reporting of CWBs targeted at the organization, peer reporting of CWBs targeted at the supervisor, and peer reporting of CWBs targeted at the workgroup. I discuss the characteristics of each scale in the subsequent sections.

Data cleaning. I used box and whisker plots and found no outliers in the pilot study data. Participants with missing data were removed and the remaining sample (N = 100) was used in the pilot analyses.

Supervisors’ encouragement to peer report scale. I will begin by explaining the basic item analyses performed on each of the scales created for the pilot study before continuing onto descriptive statistics and inter-correlations between all scales in the pilot study. Basic item analyses were conducted in order to examine item difficulty and item-total correlations for each of the new scales. The item analysis results for the supervisors’ encouragement to peer report scale are shown in Table 2. The average score on the scale (M = 5.00) and standard deviation (SD = .88) indicate medium to high levels of supervisor encouragement to peer report misbehaviors of co-workers (scores on each
item potentially ranged from 1 to 7). As shown in the table, item-total correlations were still large but generally lower for the reverse-scored items ($r_2 = .61, r_4 = .60$). I removed the reverse-scored items from this scale in order to improve scale reliability. Item 6 was also removed due to its relatively lower item-total correlation ($r = .68$). The item analysis results for the shortened scale are shown in bold in Table 2. After removing items 2, 4, and 6, scale reliability increased to an acceptable level ($\alpha = .87$).

**Workgroup norms regarding peer reporting scale.** I conducted similar item analysis for the new workgroup norms measure (see Table 3). The average score on the scale ($M = 4.5$) and standard deviation ($SD = 1.2$) indicate generally moderate norms regarding peer reporting. As shown, item-total correlations were large but generally lower for the reverse-scored items ($r_2 = .77, r_4 = .70$). I thus removed the reverse-scored items from this scale in order to increase scale reliability. I also removed Item 6 in order to make the scale appear as parallel as possible to the supervisors’ encouragement scale. The item analysis results for the shortened scale are shown in bold in Table 3. After removing items 2, 4, and 6, scale reliability increased ($\alpha = .92$).

**Occupational norms regarding peer reporting scale.** I also conducted item analysis on the new occupational norms scale (see Table 4). The average score on the scale ($M = 5.00$) and standard deviation ($SD = 1.1$) indicate slightly positive norms regarding peer reporting. As shown, item-total correlations were generally lower for the reverse-scored items ($r_2 = .72, r_4 = .75$). I removed the reverse-scored items from this scale in order to increase scale reliability. I also removed Item 6 in order to make the
scale appear as parallel as possible to the other scales. The item analysis results for the shortened scale are shown in bold in Table 4. After removing items 2, 4, and 6, scale reliability increased ($\alpha = .91$).

**Workgroup discussion of CWBs scale.** I conducted item analyses on the new workgroup discussion scale (see Table 5). The average score on the scale ($M = 4.00$) and standard deviation ($SD = 1.00$) indicates relatively average discussion of CWBs among workgroup members. As shown in the table, item-total correlations were generally lower for the items 4 and 7 ($r_4 = .52$, $r_7 = .60$), which were both reverse scored items. I removed these reverse scored items from this scale in order to increase scale reliability. Item 2, another reverse scored item, was also removed in order to make the scale appear as parallel as possible to the other scales. Unlike the other scales, item 6 was not dropped because the item-total correlation ($r = .78$) was the strongest correlation and remained the strongest if it were to be dropped ($r = .67$). The item analysis results for the shortened scale are shown in bold in Table 5. After removing items 2, 4, and 7, scale reliability increased to a more acceptable level ($\alpha = .83$).

**Construct validity of the new scales.** Table 6 shows a matrix of intercorrelations between the final version of each scale in the pilot study. Internal consistency reliabilities are displayed along the diagonal. The descriptive statistics for each scale are also displayed. The descriptive statistics and correlations shown for supervisors’ encouragement, workgroup norms, occupational norms, and workgroup discussion are from the shortened versions of these scales. As described above, each peer reporting subscale yields an “observed CWBs” score as well as a “reported CWBs” score.
Based on prior research (see Bowling & Lyons, 2015; Gruys et al., 2010), I predicted that (a) observed CWBs at a specific target (i.e., organization, supervisor, workgroup) would be positively related to reported CWBs at the corresponding target, (b) supervisors’ encouragement would be positively related to reported CWBs targeted at the supervisor (CWB-S), (c) workgroup norms would be positively related to reported CWBs targeted at the workgroup (CWB-W), (d) workgroup discussion of CWBs would be positively related to reported CWBs targeted at the workgroup, and (e) occupational norms would be positively related to reported CWBs targeted at the organization, supervisor, and workgroup. The pattern of correlations reported in Table 6, however, is not entirely consistent with these predictions. Each of the observed CWBs were correlated with reported CWBs at the corresponding targets (CWB-O: \( r = .46 \), CWB-S: \( r = .58 \), CWB-W: \( r = .52 \)). However, supervisors’ encouragement to peer report was not significantly correlated with CWB-S reported (\( r = -.06 \)). Furthermore, workgroup norms regarding peer reporting was not significantly correlated with CWB-W reported (\( r = -.09 \)). Workgroup discussion of CWBs was not significantly correlated with CWB-W reported (\( r = .07 \)). Occupational norms of peer reporting was not significantly correlated with CWB observed or CWB reported scores, regardless of target. In sum, these findings provide mixed support for the construct validity of the new scales.

**Primary Study**

**Data cleaning.** I used box and whisker plots to identify outliers (\( N = 11 \)). I conducted all tests of the study hypotheses first with the outliers included, and then again with any outliers removed. The conclusions were similar in both analyses, therefore I
kept the outliers in the analyses. As suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007, p. 63), I performed a missing data analysis (MVA) in SPSS to identify missing data and observe any patterns among the missing data. Missing data appeared to be randomly distributed and no visible pattern was recognized. I chose not to replace missing data with mean values, using regression, or using expectation maximization (EM) because each of these procedures did not significantly change the means or standard deviations for the data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 71). There were no complete cases of missing data. Therefore, participants with missing data were left in the data set for the correlation analyses. Missing data were removed listwise, however, for all regression analyses.

In the current study, I was interested in the behavior of CWB witnesses. Therefore, scoring for the peer reporting subscales was dependent on the number of CWBs observed. More specifically, if participants responded that they had not observed any CWBs targeted at the relevant body (i.e., organization, supervisor, workgroup) in the last year, their data was excluded for the analyses pertaining to that particular subscale.

**Descriptive statistics.** Table 7 shows a correlation matrix of all variables in the primary study. Internal consistency reliabilities are displayed on the diagonal. The descriptive statistics, including mean and standard deviation, for each variable are also displayed. Given that missing data were removed pairwise, the sample sizes for each variable are displayed as well.

On average, participants observed more CWBs targeted at the organization (CWB-O; \( M = 4.69 \)) than CWBs targeted at the supervisor (CWB-S; \( M = 3.81 \)) or CWBs targeted at the workgroup (CWB-W; \( M = 3.57 \)). On average, participants reported more
CWB-O ($M = 1.16$) than CWB-S ($M = 0.85$) or CWB-W ($M = 0.94$). Furthermore, participants reported relatively few of the CWB-W (26.33%), CWB-S (22.31%), and CWB-O (24.97%) that they observed. These proportions of CWBs reported are consistent with prior research (see Bowling & Lyons, 2015).

**Hypothesis 1: Main Effects of Peer Reporting Policies.** Hypothesis 1 posited that the presence of organizational peer reporting policies would be positively associated with peer reporting of CWB-O. I tested Hypothesis 1 using hierarchical regression analysis. In Step 1, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-Os onto managerial status, CWB-O observed, and occupational norms regarding peer reporting. In Step 2, I regressed peer reporting onto the presence of a peer reporting policy. The hierarchical regression results for the second step are shown in Table 8. Job level was a significant predictor of peer reporting ($\beta = .14, p < .01$) as well as CWB-O observed ($\beta = .44, p < .001$). Occupational norms was also a significant predictor of peer reporting ($\beta = .16, p < .01$). However, the presence of an organizational peer reporting policy was not a significant predictor of peer reporting ($\beta = .05, p = .33$). The second step of the hierarchical regression model did not account for incremental variance in peer reporting above and beyond the first step, $R^2 = .27, \Delta R^2 = .00, F(4, 404) = .96, p = .33$. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was not supported.

**Hypothesis 2: Main Effects of Supervisor Encouragement.** Hypothesis 2 posited that supervisors’ encouragement to peer report would be positively associated with peer reporting of CWBs directed at the supervisor (CWB-S). Hypothesis 2 was tested using a hierarchical regression analysis. In Step 1, I regressed peer reporting of
CWB-S onto managerial status, CWB-S observed, and occupational norms regarding peer reporting. In Step 2, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-S onto supervisors’ encouragement to peer report. The hierarchical regression results for the second step are shown in Table 9. Only CWB-S observed was a significant predictor of peer reporting ($\beta = .56, p < .001$). Supervisors’ encouragement to peer report was not a significant predictor of peer reporting ($\beta = .11, p = .05$). The second step of the hierarchical regression model did not account for incremental variance in peer reporting above and beyond the first step, $R^2 = .36, \Delta R^2 = .01, F(4, 389) = 3.73, p = .05$. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was not supported.

**Hypothesis 3: Main Effects of Workgroup Norms.** Hypothesis 3 posited that workgroup norms regarding peer reporting would be positively associated with peer reporting of CWBs directed at the workgroup (CWB-W). Hypothesis 3 was tested using a hierarchical regression analysis. In Step 1, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-W onto managerial status, CWB-W observed, occupational norms regarding peer reporting, and workgroup discussion of CWBs. In Step 2, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-W onto workgroup norms regarding peer reporting. The hierarchical regression results for the second step are shown in Table 10. Neither job level ($\beta = .05, p = .25$) nor occupational norms ($\beta = .09, p = .13$) were significant predictors of peer reporting. CWB-W observed ($\beta = .41, p < .001$) and workgroup discussion ($\beta = .11, p = .03$), however, were significant predictors of peer reporting. Workgroup norms was not a significant predictor of peer reporting ($\beta = .12, p = .06$). The second step of the hierarchical regression model
did not account for incremental variance in peer reporting above and beyond the first step, $R^2 = .26$, $\Delta R^2 = .01$, $F(4, 367) = 3.45$, $p = .06$. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.

**Hypothesis 4: Moderating Effects of Organizational Commitment.**

Hypothesis 4 posited that organizational commitment would moderate the relationship between the presence of an organizational peer reporting policy and peer reporting of CWB-O, such that this relationship would be stronger when levels of organizational commitment were high rather than low. Hypothesis 4 was tested using a moderated regression analysis. For clearer interpretation, I mean-centered each of my predictor variables and mean-centered them when calculating my interaction terms (Hofmann & Gavin, 1998). In the first step, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-O onto managerial status, CWB-Os observed, and occupational norms regarding peer reporting. In the second step, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-O onto organizational peer reporting policies and affective organizational commitment. In the third step, I regressed peer reporting onto the organizational peer reporting policies x affective organizational commitment interaction term. The moderated regression results for the final step are shown in Table 11. All variables entered in the first step were significant predictors of peer reporting, including job level ($\beta = .12$, $p < .01$), CWB-O observed ($\beta = .46$, $p < .001$), and occupational norms ($\beta = .12$, $p = .01$). Similar to the analyses for Hypothesis 1, however, the presence of a peer reporting policy was not a significant predictor of peer reporting ($\beta = .06$, $p = .20$). Affective organizational commitment was a significant predictor of peer reporting ($\beta = .18$, $p < .001$). The interaction between peer reporting
policies and affective organizational commitment was also significant ($\beta = .10, p = .03$).
The final step of the moderated regression model accounted for significant incremental variance in peer reporting above and beyond the prior steps, $\Delta R^2 = .01, F(6, 402) = 4.89, p = .03$. Thus, organizational commitment significantly moderates the relationship between peer reporting policies and peer reporting of CWB-Os.

Figure 1 shows a plot of the interaction effect between organizational peer reporting policies and affective organizational commitment (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2002; Preacher, Curran, & Bauer, 2006). As shown in the figure, the presence of a peer reporting policy had a positive relationship with peer reporting among workers who were high in organizational commitment; however, it had essentially no relationship with peer reporting among workers who were low in organizational commitment. Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported.

**Hypothesis 5: The Moderating Effects of Commitment to Supervisor.**
Hypothesis 5 posited that commitment to the supervisor would moderate the relationship between supervisors’ encouragement to peer report and peer reporting of CWB-S, such that this relationship would be stronger when levels of commitment to the supervisor were high rather than low. Hypothesis 5 was tested using a moderated regression analysis. For clearer interpretation, I mean-centered each of my predictor variables and mean-centered them when calculating my interaction terms. In the first step, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-S onto managerial status, CWB-S observed, and occupational norms regarding peer reporting. In the second step, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-S onto supervisors’ encouragement to peer report and affective commitment to the
supervisor. In the third step, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-S onto the supervisors’ encouragement to peer report x commitment to the supervisor interaction term. The moderated regression results for the final step are shown in Table 12. CWB-S observed (β = .59, p < .001) and commitment to the supervisor (β = .16, p < .01) were significant predictors of peer reporting. The interaction between supervisors’ encouragement and commitment to the supervisor was not significant (β = .07, p = .08). The final step of the moderated regression model did not account for significant incremental variance in peer reporting of CWB-S above and beyond the prior steps, ΔR² = .01, F(6, 387) = 3.09, p = .08. Thus, commitment to the supervisor did not moderate the relationship between supervisors’ encouragement and peer reporting of CWB-S. Hypothesis 5, therefore, was not supported.

**Moderating Effects of Work Group Commitment.** Hypothesis 6 posited that commitment to the workgroup would moderate the relationship between workgroup norms regarding peer reporting and peer reporting of CWB-W, such that this relationship was stronger when levels of commitment to the workgroup were high rather than low. Hypothesis 6 was tested using a moderated regression analysis. For clearer interpretation, I mean-centered each of my predictor variables and mean-centered them when calculating my interaction terms. In the first step, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-W onto managerial status, CWB-W observed, occupational norms regarding peer reporting, and workgroup discussion of CWBs. In the second step, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-W onto workgroup norms regarding peer reporting and affective commitment to the workgroup. In the third step, I regressed peer reporting of CWB-W
onto the workgroup norms regarding peer reporting x affective commitment to the workgroup interaction term. The moderated regression results for the final step are shown in Table 13. CWB-W observed ($\beta = .42, p < .001$) and workgroup discussion ($\beta = .11, p = .04$) were significant predictors of peer reporting. Neither workgroup norms ($\beta = .11, p = .08$) nor commitment to the workgroup ($\beta = .03, p = .48$) were significant predictors of peer reporting. The interaction between workgroup norms and commitment to the workgroup was not significant ($\beta = .03, p = .54$). The final step of the moderated regression model did not account for significant incremental variance in peer reporting above and beyond the prior steps, $R^2 = .27, \Delta R^2 = .00, F(6, 365) = 3.09, p = .54$. Thus, commitment to the workgroup does not moderate the relationship between workgroup norms regarding peer reporting and peer reporting of CWB-W. Hypothesis 6, therefore, was not supported.

**Alternative regression analyses.** In addition to the hierarchical regression analyses conducted to test each hypothesis, I also conducted additional regression analyses using the proportion of CWBs reported to CWBs observed as the criterion variable for each model. Prior research, however, has demonstrated that the use of a proportion as the criterion variable in linear regression analyses is inappropriate (Papke & Wooldridge, 1996). More specifically, a linear regression with un-transformed proportions results in the prediction of proportions that are outside the lower bound of zero and upper bound of one. Researchers should instead consider performing a logit transformation on the proportions to prevent the issue of predicted values being out of the bounds of possible values. Thus, I conducted a logit transformation on each of the
proportions for each regression model. However, to avoid the issue of extreme values (i.e., proportions of zero and one) being removed from the analyses, I adjusted all proportions of zero to be equal to .005 and all proportions of one to be equal to .995. This rounding procedure allowed for all relevant proportions to be included in my analyses and adequately captured the appropriate variation in my data. The results of these analyses are displayed in Appendices N through S. Using this alternative regression analysis based on the proportions of CWBs reported, Hypotheses 2 and 3 were supported, whereas Hypothesis 4 was not supported.
IV. DISCUSSION

Counterproductive work behaviors (CWBs) harm organizations and their members, but unfortunately they often go undetected by management (Bennett & Robinson, 2000; Niehoff & Paul, 2000). The purpose of the current study was to investigate the mechanisms by which the organization, supervisor, and the workgroup might each encourage employees to report the CWBs they witness—thus aiding in the detection of CWB. I argued that organizational peer reporting policies, supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, and workgroup norms regarding peer reporting each created a “strong” peer reporting situation that counteracts witnesses’ general hesitancy to peer report. However, I found no support for the main effects of policies, supervisors’ encouragement, or workgroup norms on peer reporting. Furthermore, I hypothesized that commitment to the organization, supervisor, and workgroup would moderate the respective relationships of organizational policies, supervisors’ encouragement, and workgroup norms with employees’ peer reporting of CWBs. I found a significant moderating effect for organizational commitment on the relationship between policies and peer reporting of CWB-O: Workers who were high in organizational commitment were more likely to report the CWB-Os they witness than were workers who were low in organizational commitment. However, I found no significant moderating effects for either commitment to the supervisor or for commitment to the workgroup. In the next section I describe the theoretical implications of my findings.
Theoretical Implications

First, it is important to note that peer reporting is a low base rate behavior. More specifically, workers tend not to report the CWBs they witness. Current results demonstrate that only one-fifth to one quarter of CWBs workers observed are reported. Prior research has demonstrated similar proportions of CWBs reported (see Bowling & Lyons, 2015; Gruys et al., 2010). Tests of my hypotheses, therefore, may have not reached statistical significance because of the low base rate of peer reporting behavior. In other words, my null results could be the result of range restriction caused by peer reporting’s low base rate.

I did not find significant main effects for organizational peer reporting policies, supervisors’ encouragement to peer report, or workgroup norms regarding peer reporting on workers’ peer reporting behavior. It is possible that these variables are insufficient to overcome workers’ natural hesitancy to engaging in peer reporting (Treviño & Victor, 1992; Victor et al., 1993). The hesitancy to report might originate in childhood development in which “tattling” on others is neither effective nor encouraged after a certain age (Cooney, Huthison, & Costigan, 1996; Ingram & Bering, 2010). More specifically, children tattle on each other (i.e., inform a third party, usually an adult, of wrongdoing) at an early stage of development, but this stage is immediately followed by a stage in which negotiation is preferred rather than tattling (Cooney et al., 1996). As adults, reporting coworkers for misbehaviors in the workplace often creates conflict or results in retaliation (De Graaf, 2010; King & Hermodson, 2000). Thus, workers might be hesitant to report because they have been socialized not to report, and they fear
retaliation from perpetrators, or sometimes, the organization. Also, these constraints on behavior might weaken the strength of the peer reporting situation. More specifically, the strength of the peer reporting situation created by organizational, supervisor, and workgroup behaviors, might not be sufficient to encourage peer reporting because socialization not to report and fear of retaliation for reporting suppress the strength of the peer reporting situation.

The current results have implications for the possible mechanisms by which organizations can facilitate their workers’ peer reporting behavior. Organizational peer reporting policies do not appear to facilitate workers’ reporting of CWB-Os. It is possible that when organizational policies are present but the organization fails to adhere to or “follow-through” with their policies that workers choose not to follow the policies (Treviño & Weaver, 2001). When organizations fail to follow-through on their ethics policies, such as peer reporting policies, workers might view this failure as a violation of expectations regarding procedural and retributive justice. Thus, workers choose not to report because doing so does not result in action.

Furthermore, it is possible that the mere presence of a policy is not enough. Rather, it is important that the policy has certain qualities that are conducive to peer reporting. While the presence of a peer reporting policy might provide clarity as to which behaviors should be reported or the paths by which workers should report, certain features of a policy might increase the policy’s strength (Smith-Crowe, Tenbrunsel, Chan-Serafin, Brief, Umphress, & Joseph, 2015). For example, the 2007 National Business Ethics Survey (NBES; Ethics Resource Center, 2007) indicated a number of
policy features (e.g., written standards, training, and ethics hotlines) that were associated with increased peer reporting. Furthermore, the 2013 edition of the NBES (Ethics Resource Center, 2013) recommended the implementation of performance evaluations of ethical conduct, systems to discipline violators, guided ethics values or principles, and protection from retaliation to improve peer reporting behavior. Thus, the non-significant relationship between organizational peer reporting policies and peer reporting of CWB-O in the current study might have been a result of not measuring specific qualities of peer reporting policies.

To the extent of the author’s knowledge, this is the first peer reporting study to focus on supervisor behaviors that might encourage subordinates to report the CWBs they witness. This is a worthwhile focus because supervisor behavior can potentially be modified via organizational practices (e.g., supervisor training can emphasize behaviors that encourage subordinate peer reporting). The current results, however, suggest that supervisors’ encouragement to peer report does not facilitate peer reporting among subordinates. Prior research has shown that missing the appropriate pathways along which a worker should report CWBs discourages workers to report (Hor et al., 2010). Thus, it is possible that encouragement to peer report must be communicated in a manner that clearly specifies (a) the behaviors to be reported, and (b) the paths by which reporting should occur.

Also, current results have implications for the effects of the workgroup on the peer reporting behavior of workgroup members. Workgroup norms regarding peer reporting do not appear to have a significant effect on the peer reporting of CWBs.
targeted at the workgroup. Prior research both supports and contradicts the current finding. Most workgroups consist of workers who are of similar tenure and professional backgrounds. My finding is supported by prior research which has indicated that when the perpetrator of a misbehavior is perceived as similar to oneself, the witness is less likely to report that behavior and more likely to mimic that behavior in the future (Schmidtke, 2007). Thus, when group members are perceived as similar to each other, they will be less likely to report. My finding, however, conflicts with claims that the social norm consensus in a group not to report discourages group members to report (King & Hermodson, 2000). Rather, according to my finding, workgroup norms have little influence on group members’ peer reporting behavior.

The current findings regarding the significant moderating effect of organizational commitment on the relationship between peer reporting policies and peer reporting of CWB-Os have significant theoretical implications. Prior research has demonstrated that workers high in organizational commitment feel the need to help and give back to the organization (Meyer & Allen, 1997; Mowday et al., 1979). Prior peer reporting research has demonstrated that workers high in organizational commitment tend to report more CWBs—perhaps this represents an attempt to “give back” to the organization (Bowling & Lyons, 2015). Thus, my findings are consistent with prior research in the organizational commitment and peer reporting literatures. Furthermore, my findings are consistent with the principles of reciprocity and social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Gouldner, 1960).

I found, however, that organizational policies were not significant predictors of
peer reporting, but organizational commitment was a strong predictor as was the interaction between policies and commitment. Workers in organizations without policies but with high levels of organizational commitment reported significantly fewer CWB-Os than workers in organizations with policies and with high levels of organizational commitment. It is possible that workers in organizations without policies but with high levels of organizational commitment might feel a sense of ambiguity regarding the actions to be taken when witnessing CWB-Os (Hor et al., 2010). More specifically, they might want to help the organization, but the ambiguity regarding the appropriate actions to be taken after witnessing CWBs prevents them from reporting CWBs (i.e., they don’t want to risk harming the organization). Workers in organizations with policies and with high levels of organizational commitment, however, (a) may feel that their organization cares about them, (b) know that certain CWBs should be reported, and (c) trust that their organization will value the reported information despite the perceived risks (Liu & Wang, 2013). Thus, workers high in organizational commitment likely feel so attached to their organization that when instructed to report the CWBs they witness, they are far more likely to do so compared to workers in organizations without policies and to workers with lower levels of organizational commitment.

As stated previously, the current study is the first to investigate the effects of the supervisor on subordinates’ peer reporting behavior. The results showed that commitment to the supervisor does not moderate the relationship between supervisors’ encouragement to report and peer reporting of CWBs targeted at the supervisor. Prior research has indicated that commitment to the supervisor is positively related to job
performance (Vandenberghe et al., 2008). Thus, it is possible that if peer reporting was not a part of a subordinates’ official job duties that they would not report the CWBs they witness. Alternatively, subordinates might feel uncomfortable reporting CWBs to their supervisor, especially when the CWBs were directed at their supervisor. Reporting such information would be particularly uncomfortable if subordinates are high in commitment to the supervisor. More specifically, workers with high levels of affective commitment to the supervisor want to help their supervisors. Reporting CWBs directed at their supervisor, however, might be viewed as detrimental to their supervisor’s well-being by eliciting negative affective reactions. Therefore, workers high in commitment to the supervisor might withhold insulting information from their supervisor to protect their supervisor’s well-being.

Also, workers might not report CWBs directed at their workgroup regardless of their levels of commitment to the workgroup. Workers might prefer to discuss misbehavior targeted at the workgroup with other workgroup members rather than reporting such behavior outside the group. More specifically, workers high in commitment to the workgroup might not want to violate trust within the group by reporting CWBs to someone outside the group. As shown in Table 9, discussing CWBs in the workgroup was a significant predictor of peer reporting, whereas workgroup norms was not. Thus, workers might prefer to keep such information to the group rather than potentially causing unintentional, negative consequences for group members, especially when they are committed to their workgroup (De Graaf, 2010).
Practical Implications

The current findings have practical implications for organizational settings. Results showed that organizational policies regarding peer reporting were not significantly associated with peer reporting of CWB-Os. Organizational commitment, however, significantly moderated this relationship such that the relationship between policy presence and peer reporting of CWB-Os was higher for high-commitment workers than for low-commitment workers. In fact, the highest level of peer reporting of CWB-Os occurred when (a) workers were highly committed and (b) a peer reporting policy had been implemented. Thus, practitioners should first focus on increasing organizational commitment among workers. The organizational commitment literature provides many examples of interventions by which organizations can improve workers’ organizational commitment. Nyhan (1999), for example, found that interpersonal trust is a strong, positively associated correlate of organizational commitment. Thus, organizations should engage in trust building from the bottom-up in order to increase organizational commitment. Regarding peer reporting, more specifically, organizations can ensure workers that they can trust each other when reporting CWBs. Additionally, Buchanan II (1974) found that social interaction with organizational peers was a significant predictor of organizational commitment and therefore suggested that organizations focus on improving social interactions among peers in the organization in order to increase organizational commitment.

Future Research

In the current study, I did not measure workers’ consideration of peer reporting as
either a part of their job description or a behavior that is above and beyond their job
description. Prior research has shown that there are differences between workers in
whether they consider organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) an official job duty
(i.e., in-role behavior) or going beyond their job duties (i.e., extra-role behavior;
Morrison, 1994). Similarly, future research should investigate whether or not workers
consider peer reporting to be an in-role or extra-role behavior. More specifically, if peer
reporting is a part of the worker’s job performance domain, then they might be more
likely to report because ambiguity around peer reporting might be removed (Hor et al.,
2010). If workers, however, are unfamiliar with their organization’s peer reporting
policy, but their supervisors and workgroups bring this information to the workers’
attention, then perhaps peer reporting will be more likely. Future research is needed to
clarify and provide evidence to support these assumptions.

Also, future research should examine how peer reporting policies affect peer
reporting of CWBs regardless of the target. In the current study, I created three separate
scales to measure peer reporting of CWBs directed at specific targets. Given the low
base rate of peer reporting (see Bowling & Lyons, 2015), however, it might be more
effective to examine the effects of organizational peer reporting polices on the reporting
of CWBs in general. More specifically, combining the scales created in the current study
would allow for a broader range of CWBs that might be witnessed. Prior research by
Bennett and Robinson (2000), for example, has posited that creating CWB measures that
consist of a heterogeneous mix of CWBs allows researchers to capture different CWBs
that might be more common in one organization than another or are context-dependent.
This practice helps address the low base rate associated with studying narrower forms of CWB. Thus, future peer reporting research might benefit from scales measuring the reporting of a broad range of CWBs.

Future research should continue to investigate the effects of supervisors on their subordinates’ peer reporting behavior. More specifically, rather than asking subordinates about their peer reporting behavior, researchers should ask supervisors about their subordinates’ peer reporting behavior. Participants might answer survey items in a manner that depicts them as more socially desirable than they actually are (Zerbe & Paulhaus, 1987). Thus, in order to appear more socially desirable, participants might not be honest in the CWBs they have reported. Gathering the frequency of subordinates’ peer reporting behavior from their supervisors, however, might eliminate the issue of social desirability and thus realistically depict the peer reporting behavior of their subordinates.

Finally, future research should investigate how workgroups informally punish group members for committing CWBs directed at the workgroup. Prior research has demonstrated that group members will only report the misbehaviors they witness when the group benefits from the reporting (Miceli & Near, 1985). Current results, however, showed that workgroup norms regarding peer reporting of CWBs directed at the workgroup does not predict peer reporting. Thus, simply holding beliefs or norms about peer reporting is not associated with peer reporting behavior. Rather, workgroups might resort to informal tactics to punish group members for committing CWBs directed at the workgroup, especially if the organization does not punish CWBs or is perceived as not following through with punishment. Future research is needed to provide evidence to
support these assumptions.

Limitations

There are three important limitations of which to take note in the current study. First, because I used self-report measures current results might have been affected by common method variance (CMV). As shown by the many non-significant correlations in Table 7, it is unlikely that CMV significantly inflated the correlations I observed. Furthermore, prior research has demonstrated that CMV actually attenuates observed moderator effects (Evans, 1985). Thus, the significant moderator effect observed for organizational commitment was found in spite of CMV rather than as the result of CMV. Although the risks of CMV on results can be significant, future peer reporting research should continue to use self-report measures to avoid the aforementioned issues associated with scenario-based studies.

Second, also due to my use of self-report measures current results might have been affected by a social desirability bias. Social desirability bias refers to participants’ tendency to deny that they have socially undesirable traits or behaviors and to admit to socially desirable traits or behaviors instead (Zerbe & Paulhaus, 1987). This bias is problematic in ethics research, including peer reporting research. For example, Randall and Fernandes (1991) found that self-reported ethical conduct is positively associated with (a) over-reporting of desirable behaviors and (b) under-reporting of undesirable behaviors. In the current study, I asked participants about the number of CWBs they have observed and reported. Thus participants might have responded in a socially desirable manner by (a) over-reporting the number of CWBs they observed and reported,
and (b) under-reporting the number of CWBs they observed but did not report.

Third, the current study relied on cross-sectional data rather than longitudinal data. Cross-sectional data, although convenient, provides weak evidence for causal inferences. Thus, I cannot make causal inferences from the current results. Future peer reporting research should collect longitudinal data from organizations.

Conclusion

In the current study, I sought to determine the effects of three different constituencies—the organization, supervisor, and workgroup—on employees’ peer reporting of CWBs targeted at the corresponding constituency. I also examined how commitment to the organization, supervisor, and workgroup further facilitated workers’ peer reporting behavior. My study was the first in the peer reporting literature to examine the effects of supervisors on peer reporting, which is significant because supervisors could potentially be trained to behave in ways that encourage peer reporting. However, I observed no significant main effects and I found that only organizational commitment produced the hypothesized moderator effect. Given the importance of CWB detection and prevention, I encourage future research to continue investigating the organizational variables that might facilitate peer reporting behavior.
V. REFERENCES


Diekmann, K. A. (2008). ‘She did what? There is no way I would do that!’ The potential interpersonal harm causes by mispredicting one’s behavior. *Journal of Business Ethics, 80*, 5–11.


Table 1

Summary of the differences between peer reporting and whistle-blowing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Peer Reporting</th>
<th>Whistle-blowing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harmed by the misbehavior</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perpetrator of the misbehavior</td>
<td>Coworker</td>
<td>Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party receiving information about misbehavior</td>
<td>Supervisor</td>
<td>External party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Table constructed from findings by Bowling and Lyons (2015), Curphy et al. (1998), and Miceli and Near (1984).
Table 2

*Item analysis for supervisors’ encouragement to peer report scale*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Item-total correlation (r)</th>
<th>Item-total correlation if item dropped (r)</th>
<th>Scale reliability if item dropped (α)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. My supervisor encourages me to report any co-worker misbehavior that I witness.</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. My supervisor prefers that I don’t report the misbehavior of my co-workers. (R)</td>
<td>5.08</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>.61</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. My supervisor encourages his or her subordinates to report co-worker misbehavior.</td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. My supervisor discourages me from reporting the misbehavior of my co-workers. (R)</td>
<td>5.22</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. My supervisor encourages me to report the misbehavior of my co-workers.</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>1.17</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. If I were to witness co-worker misbehavior, then my supervisor would want me to report it.</td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All bolded items are items included in the final version of the scale. Bolded values correspond to item analysis results for the final version of the scale. N = 100. α = .78 for original scale. All missing data were removed before conducting the item analysis. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item.
Table 3

*Item analysis for workgroup norms regarding peer reporting scale*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Item-total correlation (r)</th>
<th>Item-total correlation if item dropped (r)</th>
<th>Scale reliability if item dropped (α)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Members of my workgroup encourage me to report any co-worker misbehavior that I witness.</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Members of my workgroup prefer that I don’t report the misbehavior of my co-workers. (R)</td>
<td>4.35</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. My workgroup encourages its members to report co-worker misbehavior.</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Members of my workgroup discourage me from reporting the misbehavior of my co-workers. (R)</td>
<td>4.61</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Members of my workgroup encourage me to report the misbehavior of my co-workers.</td>
<td>4.47</td>
<td>1.38</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.92</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. If I were to witness co-worker misbehavior, then my workgroup members would want me to report it.</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All bolded items are items included in the final version of the scale. Bolded values correspond to item analysis results for the final version of the scale. N = 100. α = .90 for original scale. α = .92 for final version of scale. All missing data were removed before conducting item analysis. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item.
### Table 4

**Item analysis for occupational norms regarding peer reporting scale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Item-total correlation ($r$)</th>
<th>Item-total correlation if item dropped ($r$)</th>
<th>Scale reliability if item dropped ($\alpha$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The norms of my career field encourage me to report any co-worker misbehavior that I witness.</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. People in my career field frown upon the reporting of the misbehavior of one’s coworkers. (R)</td>
<td>4.74</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. <strong>People who work in my career field are encouraged to report co-worker misbehavior.</strong></td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. People who work in my career field are discouraged from reporting co-worker misbehavior. (R)</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. <strong>The norms of my career field encourage me to report the misbehavior of my co-workers.</strong></td>
<td>4.84</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.93</td>
<td>.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. If I were to witness co-worker misbehavior, then the norms of my career field would encourage me to report it.</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All bolded items are items included in the final version of the scale. Bolded values correspond to item analysis results for the final version of the scale. $N = 100$. $\alpha = .89$ for original scale. $\alpha = .91$ for final version of scale. All missing data were removed before conducting item analysis. Refer to Table X for item content. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). R indicates a reverse-coded item.
### Table 5

**Item analysis for workgroup discussion of CWBs scale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Item-total correlation (r)</th>
<th>Item-total correlation if item dropped (r)</th>
<th>Scale reliability if item dropped (α)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I often discuss co-worker misbehavior that I’ve witnessed with members of my workgroup.</td>
<td>4.07</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I prefer not to discuss the misbehavior of my co-workers with members of my workgroup. (R)</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I am encouraged to discuss co-worker misbehavior with my workgroup.</td>
<td>3.62</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I am discouraged from discussing co-worker misbehavior with my workgroup. (R)</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I feel comfortable discussing the misbehavior of my co-workers with members of my workgroup.</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>.72</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. If I were to witness co-worker misbehavior, then I would discuss it with members of my workgroup.</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.82</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. I never discuss co-worker misbehavior that I’ve witnessed with members of my workgroup. (R)</td>
<td>4.20</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>.60</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** All bolded items are items included in the final version of the scale. Bolded values correspond to item analysis results for the final version of the scale. N = 100. α = .79 for original scale. α = .83 for final version of scale. All missing data were removed before conducting item analysis. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item.
Table 6

*Correlation matrix between pilot study variables*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. CWB-O observed</td>
<td>4.49</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. CWB-S observed</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>.67**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. CWB-W observed</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>.64**</td>
<td>.78**</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Supervisors’ encouragement</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>-.13</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>.48**</td>
<td>(.92)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Workgroup norms</td>
<td>4.42</td>
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<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.48**</td>
<td>(.91)</td>
<td>(.78)</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.48**</td>
<td>(.91)</td>
<td>(.83)</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Occupational norms</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>-.15</td>
<td>.37**</td>
<td>.48**</td>
<td>(.91)</td>
<td>(.78)</td>
<td>(.37)</td>
<td>(.48)</td>
<td>(.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Workgroup discussion</td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>(.83)</td>
<td>(.04)</td>
<td>(.24)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. CWB-O reported</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.30**</td>
<td>.38**</td>
<td>.00</td>
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<td>9. CWB-S reported</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>1.73</td>
<td>.33**</td>
<td>.58**</td>
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<td>.42**</td>
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<td>10. CWB-W reported</td>
<td>1.33</td>
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<td>.43**</td>
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<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* $N = 100$. $SD =$ standard deviation. CWB-O = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the organization. CWB-S = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the supervisor. CWB-W = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the workgroup. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = $p < .05$. ** = $p < .01$. Shaded areas refer to correlations that were hypothesized as statistically significant. If available, internal-consistency reliabilities are displayed on the diagonal.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>M</th>
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<tr>
<td>6. Supervisors’ encouragement</td>
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<td>4.94</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Workgroup norms</td>
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<tr>
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<td>.19**</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Supervisor commitment</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>1.40</td>
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<td>12. Workgroup commitment</td>
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<td>13. Occupational commitment</td>
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<td>14. CWB-O reported</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.46**</td>
<td>.45**</td>
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<td>501</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>.10*</td>
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<td>.06</td>
<td>.62**</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Missing data removed pairwise. SD = standard deviation. CWB-O = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the organization. CWB-S = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the supervisor. CWB-W = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the workgroup. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p < .05. ** = p < .01. If available, internal-consistency reliabilities are displayed on the diagonal.
Table 8

*Hierarchical regression results for H1*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>CWB-O reported</th>
<th></th>
<th>Model</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>SE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job level</td>
<td>.14**</td>
<td>.15</td>
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<tr>
<td>CWB-O observed</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupational norms</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>$F$</td>
<td></td>
<td>.96</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\Delta R^2$ for the last step</td>
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<td>.00</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* CWB-O = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the organization. $SE =$ standard error. $N = 408$. Participants who did not know if their organizations had a peer reporting policy, and participants who have never observed CWB-Os in their organizations were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in the hierarchical regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = $p < .05$. ** = $p < .01$. 
### Table 9

**Hierarchical regression results for H2**

<table>
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<th>Variables</th>
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<th>SE</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Job level</td>
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<td>.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWB-S observed</td>
<td>.56**</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational norms</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors’ encouragement</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$F$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\Delta R^2$ for the last step</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note.** CWB-S = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the supervisor. $SE =$ standard error. $N =$ 393. Participants who have never observed CWBs targeted at their supervisors were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in the hierarchical regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = $p < .05$. ** = $p < .01$. 
Table 10

Hierarchical regression results for H3

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>β</th>
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<th>Model</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Job level</td>
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<td>.09</td>
<td>.08</td>
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<tr>
<td>Workgroup norms</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup discussion</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R²                        | .26 |
Adjusted R²                | .25 |
F                          | 3.45|
ΔR² for the last step     | .01 |

Note. CWB-W = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the workgroup. SE = standard error. N = 372. Participants who have never observed CWBs targeted at their workgroups were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in the hierarchical regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p < .05. ** = p < .01.
Table 11

**Moderated regression results for H4**

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<td>Model</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy * Organizational commitment</td>
<td>.10*</td>
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R²: .31*

Adjusted R²: .30

F: 4.89*

ΔR² for the last step: .01*

*Note. CWB-O = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the organization. SE = standard error. N = 408. Participants who did not know if their organizations had a peer reporting policy, and participants who have never observed CWB-Os in their organizations were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in the moderated regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p < .05. ** = p < .01.
Table 12

*Moderated regression results for H5*

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<td>CWB-S observed</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors’ encouragement</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor commitment</td>
<td>.16**</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors’ encouragement * Supervisor commitment</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R²            | .38 |
Adjusted R²   | .37 |
F             | 3.09 |
∆R² for the last step | .01 |

Note. CWB-S = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the supervisor. SE = standard error. N = 393. Participants who have never observed CWBs targeted at their supervisors were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in the moderated regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p < .05. ** = p < .01.
Table 13

*Moderated regression results for H6*

<table>
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<td>CWB-W observed</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup discussion</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>.07</td>
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<td>Workgroup norms</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.08</td>
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<td>Workgroup commitment</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.07</td>
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<td>Workgroup norms * Workgroup</td>
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<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
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<td>$F$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$\Delta R^2$ for the last step</td>
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<td></td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* CWB-W = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the workgroup. $SE =$ standard error. $N = 372$. Participants who have never observed CWBs targeted at their workgroups were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in the moderated regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. $*=p < .05$. $** = p < .01$. 

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Figure 1. Interaction of organizational policy regarding peer reporting and organizational commitment on peer reporting of counterproductive work behaviors targeted at the organization (CWB-O). N = 408. Slope was greater for the higher organizational commitment group ($\beta = 1.10$) than the lower organizational commitment group ($\beta = -0.09$). Participants who (a) did not know if their organizations had a peer reporting policy, and (b) participants who have never observed CWB-Os in their organizations were removed.
Appendix A

Pilot Study Cover Letter

DATE

Dear Participant:

You are being invited to participate in a research study by completing a survey conducted by graduate student Joseph Dagosta and Professor of Psychology Dr. Nathan Bowling about the reporting of deviant behavior in the workplace to an individual in a position of authority. There are no known risks for your participation in this research study. The information collected may not benefit you directly. The information learned in this study may be helpful to others. The information you provide will help us understand how organizations can encourage employees to report deviant behavior. Your completed survey will be stored securely online.

The survey will take approximately one hour to complete. You will be compensated with one credit for each 30 minutes of participation. Credit is pro-rated for those who withdraw from the study before it is completed. Please complete the entire survey in one sitting. You will NOT be able to partially complete the survey and return to it at a later time. Please be sure you have available the allotted amount of time before beginning the survey. You will have a maximum of 60 minutes to complete the survey.

Individuals from the Department of Psychology, the Institutional Review Board (IRB), Office of Research and Sponsored Programs and other regulatory agencies may inspect these records. In all other respects, however, the data will be held in confidence to the extent permitted by law. Should the data be published, your identity will not be disclosed.

Taking part in this study is voluntary. By completing this survey, you agree to take part in this research study. You do not have to answer any questions that make you uncomfortable. You may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to be in this study you may stop taking part at any time. If you decide not to be in this study or if you stop taking part at any time, you will not lose any benefits for which you may qualify.

If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about the research study, please contact: Joseph Dagosta (email: dagosta.2@wright.edu) or his faculty advisor Dr. Nathan Bowling (email: nathan.bowling@wright.edu). If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may call the Wright State IRB Office at (937) 775-4462. You can discuss any questions about your rights as a research subject with a member of the IRB or staff. The IRB is an independent committee made up of people from the University community, staff of the institutions, as well as people from the community not connected with these institutions. The IRB has reviewed this research study.

Sincerely,

Joseph Dagosta
Appendix B

Supervisors’ encouragement to peer report scale items

1. My supervisor encourages me to report any co-worker misbehavior that I witness.
2. My supervisor prefers that I don’t report the misbehavior of my co-workers.
3. My supervisor encourages his or her subordinates to report co-worker misbehavior.
4. My supervisor discourages me from reporting the misbehavior of my co-workers.
5. My supervisor encourages me to report the misbehavior of my co-workers.
6. If I were to witness co-worker misbehavior, then my supervisor would want me to report it.

Note. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item. Items in bold are items that were kept after item analyses and included on the final version of the scale used in the primary study.
Appendix C

Workgroup norms regarding peer reporting scale items

1. Members of my workgroup encourage me to report any co-worker misbehavior that I witness.
2. Members of my workgroup prefer that I don’t report the misbehavior of my co-workers.
3. My workgroup encourages its members to report co-worker misbehavior.
4. Members of my workgroup discourage me from reporting the misbehavior of my co-workers.
5. Members of my workgroup encourage me to report the misbehavior of my co-workers.
6. If I were to witness co-worker misbehavior, then my workgroup members would want me to report it.

Note. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item. Items in bold are items that were kept after item analyses and included on the final version of the scale used in the primary study.
### Appendix D

**Occupational norms regarding peer reporting scale items**

1. The norms of my career field encourage me to report any co-worker misbehavior that I witness.
2. People in my career field prefer that I don’t report the misbehavior of my co-workers.
3. **People who work in my career field are encouraged to report co-worker misbehavior.**
4. People who work in my career field are discouraged from reporting co-worker misbehavior.
5. **The norms of my career field encourage me to report the misbehavior of my co-workers.**
6. If I were to witness co-worker misbehavior, then the norms of my career field would encourage me to report it.

*Note.* Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). R indicates a reverse-coded item. Items in bold are items that were kept after item analyses and included on the final version of the scale used in the primary study.
1. I often discuss co-worker misbehavior that I’ve witnessed with members of my workgroup.
2. I prefer not to discuss the misbehavior of my co-workers with members of my workgroup. (R)
3. I am encouraged to discuss co-worker misbehavior with my workgroup.
4. I am discouraged from discussing co-worker misbehavior with my workgroup. (R)
5. I feel comfortable discussing the misbehavior of my co-workers with members of my workgroup.
6. If I were to witness co-worker misbehavior, then I would discuss it with members of my workgroup.
7. I never discuss co-worker misbehavior that I’ve witnessed with members of my workgroup. (R)

Note. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item. Items in bold are items that were kept after item analyses and included on the final version of the scale used in the primary study.
Appendix F

Bowling and Lyons’s (2015) adapted peer reporting of CWB-Os scale items

1. A co-worker littered the work environment.
2. A co-worker came in late to work without permission.
3. A co-worker took an additional or longer break than is acceptable at your workplace.
5. A co-worker spent too much time fantasizing or daydreaming instead of working.
6. A co-worker took property from work without permission.
7. A co-worker put little effort into his/her work.
8. A co-worker intentionally worked slower than he/she could have worked.

Note. There are three possible responses to each item: “I have NOT witnessed this behavior in my workplace,” “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, but I did NOT report it,” and “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, and I did report it.”
Appendix G

Bowling and Lyons’s (2015) peer reporting of CWBs directed at workgroup scale items

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>A co-worker publicly embarrassed someone in my workgroup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>A co-worker made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark about someone in my workgroup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>A co-worker acted rudely toward someone in my workgroup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>A co-worker cursed at someone in my workgroup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>A co-worker said something hurtful to someone in my workgroup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>A co-worker made fun of someone in my workgroup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>A co-worker played a mean prank on someone in my workgroup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>A co-worker neglected to follow their workgroup’s instructions.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. There are three possible responses to each item: “I have NOT witnessed this behavior in my workplace,” “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, but I did NOT report it,” and “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, and I did report it.”
Appendix H

Mitchell & Ambrose’s (2007) adapted supervisor-directed CWBs scale items

1. A co-worker made fun of my supervisor at work.
2. A co-worker played a mean prank on my supervisor.
3. A co-worker made an obscene comment or gesture toward my supervisor.
4. A co-worker acted rudely toward my supervisor.
5. A co-worker gossiped about my supervisor.
6. A co-worker made an ethnic, religious, or racial remark against my supervisor.
7. A co-worker publicly embarrassed my supervisor.
8. A co-worker swore at my supervisor.
9. A co-worker refused to talk to my supervisor.
10. A co-worker said something hurtful to my supervisor at work.

Note. There are three possible responses to each item: “I have NOT witnessed this behavior in my workplace,” “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, but I did NOT report it,” and “I have witnessed this behavior in my workplace, and I did report it.”
Appendix I

Meyer and Allen’s (1991) affective organizational commitment scale items

1. I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career in this organization.
2. I enjoy discussing my organization with people outside it.
3. I really feel as if this organization’s problems are my own.
4. I think I could easily become as attached to another organization as I am to this one. (R)
5. I do not feel like “part of the family” at my organization. (R)
6. I do not feel “emotionally attached” to this organization. (R)
7. This organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me.
8. I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my organization. (R)

Note. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item.
Appendix J

Stinglhamber et al.'s (2002) affective commitment to the supervisor scale

1. I have respect for my supervisor.
2. I appreciate my supervisor.
3. I have little admiration for my supervisor. (R)
4. I feel proud to work with my supervisor.
5. My supervisor means a lot to me.
6. I do not feel attached to my supervisor. (R)

Note. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item.
Appendix K

Stinglhamber et al.’s (2002) affective commitment to the workgroup scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. My workgroup means a lot to me.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. I really feel a sense of belonging to my workgroup.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. I feel proud to be a member of my workgroup.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my workgroup. (R)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. I do not feel like part of the family in my workgroup. (R)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. I do not feel emotionally attached to my workgroup. (R)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item.


Appendix L

Stinglhamber et al.’s (2002) affective occupational commitment scale

1. My occupation means a lot to me.
2. I am proud of the occupation that I practice.
3. I am enthusiastic about my occupation.
4. I do not feel emotionally attached to my occupation. (R)
5. I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my occupation. (R)
6. I do not identify myself with my occupation. (R)

Note. Responses to each item are made on a 7-point graphic rating scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). R indicates a reverse-coded item.
Appendix M

Primary Study Cover Letter

The Influence of the Organization, Supervisor, and Workgroup on Peer Reporting of CWBs

DATE

Dear Participant:

You are being invited to participate in a research study by completing a survey about conducted by graduate student Joseph Dagosta and Professor of Psychology Nathan Bowling about the influence of the organization and its constituencies on workers’ report of deviant behavior in the workplace. There are no known risks for your participation in this research. The information collected may not benefit you directly. The information learned in this study may be helpful to others. The information you provide will help us understand how organizations can encourage employees to report the deviant behavior they witness. Your completed survey will be stored securely online.

The survey will take approximately 60 minutes to complete. You will be compensated with $0.50 for completing the survey. Please complete the entire survey in one sitting. You will NOT be able to partially complete the survey and return to it at a later time. Please be sure you have available the allotted amount of time before beginning the survey. You will have a maximum of 60 minutes to complete the survey.

Individuals from the Department of Psychology, the Institutional Review Board (IRB), Office of Research and Sponsored Programs and other regulatory agencies may inspect these records. In all other respects, however, the data will be held in confidence to the extent permitted by law. Should the data be published, your identity will not be disclosed.

Taking part in this study is voluntary. By completing this survey, you agree to take part in this research study. You do not have to answer any questions that make you uncomfortable. You may choose not to take part at all. If you decide to be in this study you may stop taking part at any time. If you decide not to be in this study or if you stop taking part at any time, you will not lose any benefits for which you may qualify.

If you have any questions, concerns, or complaints about the research study, please contact: Joseph Dagosta (email: dagosta.2@wright.edu) or his faculty advisor Dr. Nathan Bowling (email: nathan.bowling@wright.edu). If you have any questions about your rights as a research subject, you may call the Wright State IRB Office at (937) 775-4462. You can discuss any questions about your rights as a research subject with a member of the IRB or staff. The IRB is an independent committee made up of people from the University community, staff of the institutions, as well as people from the community not connected with these institutions. The IRB has reviewed this research study.

Sincerely,

Joseph Dagosta
### Appendix N

*Ratio of reported to observed CWB-O hierarchical regression results for H1*

<table>
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<th>Variables</th>
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<td>Occupational norms</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.40</td>
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</tr>
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</table>

| $R^2$                | .06  |
| Adjusted $R^2$       | .05  |
| $F$                  | 13.45|
| $\Delta R^2$ for the last step | .00 |

*Note.* CWB-O = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the organization. $SE =$ standard error. $N = 408$. Participants who did not know if their organizations had a peer reporting policy, and participants who have never observed CWB-Os in their organizations were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in the hierarchical regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. $* = p < .05$. $** = p < .01$. 

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### Appendix O

**Ratio of reported to observed CWB-S hierarchical regression results for H2**

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<tr>
<td>Supervisors’ encouragement</td>
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<td>.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>.05*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$F$</td>
<td>13.33*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta R^2$ for the last step</td>
<td>.01*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* CWB-S = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the supervisor. *SE* = standard error. *N* = 393. Participants who have never observed CWBs targeted at their supervisors were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in the hierarchical regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = $p < .05$. ** = $p < .01$. 

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### Appendix P

Ratio of reported to observed CWB-W hierarchical regression results for H3

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup norms</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>$F$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Δ$R^2$ for the last step</td>
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<td>.01*</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note. CWB-W = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the workgroup. $SE =$ standard error. $N = 372$. Participants who have never observed CWBs targeted at their workgroups were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in the hierarchical regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = $p < .05$. ** = $p < .01$. 
Appendix Q

**Ratio of reported to observed CWB-O moderated regression results for H4**

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<td>Policy</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational commitment</td>
<td>.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy * Organizational commitment</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**R²** | .10  
Adj **R²** | .09  
**F** | 22.20  
Δ**R²** for the last step | .00  

*Note.* CWB-O = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the organization. SE = standard error. N = 408. Participants who did not know if their organizations had a peer reporting policy, and participants who have never observed CWB-Os in their organizations were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in the moderated regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p < .05. ** = p < .01.
### Appendix R

**Ratio of reported to observed CWB-S moderated regression results for H5**

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<td>Job level</td>
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<td>.30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupational norms</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supervisors’ encouragement</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisor commitment</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors’ encouragement * Supervisor commitment</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.06</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

$R^2$ = .06

Adjusted $R^2$ = .04

$F$ = 11.80

$\Delta R^2$ for the last step = .00

*Note.* CWB-S = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the supervisor. $SE =$ standard error. $N = 393$. Participants who have never observed CWBs targeted at their supervisors were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in the moderated regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = $p < .05$. ** = $p < .01$. 

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### Appendix S

*Ratio of reported to observed CWB-W moderated regression results for H6*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Model</th>
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<tr>
<td>Job level</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.36</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational norms</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.16</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup discussion</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup norms</td>
<td>.17*</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Workgroup commitment</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workgroup norms * Workgroup commitment</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| R²                                      | .12 |
| Adjusted R²                             | .11 |
| F                                       | 18.98 |
| ∆R² for the last step                  | .01 |

*Note.* CWB-W = counterproductive work behavior targeted at the workgroup. SE = standard error. N = 372. Participants who have never observed CWBs targeted at their workgroups were removed. Standardized regression coefficients are from the last step in the moderated regression model. Two-tailed significance tests are reported. * = p < .05. ** = p < .01.