Game-Specific and Player-Specific Knowledge Combine to Drive Transfer of Learning Between Games of Strategic Interaction
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
6-12-2016
Abstract
Trust in others transfers between games of strategic interaction (e.g., iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma– PD and Chicken Game – CG). This transfer of trust represents knowledge acquired about the other player (player-specific knowledge), carrying over from one situation to another, which is separate from what was learned about the previous game (game-specific knowledge). We examine how the transfer of both player-specific and game-specific knowledge informs one’s decisions when interacting with a new player. In this paper, we present the experimental design of an upcoming study, where participants will sequentially play two games of strategic interaction (PD & CG) with the same or a different computerized confederate agent. In addition to the experimental design, we present model predictions, using a previously published computational cognitive model of trust dynamics. The model predicts transfer of learning effects in both conditions and larger effects when interacting with the same agent.
Repository Citation
Collins, M. G.,
Juvina, I.,
& Gluck, K. A.
(2016). Game-Specific and Player-Specific Knowledge Combine to Drive Transfer of Learning Between Games of Strategic Interaction. International Conference on Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling and Prediction and Behavior Representation in Modeling and Simulation, 186-195.
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/psychology/519
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-39931-7_18
