Publication Date
2015
Document Type
Thesis
Committee Members
Erik Banks (Advisor), Julienne Weinzimmer (Advisor), Scott Wilson (Committee Chair)
Degree Name
Master of Humanities (MHum)
Abstract
In this paper, I will argue against Peter Singer's replaceability argument. I start by showing how Singer's ethical theory of preference-utilitarianism leads to his assertion that everyone should be vegetarian, and later his conclusion that some animals are replaceable. To refute Singer, I argue that death deprives sentient beings of pleasure, and any other good they are capable of experiencing, so death is harmful to animals. Next, I discuss one last claim central to Singer's replaceability argument, that merely sentient animals are not the same individual between periods of consciousness because they have no memory or psychological connections. I refute the claim that they don't retain their individuality by arguing that their individuality is biological, rather than psychology. I conclude that merely sentient beings are biological individuals who are harmed by death because death deprives them of pleasure. Thus, they are not replaceable.
Page Count
93
Department or Program
Humanities
Year Degree Awarded
2015
Copyright
Copyright 2015, all rights reserved. This open access ETD is published by Wright State University and OhioLINK.
