Publication Date

2017

Document Type

Thesis

Committee Members

Zachariah Fuchs (Advisor), Luther Palmer (Committee Member), Xiadong Zhang (Committee Member)

Degree Name

Master of Science in Electrical Engineering (MSEE)

Abstract

This thesis develops the equilibrium solution for a two-target engage or retreat differential game. In this game, the attacking player is modeled as a massless particle moving with simple motion about an infinite, obstacle-free plane. The opposing player, referred to as the defender, is tasked with the protection of two high-value targets. The mobile attacker must choose to either engage one of the high-value targets or retreat across a predefined boundary. Simultaneously, the defensive player must choose whether to minimize or maximize the attacker's integral utility in an effort to persuade the attacker to choose retreat from certain initial conditions. It is shown that the solution to the game can be constructed in terms of two related optimization problems referred to as the Game of Engagement and Optimal Constrained Retreat. The optimality conditions of the game are developed and numerical solutions are presented for several illustrative examples.

Page Count

52

Department or Program

Department of Electrical Engineering

Year Degree Awarded

2017

ORCID ID

0000-0001-9834-4511


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