Publication Date
2018
Document Type
Thesis
Committee Members
Paul Lockhart (Committee Chair), Sean Pollock (Committee Member), Jonathan Winkler (Committee Member)
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Abstract
My thesis seeks to understand if the Wehrmacht understood the Red Army's operational doctrine following the war. I will analyze both Red Army and Wehrmacht after action reports and memoirs created after the war to accomplish this. This analysis covers the Battle for Moscow, the Battle of Stalingrad, Operation Zitadelle, and ends with the destruction of the Wehrmacht's Army Group Center in Operation Bagration. This period represents the marked rise and decline of the Wehrmacht's martial supremacy in Russia. The comparison of Russian and German after action reports from this period exposes a weakness in German operational doctrine, which ultimately destroys the Wehrmacht in the East. The Wehrmacht excelled in the tactical layer of strategy, but failed to exploit its tactical victories at the operational level. The Wehrmacht's obsession with victory through tactical supremacy caused them to create patterns of doctrinal behavior that the Red Army exploited time and time again.
Page Count
98
Department or Program
Department of History
Year Degree Awarded
2018
Copyright
Copyright 2018, all rights reserved. My ETD will be available under the "Fair Use" terms of copyright law.
