Publication Date
2021
Document Type
Thesis
Committee Members
Laura Luehrmann, Ph.D. (Advisor); Pramod Kantha, Ph.D. (Committee Member); Vaughn Shannon, Ph.D. (Committee Member)
Degree Name
Master of Arts (MA)
Abstract
This study identifies three tactics authoritarian leaders use to attempt to effectively coerce their citizens without losing power: 1) performance legitimacy, 2) nationalist legitimacy, and 3) institutional legitimacy. To demonstrate these tactics of what I call “coercive effectiveness,” the author employs a most-different-systems analysis on the regimes of Xi Jinping (2012 2015) and Bashar al-Assad (2000-2004). The author finds that coercion is more likely to be effective under the following conditions: 1) when leaders use economic performance and institutionalist strategies rather than nationalist tactics, 2) when an authoritarian leader climbs the ladder to power rather than inheriting leadership and 3) when a regime is structured around the party rather than those centered on an individual leader. These findings allow policy makers to make more informed decisions for interacting with leaders. For example, the more that a regime centralizes its power, the more likely they will lose their grip on coercion by making themselves the sole target for blame.
Page Count
120
Department or Program
Department of Political Science
Year Degree Awarded
2021
Copyright
Copyright 2021, all rights reserved. My ETD will be available under the "Fair Use" terms of copyright law.
ORCID ID
0000-0001-7191-430X
