Publication Date
2025
Document Type
Thesis
Committee Members
Saiyu Ren, Ph.D. (Advisor); Marian Kazimierczuk, Ph.D. (Committee Member); Raymond Siferd, Ph.D. (Committee Member)
Degree Name
Master of Science in Electrical Engineering (MSEE)
Abstract
As computers and integrated circuits become more commonplace, the risk of a Hardware Trojan attack becomes more worrisome. Trojans can exploit design flaws or be inserted between essential components to leak information, change the circuit function, or destroy the circuit altogether. Several methods of trojan detection and prevention have been introduced, however few can handle combined analog and digital circuits, known as mixed-signal circuits. This thesis demonstrates a Hardware Trojan detection method implemented in an Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC), which is a mixed-signal circuit. The detection method involves splitting the circuit into segments with approximately equal leakage currents (a large part of static current) via 1 Ω resistors on the ground pins, which will convert the current to voltage. The analog and digital portions are also split. The built-in detection circuit will report post-fabrication whether a trojan has been detected and in which segment the trojan is in. The detection circuit determines whether a circuit is trojan-free or trojan-attacked by calculating the difference in leakage current between segments and comparing that to statistically determined lower and upper bounds of acceptable differences. Monte Carlo simulations with 200 runs shows the minimum detectable trojan size ranges between 1.13-15.39% for a 100% detection rate.
Page Count
68
Department or Program
Department of Electrical Engineering
Year Degree Awarded
2025
Copyright
Copyright 2025, all rights reserved. My ETD will be available under the "Fair Use" terms of copyright law.
ORCID ID
0009-0007-3668-903X
